ML17309A434

1989 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted W/O Prior Approval for Aug 1988 - Jul 1989. W/891219 Ltr

ML17309A434
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/31/1989
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9001020174
Download: ML17309A434 (366)

Text

jACCELERATED DISIBUTION DEMON~ONSYSTEMrREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRXBUTXON SYSTEM(RIDS)DOCKETFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION RCOPIES'TTR ENCL10'10

SUBJECT:

"1989ReptofFacilityChanges,Tests&ExperimeductedIw/oPriorApprovalforAug1988-Jul1989."W91219ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODEIE47DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLJ'IZE:ETITLE:50.59AnnualReportofChanges,TestsorExperimntsMadeW/otApprovNOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).'5000244 RECIPIENT RECXPIENT COPIESIDCODE/NAME IDCODE/NAME LTTRENCLPDl-3LAPD1-3PDEJOHNSON,A INTERNAL:

AEOD/DOANRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NR8/JEEP/PRPB11 G-F02EXTERNAL:

LPDRNSIC1111.2'2111111AEOD/DSP/TPABNRR/DOEA/OEAB11 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RGN1FILE01NRCPDR1111111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIERIS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASIXICONI'ACI'HE DOCUMENTCORIROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEPROMDISHUBUTION TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR19ENCLADDS

<<g~yeas$1>IfROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION

~89EAS(Av'ENUE,HOCHESTER, N.Y.14649.0001 TfLCP~OhCL+tAcoDf7lc5462700December19,1989U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDesk,Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

AnnualReportofFacilityChanges,Tests,andExperiments Conducted WithoutPriorCommission ApprovalR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Gentlemen:

Thesubjectreportisherebysubmitted asrequiredby10CFR50.59(b).

Enclosedaretheoriginalandonecopyofthereportcontaining descriptions andsummaries ofthesafetyevaluations conducted insupportofchangestothefacilityandprocedures described intheUFSARandspecialtests,fromAugust1988throughJuly1989.Verytrulyyours,RES/jdwEnc.RobertC.MecdyGeneralManager,NuclearProduction xc:USNRCRegionIOfficeUSNRCResidentInspector 9'001020i74 85'0731PDRADOCK05000244RPDC 1989REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGESgTESTSANDEXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1988THROUGHJULY1989SECTIONASECTIONBSECTIONCSECTIONDSECTIONECOMPLETED ENGINEERING WORKREQUESTS(EWR)COMPLETED STATIONMODIFICATIONS (SM)TEMPORARY BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES'HIELDING'ND FLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESPROCEDURE CHANGESCOMPLETED SPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTS R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWER=PLANTDOCKETNO.50-244ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION DATEDDECEMBER19g19899001020174 e

SECTIONA-COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORKREQUESTS(EWRs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofmodifications inthefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreport,andasummaryofthesafetyevaluation forthosechanges,pursuanttotherequirements ofl0CFR50.59(b).

Thebasisforinclusion ofanEWRinthissectionisclosureofthecompleted modification packageintheDocumentControlDepartment.

EWR-1660RCSOVERPRESSURE PROTECTION THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEAUTOMATIC PRESSURERELIEFDURINGLOWTEMPERATURE REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMOPERATION.

THEDESIGNPROVIDESREDUNDANT TRAINSOFPRESSURESENSINGINSTRUMENTATION ANDRELIEVXNG CAPACITY.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARESMALLBREAKLOCA,ANDRCSOVERPRESSURIZATION TRANSIENT.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH F1TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE/

BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-2602PRESSURIZER SAFETYANDRELIEFVALVEPIPINGTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEVERIFICATION OFTHEFUNCTIONABILITYANDTHESTRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OFTHEPRESSURIZER RELIEFANDSAFETYVALVEPIPING.THISWORKWILLINCLUDEDYNAMICANALYSISOFTHEPIPINGINCLUDING EFFECTSDUETOSEISMICEVENTSASWELLASSYSTEMOPERATION.

THEPIPESUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATED FORTHERESULTING LOADSANDMODXFIEDASNECESSARY.

THISWORKALSOINCLUDESTHERMALANALYSIS, DESIGNANDINSTALLATION OFAREFLECTIVE INSULATION SYSTEMONTHEPRESSURIZER HEADANDSAFETYVALVELOOPSEALS.THISVERIFICATION ANDMODIFICATION XSNECESSARY TOCOMPLYWITHNUREG0737'ECTION IIELD1gPERFORMANCE TESTINGOFBWRANDPWRRELIEFANDSAFETYVALVESAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARESEISMICEVENTANDTHEOCCUEGUNCEOFASMALLLOCA.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSISgITHASTHEREFORE gBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES/

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES'F ACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR3059CONTROLOFHEAVYLOADSMODIFICATIONS THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADING OFSAFETY-RELATED OVERHEADLOADHANDLINGSYSTEMS.THEMAJORADDITIONISTHEINSTALLATION OFAMECHANISM BYWHICHTHEPRESSURIZER HATCHBLOCKSWILLBEPHYSICALLY PROHIBITED FROMFALLINGINTOTHEPRESSURIZER CAVITYDURINGREMOVALANDREPLACEMENT.

THISWILLBEACHIEVEDTHROUGHINSTALLATION OFSTRONGBACKSONTHEHATCHCOVERBLOCKS.OTHERMODIFICATIONS, ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED INREVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSISWEREINCLUDEDTOFULLYCOMPLYWITHTHEORIGINALINTERPRETATION OFNUREG-0612.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISDELETESTHEMODIFICATION OFMONORAILS NOTEDINREVISION0.BASEDUPONFURTHERENGINEERING REVIEWSTHESEMONORAILSYSTEMSWEREDETERMINED TOALREADYBEINCOMPLIANCE WITHANSIB30.11-1980.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSAR~ANDTHEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHXSMODIFICATION ARE>DECONTROL OFHEAVYLOADSiiGUIDELINES (NUREG0612)ANDSEISMICEVENTS.THEDESIGNFORUPGRADING OFTHEPRESSURIZER HATCHBLOCKSWILLENHANCETHECAPABILITY OFTHEPRESSURIZER CUBICLETOWITHSTAND SEISMICEVENTS.XTWILLALSOENSURETHATDURINGMOVEMENTOFTHEHATCHBLOCKS,ACCIDENTAL DROPPINGOFABLOCKFROMTHEJIBCRANEWILLNOTCAUSEDAMAGETOTHEPRESSURIZER, ITSINSTRUMENTATION ANDASSOCIATED VALVESLOCATEDATTHETOPOFTHEPRESSURIZER.

THUS~THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR,1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING ASEISMXCEVENT,2)POSEATHREATTOTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMBOUNDARY.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELXFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3175CONTROLRODDROPTESTCABLETHISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEINSTALLATION OFANINSTRUMEN-TATIONCABLEFROMTHECONTROLRODDRIVECABINETSINTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGTOTHERODPOSITIONINDICATION RACKSINTHERELAYROOM.THESENEWCABLESAREREQUIREDTOTESTTHECONTROLRODDROPRATE.PRESENTLY, I&CRUNSATEMPORARY CABLEFORTHISPURPOSEANDTHENREMOVESITWHENTESTINGZSCOMPLETED.

TOCONSERVETIMEANDMANPOWERDURINGSHUTDOWNPERIODS'T ZSPROPOSEDTHATAPERMANENT CABLEANDASPAREBEINSTALLED FORCONTROLRODDROPTESTING.THISMODIFICATION ISDESIGNATED NOTSEISMICCATEGORYI,HOWEVERTHEDESIGNSHALLMEETSECTIONC.2OFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.29.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE.1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES(2)ASEISMICEVENT.THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEPOSSIBILITY ORIMPACTOFAFIRE~ADDITIONAL WIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEADDEDINTHISMODXFICATION, WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE, THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE383-1974FLAMETEST,REQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSXGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION ISDESXGNATED NOTSEISMICCATEGORYIgHOWEVERSANYNEWCABLEANDCONDUITSHALLBEINSTALLED SUCHTHATITWILLNOTIMPACTANYSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEMSDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFTHEELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED WILLNOTRESULTZNDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRESORASEISMICEVENT.

EWR-3258A SERVICEWATERCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEMECHANICAL MANUALREMOTEOPERATORS TOCONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES4629'630'643 AND4644'HEFUNCTIONOFTHEREMOTEMANUALOPERATORS ISTOFACILITATE OPERATING THEASSOCIATED VALVESWHEREACCESSBYPERSONNEL ISRESTRICTED DUETONEARBYPIPINGANDEQUIPMENT.

ALLNEWVALVESWEREINSTALLED UNDERTHEPREVIOUSREVISION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZED, INTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY

'GUIDE1.70.THE.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE')PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESB)RUPTUREOFTHESTEAMANDFEEDWATER PIPESINSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENT C)FIREOREARTHQUAKE BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFOREJ BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED..

ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3645GROUNDWATER LEVELTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFTHREEPERMANENT GROUNDWATER MONITORING WELLS.THEDESIGNBASESFORTHEHIGHESTSTILLGROUNDWATER LEVELFORTHER.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTASSUMEDFORTHEDESIGNOFTHEPLANTSTRUCTURES WAS250.0MSL.ASARESULTOFSEPTOPICII-3.5"FLOODING POTENTIAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS ITISNECESSARY TODETERMINE IFTHEORIGINALDESIGNBASISGROUNDWATER LEVEL(DBGWL)ISANACCEPTABLE UPPERLIMITTOBEUSEDTOCALCULATE THELOADINGCAPABILITY OFTHEPLANTSTRUCTURES.

TOASCERTAIN THECORRECTDBGWL,THREEGROUNDWATER MONITORING WELLSWILLBEINSTALLED ONTHER.E.GINNAPLANTSITE.THISINSTALLATION WILLCONSISTOFTHREEFULL-ENCASED BORINGSDRILLEDINTOTHEGROUNDWATER TABLE.ALIQUIDLEVELDETECTION ANDINDICATION UNITWILLBEINSTALLED ONONEWELLTOCONSTANTLY MONITORANDRECORDTHEGROUNDWATER LEVEL.REFERTORGGEDRAWINGNUMBER33013-1384 FORTHELOCATIONOFTHETHREEBORINGS.IFMOREDATATOESTABLISH ADBGWLISNEEDED'HE OTHERTWOWELLSWILLBEAVAILABLE TOMONITORTHISINSTALLATION WILLINCLUDETHREEFULL-CASED BORINGSDRILLEDINTOTHEWATERTABLE~ONEFULLYELECTRONIC LIQUIDLEVELSENSINGMONITORED THREEFLANGECAPSFORTHEWELLHEADS'NEALL-WEATHER ENCLOSURE FORTHETRANSMITTER ANDARUNOFELECTRICCABLECONNECTED TOANEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERINSIDETHEPLANT.INTHEUNLIKELYEVENTOFFAILUREOFANYCOMPONENT OFTHISMODIFICATION, NONEOFTHECLASSIEEQUIPMENT INTHEPLANTWILLBEPREVENTED FROMPERFORMING ITSSAFETYFUNCTION.

THEACCIDENTEVENTSANALYZEDBYTHEFSARHAVEBEENREVIEWEDANDNONEWILLBEAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3678OVEREXCITATION

.RELAYTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION CONSISTING OFINSTALLATION OFANOVEREXCITATION RELAYONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.OVEREXCITATION OFTHEGSUANDNO.11TRANSFORMERS CANMOSTCOMMONLYOCCURDURINGPLANTSTARTUP.ASTHETURBINEGENERATOR ISBEINGBROUGHTUPTORATEDVOLTAGEANDSPEEDgTHEEXCITATIONLEVEL(VOLTS/HERTZ

),MUSTNOTEXCEEDTHETRANSFORMERS CAPABILITIES.

IFTHESECAPABILITIES AREEXCEEDED, THERMALDAMAGETOTHEUNITSWILLOCCUR.DEPENDING UPONTHEMAGNITUDE ANDDURATIONOFOVEREXCZTATIONg TRANSFORMER FAILUREWILLOCCUREITHERIMMEDIATEL'Y ORAFTERREPEATEDLESSSEVEREEVENTS.THEEXISTINGOVEREXCITATION RELAYATGINNAgWHICHOPERATES'THECONTROLROOMANNUNCIATOR, ISANELECTROMECHANICAL DEVICE~ITSOPERATING CHARACTERISTIC DOESNOTACCURATELY MATCHTHETRANSFORMER

'OVEREXCITATION CAPABILITIES

~THERELAYPROPOSEDZNTHEMODIFICATIONgHOWEVER~CANBESETTODUPLICATETHETRANSFORMER'S CAPABILITIES FORVERYACCURATEALARMANDTRIPOPERATION.

THISRELAY,WHICH'NCORPORATES MICROPROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY, WILLINITIALLY BEINSTALLED WITHITSOUTPUTSCONNECTED TOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERFORALARMINGANDDATARETENTION.

AREVIEWHAS-.BEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)-ASEISMICEVENT,-(3)ALOSSOFLOAD.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFOREJ BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMAL.OPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-3728WASTEEVAPORATOR LINETHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR).ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHINVOLVESREPLACING ANDREROUTING THEPIPINGBETWEENV1799EAND1654AOUTSIDETHEHIGHRADIATION AREA.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTANDNRCIECIRCULARNO.80-18.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHEMODXFZCATION ARE:A)RADIOACTIVE LIQUIDWASTESYSTEMLEAKORFAILUREB)FIRESC)SEISMICEVENTSTHEFOLLOWING ASSESSMENT ISMADE:THEPROBABILITY OFRADIOACTIVE LIQUIDWASTESYSTEMLEAKORFAILUREWILLNOTBEINCREASED SINCETHEMODIFICATION WILLMEETOREXCEEDPRESENTLY ESTABLXSHED CRITERIA.

BASEDONTHEREQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED ZNSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA, THEMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFORTHEEFFECTSOFAFXRESINCETHEMATERIALS USEDWILLMEETCRITERIAEQUALTOORGREATERTHANTHOSEPRESENTLY INSTALLED.

THISMODIFICATION ISNON-SAFETY RELATEDBUTWILLBESEISMIC-ALLYSUPPORTED SOTHATITDOESNOTAFFECTSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

BASEDONNRCZECIRCULARNO.80-18ANDNRCREG.GUIDE1.143THENON-SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION ISACCEPTABLE.

BASEDUPONALLTHEABOVEANALYSES:

1)STRUCTURES fSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES'F ACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2).MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATXONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

(7)

EWR-3882SIMULATOR BUILDINGANDTRAININGCENTERALARMPANELTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHCONSISTSOFINSTALLZNG ANALARMPANELZNTHEGUARDHOUSE'~

ANDINSTALLING CONDUITANDCABLEIN'THEGUARDHOUSE ANDTHESIMULATOR BUILDING.

THEALARMCIRCUITSWILLCONSISTOFEXISTINGDIRECTBURIALCABLEBETWEENTHEGUARDHOUSE AND,TRAININGCENTER,NEWCABLEWILLBEINSTALLED BETWEENTHETRAININGBUILDINGSECURITYPANELANDTHESIMULATOR BUILDINGALARMPANEL.POWERTOTHEGUARDHOUSE ALARMPANELWILLBEFROMTHEEXISTINGLIGHTINGPANELINTHEGUARDHOUSE WHICHISFEDFROMNON-CLASS 1EBUS15.THEADDITIONAL LOADOFAPPROXIMATELY 1-AMPWILLNOTDEGRADEBUS15'AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHIS.MODIFICATION ARE:LOSSOFA.C.,POWER, SEISMICANDFIRE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.5OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3895INSTALLSTATESBLOCKSTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDENEWSLIDINGLINKTERMINALBLOCKSTOSEVERALAGASTAT"TIMERELAYS'HE PURPOSEOFTHESENEWTERMINALBLOCKSISTOFACILITATE TESTINGOFTIMERELAYSWITHOUTDISCON-NECTINGWIRES.THISWILLELIMINATE THEPOSSIBILITY OFRECONNECTING WIRESINCORRECTLY AFTERRELAYTESTING.DEVICESAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)2)3)4)5)EMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR 1AAND1BCIRCULATING WATERPUMP1AAND1BFEEDWATER PUMPlAAND1B4160VACBUS11AAND11BNO.1GENERATOR BACKUPRELAYS

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSAR,ANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSXSBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS,SPECIFICALLY FIREANDEARTHQUAKE.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4'FTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINS'FSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHE'IFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3983INSTRUMENTATION REROUTEFORTORNADOES ANDHELBTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEREROUTING OFREQUIREDINSTRUMENTATION CABLEWHICHMAYBEAFFECTEDBYTORNADOES ORHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKS.INTHENRC'SREVIEWOFPIPEBREAKSINSIDECONTAINMENT ZTWASNOTEDTHATSAFETYRELATEDINSTRUMENTATION CABLETRAYSANDCONDUIT'ASSED WITHINTHEZONEOFINFLUENCE OFBREAKSONTHECVCS~CHARGINGANDLETDOWNLINESANDACCUMULATOR "A"LEVELTAP.INTHEEVENTOFAPOSTULATED FAILUREOFTHESELINES,<HOTORCOLDSAFESHUTDOWNANDAPPROPRIATE ACCIDENTMITIGATION INSTRUMENTATION SHOULDREMAINAVAILABLE.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,2)ASEISMICEVENTS3)AHIGHENERGYLINEBREAK(HELB)g4)ATORNADOS5)ALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT(LOCA).BASEDUPONTHEANALYSISDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSISITHAS~THEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-3989TURBINEBUILDINGPRESSURIZATION THESCOPEOFEWR-3989COVERSTHEDETAILEDANALYSISOFTHETURBINEBUILDING'S STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASWELLASDESIGNANDINSTALLATION OFMODIFICATIONS THATAREREQUIREDASARESULTOFTHISANALYSIS.

TWOSPECIFICDOUBLEENDEDPIPERUPTURES,WILLBECONSIDERED ZNTHEANALYSIS:

A)ABREAKINTHE20"FEEDWATER LINEDOWNSTREAM OFTHENUMBER5FEEDWATER HEATER~ANDB)BREAKINTHE12<>MAINSTEAMDUMPLINEDOWNSTREAM OFTHE36"HEADER.THEENERGYANDPRESSURERELEASEASARESULTOFAPIPERUPTUREINONEORBOTHLOCATIONS LISTEDABOVEWILLEXCEEDTHEPRESENTSTRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OFTHETURBINEBUILDING.

THEPROBLEMANDEFFECTOFHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDEOFTHECONTAINMENT BUILDINGWEREORIGINALLY REVIEWEDIN1973UNDEREWR-1836'TTHATTIMETHERESULTSOFTHEANALYSISWERE1)THECONTROLBUILDINGANDTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDINGTHATCOULD-BESEVERELYDAMAGEDBYAPIPERUPTUREANDINSTALLATION OFPRESSUREWALLSATTHEINTERFACES BETWEENTHESEBUILDINGS ANDTHETURBINEBUILDINGWOULDBEREQUIRED; 2)ITWASRECOGNIZED THATOTHERPORTIONSOFTHETURBINEBUILDING, SUCHASATTHEWALLCOMMONTOTHETURBINEANDINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGS COULDREQUIREFURTHERANALYSIS; AND3)AMOREDETAILEDANALYSISOFTHESTRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OFTHETURBINEBUILDING, WITHREGARDSTOTHEENERGYLINEBREAKSWASCALLEDFORgASFAILUREOFTHETURBINEBUILDINGCOULDIMPACTTHEINTER-CONNECTED SAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES.

INSTALLATION OFTHETWOPRESSUREWALLSWASACCOMPLISHED UNDERTHEORIGINALEWR-1836.

ANALYSISANDMODIFICATION OFTHEWALLCOMMONTOTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGANDTURBINEBUILDINGISBEINGACCOMPLISHED UNDEREWR-2846B.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE,PIPEBREAKINTHETURBINEBUILDINGS ANDOPERATING BASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSISgITHASTHEREFORE gBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3992VITALAREAANALYSISSECURITYMODIFICATIONS THEMODIFICATION CONSISTSOFINSTALLING ASECURITYALARMSWITCHONTHEDOOROFTHETURBINEBUILDINGDCDISTRIBUTION PANELLOCATEDATELEVATION 253'.6"OFTHETURBINEBUILDINGTHEREASONFORTHISMODIFICATION ISTOCOMPLYWITHANRG&ECOMMITMENT TOMODIFYTHEPHYSICALSECURITYPLANPERTHELOSALAMOSNATIONALLABORATORY VITALAREAANALYSIS.

AREVIEWHAS'BEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARESEISMIC.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1.TO4.5OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASBEENDETERMINED THATTHISMODIFICATION ISNOTREQUIREDTOBSEISMICANDITSFAILUREWILLNOTAFFECTSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT ORSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES.

EWR4040DIESELGENERATOR VAULTHUMIDITYTHEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOREDUCETHEEXISTINGHUMIDITYLEVELSINTHEAANDBDIESELGENERATOR VAULTS.THESTRUCTURAL/ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS WITHINTHEVAULTAREASAREDETERIORATING DUETOHIGHHUMIDITYLEVELS.THISMODIFICATION ISREQUIREDINORDERTOREDUCETHEADVERSEEFFECTSOFTHEEXISTINGSPACECONDITIONS.

THISMODIFICATION WILLHENCEIMPROVEEXISTINGCONDITIONS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEONLYEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'UCH ASFIRE~FLOODS~STORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES'HE DESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE VERIFICATION BEPERFORMED TOVERIFYTHATTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHEREQUIREMENTS OFAPPENDIXR.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTANYPREVIOUSANALYSISCONCERNING FLOODSORSTORMS.THISISAREQUIREMENT OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

0 THEDEHUMIDIFICATION SYSTEMSWHICHAREREQUIREDTOBEINSTALLED UNDERTHISMODIFICATION ARECLASSIFIED ASNON-SAFETY RELATED.THEEQUIPMENT ISNOTREQUIREDTOMAINTAINFUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY FOLLOWING ASEISMICEVENT.HOWEVER,THEEQUIPMENT WILLBEDESIGNEDANDINSTALLED SUCHASTONOTADVERSELY AFFECTANYSAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS ORSTRUCTURES.

THISZSAREQUIREMENT OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

THEREFOREgTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HE ADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESJ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS.

PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-4057FEEDWATER FLOWMEASUREMENT SYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION CONSISTING OFTHEINSTALLATION OFAFEEDWATER FLOWMEASUREMENT SYSTEMFORMEASUREMENT OFABSOLUTEFEEDWATER FLOWRATE.THENEWFEEDWATER FLOWMEASUREMENT SYSTEMWILLMEASURETHERATEOFFLOWTHROUGHTHEUSEOFANULTRASONIC TECHNIQUE UTILIZING PULSESOFHIGHFREQUENCY SOUNDACROSSTHEFLUIDFROMONE-TRANSDUCER TOANOTHER.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLIMPROVETHERELIABILITY OFTHEFEEDWATER FLOWMEASUREMENT.

EAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:A)B)C)D)LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER EXCESSIVE HEATREMOVALDUETOFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE DECREASEFEEDWATER PIPINGBREAKERSEISMICANDFIRESBASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE~

BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMAL.OPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

(12)

EWR-4072ADDITIONOFDYNAMICDATAMANAGERTORCPVIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHEEXISTINGRCPVIBRATION MONITOR.PRESENTLY THEEXISTINGTCPVIBRATION MONITORPROVIDESINDICATION OFROTORVIBRATION AMPLITUDE ONLY.ZNORDERTOTAKEADVANCEOFANALYTICAL METHODSFORPREDICTING FAILUREANDDIAGNOSING DEGRADATION INROTATINGMACHINERY.

THEMONITORMODULESWILLBEMODIFIEDTODIGITIZED, STORE~ANDTRANSMITDIAGNOSTIC VIRATIONDATATOTHEHEWLETT-PACKARD 9816SCOMPUTER.

THISDIAGNOSTIC DATAINCLUDESR5OTATZONAL SPEEDAMPLITUDE ANDPHASEANGLE~MAXIMUMANDMINIMUMVALUES'ND DYNAMICWAVEFORMS.THEEXISTINGCOMPUTERSHOFTWARE WILLPERMITDYNAMICANDSTATIC.VIBRATION DATATOBEDISPLAYED INTHEFORMOFGRAPHICPLOTS'LARM LIGHTS'EPORTS~

ANDLOGS'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSRREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASgTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

hEWR-4135TDAFPD.C.LUBEOZLPUMPLOCALCONTROLTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFMANUALSTARTCIRCUITRY FORTHETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP(TDAFP)DCLUBEOILPUMP.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOPROVIDEMANUALSTART/STOP CAPABILITY OFTHEDCLUBEOIL'UMPSHOULDAFIREOCCURINANYAREAOFTHEPLANTREQUIRING LOCALCONTROLOFTHETDAFP.THISMODIFICATION ISREQUIREDTOCOMPLY,TO THEFIREPROTECTION REQUIREMENTS OFTHEAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNREPORT.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHZS-MODIFICATION ARE:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,AND2)ASEISMICEVENT.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED, UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT

.CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHE,LIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND, COMPONENTS PROVIDED"FORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-4136'A'IESELGENERATOR EMERGENCY CONTROLPANELTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHPROVIDESISOLATION OFCONTROLCIRCUITSINTHE'A'IESELGENERATOR ROOMANDSECONDLY, TOPROVIDESUFFICIENT CONTROLFEATURESSOAS'OALLOWLOCALCONTROLOF-THE'A'IESELGENERATOR WHICHWILLSATISFYTHEREQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY.THEAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVE SAFESHUTDOWNSYSTEMREPORTREVISION2.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHE.GINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHE,EVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70."THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)LOSSOFACPOWERTOSTATIONAUXILIARY DURINGNORMAL,CONDITIONS INCLUDING THOSECONDITIONS INTHEAPPENDIXRANALYSIS, 2)LOSSOFDCCONTROLPOWER,3)MAJORANDMINORFIRE,AND4)EVENTSOFFLOOD,STORM,OREARTHQUAKE.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3'TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ITHASTHEREFORE, BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.IT'HASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMSJ ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4138APPENDIXRCHARGINGPUMPD.C.FEEDTHISEWRADDRESSES THE,MODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEABACKUPD.C.FEEDFORTHECHARGINGPUMPlAASPARTOFRG&ECOMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXROF10-CFR-50 ZTISNECESSARY TOADDANALTERNATIVE D.C.FEEDTOTHECHARGINGPUMP1A.THENEWBACKUPD.C.FEEDWILLINSURETHATCHARGINGPUMPAlISAVAILABLE FORSERVICEAFTERFIREINTHECONTROLCOMPLEX.ANEWTRANSFERSWITCHWILLALSOBEPROVIDEDWHICHWILLISOLATETHENORMALD.C.FEEDTOTHECHARGINGPUMPlAPRIORTOAPPLYINGTHEBACKUPFEED.EWR-41394139AAPPENDIXRSPRINKLER ANDFIREDAMPERMODSTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUESTADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFCLOSEDHEAD,CLOSE-SPACED SPRINKLERS AROUNDTHEPERIMETERS OFTHETWOSTAIRWELLS ANDTHEEQUIPMENT HATCHATTHECEILINGLEVELOFTHEMEZZANINE FLOOR.INADDITION, DUCTPENETRATIONS OFFIREBARRIERSNEEDTOBEPROTECTED ANDTHREEHOURRATEDDAMPERSWILLBEINSTALLED INTHEDUCTATTHEBARRIERFOREACHOFTHESEPENETRATIONS BETWEENFIREZONESAMO,ABMgABBM,ANDCHG.THEDAMPERSWILLCLOSEAUTOMATICALLY ATAFIXEDTEMPERATURE, PROVIDEDTHATSYSTEMDIFFERENTIAL PRESSUREDOESNOTPRECLUDEDAMPERFUNCTIONALITY.

THISMODIFICATION ISNECESSARY INORDERTOCOMPLYWITHTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFR50APPENDIXR~SECTIONIIIG2gANDAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEMREPORTSREVISION2gDATEDJANUARY1985'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUPDATEUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEONLYEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREINTERNALANDEXTERNAL'EVENTS~SUCHASFIREgFLOODS'TORMS~

ANDEARTHQUAKES'HE EFFECTSOFAMAJORFIRE(S)ONTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYAREADDRESSED INTHEUSNRCFIREPROTECTION SAFETYEVALUATION REPORT.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEANYEXISTINGFIREBARRIERSNORWILLITDEGRADEANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION SYSTEMSORCOMPONENTS.

THEMODIFICATION CONFORMSTOCOMMITMENTS MADE,ANDARETHOSENECESSARY TOACHIEVECOMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXRANDTHEREBYASSURESAFESHUTDOWNFOLLOWING ALLPOSTULATED FIRES.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTANYPREVIOUSANALYSESCONCERNING FLOODSORSTORMS.POTENTIAL FLOODINGOFTHERHRPUMPSSHALLNOTBEGREATERTHANEXISTINGASSPECIFIED INTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

THEFIRESUPPRESSION SYSTEMISCLASSIFIED ASNON-NUCLEAR SAFETYCLASSBUTTHEPIPINGTOBEINSTALLED WILLBEDESIGNEDSOTHATTHEFAILUREDURINGASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTCAUSEDAMAGETOANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGSEISMICSYSTEMSORSTRUCTURES.

THEVENTILATION SYSTEMISCLASSIFIED ASANON-NUCLEAR SAFETYCLASSBUTTHEFIREDAMPERINSTALLATION WILLBEDESIGNEDSOTHATFAILUREDURINGASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTCAUSEDAMAGETOANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGSEISMICSYSTEMSORSTRUCTURES.

RELOCATED ELECTRICAL CIRCUITSSHALLBEREINSTALLED SEISMICCATEGORYI,HENCETHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGSEISMICSYSTEMSORSTRUCTURES.

THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HE ADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ANDTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFATYPEDIFFERENT FROMANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISNOTREDUCED.THEREFORE, THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION.

NOCHANGESTOTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AREREQUIREDASTHERESULTOFTHEMODIFICATION TOMAINTAINTHEPRESENTMARGINSOFSAFETY.

EWR-4276FLUXMAPPINGSEISMICRESTRAINT THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEWORKINVOLVESSEISMICALLY ANALYZING GINNA'SRESTRAINT OFTHEFLUXMAPPINGSYSTEM,ANDPERFORMING MODIFICATIONS WHERENECESSARY TOUPGRADETHEEXISTINGSTRUCTURE.

THISRESTRAINSUPPORTSTHE10PATHTRANSFERDEVXCESANDISOLATION VALVESWHICHISLOCATEDDIRECTLYABOVETHESEALTABLE.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE')DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY DUETOASMALLLOCAB)FIRESC)SEISMICEVENTSBASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATION ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

EWR4330FEEDWATER PUMPRECIRCULATION SYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOIDENTIFYANDRESOLVETHECAUSEOFDEGRADATION INTHEFEEDWATER PUMPRECIRCULATION SYSTEM.DEGRADATION HASBEENIDENTIFIED INTHERECIRCULATION VALVES4253(CV-19),4262(CV-18)ANDIN,THEPIPINGDOWNSTREAM OFTHESEVALVES.DEGRADATION HASALSOBEENFOUNDINSUPPORTSONTHEMAINFEEDWATER RECIRCULATION ANDFEEDWATER CLEANUPLINESENCOREDIN-CONCRETE.

EXCESSIVE IMPELLERWEARINTHEMAINFEEDPUMPSHASOCCURREDCONSISTENTLY.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE:LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER ANDHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

MODIFICATION REQUIREDBYDESIGNCRXTERIAWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER ANDHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDEOFCONTAINMENT-'

THEDESIGNANDMATERIALS USEDINTHISMODIFICATION WILLMEETAPPENDIX>>R>>REQUIREMENTS BASEDUPON10CFR50APPENDIXRANDENGINEERING PROCEDURE ANDWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFA,FIRE.MODIFICATION TOTHEFEEDWATER SYSTEMSWILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCE ORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENT ORSYSTEM.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

1)STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,AND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING'ND TRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHE'LIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

.EWR-4346WIDERANGEPRTPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION TOTHEWIDERANGEPRESSURIZER RELIEFTANK(PRT)PRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION ANDTOTHERCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION.

EWR-4346WILLREPLACETHEEXISTINGP440PRESSURETRANSMITTER, SIGNALPROCESSING, ANDMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB)INDICATORS WITHMODERNINSTRUMENTS THATARECAPABLEOFMONITORING PRTPRESSUREUPTOTHERATINGOFTHEPRTRUPTUREDISC(100PSIG)."EWR-4346WASWRITTENINRESPONSETOHUMANENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HED)f0056AND40407.THEHEDSREQUIRETHEINSTALLATION OFANEWWIDERANGEPRTPRESSUREINDICATOR ONTHEMCBBYJUNE1988.

THEEXISTINGPRTPRESSURETRANSMITTERS INDICATORSgPOWERSUPPLYgANDBISTABLESWILLBEREPLACEDANDSCALEDTOACHIEVETHENEWREQUIREDRANGE.SINCETHEPRTRUPTUREDISCRATINGIS100PSIGgTHENEWPRTPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION RANGEWILLBE0TO150PSIGTOENSURETHATTHEPRTRUPTUREDISCRATINGPLUSANYASSOCIATED UNCERTAINTIES ARECOMPLETELY ENVELOPED.

ONEOFTHEINDICATORS WILLBERE-SCALED TOTHENEWWIDERANGESPANANDTHEOTHERWILLREMAINANARROWRANGEINSTRUMENT FORMONITORING PRTPRESSUREUNDERNORMALOPERATING CONDI-TIONS.THISMODIFICATION WILLREQUIRETHEINSTALLATION OFNEWSCALINGMODULESINTOANINSTRUMENT RACKINTHERELAYROOM.THEPI-440ADISABLESWITCHSHALLBEDELETEDFROMTHEPRTPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION.

ALSOINCLUDEDINTHESCOPEOFTHISEWRISTHEINSTALLATION OFTWONEWVERTICALSCALEINDICATORS TODISPLAYRCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREONTHEMCB.PRESENTLY, RCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREISDISPLAYED ONSTRIPCHARTRECORDERS

'PR-420ANDPR-429ONTHEMCBFRONT,ANDAVERTICALSCALEINDICATOR ONTHEREAROFTHEMCB.READABILITY OFTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS ISPOOR/THEREFORE'ERTICAL SCALEINDICATORS FORDISPLAYOFRCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREWILLBEADDEDTOTHEFRONTOFTHEMCB.THEINDICATOR ONTHEMCBREARWASINSTALLED UNDEREWR-3067(MINORMOD)FORUSEWITHTHEOVERPRESSURZZATZON SYSTEMANDTHEREACTORHEADVENTVALVES,ANDSHALLREMAINTOPERFORMTHATFUNCTION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.G-UIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES~2)ASEISMICEVENTS3)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING.

THEFIRSTEVENTCONSIDERED IS"MAJORANDMINORFIRES".NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANTgTHEREFORE/

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASAPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES'HUS gTHEMODIFICATION

-NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES

/NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR"MAJORANDMINORFIRES".

THESECONDEVENTCONSIDERED IS"ASEISMICEVENTTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYPORTIONSOFTHEPRTPRESSUREINSTRU-MENTATION AREDESIGNATED NONSEISMICCATEGORYI"/HOWEVER~ANYMODIFICATION TOTHISSYSTEMWHOSEFAILURECOULDCAUSEDAMAGETOSAFETYRELATED'QUIPMENT WILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS.

OFUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.29,REVISIONC.2.THERCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION ISDESIGNATED SEISMICCATEGORYI'HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUXRESTHATALLNEWRCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION BEQUALIFIED ANDINSTALLED PERIEEE3441975'HEREFORE' SEXSMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPACTTHEPROPEROPERATION OFTHERCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION.

THUS/THEMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR"ASEISMIC*EVENT THETHIRDEVENTCONSIDERED IS~tPIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING".

THENEWPRESSURETRANSMITTER WILLINTERFACE WITHTHEEXISTING3/8INCHPRTPRESSURESENSINGLINEINTHESAMEMANNERASDOESTHEEXISTINGPRESSURETRANSMITTER.

THEREFORE THISMODIFICA-TIONDOESNOTINTRODUCE ANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNING PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING.

THUS,THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES'OR DOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR"PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING".

ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSXENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS, ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFI-CATION.(20)

EWR4543PT-32.2TESTCABLEINSTALLATION THISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION WILLPROVIDEANALTERNATE CONTROLCABLETOBEDEDICATED TOPORVTESTINGCONTROLCIRCUITS.

THEDEDICATED CABLEWILLCONNECTRACKR2INTHECONTROLROOMTOTHENEWTESTBOXLOCATEDNEARTHETOPOFTHEPRESSURIZER CUBICLE.SPECIFICALLY, EXISTINGSPARECIRCUITSR881ANDR882WILLBEUSEDTOACCOMPLISH THEREQUIREDCONNECTIONS.

ANEWTESTBOXWILLBEINSTALLED ANDONENEWTHREECONDUCTOR CABLEWILLBEINSTALLED TOACHIEVETHEDESIREDTESTBOXLOCATIONNEARTOPOFPRESSURIZER.

THEADDITIONOFTHETESTBOXSERVESTWOPURPOSES'ONE TOPROVIDEACONVENIENT RECEPTACLEFORPT-32.2TESTLEADSANDITWILLREDUCETHECABLERUNWITHINCONTAINMENT.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFIC-ATIONAREFIRE,SEISMICANDSMALLLOCAEVENTS.THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEONLYHARDWAREASSOCIATED WITHTHISMODIFICATION ISTHEANCHORAGE OFCONDUITANDATESTBOXNEARTOPOFTHEPRES-SURIZER.THEPROPOSEDTESTBOXANDCONDUITWILLBEMOUNTEDCONSISTENT WITHTHEC2REQUIREMENTS OFREGULATORY GUIDE1.29.THUSTHECONSEQUENCES OFAFAILUREDUETOASEISMICEVENTAREMITIGATED.

THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFAFIREONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THECONTROLWIRINGFORTHECONNECTION BETWEENTHER2RACKINTHECONTROLROOMANDTHETESTBOXLOCATEDATTHEPRESSURIZER CUBICLEISREQUIREDTOMEETREQUIREMENTS OFIEEESTD383-1984FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASMALLLOCAONTHEPLANTCAUSEDBYANINADVERTENT PORVOPERATION DUETOTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION WILLNOTCONNECTTHETESTBOXTOTHEPORV'S;THEONLYTIMETHETWOWILLBECONNECTED ISDURINGSHUTDOWNWHENTESTINGANDTIMINGOFPORV'SISPERFORMED.

THEREFORE, THECONSEQUENCES OFASMALLLOCADUETOTHISMODIFICATION AREMITIGATED.

THEREFORE gBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSISgITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURES gSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

-EWR-4640HU-1TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL RELAYMODIFICATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHMODIFIESTHEHU-1DIFFERENTIAL RELAYSFORTRANSFORMERS NO.1,llAND12A.THEHU-1RELAYMODIFICATION WILLLOWERTHETHRESHOLD OFRESTRAINT FORTHEHARMONICRESTRAINT UNITFROM154TO7.5%.ARESISTORWILLBECONNECTED INPARALLELWITHTHEHARMONICRESTRAINT UNITOPERATECOIL(TOPUNIT),REDUCINGTHEPOTENTIAL FORSPURIOUSOPERATION RESULTING FROMINRUSHHARMONICS DURINGENERGIZATION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONAREFIRE,ANDEARTHQUAKE, LOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERANDLOSSOFELECTRICAL LOAD.THISMODIFICATION CONSISTSOFWIRINGANDCOMPONENT REPLACEMENT INTERNALTOTHEHU-1RELAYCASE.THEREISNOINCREASE'N COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALANDNOINCREASED POTENTIAL FORFIRE.THISMODIFICATION ISCLASSIFIED NON-lEWHICHISCONSISTENT WITHTHECLASSIFICATION OFTHETRANSFORMERS ANDTHEEMERGENCY OFFSITEPOWERSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHEABILITYOFTHERELAYTOPROVIDEITSPROTECTION FUNCTION.

THEREFORE, THEABILITYOFCLASS1ESYSTEMTOOPERATEPROPERLYDURINGASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTBEIMPAIRED.

(22) 0 UPONLOSSOFELECTRICAL LOAD,AUXILIARY LOADSAREAUTOMATIC-ALLYTRANSFERRED FROMTHE11TOTHE12ATRANSFORMER.

THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTODECREASETHEPOTENTIAL FORINAPPROPRIATE OPERATION OFTHEDIFFERENTIAL RELAYWHILEMAINTAINING THEORIGINALTRANSFORMER PROTECTION FUNCTIONOFTHERELAY.THECONSEQUENCE OFAFAILUREOFTHEPROPOSEDRESISTORADDITIONHASALSOBEENEVALUATED ANDHASBEENDETERMINED TOBENEGLIGIBLE.

SPECIFICALLY, IFTHERESISTORSHOULDOPENSTHEHU1RELAYWILLREVERTBACKTOA15%'ESTRAINT WHICHISTHEWAYTHERELAYOPERATEDPRIORTOTHEMODIFICATION.

THECONSEQUENCES ASSOCIATED WITHTHERESISTORSHORTINGHAVEALSOBEENEVALUATED.

ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATSHORTWOULDPRECLUDETHERELAYFROMOPERATING SPURIOUS-LY.THISISANACCEPTABLE FAILUREMODEEVENIFADIFFERENTIAL OPERATION'S REQUIREDBECAUSETHESYSTEMCONSISTSOFTHREESEPARATEHU-1RELAYSANDANYONEOFWHICHWILLINITIATEATRIP~THEMARGINOFSAFETY'NTERMSOFPROBABILITY OFLOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERFROMINAPPROPRIATE RELAYOPERATION, ISINCREASED

'ANDTHEDESIGNADEQUACYAS.DOCUMENTED INTHEUFSAR'SNOTAFFECTED.

ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMA'RGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLNOTBEREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.-

EWR4657UPGRADEOFSERVICEBUILDINGSTRUCTURAL TOSUPPORTPCMSHIELDING THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEOFTHESERVICEBUILDINGTOSUPPORTPERSONNEL CONTAMINATION MONITOR(S)

(PCM)SHIELDING.

THEPROPOSED.

MODIFICATION WILLUPGRADETHESERVICEBUILDINGFLOORSTRUCTURAL TOPROVIDETHENECESSARY ADDEDSTRENGTHREQUIREDTORESIST.THEADDITIONAL LOADDUETOTHEINSTALLATION OFLEADSHIELDING AROUNDTHEPCM'SINTHEMEN'SDECONTAMXNATION AREA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.SEISMICEVENTSNEEDNOTBECONSIDERED FORTHXSEWRBECAUSETHESERVICEBUILDINGISCLASSIFIED ASNON-SEISMIC.

ZNADDITION, THEMODIFICATION WILLNOTREQUIRETHEREPOSITIONZNG OFINSTRUMENTATION gCONTROLSgOROTHERCOMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITHSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEMS.(23)

ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRgORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEMODIFICATXONS.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATE CHANGESTOREFERENCE RG&EUFSARREVISION2gDECEMBER1986".BASEDONTHEEVALUATIONS ABOVE,THEREWILLBENOCHANGESTOMARGINSOFSAFETYANDADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS WILLNOTBEDIMINISHED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,WILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDADDITION.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPEOTHERTHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ONTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHESEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONS.

EWR-4674S.I.PUMPMOTORGANTRYHOISTTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEDESIGNANDINSTALLATION OFAPORTABLELIFTINGGANTRYHOISTASSEMBLYFORUSEINREMOVALOFS.I.PUMPSAND/ORMOTORSFORMAINTENANCE.

THISDEVICEZSDESIGNEDFOREASYDISASSEMBLY WITHTHEGANTRIES(SUPPORTING LEGS)BOLTEDTOAMONORAILANDTOTHECONCRETEFLOORTOPROVIDEANCHORAGE ANDSUPPORT.XTWXLLNORMALLYBYUSEDONLYWHENMAINTENANCE ISTOBEPERFORMED DURINGAPLANTSHUTDOWN.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1'0'EISMICEVENTSNEEDNOTBECONSIDERED FORUSEOFTHISGANTRYHOISTBECAUSEITWILLNOTNORMALLYBELEFTINPLACEDURINGPOWEROPERATION.

ADDITIONALLY ITISDESIGNEDANDFABRICATED TOBEANCHOREDTOTHEFLOORWHENINPLACEOVERONESAFETYINJECTION PUMP.THEREFORE, ITWILLNOTCREATEAHAZARDTOOTHERSAFETY-RELATEDEQUIPMENT DURINGITSUSE.BOTHTHEGANTRIESANDTHEMONORAILTHEYSUPPORTWILLBEREMOVEDFOLLOWING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.

(24)

USEOFTHEHOISTWILLBEADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED UNDERMAINTENANCE WORKPROCEDURES ORUNDERTHETEMPORARY MODIFICA-TIONCONTROLPROGRAMSA14061gTOENSURE1)COMPLIANCE WITHTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND2)THATONLYONETRAINOFEQUIPMENT ISAFFECTEDBYITSINSTALLATION.

BASEDONTHEEVALUATIONS ABOVE,THEREWILLBENOCHANGESTOMARGINSOFSAFETYANDADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS WILLNOTBEDIMIN-ISHED.THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT*

TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,WILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDUSEOFTHISGANTRYHOIST.THEPOSSXBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPEOTHERTHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ONTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHISPROPOSEDMODIFI-CATION.TSR-88-08 FIREPROTECTION YARDLOOPISOLATION VALVESTHETECHNICAL STAFFREQUEST(TSR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHEFIREPROTECTION YARDLOOPTOINCLUDENEWISOLATION VALVES.THEINSTALLATION OFSIX(6)ADDITIONAL'ECTIONALIZZNG MANUALGATEVALVESONTHEDOMESTICWATERSYSTEMWILLPROVIDESEGMENTISOLATION WITHOUTTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SYSTEMIMPAIRMENTS ANDIMPROVETHERELIABILITY OFTHEDOMESTICWATERSUPPLYSYSTEM.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTAFFECTTHEPLANTTRANSXENTS ANDACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN-CHAPTER15OF'THEUFSAR.THEMODIFICATION DOESRELATETOTHEPLANTDESIGNASDESCRIBED INCHAPTER3OFTHEUFSAR.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREFIRESANDTORNADOSANDWINDLOADING.(25)

THEFIREPROTECTION YARDLOOPPROVIDESABACKUPSOURCEOF.COOLINGWATERZNTHEEVENTTHATSERVICEWATERISLOST.ITPROVIDESABACKUPAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SOURCEFORTHECON-.DENSATESTORAGETANKSFORTHEMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER ORTURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMAND'BACKUPFORTHECONDENSATE SUPPLYTANKFORTHESTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.ITCANBEUSEDTOPROVIDECOOLINGWATERTOTHEEMERGENCY DIESELGENERATORS IFALLSERVICEWATERWERETOBELOST.THESTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMPROVIDESDECAYHEATREMOVALFUNCTIONINTHEEVENTOFATORNADOSTRIKE.OTHERMETHODSAREASSUMEDUNAVAILABLE.

THEYARDLOOPCANBECONNECTED FOLLOWING DEPLETION OFTHE10i000GALLONCONDENSATE SUPPLYTANK..INTHEEVENTTHESCREENHOUSE WERELOSTDUETOTORNADOSTRIKE,THEYARDLOOPCANBEUSEDTOPROVIDEABACKUPSOURCEOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FORDECAYHEATREMOVALANDEMERGENCY DIESELCOOLINGBYUSEOFCONNECTIONS AVAILABLE INTHESEAREAS.THEINSTALLATION OFTHEISOLATION VALVESWILLNOTAFFECTTHEDESIGNOROPERATION OFTHE-YARDLOOPFORTHECASESDESCRIBED BECAUSETHEVALVESWILLBE.USEDFORISOLATION

PURPOSED, AREMANUALVALVES,ANDDONOTAFFECTTHECONNECTIONS TOTHECONDENSATE SUPPLYTANKiCONDENSATE STORAGETANKSiEMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR ROOMCONNECTIONS ORSERVICEBUILDINGAUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONNECTION.

OPERABILITY OFTHEYARDSYSTEMWILLBEIMPROVEDWITHTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEVALVES.THEREFOREi THEMETHODSOFCOMPLIANCE WITHTHEAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEMISNOTAFFECTED.

BECAUSETHECONNECTIONS TOTHESTANDBY.AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONDENSATE SUPPLYTANK,AUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONDENSATE STORAGETANKS,ANDEMERGENCY DIESELGENERATOR PIPINGISNOTCHANGED,ANDTHELOOPINTEGRITY WILLBEMAINTAINED THROUGHTHEEXISTINGTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE ANDOPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS, ITISCONCLUDED THATTHEDESIGNOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEMARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED ANDTHEADEQUACYOFTHESESTRUCTURESi SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDTOMITIGATETHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS ISNOTDECREASED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENT-ORMALFUNCTION OF'QUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYiPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,WILLNOTBEINCREASED BECAUSETHECONNECTIONS PROVIDEDFORYARDLOOPTIEINSARENOTAFFECTEDANDiTHEREFORE'ROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTSFORTHISBACKUPSYSTEMWILLSTILLBEMAINTAINED.

(26)

THEPOSSIBILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYTYPEPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBECAUSETHEINTEGRITY OFTHEYARDLOOPWILLBEMAINTAINED INACCORDANCE WITHTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE ANDOPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS.

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCED,BECAUSETHESEREQUIREMENTS ARENOTBEINGALTEREDBYTHEMODIFICATION.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

(27)

SECTIONB-COMPLETED STATIONMODIFICATIONS (SMs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofstationmodification procedures performed inthefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreport.Stationmodification procedures arewrittentocompleteaportionofanEngineering WorkRequest(EWR)identified bythesameparentnumber.StationModifications arereviewedbythePlantOperations ReviewCommittee toensurethatnounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesareinvolvedwiththeprocedure.

Thebasisforinclusion ofanSMinthissectionisclosureoftheSMwhereportionsoftheparentEWR,intheformofotherSMsorotherdocumentation, remaintobecompleted.

SM-1594.5 REMOVALOFREVERSEOSMOSISR.O.TANKANDASSOCIATED COMPONENTS FROMTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALOFTHEREVERSEOSMOSISTANKANDASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT FROMTHEAUXILIARY BUILDING.

SM-1594.10 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMELECTRICAL EUIPMENTANDCONDUITINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHESPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT, CONDUITANDSUPPORTS.

SM-1594.12 FLUSHANDHYDROSTATIC TESTOFNEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE IS1)TOCONTROLFLUSHANDHYDROSTATIC TESTINGOFTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMAND2)PROVIDEINITIALVALVELINE-UPFOREXISTINGANDNEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMS'M-1594.13 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SERVICEWATERSYSTEMFLUSHANDHYDROSTATIC TESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEFLUSHANDHYDROSTATIC TESTOFTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMSERVICEWATERPIPING.SM-2512.117 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINECS-150CONTAINMENT SPRAYRISERSECTIONINCONTAINMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTODOCUMENT/DIRECT MODIFICATION OFCVSPRAYPIPINGSUPPORTSINCONTAINMENT.

SM-2512.119 STEAMGENERATOR LEVELINSTRUMENTATION TUBINGANDPIPINGSUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFSUPPORTSFORTHE"A<<STEAMGENERATOR LEVELINSTRUMENTATION TUBINGANDPIPING.SM-2512.120 SERVICEWATERPIPINGSUPPORTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFAPIPINGSUPPORTONTHESERVICEWATERPUMPDISCHARGE PIPING.

SM-2512.121 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFWSTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHESTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPORTSA-TRAININTHESAFWBUILDING.

SM-2512.122 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFW-450-STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFSTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER CROSSOVER PIPINGSUPPORTS.

SM-2799.21 RVLMSRECALIBRATION TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGOFRVLMSSYSTEMFOLLOWING RECALIBRATION.

SM-2831.1 BATTERYROOMRACKSSEISMICRESTRAINT MODIFICATION THE"PURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFBATTERYRACKlAANDBATTERYRACK1BSEISMICRESTRAINT MODIFICATION.

SM-2846.1946 A>>MSIVSOLENOIDPROTECTIVE STRUCTURE THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION=AND TURNOVEROFTHEnA"MSIVSOLENOIDPROTECTIVE STRUCTURE.

SM-2846.1946A A"MSIVSOLENOIDPROTECTIVE STRUCTURE DOORANDSHIELDPLATESTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLINSTALLATION OFADOORANDSHIELDPLATESONTHEiiAitMSIVPROTECTIVE STRUCTURE.

SM-3092.10 BORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADEPHASE2BAPU-MECHANICAL REMOVALRECONSTRUCTION ANDRELOCATIONS THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTODOCUMENT/DIRECT PIPINGMODIFICATION BAPU-PHASE2.

SM-3092.11 BORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADE-PHASE2PRE-OUTAGE ELECTRICAL THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEPRE-OUTAGE ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION FORTHEBORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADE-PHASE2.SM-3092.12 BORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADEPHASEIIBAPUELECTRICAL REMOVALSRECONSTRUCTION ANDRELOCATIONS THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROL1)THEREMOVALS/

REINSTALLATIONS ANDTURNOVEROFHEATTRACEZONESANDASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT~

2)THEDETERMINATIONS RETERMINATIONg TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFSPECIFICMOTOR-OPERATED VALVES(MOVs).SM-3092.13 BORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADEBAPUPHASEIIHEATTRACTTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADE(BAPU)PHASEIIHEATTRACESYSTEM.SM-3296.2046 INSTALLATION OFAUXILIARY BUILDINGBACKDRAFT DAMPERSANDSTATIONARY LOUVERSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOPROVIDEBACKDRAFTPROTECTION TOPREVENTDAMAGETOTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGOUTERSHELLDURINGTORNADOWINDCONDITIONS.

SM-3319.57 MCC-1C15MTHERMALOVERLOADHEATERREPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONS FORTHERMALOVERLOADHEATERREPLACEMENT ATMCC-1C/15M FORMOV-1815A.

SM-3319A.1 PHASEROTATIONCHECKPRIORTOBREAKERCHANGEOUT ONMCC-1B1C1D1E1FAND1KTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOPERFORMADOCUMENTED SURVEYOFPHASEROTATIONONBREAKERSTOBEREPLACEDDURINGTHE1988OUTAGE~ALSOgTHEPHASEROTATIONATTHEFIELDTERMINATIONS FORTHEBORICACIDEVAPORATOR PACKAGEANDTHE

AUXILIARY BUILDINGLIGHTING,TRANSFORMER 1BWILLBEDOCUMENTED.

SM-3319A.7 PHASEROTATIONCHECKPRIORTOBREAKERCHANGEOUT ATMCC-1FTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTODOCUMENTTHEPHASEROTATIONATBREAKERS, PRIORTOREPLACEMENT ATMCC-1F.SM-3755.2 P.O.R.V.BLOCKVALVEREPLACEMENT

-MECHANICAL

.THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEMECHANICAL INSTALLATION REQUIREDFORTHENEWPORVBLOCKVALVESMOV-515ANDMOV-516.SM-3768.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEM-PIPINGANDINSTRUMENT TUBINGMODIFICATIONS THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFPIPINGANDINSTRUMENT TUBINGASSOCIATED WITHTHEPENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEMUPGRADE.SM-3797.7 MRPISYSTEMTROUBLESHOOTING ANDREPAIRTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETROUBLESHOOTING, INSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFPROBLEMSFOUNDDURINGOPERATION OFTHEMRPZSYSTEM.THISINCLUDESCORRECTING THE130KHZOSCILLATION, MODIFYING THEDATACABINETCARDS'NDINSTALLING TIMEDELAYSONTHERODDROPRELAYS.SM-3881.3 BORICACIDTANKOVERLFOWPIPINGMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDTANKOVERFLOWPIPINGMODIFICATION.

SM-3881.5 MOV-897ANDMOV-898FUNCTIONAL TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONS TOPERFORMTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTINGOFNEWMOV-897AND898.

SM-3986.22 APPENDIXRFIREWRAP-SUPPORTUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOINSTALLATION OFFIREWRAPONCONDUITSUPPORTS.

SM-3986.23 STRUCTURAL STEELMODIFICATION FORFIREWRAPCONTROLTHETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATION TOTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGSTRUCTURAL STEELANDHANDRAIL'O ALLOWFORINSTALLATION OF'APPENDIX RFIREWRAP.SM-4037.2 S.P.I.N.G.

TOP.P.C;S.INTERFACE LINKTHEPURPOSEOF,THISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHESPING/PPCS INTERFACE WIRINGANDASSOCIATED COMPONENTS.

SM-4068.7 R.M.S.PUMPANNUNCIATOR THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISFORTHER.M.S.ANNUNCIATOR HOOKUPINSTALLATION.

SM-4075.5 INSTALLATION OFELECTRICHEATINGCOILSINTHET.S.C.HVACSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHIS.NEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFELECTRICAL HEATINGCOILS,ANDASSOCIATED COMPONENTS INTHET.S.C.HVACSYSTEM.SM-4282.1 CVRECIRCULATION FANCONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELELECTRICAL MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFCABLES'ONDUITSg ANDINSTRUMENTATION FORTHECVRECIRCULATION FANCONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELSYSTEM.SM-4526.18 DGFUELOILSYSTEMDAYTANKLEVELINST.CONDUITRUNLOCATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOINVESTIGATE CONDUITROUTINGFORTHED/G*FUELOILSYSTEMMODIFICATION EWR-4526.

(5)

SM-4526.19 DGINSTRUMENT TUBXNGSUPPORTSTHE'URPOSE OFTHIS-NEWPROCEDURE XSTOINSTALLTEMPORARY SEISMICSUPPORTS, ONTHEDIESELGENERATOR INSTRUMENT TUBING.SM-4554.2 4AAND4BFEEDWATER HEATERSREPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOPERFORM4AAND4BLPFEEDWATER HEATERSREPLACEMENT.

SM-4618.2 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTINGOFTHEMAINFEEDWATER PUMPROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEMAINFEEDWATER PUMPROOMNEWVENTILATION SYSTEM.SM-4638.1 GENERATOR SURGECAPACITORS ANDNEUTRALTRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFREPLACEMENT OFTHEMAINGENERATOR SURGECAPACITORS ANDNEUTRALTRANSFORMER.

SM-4761.2 MOV857AAND857BPOWERSUPPLYSWAPOVER'UNCTIONAL TESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEMOV857AAND857BPOWERSUPPLYSWAPOVERMODIFICATION.

SECTIONCTEMPORARY BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONgSTRUCTURE FEATURES~SHIELDING~ANDFLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESThissectioncontainsdescriptions andsummaries ofsafetyevaluations oftemporary changespursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.59(b).

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMANJUMPERWIR'n~FUNCTIONDATE:~~-LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED04ITE<cv4REQUEST¹:

ifM~~~dSTATESBLOCK+OTME(OvJE'E.C~41~+rLEoiq$+IuCo~gPURPOSEJul+(W<woc-ps-z7~-P3'OCATiOW:

r.c.O47re~J,~rEvo/~C~>~eelSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

Q'ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED);

>4TECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:

13M7~SKETCHATTACHED:

0YES0NODATB~OEE--DATEoINSTALLATION DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSLINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:md.c<REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

REMOVALDATE&TIME:/NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY~k~Jl>E~VERIFIEDBY:AX~rgP21989QAAttachadditional page(s)asnecessary

'49'lEEAEVAE/88';,

PAGE2ANDTHECOMMITTEE HASDETERMINED THATNOTECHNICAL SPECIFI-CATIONCHANGESORVIOLATIONS WEREINVOLVEDANDTH%KARENOUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONS

~THEFOLLOWING DOCUMENTATION ISPROVIDEDASJUSTIFICATION FORCOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50.59.

REFERENCES:

GINNASTATIONQhMANUALJUSTIFICATION:

THEMDHELECTROMETER SUPPLEMENTS OURCURRENTLY APPROVEDLEVELIITESTEQUIPMENT FORCALIBRATION OFSOURCES'HIS INSTRUMENT WASPURCHASED INCOMPLIANCE WITHSECTIONVIIOFTHEQA'AhOALANDISUSEDINCOMPLIANCE WITHSECTIONVZZZOFTHEKCaMHBXS.3'.0-88-116-002

~~~88-4391THEPROC.SPEC.PRESENTED THISNEWPROCEDURE:

THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOMEETPORCAPPROVEDGUIDANCEFORSUCHTESTS.THECOMMITTEE REVIEWEDTHEPROCEDUR~

STEPBYSTEP'ANDRECOMMENDED APPROVALOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE.

THEABOVEITEMWASREVIEWEDBYTHECOMMITTEE WITHRESPECTTOTHETECHNICAL SPECZFZCATZONS ANDTHECOMMITTEE HASDETERMINED THATNOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESORVIOLATIONS WEREINVOLVEDANDTHERE.ARENOUK%VIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONS

~THESTPROCEDURE INCLUDESSAFETYANALYSISTOCOMPLYWITH50.59-9.0OTf654DISCUSSION 91.0-88-116-001 ThEREACTORENGINEERPRESENTED ASAFETYEVALUATION FORBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLNUMBER88-68'HEJUMPERCONTROLWILLCONNECTARECORDERTOTHETESTPOINTSOFTHE-ACCUMULATOR LEVELTRANSMITTER LT-935'HIS TEMPORARY CONNECTION WILLNOTCREATEANUNREVZEWED SAFETYQ"~*kSOIRHXE.

ALLOFTHEABOVEITEMSWEREREVIEWEDBYTHECOMMITTEE WITHRESPECT

PAGE3TOTHETECHNICAL SPEClFICATIONS ANDTHECOMMITTEE.HAS DETERMINED THATNOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESORVIOLATIONS WEREINVOLVEDINTHECHANGESANDTHEREARENOUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONS

~'.HECHAIRMANADJOURNED THEMEETING..>>'.~~>>(,-l/a.JOYCEWRIGHTvPORCSECRETARY APPROVEDBY:STM.ECTORSUPERINTENDENT K.NASSAVERQCENGINEERil~>>4~>>pI~~(Plllf4

CATEGORYEVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1422gP'OCHESTER GASANDELECTRIC4,i-'II'INNASTATIONt.BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROITj"'OBFOREMAN'4 C/DATE:/0I"ggREQUEST0:0.<h-7oJUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREgFUNCTIONPT17-P9F'RFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK001HER0RiBAiu~mco~7Cgs<AiPURPOSE9+-7JAgeRerAJ&S'R7-39b7-2rgpggPSKETCHATTACHED:

5YES0NODA1E:DATE:LOCATION:~~+

<~wacoRa7CZnc.<SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

IYES"0NOI'OIICDAIE(IIIIEGUIIlED).'...

ZP-2r.5"-.8')1ECHNICAL MANAGER:.orArarSHIFTSUPERVISOR:

INSTALLATION DATE&TIME

/"g0)5A~2IENTEREDINOFFICIAL LOG;1'~4NUMBEROFTAGSINTALLED:INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY'EMOVAL DATE&TIME'NTERED INOFFICIALLOG;~+NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY'ERIFIED BY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

AUGQh.SposlnoN-5YfgAttachadditional page(s)asnecessary

SAFETYEVALUATZO SUEYFOgyp~8FSOFifr~FPNuJM~kgu<~PQIIExclusion fromScreeninCriteria-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforitems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequential change"orthereferenced-lOCFR50.59 safetyevaluation below:If"no"isansweredforItem6,providebasisforexclusion below:Bas'sfoxclusion:

OC505atvuato<<Item7.If"no"hasbeenansweredforeachquestioninitems7athrough7gthischangeisnotan'nreviewed SafetyQuestion.

Document:

theJustification fortheseconclusions below.Listmaterialreferenced inthespaceprovidedasappropiiate.

WrittenJusticatio:Mci~necee:cJnrIf"yes",PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal, andthisproposedchangeisanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittal to.theNRCfortheirreview.Submitted By:

1.iRaI-II((I8JIIIIII--PL(."eT Flj(K.,(~ayI.yytjt(I=Ottii)fl;.TCtg4rIItVIIlilaIIIIIIIIIIIHE&IIORTHOTRTHOT854OFHEFID59659735OFCORE59661649GFTSRT651OCT17il98888art~:U8COOLED INCORETCstlRF:GINSRVGt(RYI-I>>IIID<-IIE--III6(.l",68IIIIIIFLO:.~'F.'E.:

THOTCOI'RV:RCSMIDERRNGESLOOPFlLOOP898.52"13602.848.5'578.597.822175979549.648.3573.9PSIG0FOpGFFRCSt(RRROMRF(NGESLOOPFILOOP8RVGitictDT55.456.155.8oFTRV574.2573t8574.8OFTF;EF5'73.3OFTRV~-TF.:EF IIEVI1ieoFF,q0LEV=LPRE.=SSTtlTMTF.'SUF.'GEf48.8iPSIG640oF0oF-qc0FPF.ES"-UR IZERRERCTORVESSELLEVEL101.2r.R108.7:.'-9aeec"0048PRES":UPIZERRELIEFTRI<((LEI!ELil~2PRESSTE(lP89.6PORV431CLOSEDPORV438CLOSEDSTERNGENERRTOR LOOPRLOOP8TE(1PDTLVLMIDELVLMIDELEVELPRESSFFFSF-FFt853.o51.97133"'29330427952.II'2.271331383248-114INCHNL8rHKL8rHKL8iHFI=CLERPF2=cEVCAthCF3='=.IIU F5=FE.rC('.rNORtlt'3L t(ODE~OHLINECPUR.

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402'IROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROI>,

EJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIREgDATEFUSESPULED+CREQUESTSIIW7ISTATESBLOCK0OTHER0)PURPOSELOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

PlYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

lC8I~TECHNlCAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:

SKETCHATIACHED:

0YESQNOremd>rr~sW DATE:DATE:,INSTALIATION DATE8TIMEIi2%REMOVALDATE8TIMF'NTERED INOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINST+/INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

Afimz)6'zF'fc'NTERED INOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:d'7/QC>Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 40-1'ev.2/88...

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SAFETYEVALUATION SpgpkssoiSWLWm~~<<~PAb~~)4g~Cob/FPpLExcusionfromScreeninCr'teria-Items1,2,or6'f"yes"isanswex'ed foritems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequential change"orthereferenced loCFR50.59 safetyevaluation below:If"no"isansweredforItem6,providebasisforexclusion below:Basisfocuson//A-Item7.If"no"hasbeenanswez'ed foreachquestioninitems7athrough,7g.

thischangeisnotanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion.

Documentthejustification fortheseconclusions below.List:material'referenced inthespaceprovidedasappropriate.

W'tteJusao:JJJ.Wrmocn/gdiV/erscabs.?.2./.1>7,U/=SA.</l~~~v~~i5'rrv~SPec.7.2.&.4QIf"yes",PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal, andthisproposedchango.isanUnriviewed SafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittal totheNRCfortheirreview.Submitted By:

$6I.KCTFVH!-.HK"FORTIJFII.QN CODETCI'IOV15m198869:86:81IICITIIID-I-IIIE-'-IIc;42oett.0045B440RWWI-I61059i9339F0048Sb60JS~n4c;08c'659061I6360860888b00IVII8b0755570614569jIIIII,IIIIIIIIIIIII0UBCOOLEDINCORETCs!1FiRGIIISRVGtIRXERD53oFHERD595599OPE37oFCORE595615HPTR54oFHOTB53oFTSRT651HCTRCSMIDERRNGESLOOPRLOOPBFLOVPRESSTHPTTCPDDTTH-TCTRIIG98.52212597.5SS5.641.9S?6.698.8r.2218PSIG598.6oF549.6oF498oF5?4'1oFPRESSUPIZER EVELYNS0cRESSI-40TNT640TRT651URGE650LPSMS8PSIGoFoFOF.RERCTORIVESSELLEVEL188.8~R188.4iBPRESSUP.I"'EF.RELIEFTFiNI!LEVEL72.5PRES':.8TEt1P85.2PORV431jCLOSEDlPORV438CLOSEDSTERI1GENERF!TOR LOOPRLOOPBRl"SIIRRROMRRNGESLOOPRLOOPBRVGDT'51554552oFTFlVjS?4.2573.8'574.8oFTRE=5732oFTRVG-TREF DEVI1eoF*587'%VLIrJIDEVL'AIDEEVELP.ESSFFF-FFLLLPSF7753.551~8".18;I,93:.>1-I13581.9cSCONSOLEtlpfIIIII.tIODE.1.!kI.IHI:26951.952.171631183261-146ItICHPSIGICLBrH.:ICLBrH!ICLBrH

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONDATELIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0a-W/IIREQUESTS:

STATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSE2F'r/E2Tl'-DATELOCATION'AFEIY EVALUATION REQUIRED:

~S'NOSKETCHATTACHED:

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Q~INSTALLATION DATE6TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

REMOVALDATE8TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY~Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 491S2Rev.2/8S

SAFETYVLUTONSUMMARFO0~l'IPCNelusionfromScreeninCritei-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforitems1or2,'rovide=

thetypeof"inconsequential change"orthereferenced 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation below:If"no"isansweredfor*Item6,providebasisforexclusion below:BassforExclusocc.-tqaQ.JOgtC<<a~~dL,hcJcJi8-c<ec.aSra.4'./C50.9SafetEvaato-Item7If"no"hasbeenansweredforeach.question initems7athrough7gthischangeisnotanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion..

Documentthe)ustification fortheseconclusions below.Listmaterialreferenced'in thespaceprovidedasappropriate.

WtteJustificat ocedIf"yes",PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal, andthisproposedchangeisanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittal totheNRCfortheirreview.Submitted By:

CATEGORYREVIEWEOROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCE PROCEOURE A.1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN/a8.SDATE:I-2REQUESTS:

JUMPERWIRE0.FUNCTION LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBlOCK5eC~~elOTHER0PURPOSEIa~~se/~ed4~MAODATE:DATEllSHIFTSUPERVISOR:

LOCATION:

kr"~sr<<4L5cc44t~SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

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TECHNICAL MANAGER:'INSTALIATION DATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG'UMBER OFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

REMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERiFIEDBY:Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONftEFEOENCEPROCEDUIIE A-1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUIVlPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'IEFI dJUMPERWIRE@LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTION~(-Aosn"a)7APezDATEREQUEST¹:P106FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0'THER0DurnRA.BS/ee8cu<gl5///:<nrLocA7~/58AC.PURPOSE~T6jrTQH(EuToLIoLc'<R.<<>5Iu¹r~-/7tIvlggi6'TgeAPLOCATION:

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCE PROCEDURE A-14028YPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCT(ON3ogvDATF'EQUEST

¹:LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERgOUIbP.Li'0"8'iP.AIQ'JI7'HCaPEEAITLOCATION:

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REMOVALDATE8,TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary

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JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE5FUSESPULLED0llFUNCTIONP)tlIw~lP.TMvc.FLrSTATESBLOCK0OTHER0cDiPURPOSELZF-~S<<W4~8-q6-l~/3-/C>OF3+LOCATION(-o~i<'MRDQw-A,~A.QI=4gc.>N".P.c.~SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

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FIGURE2A,P~-j~SAFETYEVALUATION SUMMARYFORM4".VF~'ROCEDURE DATEPCNExclusion fromScreeninCriteria-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequential change"orthereferenced 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation below:ChangeType:If"no"wasansweredforItem6,providethebasisforexclusion below:BasisforExclusion:

10CFR50.59 SafetEvauatio-Item7If"no"hasbeenansveredforeachquestioninitems7athrough7gthischangeisnotanUnrevieved SafetyQuestion.

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writtenJustification:

CLJeetencedNatea<FIf"yes"wasansweredforItem3,checkthisboxIf"yes",wasansveredforItem7,PORCshallrevievandapprovethissubmittal.

ThisproposedchangeisanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion(USQ)'ndrequiressubmittal totheNRCfortheirreviev.Submitted By:

CATEGORYREVIEWED.REFERENCEPROCEDuRE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRENfFUNCTIONUFTEDWIRE0DATEFUSESPULLED0Dc',vREQUESTSSTATESBLOCK0OTHER05E88K6'~M~d~KPURPOSE>>iM~~

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE0SLYDATE:REQUESTS:

FUSESPULLEDSTATESBLOCK0NS,)iri'c"isrt-iinOTHER0PURPOSEirsi.car'oi/~L~)iri~Ccmr'~LOCATION:

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HAJJCATEGORY3.3.5REVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'S ro.oTnreJUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREKtFUNCTIONcn-h're~--FUSESPULLED00REQUEST¹:

STATESBLOCK0OTHER0ToMcc~PURPOSEg.n1OUCoHa6rn6LOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

EIYES~NPPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

TECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:

INSTALLATION DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;gLfC89J'KETCHATTACHED:

CfYES0NODATEDATEREMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINST8INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY'EVIEW(ASNECESSARY) eD:CdW-NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:rroloAIIoorrovrorIsronoEoS/0r".rrrr88Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'~~'~V'5JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0I~,r7FUNCTION4iC.'THER0PURPOSElNALOCATION'ot.

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

PfYES~NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

-b-TECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:

~f44'KETCH ATTACHED; X(4ES~NO.~l-9-PDATE:~~~~~INSTALLATION DATE&TIME.80'9ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

g/INSTALLED BY:.VERIFIEDBY.f~<T'-~c~M>kent'r-'r REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

~>~+~aREMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 4EB142AEV.t/88

10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation forliftingwireforThermocouple D07Theindications forTCD07areinconsistent withtheresponseofotherrelatedcoreparameters (i.e.incorefluxmap&nearbythermocouple indications).

Thermocouples areusedtosensecoreoutlettemperature, determine relativefuelassemblypowerandcompensate RVLIS.SinceTCD07isnot.consistent witheitherincoreorotherthermocouples ithasbeendeclaredinoperable.

Ithasbeendeletedfromprocessing inPPCS.Toremoveitfromtheaveraging circuitatthethermocouple panelrequiresliftingitslead.ThepanelwillthensenseanopenTCandremoveitfromaveraging.

WithTCD07inoperable theminimumrequirement per-Tech.

Specs.of4thermocouples perquadrantismet.TCD07isnotusedtocompensate RVLIS.Thefunctions ofthethermocouple systemasdescribed intheUfSARarefulfilled.

Therefore, neithertheprobability northeconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction evaluated intheUFSARisincreased.

Thepossibility ofanewaccidentormalfunction isnotcreated.ThemarginofsafetydefinedinTech.Specs.isnotreduced.

References:

Tech.Specs.3.5.3,UFSARSection7.7.4ffreyP.Wand11/30/89PORCApproval:

/2.

Cp<SELECTFUNC.KEYORTURN-ONCODEJUN13>198988'36:26R-1-tIIBJIIIIIII56615451IIISUBCOOLED NRRGINSINCORETCsRVGf&RHERD58oFHERD593595COREI9oFCORE594624THOTR57oFTHOTB56>oFTSRT653IDgIIE--III57322IIII5732261362619686086075659839611626176656817IIIIIIRCSMIDERAGESLOOPRLOOP6FLOM98.798.28PRESS22452238PSIGTHOT59625973oFTCOLD553.8549.8oFDTTH-TC43.448.2oFTRVG574.6573.2oFRCSNRRRQdRRNGESLOOPRLOQP8RVG593425964c'853458231592416035259948618S95974659442681485611e~S8595446886865755624735641357726LEVEL49.8iPRESS2241PSIGSTllT648oFWTRT647oFSURGEOF188.3r.R181.9>6PRESSURIZER RELIEFTRNNLEVELPRESS3.9TElIP83.7PORV431CLOSEDPORV438CLOSEDSTERNGENERRTOR LOOPRDT55.455.45S.4oTRVGS73.8Sr3.rS73.3oTREF5738oTRVG-TREF DEVI50PRESSURIZER 58635P.si8TEtIPDTLVLMIDELVLMIDELEVELPRESSSFFFSF-FF27953.951.869931723269-9726951.958.669938993188-81INCHPSIGNLBrHNLBrHNLB/HF2=F3=F4=CONSOLE~NORllRL FS=F6=tlODE=ONLINECPUR

October17,1988NEWSPENTFUELHEATEXCHANGER EWR1594BPIPINGSCAFFOLD88-110Afterthenewheatexchanger issetonthefoundations plannedimmediately southoftheAComponent CoolingHeatExchanger, pipinginstallation effortswillrequireworkplatforms attheareaoverthe.westhalfoftheSFPheatexchanger andattheareanorthoftheeasthalf.Eachplatformwillrise5to6feetabovethefloor,andeachwillhavesomecoverageovertheAComponent CoolingHeatExchanger.

Thedurability ofthe'CWHXSissuchastoprecludeanydamagethatcouldbepostulated fromtopplingpipe,knuckleandplankscaffold.

Coolingcapability ofoneofthetwoCCWHXSissufficient toprovideforthecoolingloadsfortheplant.Clearance mustbeprovidedforaccesstovalvesandinstruments associated withtheComponent CoolingHeatExchangers andBoricAcidEvaporator Condensate Demineralizers.

Care'shouldbetakentopreventdisturbing thesmokedetectorZ04DI.Withobservance oftheabove,theworkplatforms willnot1)resultinachangetothefacilityoritsoperation asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, or3)involveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

October20,1988SPENTFUELCOOLINGPUMPPIPINGEWR-1594B SCAFFOLDS 88-111InordertoinstallpipingfortheplannedSpentFuelCoolingPump,twoscaffolds areplannedabovethepresently existingpump,about6feetfromthefloor,perattachedsketch.TheSFPcoolingsystemisnon-seismic safetyrelated(1)however,SeismicCategoryIitemsarewithintheimmediate

vicinity, givenbelow.AandBResidualHeatRemovalPumpCoolingUnits(2),AResidualHeatRemovalPumpDischarge Temperature TT-630(3)Otherinstruments intheareaforwhichcareshouldbetakentoavoiddisturbing area'sfollows:Component CoolingReturnfromResidualHeatRemovalPumpsflowFI-651anditsassociated tubing.(3)AResidualHeatremovalPumpdischarge pressurePIC-629andPI-629Aandtheirassociated tubing.(3)Becauseofthepresenceoftheaboveitemsthetwoscaffolds shallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons September 23,1988memoattachment).

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction Engineer.

TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

'InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation,,and uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, te'stingandmaintenance accesstotheAuxiliary Buildingsub-basement, allvalvesandinstrumentation inthearea.Page1of2

Withobservance oftheaboverequirements thescaffolds willnot1)resultinachangetotheassumptions fortheSafetyAnalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)providea'hangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, or3)involveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

NOTES1)'ualityAssurance ManualAppendixAQualityandSafetyRelatedListingandDiagramsSection2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCooling,outlined inRG&EDrawing33013-1248 (portionattached).

2)UFSARSection9.4.9.1Engineered SafetyFeaturesEquipment Ventilation andCooling.3)UFSARFigure5.4-7ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(portion.-attached) 4)UFSARFigure9.2-4Sheet1Component CoolingWaterSystem(portionattached).

Page2of2

November1,1988RELAYROOMCEILINGPENETRATION WORKBYAUXRELAYRACKRA-2SCAFFOLD88-115Thepenetration workplannedwillrequireascaffoldbetweentheAux.RelayRackRA-2andtheMUXRoomdoor.Itistoriseabout15feetfromthefloor.OtheritemswithinthevicinityareContainment Isolation RelayRacksA-1andA-2,Safeguards Initiation CabinetsSI-AlandSI-A2,FoxRacks1and2,andCableTray164.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordan'ce withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelation.to theguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaison.Engineer shallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural-Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Withobservance oftheaboverequirements thescaffoldwillnot1)resultinachangetothe.assumptions fortheSafetyAnalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, or3)involveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

November30,1988FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986OVERMCC-1DSCAFFOLD88-118Ascaffoldisplannedto-extend fromthefrontof480Bus16-eastwardoverMCC-1DtothewallbehindMCC-lD.Itistoriseabout9feet.Inordertopreventanyinterference withactivities involving thealternate trainBus14andMCC-lC,itisplannedto'onstruct thescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.

Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation'rom theguidelines willbenecessary, verbal-guidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemanneras.described above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance accesstoallelectrical panelsontheBus16andMCC-,lD,toincludeclearance torackoutbreakers.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothe.assumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffecton.anyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgiveninthe.SafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

I'

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

November9,1988FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986BYBSAFETYINJECTION PUMPSCAFFOLD88-120Inordertoperformthenecessary upgradeascaffoldapprox-imately9feethighwillbeneededtofollowtheroutingshownintheattachedsketch.TherouteisadjacenttotheBSafetyInjection PumpandtheBContainment SprayPump.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed soastomaintainaccessfortestingandemergency operation toallassociated valves,instruments andh'eattraceconnections andcircuits.

Theestimated durationoftheproject,30days,issuchthatseismicconstruction requirements areimposed.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction Engineer.

TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Withobservance oftheaboverequirements thescaffoldwillnot1)resultinachangetotheassumptions fortheSafetyAnalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, or3)involveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

November9,1988FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986OVERBCONTROLRODDRIVEMGSETSCAFFOLD88-121Ascaffoldisneededtoperformthefirewrapupgrade,theworkbeinglocatedovertheBMGset,andinthevicinityoftheMGsetcontrolpanels,theReactorTripBreakerPanels,,theReactorTripBypassBreakerPanels,andBSteamGenerator SteamLinePressureTransmitters.

Itistorise10feet.Becauseofthepresenceofthesafetyrelatedfeaturesincludedintheabovelist,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction Engineer.

TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Inadditiontotheabove,severalcautionsaretobeobservedasfollows:Constrain allplankingandprovidetoeboardstominimizethepotential fordroppedobjects.Specialcareshouldbetakenduringmaterialmovementforscaffolderectionandremovaltopreventstrikingthenearbyinstruments andbreakercontrols.

Ithasbeendetermined thatthescaffoldinstallation, withobservance oftheaboverequirements willnot1)resultinachangetothefacilityoritsoperation asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, or3)involveanunreviewed safetycpxestion.

November10,1988SPENTFUELCOOLINGEWR-1594B-CONDUIT INSTALLATION OVERSFPHXTOTRAY136SCAFFOLD88-127AscaffoldisneededtoinstallconduitsupportsandconduittoextendfromneartheAuxiliary Buildingintermediate floornorthwest cornereastovertheGAux.'ldg.'xhaust Fansuctionducttotray136,overtheeastendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.

StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater SystemContainment isolation MOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespace,betweentheheatexchanger andcontainment isverycongested withpiping,pipesupportstructures, regulators, valves,instruments, andleadshielding foraprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpipingfromtheheatexchanger.

-Amajorportionoftheequipment hereisassociated withthewastegassystemsupporting theReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizer ReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.

ImmersedwithinthisspaceisoneoftheContainment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.Concurrent withtheaboveplannedeffortisaplannedrepaironTurbineAux.Feedwater Pumpdischarge checkvalve4003.The'uthorization forthescaffoldforthatjobwasbasedonmaintaining operability oftheSAFWsystem.Becauseofthe.locationoftheabovediscussed SAFWContainment isolation MOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed asseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bythe-Construction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability, inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffolduseby'theConstruction Engineer.

TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginal, copyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Withobservance oftheaboverequirements thescaffoldwillnot1)resultinachangetotheassumptions fortheSafetyAnalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, or3)involveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

November23,1988SPENTFUELCOOLINGEWR-1594B CONDUITSUPPORTANDCONDUITINSTALLATION BETWEENSFPPUMPAREAANDASAFETYINJECTION PUMPSCAFFOLD88-128InordertoinstallconduitsupportsandconduitforthisprojectintheAuxiliary BuildingBasementascaffoldisneededforworkneartheceilingfromtheSFPpumparea,eastalongthecorridorbytheResidualHeatRemovalHeatExchanger outletandbypassvalves,theRHRpipingtoSafetyInjection PumpSuctionanditsassociated flowinstrumentation, overthehosereelatcolumn8a-N1tothespaceabovetheASafetyInjection PumpandadjacenttoAContainment SprayPump.AstheportionbytheSFPpumpwouldessentially havethesamepotential effectasthescaffoldofrequest488-111,becauseoftheproximity totheoutletcontrolsofbothtrainsofResidualHeatRemoval*HeatExchanger, becauseofthepresenceofTrainAandTrainBcabletraysjusteastoftheSFPpumparea,becauseoftheproximity totheCSafetyInjection PumpandtheBContainment SprayPumpinadditiontothosealternate pumpsmentioned above,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstru'ction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheAuxiliary Buildingsub-basement, allvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovided.tofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlanttechnical Specification'ases.

Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction of,equipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

ITheinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated in-theSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnot.reducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

December6,1988PIPEENTRYGROUTINGINAUXILIARY BUILDINGSUB-BASEMENT SCAFFOLD88-133Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout8feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontal polesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchorage pointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.

BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediate vicinityofthescaffold, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment),

incorporating thefeaturesdescribed above.Allscaffoldshallbeinplacepriortotheendofshiftworkedonthedayitiserected.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmedanddocumented priortoseaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifit.isforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, androtatingequipment inthearea.Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEvents

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

December14,1988PIPEENTRYGROUTINGINAUXILIARY BUILDINGSUB-BASEMENT NORTHWEST CORNERSCAFFOLD88-134Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout8feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontal polesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchorage pointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.

BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediate vicinityofthescaffold, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment),

incorporating thefeaturesdescribed above.Scaffoldinthenortheast cornershallbecompletely dismantled beforebeg'inning thisconstruction.

Allscaffoldshallbeinplacepriortotheendofshiftworkedonthedayitiserected.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaison=Engineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmationofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, that.adeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefroma.memberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, and.rotating equipment inthearea.Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewill'enoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification, bases..Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment impoitant tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreduce*themarginofsafety'asdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

December20,1988tSPENTFUELCOOLINGPIPINGEWR1594BCOREBORINGATAUXILIARY BUILDINGINTERMEDIATE FLOORWESTSTAIRWELL SCAFFOLD88-139Inordertoperformcoreboringandpipeinstallation attheSpentFuelPoolFilternorthvaultwall,ascaffoldwillbeneededwhichwillbeusingtheAuxiliary Buildingbasementflooraspartofitsfoundation, andwillalsobepartlybasedontheintermediate floor.Betweenthetwofloorsitwillinteractwiththescaffolds 88-111forpumpdischarge piping(notstartedyet)and88-128forpumpconduit(presently existing).

Theitemsofequipment withinthevicinityofthesescaffolds aredescribed inthereviewsfortheseinstallations, andtheirpresenceisthebasisforrequiring thesetobeconstructed inaccordance withseismicscaffoldguidelines.

Ontheintermediate flooranotherseismicscaffold(88-127)existsontheoppositesideoftheSpentFuelHeatExchanger, inthevicinityoftheStandbyAuxiliary Feedwater SystemContainment Isolation MOVs.Totheimmediate southofthestairwell, onthewalltobecorebored,areSeismicCategoryIboundaryvalvesintheSFPpiping.Becauseoftheabovefactorsthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheAuxiliary Buildingsub-basement, allvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.

LockedareaaccessestotheAuxiliary Buildingsub-basement andtheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultarecontrolled bylockedgates.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnotallowanyeasieraccesstotheseareas.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamGenerator TubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

January10,1989FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986OVERBCONTROLRODDRIVEMGSETSCAFFOLD89-2Ascaffoldisneededtoperformthefirewrapupgrade,theworkbeinglocatedovertheeastendBMGset,andinthevicinityoftheMGsetcontrolpanels,theReactorTripBreakerPanels,theReactorTripBypassBreakerPanels,andBSteamGenerator SteamLinePressureTransmitters.

Itistorise10feet.Becauseofthepresenceofthesafetyrelatedfeaturesincludedintheabovelist,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction Engineer.

TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Inadditiontotheabove,severalcautionsaretobeobservedasfollows:Constrain allplankingandprovidetoeboardstominimizethepotential fordroppedobjects.Specialcareshouldbetakenduringmaterialmovementforscaffolderectionandremovaltopreventstrikingthenearbyinstruments andbreakercontrols.

Clearance shallbemaintained foruseoffirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhich.areassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

RodClusterControlAssembly(RCCA)DropRuptureofaSteamPipeAnticipated Transients WithoutScramSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

January23,1989FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986DECKOVERCABLETRAY192ADDENDUMTOSCAFFOLD89-2Inadditiontothescaffoldasmalldecknearthestairwayisneeded.ThisistobesecuredtoTray192andanearby4"diameterconduit,adjacenttotheworksite.Thetrayissupported byadoubleunistrutcantilevered fromstructural steeltotheeast,asshownontheattachedsketch.Thelimitingloadisconsidered tobeapointloadatthefreeendofthesupport.Theloadisestimated toberoughlyhalfofthecalculated capability basedonthatloadconfiguration.

Inordertoprovideaconfiguration withwhichtheaddedloadmaybeconsidered insignificant, verticalsupportshallbeprovidedunderthetrayintheformofajackstandor4X4woodwithaprovision tobearupwardonbothsidesofthetrayorthewestsideofthetray.Therearenumerousbarriersinthesurroundings whichpreventanyadverseeffectonsafetyrelatedequipment discussed inthescaffoldreview.Anaccessladder,ifused,shallbetiedoff.Thedeckshallbeatminimumof1/2in.plywoodplacedontopofthetrayandshallrestontheoutertraybarriers.

Nopressureshallbeappliedtocableswithinthetrays.'leats shallbeappliedtopreventdisplacement.

TheControlRoomOperators shallbenotifiedpriortocommencing deckinstallation.

~Basedonthefactorsdescribed abovethedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Becauseoftheadequacyofthesupportsystemasaugmented andexistingintervening barriersdiscussed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectontheSeismicCategoryIornon-seismic safetyrelatedequipment inthevicinity.

ThedesignbaseseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

RodClusterControlAssembly(RCCA)DropRuptureofaSteamPipeAnticipated Transients WithoutScram

1Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becausetheadequacyofthe'upportsystemasaugmented andthebarrierswhichint'ervene withSeismicCategoryIornon-seismic safety-related equipment aresuchastoensuretherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation willnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence or,theconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport'ecause oftheadequacyofthesupportsystemasaugmented andtheexistingintervening barrierstoSeismicCategoryIornon-seismic safetyrelatedequipment.

'Theinstallation-willnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausetheadequacyofthesupportsystemasaugmented and.thebarriersdescribed ensurethattherewillbenoadverseeffectonSeismicCategoryIornon-seismic safetyrelatedequipment withinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasis"for-anyPlantTechnical Specification

~becauseoftheadequacyofthesupportsystemasaugmented andtheintervening barrierswhichwould'preventanyadverseeffectonanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

January'25,,

1989SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTUPGRADE-EWR2512Z(SW-2200)

WORKPLATFORMS 89-4Thispipesupportupgradeeffortwillrequirefourplatforms',

oneontheAuxiliary BuildingtopfloorbyMCC-1Landthreeontheintermediate floorin,thevicinityoftheGAuxiliary BuildingCharcoalFilterandtheHeatTracePanel14anddistribution 14BPrimary.Becauseoftheproximity ofbothMCCs1LandlMtotheseplatforms, theyshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfrom-Structural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineeraridtheLiaisonEngineer.

• Inthefinalstageofconstruction priorto'use,theseismiccapability ofthescaffolds inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented piiortoscaffold'se bytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

In.thisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.'heaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions, intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalyses-givenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofNormalFeedwater PipeBreaksOutsidetheContainment BuildingDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability

~~~~~becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccident'ormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

March8,1989DIESELGENERATOR FUELOILEWR4526BDISCHARGE PIPESUPPORTUPGRADESCAFFOLDS 89-7InordertoperformpipesupportupgradeintheDieselGenerator RoomspriortothecomingannualAI&0seismically constructed scaffolds areproposedtopermitsimultaneous existence inbothrooms,asshownontheattachedsketch.Thescaffolds shallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReportAsaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliaries Decreaseinheatremovalbythesecondary systemwithcoincident lossofon-siteandexternal(off-site)

A.C.powertothestationSteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureAnticipated transients withoutSCRAMwitha=lossofA.C.powerSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

The.installation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February14,1989RHRRECIRCTIE-INEWR4675APIPETRENCHDECONSCAFFOLDFRAMEENCLOSURE 89-8WorkplannedforRHRrecirctie-ininthepipetrenchwestoftheRWSTistobesupported bydecontaminating thetrenchintheworkareapriortothepipework.An8'x8'x8'caffold frameenclosure isplannedtocontroltheareaduringdecontamination.

Becauseoftheproximity ofavarietyofSeismicCategoryIfeatures, thescaffoldframeshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February14,1989RHRHEATEXCHANGER MONORAILINSTALLATION ANDEDDYCURRENTINSPECTION WORKPLATFORMS 89-9Planstoinstallmonorails tolift,eachRHRHeatExchanger andtoperformeddycurrenttestingwillrequireworkplatformsatseverallevelsatbothheatexchangers concurrently.

Becauseofthis,theyshallbeconstructed oneatatimeinaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memo.attachment).

Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldsshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored by,theConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

=Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyofthe.authorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinal'stageofconstruction priorto'eginning erectionofthescaffoldinthesecondheatexchanger cubicle,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldframeinthefirstcubicleinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented bytheConstruction

Engineer, or,theLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.'Suchdocumentation

.shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Aftersuchconfirmation erectionofthescaffoldframeinthesecondcubiclemaybegin,accompanied bymonitoring, confirmation, notification anddocumentation aswiththefirstcubicle.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalvesandinstrumentation inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

The'installation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

March1,1989RHRHEATEXCHANGER MONORAILS MWR89-202289-10Inorderto,perform eddycurrentexamination ontheRHRHeatExchanger tubesaliftingarrangement hasbeendesignedtobeattachedwithineach.RHRHXcubicle.Thesketchesshowingdimensions andrequirements, indicating thedesignisSeismicCategoryIIoverI.Assuch,althoughthisstructural featureisnotSeismicCategoryI,itiscapableofwithstanding aseismiceventequaltothatforwhichtheSeismicCategoryIitemsaredesignedwithoutproviding anypotential fordamagetoSeismicCategoryIitemswithin,thevicinity.

Theinstallation andinspection activities shallbecontrolled perWP-7204-1.

Anadditional construction requirement shallbethatthemonorails aretobeinstalled inoneResidualHeatExchanger cubicleatatime.Uponcompletion ofthefirstinstallation theConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead,shallconfirm,anddocumenttheseismiccapability inrelationto-thedesignandinstallation requirements Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineer'hall notifytheShiftSupervisor oftheconfirmation priortoproceeding withinstallation inthesecondcubicle.Confirmation, documentation andnotification shallfollowforthesecondcubicleaswiththefirst.Theconstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontherequirements providedpriortoinstallation.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 are-giyenbelow.rTheinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constru'cted featureitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation or.intheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgiven,intheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.

Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability.

ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously

,'valuated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

March9,1989NONREGENERATIVE HEATEXCHANGER PREPARATIONS FORLIFTFOREDDYCURRENTEXAMINATION PLATFORM89-11InordertopreparetolifttheNonregenerative HeatExchanger foreddycurrentexamination aworkplatformisneededjustbelowthecomponent coolingwaterinletflange.Thisheatexchanger isSeismicCategoryI.Becauseoftheestimated durationoftheplatforminstallation, andtheeasewithwhichaseismicscaffoldcanbeinstalled itwasdecidedtoconstruct itassuch.Accordingly, theplatformutilizeaframeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalvesandinstrumentation inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.NTheinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Theinstallation doesnotinvolvea*changeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewill.benoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasethe,probability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnot,reduce themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withany'equipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February27,1989SAFETYINJECTION RECIRCEWR3881COREBORINGSCAFFOLD89-15InordertoperformcoreboringintheceilingabovetheAuxiliary BuildingBasementaworkplatformisneededatthesite,betweentheASafetyInjection PumpandtheRefueling WaterTank.AlsowithinthevicinityarecabletraysforTrainsAandB,andtheHoseReelatColumn8a-N.Itistobeconstructed takingadvantage ofinterlocking withthebuildingstructure, andinparticular tosurroundtheabovecolumn.Becauseoftheproximity oftheabovesafetyrelatedfeaturesthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthe'area.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

RuptureofaSteamPipe.Decrease inReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction.

ofequipment important=to safetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

The'installation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,it.willbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

RHRPUMPRECIRC.EWR-4675PIPETIE-INSCAFFOLD89-17.3/1/89TheRHRrecirc.tie-ineffortwillrequireaworkplatformintheAuxiliary BuildingbasementasColumnline7a,whichisbetweenMOV-856RWSToutlettoRHRandRWST.,AlsowithinthisvicinityareSeismicCategoryIinstruments andcontrolsforRHR.HeatExchanger outletandbypasscontrol.Becauseofthesethescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memo,attachment)

.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored by'theConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priorto"use,the,seismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmedanddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.,Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewof"attributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyof"theAuthorization Form..TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnot,resultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewith,nointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffect-on any,existingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhich.areassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEvents~Therewillbeno.adverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbe'nointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.The'nstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

rTheinstallation does'notreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed intheba'sesofTechnical Specifications.

3/14/89OFF-SITEELECTRICAL RECONFIGURATION EWR-4525CONDUITINSTALLATION INRELAYROOMSCAFFOLD89-25Scaffolding isneededtosupportconduitinstallation intheRelayRoom,whichisestimated totakeabout6weeks,andwillbeoverAuxiliary RelayRacks,Containment Isolation RelayRacks,Safeguards Initiation CabinetsandRelayLogicandTestRacks.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead,Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.THisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuring'oftheplanks.Suchdocumentation, shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment inthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation, panels,firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.,Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexisting'lant provisions intheimmediate vicinityintheir'unctions innormaloperation or,intheirfunctions asdescribed

.intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthis,proposedinstallation arethefollowing:

RuptureofSteamPipeDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory

=SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences of,anaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,because,asaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhaveno,interface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

CONDENSATE MAKEUP/REJECT PIPESUPPORTTEMPORARY MODIFICATION 89-26PREL1MINARY 10CFR50.59 EVALUATION May9,1989Asaresultofthismodification thefollowing conclusions maybe,drawn:Theprobability ofevaluated inthemodificationwilllinetoitsdesignoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously UFSARwillnotbeincreased.

Thisreturnthecondensate makeup/reject intent.2)Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.

Thismodification willnotchangeanyplantcomponent thatwouldchangetheconsequences ofanyaccident.

3)Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important.

tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.

Theaffectedlinedoesnotserveanaccidentmitigation functionandthenewsupportwillnotincreasetheprobability ofanymalfunction.

4)Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased.

5)Sincethismodification returnsthelinetoitsoriginaldesigncondition, thepossibility ofanaccidentdifferent fromthoseevaluated intheUFSARwillnotbecreated.6)Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotbecreatedforthesamereasonasg5above.7)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfortheTechnical Specifications willnotbereducedsincethismodification willreturnthelinetoitsdesignconfiguration.

3/18/89A'STEAMGENERATOR SNUBBERREPLACEMENT EWR-1483SCAFFOLDS ANDRIGGING89-38'The.scaffolds fortheeffortsforsnubberremoval,bumperinstallation andhotclearance confirmation aredesignedandprovidedperRochester Scaffold=andEquipment CompanydrawingsRS-116andRS-117.Thefollowing lettersareattachedtoindicatestructural Engineering evaluation ofloadingofsteelmembersforscaffoldsupportandrigging,'nd seismiccapability:

1.S.K.FergusonJanuary4,1988lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

EWR1483Temporary RiggingforSnubbersandStruts.2.S.K.FergusonJanuary14,1988lettertoM.J.Smith,

Subject:

S/GSnubberReplacement Scaffolding EWR14833.S.K.FergusonFebruary4,1988lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

ScaffoldforSnubberRemoval.Theinstallation willtakeplacewhiletheunitisincoldcondition; however,thehotclearance phasewilltakeadvantage oftheseismicdesign,allowingexistence ofsuchscaffoldsbybothSteamGenerators simultaneously.

Unlessfurtherevaluation isperformed topermitsimultaneous dismantling ofthescaffolds, scaffoldatonesteamgenerator istobecompletely removedpriortostartingdismantling scaffolding at,theotherSteamGenerator.

Basedontheseismiccapability ofthescaffolddesignthedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysis'given intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplant'provisions intheimmediate

vicinity, intheirfunctions innormal",operation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.The'designbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Decrease'n ReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofire'fighting provisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

3/18/89BSTEAM.GENERATOR SNUBBERREPLACEMENT EWR-1483SCAFFOLDS ANDRIGGING89-39Thescaffoldsfortheeffortsforsnubberremoval,bumperinstallation andhotclearance confirmationaredesignedandprovidedperRochester ScaffoldandEquipment CompanydrawingsRS-,116andRS-117;Thefollowing lettersareattachedtoindicatestructural Engineering evaluation of,loadingofsteelmembersforscaffoldsupportandrigging,andseismiccapability:

1.S.K.FergusonJanuary4,1988lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

EWR1483,Temporary RiggingforSnubbersandStruts.2~3~4~S.K.FergusonJanuary14,1988lettertoM.J.Smith,

Subject:

S/GSnubberReplacement Scaffolding EWR1483S.K.FergusonFebruary4,1988.letter toR.N.Murray,

Subject:

ScaffoldforSnubberRemoval.S.K.FergusonMarch6,1989lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

EWR-1483SnubberReduction ProgramTemporary Rigging-"B"MainSteamLine.Theinstallation willtakeplacewhiletheunitisincoldcondition; however,thehotclearance phasewilltakeadvantage oftheseismicdesign,allowingexistence ofsuchscaffolds bybothSteamGenerators simultaneously.

Unlessfurtherevaluation isperformed topermitsimultaneous dismantling ofthescaffolds, scaffoldatonesteamgenerator istobecompletely removedpriortostartingdismantling scaffolding attheotherSteamGenerator.

Basedontheseismiccapability ofthescaffolddesignthedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEvents

~~~~~~Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becau'setherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthe-basisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

May23,1989RESIDUALHEATREMOVALTOLOOPBVENTVALVE2779FLANGEHOSEREMOVALSCAFFOLD89-148Aworkplatformisdesiredinordertoremovethehosefromaflangeattheventvalve2779.WiththeReactorCoolantSystemattemperature greaterthancoldshutdowntemperature theexistence ofmorethanone'rainofsafeguards equipment whichcouldbeincludedwithintheareawhichcouldbeaffectedbyascaffoldmustbeconsidered.

Theareaoftheproposedscaffoldincludesequipment associated withtwotrains.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering

.(M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEn'gineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, that.adeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory Steam.Generator TubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipe.SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedto~~~~~~~~~~~~firefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence or=theconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface

,withanyexistingequipment.

orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation does,notreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlant'echnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

8/30/89ADIESELGENERATOR ROOMPAINTINGSCAFFOLD89-160Scaffolding isneededforworkplatforms forceilingandwallpainting.

Becauseofthemanyobstacles tousingeasy-built

scaffold, poleandknucklescaffoldmustbeused,whichwilladdtothedurationofscaffoldexistence; becauseofthisandthepotential effectontheMCCwithinthevicinitywhichcontainsthebreakerfortheBDieselGenerator AirStartCompressor, thescaffolding shallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement,

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdecking'inplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167attached.)

Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Thejobsupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheLiaisonEngineer, Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthe.scaffoldinrelationto'heguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.During'onstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Nonon-seismic scaffoldconstruction orteardownactivityistobeundertaken inthealternate DieselGenerator Roomunlessinterimorfinalseismiccapability isestablished andisbeingmaintained withintheADieselGenerator Room.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction andoperational

'requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReportAsaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectona'yexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliaries Decreaseinheatremovalbythesecondary systemwithcoincident lossofon-siteandexternal(off-site)

A.C.powertothestationSteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureAnticipated transients withoutSCRAMwithalossofA.C.powerSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfor'nyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbe.independent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

8/30/89ADIESELGENERATOR ROOMPAINTSCAFFOLDEND<<OF-SHIFT STATUSSincestartofscaffoldconstruction intheADieselGenerator RoomonJuly10,1989,thebuildingcrewhasbeenalternating betweenthisinstallation andaninstallation intheScreenhouse, withhighest.prioritygiventotheScreenhouse work.Wheneverworkwasdoneonthescaffoldstructure intheADieselGenerator Room,Ihavebeennotifiedandperformed anend-of-shift inspection.

Atthecompletion ofeachsuchworkeffortthestructure wasfoundtobecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled.

Thescaffoldisyettobeturnedoverforusebythepaintcrew.MichaelJ.SmithLiaisonEngineer

June20,1989SPENTFUELPOOLCOVER89-162hWorkabovetheSpent.FuelPoolisplanned,andasameasuretopreventdebrisfromentering, thepoolistobecoveredwithaprotective structure asshownontheattachedsketch.Shouldanydebrisenterthepoolnotification totheConstruction Engineershallbemade.Priortofueltransfersystemoperation, acompleteinspection shallbemadeinthefueltransferslot.Theanalysisforprojectile impingement on,theSpentFuelRackinvolvesamassequivalent toautilitypole.Theplatformassemblycomponents represent lessmass;thepotential effectontherackbytheassemblywouldbemorebroadlydistributed.

Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotorprocedures asdescribed indesignbasiseventanalyzedassociated withthisproposedaccident.

resultinachangetothefacilitytheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheintheSafetyAnalysisReportinstallation isthefuelhandlingTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseofthelackofanypotential effectonthefuelduetotheprotection affordedbytherackasdescribed above.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport'becausethecapability oftherackandtheabsenceofsafetyrelatedequipment inthearea.Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftherackcapability described above,thelackofimpact.onreactorsafetyandtheboundinganalysisofthefuelhandlingaccident.

Theinstallation doesnotreduce,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becauseof.thecapability oftherack.=Thetotalweightofthetemporary structure isestimated at8,600lbs.Thisweight.willbesupported by32feetofSFPbridgetrackwhichisatotalsurfaceareaof4.67ft2.Thefinalloadonthetracksis1842lb/ftavaluefarlessthanthatexperienced whentheSFPbridgeismovingwithafuelassemblyattached.

Thestructure willsupportpersonnel andsmalltoolsandequipment suchaspaintcansandbrushes,however,thecoverisnotintendedforuseasa.temporary storageareafornon-related ancillary equipment.

Duringassemblyofthestructure doubleriggingwillbeused'forallmovesovertheSFParea.Sufficient spacewillbeavailable forvisual~SFP"waterlevelverification.

June20,1989MAINSTEAMLINEPRESSURETRANSMITTER TUBINGREROUTEEWR4933WORKPLATFORMS 89-163Workplatforms areneededtoperformthetubingrerouting tobelocatedbytheIntermediate BuildingNortheaststair,betweentheContainment wallandthenorthwall.WithinthisvicinityaretheControlRodMGSetControlPanels,theReactorTripBreakerPanels,theReactorTripBypassBreakerPanels,theBMainSteamLinePressureTransmitters, andnumerouscabletrays.Thescaffoldframefortheseplatforms istoriseapproximately 20Becauseofthepresenceofthesafetyrelatedfeatureslistedabove,thescaffoldframesystemfortheworkplatformsshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988.memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,oiobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

RodClusterControlAssembly(RCCA)DropRuptureofaSteamPipeAnticipated Transients WithoutScramSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnot.involveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

June22,1989SAFETYINJECTION TOBLOOPFLOWORIFICEFE-924SCAFFOLD89-166Aworkplatformisneededabout4ft.abovetheflooreast,oftheSafetyInjection toBLoopMOV's878AandB,northoftheExcess'LetdownLetdownHeatExchanger, whichisjustbehinda7ft.highchainlinkbarrier,westofabuildingcolumnintervening withtheRegenerative HeatExchanger, alsowithinthechainlinkbarrier,andsoutheast ofCVCSairoperatedvalvesfor,normalchargingtoBColdLeg,chargingtoBHotLegandAuxiliary Pres'surizer Spray,inorderofdistancefromtheorifice.ThedistancetothefirstCVCSvalveisabout6ft.Theunitispresently with=RCS.temperature lessthan350F,tobemaintained

.assuchuntilafterremovalofthescaffold.

Analternate pathfor'harging totheAloopexists,whichhasarouteawayfromthescaffoldarea.Auxiliary Pressurizer Sprayisnotnormallyused.Thealternate pathforchargingtoA-Loopshallbemaintained operableduringthescaffoldexistence.

ITheaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory ChemicalandVolumeControlSystemMalfunction Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseobserving therequirements ofmaintaining lessthan350Fandthealternate chargingpathoperablewillpermitsatisfying theassumptions andbasesintheTechnical Specifications dealingwithSafetyInjection andChemicalandVolumeControl.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseobserving theoperational requirement ofmaintaining lessthan350oFassuresthattherewillbenoneedforthedeliverycapabilities ofthe.SafetyInjection Systemcalledforinthedesignbases.Thealternate chargingpathwillbeavailable intheeventofanyadverseaffectonthenormalchargingpath.""*l

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasafeaturetobeinplaceonlyduringmaintaining RCStemperature lessthan350Fwiththealternate chargingpathtoALoopavailable, therewillbenoeffectonsafetyofoperations.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasafeatureinstalled withimposition ofRCStemperature limitation of350Fandmaintaining operability ofthechargingpathtoALoop,itwillhavenoeffectonsystemsasdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSE WINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BYASERVICEWATERPUMPSCAFFOLD89-167Scaffolding isrequiredintheScreenhouse fortheinstallation ofsecurity'barsforSM-89-03.

Thispermit(89-167)isforaseismicscaffoldadjacenttotheeastwallofthebuildingnearthesouthsideofthehouseheatingboiler(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit,).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedservicewaterpumplA.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines.

providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

'heerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthoiization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershal'1reviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheScreenhouse allvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeature*there willbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSE WINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BYBUS17SCAFFOLD89-168Scaffolding isrequiredintheScreenhouse fortheinstallation ofsecuritybarsforSM-89-03.

Thispermit(89-168)isforaseismicscaffoldinthenortheast cornerofthebuildingalongcolumnlines7andEE(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedBusses17and18.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheScreenhouse allvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedto~~~~~~~firefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSE

'WINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BYBUS18SCAFFOLD89-169Scaffolding isrequiredintheScreenhouse

~fortheinstallation ofsecuritybarsforSM-89-03.

Thispermit(89-169)isforaseismicscaffoldinthesoutheast cornerofthebuildingabovethestairwell tothebasement(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedBus18.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocess,shallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,or.isobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheScreenhouse allvalves,instrumentation, panels,firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangein'.thePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewill*benoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability

'ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismic'eature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation does-notreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforany'lantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwill.beindependent of,andwillhavenointerface with'nyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSE WINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BYDIESELFIREPUMPOILTANKSCAFFOLD89-170Scaffolding isrequiredintheScreenhouse fortheinstallation ofsecuritybarsforSM-89-03.

Thispermit.(89-170)isforaseismicscaffoldonthesouthwallofthebuildingneardoorSO(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedBus18.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment.)

.The,JobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sess'ionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheScreenhouse allvalves,instrumentation, panels,firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofire.fighting provisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications because.asaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent, of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSE WINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BETWEENFIREPUMPSSCAFFOLD89-171Scaffolding isrequiredintheScreenhouse fortheinstallation ofsecuritybarsforSM-89-03.

Thispermit(89-171)isforaseismicscaffoldonthesouthwallofthebuildingneardoorS2(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedservicewater.pump1D.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.TheJobSupervisor shallverifythat.anorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheScreenhouse all.valves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

August1,1989SAFETYEVALUATION FORTEMPORARY STRUCTURE FEATUREAUTHORIZATION FORM89-180Thistemporary structure willbeplacedunderthereference legpipingtosupportthecondensate potandassociated tubing.Thereference legpipingwillbeliftedbyhandwhilemeasuring andrecording themaximumliftforce.Theliftwillnotcreateanysubstantial deflection oftherootvalveandwilltherefore notcreateanunexceptable stressontheweldsinthereference leg.Thereference legwillnotbeliftedpastthecondensates potsoriginaldesignelevation.

Therefore, thistemporary structure willnotendangertheintegrity ofthereference legpiping.Thistemporary structure willberemovedpriortoleavingthehotshutdowncondition.

Thistemporary structure willnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentortheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Thistemporary structure willnoteffectthepressuretransmitter PT-429andtherefore willnoteffecttheresponseofsafetyinjection toanaccident.

Thisstructure willnoteffecttheintegrity ofthereference legandwillonlybeusedtosupportthestaticloadofthepipingwillremainintact.Thistemporary structure willnotcreateanaccidentofadifferent typethenthosespecified intheUFSAR.TheSafetyInjection Systemwillreactasdesignedtoanyaccidentaddressed intheUFSAR.Thistemporary structure willnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinanytechnical specification basis.Thisstructure doesnotrenderanyplantsysteminoperable, norwillitdegradeanyoperating system.

8/11/89SCREENHOUSE NORTHOFMCC-1GPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-183Scaffolding isneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareanorth*ofMCC-1Gnotcoveredbypreviously approvedscaffolds 89-167and89-168.Becauseoftheproximity oftheserviceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsandMCC-1Gthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, that-adeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary,.

verbalguidance'rom amemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedto~~~~~~~firefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnot'increase theprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

8/11/89SCREENHOUSE SOUTHWALLOVERDIESELFIREPUMPPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-184Scaffolding isneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareaovertheDieselFirePumpbetweentheareascoveredbypreviously approvedscaffolds 89-170and89-171.Becauseoftheproximity oftheserviceWaterPumpsandFireServiceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons'on Authorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

8/28/89REFUELING WATERTANKOPERATING FLOORPAINTSCAFFOLD89-189Inordertominimizecontamination attheAux.Bldg.topflooritwillbenecessary todecontheRWSTfromtoptothefloor,and,tofacilitate futuredeconefforts,itisdesirable tofollowupwithpainting.

Becauseofthenearnessof480VBus14andtherelatively lengthyprojected durationofthescaffoldexistence, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythat,anorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accessallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory RuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

September 6,1989AMAINSTEAMARV-3411REPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-190RepairworkonARV-3411willnecessitate aworkplatform, constructed ofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.ThesmalltubingfortheARVairoperatorwillbedisconnected duringthevalverepairpreparations.

Assuchtheplatformwillhavenopotential effectontheARVs,andthestructures willberestricted frommovementinthedirection ofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.

TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelatively lightscaffoldmaterials; however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporated astheisolation valve3507bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistence isprojected tobe2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification" bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

September 7,1989LAUNDRYEXHAUSTFANVIBRATION/EXPANSION RINGREPLACEMENT WORKPLATFORM89-191RepairisrequiredonductworkattheLaundryExhaustFan,locatedinthevicinityoftheAFeedwater Line.TheentriesfromtheMotorandTurbineAuxiliary Feedwater Pumpdischarges arenearby,andthereisahighdensityofsnubbersforthispipinginarea(5mechanical and1hydraulic)

.Atemperature sensor(TE-2096) islocatedatthetopofthefeedwater linedownstream ofcheckvalve3003.Becauseoftheexistence oftheabovefeatureswithinthevicinityoftheproposedscaffold, scaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguideline's provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdes'cribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofNormalFeedwater LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliaries SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,it.willbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

September 12,1989SIRECIRCFLOWORIFICEFE-916LEAKREPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-192Aworkplatformisrequiredtocorrectaleakcondition atSIrecircfloworificeFE-916,locatedbetweentheRefueling WaterTankand480vBus16.AlsowithinthevicinityareTemperature Indicator TI-917,andSIrecircMOVs897and898.TheMOVsarewithintheASMESeismicClass2boundaryasindicated onPAID33013-1261 Containment Spray(SI).Theplatformistobeabout4ft.high,estimated tobeinexistence 2days.Becauseoffactorsgivenabovethescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheSobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shall.beconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingand.maintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

tTheinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffect,onanyexistingplant'provisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thedesignbasiseventsanalyzedin.theSafetyAnalysisReportwhich.areassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

.Theinstallation does'ot.involveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffect.onassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremain'independent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

,Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

9/26/89AUXILIARY BUILDINGTOPNORTHWALL(CNMT)PLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-193AscaffoldisplannedforpaintingthenorthwallattheAuxiliary Buildingtoplevel,toextendfromtheSpentFuelPooltotheareanorthof480VBus14,andtieintoaplannedscaffoldaroundtheRWST,controlled byAuthorization Form89-189.Becauseofthelargeareatobecovered,including theareasurrounding 480VBus14,andtherelatively lengthy-projected durationofthescaffoldexistence, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Inaddition, partoftheorientation shallstresstheimportance oftakingcarenottobumpanylivesmokedetectors.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer.

Inaddition, theJobSupervisor shallnotifytheFireProtection groupduringinstallation toallowforconsultation onanypotential interferences withfiredetection/sprinkler provisions encountered.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.

Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance

,accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed soasnottointerfere withAuxiliary BuildingCraneuseduringfueltransfermechanism workplanned.Duringscaffolduse,G.Jossshallbecontacted onprevention ofpaintingILRTinspection areasonthecontainment wall.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:"

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory RuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

AUXILIARY BUILDINGTOPSOUTHWALLWESTFROMCOLUMNLINE8aPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-1949/26/89'1Ascaffoldisplannedforpaintingthesouth-wallattheAuxiliary Buildingtoplevel,toextendfromtheDeconPittotheMonitorTanks.Becauseofthelargeareatobecovered,including theareaimmediately adjacenttobothComponent CoolingHeatExchangers, andtherelatively lengthyprojected durationofthescaffoldexistence, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167);ITheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Inaddition, partoftheorientation shallstresstheimportance oftakingcarenottobumpanylivesmokedetectors.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer.

Inaddition, theJobSupervisor shallnotifytheFireProtection groupduringinstallation toallowforconsultation onanypotential interferences withfiredetection/sprinkler provisions encountered.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, the'tructural Engineer-shalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakento'preventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed soasnottointerfere withAuxiliary BuildingCraneuseduringfueltransfermechanism workplanned.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory RuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent.

of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

TemorarInstallation and0erationofStandbS.F.P.Coolin~SetemAspartofENR-1594; "SpentFuelPoolCooling",

theStandbyS.F.P.CoolingSyst:emwillbeutilizedinadifferent configuration thenoriginally analyzed.

Therecirculation pump,heatexchanger, andassociated SpentFuelPoolpipe,valves,fitting,hoses,andinstrumentation willbeprovidedandinstalled asshownonattachedsketch(s) andperSM-1594.8A.

Thestandbysystemwillremaininserviceuntilthenewsystemisinstalled, tested,andplacedinoperation perEWR-1594.

TemorarFluidProvisions:

Hosesareconnected fromtheS.W.systemtotheskidmountedS.F.P.HeatExchanger.

Thesetwohoseswhichpasswithin5'feachC.C.W.pumpwillbesecuredtoexistingplantstructural members.Thehosedesignpressureis200psigwhichexceedstheS.N.systemdesignoperating pressure.

Asystemreliefvalvelocatedontheheatexchanger shellwillpreventthesystempressurefromexceeding 150psig.Isolation valvesareprovidedtoisolateservicewaterfromtheskidmountedheatexchanger.

TheC.C.N.systemrequiresonlyonepumptomeettherequireddesign.IntheeventofafailurewhichcausesacompletefailureoftheC.C.W.system,residualheatremovalwouldbeaccomplished withauxiliary feedandsteamgenerators.

ThiseventhasbeenanalyzedintheUFSARanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

EWR-1594addresses apostulated breakinthesixinchsupplyandreturnlines.Sincetherearetwotrainsofservicewater,theassumption is,ifonetrainislost,theothertrainwillprovidetherequiredcoolingfortheplant.Failureofthesixinchreturnlinewouldnotaffectthecoolingofcomponents intheservicewatersystem,Aredundant servicewaterreturnlineisprovided.

Inbothcasesstatedaboveisolation valvesareprovidedtoisolateservicewaterfromthe'skidmountedheatexchanger andassociated-hoses.Theinstallation andtie-intotheS.W.systemofhosestoandfromtheskidS.F.P.heatexchanger andtheirlocations inreference toC.C.W.pumpsandassociated components willnot1)resultinachangetothefacili'ty orit'soperation asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, or3)involveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

S.F.P.Recirculation HosesPieandFittinsTheskidpumpdischarge pipinghoseandfittingwhichconnectstothebottomoftheskidmountedS.F.P.heatexchanger willnotbelocatednearanysafetyrelatedequipment.

oranyotherplantpiping.Thehosewillberoutedalongthefloor.Page1of3

Theskidmountedheatexchanger discharges intotheexistingpooldischarge pipe.ThehoserouteisfromtheS.F.P.HxDischarge alongthesouthwalloftheAuxiliary BuildingandtiesintotheexistingS.F.P.discharge piping.Exceptforhose,valves,andfittingslocatedoverthespentfuelpool,thehoseisnotlocatednexttoanysafetyrelatedequipment.

Thehosewillbesecuredtostructural members.Thehosewillrunwithinapproximately twofeetofradiation monitorR-18.AhosebreakinthisareawhichcouldcauseR-18tobecomeinoperable couldincreasethepossibility ofanunmonitored release.DuringliquidreleasesR-18andassociated systemsaremonitored; thus,afailureandthereleaseofanyunmonitored releasewouldbeminimized.

Plantprocedures dictatethatpriortoanyliquidreleasethelimitsforactivityarebelowthoserequiredby10CFR20.Thedischarge hose,valves,andfittingslocatedoverthesouthwest corneroftheSpentFuelPitwillbetiedintotheexistingpooldischarge pipe.Theexistingdischarge pipeisprovidedwithavacuumbreakertopreventthesiphoneffectandeventualdraindownofthespentfuelpool.Thehosewillbesecuredtostructural members.Thecombinedweightoftheabovestatedcomponents islessthanthatofa1490lb.woodenpoleorfuelhandlingtoolwithattachedassembly.

Theimpact:of theaboveuponthefuelracksisanalyzedintheUFSAR.Therefore, thisinstallation boundedby.theabovewillnotchangeanyassumption asdescribed inUFSAR.Thesuctionpipewillprotrudebelowthenormalspentfuelpoolleveltoanelevation nolowerthan275'"(elevation ofuppersuctionpipe).Thepipeandattachedfittingswillbelocatedinthesoutheast corneroftheSpentFuelPool.Spentfuelisnotlocatedinthisarea.Thepipewillbelocatedatorabovetheelevation oftheupperpoolsuctiontapwhichhasbeenanalyzedanddesignedtopreventpooldraindownasstatedinUFSAR.Abreakorruptureofthesuctionhoseoutsidethepoolandatanelevation belowthepoolwaterlevelwouldonlydrainthepoolwaterleveldowntothatoftheuppersuctiontap.whichhasbeenanalyzedintheUFSAR.Aventvalveandisolation valvelocatedabovethepoolwaterlevelandinthetemporary suctionlinecouldbeoperatedtostopthesiphoning ofwaterfromthepool.Therefore, thisinstallation doesnotchangetheassumptions asstatedinUFSAR.Thewe'ightofthehoseandfittingsislessthanthatofawoodenpoleorfuelhandlingtoolwithattachedassembly.

Therefore, thisinstallation boundedbytheabovewillnotchangeanyassumptions asdescribed inUFSAR.Page2of3

S.F.P.HeatExchanerThespentfuelstandbyheatexchanger willbelocatedlessthan1.5timestheheightawayfromsafetyrelatedequipment andthefloodedweightoftheheatexchangers isgreaterthan7200lbs.Theheatexchanger willbeseismically mountedtopreventcontactwiththe1ACCWpumpduringaseismicevent.ServicewaterreturnfromtheS.F.P.back-upheatexchanger willbesampledandanalyzedtodetectanytubeleakage.S.F.P.Recirculation PumTheS.F.P.recirculation pumpislocatedfurtherthan1.5timesitsheightfromanysafetyrelatedequipment.

Thepumpbasewillbesecuredtothefloortopreventmovement.

The3phasepowersupplytothepumpmotorwillbefromanon-safetyrelatedsourceandthecablewillnotbelocatednexttoanysafetyrelatedcomponents.

Back-uSentFuelPoolSstemBasedonalltheabovethestandbyspentfuelpoolcooli'ngsystemwillnot1)resultinachangetotheassumptions asdescribed inth'eSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications, or3)involveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

PreparedBy:Oa~e:ApprovedBy:PORCReviewDate:Page3of3

TEMPORARY INSTALLATION ANDOPERATION OFSTANDBYS~F.P.COOLINGSYSTEMASPARTOFgWR1594.tiSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING<<THESTANDBYS.F.P.COOLINGSYSTEMWILLBEUTILIZEDINADIFFERENT CONFIGURATION THENORIGINALLY ANALYZED.

THERECIRCULATION PUMPHEAT"EXCHANGER gANDASSOCIATEDSPENTFUELPOOLPIPEgVALVESgFITTINGgHOSESgANDINSTRUMENTATI ONWILLBEPROVIDEDANDINSTALLED ASSHOWNONATTACHEDSKETCH(S)

ANDPERSM-1594.8A.THESTANDBYSYSTEMWILLREMAININSERVICEUNTILTHENEWSYSTEMISINSTALLED, TESTED,ANDPLACEDINOPERATZON PEREWR-1594.

TEMPORARY FLUIDPROVISIONS:

HOSESARECONNECTED FROMTHES.W.SYSTEMTOTHESKIDMOUNTEDS.F.P.HEATEXCHANGER.

THESETWOHOSESWHICHPASSWITHIN5'FEACHC.C.W.PUMPWILLBESECUREDTOEXISTINGPLANTSTRUCTURAL MEMBERS.THEHOSEDESIGNPRESSUREIS200PSIGWHICHEXCEEDSTHES.W.SYSTEMDESIGNOPERATING PRESSURE.

ASYSTEMRELIEFVALVELOCATEDONTHEHEATEXCHANGER SHELLWILLPREVENTTHESYSTEMPRESSUREFROMEXCEEDING 150PSZG.ISOLATION VALVESAREPROVIDEDTOISOLATESERVICEWATERFROMTHESKIDMOUNTED.HEATEXCHANGER.

THEC.C.W.SYSTEMREQUIRESONLYONEPUMPTOMEETTHEREQUIREDDESIGN.INTHEEVENTOFAFAILUREWHICHCAUSESACOMPLETEFAILUREOFTHEC.C.W.SYSTEM,RESIDUALHEATREMOVALWOULDBEACCOMPLISHED WITH

AUXILIARY FEEDAttDSTEAMGENERATORS

~THISEVENTi{ASBEENANALYZEDIttTHEUFSARAtiDDOFSttOTINVOLVEANUttRFVTFWt;li SAFETYQUF.R'<'TOll.

EWR-1594ADDRESSES APOSTULATED BREAKINTHESIXINCHSUPPLYANDRETURNLINES.SINCETHEREARETWOTRAINSOFSERVICEWATER/THEASSUMPTION ISgIFONETRAINISLOST'HEOTHERTRAXNWILLPROVIDETHEREQUIREDCOOLINGFORTHEPlhtfT.FAILUREOFTflESIXIt(CItRETURNLIt(EWOULDNOTAFFECTTHECOOLINGOFCOMPONENTS INTHESERVICEWATERSYSTEM.AREDUNDANT SERVICEWATER,RETURNLINEISPROVIDED.

INBOTHCASESSTATEDABOVEISOLATION VALVESAREPROVIDEDTOISOLATESERVICEWATERFROMTHESKIDMOUNTEDHEATEXCHANGER ANDASSOCIATED HOSES.THEINSTALLATION ANDTIE-XNTOTHES.W.SYSTEMOFHOSESTOANDFROMTHESKIDS.F.P.HEATEXCHANGER ANDTHEIRLOCATIONS ItfREFERENCE TOC.C.W.PUMPSANDASSOCIATED COMPONENTS WILLNOT1)RESULTINACHANGETOTHEFACILITYORXT'SOPERATION ASDESCRIBED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,2)PROVIDEACHANGETOTHEPLANTTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, OR3)INVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION.

S.F.P.RECIRCULATION HOSESPIPEANDFITTXNGS/RX'soL>7~+

tj-rd'6fTHESKIDPUMPDISCHARGE PIPINGHOSEANDFITTINGWHICHCONNECTSTOTHEBOTTOMOFTHESKXDMOUNTEDS.F.P.HEATEXCHANGER WILLNOTBELOCATEDNEARANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT ORANYOTHERPLANTPIPING.THEHOSEWILLBEROUTEDALONGTHEFLOOR.Zmeyacc~p'~THESKXDMOUNTEDHEATEXCHANGER DXSCHARGES INTOTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGAND'TIESINTOTHEEXISTINGS.F.P.DISCHARGE PEPIN.EXCEPTFORHOSE,VALVES,ANDFITTINGSLOCATEDOVERTHESPENTFUELPOOL,THEHOSEXSNOTLOCATEDNEXTTOANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

-T8~44ZWILLBESECUREDTOSTRUCTURAL MEMBERS.PROXXRYESTHEEXISTINGDISCHARGE PIPEISPROVIDEDWXTHAVACUUMBREAKERTO

PREVENTTHESIPHONEFFECTANDEVENTUALDRAINDOWNOFTHESPENTFUELPOOL.THEHOSEWILLBESECUREDTOSTRUCTURAL MEMBERS.ETHEREFORE, THISINSTALLATION BOUNDEDBYTHEABOVEWILLNOTCHANGEANYASSUMPTION ASDESCRIBED INUFSAR.THESUCTIONPIPEWILLPROTRUDEBELOWTHENORMALSPENTFUELPOOLLEVELTOANELEVATION NOLOWERTHAN275i0(ELEVATION OFUPPERSUCTIONPIPE).THEPIPEANDATTACHEDFITTINGSWILLBELOCATEDINTHESOUTHEAST CORNEROFTHESPENTFUELPOOL.SPENTFUELISNOTLOCATEDINTHISAREA.THEPIPEWILLBELOCATEDATORABOVETHEELEVATION OFTHEUPPERPOOLSUCTIONTAPWHICHHASBEENANALYZEDANDDESIGNEDTOPREVENTPOOLDRAINDOWNASSTATEDZNUFSAR~ABREAKORRUPTUREOFTHESUCTIONHOSEOUTSIDETHEPOOLANDATANELEVATION BELOWTHEPOOLWATERLEVELWOULDONLYDRAINTHEPOOLWATERLEVELDOWNTOTHATOFTHEUPPERSUCTIONTAPWHICHHASBEENANALYZEDINTHEUFSAR.AVENTVALVEANDISOLATION VALVELOCATEDABOVETHEPOOLWATERLEVELANDINTHETEMPORARY SUCTIONLINECOULDBEOPERATEDTOSTOPTHESIPHONING OFWATERFROMTHEPOOL.THEREFORE, THISINSTALLATION DOESNOTCHANGETHEASSUMPTIONS ASSTATEDINUFSAR.THEWEIGHTOFTHEHOSEANDFITTINGSISLESSTHANTHATOFAWOODENPOLEORFUELHANDLINGTOOLWITHATTACHEDASSEMBLY.

THEREFORE, THISINSTALLATION BOUNDEDBYTHEABOVEWILLNOTCHANGEANYASSUMPTIONS ASDESCRIBED INUFSAR.S.F.P.HEATEXCHANGER THESPENTFUELSTANDBYHEATEXCHANGER WILLBELOCATEDLESSTHAN1.5TIMESTHEHEIGHTAWAYFROMSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT ANDTHEFLOODEDWEIGHTOFTHEHEATEXCHANGERS ISGREATERTHAN7200LBS.THEHEATEXCHANGER WILLBESEISMICALLY MOUNTEDTOPREVENTCONTACTWITHTHElACCWPUMPDURINGASEISMICEVENT.SERVICEWATERRETURNFROMTHES.F.P.BACK-UPHEATEXCHANGER WILLBESAMPLEDANDANALYZEDTODETECTANYTUBELEAKAGESSTANDBYS.F.P.RECIRCULATION PUMPTHES.F.P.RECIRCULATION PUMPZSLOCATEDFURTHERTHAN1.5TIMESITSHEIGHTFROMANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

THEPUMPBASEWILLBESECUREDTO'HEAUXILIARY BUILDINGOPERATING FLOORTOPREVENTMOVEMENT.

THE3PHASETEMPORARY POWERSUPPLYTOTHESTANDBYS.F.P.PUMPMOTORWILLBEFROMMCC-1CPOS~1HWHICHPRESENTLY ISASPAREBREAKER.THETEMPORARY CABLEWILLBEROUTEDFROMMCC-1CPOS.1HPOSITIONALONGTHEEXISTINGCONDUITSUPPORTS

ANDBUILDINGSTRUCTURES TOTHESTANDBYS.F.P.PUMP.THEPUMPTEMPORARY POWERSUPPLYHASBEENEVALUATED ANDAPPROVEDBYELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (SEELETTER$13N1-RR-L2131 FROMJOHNH.SMITH).THECABLETOBEUSEDISQ.A.APPROVEDANDMEETSZEEE38/SPECIFICATIONS, quJ~ie),.TEMPORARY HOSEBETWEEN"A"CVCSHOLDUPTANKANDS.'F~P~COOLINGSYSTEMADRAINHOSEANDPORTABLEPUMPWILLBEINSTALLED BETWEENTHEDISCHARGE OFS.F.P.COOLINGPUMPANDTHE"A"H.U.T.THISPROCEDURE SM-15948A WILLCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDDRAINDOWNOFTHES.F.P.COOLINGSYSTEMPIPINGTO"A"H.U.T.THEREISADEQUATECAPACITYINH.U.T.'STODRAINAPPROXIMATELY 1500GALLONSOFBORATEDWATERFROMS.F.P.PIPING'ROCEDURAL CONTROLSANDCONTINUOUS MONITORING OFTHEDRAINDOWNPROCESSWILLNEGATEANYPOSSIBILITY OFDRAININGOFSPENTFUELPOOLWATERTOCVCSHOLD-UP-TANKS'ACK-UP SPENTFUELPOOLSYSTEMBASEDONALLTHEABOVETHESTANDBYSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMWILLNOT1)RESULTINACHANGETOTHEASSUMPTIONS ASDESCRIBED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,2)PROVIDEACHANGETOTHEPLANTTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, OR3)INVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION.

THEABOVEITEMWASREVIEWEDBYTHECOMMITTEE WITHRESPECTTOTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ANDTHECOMMITTEE HASDETERMINED THATNOTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESORVIOLATIONS WEREINVOLVEDANDTHEREARENOUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONS.

THISITEMISNOTCOMPLETE, PENDINGREVIEWOFMODIFICATION INSTALLATION.

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77~m

March16,1989LOSSOFDECAYHEATREMOVALEXPEDITIOUS ACTIONINTERIM"A"HOTLEGLEVELTRANSMITTER 89-9Genericletter88-17recommended expeditious actionsincluding installing twoindependent RCSwaterlevelindications withthecapability toprovidewaterlevelinformation toControlRoomoperators.

Onesuchprovision, apressuretransmitter (PT-432A) withindication attheMainControlBoardhasbeeninpermanent existence; however,asimilarprovision istobeinstalled priortoenteringthenextreducedreactorcoolantinventory operation.

Thiswillbeinstalled atatestconnection downstream oftheLoopAHotLegSampletapmanualrootvalve504,usingtubingofidentical materialtothepermanent installation forPT-432AintheBLoopSampletapexceptthat3/8"tubingmaybeusedinplaceof1/4".Atransmitter, similartoPT-432A,istobeinstalled, designated DPT-432Batthetestpointdiscussed above,tobemountedsecurelytotheadjacentwalloronastandwhichwillbefabricated andinstalled suchastoinsureagainsttopplingbyuseofstruts,bumpersortie-downs.

Thesignalcablewillbeinstalled underthecontrolsofprocedure A-1405installation andremovaloftemporary cables.Theexistingprocedure 0-2.3.1,DrainingtheReactorCoolantSystem,istoberevisedtoaddresstheindications tobemonitored, including thesubjectprovision.

Regarding levelindication difference betweenmeasurement points,thedifference calculated fromWestinghouse ESBU/WOG-88-173 datedOctober14,1988willbeprovidedtooperators forguidance.

Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseofthesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequatesupportsystemtoprovidedasdiscussed above,itwill.nothaveanyadverseeffectonthesafety-related equipment inthevicinity, orresultinadecreaseinreactorcoolantinventory.

ThedesignbaseseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemissuchastoensuretherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.

Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemtobeutilizedensurestherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafety-related equipment.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andthesupportsystemadequacy, asdescribed above',ensurestherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafetyrelatedequipment withinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becauseofthesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemwhichensuresagainstanyadverseeffectonequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

10CFR50.59 SAFETYEVALUATION TEMPORARY MODIFICATION 89-21ATEMPORARY CONNECTION OFLT-426REFERENCE LEGTOLT-427INTRODUCTION Thistemporary modification willconnectthereference legofLT-426withtheexistingreference legofLT-427.Theplantiscurrently atHotShutdownandwillremainathotorcoldshutdownwhilethistemporary connection isinplace.Thepurposeofthistemporary connection istodetermine theoperability ofLT-426whileconnected tothereference legofLT-427duetoapossibleobstruction inthereference legofLT-426.Thereference legofLT-426alsohaspressuretransmitter PT-429.Thispressuretransmitter providesinputtoOT~T,lowpressurizer

pressure, andhipressurizer pressuretripalongwithlowpressurizer pressuresafetyinjection andpressureinterlock inputtoPORV430.Thereference legforLT-427haspressuretransmitter PT-430.Thispressuretransmitter providesinputtoOT~T,lowpressurizer

pressure, andhipressurizer pressuretrips,lowpressurizer pressuresafetyinjection alongwiththepressureinputtoPORV430,andthelowpressurealarmat2185pslgoThetemporary connection willbeconstructed of3/8stainless steeltubingandwillbeconnected fromthelowsideofLT-426onthereference legsideofV12231Landthereference legwithPT-429(LT-426Sreference leg)willbecapped.Theotherendofthetemporary connection willbeconnected tothedrainpointofthereference legofLT-427,atthetransmitter sideofthelowsideisolation valve.Theprocessofvalvinginthistemporary tubingwillallowoperability ofthe2/3lowpressuresafetyinjection circuitry.

Initially, LT-426andPT-429willbeinoperable, isolatedandtheassociated bistables willbeinthetripcondition.

Allremaining pressurizer pressureandleveltransmitters willbeoperable.

Afterthereference legofLT-426iscapped,pressuretransmitter PT-429willbedeclaredoperableanditsbistables reinstalled.

Atthispoint,LT-427willbedeclaredinoperable anditsbistables tripped.Thiswillgenerateareactortripsignalfrom2/3hipressurizer level(reactortripbreakerswillbeopenpriortotripofbistables).

Theconnection willthentakeplacebetweenthelowsideofLT-426andthereference legofLT-427.Page1

SAFETYEVALUATION Theprobability ofoccurrence orthe.consequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.

Sincethestainless steeltubingrunfromLT-426toLT-427willberatedforsystempressureandtemperature, theprobability ofaLOCAfromthetemporary tubingwillnotbeincreased fromtheLOCAaccidentaddressed intheUFSARChapter15.Sincethetemporary tubingandbothconnection pointsare3/8"indiameter, aleakfromthetemporary tubingwillbeequalto,orlessthanthecapabilities ofthechargingsystem.Sincetheplantismaintained atthehotshutdowncondition, theReactorTripsfromboththepressurizer pressurechannels(OT+Tlowpressureandhipressure) andthelevel.channels (hilevel)arenotrequiredtobeoperableperTechnical Specification 3.5table3.5-1.Letdownisolation signalwillnotbeoperableduringthisevolution.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentwillnotbeincreased becausetheletdownisolation signalisnotassumedintheaccidentanalysisofChapter15oftheUFSAR.Since,thepressurizer lowpressuresafetyinjection signalwillbeinthetripcondition oroperable, safetyinjection willremainfullyoperabledur'ingthistemporary modification.Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbythistemporary modification.

Thesafetyinjection systemwillremainfullyoperableduringthistemporary modification andwillrespondtotheaccidentasaddressed inChapter15oftheUFSAR.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbythistemporary modification.

Section3.5ofTechnical Specifications willbesatisfied duringthistemporary modification.

Asimulated signalwillbeinstalled intothedefeatedLT-427channeltoallowoperation ofthepressurizer heatersandtokeep100kwofheatersoperable.

ZnChapter15accidentanalysis, letdownisolation istotakeplacethroughCVisolation signalofAOV-371andnotvialetdownisolation.

CONCLUSION Temporarily connecting thereference legofLT-427toLT-426doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionproviding theconnection isperformed asspecified above.Page2

SECTIOND-PROCEDURE CHANGESThissectioncontainsadescription ofthechangestoprocedures asdescribed intheUFSARandasummaryofthesafetyevaluation pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.59(b).

us00PROCEDURE DATE48'CN-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequential change"orthereferenced 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation below:ChangeType:If"no"wasansweredforItem6,providethebasisforexclusion below:BasisforExclusion:

-Item7If"no"hasbeanansweredforeachquestioninitemsVathrough7gthischangeisnotanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion.

Documentthe)ustification fortheseconclusions below.Listanymaterialreferenced inthespaceprovided.

WrittenJustification:

VaYlOIf"yes+wasansweredforItea3,checkthisboxIf"yes",wasansweredforItem7,PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal.

ThisproposedchingeisanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittal totheNRCfortheirreview.Submitted By!

50.59forPT-32AAmendment 34totheGinnaTechnical Specifications, mandateslogictraintestingforthereactortripandbypassbreakers, onanalternate monthbasis.Thismonthlylogictestingwillverifytheoperability ofallsetsofreactortriplogicactuating

contacts, onthetrainundergoing testing.Duringthistesting,operation ofonesetofcontactswillresultinareactortripbreakertrip,theoperation ofallothersetsofcontactswillbeverifiedbytheuseofindication circuitry.

Thetestingshallbeperformed monthlyunlessthereactortripbreakersareopenorshallbeperformed priortostartupiftestinghasnotbeenperformed withinthelast30days.Themonthlytestingofthebypassbreaker,willverifymanualtripofthebypassbreakerusingtheshunttripcoil,actuatedfromthetestswitchesinthereactorprotection rack.Thereactortriplogicwasdesignedtohavethecapability oftestinganyofthevariouslogiccombinations whileatpower,withtheuseofthebypassbreakerastheallowingfactor.Duringsuchlogictesting,thereisnoreduction inplantsafetyduetothetrippingscheme,wherebythetrainnotundergoing testinggenerates thetripsignalforitsrespective reactortripbreakerandthebypassbreakerwhichisinservice,bypassing theoppositetrainsreactortripbreaker.Therefore, ifanactualtripsignalweretobegenerated, boththebypassbreakerandthereactortripbreakerontheactivetrainwouldopen,resulting inareactortrip.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillbeincreased, duetothenatureoftheincreased testingofthelogicactuating relaysandassociated contacts.

Thisisanobviouspointinthatthehistoryoftheserelaysandcontactswerethedetermining factorintheNRC'sdecisionto'testthembi-monthly, inlieuofyearly,ashadbeendoneinthepast.Therefore, byvirtueoftheNRC'sreviewofthisissueandtheirdecisiontoincreasethetestingfrequency, nounreviewed safetyquestions exist.Additionally, evenifthemalfunction rateincreases substantially, thefactthatwearetestinginanestablished safetyconscious testalignment, willnotcompromise plantsafetyorcauseanyunreviewed safetyquestions tobegenerated.

GreggE.Joss4/29/89

0PROCEDURE DATEPCNs0oee-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequential change"orthereferenced 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation belov:ChangeType:If"no"wasansweredforItem6,providethe.basisforexclusion belov:BasisforExclusion:

Item7If"no"hasbeenansweredforeachquestioninitems7athrough7gthischange.isnotanUnrevieved SafetyQuestion.

Documentthejustification iortheseconclusions belov.Listanymaterialreferenced inthespaceprovided.

WrittenJustification:

e~Vg0~If"yes+"was answeredforItex3,checkthisboxIf~yes~,wasansweredforXtex7,PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal.

ThisproposedchangeisanUnrevieved SafetyQuestion(VSQ)andrequiressubxittal totheNRCfortheirreview.Subxitted Byi

50.59forPT-32BAmendment 34totheGinnaTechnical Specifications, mandateslogictraintestingforthereactortripandbypassbreakers, onanalternate monthbasis.Thismonthlylogictestingwillverifytheoperability ofallsetsofreactortriplogicactuating

contacts, onthetrainundergoing testing.Duringthistesting,operation ofonesetofcontactswillresultinareactortripbreakertrip,theoperation ofallothersetsofcontactswillbeverifiedbytheuseofindication circuitry.

Thetestingshallbeperformedmonthlyunlessthereactortripbreakersareopenorshallbeperformedpriortostartupiftestinghasnotbeenperformed withinthelast30days.Themonthlytestingofthebypassbreaker,willverifymanualtripofthebypassbreakerusingtheshunttripcoil,actuatedfromthetestswitchesinthereactorprotection rack.Thereactortriplogicwasdesignedtohavethecapability oftestinganyofthevariouslogiccombinations whileatpower,withtheuseofthebypassbreakerastheallowingfactor.Duringsuchlogictesting,thereisnoreduction inplantsafetyduetothetrippingscheme,wherebythetrainnotundergoing testinggenerates thetripsignalforitsrespective reactortripbreakerandthebypassbreakerwhichisinservice,bypassing theoppositetrainsreactortripbreaker.Therefore, ifanactualtripsignalweretobegenerated, boththebypassbreakerandthereactortripbreakerontheactivetrainwouldopen,resulting inareactortrip.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillbeincreased, duetothenatureoftheincreased testingofthelogicactuating relaysandassociated contacts.

Thisisanobviouspointinthatthehistoryoftheserelaysandcontactswerethedetermining factorintheNRC'sdecisiontotestthembi-monthly, inlieuofyearly,ashadbeendoneinthepast.Therefore, byvirtueoftheNRC'sreviewofthisissueandtheirdecisiontoincreasethetestingfrequency, nounreviewed safetyquestions exist.Additionally, evenifthemalfunction rateincreases substantially, thefactthatwearetestinginanestablished safetyconscious testalignment, willnotcompromise plantsafetyorcauseanyunreviewed safetyquestions tobegenerated.

GreggE.Joss4/29/89

PROCEDURE DATE6PCNsonfomSreeCte-Items1,2,or6If<<yes<<isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequential change<<orthereferenced 10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation below:ChangeType:If<<no<<wasansweredforItem6,providethebasisforexclusion below:BasisforExclusion:

FR50.59SafetEvauatio-Item7If<<no<<hasbeenansweredforeachquestioninitems7athrough7gthischangeisnotanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion.

DocumenttheJustification fortheseconclusions below.Listanymaterialreferenced inthespaceprovided.

WrittenJustification:

""Cuur/a+iIf<<yes"wasansweredforItem3,checkthisbox&FitC7P/C~c4Maw'cIf"yes<<,wasansweredforItem7,PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal.

ThisproposedchangeiaanUnreviewed SafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittal totheNRCfortheirreview.Submitted By:

TheattachedprocedureRF4.".2controlsthee>;aminati onoffuelasembliesXTOandXT04.Dothfuelassemblies willbeeaminedinthespentfuel'oolduringtheoutageperiodthatthecoreiscompletely unloaded.

FuelassemblyXT04willbee;;amined visuallyonly.FuelassemblyXTO~willbee>:amined

visually, but=willalsohaveindividual rodsremovedforspecificmeasurements.

Toremovetherodsthefuelassemblywillbeplacedinthenewfuel'elevator andraisedtoadepthoFnolessthan8I'tbelowthepoolsurface.Atthislevelt:heuppertieplatewillberemovedandindividual rodsgrappled.

Eactsrodwillberemovedandreinserted<<'0inchesbyllafldtoinsurethei,rarenointerferencesatthegrid..Therodwi11becompletelyremovedbyloweringthenewfuelelevator.

Afterthemeasurements arecompleted therodwillbe'reinserted byhand20inches,andthenfullyinsertedbyralsingtheelevator.Additional1yperipheralrodswi11bereinsertedusingaspecialfi::I:ure tominimi"etI>epotential forIiooI;out atgrid1QcaIiiolIs~TransIeroFfueJasemblieswittiinthespentfuelpoolwillbeinaccordance withexistingprocedure RFB.4.No1oadsine::cessofafuel'ssembly anditshandlingtool<1500lbs)willbesuspended overrackscontaining spentfuel.Thereforetheradiological releasefromapotential fuelhandli.ng accidentremainsboundedbythatanaly".ed inse<-ion15.7.3oftheUFSAR.PlacementO'FasI)entfuelassemb1yinthenewfuelelevatorisnotaddressed inSection9.1.4..~~?intheUFSARwhichspeciFicallystatesthattheelevatorwi11beusedfornewfuelonly.ThesafetyconcernisthepotentialFortheelevatortoberaisedtothepoolsurfacewithaspentfuelassembl)creatingasevereradiological ha"ard.Howeverthepotential forthistoocrurisminirni";.ed throughtwoindependent measulesFirst)elevatoroperation isnormallycontrolled byapushbuttoni:hatmustbecontinuously depressed foroperation.

Theelevatorcablewillbesuitiblymarkedtoprovidetheoperatorwithindication whenminimumdepthisapproached.

Second,theuplimitswitchontheelevatorwillbeadjustedtomaintaintheminimumSftdepth.TransferoFsingleFuelrodswillbebyhandtools.Thesetoolswillbemarkedtoindicatetheminimumrequireddepthof6ft.Thefuelrodelevatorwillalsobeequipedwithlimitswitchestomaintaintheminimumdepthat6Initialofthefuelrodsfromthefuelassemblywillbeperformed manuallytopreventthepotential foroverloading therodduring1owerinoftheelevator.

Initialinsertion oftherodwillalsobeperformed manual1ya

Theattachedprocedure RF02.2controlsthee;-;amination offuelassemblies XTOiandXT04.BathFuelassemblies willbee;;amined inthespentfuelpoolduringtheoutageperiodthatthecoreiscompletely unloaded.

FuelassernblyXTrr0wi11bee~aminedvisual1yonly.FuelassemblyXTO~willbee;(amined visuall'y, butwillalsohaveindividual rodsremovedforspecificmeasurements.

Toremovetherodsthefuel,assemblyrvillbeplacedinthenewfuelelevatorandraisedtoadepthofranlessthan8ftbelo<vthepoolsurface.Atthisleveltheuppertieplatewillberemovedandindividual rodsgrappled.

Eachrodwillberemovedandreinserted20inchesbyhandtoinsuretheirarenointerfereraces atthegrids.Therndwillbecompletely removedby,.loweringthenewFIrelelevator...

Afterthemeasurements arecornpletedtherodwillbereinserted byhaAd20inches,andthorrfullyinsertedbyraisi'ngtheelevator~

.Additional1yperipheral rodsuri11bereinsertedusingaspecialfi::turetominirni"ethepotential forbool:nutatgrid~1neatinns.Transferoffrelassemblies withinthespentfuelponlwillbei'accordance withe;:itingprocedureRF8.0.Noloadsin':;cess ofaFuelasserrlb1yanditshandlingtool(15001bs)wi11besuspended overrackscontaining spentFuel.ThereFore theradiological releasefromapotential fuelhandlinpaccidentremainsboundedbythatanaly"edins-.tion15.7.3oftheUFSAR.Plclcerl)erlt nfa'spel'ltfuelassemb1yinthenewfuelelevatorisnotaddressed inSectionP.i.0.3.2intheUFSARwhichspecifically statesthattheeleYa'tnluri11beusedfornetfuelonly.Thesafetyconcernisthepotential fortheelevatortoberaisedtothepoolsurfacewithaspentfuelassemblycreatingasevereradiological ha"ard.Howeverthepotential forthistoocrurisrninirni"edthroughtwoindependent.

measures.

First,ele'vatoroperationisnormal1ycontrol1edbyapush'uttonthatmustbecontinuously depressed foroperation.

Theelevatorcable<villbesuitiblymarl;edtoprovidetheoperatorwithindication whenrninimurg depiliisapproached-.

Second,theup1imitswitch,ontheelevatoruril1beadjustedtomaintaintheminimum8ftdepth.TransferoFsinglefuelrodswillbebyhandtools.Thesetoolswillbemellh'pdtnindicatetheminimumrequireddepthof6ft.Thefuelrodelevatorwillalsobeequipedwithlimitswitchestomaintaintheminimumdepthat6ft.Theinitialpullofthefuelrodfromthefuelassemblywillbeperfnrmed manuallytopreventthepotential foroverloading therodduringlnrvering oftheelevator.InitialinsertionnFtherodwillalsobeperformed manually.

Therefore thisproce>sdoesnotpresentanunrevicuredsafetyquestionfnlthefnl1DivingIeasons:1.Theprobabi1ityofoccurrer)ceortheconsequences ofanidentormalfunction oFequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.

I'IThefuelhandlingaceidentisaddressed in.ch'a'pter,:.15,of

'th'e+UFSAR;-

".-,;.;~'~>7;.~~'t notimeismorethanonefuelassembly'hei'ng:-"Cranspdr't'Od':;by'Ya',"~"'-~',.-".

It~y.WV'

handlingtoolorinstalledintlutenewfuelelevatorFuie::amiflation.notimedoestheoppor<uni tyoccur,formoreth'anoneassemblytobedamagedbyahandlingaccident.

Therequiredbuildings ventilation alignment andtheradiol'ogical sourcetermisboundedbytheLJFSAF(assumptions.

2.Thepossibi1ityforanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferenttypethananyevaluated previouslyinthesafetyanalysisisflotcleated~Severeradiological consequence=

wouldresultiFaspentfuel"assembly wasraisedtothesurFaceofthepoolinthenewfuel.elevator.

However,thiswouldrequirethefailureoftwoindependent meansofrestricting theassemblyheightto,themaximumspecified.

The.marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisForanytechnical speciFicationisflolreduced.Therequiredsystemstomitigatetheeffectsoffuelhandlingaccidents arerequiredForthisFuelexamination.

Therequireddepthfortheee'amined fuelassemblyinthenewfuelelevatorwillprovidesufFicientradiological shielding, oradjustments willbemadebaseduponreviewbyhealthphysicspersonnel.

'Thedoublefailurerequiredraisingthefuelassemblymakesevaluation ofthisevente-sary.

SECTIONE-COMPLETED SPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTS Thissectionistocontainadescription ofspecialtestsandexperiments performed inthefacility, pursuanttotherequire-mentsof10CFR50.59(b).Withinthetimeframeofthisreport,thereweretwoconducted.

<<<<E~~P-+'"~~CENTRALRECORDSOALIFr:FIMF.

FIGURE4A-301.1:llRefertoA-301.1forstructions S2~TYEMQlJATION SUNDRYREPORT3>l'orSTPFs02No.DESCRIPTION OFMODIFICATION, SPECIALTESTOFEXPERIMENT:

Qgeci5,~e.s+

"QgSLEcUO~IO-P-a~I" PREPAREDBY:).~,P.,A.%acres.1.DOCUMENTS REVIEWED:

JsJA.UFSAR-SECTION8~)SECTIONSar.+ID'9.6,B.TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DgkgY~<mAoMDATE:P~esIS.l.II.I-ID.I.IDIPAGES(.14l'lPAGES~~~A<M(~4Pres/56~IW~mISSECTION5.3SECTION2.EVALUATION RESULTS:WS'ISPAGES.Q-)v~PAGES>~-P+~~~3>-gA.ANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONINVOLVED(IFYES,CHECKAPPLICABLE REASONBEZDW)-ZNCRFASED PROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFCONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORAMALI!UNCTION:

-POSSIBILITY CREATEDFORACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION NOTCONSIDERED BEFORE:-MARGINOFSAPIDDEFINEDINBASISFORTECHNXCAL SPECZFICATXONS ISREDUCED:B.ACHANGEINTECHNICAL SPECXFICATIONS REQUIRED~$ZFYESIBRIEFDESCRIPTION:

NOiAPPROVEDPORCDATE:08NSARBDATE:USNRCAPPROVAL(ZFREQUIRED)

TITLEITEMNUMB~@+Gi~~DDATE 0-)hh

SAFETYEVALUATION SpecialTest"RCSLeakageDetermination of10/7/88ST-88.21.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS:

~Thepurposeofthistestistodetermine thecause(s)of"B"SIAccumulator

("A"LoopAccumulator) inleakageanddetermine thecauseofanobservedelevatedpressureandtemperature onlAHighHeadSILine("B"LoopSILine)andcorrectifpossible.

1~2Thescopeofthisanalysisistoassurethattheconductofthistestduringreactorpoweroperation doesnot:a~increasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheFSAR,orb.c~createthepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously, orreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification.

4

REFERENCES:

GinnaUpdatedFacilitySafetyAnalysisReportSection6andSection15.2'2.3GinnaTechnical Specifications Section3.3.RG&EDwg.33013-1262.

3.0 SAFETYANALYSIS

3.110CFR50.59ReviewTheproposedprocedure todetermine RCSleakageof10/7/88hasbeenreviewedtodetermine ifsections50.59(a)(2)(i),

(a)(2)(ii) and(a)(2)(iii) apply(a)(2)(i)

TheclosureofMOV878"B"or"D"constitutes theenteringofalimitingcondition foroperation (LCO)(Section3.3GinnaTechnical Specifi-cations).

TheLCOconstitutes ananalyzedcondition withintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Therefore, theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased beyondthatassumedintheTechnical Specification LCO.

However,giventhatthe878B/Dflowpathsareessential indelivering watertoeachcoldlegoftheRCSduringanaccidentcondition withnofunctional replacement, similartotheaccumulator outletvalves,itisrecommended thatthe878B/Dvalve,1)remainactivewhileclosedand2)shouldbeclosednomorethan(1)onehoursimilartotheaccumulator outletvalvespecifi-cation.(a)(2)(ii)

Nodifferent typeaccidentormalfunction otherthantheSARevaluated accidents ormalfunctions asdefinedbytheTechnical Specification LCOiscreated.(a)(2)(iii)

Noreduction inthemargintosafetyasdefinedinthebasisofTechnical Specifications isintimated bythistest[seediscussion in(a)(2)(i) above]4.0PRELIMINARY SAFETYEVALUATION:

Basedontheaboveitisdetermined that:a~theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated inthesafetyanalysiswillnotbeincreased, andb.c~thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanthatevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysiswillnotbecreated,andthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreduced.PREPAREDBY:Responsible SineerDATE:REVIEWEDBY:eactorEngineerDATE:APPROVEDBY:>">~>CCenicalMaagrDATE:)0-

A-301.1:11RefertoA-301.1forInstructions SAFER'YEVMZJATION SUMMARYREPORTpopPRDcf~l48kNo.57-P9.jIV~~/d'Ah'red

$7E47ig/~rd~

/kj'dnagQ/Af5Qc'~s~~)8i zZQ54'C5g~/4E~iOHo/NorA'p84/eddySysvZePi/mrgV/RrEWPdrQRy/~s~w~vio4 c)Fwb'M4'olde/zS 5'Ag<~R<YsIS10Am&3-W/A7/80'REPARED BY:DATE:53III1.DOCUMENTS REVIEWED:

A.UFSAR-SECTIONSECTIONB.TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTIONSECTION2~EVALUATION RESULTS:A.ANUNEKVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONINVOLVED(IFYES,CHECKAPPLICABLE REASONBEZDW)PAGES~~/~,~-P3PAGES~-/~P4')wgFr$S&IIIII-INCREASED PROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFCONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORAMALI'UNCTION:

-POSSIBILITY CREATEDFORACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION NOTCONSIDERED BEFORE:-MARGINOFSAFETYDEFINEDINBASISFORTECHNICAL

'PECIFICATIONS ISREDUCED:-

,B.ACHANGEZNTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRED~QZFYES,Hu:EFDESCRIPTION:

APPROVEDPORCDATE:NSARBDATE:hUSNRCAPPROVAL(ZFREQUIRED):

TITLEITEMRJNBYS./0-Bgogoe

SAFETYANALYSISGINNASTATIONTEMPERATURE STRATIFICATION MONITORING TEMPORARY MODIFICATION REVISION0APRIL27g1989PREPAREDBY:Electrical EngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:eactorEngineerrrDateAPPROVEDBY:5anager,Technical Engineering Date C

RevisionStatusSheetPageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.000-00SafetyAnalysisPageiiRevision0

SAFETYANALYSIS1.0SCOPEOPANALYS1S:

NRCBulletinNo.88-11,"Pressurizer SurgeLineThermalStratification",

requestsalladdressees toestablish andimplement aprogramtoconfirmpressurizer surgelineintegrity inviewoftheoccurrence ofthermalstratification, andrequiresthemtoinformthestaffoftheactionstakentoresolvethisissue.Pursuanttosatisfying therequirement andscheduleofBulletin88-11,Rochester GasandElectricCorporation isparticipating inaprogramforpartialresolution ofthisissuethroughtheWestinghouse Owner'sGroup(WOG).TheWOGprogramisdesignedtobenefitfromtheexperience gainedintheperformance ofseveralplant-specificanalysesonWestinghouse PWRsurgelines.Thesedetailedanalysesincludeddefinition ofrevisedthermaltransients (including stratification).

Theoverallanalytical approachusedinalloftheseanalyseshasbeenreviewedbytheNRCstaff.Asignificant amountofpressurizer surgelinethermalmonitoring datahasbeenobtainedinsupportoftheseplant-specific analyses.

Additional pressurizer surgelinethermalmonitoring andplantsystemdatacontinues tobemadeavailable withintheWOG,resulting inasteadilyincreasing database.

Pressurizer surgelinetemperature stratification datawillbecollected atGinnaforinclusion intheWOGdatabase.

1~2Thermalstratification andcyclingphenomena werealsodiscovered inauxiliary pipingconnected totheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Thesephenomena maycausepipecracksintheunisolable sections.

ofauxiliary pipingsystems.USNRCissuedBulletin88-08andsubsequent supplements toaddressthisphenomena.

Asaresult,electricutilities arerequiredtoprovideresponsetotheNRCregarding thereviewandidentification ofauxiliary pipesectionsconnected totheRCSthatmaybesub)ected tothermalstratification notconsidered inthedesignoftheplant.Westinghouse hasidentified threepipingsectionsthatmaybesub)ected tothermalstratification.

Theseare:SafetyAnalysisPage1Revision0Date4789

a)charginglinetoLoopBhotlegbetweencheckvalve393andtheRCSnozzleb)alternate charginglinetoLoopAcoldlegbetweencheckvalve383AandtheRCSnozzle1.3c)auxiliary spraylinebetweencheckvalve297andthemainpressurizer spraylineThisanalysisaddresses theconsequences of-installing temporary thermocouples onthepressurizer surgeline,LoopBchargingline,LoopAalternate chargingline,-andauxiliary sprayline.Thermocouple extension wireshallbetemporarily routedtoadataacquisition controller.

Thecontroller shallprovideadigitaloutputtoaremotepersonalcomputer.

Thedataoutputlineshallutilizetemporary cableandexistingsparecircuitstoexitcontainment.

1~4Inadditiontothethermocouples, fourtemporary displacement transducers aretobeinstalled onth0pressurizer surgeline.Thetransducers willmonitorlinemovementduringheat-up,cool-down, andduringtemperature stratification conditions.

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:

2'2'2'2.52.6GinnaStationProcedure, A303'reparation, Review,andApprovalofSafetyAnalysisforMinorModifications orSpecialTests".GinnaStationProcedure, A<<1405,"Installation andRemovalofTemporary Cables".GinnaStationProcedure, "A-1406,"ControlofTemporary Modifications".

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport.USNRCRegulatory Guide1.70,StandardFormatandContentofSafetyAnalysisReportsforNuclearPowerPlants,LWREdition,Revision3,November1978.AppendixRAlternative ShutdownSystem,"GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Revision4,January1987.SafetyAnalysisPage2Revision0Date42789

2'GAI,"FireProtection Evaluation" ReportNo.1936,March1977.3.0SAFETYANALYSIS:

3.1AreviewhasbeenmadeofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaFSARandtheeventsrequiring analysisbytheUSNRCRegulatory Guide1.70.Theeventsrelatedtothismodification are:3.1.13~1.23'~31)seismicevent2)majorandminorfiresAlltemporary instrument cableinstalled shallberoutedtofollowtherespective linetobemonitored andthendropvertically tocontainment floorelevation 235'.Thetemporary cablewillthenberoutedalongthefloor,following theshieldwalltothefreestandingdataacquisition controller.

Noseismicimpactisanticipated sinceinstrument cableweightisnegligible comparedtopipe/insulation weight.Instrument cableroutedonthefloorandthefreestandingcontroller (approx.10"Hx12"Wx24"D)willnotaffectseismicstructures intheimmediate vicinity.

Thedataacquisition controller willbeplacedoutsideoftheshieldwallnearthelowerendofthepressurizer.

Temporary cableusedforthedatalinkshallfollowtheshieldwallatelevation 235',risetoelevation 253'iasouth-east stairs,andfollowtheshieldwalltoIncoreReference JunctionBox1B.Noseismicimpactisanticipated sincethiscablewillfollowafloor/stair routing.Cableseparation inIncoreReference JunctionBox1Bshallbemaintained.

Thetemporary datalinkcableshallbesplicedtosparecircuitA780.Cableandconductor insulation shallberestoredusingRaychemWCSFsleeves.ThesplicedcablesshallbedressedinIncoreBox1BsothatdistancebetweenA780andIncoreThermocouple cablesismaximized.

SafetyAnalysis*Page3Revision0Date789

3Thistemporary modification willnotpropagate amajororminorfire.Cablesusedforthermocouples andthermocouple extensions areindividually sheathedinInconelOverbraid (thermocouples) orTinnedCopperOverbraid (extensions).

Noadditional fireloadingisanticipated bytheoverbraided cable.Temporary cableusedforthedatalinkisratedandqualified toIEEE-383flamerequirements asaminimum.Totalestimated containment fireloadingforthistemporary datalinkcableis200000BTUs.3'~5Temporary cableusedforthedatalinkwillbesplicedtoexistingsparecableA779intheAirHandlingRoom.Routingisthroughafloorpenetration totheMux.Room.Totalfireloadingforthetemporary cableintheAirHandlingRoomisnegligible.

Totalfireloadingforthetemporary cableintheMux.Roomisestimated at2000BTUs.3.1.63.1~73.1~83~23~2~1Firebarrierpenetrations willberepairedandreplacedinaccordance withexistingplantprocedures.

Therefore existingsealswillnotbedegraded.

Thismodification doesnotaffectthesafeshutdownanalysis.

intheAppendixRsubmittal sincethereisnoeffectonseparation ofexistingcircuits, associated

circuits, orfireareaboundaries asanalyzedintheAppendixRsubmittal.

Thismodification willnoteffectthecapabilities oftheAlternative ShutdownSystem.Furthermore, noneoftheexistingprocedures forobtaining anAlternative SafeShutdownwillbeeffected.

Thismodification, therefore, complieswith10CFR50,AppendixR.Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

SafetyAnalysisPage~Revision~

4'PRELIMINARY SAFETYEVALUATION:

4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4'4.34'Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision0Date78

l,@AlloftheabovewerereviewedbythePORCcommittee withrespecttotheTechnical Specifications andthecommittee hasdetermined thatnoTechnical Specification changesorviolations wereinvolved.

Additionally, thesechangeswerereviewedinc'ommittee todetermine iftheypresented anUnreviewed SafetyQuestionandthegeneralsummations ofthesereviewsareasfollows:Thesechangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence, ortheconsequences'f anaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyaspreviously evaluated intheUFSAR,because:2~Thesechangeswere'adetoensurecontinued operability/availability ofplant,equipment andwillnotresultinanyequipment beingoperatedoutsideofitsnormaloperating'ange.

Thisresultsincontinued operability/availability, ofequipment important tosafety.Thesechangesadditionally willnotresultinachangeofoperating characteristics ofequipment usedintransient/accident mitigation whichprecludes anincreaseintheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccident.

Becausethesechangesensurecontinued availability ofplantequipment, thelimitsshownintheTechnical Specifications, andtheassumptions ofthesafetyanalysesoftheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcontinuetobemet.Asaresultthereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanypresently postulated accident.

IThesechangesdonotcreatethepossibility foranewordifferent kindofaccident, oramalfunction ofadifferent, typefromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecause:3~Thesechangesdonotpresentnewfailuremechanisms outsideofthosepresently anticipated, andareboundedbytheeventscontained intheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.Thesechangesdonotreducethemarginofsafetybecause:Presentmarginsascontained intheTechnical Specifications arevalid,andtheseprocedure changesaremadewithin.thoselimits.Theseprocedure changeswillnotresultinviolating thebaselineassumptions madeforequipment availability intheTechnical Specifications, andtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.

~'