ML13311A050

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Changes to the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program
ML13311A050
Person / Time
Site: Ginna, Berkeley Research Reactor
Issue date: 11/04/2013
From: Palmer E F
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
Download: ML13311A050 (4)


Text

Safeguards Information Eugene PalmerDirector, SecurityR.E Ginna Nuclear Power Plant1503 Lake RdOntario, NY 14519-9364 (585)-771-5223 Eugene. Palmer@cengllc.com CENGS.a joint venture ofConstellation y- eDFEnergy-November 4, 2013U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTENTION:

Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power PlantDocket No. 50-244 and 72-67Changes to the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Security Plan, Trainingand Oualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security ProgramPursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p), attached is Revision 6 to the R. E. GinnaNuclear Power Plant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Program.

A summary of changesis provided in Attachment 1 and the revised Plan is provided in Attachment

2. Attachment 2,Revision 6 to the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation SecurityProgram is classified as Safeguards Information.

This Security Plan change submittal is in regards to removing a reference to the site's originalvehicle barrier system (VBS). This reference is being removed to support the proposed vehiclegate replacement at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. These modifications will not alter theprotective strategy nor reduce the effectiveness of the vehicle barrier system (VBS). In 1994, aVBS was installed that met the requirements listed in NUREG/CR 6190 Rev. 1. A portion of thissystem consisted of a vehicle gate that allowed vehicles access in and out of the protected area.In 2004, the DBT was revised as well as NUREG/CR-6190.

As a result of this, a new VBS wasinstalled at Ginna Station to meet the requirements listed NUREG/CR6190 Rev 2. The previousVBS, which includes the Jersey barrier and cable-bollard

systems, was no longer utilized to meetregulatory requirements was retired in place and referenced in the plan as providing additional margin. The existing vehicle gate which was part of the VBS installed in 1994 has significant reliability and obsolescence concerns and the decision has been made to replace it with a newgate which is not designed to the same criteria as the previous gate.Safeguards Information sco(

Safeguards Information Document Control DeskNovember 4, 2013Page 2After reviewing the site design blast calculation, replacement of the main vehiclegate does notinvalidate any inputs, assumptions or results provided in this calculation.

The gate being replacedmeets the requirements that were set forth as a result of NUREG/CR 6190 issued in 1994.However, since that time, the DBT has been revised.

Site blast calculations analyze the currentDBT counter measures, which satisfactorily meet or exceed the requirements described in theupdate to NUREG/CR 6190 to reflect the DBT that is dated March 17, 2004.After a review of R.E. Ginna Station's protective strategy and R.E Ginna Nuclear Power PlantSecurity Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security

Program, Revision 5, it has been determined thatreplacing the existing gate will not impact the site's protective strategy

.Timelines and defensive positions will not be impacted.

The operation of the new gate will remain the same as the gatebeing replaced.

In addition, certain sections of the Jersey barrier and cable-bollard systems willremain in place as a conservative measure although they will no longer be taken credit for in thesite's security plan. In conclusion, the modification that is being made to the site's VBS will notreduce the effectiveness of the security plan.Should you have any questions regarding the information in this submittal, please contact Mr.Thomas Harding, Director Licensing at (585) 771-5219.

Very truly yoDEugene F. PalmerSafeguards Information Safeguards Information Document Control DeskNovember 4, 2013Page 3Attachments:

(1)Summary of the Changes for Revision 6 of the "R. E. Ginna Nuclear PowerPlant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation SecurityProgram."

(2) "R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, and Independent Spent Fuel StorageInstallation Security Program,"

Revision 6.NOTE: ATTACHMENTS 2 TO THIS LETTER CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AND MUST BEPROTECTED ACCORDINGLY.

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT 2, THIS LETTER MAY BE DECONTROLLED.

cc: W. M. Dean, NRC (with Attachments)

M. C. Thadani, NRC (without Attachments)

Resident Inspector, NRC (Ginna) (without Attachments)

Safeguards Information Safeguards Information Document Control DeskNovember 4, 2013Page 4bcc: M.A. Geckle (w/o attachments)

E. F. Palmer (w/o attachments)

M. Ives (w/o attachments)

T. L. Harding (w/o attachments)

J. A. Jackson (w/o attachments)

J. P. Ortiz (w/o attachments)

E. P. Perkins (w/o attachments)

G. Sen (w/o attachments)

COMMITMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THIS CORRESPONDENCE:

0 NoneSafeguards Information