ML17206A832
| ML17206A832 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1979 |
| From: | UHRIG R E FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | OREILLY J P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| L-79-99, NUDOCS 7906050451 | |
| Download: ML17206A832 (14) | |
Text
.O.SOX529100.MIAMI,FL33I52l~AF(fg0FLORIDAPOWER8LIGHTCOMPANYApril24,1979Mr.JamesP.O'Reilly,Director,RegionIIOfficeofInspectionandEnforcementU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission101MariettaStreet,Suite3100Atlanta,Georgia30303
DearMr.O'eilly:
Re:RII:JPO50-335IEBulletins79-06,79-06BFloridaPower6LightCompanyhasreviewedIEBulletins79-06and79-06B,andaresponse,numberedtocorrespondtoBulletin79-06B,isattached.Verytrulyyours,RobertE.UhrigVicePresidentAdvancedSystems&TechnologyREU/MAS/msAttachmentcc:klaroldF.Reis,EsquirePoa'PG/@/Ui'l'8:1P'r.Cgpy~906050%5/~PEOPLE..SERVINGPEQPL 8CI Response1Atrainingprogramtoaddresstheconcernslistedinitemsla,lb,and2isbeingformulated.Thistrainingprogramwillinclude:(1)Thepotentialofformationofvoidsintheprimarycoolantsystem,waystoidentifythesevoidsandthenecessaryinstructionstoprovidealternatemethodsofcoolingthecore,(2)Useofallavailableinstrumentationduringtransientconditions,(3)Philosophyofoperatingsafeguardssystemssuchthatthesesystemswillnotbecompromisedbymanualactionunlesscontinuedoperationcouldresultinunsafeplantconditions,(4)ReviewofapparentoperationalerrorsasidentifiedduringTHIincident,and(5)Analyzingplantconditionsduringtransientconditions.Inaddition,thoseproceduresaddressingtheabovehavebeenidentifiedandwillbeincludedinthetrainingprogram.AlloperatorsandplantmanagementinvolvedwithoperationswillreceivethistrainingpriortoreturntoMode1.Thoseonannualleave,etc.,willperformthisreviewpriortoassumingshiftoperationsresponsibilities.Response2SameasResponse1Response3Webelievetheintenthere(asstatedmoreexplicitlyinItem8)istoavoidinadvertentreleasesfromcontainmentinaneventwhereSIAS(ECCSactuationsignal)occurswithoutCIS.Thefollowinglistprovidesthoselinespenetratingcontainmentwhichatthepresentarenotisolatedonasafetyinjectionactuationsignal:(1)StcamGeneratorBlowdown(2lines)(2)PrimaryMakeupWater(3)InstrumentAirSupply(4)ContainmentPureAirExhaust(5)ContainmentPurgeSupply(6)NitrogenSupplytoSafetyInjectionTanks(7)ReactorCoolantSample(8)PressurizerSurgeLineSample(9)PressurizerSteamSpaceSample(10)SteamGeneratorBlowdownSample(2lines)(11)ContainmentVentHeaderReactorDrainTankPumpSuction(13)ReactorCoolantPumpControlledBleedoff(14)ContainmentAtmosphereRadiationMonitoringSystem(3lines)
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Allotherlinespenetratingcontainmentareeitheressentialtocorecoolingcapability,havelockedclosedmanualvalves,orcurrentlyreceiveanisol'ationsignalfromSIAS.Weareproceedingwithevaluationofchangesnecessarytoallowisolationoftheabovelinesuponreceiptofasafetyinjectionactuationsignal.Forinterimactionuntilthesedesignchangescanbeimplemented,weproposedirectingoperatorstomanuallyinitiateCISuponreceiptofa(valid)SIAS.AfterverifyingCIShadactuatedthesignalwouldbereset.Thiswouldnotrepositionanyvalvesandwouldprovidetwopositivebenefitswhilestillpreventinginadvertentreleases.a.iftheCISsetpointswerelaterreachedtheactuationsignalandalarmswouldinsureimmediateoperatorattentiontothechangingcondition,endb.itwouldallowtheoperatortopositLonvalvesifnecessarytohelpevaluateandcontroltheoccurrence(i.e.,sampleRCS,containment,and/orsteamgeneratorsforactivity,coolthequenchtankwithprimarywatertodelayoravoidtankrupture,orprovidebackupinstrumentairtothecontainment)~Response4ThepresentSt.LucieUnit1(PSLPl)designdoesnotprovideforautonmticinitiationofAuxiliary'eedWater(AFW)duetovariousdesignfeaturessignificantlydifferentfromtheTMIplant.Thisisbeingevaluatedandisdiscussedbelow.ThenormalproceduresrequirethattheoperatorinitiateAFWoperationwhenplantconditionsrequireit.ThePSLPlAFVsystemhasfullcontrolandindicationinthecontrolroomononeofthemainreactorcontrolpanels.PriortoMode1operation,instructionswillbeissuedtofurtherensurethatanoperatorisdesignatedtoensurethatAFWflowisinitiatedandverified,ifneeded,duringtransientoraccidentsituations.ItshouldbenotedthatPSLPldesigndoesnotrequireanymanualvalverepositioningforperiodicsurveillancetesting.Also,asnotedintheresponsestoItems87and09,thefewmanuallyoperatedvalvesinthesystemarelockedintheproperposition,andarerestoredaftermaintenance.Itisfurtherintendedtoincreasetheroutinesurveillanceofthesevalvestoprovideadditionalassurancethattheyareproperlypositioned.ThewaterinventoryinPSL81steamgenerators(evenwhenthereactorandturbinetripareinitiatedbylowS/Glevel)issufficienttocontroldecayheatremovalforatleast13minutes.FurtherdiscussionofthistopiccanbefoundinPSLPlFSARsection)0.5.Itshouldbefurthernotedthatoperationalexperiencehasdemonstratedthatadequate timeexistsformanualinitiation.Theabovefactsandthedesignatedoperatorprovideeffectiveinterimactiontomeet'heintentofthisItem.FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)isevaluatingthenecessityandfeasibilityofvariousschemesregardingautomaticstartand/orinitiationofAFMflow.Response5Existingproceduresspecificallyaddressfailureofapressurizerrelieforsafetyvalvetoreseat.Nonetheless,thoseprocedureswhichareconcernedwiththeoff-normaloperationofPowerOperatedReliefValvesarebeingre-evaluated.AllinstrumentationwhichwouldidentifyfailureofaPORUtocloseislocatedontheReactorCoolantSystemsectionofthemainRTGBandisreadilyavailabletotheoperator.Availableindicationsare:PORVsolenoidconditionindicatinglights,in-linetemperatureindicationonreliefline,quenchtankindicationsndalarmsRCSpiessureandlevelandPORUisolationvalvesVposition.ExistingproceduresinstructtheoperatortoclosethePORblockvalveswhenthePORVfailstoreseat.PleasenotethattheseproceduresandanynecessarychangeswillbeincorporatedintothetrainingprogrambeingformulatedtoaddressItems1and2.AlllicensedoperatorswillreviewtheseprocedurespriortoproceedingtoMode1.Licensedoperatorsonleave,etc.willperformthisreviewpriortoassumingshiftoperationalresponsibilities.Response6MehaveidentifiedtheproceduresconcernedwithEngineeredSafetyFeaturesactuations.Theseproceduresareintheprocessofbeingreviewedandwillberevised,ifnecessary,tocomplywiththeintentofItems6a,6b,and6d.AnychangestotheseprocedureswillbereviewedbytheFacilityReviewCroupandimplementedpriortoMode1.Theseprocedureswillbediscussedasapartofthetrainingsessions(Items1d1b)dalllicensedoperatorswillparticipateinthetrainingwillandreviewpriortoMode1.Thoseoperatorsonleave,etc.,werfonnthisreviewpriortoassumingshiftresponsibilities.peronnSaturationpressuretemperaturecurveshavebeenpreparedforposngdforstiintheControlRoom.Itshouldbenotedthat,duetopresentdesign,fullconformancetoPara.6.c.cannotbeachieved.ThecoolingwatertotheRCPmotorsandsealsisisolatedonSIAS.PSLesigndoesnotallowresetofSIASwhiletheinitiatingconditio4eistsandthepumpcoolingwatervalvesnditionandtheunderlyingdesignvendorandotherindusyintothere-evaluationandreviewprocess.cannotbeoverriddenopen.cobasis,includingtheneedforperatingpumps,isbeingre-evaluated.Inconnectionwiththere-evuationandtheprocedurereviewdescribedabove,wehaverecentlyreceedrelatedinformationfromourNSSStrsoucesandwearefactoringthisinformation Response7Existingproceduresdospecificallyaddresssafetyrelatedvalvepositions,retestrequirementsforsafetyrelatedequipmentandvalvepositionduringoperation.Theseproceduresarebeingre-evaluatedand,ifrequiredwillberevisedandincludedinthetrainingprogramas71definedintheresponsetoItemslaandlb.PriortoMode1,allsafetyrelatedvalvepositionswillbeverified.Response8Wehavereviewedourpresentcontainmentisolationdesign.Otherthansystemsneededtoassurecorecoolingcapabilityonlythe14penetrationslistedinItem83donotisolateonSIAS(andtheydoi'solateonCIS).TheinterimoperatoractiondescribedintheresponsetoItem83willprecludeinadvertenttransferoffluidsfromcontainmentonaninterimbasis.AsnotedinItem3,weareevaluatingactionsneededforautomaticisolationonSIASofthesepenetrations.ItshouldbespecificallynotedthatourpresentdesigndoesisolatethecontainmentsumppumpdischargevalvesonbothSIASandCIS.Itshouldbefurthernotedthat:(1)Neithercontainmentisolationnorsafetyinj~ctionactuationcanberesetwiththeassociatedactuationsjgnalstillpresent.(2)Allisolationvalveswillremainclosedifcontainmentisolationorsafetyinjectionactuationisreset.(3)PeriodicTestingasrequiredbySt.LucieUnit1TechnicalSpecificationswillensurecontinuedoperabilityoftheabove.Response9Existingproceduresaddressall3concerns.Nonetheless,theoperability/retestprogramhasbeenre-evaluatedwiththefollowingresults:(1)SafetyrelatedsystemsaretestedforoperabilityperTechnicalSpecificationsandexistingproceduresonaroutinebasis.Thistestisadequatetodemonstrateaspecificoperabilityrequirementpriortoremovingtheredundantitemfromservice.However,iftheitemhadbeenremovedfromservicesinceitslastscheduledtestitcouldpossiblynothavebeentestedadequatelyduetodeficientimplementationofexistingprocedures.Therefore,PSLischangingitsprocedureforremovingsafetyrelatedequipmentfromservicetorequireareviewoftherecords(clearancelog,Out-of-Servicelog)whichwouldindicateapossibleuntestedsituation.Iftheserecordsindicatetheequipmenthadbeenremovedsinceitslastscheduledtest,areviewofthespecificretestwillbeconductedtoensureadequacy,oranewtestwillbeconducted
priortoremovingtheredundantequipmentfromservice.(2)Specifictestproceduresrequirerestorationaspartoftheprocedure.Operab1lityfollowingmaintenanceisspecifiedintheQualityInstructions(QI-llSeries).Inadditiontheequipmentclearanceprocedureprovidesinstructionsforrestoration(e.g.valves,fuses,breakers,etc.).Noprocedurechangesareconsiderednecessary.(3)Theon-shiftlicensedoperatorsaretheissuingandapprovingauthorityforallsafetyrelatedequipmentremovedfromserviceviatheEquipmentClearanceProcedure.Inadditionthesenioroperatoronshift(NuclearPlantSupervisor)mustbenotifiedofallequipmentremovedfromservicewhichaffectthe.TechnicalSpecifications.TheseitemsareenteredinanOut-of-Servicelog.Alllicensedoperatorsonshiftarerequiredtoreview(and1nitial)theOut-of-Serviceloguponshiftturn-over.Noprocedurechangesareconsidere'ecessary,Response10AsFPLunderstandsthisitem,itaddressessituationsassociatedwithsignificantreleaseofradioactivematerial.Suchreleaseofrad1oactivematerialwouldbeexpectedtobeprecededbydamagetofuelassembliesinthereactor.Theplantcurrentlyhasthemeansto1dentifysuchconditions.Whenaconditionsuchasdescribedaboveisidentified,theSt.LuciePlantEmergencyPlanisputintoeffectandtheEmergencyControlOfficerorhisdesignatedalternateisnotifiedbyonsitepersonnel.Theseofficersarealwaysavailablebytelephoneorbeeper.TheEmergencyControlOfficer,whoislocatedoffsito,wouldnotifyNRC-I&Eandgiveareportofthesituation.Practicedrillsindicatethatsuchnotificationcanprobablybemadewithinonehour.Wehaveadoptedthissysteminordertoallowonsiteoperatorstodevotemaximumefforttowardbringingtheplanttoastablecondition.PlantpersonnelperiodicallyupdatetheEmergencyControlOfficeronthestatusoftheplant.TheEmergencyControlOfficerwouldthenperiodicallyupdateNRC-I&E.ConsideringtheTHI-2incidentandthecommunicationproblemsencounteredbytheNRC,FPLrecognizestheneedfortheNRCtobefullyandaccuratelyinformedaboutconditionsatnuclearplantswhichmayadverselyaffectthepublichealthandsafety.WebelievethatourestablishednotificationproceduremeetstheNRCconcernforpromptnotification.Wewillcontinuetoassessourabilitytoestablishan"opencontinuouscommunicationchannel"whichestablishesdirectvoicecontactwitharesponsiblerepresentativeoftheNRCassuggestedinItemll,andwillinformyouofourconclusions.
1il ResponsellWearereviewingthoseprocedureswhichaxeapplicabletothoseconditionswhereHydrogengascouldaccumulateatvarioushighpointsintheRCS.OurprocedurescurrentlyaddressthereleaseofHydrogento.thecontainmentatmosphere.InstructionstotheoperatortoplacetheHydrogenrecombinersinoperationasasubsequentactionupontheidentificationoflossofreactorcoolantareprovided.AnyinstructionchangesornewinstructionswillbeincludedinthetrainingpackagediscussedinItemlaandlbandwillbeimplementedbforeMode)operation.ThefollowingdescribesthecapabilitiesatSt.LucieUnit1todealwithsignificantamountsofnon-condensiblegasesthatmayhegeneratecLduringatranientorotheraccidentintheprimarysystemandreleasedtocontainment.Pe"tnrCoolantSystem(l.)VentingtheRCS-Thereareseveralpotentialhighpointswithinthereactorcoolantsystemwherenon-condensiblegasesmayaccumulate.Inordertoremoveaccumulatedgasesfromvarioushl~hpoints,thefollowingmethodsareavailable:a.Thepressurizersteamspacemaybevent.dthroughtheprimarysamplesystemsteamspacesamp'~line.Thislinepenetratesthecontainment,thefluidtcooled,anddischargedtothevolumecontroltank(VCT).TheVCTventstothegaswastemanagementsystem(GWMS)fox'torageofthegas.b.Thereactorcoolantpumpsealcavitymaybeventedthroughthecontrolledbleedoffforeachreactorcoolantpump.Thisflowcanberoutedtothevolumecontroltankorthereactordraintank.ThesetankscanbeventedtotheGAMSc.TheRCSpressurizersurgelineandhotlegsamplesystemconnectionsmaybeusedtopartiallyventtheloopsandreactorvesselhead.Thepathfortheventingisthesameasthatdescribedforthepxessurizersteamspacein(a)above~d.Thereactorvesselheadmaybepartiallyventedthroughthepressurizerasdescribedin(a)or(c)aboveiftheRCSfluidlevelpermits.Completeremovalofgasaccumulatedinthereactorvesselheadrequiresredisolvingitinthecoolantandthendegassingthecoolantasdescribedin(2)below.
e.Pressurizermotoroperatedreliefvalvescanbeusedtoventgasinthepressurizer(andthrough,thepressurizerotherportionsoftheRCS)tothequenchtank.(2)DegassingtheRCS-Theexistingsystemstypicallyhavethefollowingcapabilitiestodegasdissolvehydrogenand/ornon-condensiblegasesfromthereactorcoolant:a.Degassingviathepressurizer'.Withthismethodallpressurizerheatersareenergized,sprayflowisadjustedtomaintainaconstantplantpressure,andthepressurizerisventedviatheexistingsteamspaceprimarysampleconnectiontotheVCT.b.DegassingtheRCSviatheCVCS:WiththismethodthereactorcoolantpassesthroughtheletdownlinetotheVolumeControlTank(VCT).TheVCTisventeddirectlytotheGWMS.c.WasteGasProcessing-Theplantgaseouswastemanagementsystemmaybeusedtoprocessorstorethehydrogenandnon-condensiblegasescollectedfromtheRCS.Theapproximatestoragecapacityoftheplantgaseouswastemanagementsystems(GWMS)atSt.1.ucieUnit1is5300SCF.d.ContainmentHydrogen'ontrol-InordertopreventexcessivehydrogenbuildupfollowingapostulatedLOCA,ahydrogencontrolsystem,consistingofhydrogenrecombiners,isincludedintheplantd'ign.Theuseofhydrogenrecombinationwillallowcontrolofhydrogenconcentrationinthecontainmentwithoutanyreleasetotheenvironment.Thetworecombinersareelectricallypoweweredthermalunitsinsidecontainment.Eachunitcanprocess100-120SCFMofcontainmentair.AhydrogensamplingsystemisprovidedtomonitorthelevelofhydrogenconcentrationinthecontainmentfollowingaLOCA.
0 ATTACHMENT:PROCEDURESIDENTIFIEDFORREVIEWPROCEDURENUMBER0030140003014201200400120041012004207000400810040003013000301310120031012003401200350120036'0310030041003004400300510030053003005300310010125TITLEBLACKOUTOPERATIONRCSCOOLDOWNDURINGBLACKOUTLOSSOFREACTORCOOLANTFLOWSTM.GENERATORTUBEFAILURELOSSOFREACTORCOOLANTLOSSOFFEEDWATERORSTM.GENERATORLEVELMAINSTEAMLINEBREAKSHUTDOWNRESULTINGFROMRX.TRIPORTURBINETRIPPLANTANNUNCIATORSUMMARYEXCESSIVEREACTORCOOLANfSYSTEMLEAKAGFREACTORCOOLANTPUMPOFF-llORMALOPERATIONPRESSURIZERLEVELANDPRESSUREOFFNORtgLOPERATIONPRESSURIZERRELIEF/SAFETYVALVEOFF-NORMALOPERATIONCCWOFF-NORMALOPERATIGlHPSIOFFNORMALOPERATIONSDC/LPSIOFF-NOR>lALOPERATIONUNCONTROLLEDRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVELI(UIDSWASTEGASSYSTEMOFF-NORMALOPERATIONSUNCONTROLLEDRELEASEOFRADIOACTIVEGASSCHEDULEOFPERIODICTESTS,CHECKSANDCALIBRATIONS(WHICHINCLUDESTECH.SPEC.ANDASl'IESECTIONXIPUMPANDVALVETESTING)