ML24151A460

BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. – NRC Core Inspection Report 07000027/2024006 and Apparent Violation

ML24151A460
Person / Time
Site:	BWX Technologies
Issue date:	06/20/2024
From:	Masters A NRC/RGN-II/DFFI
To:	Bittner J BWXT
References
EA-24-039 IR 2024006
Download: ML24151A460 (10)

Text

EA-24-039 James J. Bittner Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Operations Group, Inc.

BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc.

P.O. Box 785 Lynchburg, VA 24505-0785

SUBJECT:

BWXT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS GROUP, INC. - NRC CORE INSPECTION REPORT 07000027/2024006 AND APPARENT VIOLATION

Dear James J. Bittner:

On March 28, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your BWXT Nuclear Operations Group facility in Lynchburg, VA. The purpose of the inspection was to follow up on an Event Notification (EN) submitted by BWXT on October 17, 2023 (EN 56800). The enclosed inspection report presents the results of this inspection. The inspectors discussed the preliminary inspection findings with you at the conclusion of the on-site portion of the inspection. On June 20, 2024, a final exit briefing was conducted via phone with you and other members of your staff.

Based on the results of this inspection, an apparent violation was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The enclosed report documents the subject apparent violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 70.24 (10 CFR 70.24),

Criticality accident requirements, for BWXTs failure to maintain a monitoring system capable of detecting the criticality accident characteristics defined in paragraph (a)(1) of this section.

Specifically, on October 16, 2023, BWXT staff determined that the facilitys criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) was unable to detect the minimum accident of concern in some process areas due to incorrect assumptions in the original system design and configuration. June 20, 2024 J. Bittner Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to: (1) respond to the apparent violation addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the date of this letter or (2) request a Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference (PEC). If a PEC is held, it will be open for public observation to the extent allowed by the sensitivity of the information to be discussed; and the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference. If you decide to participate in a PEC, please contact Eric Michel, Chief, Projects Branch 2, at 404-997-4555 within 10 days of the date of this letter. A PEC should be held within 30 days of the date of this letter.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to an Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 07000027/2024006; EA-24-039 and should include: (1) the reason for the apparent violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. Additionally, your response should be sent to the NRCs Document Control Center, with a copy mailed to Anthony Masters, Director, Region II Division of Fuel Facility Inspection, 245 Peachtree Center Avenue N.E., Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303, within 30 days of the date of this letter. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.

If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a PEC does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned.

In presenting your corrective actions, either in a written response or a PEC, you should be aware that the promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing corrective action credit under Section 2.3.4, Civil Penalty, of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Therefore, the specificity, depth, and timeliness of your immediate and long-term corrective actions will be a factor in NRCs final decision. The guidance in NRC Information Notice 96-28, "Suggested Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action," may be helpful. This guidance is available on the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html via Accession Number ML22304A142.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice and Procedure," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs ADAMS. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Eric Michel of my staff at 404-997-4555.

Sincerely, Anthony D. Masters, Director Division of Fuel Facility Inspection Docket No. 70-27 License No. SNM-42

Enclosure:

As Stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV Signed by Masters, Anthony on 06/20/24

ML24151A460 X Non-Sensitive X Publicly Available X SUNSI Review Sensitive Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RII/DFFI RII/DFFI RII/DFFI RII/EICS RII/ORA

NAME N. Peterka N. Pitoniak E. Michel M. Kowal S. Price DATE 5/30/2024 5/30/2024 5/31/2024 6/3/2024 6/3/2024

OFFICE HQ HQ/OE HQ/ RII/DFFFI

NAME R. Carpenter J. Peralta S. Helton A. Masters

DATE 6/14/2024 6/13/2024 6/11/2024 6/20/2024 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Inspection Report

Docket Number: 07000027

License Number: SNM42

Report Number: 07000027/2024006

Licensee: BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc.

Facility: BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. - Lynchburg

Location: Lynchburg, VA

Inspection Dates: March 18 - 28, 2024

Inspectors: N. Peterka, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector P. Glenn, Fuel Facility Inspector

Approved By: Anthony Masters, Director Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an event follow-up inspection at the BWXT Nuclear Operations Group facility in Lynchburg, VA, in accordance with the fuel cycle facility inspection program.

This is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of licensed fuel cycle facilities.

Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/materials/fuel-cycle-fac.html for more information.

List of Violations

Criticality Accident Alarm System Detector Placement Error Severity Report Section Apparent Violation 88015 AV 07000027/2024006-01 Open EA-24-039 An Apparent Violation (AV) was identified for failure to meet 10 CFR 70.24 (a)(1) due to the failure to ensure criticality accident alarm detectors could detect the minimum accident of concern.

2 PLANT STATUS

BWXT Nuclear Operations Group is authorized to receive, possess, use, store, and ship special nuclear material pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material. The primary activity on the BWXT site is the production of fuel material containing highly enriched uranium for naval reactors. In addition, BWXT has other operations, including the production of uranium fuel for research reactors in the area of the plant known as Research and Test Reactors.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Inspections were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2600, Fuel Cycle Facility Operational Safety and Safeguards Inspection Program. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

SAFETY OPERATIONS

88015 - Nuclear Criticality Safety

The inspectors evaluated selected aspects of the licensees nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program to verify compliance with selected portions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," including 70.50, 70.61, 70.62, Appendix A; Chapter 5, "Nuclear Criticality Safety," of the facilitys license application; and applicable licensee procedures.

3 Nuclear Criticality Safety

Criticality Incident Response and Corrective Action (IP Section 02.05)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees response to a recent criticality-related event to verify compliance with 10 CFR 70 and applicable sections of the license application. Specifically, the inspectors followed-up on WER 07000027/2023-002, "Criticality Accident Alarm System Detector Placement Design Error (EN56800),"

through:

• walkdowns of the Bay 5A autoclave operations, existing criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) detector coverage, interim compensatory measures, and criticality safety items relied on for safety (IROFS)

• interviews with licensee operators, licensing engineers, and NCS engineers

• review of CA202301287, the licensee's corrective action system entry for the CAAS event

• review of investigative report for CA202301287, dated November 16, 2023

• review of OP-0006115, "Operating Procedure for Boehmite Prefilming of Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Elements," Rev. 5, describes criticality safety controls for ATR autoclave operations in Bay 5A

• review of NCS-2023-101, "NCS Safety Concern for Inadequate Criticality Detector Coverage in Bay 5A Fuel Operations," dated November 8, 2023

• review of accident sequences and IROFS applicable to criticality safety for Bay 5A autoclave operations in Safety Analysis Report (SAR) 15.23, "Fuel Plate and Element Fabrication Processes Research and Test Reactor and Targets (RTRT) Operation," Rev. 123

• review of the licensee's 30-day report (ML23325A040), dated November 16, 2023

Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Detector Placement Error Severity Report Section Apparent Violation (AV) 88015 AV 07000027/2024006-01 Open EA-24-039 An AV was identified for failure to meet 10 CFR 70.24 (a)(1) due to the failure to ensure criticality accident alarm detectors could detect the minimum accident of concern.

Description:

During development of an NCS Process Analysis (PA) for the RTRT-ATR autoclave located in Bay 5A, a criticality safety engineer questioned the original modeling parameters used for the CAAS detector placement for the autoclave. Upon further examination of the detector placement calculations by NCS staff, it was determined an error had occurred in the original detector placement calculations when modeling the minimum accident of concern (MAOC) to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1) as documented in NCS-TR-00004, Placement of Detectors for the CIDAS System, dated October 25, 2012.

The error in the calculations was the result of the source term placement for the RTRT-ATR autoclave to show compliance with the MAOC. The original criticality safety engineer had misinterpreted the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1) and placed the source term two meters above the reacting material (autoclave). As a result, the source term was in a non-conservative location because it did not take into account shielding from the vessel being

4 below grade of a concrete floor, the ATR fuel location within the bottom half of the vessel during operation, and during normal operations the autoclave contains water. The licensees MAOC is approximately 10^14 fissions. As currently installed, it would take a criticality accident producing approximately 10^16 fissions for the detectors to function as modeled and currently installed.

The licensee re-calculated the detector placement utilizing the revised parameters and determined, as installed, the detector placement was not adequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1). As such, the licensee reported this condition to the NRC as EN56800 on October 16, 2023. An extent of condition review determined that this calculation error existed in other submerged/enclosed vessel operations on-site such as pickling, annealing, ultrasonic (UT) clean, final clean, waste treatment operations, and water volume.

Corrective Actions: The licensee's immediate corrective actions included shutting down Bay 5A and other areas of the facility with similarly-arranged process vessels and implementing compensatory measures including issuing alarming electronic dosimeters set at 15 mR/hr to personnel following restart operations in the affected areas. An extent of condition review determined that this calculation error existed in other submerged/enclosed vessel operations on-site such as pickling, annealing, UT clean, final clean, waste treatment operations, and water volume. Long-term corrective actions are being developed and implemented by the licensee.

Corrective Action

References:

The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as CA202301287.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure of the CAAS to detect the MAOC in several process areas for an extended period of time represented a potential violation of 10 CFR 70.24. The inspectors evaluated this potential non-compliance in accordance with Appendix B of NRC IMC 0616 and the NRC Enforcement Policy, and determined it required further evaluation under the NRC escalated enforcement process based on the circumstances of the issue and the violation examples in Section 6.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 70.24, Criticality accident requirements, states in part, that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material in a quantity exceeding 700 grams of contained uranium-235...shall maintain in each area in which such licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored, a monitoring system meeting the requirements of either paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(1) states that the monitoring system shall be capable of detecting a criticality that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 rads of combined neutron and gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of 2 meters from the reacting material within one minute. Coverage of all areas shall be provided by two detectors.

Contrary to the above, from October 25, 2012, to October 16, 2023, the licensee failed to maintain in each area in which licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored a monitoring system (i.e., the CAAS) with two detectors capable of detecting a criticality that produces an absorbed dose in soft tissue of 20 rads of combined neutron and gamma radiation at an unshielded distance of 2 meters from the reacting material within one minute.

Specifically, during the conduct of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Process Analysis in October 2023, the licensee determined that initial modeling parameters and assumptions used in October 2012 for the CAAS detector placement in Bay 5A, pickling, annealing, UT clean, final clean, waste treatment operations, and water volume process areas to detect the minimum

5 criticality accident of concern within large process vessels were incorrect. As a result, the CAAS as designed could neither detect the minimum accident of concern nor meet the coverage requirements in 10 CFR 70.24.

AV 07000027/2024006-01, Criticality Accident Alarm System Detector Placement Error

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an apparent violation pending a final significance (enforcement) determination.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On June 20, 2024, the inspectors presented the Nuclear Criticality Safety inspection results to James Bittner and other members of the licensee staff.

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