IR 05000269/2024002
ML24201A090 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Oconee |
Issue date: | 07/25/2024 |
From: | Eric Stamm NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1 |
To: | Snider S Duke Energy Carolinas |
References | |
IR 2024002 | |
Download: ML24201A090 (27) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000269/2024002 AND 05000270/2024002 AND 05000287/2024002
Dear Steven Snider:
On June 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station. On July 24, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Oconee Nuclear Station.July 25, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Eric J. Stamm, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000269 and 05000270 and 05000287 License Nos. DPR-38 and DPR-47 and DPR-55
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000269, 05000270 and 05000287
License Numbers: DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55
Report Numbers: 05000269/2024002, 05000270/2024002 and 05000287/2024002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2024-002-0022
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station
Location: Seneca, South Carolina
Inspection Dates: April 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024
Inspectors: N. Smalley, Senior Resident Inspector E. Robinson, Resident Inspector D. Dang, Resident Inspector, Acting B. Bowker, Reactor Inspector A. Hutto, Senior Project Engineer J. Nadel, Reactor Inspector E. Riggs, Senior Technical Training Program Specialist A. Ruh, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Vasquez, Reactor Inspector
Approved By: Eric J. Stamm, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Oconee Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Maintain Fire Penetration in Accordance with Fire Protection Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.05 Systems NCV 05000269/2024002-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 3.D for the licensees failure to maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the fire resistive penetration seal assembly in fire penetration 1-M-N-5 was installed to the correct seal thickness per plant design drawings.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000270/2023-001-00 Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2, 71153 Closed Inappropriate Procedural Guidance for Planned Online Maintenance Results in Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function
LER 05000287/2023-002-00 Oconee Nuclear Station, Unit 3, 71153 Closed Passive Containment Isolation Device Inoperability Results in Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the entire inspection period, with the exception of a temporary power reduction to 96 percent RTP on May 1, 2024, as required to implement a measurement uncertainty recapture power uprate from 2568 megawatts to 2608 megawatts core thermal power.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent RTP. On May 4, 2024, Unit 3 was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage (O3R32). During startup, on May 29, 2024, Unit 3 was limited to 74 percent RTP following unexpected measured high assembly power for assembly location H-05. On June 2, 2024, Unit 3 was shut down for a maintenance outage (O3F32A) to replace two burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs) that had incorrect boron concentrations. During O3F32A, indications of a leaking fuel assembly were discovered, independent of the faulty BPRAs. The leaking assembly was isolated and replaced, with no indications of significant fuel damage. The unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on June 20, 2024, and operated at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Standby shutdown facility, protected service water and alternate reactor building cooling portable submersible pump equipment on April 15, 19, and 25, 2024
- (3) Unit 3 low pressure injection system during O3R32 refueling outage on May 21, 2024
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire zone 105: Unit 2 cable room on April 16, 2024
- (2) Fire zone 108: Unit 1 east penetration room on April 30, 2024
- (3) Fire zone 89: Unit 3 equipment room on May 22, 2024
- (4) Fire zone 124: Unit 3 containment on May 24, 2024
- (5) Fire zone 112: Unit 3 control room on May 28, 2024
- (6) Fire zone 85: Unit 1 auxiliary building 200 level hallway on June 10, 2024
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) Unit 1 reactor building cooling units following performance testing per PT/0/A/0160/006, Reactor Building Cooling Units Performance Test, on April 23 and April 24, 2024
===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)
The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities in Unit 3 during refueling outage O3R32 from May 6 to May 17, 2024.
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===
The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:
- (1) Ultrasonic Examination (UT)
- 3-RC-212-53V, high pressure injection (HPI) nozzle to safe end, ASME Class 1
- 3-PDB1-46, HPI nozzle inner radius, ASME Class 1
- 3-PDB2-11, HPI nozzle to safe end, ASME Class 1
- 3-PDB2-46, HPI nozzle inner radius, ASME Class 1
Radiographic Examination
- 3-LP-0182-10, low pressure injection (LPI) pipe to valve, ASME Class 2 (associated with work order (WO) 20397347)
- 3-LP-0182-11, LPI valve to pipe, ASME Class 2 (associated with WO 20397347)
Dye Penetrant Examination
- 3-03-0-2401A-SR3, feedwater (FDW) pipe support, ASME Class 3
- 3-LP-0 182-11, 3A LPI header test line, ASME Class 2 (associated with WO 20397347)
Magnetic Particle Examination
- 3-LPS-0769-68, ASME Class 3 (associated with WO 20547399)
- 3-LPS-0769-69, ASME Class 3 (associated with WO 20547399)
Visual Examination
- 3-RPV-BMI nozzles, bare metal VT-2 exam, ASME Class 1
- B4.30 VT-2 on the reactor pressure vessel head, bare metal visual, ASME Class 1
Welding Activities
- Gas tungsten arc welding o WO 20397347-13, 3A LPI HDR test line, 3" gate valve, ASME Class 2 o WO 20547399, new 18" valve 3LPSW-1236 and piping, ASME Class 3
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection
Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:
- (1) Bare metal visual examination of the reactor pressure vessel upper head, ASME Class 1
PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors verified the licensee is managing the boric acid corrosion control program through a review of the following evaluations:
(1)
- Boric acid walkdown - May 7, 2024
- Review of boric acid evaluations o Action request (AR) 02477429 o AR 02483940 o AR 02491702
- Review of corrective actions performed for evidence of boric acid leaks that were identified o AR 02515422 o Work request (WR) 20268607 o WR 20268611
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed power ascension for Unit 2 due to the power uprate from the main control room on May 1, 2024.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated simulator just in time training for power escalation using lesson plan OP-OC-20JT-06 on June 12, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) C low pressure service water pump (LPSW) pump lubricating oil sampling and addition using commercial grade dedicated oil, WO 20645573
- (2) Nuclear condition report (NCR) 2473173, Unit 1/2 C LPSW pump tripped after maintenance on May 17, 2023
- (3) NCR 2501851, Keowee hydro unit air circuit breaker, ACB-1, failed to open on shutdown on January 22, 2024
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Units 1, 2, and 3 green risk due to planned maintenance on the primary instrument air compressor, on April 9, 2024
- (2) Units 1 and 2 green risk due to maintenance for the C train of LPSW, on April 18, 2024
- (3) Units 1, 2, and 3 green risk due to maintenance for protected service water primary and booster pump, on April 26, 2024
- (4) Unit 3 yellow risk due to reactor coolant system draining and lowered inventory operations, on May 5 and May 6, 2024
- (5) Units 1, 2, and 3 green risk following issuance of a tornado watch, on May 8, 2024
- (6) Unit 3 yellow risk due to reactor coolant system draining and lowered inventory operations, on June 4 and June 5, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (3) NCR 2512430, unexpected bearing cooling water alarms during KHU-2 starts
- (4) NCR 2517136, debris discovered in Unit 3 borated water storage tank
- (5) NCR 2517412, Unit 3 core high assembly power at H-05 on power escalation following O3R32 refueling outage
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modification:
- (1) AR 2403542, replacement of axial power shaping rod assemblies for all 3 units
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage O3R32 activities from May 4 to May 29, 2024
- (2) The inspectors evaluated forced outage O3F32A activities from June 2 to June 20, 2024
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (8 Samples)
- (1) PT/1/A/0251/001, "C Low Pressure Service Water Pump Test," following oil sampling and seal regulator maintenance, on April 19, 2024
- (2) TT/2/A/0261/021, "CCW Pump Flange Seal Data Collection Test," of 2D condenser circulating water pump, on May 1, 2024, following installation of engineering change
===422106
- (3) PT/3/A/0600/012, "Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test," following outage maintenance, on May 22, 2024
- (4) PT/3/A/0151/019, "Penetration 19 Leak Rate Test," following preventive maintenance on reactor building purge valves, on May 22, 2024
- (5) PT/0/A/0711/001, "Zero Power Physics Test," on May 25, 2024
- (6) PT/3/A/0811/001, "Power Imbalance Correlation Test," on Unit 3 following refueling outage, on May 28, 2024
- (7) PT/2/A/2200/011, "KHU-2 Turbine Guide Bearing Oil System Retest," following motor contact inspection, on June 8, 2024
- (8) PT/1/A/0600/13, "1A MDEFW Pump Test," following maintenance, on June 11, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) PT/3/A/0261/010, "Essential Siphon Vacuum System Pump Tests," on Unit 3, on April 11 and April 15, 2024
- (2) PT/3/A/0610/001, "J Emergency Power Switching Logic (EPSL) Loadshed Test," on May 17, 2024
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) PT/3/A/0151/029, "Penetration 29 Leak Rate Test," on Unit 3, on May 15, 2024
- (2) PT/3/A/0151/019, "Penetration 19 Leak Rate Test," on Unit 3, on June 12, 2024
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a simulator drill and exercise performance examination using lesson plan ASE-13 on June 25,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
- (3) Unit 3 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) NCR 2516804, Part 21 notification for potential defect of AMETEK oil filled aluminum case capacitors - 07-020139-10
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in foreign material issues and foreign material exclusion controls during refueling outages that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensees event reporting determinations to ensure it complied with reporting requirements.
- (1) LER 05000270/2023-001-00, Inappropriate Procedural Guidance for Planned Online Maintenance Results in Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function (ADAMS Accession No. ML24060A312). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000269, 05000270, 05000287/2023011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML23236A615)under Inspection Results Section 71111.21M. This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 05000287/2023-002-00, Passive Containment Isolation Device Inoperability Results in Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (ADAMS Accession No. ML24060A311). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection Report 05000269, 05000270, 05000287/2023004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML24038A367) under Inspection Results Section 71152A.
This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Maintain Fire Penetration in Accordance with Fire Protection Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.05 Systems NCV 05000269/2024002-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 3.D for the licensees failure to maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the fire resistive penetration seal assembly in fire penetration 1-M-N-5 was installed to the correct seal thickness per plant design drawings.
Description:
On March 14, 2024, during a fire protection walkdown of the Unit 1 east penetration room, the inspectors identified a potentially degraded fire barrier penetration, 1-M-N-5, a 5-inch pipe passing through the wall above door 401B between the Unit 1 cable room and the Unit 1 east penetration room. Although the penetration seal was flush with the wall, inspectors noted possible degradation with signs of potential loss of foam insulation in the seal assembly. The inspectors informed the licensee operations staff and the fire protection engineer, who determined that the penetration seal was non-functional. The licensee established an hourly fire watch and documented the condition in the corrective action program as NCR 2508926.
The licensee determined through a destructive examination that the wall containing penetration 1-M-N-5 had a thickness of only eight inches. This was contrary to the dimensional data listed in the equipment database (EDB), the established method of design control for plant equipment. The EDB had listed 1-M-N-5 as a penetration of 12 inches thick.
Additionally, the penetration was installed with foam insulation seal, but the EDB incorrectly listed a grout seal design. Procedure MP/1/A/1705/018, Fire Protection - Penetration - Fire and Flood Barrier - Inspection and Minor Repair, is used for periodic external visual inspection and repair of fire penetrations such as 1-M-N-5. The licensee identified that this procedure had listed the wall containing this penetration as being 12 inches thick as far back as 1998. Around this time, an effort was undertaken by the licensee to re-inspect and repair many fire penetrations as well as implement the EDB as the method of design control. The engineering change (EC) implemented in 1999, established EDB entries and issued drawings for maintenance and inspection of penetration seals. This information was then used to update inspection procedure MP/1/A/1705/018.
The licensee concluded that the most likely cause of the dimensional design discrepancies was an improper interpretation of plant drawings during the establishment of the EDB and implementation of the EC in 1999. The licensee completed inspections of penetration 1-M-N-5 several times since 1999 per MP/1/A/1705/018. The licensee used drawing O-0310-KM-001 to verify correct penetration seal design. Based on the wall thickness of the penetration in question, the licensee would refer to either Detail M-1 or M-2 for a barrier thickness of less than 12 inches or equal to or greater than 12 inches, respectively. Based on the flawed penetration thickness listed as 12 inches in MP/1/A/1705/018, the visual condition of the penetration would have been acceptable per Detail M-2 as 12 inches of seal material would have been present. However, with the current plant configuration of the penetration being only 8 inches in thickness and the penetration seal being flush with the wall surface, the penetration would not have been acceptable in accordance with Detail M-1 of O-0310-KM-001. Specifically, penetration 1-M-N-5 would be required to have a minimum of 12 inches of foam insulation, extending beyond the barrier plane to achieve the required seal depth. The maintenance procedures consist of external visual inspections, which allowed the as-built configuration being different from the procedure stated wall thickness to go unrecognized since 1999.
Corrective Actions: The licensee declared the penetration non-functional and set an hourly fire watch. Additionally, the correct penetration depth and seal design was determined, and the fire penetration seal was repaired and restored to a functional condition (12-inch foam insulation thickness). The equipment database and associated maintenance procedures for inspection and repair were corrected to reflect actual plant conditions.
Corrective Action References: NCRs 2508926, 2509983
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to maintain fire penetration 1-M-N-5 in accordance with drawing O-0310-KM-001, Penetration Seal Configuration Mechanical Fire Penetration Seal Designs Details M-1 & M-2, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that penetration 1-M-N-5 was maintained with a minimum of 12 inches of foam insulation per Detail M-1 to ensure that the 3-hour rated fire boundary was functional as required by the fire protection program.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, fire penetration 1-M-N-5 separates two high risk fire zones in the auxiliary building and was declared non-functional, adversely impacting the 3-hour fire boundary. Additionally, this performance deficiency is similar to the more than minor Example 2.d in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The finding was assigned to category 1.4.4 Fire Confinement with a High Degradation rating because greater than 10 percent of the required foam seal depth was missing. Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, 1, Step 1.4.4-E, the inspectors determined that if a fire were to spread from one fire area to another due to the degraded fire barrier, no additional targets would be damaged in the exposed fire area that could impact the credited safe shutdown strategy for the exposing fire area. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3, Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 3.D required, in part, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a)and 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805. NFPA 805, Section 3.11.4, requires, in part, that through penetration fire stops shall be protected such that the annular space between the penetrating item and the through opening in the fire barrier shall be filled with a qualified fire resistive penetration seal assembly capable of maintaining the fire resistance of the fire barrier. Oconee implemented this requirement through drawing O-0310-KM-001, Penetration Seal Configuration Mechanical Fire Penetration Seal Designs Details M-1 & M-2, via the licensee's design control equipment database. Fire Penetration 1-M-N-5 is a pipe penetration with a foam seal assembly through an 8-inch fire barrier and is required to be maintained in accordance with Detail M-1 (12-inch foam insulation thickness) of drawing O-0310-KM-001.
Contrary to the above, from at least 1999 until March 15, 2024, the licensee failed to implement and maintain in effect, all provisions of the approved fire protection program as required by drawing O-0310-KM-001. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain fire penetration 1-M-N-5 in accordance with Detail M-1 of drawing O-0310-KM-001.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On May 9, 2024, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Steven Snider and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 24, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Steven Snider and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.04 Corrective Action 2512968
Documents
Drawings OFD-102A-3.1 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (Borated 065
Water Supply and LPI Pump Suction)
OFD-102A-3.2 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (LPI Pump 049
Discharge)
OFD-102A-3.3 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (Core 025
Flood)
OFD-121D-1.1 Flow Diagram of Emergency Feedwater System 038
Miscellaneous Clearance PRT-3 -24-3A LPI TRAIN-0109
71111.05 Calculations OSC-9293 NFPA 805 Transition Radioactive Release G-1 Table 004
OSC-9314 NFPA 805 Transition Risk-Informed Performance-Based 006
Fire Risk Evaluation
OSC-9659 Oconee Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment for Units 1, 011
2, and 3
Corrective Action 2508926
Documents
Fire Plans CSD-ONS-PFP-Pre-Fire Plan for U1 Auxiliary Building Elevation 783 000
CSD-ONS-PFP-Pre-Fire Plan for U1 Auxiliary Building Elevation 809 000
CSD-ONS-PFP-Pre-Fire Plan for U2 Auxiliary Building Elevation 809 000
CSD-ONS-PFP-Pre-Fire Plan for Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Elevation 796 001
CSD-ONS-PFP-Pre-Fire Plan for Unit 3 Auxiliary Building Elevation 822 000
CSD-ONS-PFP-Pre-Fire Plan for U3 Reactor Building All Elevations 000
3RB
Miscellaneous O-0310-FZ-006 Auxiliary Building - Units 1 Fire Protection Plan Fire Area & 003
Fire Zone Boundaries Plan at EL 783 + 9
O-0310-FZ-011 Auxiliary Building - Unit 3 Fire Protection Plan Fire Area & 000
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Fire Zone Boundaries Plan at EL 796+6 & 797+6
O-0310-FZ-017 Auxiliary & Reactor Building - Unit 3 Fire Protection Plan 003
Fire Area & Fire Zone Boundaries Plan at EL 822+0 & EL
25+0
O-0310-FZ-023 Reactor Building - Units 3 Fire Protection Plan Fire Area & 001
Fire Zone Boundaries Plan at EL 861 + 6
O-0310-K-004 Fire Protection Auxiliary Building Unit 1 EL 783 + 9 009
O-0310-K-009 Fire Protection Auxiliary Building Unit 3 EL 796+6 015
O-0310-K-010 Auxiliary Building Unit 1 Fire Protection Plan & Fire Barrier, 14
Flood & Pressure Boundaries Plan at EL 809+3
O-0310-K-015 Fire Protect Auxiliary Building Unit 3 EL 822+0 017
O-0310-K-018 Auxiliary & Reactor Building Unit 3 Fire Protection Plant & 11
Fire Barrier, Flood, & Pressure Boundaries Plant at EL 838 +
0, EL 844 + 6, Below EL 876 + 0 and Below EL 886 +5
O-0310-K-021 Reactor Building - Unit 3 Fire Protection Plan & Fire Barrier, 3
Flood & Pressure Boundaries Plan at EL 861 + 6
O-0310-KM-001 Penetration Seal Configuration Mechanical Fire Penetration 6
Seal Designs Details M-1 & M-2
Procedures AD-FP-ALL-1520 Transient Combustible Control 001
MP/0/A/1705/027 Fire Protection - Fire Barrier Penetrations - Installation and 047
Repair Using Silicone Foam and Damming Material
MP/1/A/1705/018 Fire Protection - Penetration - Fire and Flood Barrier - 062
Inspection and Minor Repair
Work Orders 20265272
71111.07A Calculations OSC-11956 Reactor Building Cooling Units Performance Test 12
Corrective Action 2510287, 2438405, 2479288, 2507201, 2515539
Documents
Miscellaneous ONEI-0400-400 Revised Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) 3
Requirements in Support of 1-Year Mission Times
Work Orders 20653985
71111.11Q Miscellaneous EC 105524
Power Escalation JITT, OP-OC-20JT-06
Procedures AD-OP-All-0106 Conduct Of Infrequently Performed Tests Or Evolutions 4
AD-OP-ALL-1000 Conduct of Operations 023
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
AD-OP-ALL-1001 Abnormal Conduct of Operations 006
AD-OP-ONS-Oconee Specific Abnormal Operations Guidance 007
0002
AP/0/A/1700/047 External Flood Mitigation 029
OP/2/A/1102/004 Operation at Power 134
71111.12 Corrective Action 2473173, 2466960, 2501851, 2355727, 2357958, 2365144,
Documents 2446131, 2356835, 2356873, 2503151, 2453446
Drawings KEE-114 Elementary Diagram Generator Control ACB-1 Control 34
Circuit
Engineering 403225
Changes
Miscellaneous Lubrication Datasheet for ON0LPSPU000C 04/18/2024
OSS-0254.00- (ELECT) Keowee Emergency Power Design Basis 035
2005 Document
Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1103 Procurement Engineering Products 7
PT/0/A/0251/029 Siphon Seal Water System Test 30
Work Orders 20262241, 20433314, 20643793, 20447425, 20654745
71111.13 Corrective Action 2490772, 2490763
Documents
Drawings OFD-137B-1.1 Flow Diagram of Instrument Air System (Air Compressors, 28
After Coolers, Receivers, Air Dryers)
Miscellaneous Phoenix ONS Risk Profile for all Units on the week of April
2, 2024
Phoenix ONS Risk Profile for Unit 3 on the week of June 3,
24
OSS-0254.00-00- Design Basis Specification for the Instrument Air System 018
25
Procedures AD-OP-ALL-0106 Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions 4
AD-WC-ALL-0240 On-line Risk Management Process 4
AD-WC-ALL-0410 Work Activity Integrated Risk Management 14
AD-WC-ALL-0420 Shutdown Risk Management Rev 8
AD-WC-ALL-0420 Shutdown Risk Management 8
AD-WC-ALL-0430 Outage Risk Review 7
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
AD-WC-ONS-ONS Shutdown Risk Management 5
20
AD-WC-ONS-ONS Shutdown Risk Management Rev 5
20
AP/0/A/1700/006 Natural Disaster Rev 35
AP/3/A/1700/022 Loss of Instrument Air 029
MP/0/B/3007/049 Compressors - Primary Instrument Air - Sullair - Model 32-029
25-400 - Preventive Maintenance
OP/0/A/1102/026 Operations IPTE Pre-Job Briefings 033
OP/0/A/1106/027 Instrument Air System 128
PT/0/A/0500/001 Protected Service Water Primary and Booster Pump Test 007
Work Orders 20599978, 20647911
71111.15 Calculations OSC-7220.81 Supporting Design Analyses for ONS 3 EC 424255 000
Evaluation for Acceptability of Existing Indications on the
OSC-9033 Risk Significance Evaluation of Sump Outlet Pipe Foreign 0
Material
Corrective Action 2511743, 2503915, PIP-O-05-05720, PIP-O-11-09953,
Documents 2511097, 2487656, 2512045, 2441303, 2483549, 2511097,
2517412, 2517443, 2517450, 2517461, 2517929, 2515886,
2354522, 2517136, 1761227, 2317886, 2517379, 2515786
Drawings KEE-213-2 Elementary Diagram Master Control System Gen. 22
Miscellaneous Relaying
KFD-100A-2.1 Flow Diagram of Turbine Generator Cooling Water System 22
OFD-124A-3.1 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Service Water System 40
Turbine BLDG. (Low Pressure Service Water Pumps)
Miscellaneous Engineering Change 424255 000
ONEI-0400-592 Oconee 3 Cycle 33 Final Core Load Map 000
ONEI-0400-598 Oconee 3 Cycle 33 Core Operating Limits Report 000
OSS-0254.00-00- (Elect) Keowee Emergency Power Design Basis Document 034
2005
PT/0/A/0811/001 Power Escalation Test 059
Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1110 Design Review Requirements 11
AD-EG-ALL-1708 Development of Relief Requests and Alternatives Pursuant 0
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
AD-MN-ALL-0002 Foreign Material Exclusion 16
AD-NE-ALL-1107 Evaluation of Indications and Relevant Conditions 4
AD-PI-ALL-0100 Corrective Action Program 30
IP/0/A/2005/006 Maintenance Of Keowee Hydro Station General Electric 021
EX2100 Digital Exciter
OP/0/A/1106/019 Keowee Hydro At Oconee 114
OP/2/A/2000/102 KHU-2 Alarm Response Guide 2SA-2 012
TE-MN-ALL-0002 Foreign Material Exclusion Level and Controls Screening 3
Work Orders 20266554, 20651767, 20255683, 20651767, 20658316,
266313, 20266013, 20661235, 20537999
71111.18 Corrective Action 2403506, 2403542, 2423658
Documents
Miscellaneous OSC -11971 Oconee Replacement Axial Power Shaping Rod Assembly 1
(APSRA) Mechanical Design Evaluation
71111.20 Corrective Action 2515019, 2515022, 2515090, 2515091, 2517306, 2518069,
Documents 2518189, 2518172, 2518685, 2517443, 2517450
Drawings OFD-101A-3.1 Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Letdown 044
Section)
OFD-101A-3.2 Flow Diagram of High Pressure Injection System (Storage 044
Section)
OFD-102A-3.1 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (Borated 065
Water Supply and LPI Pump Suction)
OFD-102A-3.2 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (LPI Pump 049
Discharge)
OFD-102A-3.3 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (Core 025
Flood)
OFD-104A-3.1 Flow Diagram of Spent Fuel Cooling System 061
OFD-109A-3.1 Flow Diagram of Purification Demineralizers 016
OFD-116-3.1 Flow Diagram of Reactor Building Purge System 14
OFD-121D-1.1 Flow Diagram of Emergency Feedwater System 39
Engineering 424347 Disposition for Re-use of Fuel Assembly UDPK01 and 0
Changes UDPK03
Miscellaneous Clearance OPS-3-24-HP-LTOP S/U-0667
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Clearance OPS-3-24-LPI-LPI Sys Fill-0680
Pheonix Online Risk profile for Unit 3 for the week of April
28, 2024
O3R32 - Outage Schedule by Early Start, Current
Active/Working Version
Clearance OPS-3-24-RC-PZR Cooldown-0409
Clearance OPS-3-24-HPI-HPI Fill-0678
ONEI-0400-267 Oconee 3 Cycle 32 Spent Fuel Pool Decay Heat 013
Engineering Instruction
ONEI-0400-301 Communication of Requirements for Oconee Technical 001
Specification 3.7.13: Definitions, Boundary Conditions, and
Spent Fuel Pool Storage Qualifications
ONEI-0400-349 Core Alignment Verification 001
ONEI-0400-371 Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling 003
Heat Up Times Due to Decay Heat
ONEI-0400-592 Oconee 3 Cycle 33 Final Core Load Map 002
OSC-11714 Oconee Nuclear Station Cycle Specific Decay Heat 019
Calculations
OSC-1594 NUREG-0612 - Control of Heavy Loads - Load Drop 002
Analysis
OSC-6051 Verification of Alternate Method Used to Fill Spent Fuel 011
Pools Following Operation of SSF RC Makeup System
OSS-0254.00-00- (Mech) Design Basis Specification for Standby Shutdown 064
1004 Facility Reactor Coolant Makeup System
OSS-0254.00-00- (Mech) Design Basis Specification for the Spent Fuel 034
1006 Cooling System
OSS-0254.00-00- (Mech) Design Basis Specification for Reactor Building 046
4001 Containment Isolation
Procedures AD-MN-ALL-0002 Foreign Material Exclusion 16
AD-MN-ALL-0009 Nuclear Rigging and Lifting 9
AD-OP-ALL-0201 Protected Equipment 10
AD-OP-ALL-0203 Reactivity Management 16
AD-SY-ALL-0460 Managing Fatigue and Work Hour Limits 8
AM/0/A/3009/012 Emergency Plan for Refilling Spent Fuel Pools 013
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
A
AP/3/A/1700/002 Excessive RCS Leakage 016
AP/3/A/1700/026 Loss of Decay Heat Removal 029
AP/3/A/1700/035 Loss of SFP Cooling and/or Level 025
FG/0/A/1900/011 Alternative Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 002
IP/0/B/0200/027 A Reactor Level Instrumentation and Calibration 033
IP/0/B/0200/027 B Ultrasonic Level Instrument Installation and Calibration 025
IP/0/B/0200/027 Reactor Vessel Level Transmitters Return to Service and 013
C Removal from Service
IP/0/B/3002/002 A Polar Crane Inspection and Preventive Maintenance 015
MP/0/A/1150/002 Reactor Vessel - Closure Head - Installation 059
A
MP/0/A/1400/002 Equipment Hatch - Reactor Building - Temporary Opening 042
A and Closing
MP/0/A/1500/009 Defueling/Refueling Procedure 078
MP/0/A/1710/017 Crane - Whiting - Polar - Inspection 018
B
MP/0/A/1800/105 RBES - LPI Suction Line Flange Installation and Removal, 023
A Drain Line and Sump Inspections
MP/0/A/3005/012 Containment Inspection/Close Out Procedure 022
MP/0/B/1710/022 Operation of Reactor Building Polar Crane and Auxiliary 039
Hoist (CRD Crane)
OP/0/A/1108/001 Curves and General Information 119
OP/0/A/1108/001 Reactor Core and SFP Loss of Cooling Heatup Tables 008
A
OP/0/A/1108/001 Spent Fuel Pool Level vs. Temperature Curves 018
B
OP/3/A/1102/001 Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup 285
OP/3/A/1102/001 Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup 285
OP/3/A/1102/004 Operation at Power 143
OP/3/A/1102/004 Operation at Power 142
OP/3/A/1102/010 Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown 256
OP/3/A/1102/015 Filling and Draining FTC 088
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
OP/3/A/1102/028 Reactor Building Tour and Containment Material Controls 022
OP/3/A/1103/011 Draining and Nitrogen Purging RCS 100
OP/3/A/1104/004 Low Pressure Injection System 171
OP/3/A/1104/006 SF Cooling System 102
OP/3/A/1104/010 Low Pressure Service Water 122
OP/3/A/1104/049 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) 061
OP/3/A/1105/019 Control Rod Drive System 035
OP/3/A/1106/001 Turbine Generator 129
OP/3/A/1106/006 Emergency FDW System 116
OP/3/A/1502/001 Operations Defueling/Refueling Responsibilities 093
OP/3/A/1502/007 Operations Defueling/Refueling Responsibilities 093
OP/3/A/1502/009 Containment Closure Control 050
PT/0/A/0711/001 Zero Power Physics Testing 081
PT/0/A/0750/002 Core Inspections Procedure 031
PT/0/A/0750/012 Development of Fuel Movement Instructions Procedure 054
PT/0/A/0750/012 Development of Fuel Movement Instructions Procedure 054
PT/0/A/0750/018 Refueling Activities 026
PT/0/A/0775/015 Core Alignment Verification 015
PT/3/A/0115/008 Reactor Building Containment Isolation and Verification 043
PT/3/A/0115/012 Unborated Water Source Isolation Verification 005
PT/3/A/0150/029 Performance Containment Verification 015
PT/3/A/0150/030 Containment Verification 004
PT/3/A/0150/034 Leak Rate History Record and Reactor Building Leak Rate 012
Verification
PT/3/A/0200/046 Reactor Coolant System Leak Test 011
PT/3/A/0600/001 Instrument Surveillance Prior to Mode Change 44
B
PT/3/A/0600/015 Control Rod Movement 030
PT/3/A/0630/001 Mode Change Verification 037
Work Orders 20541411, 20541412, 20268299, 20612211, 20612035,
20612355, 20612627, 20612628
71111.24 Corrective Action 2476102, 2473099, 2471437, 2426308, 2426301, 2516589,
Documents 2518189, 2515022, 2517412, 2517443, 2505843, 2469093,
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
2401644, 2327394, 2401085, 2327585, 2401253, 2518116
Drawings OFD-102A-3.1 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (Borated 065
Water Supply and LPI Pump Suction)
OFD-102A-3.2 Flow Diagram of Low Pressure Injection System (LPI Pump 049
Discharge)
OFD-116A-3.1 Flow Diagram of Reactor Building Purge System 014
OFD-121D-1.1 Flow Diagram of Emergency Feedwater System 039
Engineering 422106, 424347
Changes
Miscellaneous ONEI-0400-352 Oconee Mast Sipping Limits and Precautions 001
ONEI-0400-477 Oconee Core Power Distribution Comparison Criteria 000
OSS-0254.00-00- (MECH) Design Basis Spec for the Essential Siphon 015
1049 Vacuum System
Procedures AD-NF-ALL-0806 Nuclear Fuel Integrity 6
AD-OP-ALL-0106 Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions 4
AP/3/A/1700/026 Loss of Decay Heat Removal 029
AP/3/A/1700/035 Loss of SFP Cooling and/or Level 025
EP/3/A/1800/001 Unit 3 EOP Enclosures 5.31-5.40 0
0P
MP/0/A/1200/045 Valve - Henry Pratt Type RIA11 - Reactor Building Purge - 025
Seat to Disc Adjustment
MP/0/A/1200/088 Valves - Henry Pratt - Reactor Building Purge Isolation - 028
Preventive Maintenance
MP/0/A/1840/040 Pumps - Motors - Miscellaneous Components - Lubrication 004
A Post Maintenance Testing
MP/0/A/3009/020 DC Motor - Up to 50 HP - Visual Inspection and Preventive 010
A Maintenance
PT/0/A/0711/001 Zero Power Physics Test 081
PT/0/A/0750/023 Fuel Assembly Inspection by In-Mast Sipping 009
PT/0/A/0750/025 Fuel Assembly Inspection by Canned Sipping 001
PT/0/A/0800/030 Core Power Distribution Comparison 063
PT/0/A/0811/011 Power Escalation Test 058
PT/1/A/0600/013 Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test 078
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
PT/2/A/2200/011 KHU-2 Turbine Guide Bearing Oil System Surveillance 014
PT/3/A/0150/006 Mechanical Penetration Leak Rate Data 076
PT/3/A/0151/019 Penetration 19 Leak Rate Test 019
PT/3/A/0151/029 Penetration 29 Leak Rate Test 013
PT/3/A/0152/016 Purge System Valve Stroke Test 020
PT/3/A/0261/010 Essential Siphon Vacuum System Test 37
PT/3/A/0600/012 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Test 096
PT/3/A/0610/001 EPSL Normal Source Voltage Sensing Circuit 036
A
PT/3/A/0610/001 EPSL Startup Source Voltage Sensing Circuit 036
B
PT/3/A/0610/001 EPSL Standby Bus 1 And 2 Voltage Sensing Circuits 021
C
PT/3/A/0610/001 Emergency Power Switching Logic Test 056
J
Work Orders 20647905, 20523776, 20563143, 20645573, 20561397,
20666997, 20611772, 20612606, 20612630, 20612607,
20476249, 20648458, 20469789, 20669079, 20609616,
20655172
71114.06 Miscellaneous ASE-13
71151 Corrective Action 2506370
Documents
Miscellaneous MSPI Derivation and Margin Reports for Heat Removal for
Oconee Nuclear Station
Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) Basis 27
Document
LER 270-2023-001
LER 287-2023-001
LER 287-2023-002
RCS Leak rate data for Oconee Nuclear Station
MSPI Derivation and Margin Reports for Cooling Water
System for Units 1, 2, and 3 from June 2023 to March 2024
AD-PI-ALL-0700 Performance Indicators 6
OSS-0254.00-00- (Mech) Design Basis Spec for Keowee Turbine Generator 018
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
1046 Cooling Water (WL) System
PT/X/A/0201/007 RCS Leakage Calculation Test 1
71152A Corrective Action 2516908, 2516782
Documents
Miscellaneous Interim Report of a Deviation Associated with an Oil Filled
Capacitors in Aluminum Case Part Number 07-020139-10,
Final Report of a Deviation Associated with an Oil Filled
Capacitors in Aluminum Case Part Number 07-020139-10
71152S Corrective Action 2504661, 2508057, 2517041, 2517136, 2515865, 2518663,
Documents 2494275
Work Orders 20263850, 20263851, 20263865, 20263849, 20537999,
20670317
71153 Corrective Action 2477145, 2477208, 2477210, 2477611, 2489821, 2477886,
Documents 2477925, 2480047, 2480068, 2503208
23