ML20205D475
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| ML20205D475 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1986 |
| From: | Blake J, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205D467 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-86-14, 50-370-86-14, NUDOCS 8608180051 | |
| Download: ML20205D475 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1986014
Text
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UNITE 3 STATES
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Sa [ fig % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
* REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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* 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.: 50-369/86-14 and 50-370/86-14
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Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17
Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2
Inspection Conducted: J e 9-13 86
Inspector: 0
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Approved by: . _/ u- 7//7!&fo
J. J' Blake7 Section Chief D&te Signed
Engineering Branch
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SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas
of inservice inspection (ISI), work observation, evaluation and review of
records, Eddy Current (EC) examination results of steam generators (SG) tubes;
nuclear service water flow element replacement on pump 1-B; shot peening of S&G
tubes; review of snubber functional test records.
Results: One violation was identified - violation 369/86-14-01, Instruments and
Shot Peening Material Used to Qualify SG Tube Shot Peening Procedure and
Personnel Not Identified, paragraph 5.
8608180051 860729
PDR ADOCK 05000369
G PDR
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REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
G. W. Grier, Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, Corporate
*T. McConnel, Station Manager, McGuire Nuclear Staion (MNS)
*B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Service - MNS
*D. J. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance - MNS
R. P. Ruth, Senior QA Engineer - MNS
*A. F. Batts, QA Technical Support Supervisor - MNS
*N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer - MNS
*M. Carpenter, QA Vendor Inspector
D. Mayes, QA Engineer Corporate
T. Troutman, Inservice Inspector (ISI) Coordinator
G. Baker, Level II Eddy Current Examiner
W. E. Smith, Engineering Specialist, Snubbers
J. R. Pring, Test Supervisor, Technical Services Performance
Other Organization
Babcock & Wilcox, Special Products and Integrated Services (SPIF)
B. Street, Coordinator
S. Hellman, Manager, Steam Generator Services
J. Gutzwiller, Engineer
W. R. Speight, QC Level II Lead Mechanical Inspector
B. Stallings, Shift Supervisor
J. Helmey, Steam Generator Engineer
R. Patterson, ISI Coordinator
NRC Resident Inspector
W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector
* Attended exit interview
2. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 13, 1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in cetail the inspection findings. No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
(0 pen) Violation 369/86-14-01: Instruments and Material used for the
Qualification of Special Process Shot Peening Procedure and Personnel Not
Identified, paragraph 5.
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(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/86-14-02: Designation of Effective
Code for the Nuclear Service Water System, paragraph 6.
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/86-14-03: Verification of Snubber
Tests by Qualified Personnel, paragraph 7.
The licensee identified as proprietary some of the materials provided to and
reviewed by the inspector during this inspection, however, details from this
material is not included in this report.
3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4. Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5. Steam Generator Tube Shot Peening - Unit 1 (627038)
On May 27, 1986, the licensee met with NRC staff in Bethesda, Maryland to
discuss plans for shot peening the steam generator (SG) tubes of McGuire
Unit 1, during the current refueling outage. The licensee stated that shot
peening was a remedial preventive measure against primary water stress
corrosion cracking (PWSCC) within the tubesheet region of the SGs identified
at both units.
Apparently certain parameters which influence PWSCC rates include material,
residual tensile stresses and aggressive environment, e.g., operating
temperature. As used in this application shot peening, under controlled
parameters, induces compressive stresses over a thin layer of material on
the internal diameter (ID), surface of the SG tubes and thereby helps to
improve the material's resistance to PWSCC in the area of interest. Through
discussions with cognizant personnel the inspector ascertained that the
process (shot peening) had been designated as a special process for
safety-related work with commensurate administrative controls and quality
assurance requirements. Within these areas the inspector reviewed for
content, the process specification, the shot peening procedure, the formal
process qualification records, personnel performance qualification records,
equipment calibration and certification records. Also, the inspector
observed the operation by video in the control center located in a trailer
outside the containment building. At the time, the contractor was shot
peening steam generator "C" of Unit 1.
As a result of discussions, document review and observations, the inspector
noted that the process specification No. 51-1159413-00, identified certain
parameters and/or items as essential variables including, but not limited to
shot peening material used, SG tube internal diameter, test strip material
and the arc height deflection on the test strip material measured for
calibration purposes. Within these areas the review disclosed that although
the specifi:ation identified a specific type of shot material together with
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manufacturing requirements and hardness levels, the qualification document
did not identify the material, e.g. heat / lot number, therefore it could not
be ascertained whether the material used in the process qualification met
specification require;nents and in fact was the same as, or similar to, that
used in the field application. In addition, the inspector found that the
qualification record did not identify the individuals who performed the
qualification and certain instruments used in the qualification of the shot
peening procedure. Those instruments ir.cluded pressure gages, dial
indicators and weight scale. The inspector, discussed this finding first
with B&W's site supervision and the accountable engineer in charge of the
qualification who provided copies of calibration certificates for instru-
ments that were in use and for spares on hand. The engineer stated that
although the qualification record did not identify the instruments and/or
specific material used in the qualification, the instruments used had been
calibrated as required by the B&W, QA program and that it was an oversight
which resulted in this problem. Additional discussions were held with the
licensee on this matter both prior to and after the termination of this
inspection. In all instances the inspector explained to the licensee that
although the instruments and material used in the qualification of the
process could have been properly calibrated and/or certified there was
nothing on the process qualification record to link the instruments / material
used in the process qualification with the calibration records provided.
The inspector stated that this failure to provide objective evidence to
verify that special processes affecting the quality of nuclear safety-
related structures were closely controlled was in violation of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion IX as implemented by Duke 2-A Section 17.2.9. This
violation was identified as 369/86-14-01 " Instruments-Materials Used for the
Qualification of Special Process Shot Peening Procedure and Personnel Not
Identified.
6. Nuclear Service Water Flow Element Installation Units 1 and 2 (62703B)
a. This work effort was a followup to that documented in Report 50-369,
370/86-13. At the time of this inspection, the licensee was installing
the last of the four flow element subassemblies, two per unit. The
subassembly under discussion was for train "B" and was identified as
RN751. It was made out of stainless steel pipe 17.375"ID, with
stainless steel flange connections welded on each end. The orifice was
designed per ASME Manual on Fluid Meters, 6th Edition and calibrated to
1/2% of full scale flow of approximately 20,000 gal./ min. To make room
for this subassembly the licensee removed a section from the existing
18"9 carbon steel pipe and welded flange connections to facilitate
installation of the subassembly. The inspector reviewed the field
fabrication records / weld ticket at the work area and ascertained that
the designated code was ANSI B31.7 (69), class 3, QA Condition 1. The
flange to pipe fillet welds appeared on drawing MC-2418-14 and were
identified as 1RN 751-5 and -6. At the time of this inspection, the
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welds were being fabricated and the inspector checked them for
compliance with code requirements. In addition, the inspector reviewed
the applicable weld procedure qualification record, (PQR) L-103,
performance qualification records for welders R.E.W. and R.T.M, and the
quality records for the following welding consumables.
Type Size Heat / Lot
7018 1/8"4 01-3k-803R
7018 1/8"4 11684
7018 3/32"4 4E418801
7018 3/32"4 422W7041
The qualification / certification records for QC welding inspector J.Y.R.
were also reviewed. Within those areas, the inspector was informed
that a nonconformance had been written on these welds for lack of
preheat as specified on the Field Weld Data Sheet. Through discussions
with cognizant site personnel and a review of the applicable documents
the inspector noted an inconsistency concerning the effective code for
the Nuclear Service water system. This was as follows:
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QA/QC field weld records showed the effective code as ANSI B31.7,
1969 Edition
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Pipe Specification MCS-1206.00-02-0002, Rev. 95, 3/28/86,
Paragraph 4.5.5 states in part that the Nuclear Service Water
System conforms to ANSI B31.7(69) Class II.I. Repairs, replace-
ments and modifications performed under ASME XI, may be made in
accordance with ASME III Subsection ND, 1971 Edition with W'71
Addenda.
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Design Engineering Memorandum entitled: McGuire Nuclear Station
RN System - Change Effective Code, 2/16/86 states in part that
Specification MCS-1206.00-02-002 will be revised to show ASME III,
Subsection ND,1971 Edition thru W'71 Addenda as the effective
code for future work on the RN System.
The inspector stated that the use of the word "may" in Revision 95
of the subject specification above, does not reflect design
engineering's definitive position on the adoption of ASME
Section III (71W71), as the effective code for this line.
Moreover, the inspector stated that the word "may" creates
ambiguity which results in confusion for everyone involved in the
repair, replacement, modification and inspection of this system.
The licensee agreed to review the related documents and take
appropriate action to rectify the situation. This was identified
as Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/86-14-02 Designation of
Effective Code for the Nuclear Service Water System. In a
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followup telephone conversation with cognizant site QA/QC
personnel the inspector ascertained that the question, regarding
the application of preheat prior to making the pipe to flange
fillet weld, was being resolved by clarifying that the base metal
criterion used to determine the need for preheat was the thickness
of the pipe instead of the flange. In this case, the thickness of
the base material (pipe) was 0.525 inches, which did not require
preheat. Also, it is the inspector's understanding that action
has been implemented to resolve the effective code issue.
b. Nuclear Service Water Pumps - Reference Head Curves Units 1 and 2
ASME Code Section XI, (80, W81) Subsection IWP-3100 reouires that
safety-related pumps first be tested to establish reference values,
which are to be used for comparison during subsequent inservice
testing. The tests, and the subsequent reference head curves for pumps
1-A of Unit 1 and 2A, 2B of Unit 2 were conducted and the curevae drawn
per procedure PT/1/A/4403/05 "RN System Baseline Performance test."
The inspector discussed the test results and reviewed the reference
curves drawn for the above pumps with the accountable engineer who
indicated that they (curves) were well within design requirements.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified.
7. Functional Testing of Snubbers, Units 1 and 2 (737538)
Functional testing of safety-related snubbers is conducted .under McGuire
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Nuclear Station Technical Specification (TS) Section 3/4.7.8 which requires
all snubbers listed in Tables 3.7-4a and -4b to be operable. Section 4.7.8
describes surveillance requirements including functional testing, sample
plan selection, acceptance criteria and corrective actions. The following
procedures, which are used to implement the above requirements, were
reviewed for content:
MP/0/A/7650/54 Snubber Test Bench Calibration 4/17/86
MP/0/A/7700/01 Functional Testing of Mechanical Snubbers
MP/0/A/7650/50 Operability Testing of Hydraulic Snubbers
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Work request number WR-048892 was used to perform the required checks on
hydraulic and mechanical snubbers. Snubber selection is performed by
computer. The snubbers picked for testing are a random sample representing
all types and sizes of snubbers. Test records selected for review were
from the recently completed Unit 2 outage which commenced in April of 1986.
The record review and evaluation was for the following snubbers.
2MCA-CF-208A&B
2MCA-S-NI-150-09-NA&B
2MCA-CF-H204A&B
2MCA-SM-232
2MCA-S-KC-512-01-0
2MCA-RN-3022A&B
The records were reviewed to ascertain whether:
a. The test equipment and personnel were properly qualified or certified
and equipment were periodically calibrated as prescribed,
b. Test acceptance criteria were established and applied.
c. Instructions and procedures were being followed.
d. Deficiencies were identified and corrective actions taken as
prescribed.
e. The number of units to be tested during the performance of the test
plan complies with the surveillance program.
f. Test data were recorded and results documented and reviewed as
prescribed.
Within these areas, the inspector noted the following:
Section 3, Personnel Requirements, of MP/0/A/7700/01 states that
testing shall be performed by qualified personnel. However, the test
records reviewed had no provision for the signature of the qualified
individual who performed the test and no signature of such an
individual appeared on these records. Also, the inspector noted that
procedure MP/0/A/7650/50 had no requirements for personnel qualifica-
tions.
In discussions with cognizant licensee personnel, the inspector acknowledged
the fact that people assigned the task of supervising and/or conducting the
tests appeared to be fully qualified. But stated that QA records of test
results are needed to provide objective evidence that the tests complied
with procedural requirements, which include but are not limited to personnel
qualifications, equipment calibration, etc. The licensee agreed to review
and revise the procedure / records to provide this information. This matter
was identified as Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/86-14-03 Verification of
Snubber Tests by Qualified Personnel.
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8. Inservice Inspection (ISI) - Observation of Work and Work Activities (73753B)
Unit 1
The inspector observed ISI work and work activities to determine whether the
inservice inspection of pressure retaining components was performed in
accordance with Technical Specifications, the applicable ASME Code require-
ments. The applicable code for this activity was ASME XI (80,W81).
a. The inspector reviewed the licensee's ISI plan for the current outage
to determine the work scope for the present outage and to ensure that
components selection, number of items to be inspected, methods of
examination, and extent of examination were in accordance with the
applicable edition of the Code and had been properly documented and
approved.
b. Personnel qualification / certification records for four Babcock & Wilcox
Level II examiners associated with the inspections of paragraph c.
below were reviewed to determine whether the qualification and
certification records properly reflect the following:
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Employer's name
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Person certified
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Activity qualified to perform
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Level of certification
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Effective period of certification
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Signature of individual certifying title and level
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Basis used for certification, such as the required number of
training hours, etc. for the examination method specified
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Annual visual acuity, color vision examination, and periodic
recertification
c. The inspector observed the ultrasonic examinations including calibra-
tion activities for the following:
Weld / Component
Identification Item Number Component Description
ISGO-068-07 C01.010.005 Steam Generator ID Upper
Shell to Head
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The inspections were compared with applicable procedures in the
following areas:
(1) Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedure
(2) Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel
(3) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level
(4) Recording of inspection results
(5) Type of apparatus used
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(6) Extent of coverage of weldment
(7) Calibration requirements
(8) Search units
(9) Beam angles -
(10) DAC curves
(11) Reference level for monitoring discontinuities
(12) Method of demonstrating penetration
(13) Limits of evaluating and recording indications
(14) Recording significant indications
(15) Acceptance limits
Certification records for material and equipment used in the above examina-
tions were also reviewed by the inspector.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
9. Inservice Inspection Data Review and Evaluation (737558) Unit 1
The inspector reviewed nondestructive examination (NDE) records for the
current inspection period to ascertain whether the extent and frequency of
examinations were consistent with the Technical Specification and the NRC
accepted ISI program and whether they met the minimum examination require-
ments specified in the applicable code.
a. NDE ccords for the following pressure retaining piping system welds
were swler ed by the inspector:
Weld / Component
Identification Item Number Results
Flywheel (inplace) E01.001.004 No Recordable Indications
(NRI)
Welded Attachments C03.040.012 NRI
C03.004.001 NRI
Safe End on top of Pzr. 805.020.012 NRI
IPZr-W4CSE
1PZR-W4BSE B05.020.010 NRI
Rubbing Pad to 42"$
Guard Pipe -1MCA-SM-148 C03.040.010 NRI
1" Lug to 42" Guard Pipe C03.040.011 NRI
Steam Generator - 10
Upper Shell to head weld
1SGD-068-07 C01.010.005 Three recordable
indications, ER-400,-401,
-402 documented and
evaluated as required by
Level III
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The records for the above welds were reviewed to determine whether they
contained or provided reference to the following documents:
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Examination results and data sheets
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Examination equipment data
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Calibration data sheets
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Examination evaluation data
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Records on extent of examination
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Records of deviation from program and p'rocedures including
justification of deviation, if applicable
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Records on disposition of findings
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Re-examination data after repair work, if applicable
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Identi ficatior, of NDE material such as penetrant, penetrant
cleaner, couplant, films, tapes, etc. as applicable,
and to ascertain whether the following requirements were met as
applicable,
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The method, extent, and technique of examination complied with the
licensee's ISI program and applicable NDE procedure.
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The examination data within the acceptance criteria as outlined in
the applicable NDE procedure and applicable Code requirements.
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The recording, evaluating, and dispositioning of findings were in
compliance with the applicable NDE procedure and Code require-
ments.
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Inservice NDE results were compared with the recorded results of
prior Section XI examinations.
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The method used for NDE was sufficient to determine the full
extent of indication or acceptance.
Within the areas examined, no violation or deviation was identified.
b. Eddy Current (EC) Examination of Steam Generator (SG) Tubes, Unit 1
ISI activities during this refueling outage included the eddy current
(EC) examination of tubes in the four SGs A-D. Data acquisition and
analysis was being performed by B&W. The approved B&W procedure
ISI-423 Rev. 8 and related references such as, Regulatory Guide 1.83,
July 1975 and Code Case N-401 were the governing documents.
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The examination was conducted with a multi-frequency technique,
utilizing the computerized MIZ-18 EC Examination System to analyze tube
integrity. Discussions with the licensee disclosed the following:
Steam Tube Sample Inspection
Generator Inspected Results
A 6% sample - 3% random clear
and 3% special interest and
preheater area
B 6% sample - 3% random clear
and 3% special interest and
preheater area
C Same as A&B above with an Three (3) tubes
additional 6% because of plugged
three (3) pluggers
D 6% sample, identified four (4) 135 tubes
plugable tubes which resulted plugged
in inspection of 100% of SG
tubes
Discussions with licensee personnel disclosed that the tube defects showed
no bias towards any specific location and the degree of degradation varied
in magnitude between 40% and 100% of tube wall thickness. In SG "D" the
defects were located in the tube sheet region. It is the inspector's
understanding that the licensee met with NRR to discuss the EC results in
SG"D".
Within the inspected areas, no violations or deviations were identified.
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