ML19210B486
| ML19210B486 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1978 |
| From: | Herbein T METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GQL-0147, GQL-147, NUDOCS 7911080715 | |
| Download: ML19210B486 (33) | |
Text
.
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY POST OFFICE Box 542 RE ADING, PENN!,iYLV ANI A 19603 TELEPHONE 215 - 929-3601 January 31, 1978 GQL 0147 W,,s, W-
- Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ,
4Q* [,, / ' .
Attn: R. W. Reid, Chief m **; * .
Operating Reactors Branch No. k 94 #'ie g, NU J .[/;.~i.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccc: mission
'4ashington, D. C. 20555 ff l gwe ,
Dear Sir:
Q'w , ,,
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)
' Operating License No. DFR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Cask Drop Analysis Additional Infornatien In response to your letter of August 18, 1977, and per our letter of November 22, 1977 (GQL 1622), enclosed please find the subject additienal information.
e"ely,
/ '
1 J. G Herbein Vice President-Generation JGH:RJS:cjg Enclosure.
1584 142 k
Pt p a i
=
THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 CASK EROP ANALYSIS ADDITIONAL I:TFOFRATION 1.0 The Cask Drop Evaluation for Three Mile Island Uni
- 1 (TMI-1), enclosed with your February lb, 1976 letter, states:
(1) "During transfer of the cask to and frem the decontamination pit and raising and levering of the cask within the pit, results of evaluations indicate that with the present system, cask drop accidents could possibly result in unacceptable damage to engineered safeguard circuits, spent fuel pool coolant pipts, and ecoling water pipes to the spent fuel pool coolers. Met-Ed is currently evaluating pessible plant modifications and changes to operating procedures to correct this situation," and (2) "When the location for cask decontamination operations is selected, the specific plant modifications and changes to operating precedures and technical specifications that are required vill be des.ribed to NRC. Until such time, the present cask decontamination pit vill not be used."
The discussion supporting the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications transmitted by your letter of September 21, 1976 states that as a result of your studies, it is new proposed to relocate the cask decentamination area in the shaded area shown in Figure 3.11-3 of ycur September 21, 1976 1584 143.
submittal. Further, FSAR Figure 1-3 shovs that the Unit 1 temporary new fuel storage arealls located parallel to the transporter railroad tracks and could be in the path of the spent fuel cask as it travels to and frc=
the Unit 1 decentamination area as well as the corresponding verk stations in Unit 2.
It is expected that an inec=ing empty shipping cask vill be moved frc=
the transporter to the decontamination area for cleaning before being moved to the loading pit. For the Unit I leaded cask, it is possible that it will be =oved frc= the cask stcrage and leading pit across the
=
railroad tracks and again over the temporary new fuel storage area to the decentamination area for decontamination before being leaded en to the transporter.
To enable us to continue our review and evaluation of the safety implications of the Unit 1 proposed changes, once the shipping cask and transpcrter has entered the Unit 1 building for the offsite shipment of fuel frc=
either Unit 1 or Unit 2, we vill require the folleving additional information.
QUESTION 1.1 Provide one drawing showing the relative location of the folleving areas of Unit 1: (1) the new fuel storage areas; (ii) the spent fuel storage pool; (iii) the spent fuel cask storage and leading pit; and (iv) the specific location of the cask decontamination area.
1584 144
RESPONSE
The requested infor=ation is shown en Figure 1.
3 To further clarify these areas, the folleving figures have been revised:
Figure 1-3 TMI-1 FSAR (1) " Temporary : lev Fuel Storage Rack" changed to " Receiving /
Shipping Area."
(2) " Spent Fuel Cask Storage Area" changed to " Spent Fuel Cask Storage & Leading Pit and Decentamination Area."
Figure 1J." TMI-1 FSAR (1) " Decontamination Pit" changed te "Decenta=ination Pit (Not Used)."
(2) " Spent Fuel Cask Storage" changed te " Spent Fuel Cask Storage & Leading Pit and
. Decentamination Area."
Figure 9-18 TMI-l FSAR (1) "Te=perary tiev Fuel Sterage Rack" changed to " Receiving /
Shipping Area."
(2) " Shipping Cask Area" changed to
" Spent Fuel Cask Storage &
Leacing Pit and Decentaminatien
^=e*
1584 145
3 a
(3) "Decentamination Pit Area" changed to "Decentsnination Pit Area (Not Used)."
CUESTION
- s 1.2 To adequately evaluate the potential for unsafe conditions occurring in Unit 1 folleving a cask drop accident at any point along its revised .
path of travel between the transporter, the newly located decontaninatien area, and the spent fuel cask leading pit, supertnpose the travel paths of the shipping cask for Unit 1 and 2 within the Unit 1 building on the drawing requested above.
RESPONSE
The travel path of the shipping cask for Unit 1 and 2 within the Unit 1 ,
building is shown en Figure 1.
QUESTION 1.3 Verify that the path of travel of the spent fuel cask frem the transporter to the Unit 2 building has not changed due to these proposed changes er describe, discuss and denonstrate that no safety related consequences could result from these changes.
1584 146 The path of travel of the spent fuel cask frcm the transporter to the Unit 2 building remaine as shcvn in the TMI-2 FSAR, Volume 3, Section 9.1.h.2.2. See Figure 1.
5 Therefore, there are no changes to evaluate for safety related consequences.
CUESTION 1.h Assusigg the engineered safeguard circuit trays have been relocated as proposed in Figures IV-3 and IV h (February 1k ,1976 submittal) and a cask drop accident occurs such as to disable one of the two separated engineered safeguard trays when the reactor is at pcVer. Provide the follevin[information:
(a) Describe, discuss , and demonstrate that the single event (cask drop),
at any point along its path of travel, vill not initiate another s
event that pctentially could prevent a safe reactor shutdown or prevent adequate spent fuel cooling. Your analysis shculd assume a single failure in the systems associated with the remaining intact engineered safeguards tray er other essential systems but may include usenof non-safety grade equipment. Where possible, reference the en appropriate Figures in the FSAR which show the.lecation of threatened equipment.
s
RESPONSE
1584 147 The engineered safeguard cable racevay system in the vicinity of the spent fuel cask handling path is separated and constructed so as to preclude da age to more than one redundant safeguard channel for any single failure. The raceways are separated and contained within two protected areas so that a postulated cask drop accident would not simultaneously damage redundant engineered safeguard channels. The simultaneous occurrence of an open or short circuit in the protected redundant engineered safeguard cable is highly i= probable and not censidered credible.
w
Additionally, ve have analy::ed the postulated cask drop and have concluded that this accident will not initiate another event that could preclude a safe reactor shut-down or prevent adequate spent fuel ecoling. In addition, IEEE Trial-Use Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Statiens, August 15,177TIEEEStd. 603-1977 Paragraph h.3 Single Failure Criterion, does not require an analysis that vould " assume a single failure in the systems associated with the remaining intact engineered safeguards tray." A postulated cask drop is a design basis event and in itself is considered a single failure; therefore, the engineered safeguard system is not required to sustain a second single failure.
Per the Cask Drop Evaluation, February lb, 1976 item h page IV-9 it is concluded that the " changes described" vill provide reasonable assurance that cask drop accidents during transfer of the cask to and from the cask leading pit and raising and lowering of the cask within the pit will not result in the cask fallinst into the "B" spent fuel pool. This means that there can be no damage to the mechanical equipment of the spent fuel pool cooling system. The only mechanical portion of the spent fuel pool cooling system that could be damaged is that portion of the h" line (for filling and partially emptying the spent fuel cask storage and leading pit) that penetrates the liner of the vest wall of the pit. Since the only function of this pipe is to fill and partially empty the spent fuel cask storage and loading pit, no damage whatsoever is incurred to the spent fuel cooling system.
cyes m a i584 148 1.k(b) In reference to the criteria that vill be followed in making the modifications, the following statement is made " Damage to =ulticolored
7 circuits along with damage to circuits associated with cne of those colors is acceptable since the =ulticolored circuits are protected interconnections between two redundant channels." Provide further clarification which demonstrates that the protected interconnections between two redundant channels vill provide adequate protection in the
. event of: (a) any open circuit, (b) any short circuit and (c) any s'hort circuit between any two conductors that eculd develop as a result of a cask drop accident, and thereby provide assurance that no mere than one channel of redundant engineered safeguards system, or reactor protection system could be degraded or disabled.
RESPONSE
t There is caly one multi-selored circuit in the vicinity of the cask travel area.
This circuit provides an interlock to the reactor building energency cooling unit fan. This circuit is run in conduit through the area of a postulated cask drop accident. The loss of this circuit through an open circuit cculd cause the loss of the Reactor Building cooling fan; a short circuit vculd definitely cause the loss of the fan control erreuit and therefore the fan vould be inoperable until
. minor modifications could be made. The consequences of the fan loss are minor (the requirements for this fan are described in Section 6.3 of the FSAR) since this is the third redundant back-up to the Reacter Building Energency Cooling System.
STATEME'IT 1584 149 2.0 It is stated in your submittal that:
s
8 (1) the cask will be handled above and adjacent to engineered safeguard equipment; (2) the floor slabs are not designed to withstand the inpact of a dropped cask; 9
(3) cask sizes considered in the evaluation included small truck casks weighing approximately 25 tons up to the large rail casks weighing up to the rated capacity of the fuel handling crane of 110 tons.
QUESTION 2.1 Based on the most adverse ec=bination of cask drop conditions, at all points along its revised path of travel within the Unit 1 building, da=cnstrate by analysis that sufficient design margin exists to enable the staff to conclude that, for the specific shipping casks considered, the resulting damage vill not preclude the facility's essential equipment (such as pumps , piping, valves ,
and electrical trays) frc= attaining and maintaining a controlled, cold safe reactor shutdown. '4here structures are found to withstand the impact of the cask drop, present the input parameters assumed in the analysis including:
cask veight, cask impact area, drop height, drop location, and the assumptions regarding credi,t taken in the analysis for the action of impact limiters.
RESPONSE
The results of an evaluation of the effects of postulated spent fuel cask drop accidents at Three Mile Island Unit 1 are contained in the February lb,1976, sub-1584 150
9 mittal (Met-Ed letter GQL 0215 to NRC dated February lb,1976). Proposed technical specification changes to plant operating procedures during cask handling are contained in the September 21, 1976, sut=ittal (Met-Ed letter GQL 12hk to NRC dated September 21, 1976).
The evaluation included cask drop accidents during transfer of the cask be-tween the railcar and the top of the "B" spent fuel pool, transfer of the cask to and frc= the cask loading pit and raising and levering of the cask within the pit, and transfer of the cask to and frc= the decontamination pit and raising and levering of the cask within the pit. Thus, cask drop accidents vere con-sidered at all points along the revised transfer path. Cask sizes considered in the evaluation' included small truck casks weighing approximately 30 tens up to large rail casks weighing up to the rated capacity of the fuel handling crane of 110 tons. Considerations were given to integrity of the spent fuel storage pool and spent fuel assemblies stored in the pool, and integrity of safety sys-tems and equipment located below the cask transfer path. Results of the eval-uation are su==arized below.
During transfer of the cask between the railcar and the top of the "3" spent fuel pool, results of evaluations indicsted that cask drop accidents at certain locations could possibly result in unacceptable damage to engi-neered safeguard circuits located in cable trays belev the cask transfer path. Accordingly, Met-Ed has relocated one engineered safeguard circuit tray (containing two engineered safeguard circuits) and revised the cask transfer path to take advantage of the physical separation that ncv exists between other trays so that single cask drop accidents vill not result in un-e acceptable damage to engineered safeguard circuits located below the cask .
transfer path. The specific details are discussed in Section IV.A of the 1584 151
^*
- 10 February lb ,1976, submittal and the September 21, 1976, sut=ittal.
During, transfer of the cask to and from the cask icading pit, results of evaluatiens indicated a cask drop on the edge of the pocl vall could result in the cask being deflected into the "B" spent fuel pccl. Accordingly, Met-Ed has revised the cask transfer path to the cask leading pit so that the cask vill be tipped in a direction away frcm the "3" spent fuel pool in the event of a cask drop ~en the edge of the pool vall. The revised cask trans-fer esth to the cask loading pit is discussed in Section IV.B cf the Febru-ary lh, 1976, submittal and the September 21, 1976, submittal.
- e Dur,ing transfer of the cask to and from the decontamination pit and raising and levering of the cask within the pit, results of evaluations indicated that cask drop accidents could possibly result in unacceptable damage to g engineered safeguard circuits, spent fuel pool ecoling pipes, and cooling water pipes to the spent fuel pool coolers. Accordingly, Met-Ed has de-cided not to use the present cask decontamination pit. The cask vill be decontaminated in the cask leading pit and transferred to the receiving /
shipping area.
Results of additional evaluations indicate that during transfer of the cask over the receiving / shipping area on the 305'-1" elevation, south of the railcar slab, cask drop accidents could possibly damage green engineered safeguard circuits located in the air intake tunnel. To do this, the cask veuld have to penetrate two floor slabs at elevations 305'-1" and 293'-0" as shown in Figure IV-2 of the February lb ,1976, submittal. Since the resulting damage would be limited to one redundant system, the possible damage 1584 152
- y 11 is considered acceptable in accordance with the criteria established in Section IV-A of the February 14, 1976, submitt al .
The railcar slab at elevation 301'-6" and the operating floor slab at elevation 305'-1" (refer to Figures IV-3 and IV h of the February 1h,1976, submittal) located belev the revised cask transfer path are not designed to withstand the impact of a dropped cask. Therefore, in the cask drop evaluation, the engi-neered safeguard circuits located in trays belev these ficor slabs are assumed to be damaged in the event of cask drop accidents over these flocr slabs. The .
specific circuits that could be damaged are identified in Section IV-A of the February 1h, 1976,' submittal. As discussed in the February 1h, 1976, sub-
=ittal, the revised cask transfer path and the plant modification to relocate ene entire engineered safeguard circuit tray provide reasonable assurance that single cask drop accidents over the fleer slabs at elevations 301'-6" and 305'-1" will not result in damage to more than ene redundant channel of engi-neered safeguard circuits. This vill assure that the resulting damage vill s
not preclude the facilities' essential equipment from attaining and maintaining a controlled, cold, safe reactor shutdown.
The bottom of the cask loading pit is constructed of reinforced concrete to bed-rock and thus is designed to withstand the impact of a dropped cask. Maximum drcp height is approximately hh feet. Likewise, the 5-foot vide valls of the "B" spent fuel pool are constructed of reinforced concrete to bedrock and are also designed to withstand the impact of a dropped cask. Maximum drop height is approximately 1 foot (FSAR Secticn 9.7.1.1.). The 1.5-fect vide east vall of the cask loading pit is also constructed of reinforced cererete to bedrock.
1584 153
12 Additional calculations have been perfor=ed to determine the structural ade-quacy of the east vall of the cask icading pit as a result of postulated cask drop accidents. As indicated in Section IV-B of the February 1h ,1976, submittal, a cask drop on the east vall of the cask leading pit vill result in local crushing of the vall of less than 0.50-inch at the top. The gross strength of the east vall is not affected by this a= cunt of local crushing. The east vall has been analyzed for stability or buckling due to the cask impact load and the vertical and horizontal reaction loads due to a cask tipping accident on the edge of the vall. Results of these calculations indicate the vall is structurally adequate for the maxi =um applied i= pac * .nd reaction loads.
Input parameters for the above analyses are summarized below.
Assumed Impact Drop Ce sidered Drop Location n2 NFS-4 30 660 - Balsa 6 Center of 5'-0" wide 77 - Steel s.outh wall of "B" spent fuel pool and center of l'-6" wide east wall of NLl 1/2 30 855 (2) 6 cask loading pit.
IF 300 75 814 (3) 6 IF 400 110 1134 (3) 6 (Proposed)
NLt 10/24 110 3959 (2) 6 (1) Total impact area of the bottom of the cask. The impact area on the l'- 6" cast wall is Dia of Cask x '.'.'idth of East Wall Total Impact Area x = Projected Area of Cask Bottom j}4 l584 (2) Impact area of cask bottom plate without impact limiters.
(3) Impact area of the impact fins.
13 For the NLI 1/2 and NLI 10/2h casks, the impact limiters were assumed to be removed from the cask, i.e. , no credit was taken in the analysis for the impact limiters. For the IF 300 and IF hoo (proposed) casks, no credit was taken for the energy absorption characteristics of the impact limiters. The actual tspact area of the impact fins located on the cask bottom plate was used in the analysis. For the NFS h casks, credit was taken for the balsa vood impact limiter which is an integral part of the cask bottom plate.
Two additional areas of the structure found to withstand the impact o$ the cask drop within the Unit 1 building are discussed in Section IV.A.3 of the February 4,1976 submittal (Points B and C). For these areas the input parameters assumed in the analysis are:
- a. Cask Weight 110 Tens
- b. Cask Impact Area Point Impact
- c. Drop Height hh'-0"
- d. Drop Location Direct hit on to the North and South vall of the er rail-car slab, at Elevation 305'-1".
- e. Credit for Cask I= pact Limiters None QUESTION 2.2 Demonstrate that following a cask drop accident the cask vill not tip, roll, or impact on Unit 1 temporarily stored new fuel in a manner which would lead"to a criticality accident. In particular, state a maxlTJ 1584 155
. lh 6
credible value for the multiplication factor (K,ff) following such a cask drop accident considering the effects of any pcssible reduction in fuel spacing, with the introduction of neutron moderating material -
(aqueous feam, water from ruptured pipes or fire-fighting apparatus, etc.). This maximum credible value shculd include reflective effects frem structural concrete and any other moderating materials near the fuel mass. Provide the assumptions =ade in the analyses and the yesulting safety margins which support your conclusiens.
RESPONSE
As shown on Figure 1, the area south of the railroad track is no longer designated as a temporary storage area for new fuel. New fuel vill be receipt inspected in this area and then vill be transferred to the new fuel storage racks shown in Figure 1 or to the spent fuel pools. No new fuel vill be permitted in the receiving / shipping area during cask handling operations. Therefore the questioned
- impact of an accident en Unit 1 temperarily stored new fuel cannot occur.
e QUESTION 3.0 For each of the spent fuel shipping casks that will be handled, de=enstrate that the crane hoist vill not subject the varicus cask trunniens and handling yokes, considered in ycur evaluation, to excessive deceleration leads under the felleving assumptions: (1) the cask is near its upper limit of travel; (2) the cask is being lowered at its maxi =um speed as defined by the hoist centrols; and (3) the crane experiences a less of power thereby causing the hoist mechanical load brake and the solencid
!594 156
15
- brake to autonatically set. -
2 Accdtdingly, in tabular form for each cask, provide the following information:
w (a) the static factors of safety of the cask handling yoke, the cask trunnions and the weight of cask; s
- (b) the maximum lowering speed as defined by the hoist controls; and (c) the results of dynamic analyses which demonstrate that the cask trunnions and handling yoke have sufficient design margin to preclude their failure due to the deceleration loads created by the hoist breaks.
RESPONSE
The considered casks are in conformance with 10 CFR 5 71.3(c). The static factor of safety of the cask handling yoke and the cask trunniens is 3.0 based on the yield strength of the material. The maximum lowering speed as defined by the hoist controls is 5 feet per minute.
Dynamic analyses have been performed considering that the deceleration load hypothesized in Items 3.0 (1), (2) and (3), is absorbed by the crane hoist reeving between the take-up drum / upper block and the =ain block in its highest position. The results of these analyses are:
) )b
16
\
Cask '4eight (Tens) Dynamie Lead Facter of Safety On Yield 110 1.1 3 + 1.1 = 2.7 75 1.1 3 + 1.1 = 2.7 25 1.2 3 + 1.2 = 2.5 These results are conservative as no credit is taken for the mechanical portion of the crane acting as ,an energy absorter.
The results demonstrate that the cask trunnions and handling yoke have sufficient design margin to preclude their failure due to the deceleratien loads created by the hoist brakes.
CUESTION h.0 It has been noted that the bases prceided in your September 21, 1976 submittal for Item 3.11.2 of the revised Technical Specifications has emitted reference to FSAR Figure 9-18A entitled " Fuel Handling Building Crane Key Interlock System Limits". Provide a revised Figure 9-18A sheving the new key interlocked limits of travel of the crane.
Further, the basis for the present Technical Specificatien states that in the "unlikely event of a load drop accident, there vould be no possibility of this resulting in any damage.....". The proposed corresponding statement in the revised Technical Specification basis states there "would be less possibility." Describe, discuss and clarify the purpcse of this revision and the potential equipment and structures involved. j
17 RESPCUSE FSAR Figure 9-19A vill be revised showing the new key interlock linits of travel of the crane. This vill be acecmplished by substituting Figure I for 9-18A. Additional details are also shown in Figures IV h and IV-6 of the February lk, 1976, submittal. The substitution of the phrase "would be less possibility" for "vculd be no possibility" in the revised Technical Specification was editorial in nature and was not to be construed as a revision in itself potentially affecting equipment and structures. The appropriate phraseology shall be "veuld be no possibility" as was previously stated in the original Technical Specification. QUESTION 5.0 Since the keyed interleck limits of crane travel only applies when the load being handled exceeds 15 tons, provide the folleving infor=ation regarding the system acceptability when there is a lead of lh tons on the crane hook, and it is over the stored spent fuel when "tvo blocking" occurs (i.e., the upper limit switch fails and the lover hoist block-contacts the icver bicek). Demonstrate that either (a) the resulting radiological release vill remain within acceptable limits should the lower load block and hook drop and impact on the stored spent fuel; or
~
(b) the lever load bleek and hook vill not drop should "tvo biccking" occur. (In the latter case, the analysis should take into account the peak stall torque of the hoist motor plcs the kinetic energy of the hoist motor plus the kinetic energy of the hoist power train and =ctor when the heck is being raised at its maximum rated speed as alleved by _1584 1 59 c.
18 the control system).
RESPONSE
Loads of ik tens and less vill be handled en the auxiliary crane trolley / block.
"Two blocking" will be prevented by the addition of a second linit switch.
This limit switch will provide a redundant means of stopping the crane bicek from exceeding its upper travel limit. CUESTICU 6.0 In regard to the shipping cask crane which is shared by Units 1 and 2, it has been noted that the staff's Safety Evaluation Repcrt for Unit 2, dated September 1976, contains the following statement "We find the fuel handling system to be acceptable for a cask not exceeding 70 tons in weight, and will condition the operating license accordingly until and unless the applicant justifies use of a larger cask." Section 3.11.h of the Unit 1 Technical Specifications would permit the crane to handle loads up to 110 tons since it states " Leads in excess of book capacity shall not be lifted, except for lead testing." e Describe and discuss any differences which exist between Units 1 and 2 as it relates to cask drop accidents. Further, the depth of detail provided shculd enable the reviewer to concur in the acceptability of 110 ton loads for the crane when they are being handled in the Unit i facility. 1584 160
19
RESPONSE
i The Unit 2 FSAR indicates that a cask tipping analysis has been performed for the prepcsed IF400 shipping cask which represents the maxi =um size and weight (N100 ten) of aty cask under censideration. It also states that any cask drop over the fuel handling bridge operating ficor er the cask pocl vill not result in danage to the spent fuel pool or other safety related cc=ponents. The cask pcol dimensions and design vere based on the characteristics of the 70 ten General Electric cask, IF300. o However, a recent reanalysis has revealed that the Unit 2 fuel handling building is able to withstand a cask irop accident of weight equal to the capacity of the crane from a height of six inches. Unit 1 was analyzed in all respects for the larger size cask and is, as a result, requesting licensing for the rated capacfty of the crane, c Therefore, no difference exists between Units 1 and 2, with respect to cask drop accidents. C,UESTION 7.0 Figure IV-3, (February lk,1976 submittal) shewing the modified cas,k transfer path and nev location for engineered safeguards tray, indicat-s that the railcar is located partially cutside the building during those times when the cask is being lifted from and lowered onto the railcar. Describe and discuss what =eans will be provided to prevent the railcar pcsition from being adversely altered during a cask handling accident, such that it spans both the red and green cable trays during a cask drop accident and thereby being in a pcsition to potentially cause damage to both redundant portions of the engineered safeguards cable trays. 1584 16i RESPCNSE The detail cask handling procedures will require that the brakes on the cash k
20 carrier, i.e., either the railcar or truck bed, be set and wheel chocks positioned prior to unloading or loading the spent fuel cask to prevent the carrier position from being adversely altered during a postulated cask drop accident. The procedures vill also prohibit the cask carrier frcm being moved further into the building until the cask is removed frem above the carrier. QUESTION ", 8.0 Since the rail car will be partially outside the building during cask handling operations, describe, discuss and demonstrate that there are no significant adverse safety consequences resulting frcm having the heavy rolling door, shown in FSAR Figure 1-8, Section E1 - El, open during sYeh cperations involving the offsite shipment of spent fuel from either Units 1 or 2 should a cask handling accident occur. Should the open doqrs result in a potential hazard to public health and safety, describe your proposed corrective =easures.
RESPONSE
An analysis was performed to determine the radiological consequences at the TMI site boundary for a gross release of activity from a fully loaded fuel cask. The analysis is based on the following:
- a. The accident is assumed to occur after the assemblies have cooled for 120 days,
- b. All of the rods in twenty assemblies are assumed to rupture as a result of the accident.
1}9d l07
21
- c. The damaged asse=blies are all assu=ed to be the highest pcVered asse=blies.
The inventory per assembly is deter =ined by applying a radial peaking facter of 1.7 to the inventory of an average assembly. The inventory of an average asse=bly is determined by dividing the core inventories of Table 15A-2 cf the Unit 2 FSAR by the number of assemblies in the core.
- d. All of the activity in the clad gap in the daraged reds is released instantaneously to the environment. The gap activity is based on Regulatory e
Guide 1.25 assu=ptiens, i.e. 10 percent of the total noble gases other than Kr-SS, 30 percent of the Kr-85, and 10 percent of the total radioactive icdine in the reds at the tL=e of the accident.
- e. Atmospheric diffusion is calculated using a 0-2 hour dispersien factor at the exclusion boundary of 6.1 x 10- sec/=3 This value is based on Table 6.2-9c submitted in A=endment L8 to the FSAR for Unit 2.
g Isotopic releases to the at=csphere using these assumptions are su==arized belev: Isotope Activity Released (curies) Kr-85 5.02+h Xe-131= 9.78+0
, Xe-133 3.76-1 I-131 h.32+
584 163 The resulting thyroid and whole body doses at the exclusien bcundary are 13.5 and 0.016 Re=, respectively. These exposures are vell within the guidelines of 10CFR100. Since the calculations are extremely con-servative and were performed without taking credit for isolation of the
22 cask leading area, no changes to facility equipment or Technical Specifications have been considered. CUESTION 9.0 On Page IV k, of your February lk,1976 submittal, you state " Administrative procedures will be used to limit the height the cask lower surface is raised above the top of the "3" spent fuel pcol to 6 inches maximum". Proposed Technical Specification 311.3 also makes a related reference to administrative control of load clevation. Clarify what will be the carrying height of the cask botten surface, with respect to fixed structures, at all points along the path of travel of the spent fuel shipping cask while it is within the building. What are the measures, in addition to aininistrative controls, which could be incorporated to preclude cask drop heights exceeding the abcve carrying heights.
RESPONSE
Maximum height over spent fuel pool valls vill be six inches. Maximu= height over 305'-1" floor vill be h3'-5". Presently there are structures that interfere with this travel scheme. These obstructions (a six inch curb, a few handrail pests and a fuel handling bridge step) vill be remeved during cask handling operations. 1584 164
23 QUESTICN 10.0 Provide proposed Technical Specifications for crane rope inspection and replacement and for assuring operability of the ILnit switches which restrict crane travel. Use the appropriate correspondir! parts of chapter 2-2 of the American National Standards Instituta ANSI E30.2 for guidance in preparing your response.
RESPONSE
Procedure 3010 outlines the frequent and periodic inspection of cranes at TMI and is in accordance with ANSI 330.2 This procedure Lnplements cur legal requirements of Federal Register Par. II, Subpart U, Sec. 1910.179 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and fulfills our co==itment made in Anendment 50 of the TMI-l FSAR. Based on the above and since the NRC Standard Tech. Spec's do not require the above details, we feel that no technical specification is necessary. QUESTICN - 11.0 The FSAR states "A '4hiting automatic paddle-type limit switch is installed for upper hoist limit to prevent "two-blocking" situations." Describe the design features or procedures that will be used to provide assurance that a single failure vill not defeat this protection against 'two-bloc king" .
RESPONSE
1584 1615 "Two-blocking" is prevented on the fuel handling crane main hook by a paddle-e i
2h type limit switch, and by Adminsistrtive centrol. A screv-type switch on the lain hook is presently utilized as a lover limit switch. This switch will be =cdified te also function as an upper limit switch. Therefore, a single failure in the system would still have redundant means of preventing "tvo-blocking." CUESTION 12.0 Provide a sun =ary of the cask stability analysis when the cask is dropped On the south wall of the "B" spent fuel pool for both eccentric and straight drop conditions." REC?CUSE Results of the cask stability analysis when the cask is dropped onto the 5-foot
~
vide south wall of the "3" spent fuel pool are presented below for the eccentric drop condition. Results for the straight drop are less severe than the eccentric drop condition and therefore are not controlling. The main elements of the cask stability analysis are sw==arized belev.
- 1. The cask bottem surface is assumed to be raised 6 inches above the tcp of the spent fuel pool vall and the cask cente of gravity is assumed to be located 3 inches from the center of the 6-inch vide transfer path as shown in Figu;
- 2a.
- 2. The lifting trunnien or lifting yoke arm on one side of the cask is assu=ed to fail. This lets the cask drop straight down 3 to 5 inches (depending on the cask involved) until the resulting slack in the system is rencved, i.e.,
i59.4 1-6
25 a straight line of action is established between the unfailed cask trunnien, the center of the lifting ycke and the cable drum as shein in Figure 2b. At this point, the cable becc=es tight.
- 3. As the cask continues to drop the lead in the cable increases in direct pro-pertion to the stretch of the cable. The eccentrically applied load reduces sne casks vertical velocity and tmparts angular and lateral velocity to the cask as shown in Figure 2c.
- h. Eccentric drop analyses indicate that the maximum force produced in the cable is about k times the seight of the cask. At this lead, the up until new unfailed cask trunnion or ydke arm is expected to fail. The cask then free falls with constant angular and lateral velocity as shewn in Figure 2d until it impacts the top of the south wall of the "B" spent fuel pool.
- 5. The angular and lateral kinetic energy of the cask at impact are deter =ined frem the above model. Assuming all of this energy goes into increasing the pctential energy of the cask, the a: cunt the cask center of gravity is raised due to tipping is calculated as shewn in Figure 2e, The cask is ecn-sidered stable and vill not tip ever if the cask center of gravity is en the stable side of the pivot point, i.e., to the right of the pivot point shown in Figure 5.
Analyses were performed for three cask veights; 30-ton (NFS h and NLI 1/2), 75-ton (IF 300), and 110-ton (IF h00 - proposed, and NLI 10/2h) . Results are su==arized below and show that all of the casks vould be stable due to eccentric 1584 167
26 drops from 6 inches or less. Increase in Cask Cask Positten Cask Velocity increase in Center of Gravity g, at Impact at impact Cask Center at which Cask g o n ,. ,, of Gravity becomes Unstable a x, in de. Deg A,in/sec eRad/see th,in ah , In 30 1.88 .776 10.68 .077 0.50 ^3.05 75 2.08 1.85 11.80 .183 1.'10 2.92 110 2.22 2.58 12.6 .256 1.60 2.85 (1) includes maximum bridge travel speed = 50 fpm (10 in/sec). QUESTION 13 0 Show that the liner plate vill not tear if the east vall of the leading pit deflects 1" as postulated in Section IV-B-3 Also discuss the effects on the fuel racks which are in contact with the east vall due to the 1" deflection.
RESPONSE
No credit is taken for the 3/16-inch liner plate in the analysis to determ'ne the structural adequacy of the east vall of the cask loading pit for impact loads due to a postulated eccentric drop accident. Therefore, the conclusions stated in the February 14, 1976, submittal stating that the deflection of the east vall is less than 1 inch and that gross failure of the east vall vill not occur are valid even if the liner plate locally tears. It is also noted that the 1-inch vall deflection is calculated to cause a maximum strain in the liner plate of about 1.6 percent. This is well below the minimum elongation of the stainless 1584 168
27 steel liner plate of h0 percent. The 1-inch deflection reported in the February lb, 1976, submittal to the NRC is for a case where the cask impacts the l'-6" vide east vall of the cask lead-ing pit following a postulated eccentric drop accident while raising or icwering the cask vithin the pit. The maximum calculated deflection of 1-inch occurs when the cask i= pacts the east vall at the top of the cask loading pit where the vall is considered as a cantilever since no credit is taken for support at the north end frcm the fuel transfer gate. At the elevation of the spent fuel stor-age racks,]the east vall of the cask leading pit is much stiffer because it is supported at the north end, i.e., at this elevation the vall is no longer con-sidered a cantilever since the opening for the fuel transfer gate stops about 2.5 feet above the spent fuel storage racks. Hence, the deflection of the east vall of the cask leading pit at the elevation of the spent fuel storage racks due to cask impact leads is expected to be significantly less than 1 inch. Additional analyses have been performed to (1) deternine the deflection of the east vall of the cask leading pit at the elevation of the spent flel stcrage racks due to cask impact leads en the side of the vall folleving a postulated eccentric drop accideIt, and (2) evaluate the effect of the deflection of the vall en the spent fuel storage racks that are in contact with the vall. Results of these analyses are s e nvized below. The maximum calculated deflection of the east vall of the cask loading pit at the elevation of the upper spent fuel stcrage rack supports is abcut 0.5 inch. 1584 169
- 28 The maximum calculated impact lead transnitted into the spent fuel stcrage rack supports is about 320 kips. Assuming this impact lead is carried by the three middle supports (out of a total of seven), the maximum lead per suppcrt is about 107 kips. Thus, as a worst case, the effect of the 0.5 inch deflection of the east vall of the cask loading pit could be to reduce the center-to-center spacing between fuel assemblies of two adjacent revs frca 13.625 inch tc 13.125 inch. It should be noted that the above reduction in center-to-center spacing applies only in the east-wect direction of the spent fuel pool. The center-to-center spacing of fuel assemblies of adjacent racks in the north-south direction and center-to-center spa ing of fuel assemblies within the individual racks is not changed. Based on extrapolation of sensitivity studies performed in Metropolitan Edison Company Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 " Spent Fuel Pecl Mcdification Eescription and Safety Analysis", ^1e calculated multiplication factor is less than 0.95 and therefore acceptable. It should be noted as with all previous analysis, no credit is taken fcr any beric acid concentration in the spent fuel pool water. 1584 170
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