ML20215N544

Advises That ACRS Request to Hire Separate Legal Counsel Cannot Be Granted.Commission Remains Unpersuaded That Legal Svcs Required Cannot Be Provided by the Ofc of General Counsel

ML20215N544
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/14/1986
From:	Roberts T NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	Ward D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Shared Package
ML20214U434	List: IA-86-649, Advises That ACRS Request to Hire Separate Legal Counsel Cannot Be Granted.Commission Remains Unpersuaded That Legal Svcs Required Cannot Be Provided by the Ofc of General Counsel ML20215N526 ML20215N528 ML20215N532 ML20215N533 ML20215N535 ML20215N536 ML20215N537 ML20215N538 ML20215N539 ML20215N540 ML20215N541 ML20215N544
References
FOIA-86-649 COMLZ-86-14, NUDOCS 8611060273
Download: ML20215N544 (1)

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! o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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• s a * ,o CHAIRMAN i

COMLZ-86-14 l MEMORANDUM FOR: David A. Ward, Chairman s.

Advisory Comittee on Reactor  :

Safeguards {

FROM: ThomasM. Roberts,ActingChairmanf

SUBJECT:

ACRS' REQUEST TO HIRE ITS OWN LEGAL COUNSEL l The Comission has reconsidered the question of whether the ACRS may hire  !

its own legal counsel. The Commission remains unpersuaded that the legal '

services the ACRS requires cannot be provided by the Office of General Counsel. It is the decision of the Comission that your request to hire separate legal counsel cannot be granted.

cc: Chainnan Zech Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal OGC - H Street l

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1. UNITED STATES

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k NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHIN GTON. D.C. 20555 July-15, 1986

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OFFICE Oft THE COMMISSIONEM Mr. Carl Walske, President Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.

7101 Wisconsin Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814-4805

Dear Mr. Walske:

Thank you for your letter of May 29, 1986, regarding my May 22, 1986 testimony before the Energy Conservation and Power Subcomittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. In your letter, you expressed.

concer.n that my statement may have been misinterpreted in the public arena. -

In particular, you point to my statement that "... given the present level of safety being achieved by the operating nuclear power plants in this

_cauntry, we can expect to see a core meltdown accident within the next 20 years, and it is possible that such an accident could result in off-site releases of radiation which are as large as, or larger than, the releases estimated to have occurred at Chernobyl." You state that the Atomic [

Industrial Forum does not agree with my characterization of the likelihood of a core meltdown in this country within the next 20 years, and it is the position of the AIF that, even if.there were to be a core meltdown, the-probability of a substantial release of radioactive materials is very low (i.e., one substantial release in 200 core meltdowns).

I stand by my' statement before the Energy Conservation and Power Subcom-mittee. I believe that it represents an accurate and balanced assessment of the risk posed by the 100 operating nuclear powerplants in this country.

I have provided my rationale for the views contained in my statement However, before since you have the Subcomittee in various forums in the past.

taken issue with my statement I want to take this opportunity to explain my position in detail.

I share your concern for accuracy. I recall reading in the newspapers in recent months statements by senior officials within the nuclear industry that our plants are " perfectly safe" and we "will not have a Chernobyl-type plant accident here." Apparently, such absolute statements are thought to be needed to counter-balance arguments from the other side that there is an imediate threat to the public which requires the shutdown of our To convey nuclear an impression plants. In my view, neither position is accurate.

that Chernobyl-type releases are impossible in this country is as-inaccurate as conveying an impression that a similar disaster is a certainty. I attempted to take the middle road in my opening statement l We do not fully understand the risks of nuclear before the Subcommittee.

power, and we should not be fearful of saying so.

Your letter contained a number of specific criticisms of my statement. '

First, you stated that the NRC staff's 45 percent core meltdown estimate over the next 20 years does not take into account safety inprovements now

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being . developed and others which will b'e forthcoming. I agree. However, that estimate also does not include all contributors to the probability of a core meltdown. For example, it does not accurately reflect the contributions.to risk from external events such as earthquakes and floods.

t More importantly, it does not properly account for human errors or degradation in the material condition of the plant. The performance of'

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existing plants demonstrates that these weaknesses in probabilistic studies

> may result in a significant underestimate of the actual risk. Specifi-cally, we are learning that the plants often react in ways we do not expect. As Harold Denton, the Commission's chief safety officer, wrote:

"I believe that the recent Davis-Besse event illustrates that, in the real world, system and component reliabi.lities can degrade below those we and the . industry routinely assume in estimating core melt frequencies." (See, Memorandum from Harold R. Denton to William J. Dircks, dated June 27, 1985.). Thus, my views do not rest only on the 45 percent estimate or on the theoretical calculations of IDCOR which you reference. Neither takes into account the large uncertainties in these theoretical estimates and . -

neither accurately reflects the actual operation of the plants in the real world.

Recent operating experience, including the several serious operating events at U.S. nuclear powerplants in 1985, indicates that inadequate or improper maintenance, surveillance testing errors, equipment failures, design inadequacies, and operator and other personnel errors are occurring at U.S.

plants at an unacceptably high rate and.that they are significant contributors to operating events that can lead to severe accidents. This operating experience shows that these contributors are causing the total loss of one or mors safety systems and multiple equipment failures at plants that can substantially erode defense-in-depth and lead to accident conditions beyond the design basis of the plant.

f One would hope that we are aggressively pursuing the root causes of these occurrences. Unfortunately, it does not appear that all .U.S. nuclear utilities are learning the lessons of experience. Our Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AE00) conducted a survey in the fall of 1984 to determine how well licensees were learning the lessons of experi-

"Most plants are making moderate, not extens ve, i ence. AE0D concluded:

use of their in-house operating experience, and in general are making less use of the large body of knowledge associated with events and concerns that originate elsewhere in the industry." (See, "1985 Annual Report /AEOD S601," April 1986, p. S.) This reinforces a. previous AE00 report which found that our licensees often repeat the same mistakes, even at the same plant. The actual operating experience of our existing plants and the industry's failure to heed the lessons of experience indicate, in my judgment, that we can expect to see another serious accident in this country during the next 20 years.

In your letter, you emphasized that risk is not equivalent to core melt probability. I agree. You went on to state that it is not technically

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correct to say that any core melt accident at a U.S. reactor would yield However ,'

Chernobyl-like consequences, which you said my statement implies.

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you quoted only a part of my statement. What I said just before the statement quoted in your letter was:

Third, although we believe that all of our reactors have some capability to withstand severe core meltdown accidents, the extent to which they can withstand such accidents depends upon the sequence of events during the accident, the individual plant designs and the manner in which each plant is operated and maintained. While we hope that their occurrence is unlikely, there are accident sequences for U.S. plants that can lead to rupture or bypassing of the containment in U.S. reactors which would result in .the off-site release of fission products comparable to or worse.than the releases estimatedThat by the NRC is why staff to have taken place during the Chernobyl accident.

the Commission told the Congress recently that it could not rule out a commercial nuclear power plant accident in the United States resulting in tens of billions of dollars in property losses and injuries to the -

'public.

Thus, my statement made the point that not all core meltdown accidents can be expected to result in large offsite releases of radiation which can harm the public and contaminate large areas of land and property. The central questions, of course, are: how likely is such an accident, what are the uncertainties in estimating the probabilities, and how well do we under-stand this risk? Your letter can be interpreted very easily by the .

uninitiated to say that the reactor risks are well understood and that an accident involving substantial and harmful releases of radioactivity to the environment is all but impossible in this country. That clearly is not an accurate representation of the facts.

Your letter stated that "With-our reactors IDCOR does not find any such releases as serious as Chernobyl apparently was." I question whether there The 1975 Reactor Safety is a sound sci.entific basis for this conclusion.

Study (WASH-1400), which the industry and the NRC touted as an objective assessment of reactor risk, contains several release categories associated with core meltdowns that are equal to or greater than our estimates of the releases at Chernobyl. The NRC staff has recently advised the Commission l that the best available information suggests that some changes in specific radionuclide group releases to the atmosphere are justified; however, the r overall consequences are not significantly different from those using source terms contained in the Reactor Safety Study. Thus, the best available infonmation indicates that severe accidents with Chernobyl-type releases, or. worse, can occur at U.S. plants. ,

i The question then becomes: how likely are such accidents and what are the  :

uncertainties in estimating their probabilities? In my view, two con-clusions regarding the Reactor Safety Study are germane to this question. i First, the uncertainties in reactor risks are much larger than estimated in that 1975 report, even with all of the research and analyses that have been completed since then. Second, the bottom-line results of quantitative probabilistic risk assessments are not reliable. I thought there was a general recognition of these conclusions, but your letter seems to indicate a belief that we can now make sweeping generalizations about the low O

1 likelihood of a large-scale radiation release for all U.S. plants. In doing so, you seem to give no weight to the American Physical Society Study Group on Radionuclide Release from Severe Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants which concluded: "It is impossible to make the sweeping generalization that the calculated source term for any accident sequence involving any reactor plant would always be a small fraction of the fission. product inventory at reactor shutdown." (See, R. Wilson et al., Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 57 No. 3, Part 11, July 1985'~p. 5128.) The funda-mental issues raised in that report have not been resolved in a scien-tifically defensible way. Those issues involve factors such as the i chemical form of iodine during a severe accident, variations in containment performance due to design and construction differences, and the potential for steam explosion, both within the reactor vessel and within the -

containment. The resolution of each of these issues has a direct bearing

.on.the pot ential for a large-scale early release of fission products in the event of a severe accident. '

With regard to the chemical form of iodine, the industry has argued that during a severe accident iodine can be expected to join with cesium to form cesium iodide, which reduces the potential for ha~rmful releases of volatile iodine. Yet, recent experiments have resulted in the production of For volatile iodine and have not shown extensive cesium iodide formation.'

this reason,' the NRC staff has 'recently written: " Based on the experi-

> mental evidence available today, a definitive position regarding the i

chemical form of iodine would be premature. At this time, it is not (See, obvious what phenomena are causing specific experimental results."

l' Letter from R.B. Minogue to John J. Taylor of EPRI dated May 22,1986.)

With regard to containment performance, there is considerable evidence that containment strength may vary substantially from plant to plant based upon

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differences in design and construction. These differences effectively rule i

out broad generalizations regarding containment performance. As senior members of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research put it in describing a recent series of tests: "The lessons learned from the steel tests was that even minor details of stiffening ring attachment made a large difference in ultimate capacity. This means that individual construction details could lead to a large variation, site-to-site, in

' Rules of Thumb' are probably out ultimate capacity (of the containments).

of the question." (See, Trip Report from D.F. Ross, G.H. Marcus, and C.N.

Kelber to Robert B. Minogue dated February 3, 1986.)

- With regard to steam explosions, the industry has argued that there is little potential that such explosions could lead to substantial releases based on predictions of fragmentation of the molten core upon emersion in water. However, our researchers at Sandia National Laboratories have not j~

agreed with these predictions, noting, among other things: "A detailed examination of FIST data to date shows no match between the fragmentation

' predictions of Fauske, Corradini, or Saito-Theofanus, with regard to debris size or distribution. Mismatch is at least an order(Id.)

of magnitude, showing For these and these theories are missing some key ingredients." -

i other reasons, our researchers have not ruled out steam explosions as a l

potentially significant phenomenon which could lead to substantial i

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radiation releases. Given the best available scientific information to date and recognizing the substantial' uncertainties which still exist regarding these . issues I believe we are still a long way from making defensible generalizations about releases from core meltdowns.

You stated that the implication of my statement " exaggerates the risk from U.S. reactors by at least a . factor of two' hundred." However, your assertion fails to take into account all potentially significant' contributors to risk, all potentially significant core meltdown phenomena, a reasonable range of technically defensible parametric values for calculating containment performance during core meltdowns, all potentially significant' accident sequences, the effects of human error or design and construction errors, the effects of materials degradation with age, and significant operating events, including so-called precursors to core

' meltdown a~ccidents. -

According to WASH-1400, there are many accident scenarios that can lead to substantial releases, including a small break loss of coolant with failure of the containment sprays, an interfacing systems loss of coolant (i.e., an accident involving overpressurization of low pressure piping that is outside .of the containment but is connected to the high pressure primary cooling piping such that the loss.of coolant occurs outside of the con-tainment rather than the design basis loss of coolant inside containment),

anticipated transients without scram, station blackout, and loss of coolant accidents with failure of emergency core cooling injection. The specific release category that results from these scenarios is dependent on core meltdown phenomena and containment response thereto. While much progress has been made in understanding these accident scenarios since WASH-1400 was-published in' 1975, there remain very substantial uncertainties in evalu-

ating them. For example, during a core meltdown, theoretical source term calculations include models for plating out of significant quantities of fission products within the. primary system. However, the models do not evaluate, or poorly evaluate,-the effects of the heating of the primary system by the plated-out fission products to determine whether this-phenomenon ' alters the sequence of events and the release category. As I.

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mentioned before, steam explosions and their effects on containment and resuspension of fission products are still in dispute. These are just two examples of the many uncertainties and unknowns regarding the release categories which could result from various core meltdown sequences. With

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regard to the likelihood of the various sequences, for the reasons given above, I would say that none of the sequences can be ruled out. A number of precursor events have occurred at U.S. reactors for each of the above i scenarios.

The broad conclusions in your letter seem to be based substantially, if not exclusively, on the IDCOR program. Unfortunately, that program examined only a few plants. The nuclear industry eschewed. standardization in such areas as plant design, construction, operations, maintenance and surveillance testing. Thus, each operating plant has its own unique vulnerabilities to core meltdown accidents and'to substantial releases of radioactivity. This fact, together with the substantial uncertainties inherent in these types of theoretical analyses and the limited number of b

accident sequences considered, make extrapolation of the IDCOR results to all plants premature at best.

Given the limits of our understanding of severe accident phenomena and the large uncertainties inherent in attempting to predict the likelihood that a

< core meltdown will proceed to a large and catastrophic radiation release, I reach the same conclusion as did the President's Comission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. In the words of the Kemeny Comission:

Whether in this particular case we came close to a catastrophic accident or_ not, this accident was too serious.' Accidents as serious as TMI should not be allowed to occur in the future.

The accident got sufficiently out of hand so that those attempting to control it were operating somewhat in the dark. While today the -

causes are well understood, 6 months after the accident it is still ,:

difficult to know the precise state.of the core and what the conditions are inside the reactor building. Once an accident reachet

' this stage, one that'goes beyond well-understood principles, and puts those controlling the accident into an experimental mode (this happened during the first day), the uncertainty of whether an accident could result in major releases of radioactivity is too high~. Adding to this enormous damage to the plant, the expensive and potentially I dangerous cleanup process that remains, and the great cost of the accident, we must conclude that -- whatever worse could have happened -- the accident had already gone too far to make it tolerable.

While throughout this entire document we emphasize that fundamental

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changes are necessary to prevent accidents as serious as TMI, we must not assume that an accident of this or greater seriousness cannot happen again, even if the changes we recomend are made. Therefore, in addition to doing everything to prevent such accidents, we must be fully prepared'to minimize.the potential impact of such an accident on public health and safety, should one occur in the future.

" Report of the President's Comission on the Accident At Three Mile Island," p. 15.

That is why I have advocated a program of new initiatives aimed at both reducing the likelihood of core meltdown accidents and minimizing the

. potential for a large offsite release should such an recident occur. These new initiatives would build upon, but would go beyond the NRC's existing regulatory programs and the self-improvement programs undertaken by the industry in recent years. My proposal consists of three new initiatives for the current generation of plants.

First, we should undertake a detailed reexamination of each U.S. plant to identify and correct design weaknesses and vulnerabilities which can initiate or complicate serious accidents. To be effective, this effort must go. beyond the surrogate plant approach advocated by the industry in the IDCOR program. What is needed is a thorough and independent review of the

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design of each plant, including a verification of the a'dequacy of the existing design basis for the plant and a review of_all changes made to the  !

plant after the approval of the plant's original design basis. Given the l absence of standardization in the U.S. nuclear program and _the lack of good configuration control at some plants, this step is necessary to assure that all significant design problems are identified and corrected. l

.Second, we should undertake improvement programs in areas of demonstrated l weakness in U.S. nuclear powerplant operations, including management, human l performance, equipment reliability, and maintenance and surveillance testing. .Despite the existence of voluntary industry efforts.in several of i

these areas, we are still seeing U.S. plant performance that is substan-  !

tially below.the levels of safety and reliability being achieved.in U.S. operating experi- other  ;

countries such as Japan, Sweden, and West Germany. '

ence demonstrates that existing voluntary efforts simply are not doing the job. We need expanded efforts in each of these areas sufficient to ensure '

a level of performance at U.S. plants which is equal to that now being achieved in these other countries.

Of these areas,-it appears that -

-management is the dominant factor in-achieving excellence in performance.

We need to focus particular attention on those plants with a history of poor operating performance and reliability. The industry's Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) has been in operation now for more than six years. Although INPO has had a positive effect _in improving overall industry performance, there are still This far too many plants that fail to meet indicates either that strong acceptable standards of performance.

peer pressure within the industry is still not being applied to the poor performers or that peer pressure alone is not sufficient to bring about effective and lasting improvement. In either case, further regulatory initiatives are needed, especially for the weak performers. In addition, 4

those members of the industry with more expertise and better performance should provide more help to the weaker performers. The industry itself j

must become more aggressive in ensuring exemplary performance of all 4

nuclear utilities. After all, the future ofI want the best managed facility may to emphasize that I am not rest' in the hands of the worst managed.

l seeking perfection in U.S. nuclear power plant operations. What I am l seeking is a level of operational performance by the U.S. plants.that equals the level of performance being routinely achieved by the plants in

! such countries as Japan, Sweden and West Germany. I am convinced that this i is an achievable objective, and we in government and you in the industry should dedicate ourselves to meeting this goal within the next three years.  ;

Third, we should undertake a detailed study of additional design features, o such as a dedicated decay heat removal system and a filtering / venting

' system for containments which have the ability to reduce substantially the likelihood of a core meltdown and the potential for a large off-site l release of radioactivity. Such design features have'already been installed or are being actively pursued by several European countries with aggressive nuclear programs. These design improvements for existing, as well as for l future plants, are being accomplished in a disciplined manner at reasonable cost. We should, therefore, give specific attention to those designs which l

already exist or are under active development in other countries. 'Any such

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l featu'res~ would not necessarily have to satisfy all of the Comission's -

requirements such as the single failure criterion since they would serve as  ;

a final backup for existing plant safety systems. j

. In my view, these three initiatives would bring about fundamental improve-3 ments in the safety of U.S. nuclear powerplants that would enable the optimistic safety performance projections expressed in your letter to be realized. I believe that we both share a comon objective: to assure a -

safe'and reliable nuclear power program in this country. I therefore invite you and the other leaders of the industry to join with me in a new commitment to safety -- a comitment-that will ensure the successful, long-term operation of the plants we now have and the continued avail-ability of the nuclear option for the future. That comitment can best be achieved by a cooperative safety approach which takes advantage of the

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industry's knowledge and experience but which also recognizes the need-for, and legitimate functions of, regulation. I propose an approach whereby the NRC and'the industry would work together to define the specific objectives -

of each of the three safety initiatives I have outlined and the detailed

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requirements needed to achieve those objectives. Under this approach, the V i

' fndustry would be free to take the initiative in proposing for discussion '

creative solutions in each of the areas I have identified. However, this joint effort would result in a binding comitment by the industry to meet specific new requirements. Those comitments would then be subject to NRC -1 inspection and enforcement. The approach I am suggesting is quite similar' i to that used in many foreign countries with successful nuclear programs and builds upon the voluntary self-regulation approach advocated by the Nuclear Utilities Management and Human Resource Comittee (NUMARC).

In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, I believe that nuclear power is ~at a crossroads in this and other countries. We have the opportunity to learn s the lessons of experience, to correct the mistakes of the past, and to I

bring about lasting improvement that will ensure the accident-free . .

operation of our plants over their remaining operating lives. We had that-opportunity following the Three Mile Island accident but we failed to ,

w follow through. I sincerely hope that we do not have to wait for another nuclear accident before we come_to grips with the root causes of nuclear power risks. The failure to do this during the past twenty years of commercial nuclear experience involving large power reactors is, in my view, the fundamental reason why nuclear power is. controversial and will remain controversial until a systematic approach to safety is taken. And, the failure over the last twenty years to come to grips with the root causes of the risks is why I hold the views I expressed at the Congressional hearing. An essential first step toward correcting the mistakes of the past is to acknowledge the obvious: that'the public and the Congress will not tolerate, and the industry and the NRC cannot allow, another severe accident as serious as the Three Mile Island accident or worse. The second step is to undertake the new initiatives needed to make this objective a reality.

I have attempted in this letter to outline w' hat more we need to do and why I believe we need to do it. I suggest that we use this exchange as a foundation on which'to build a truly effective safety improvement prcgram,

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a program that will assure the long-term protection of the public and that

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will restore public confidence in the NRC and in nuclear power.

-- Sincerely, ,

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.: James K. Asselstine O

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i The Honorable James K. Asselstine U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.,' 11th Floor Washington,.DC 3 20550 ,

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Dear? Commissioner Asselstine:

Your May 22, 1986,. testimony before Mr. Markey's House Energy Conservation and Power Subcommittee has been widely misinter-

, preted in the public arena. Specifically, I refer to your statement, ". . . . given the present level of safety being achieved by the operating nuclear power plants in this country, i we can expect to see a core mel'tdown accident within the next 20 years, and it in possible that such an accident could result in off-site releases ofs radiation which are as large as, or larger than, the releases estimated to have occurred at Chernobyl."

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s We f' eel this misinterpretation is the result of yo,ur loose

- juxtaposition of an earlier NRC staff 45% core melt estimate by the end of the' century and your conjecture that larger than Chernobyl. releases are "possible."

We feel that the. matter is of vital importance. As a senior public official you are certainly aware that your remarks vis-a-vis reyclear plant safety will be widely disseminated.

The press and the, layman will not understand the subtle differenr.'ei between the 'words '.'possible" and " probable."

Our own technical position -- predicated on the 5 year, $20 million IDCOR. study -- is that the NRC staff's earlier 45% core melt estimate is conservatively high. The staff has taken historic averages from previous studies and projected them two i decades into the. future without accounting for improvements taking place and others which will evolve as nuclear technology-improves in the coming years. l t

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- Commissioner Asselstine May 29, 1986 h Most importantly, risk is not equivalent to core melt probabil-ity. It is not technically correct that any core melt accident at a U.S. reactor would yield Chernobyl-like consequences which your statement implies. The TMI accident is evidence enough to prove that point.

Given a core melt, the probability of a containment bypass release is less than one in two hundred. With our reactors IDCOR does not find any such releases as serious as Chernobyl apparently was. Thus, the implication in your statement exag-gerates,the risk from U.S. reactors by at least a factor of two hundred.

The above arguments suggest that nuclear energy is a very safe means of supplying the electricity that the U.S. economy requires.

Sincerely, CW:spg l

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UfJITED STATES y o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHIN GTON. D.C. 20555

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.....l OFFICE OF THa August 19, 198.6 COMMISSIONER i

MEMORANDUM F0,R: The Files FROM: James K. Asselstine v,

SUBJECT:

DISCUSSION WITH ST HEN B. COMLEY RE NUCLEAR SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING On Friday, August 15, 1986, I met with Mr. Stephen B. Comley to discuss his concerns regarding nuclear safety and emergency planning. Mr. Comley is a resident of Rowley, Massachusetts. Mr. Comley is interested in the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant but.is not a party in the Seabrook licensing

' proceeding. We did not discuss any contested issues in the Seabrook licensing proceeding. The following is a written summary of my responses to Mr. Comley's questions.

Question 1: Do you feel that the people of Rowley should have a voice in evacuation planning as it pertains to the Seabrook power plant?

Answer: As a general matter, I believe that the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) established by the Commission is a reasonable boundary for planning protective actions, including evacuation, in the event of a nuclear power plant accident. However, the Comission's regulations are flexible in that they allow expansion of the 10-mile EPZ to take into account nearby facilities or features for which emergency planning would be appropriate. An example would be a school located just outside the EPZ. In previous cases, I have supported expanding the size of the EPZ slightly in a particular area where the facts of the case indicate a particular feature, facility or problem area which can affect overall emergency planning for the plant.

An example of this is the bridge going to Cape Cod, which is located just beyond the 10-mile EPZ for the Pilgrim plant.  ;

Because the bridge could significantly affect emergency planning for the Pilgrim plant and because it is the principal artery leading to and from Cape Cod, I believe that it should be included in the Pilgrim EPZ, and I have so stated in the past. Whether the town of Rowley should be included in the EPZ for Seabrook would depend upon the facts in that particular case. Although this is not now a contested issue in the Seabrook proceeding, I understand that it may become one. If so, my decision would be based upon the record developed in the case. I have not reviewed W0&00$ ~fy. J

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- the situation for Seabrook, and I have no opinion on the issue at the pre'sent time. - ,

Question 2: Evacuation issue - people who can't be moved... Do you feel some means should be provided for people who cannot be moved, other than merely being sheltered?

Answer:

I am not aware that this question has been. faced squarely by the Comission in any previous ca~se. As a general matter, the Comission's regulations. require that emergency planning within the EPZ provide for a range of protective actions. These can include sheltering, but for at least some accident situations evacuation may be necessary for some or all of the people within the EPZ. Thus, emergency planning measures have been required to include needed

, transportation, particularly for those who are unable to -

evacuate themselves. I agree with this element of our emergency planning requirements. For this reason, the Commission emphasized the need for arrangements for ambulances and buses if evacuation is needed for a care facility for elderly nuns near the Fenni-2 reactor. The Comission has also considered the need for sheltering and evacuation of prisoners in detention facilities located near nuclear power plants. However, I do not believe that the Comission has faced the situation in which evacuation is impossible for some individuals within the EPZ and the only alternative is sheltering within unprotected facilities.

Question 3: Location issue --Seabrook. Has the sumer beach population been fully taken into consideration?

Answer: I believe that this is a contested issue in the Seabrook proceeding. My opinion on this and other contested ~ issues will be based upon the formal record in the Seabrook case.

I have no opinion on the issue at the present time and I cannot discuss it with you.

Question 4: As we have yet to receive all of the information on Chernobyl, what are your opinions on reducing the radius from 10 miles to 2 miles?

Answer: You are quite correct that we have not yet received all of the information needed on the Chernobyl accident to assess its potential impact on emergency planning.' It seems to me that the Chernobyl accident may well raise questions on ,

emergency planning that cut the other way -- that is, is the l 10-mile EPZ large enough and should we consider expanding  !

it? It seems to me that this is an open question until we l receive additional information on the causes, sequence of events and consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Over the past three years, the U.S. nuclear industry has advocated

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reductions' in the radioactive sourci tem (the estimates of the amounts and types of radi6 active. materials which could

- .be released during a serious nuclear accident). ~The ,

industry argues that these reduced. source terms would l justify relaxations in several NRC regulations. Chief among those is a reduction in the size of the emergency planning zone, perhaps to an area as small as two miles. The American Physical Society and others have identified a number of areas where additional work.is needed to provide a sound scientific basis for any source term reassessment.

They have advised that across-the-board reductions in the source tem are not yet justified, and that specific numerical reductions are unwarranted. The Comission has not yet taken action to reduce the source tems, and our technical staff has advised that any across-the-board reductions in emergency planning zones are premature. The staff has rejected at least one site-specific proposal to -

reduce the EPZ for the Calvert Cliffs plant on the ground that the request is premature. Of course, any licensee is free to propose a site-specific reduction in the size of the EPZ for the plant and the individual proposal would be considered by the Comission on its merits.

Question 5: I understand that the low level licensing requirements have been reduced as they pertain to issues of evacuation problems that may arise in a city or town. This change has enabled question not to be resolved before a license is issued. Given the Chernobyl. incident and the problems and questions that surround the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant in Plymouth (which has been branded "the worst-run plant in the US"), do you think we should reverse again and require that evaluation issues be resolved before a low level license is granted to any new plants?

Answer: The Comission's regulations require adequate emergency planning measures to be in place prior to the issuance of a full-power license, but not prior to the . issuance of a low-power license (these are limited to no more than five percent of full power). This decision was based upon the technical judgment that a plant beginning operation and not going above five percent power fails to generate the

' quantity of fission products and decay heat which could pose-a hazard to the public requiring evacuation or other protective action. I agree with this technical judgment that the risk to the public from low-power operation of a new plant is very low. Some have questioned whether the Chernobyl accident affects this judgment since that accident apparently occurred at low power levels. However, our staff advises that the situation at Chernobyl was quite different because the plant had been operating at higher power levels for some time, with the consequent build-up of fission products and decay heat. Having said this, I should note

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~ that I ~ opposed-issuance of a low-power operating license for the Shoreham plant on the ground that there appeared to exist an outstanding' emergency planning issue which might ,

prevent that plant from ever going into full-power I operation. In the circumstances of that case, it seemed to me unwise to contaminate the plant until the Commission had i

resolved the outstanding emergency planning issues. Such

. circumstances may well arise in other cases, and I will have to examine each case individually. But my decision in Shoreham turned on the wisdom of contaminating a plant that might never receive a full-power operating license and not on the risk to the public of-low-power operation.

Question 6: Do you feel that the NRC has represented the people as well as it has represented the nuclear industry?

Answer: I believe that in some cases, the NRC has acted more as the -

protector of the. nuclear industry than the protector of the public. These cases have included the Commission's decision to allow operation of the Indian Point plants in the face of continued significant deficiencies in emergency planning;-

the Commission's decision to reject the safety improvements recommended by the NRC staff and the hearing board in the Indian Point Special Proceeding; the Commission's decision to allow the restart of TMI, Unit 1; the Commission's decision to end the search for further reductions in the risk of severe nuclear accidents in the Severe Accident Policy Statement; and the Commission's decision to restrict the NRC staff's ability to develop needed new safety '

requirements in the Commission's backfit rule. My views are well documented in my dissenting views on each of these decisions, and they have been widely publicized. For the most part, I am the only member of the current Commission who has opposed these actions; however, one other Commissioner opposed the backfit rule. Despite my opposition to'these key Commission decisions, I believe that

.the NRC contains many able and dedicated people who are committed to the regulatory mission of the agency. If given the proper policy direction from the top, I am confident .

that the agency could pursue its regulatory responsibilities in a manner that would restore public confidence in the NRC

'as an objective and fair regulator that puts the interests

( of the public foremost.

l l Question 7: Has Chernobyl changed your thinking regarding nuclear power?

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l Answer: The Chernobyl accident has not dramatically altered my views on nuclear power or on the key regulatory issues which are before the NRC. I continue to believe that nuclear power plants can be operated, built, and designed safely, and that they should be a part of our overall energy mix.

In reaching this judgment, I recognize the substantial

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l iommitment to nuclear power which we alrea'dy have in the U.S. The challenge is to ensure that the approximately 125

. plants we have in operation or under construction are run safely. Hence, Chernobyl has underscored my belief that a severe nuclear accident in the U.S. is unacceptable, and 1 that further regulatory initiatives are needed for the future if we are to reduce the long-term risk of nuclear power to an acceptable level. In a recent letter to the

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President of the Atomic Industrial Forum, I outlined my own assessment of our current understanding of the risks of nuclear power and the steps that I believe are needed to reduce that risk to acceptable levels. I am pleased to note that as part of its recent Safety Goals Policy Statement the.

Commission agreed to a statement that an objective of our regulatory process should be to prevent- the occurrence 'of a severe ' nuclear accident -- that is, an accident causing .

damage to the reactor core -- at any U.S. nuclear power plant. This statement, together with the Comission's recent increased attention on the operating performance of U.S. plants, particularly those with a. history of poor performance, is an encouraging step in the right direction.

Question 8: Do you feel that people are really informed about and know of the dangers of nuclear power?

Answer: I am not convinced that the public is fully informed of the risk of nuclear power. The issues are often complex, and the debate on the issues is ' frequently polarized and somewhat distorted. In my recent letter to the AIF, copy attached, I attempted to describe my view of the risk of a nuclear accident, including the uncertainties in estimating that risk. As I noted in my letter, I do not believe that we fully understand that risk, and we should not be afraid to say so.

Question 9: Cost verus other funds - obsolete? j Answer: As I understand your question, do I believe that nuclear power is obsolete based upon cost considerations? The Commission's regulations focus on health and safety considerations rather than on the overall cost of nuclear o power. It is true that the cost of nuclear power has increased substantially in recent years, particularly for the large new plants. The cost of operating and maintaining the older existing plants has also increased significantly over the past several years. Although there are many reasons for the cost increases, among the more significant are poor management of plant construction, the lack of standardization, a design-as-you-build approach to plant construction, and the need to address new and unanticipated safety issues, including those arising from the Three Mile Island accident. Whether nuclear power remains competitive l

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with other alternatives is difficult to say.

It appears, however, that due to a combination of factors, . including reduced demand for electricity, financial conditions, and uncertainty about costs and safety requirements, that no U.S. utility at the present time is prepared to connit to build a new nuclear powerplant.

Question 10 How Many people were hospitalized in Russia?

Answer: I do not know the answer to this question. We are awaiting further details on the Chernobyl accident at the upcoming meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency late this month.

QUESTION 11. How old was the plant - 3 years?

_ Answer: The reactor which had the accident at Chernobyl was the newest unit of the four-unit Chernobyl plant. Although I do not know the date on which the unit began operation, I b'elieve that the plant had been in operation no more than three years, and perhaps less.

Question 12: What are the differences between the Russian plants and our nuclear plants as you see them?

Answer: There clearly are a number of design differences between U.S. nuclear powerplants and the Chernobyl plant. Other Russian ~ plant designs are more similar to ours. I do not believe that we have enough detailed design information about the Chernobyl plant to fully understand their design or the significance of the differences between their design philosophy and ours. We are awaiting more detailed design information at the upcoming IAEA meeting later this month.

However, quite apart from the design differences between the U.S. and Russian plants, there are some broad lessons with applicability to the U.S. nuclear program. One of these is the unacceptability of a severe accident here and the need to ensure that sufficient steps are taken to prevent such an accident from occurring and to limit the potential for a large offsite reltose of radiation should one occur. I have proposed-initiatives, described in my letter to the AIF, which would accomplish these objectives. Ih addition, there are specific safety areas, such as hydrogen control, which may require additional attention based upon the information obtained from Chernobyl.

Question 13: Regarding future generations, would you recommend that we continue to build nuclear plants?

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Answeri - I believe that we should retain the nuclear power option -

- for the future in this country. When I examine.other energy alternatives, it appears at the present time that coal and -

< nuclear are the principal means available for providing large central station generating facilities. Conservation and other options are having a significant impact; however, it is unclear whether they can eliminate the need for new large generating facilities at some point in the future.

But if nuclear power is to remain a viable option for the future, three conditions must be met. First, the existing plants must operate safely and there must not be a severe accident at any of the existing plants for the foreseeable future -- at least the next 20 years. Second, we must restructure the process for designing, constructing and operating future nuclear plants. This restructuring must include greater use of standardized designs; the development '

of essentially complete designs before the start of construction; better, more centralized management of the construction process; greater attention to construction quality assurance; improved designs which emphasize greater margins of safety, simplicity, ease of operation and ease of maintenance; better utility management; and improved operations and maintenance performance. Third, we must make continued progress toward developing a safe and environmentally acceptable solution to the nuclear waste disposal problem. Each of these areas, in my view, is in need of attention if nuclear power is to remain a viable option for the future. -

Question 14: Do you feel that the public would be justified in believing that the NRC is not acting in the public's best interest?

Answer: As I noted in my response to question 6, I believe there are some significant Commission decisions in recent years in which the Commission has acted more as the protector of the industry than the protector of the public. In such cases, I believe that the public would be justified in concluding i that the NRC is not acting in the public's best interests.

At the same time, as I no.ted in my previous response, the NRC staff is composed of many hard-working and dedicated

, people. If given the proper policy guidance and direction, the NRC could do much to restore public confidence in the agency as a fair and objective regulator, and in the safety i of nuclear power as well. "

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j AtomicIndustrial Farven,Inc.

7101 Wisconsan Avenue Bethesda.Mo 20814 48o5 ,

Tesophone:(3o11654-926o TWX 71082496o2 ATOMIC FOR DC l

l Carl Walske l President .

1 I

May 29, 1986 The Honorable James K. Asselstine U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W., lith Floor Washington, DC 20555

Dear Commissioner Asselstine:

Your May 22,-1986, testimony before Mr..Markey's House Energy Conservation and Power Subcommittee has been widely misinter-preted in the pub.lic arena. Specifically, I refer to your statement, " .. . . given the present level of safety being achieved by the operating nuclear power plants in this country, we can expect to see a core meltdown accident within the next 20 years, and it is.yossible that such an accident could result

. in off-site releases of radiation which are as large as, or larger than, the releases estimated to have occurred at Chernobyl."

We feel this misinterpretation is the result of your loose juxtaposition of an earlier NRC staff 45% core melt estimate by the end of the century and your conjecture that' larger than Chernobyl releases are "possible."

4 We feel that the matter is of vital importance. As a senior public official you are certainly aware that your remarks

[( The vis-a-vis press nuclear plant safetywillbewidelydisseminated.) -

h and the layman will not understand the. subtle

y)( difference between the words "possible" and " probable." /

l h- Our own technical position -- predicated on the 5 year, $20 i

million IDCOR study -- is that the NRC staff's earlier 45% core seit estimate is conservatively high. The staff has~taken

historic averages from previous studies and projected them two decades into the future without accounting for improvements '

taking place and others which wi evolve as nuclear technology improves in the coming years.

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Commissioner Asselstine. May 29, 1986 1

Most importantly, risk is not equivalent to core melt probabil-ity. It is not technically correct that any core melt accident at a U.S. reactor would yield Chernoby1'-like consequences which your statement implies.. The TMI accident is evidence enough to prove that point.

Given a core melt, the probability of a containment bypass release is less than one in two hundred. With our reactors IDCOR does not find any such releases as serious as Chernobyl

-apparently was. Thus, the implication in your statement exag-gerates the risk from.U.S. reactors by at least a factor of two '

hundred.

The above arguments suggest that nuclear energy is a very safe-means of supplying the electricity that the U.S. economy requires.

Sincerely, CW:spg t

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August 29, 1986 Washinoton. D.C.

Mr. Donnie Grimsley Da r ector . Division of Rules 84 Records FREEDOM OF INFORMATION U.S. Nuclear Reculatorv Commission ACI REQUEST u sninoter. D. C. 20555 Fora-st.- 6 yy

Dear Mr. Grimsley:

b Id h-g-g Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 5 USC 552 et seo., as amended, I hereby recuest the following material.

1) All memos. teleobone logs. or other certinent correspondence--including internal corresoondence--between Executive Director for Ooerations Victor Stello ano Deouty Director for Ooerations William Mcdonald since July, 1986 concerning the scooe ano soecific duties of the newly. created office of i n4or mat i on resource management.

' 2) A 1 memos. teleobone logs. or other certinent corresoondence--including internal cor re s oondence--be tweeri Commissioner Frederick Bernthal and Sharon Conne11v. Dir ector o4 tne Office of Insoector 84 Aditor, concerning an OIA j investtaation reoort on alleged abuses of the FTS system--includino any

/ d scussions or corresooncence concerning the orogress of the investigation.

3) A recorr. commonly re4 erred to as the Gleason Reoort, orvoared by Judoe G;eason. concernino tne oerformance of NRC's Incident Investigation Teams in generai. ano the oerformance of the IIT at Davis-Besse. in oarticular.

4) Anv me rr.o s . teleonone 1cas. or other oertinent correspondence--including internal corresoondence--between members of the Advisory. Committee on Reactor Sadecuar os ano tne NRC General Counsel's Office or related offices, concerning ACRS orocosal to hire a lawyer for the ACRS.

5) Anv memos or other certinent corresoondence--including internal corresoondence--concerning the oossible susoension or other disciolinary cction against George Messenger. a former OIA deouty, in resoonse to Massenger's alleged sexual harassment of NRC emoloye Lisa Shea, or in resoonse to NRC's settlement of an EEO complaint filed by Shea in the December 1985/ January 1986 timeframe.

6) Memo from former NRC Chairman Nunzio Palladino to OIA director Sharon Connelly in mid-1985 concerning Connelly's action in resoonse to reoorts by tnied carties within OIA that Messenger had allegedly sexually harassed Lisa Shea. an OIA emoloyer and Connelly's resoonse--written or otherwise--to that c o r r e s e.i o n d e n c e .

71 Weekly summaries--in the December 1985/ January 1986 timeframe--from EEO of4 1cer Rosenthal to the Commission concerning the orogress of the Lisa snea/Georoe Messenaer/Sharon Connolly EEO complaint matter.

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18) .Any corresoondence between NRC- Commissioner Frederick Bernthal and U.S.

Deoartment-of Justice concernino March 22-letter.from Lawrence Liooe, DOJ

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.cnted of Itiga' ton. t in reference to Lisa Shea/ George Messenger /Sharon Conn ~elly EEO comolaint matter.

9) Transertots of any NRC. commission meetings-concern 2ng the January 28, 1986 decision to olace Sharon.Connelly.on administrative leave and the March 26-27.

'1986 dec2sion to reinstated Connelly,

10) Any :inf ormation available concerning oromotions,.demontions,. transfers, Ste2nos, resignations or other job changes for OIA staff from Januarv.28 to the oresent. including names. oositions and dates for all changes.

11) Anv memos. telechone logs or notes. or other corresoondence between-Commissioner James Asselstine and the Federal Bureau of' Investigations concernano an August 15. 1986 meeting b'etween Asselstin~e and Stechen Comley of

'Rowlev. Massachusetts. and any~other information concerning Comley's

. a c t 2 v s t i e s. reoardino the Public Service Co. of New Hamoshire's Seabrook-1.

14 you~ nave any ouestions or reoutre additional information. olease feel free to cer:rac t me. Please forwaro any information to the address below. Thank you Jon addressing tnis matter.

Sincerelv, 1 7 o

Dave Airi._o Assistant Editor.

McGraw-Hill Nuclear Publications 1120' Vermont Ave.

Suite 1200 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202)463-1659

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