ML18030A645

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise, March 29, 2017 After Action Report

ML18030A645
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	12/07/2017
From:	US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Region 4
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ML18030A622	List: ML18030A644 ML18030A645
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Download: ML18030A645 (78)

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Unclassified Rfl4iological, Emergency Pr~pm:edness;f;rogr.arn, I After,Act.ion,:Repqrt . 2017 Grand.GulfNuclear Plan,t I Table of Contents Page I Table of Contents ................................................. *.'....................................................... :'. .................. 3 Executive Summary .................................._.......................................................... :............................ 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview ......................................................................................................... 7 I 1.1 1.2 Exercise Details .......................................................................... :.................................. 7 Exercise Planning Team Leadership .......................................................... :.................. 8 1.3 Participating Organizations .................. *........................................................................... 9 I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ........................................................................................... 13 2.1 E_xercise Purpose and Design ....................................................................................... 13 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives .................................................................. 13 2.3 Exercise Scenario ......................................................................................................... 15' Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ........................... ,................................................................... 17 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results .................................................................................. 17 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .................................................................... 17 Tables 3.2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation ............................................................ 20 3 .3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ............................................. 21 3.3.1 State of Mississippi .......................................................................................... 21

~.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center .............................................. 21 3.3.1.2 Joint Information System/ Center ................................................. 24 3.3.1.3 Department of Radiological Health/ Dose Assessment.. .............. 28 3.3.1.4 Field Team Management ............................................................... 30 I 3.3.1.5 3.3.1.6 Field Monitoring Teams ................................................................ 33 Laboratory ........................................................... ~ ........................... 37 3.3.2 Claiborne County ............................................................................................. 38 11 3.3.3 Adams County ................................................................................................. 43 3.3.4 Copiah County ................................................................................................. 46 3.3.5 Hinds County ...................... :....................................................... :.................... 50 I 3.3.6 Warren Cou,nty .......... :...................................................................................... 53 Section 4: Conclusion ............ :...................................................................................................... 59 Appendix A: Exercise Timeline ................................................................................................... 61 I Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders .................................................................. 63 Appendix C: Exercise Extent of Play Agreement ........................................................................ 65 I

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Unclassified I Radiqlogical Emergency Preparedness Progratl.i' After.Action ReporL.* 2017 GrandGulf.Nucleat.Plant I I

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness :Pmgrant I After Action>Rep.ort 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant Executive Summary 1* On March 29, 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency I Management Agency Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a plume-exposure-pathway exercise for the 10-mile emergency planning zone of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The evaluations of out-of-sequence activities conducted March 8 and the week I of March 13 - 17, 2017, are also included in this report.

The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, operated by the Entergy Corporation is located in Claiborne I County, 29 miles south of Vicksburg and seven miles north of Port Gibson. The emergency planning zone encompasses Claiborne County, Mississippi and Tensas Parish, Louisiana; it also

'I encompasses a small-unpopulated portion of Warren County, Mississippi, which is managed by Claiborne County.

I The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response I plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on October 21, 2015. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on November 4-5, 1981.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them during the exercise. Out of sequence activities were also successfully demonstrated. Core Capabilities associated with this exercise included: Operational Coordination; Situational Assessment; Operational Communications; Public Information and Warning; Environmental Response/Health and Safety; On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement; Critical Transportation; Mass Care Services and Public Health, Healthcare & Emergency Medical Services. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 3.2 of this report. FEMA did not identify any level 1 findings. FEMA identified two plan issues and three level 2 findings during this exercise. The first plan issue (028-17-1.e.l-P-01) concerned: Radiation monitoring equipment was not appropriate or in sufficient supply to support emergency operations. The second plan issue (028-17-4.a.3-P-02) concerned: The Department of Radiological Health air sampling procedure needs revision to clarify methodology for collecting and analyzing quality air samples for dose assessment calculations and protective actions for the public. Level 2 Finding 028 2.b. l-L2-02 concerned: The State of Mississippi dose assessment team did not provide the State Emergency Operations Center staff with accurate results in a timely manner. Level 2 Finding 028-l 7-4.a.2-L2-03 concerned: The Mississippi Radiological Emergency Response Team Coordinator failed to instruct the field teams to utilize a silver zeolite cartridge for obtaining an air sample. Level 2 Finding 028-17-5.b.l-L2-01 concerned: Message preparation, including I emergency alert system and supplemental news releases, were in conflict between the State and Claiborne County.

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Unclassified I Radiolcigical Emergency Preparedness Prog:ratri After Action Report. ,i  : t' 2017 Grand Gl)lf Nuclear Plant I Highlights of the exercise inclup~~Lthe State ofMi~sissippi's emphasis on the Homeland Security Information Network, which provided a dedicated, teleconference-level, face-to-face I

information sharing platform for real-time situational awareness. This real-;time:information sharing greatly enhanced situational awareness for decision makers in making realistic response decisions. This highlight demonstrates the commitment of all of the jurisdictions in,vqlved to I I improve their preparedness. FEMA will pro:vide an.Improvement Planto:the ,State of Mississippi that details the strengths and areas for improvement observed during the exercise.

The Improvement Plan is published under separate cover for official use only in accordance with I

HSEEP methodology.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the I

exercise and made it a success. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. I I

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness* Program I After Action.,R¢port 2017 Grand Gulf.Nuclear Pla:rit I r.1*,, '*

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Section 1: Exercise Overview *

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• Exercise'Details I ' t ;, . ; :

Exercise Name- -

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2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Statimi'Radiologital Emergency Preparedness* Exercise -

I Type of Exercise

• Full-Scale Exercise I Exercise Date March 29, 2017 I Exercise Off-Scenario/Out-of-Sequence Dates I March 8 and March 13 - 17, 2017 Locations I See the extent-of-play agreements in Appendix C for exercise locations.

Sponsors I Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 1 MEMA Drive Pearl, Mississippi 39208 I Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 7003 Bald Hill Rd, I Port Gibson, MS 39150 Program I U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I Mission

Response

I Scenario Type Full-Participation Plume-Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I

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Unch1ssified I Radi5)logical Emergency Preparedn'ess Progtam After Action Rep9rt -:.. *. *- 2017 Grand Gu1£Nuclear Plant I 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership I

Kevin Keyes .. John (J.T.) Ackermann, j (Interim) Radiological Assistance Chair FEMA Region IV .

(Interim) North Section Chief:*,

FEMA Region IV I

3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road:

Atlanta, Georgia 30341 770/220-5378 Atlanta, Georgia 30341 770/220-3175 I

kevin.keyes@fema.dhs.gov

• john.ackermann@fema.dhs.gov Gerald McLemore

• David Huttie I

Site Specialist Office Director, Office of REP FEMA Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker. Road MEMA

. 1 MEMADrive * *

• I Atlanta, Georgia 30341_ * .Pead, Mis~issippi 39208 770/220-3148.

gerald.mclemore@fema.dhs.gov .

601/933:-6366

.dhuttie@mema.ms.gov I

Karl Barber Health Physicist Administrative I

Department of Radiological Health 3150 Lawson Street Jackson, Mississippi 39213 I

601/987-6893 karl.barber@msdh.state.ms.us I I

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I Unclassified Rm:li.ological Emergency Preparedness Program I After ActionRepori . 2017 Grand Gulf Nudear Plant I 1.3 Partici]Pating Organizations Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated* in the 2017 Grand I Gulf Nuclear Station exercise.

State Jurisdictions:

I State of Mississippi j

Mississippi Emergency Management Agency I Mississippi State Department of Health, Division of Radiological Health Mississippi State Department of Health, State Health Officer Mississippi Department of Public Safety I Mississippi Department of Transportation Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce Mississippi 'Department of Environmental Quality I Mississippi Depaiiment of Finance and Administration Mississippi Department of Human Services Mississippi Fire Marshal's Office I Mississippi Association of Public Works Mississippi Public Utilities Staff Mississippi Military Department/National Guard I Mississippi Office of Homeland Security State of Louisiana I Louisiana Department of Environm~rital Quality/Radiological Services Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Public Information I Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness I Risk Jurisdictions:

Claiborne County I Claiborne County Emergency Management Agency Claiborne County Board of Supervisors Claiborne County Public Information Officer I Claiborne County Fire Department Claiborne County Health Department Claiborne County Hospital I Claiborne County Public Transportation Claiborne County Road Department Claiborne County Schools Claiborne County Sheriffs Office Claiborne County Welfare Department Claiborne County Cooperative Service/Regional Coordinator 9

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Unclassified* I Radi9l0'gical -Emergency Preparedness Prograf.ii After Action Report 2017 Grand*GulfNuelear Plant I Port Gibson Mayor's Office Port Gibson Police Department '*

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I Tensas Parish Tensas Parish Office of Homeland Security *and Emergency Preparedness I

& Public Information Officer Support Organizations I

Adams County Emergency Management Agency Adams County Department of Human Services Adams County Department of Health I

City of Natchez Police Department City of Natchez Fire Department Natchez Regional Hospital I

Copiah County Emergency Management Agency :

Copiah County Board of Supervisors Copiah County Department of Transportation I

Copiah County Fire Department Copiah County Health Department Copiah County Sheriffs Office I

Crystal Springs Mayor's Office Hazlehurst Mayor's Office Hazlehurst Emergency Medical Services I

Hazlehurst Pc;,lice Department Hazlehurst School Districts Hinds County Community College Police Department I

Hinds County Emergency Management Agency Hinds County-Utica Volunteer Fire Department Hinds County Public Works I

Hinds County Public School District Hinds County Health Department Hinds County Sheriffs Office I

Jackson Police Department Raymond Fire Department I Warren County Emergency Management Agency Warren County Volunteer Fire Department Warren County Sheriffs Office .I Warren County Department of Human Services River Region Hospital Vicksburg Police Department I Vicksburg Fire Department Vicksburg Fire & Emergency Medical Services I

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I Unclassified Ra.di{)logical Emergency Preparedrte_ss:P,rogram, I AfterAction:R~po:rt'

• 2017 Grand;Gulf Nuclear Plant I Private Organizations:

Alcon;i State University American Red Cross, Southwest and Mississippi Region I Salvation Army

. Entergylncorp.otated

• I I Federal Agencies:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV Federal Emergency Management Agency,, RegionIV I Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VI U.S. Coast Guard I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Progiarul After Action Report I; 2017 Grand Gulf Nudear Plant I I

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I Undassi,fi.ed R,~,diological Emergency Preparedn~ss Program I After Actiop Report* 2017 Grand, Gulf Nuclear Plant I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design I FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Reguiations (CFR) parts 350,351,352, I 353 and 354. 44 CFR 350 codifies sixteen planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee and for state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear I power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the REP Program cornerstones I established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities.

During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the I public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

I The results of this exercise, together with review of the radiological emergency response plans, and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 along with supplements through the annual letter of certification and staff I assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that the affected state, tribal, and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety I of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

I Formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station to FEMA Region IV by the State of Mississippi occurred on May 22, I . 1981. In accordance with 44 CFR 350, formal approval of those procedures was granted on June 23, 1983.

I 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise I objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items.

Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology, the exercise objectives meet the REP Program requirements and encompass the I emergency preparedness evaluation areas. The critical tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Mississippi and the participating counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report . . 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I

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• Operational Coordination

• Sitmition:al Assessment ,

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• Operational Communications  :. '

Public Information and Warning Envirdrimental Response/Health an1 Safety .

I On:-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement Critical Transportation Mass Care Services I

• Public Health, Healthcare & Emergency 1'4edical Services I

The definitions of each core capability fa as follows:

Operational Coordination: Establish aI).d maintain a un1fied and coordinated op.erational I

• structure and process that appropriately integrates all cri,tica1 stakeholders anci supports the execution of core capabilities. . . .. .

I Situational Assessment: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the respo,nse,.

I Operational Communications: Ensure the capacity °for tim~*ly communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among I

and between affected communitie~ in the impact area and all response forces.

.. Public Information and Waming: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reli;1ble, and actionable I

information to the whole ,community through the use of clear1 consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the I

assistance* being made ~vailable. .'. . ' ,

of Environmental Response/Health and Safety: Ensure the availability guidance and I

resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of tlre responder operatibn's a:~d. the affocted cominuriiti.es. I On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas, and.also for all traditional and I

atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Critical Transportation: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and I

accessible transpc;irtation services) for response priority objectives, including.the evacuation of people and animals, .and the delivery of vital* response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness* Prograrti I After Action*Repbrt. 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I Mass Care: Provide life-sustaining services to the affected population with a focus on hydr:ation, feeding, and sheltering to those who have themost.need, as well as support for reunifying families.

I Public Health, Healthcare, an9 fane~gency. Medical Services: .Provide iifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations. and avoid additional I disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medic~fand behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

I These core cap~bilities, when successfully demonstrated, meet 'the exercis~ objectives.

The objectives for this exercise were as follows:

I Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Direction and Control and make protective action decisions through the State Emergency Operations Centers. and County EOCs by exercise play and discussion of plans and prnce4ures. , .

I Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers, access/functional needs; schools and the public through I exercise demonstration. 1*

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to perform plume-phase field measurements and analysis utilizing simulated data and discussion of plans and procedures with State field I teams.

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate Prompt Alert and Notification System I and Emergency Alert System through exercise play.

Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint Information System for public and private sector emergency information I communications~

Obje2ti~e 6: Denio~strate the ability t~ monitor, d~co11taminate an*d register evacuees.

I 2.3 Exercise Scenario I The °fopowing is a brief summary of the s~~nario. dyvelop~q by the Gr~d Gulf Nuclear Station to drive exercise play.

• I Initial Conditiqns:

1. Plarttis at il00% power.

I 2. Weather is clear, with variable winds from the northeast.

I 3. Containment M41 High Volume Purge is running to support post RCIC Surveillance minor airborne radioactivity cleanup in Containment.

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unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness* Prograrli After Action Report . 2017 Grand GtilfNuclear Plant I

4. Div 2 DG in 'Maintenance' I

5. RHR C tagged OOS Summary:

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1. The initiating event is based on a,Preventive Radiation Nuclear Detection transportation incident proceeding through the State of Mississippi at or around 0530.

, The scenario will .transition with a Grand Gulf notification of rapid escalating event resulting in a release. The.radiological emergency preparedness scenario begins at 0800 in a Division 2 workweek at 100% reactor power. The Grand Gulf Nuclear Emergency Response Organization Blue Team is participating.

2. At 0805, a loss of containment area occurs in the drywell, which is a loss of one of

• . the reactor fission_product.barrier's. Drywell pressure will exceed 1.39#. A failure of running containment and Aux building ventilation dampers to close upon isolation signal causes a loss of the second fission product barrier.

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3. The Containment:Vent radiation m~~itor fails. I

4. Various injection systems fail to operate.

5. At 0820 a Site Area Emergency is declared.

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' 6.. At -0950, a feed water a line break oc~uis, causing reactor water level to go below -

191 inches, which is a loss .of the third fission product barrier'.

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7. By 1005, radioactivity relea~e to the environment start's, with the r~lease path being the open Containment Yen_dJation system. ' ' '

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. 8. Repafr efforts are expected to work to address the ch.allenges bf restoring water to the reactor and isolating the release path. ** *

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.. 9. Releases are unmon'itore1 and expected to exceed E~viroqmental Protec'tion* Agency Protective Action Guides near the site.

I to. Recov~ry of inje~tion systems and closure of the release pathway should be the priority.

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• 11. The Exercise is expected to. terminate at app~oximatel y 1245.

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I Unclassified Radiological.Emergency Preparedness J;>rogram I After Action. Report. 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities

• 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results I This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the March 29, 2017 plume-exposure-pathway I exercise and out-of-sequence activities of March 8 and*B-17, 2017.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core I capabilities, capability targets and critical tasks and the underlying REP criteria as delineated in the FEMA REP Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number, and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of I the following terms:

• M: Met (no unresolved level 1 or level 2 findings assessed and no unresolved I

• fin dirt gs from prior exercises)

• 1: Level 1 finding assessed I

• 2: Level 2 finding assessed or an unresolved level 2 finding(s) from a prior exercise P: Plan issue

• N: Not demonstrated I 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation I HSEEP evaluation methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demon~tration of specific capabilities during ah exercise.' A capability provides a nieans to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards.

I Co.re capabilities form the foundation of the f<EMA Region IV REP Program evaluations.

The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates I to the specific core capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are list~d in Section 3.3.of this report. . .

I . pperational C~or~h1ation: Key leadership personnel from the participating agencies

. established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure which provided effective and responsive direction a~d control. *The ov~rall decision making I process integrated critical_stakeholders, enabling p~otective actions and su1Jsequent decisions to be made in a sensible and timely manner'. The Homeland* Security .

Information Network video conference line provided a face-to-face discussion medium I for protective action recommendation discussions. The video capability removed any doubt as to whom was providing input and responses: **

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U nelassi:fied I Radiological-Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Grand GulfNuclear Plant I Situational Assessment: Decision makers were provided with relevant information regarding assessed radiological and plant conditions. -This iriforrriation allowed:decision I

makers to understand the extent of the liazards, and cas,cading effects 'and: to make the appropriate protective action decisions. However, the information was not.always provided iri a timely manner. The subsequent Level2 Finding 028-17-2.'5.1:-L2-02 is I

.discussed in Section 3.3 Operational Communications: All participating jurisdictions were active,and contained I

ample commun'ications:capabilities to allow responders to perform their. respective roles.

Communications in support of situational awareness and operations were performed without challenges. The primary and alternate means of communications, to include I

commercial phone, cell phone, and cellular alert texting were employed without failure, thus successfully demonstrating this core capability. I Public Information and Warning: Alert and notification of the public was made using simulated siren activation and EAS messages, followed by supplemental news broadcast messages, media releases, and formal media briefings in the joint information center.

I These processes enabled a coordinated, prompt and reliable information message to be delivered to the public and media. A single conflicting news release after a protective action decision resulted in a Level 2 Finding 028-17-5.b. l-L2-0l.

I Environmental Response/Health and Safety: State personnel assessed radiological and plant conditions and made recommendations and decisions. Challenges with the air I

sampler procedures, operations and field team management were observed. These challenges resulted in two plan issues (028-17-1.e.l-P-01 and 028-17-4.a.3-P-02) and assessed one Level 2 Finding: 028-17-4.a.2-L2-03. Risk and Host county emergency_

I workers successfully demonstrated their ability to perform radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and evacuees during out-of-sequence activities. I On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement: The ability to ensure a safe and secure environment of an affected community was demonstrated as an out-of-sequence activity. This was accomplished by the risk county law enforcement and road department I

demonstrating traffic and access control points operated at site area emergency.

I Critical Transportation: Administrators from Claiborne County and Port Gibson Schools demonstrated their ability, without challenges, to implement protective actions and safeguard students, staff, and faculty in the event of an incident at the Grand Gulf I Nuclear Station during an in-sequence interview.

Mass Care: Host Counties, Adams, Copiah, Hinds and Warren demonstrated the ability I to provide services and accommodations for evacuees during out-of-sequence activities.

These activities included evacuee reception, radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees at designated schools and community safe rooms selected as I Reception Center and Congregate Care facilities.

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I Unclassified RadiologicaLEmergency Preparedness .~rogtam I After Action.Report . 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I Public.Health,Uealthcare & Emergency MedicalServices: Warren.County .*

., demonstrated the. ability to provide medical transport and medical.-services for*potentially I contaminated persons during 0ut-of-sequence activities; These activities were two-phase and included Warren County Emergency. Medical Services, Vicksburg Fire Department response, patient assessment, radiological monitoring, contamination avoidance/control, I transport and transfer to the Merit Health River Regional Medical Center. The second

• . phase demonstration included patient treatment, provision of medical senrices, , '

radiological,monitoring, contamination avoidance/control, patient decontamination, and I patient aftercare by the Merit Health River Regional Medical Center.

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness ;Program' After Action Report 2017 Grand Gulf N ucleat Plant I Tables 3.2 - Summary of Exercise ,Evaluation , . ',,:*'

I DATE: March 29, 2017  :,1* .. ~',.

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SITE: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 0

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M: Met, 1: Level 1 Finding, 2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plari Issue, CZl 0 ro N: Not Demonstrated, 0: Not Scheduled for Demonstration ~ ~ ~ ~

Alert, Notify, Mobilize Direction and Control

' ' .. lal M lcl M M

M M

M M M M M M

M I

Communications Equipment ldl M M M M M M M Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations E.W. Exposure Control '

lel M 2al p*

M M

M M M M M I Protective Action Recommendations *. 2bl M 2 Dose Assessment, P ARs, and P ADs for the Emergency Event-Decision Making P ADs for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs 2b2 M 2cl M

M M

I Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3al M M M M M M M Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized {ndividuals and, the PvbJic, .

Implementation of Protective Acticms for Persons with,Disabilitie_s & Acces~/Functional Needs 3bl ..

3cl

, .. M M

I Implementation of Protective Actions for SchoQI~ 3c2 . ' " M Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Implementation. of Traffic and Access Control-Impediments to Evacuation 3dl M 3d2 M.

M M

I Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses-Field Team Management 4a2 2 ,,

Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses-Field Team Measurements and Sampling Post-Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 4a3 4bl p

M I

Laboratory Operations 4cl M Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System-Backup Alert and Notification Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media ,*

Sal M 5a3 M M

M I 5bl 2 M Monitoring; Decontamination, and Registratioff of Evacuees Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles .

Temporary Care _of Evacuees ..

6al 6bl

• 6cl

• M*

M M

M M

M M

M M

I Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 6dl M I

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I Unclassified, Radiologic;al Emergency Preparedness Prngram-I After* Action ;Report 2017 Grand*GulfNuclear Plant I 3.3 Jurisdktional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.

• 3.3.i State ofMississippi I 3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Ce:°ter I Opera.tional Coordination Capability Summary:

The Mississippi State Emergency Operations Staff successfully demorisfrated the .ability I to establish and maintain a unified operational process to support a response to. a simulated radiological incident at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. They successfully coordinated actions with other State agencies, Claiborne, Hinds, Adam, Copiah, and

.1 Warren Counties, the U.S. Coast Guard, Mississippi National Guard and Grand Gulf Nuclear ,Station.

I Mississippi State Warning Point received initial notification of.an emergency at Grand.

Gulf Nuclear Station over the INFORM' system.* Information provided over the system was immediately transferred to a reverse calling notification system. The reverse calling I notification system was used to provide information, notification to respond and track notification results of key responders. The emergency operations center was declared operational at 0833. The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency Director of I Operations mair:itained direction and control of the staff and provided input in the protective action decisions with Claiborne County. Periodic briefings were held throughout the exercise, enhancing situational awareness among the staff.

I The Mississippi Department of Transportation successfully coordinated with the U.S.

I Coast Guard, Mjssissippi Department of Fish and Wildlife, and the State of Louisiana, for the clearance of a portion of the Mississippi,River. This closure-included both cornmerci_al and private watercraft. These actions supported the protective action I decisions.

Site Assistance Visits were conducted on March 8 and 13, 2017 at the Mississippi I Emergency Management Agency and the Mississippi State Department of Health, Division of Radiological Health. The 2016 radiological emergency preparedness training records, potassium iodide and equipment maintenance and calibration records were I reviewed. No discrepancies were noted. The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency Emergency Operations Center had redundant communications capability exceeding requirements. Office equipment, automation and audio visual equipment were I state of the art. The facility has backup generator power. The facility would easily support the 24-hour mission statement of the State.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.l, l.c.l, l.e.l.

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Aft~r Action Report 2017 Grand. GqlfNuclear Plant I

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I :'., *:**i,

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - lJnresolved: None *

• f. Plan Issues: None I

.Situational Assessment Capability Summary: I During the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station exercise, the capability for appropriate offsite response organization staffs to communicate and coordinate precautionary and/or protective action decisions based on protective action recommendations from the utility I

was demonstrated at the State Emergency Operations Center. Senior representatives from.the State of Mississippi and Claiborne, Adams, Warreh, Copiah, and Hinds Counties met using a video-conference provided by the Homeland Security Information I

Network to disucss the situation at Grand Gulf and make protective action decisions.

Protective action recommendations were received from the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, the video-conference meetings were held with the Governor's Authorized I

Representative, protective action decisions were made and efficiently communicated to the citizens of all affected locations. I Protective action recommendations from Grand Gulf Nuclear Station-were based on plant conditions, field data and meteorological data. This information was transmitted to the off-site response agencies over the utility's secure message notification.system. The I

Mississippi State Department of Health, Division of Radiological Health analyzed and compared the utility recommendation and provided input to senior leadership. Protective action decisions were developed after a thorough review and discussion by the leadership I

of all affected counties and the State .. Claiborne County Emergency Management Director and the Governor of Mississippi's Authorized Representative agreed on all protective action decisions, times to sound sirens and time to release* the emergency alert I

system messages. The process was accomplished in an expedient manner without undue delays. I For this capability, the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 2.b.1, 2.b.2. I

,a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

22 I

I Unclassified RadiologicaLEmergency Preparedness .Program I After Action, Report 2017. Grand*Gulf Nuclear Plant I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I f. Plan Issues: None Operational Communications Capability Summary:

I Mississippi Emergency Management Agency staff successfully demonstrated the ability to communicate both inside and outside of their agency. A communications plan, I Incident Command System 205, was published and implemented very early in the event.

Communication links were established and maintained with other State Agencies, risk and host counties; the news media, and Grand Gulf Nuclear Station tµroughout the I exercise. Commercial and, government specific,communications1systems Were used during the exercise. *Primary and backup communications systems were fully functional.

All Emerg~ncy Support Functions staff had access fo the internet, cable television and I telephones-in the State Emergency Operations Center ... All systems demonstrated 6r observed operated properly.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: 1.d,l. , , .

• I a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. NotDemonstrated: *None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings -'- Resolved: None I e. Prior Level:2 Findings - Unresolved:: None,,.

f. Plan Issues:,, None *,

I Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

I This Capability is a duplicate of the'Joint Information Center tb include activities,*

personnel and planning. Refer to section 3.3.1.2 for details.

• I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 3.d.2, 5.a.l, 5.a.3.

I 23 I

Unclassified I Radi()logical Emergency Preparedness Program!

After, Action' RepOFt, *, 2017 Grand Gulf'Nucleai Plant I

• • .a. ! Level 1 Finding:

• None

.. ,( :' '

I

b. Level 2 Finding:. None . .

c.

• Not Demonstrated:,,.None ...

I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None.* I

e. Prior Leve12Findings - Unresolved: None

f. Plan Issues: None I

On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary: I

. The Mississippi State Emergency Operations.Center Staff successfully demonstrated the ability to control the commercial.and private watercraft on the Mississippi River as it related to *a simulated emergency at the Grand .Gulf Nuclear Station. This control ensured I

watercraft did not enter the affected area. River traffic was notionally controlled from Natchez to Vicksburg. The action was performed by representatives from the Mississippi Department of Transportation, Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries I

and Parks, and the United States Coast Guard. A unified command was established at the State Emergency Operations Center to coordinate the simulated.effort. I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 1..d.1,-1.e..1, 3.a.14 '3.d.1,,3.-ct.2*. *1, I

a. Level 1 Finding: None b~ . Level 2 Finding: None , , i *.

I I

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings,... Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

.f.. Plan:Jssues: None.*

• I 3.3.1.2 Joint Information System/ Center I

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The ability to provide coordinatesl emergency information al).d instructions to the public I at

. 'and medi~ ,was demonstrated_ t~~ Mississippi 'Emergeq.cy Management Agency's Joint I

24 I

I Unclassified R,adiological Emergency Preparedness :Program I After Action Report *

• 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant.

I Information Center in support of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station ... Representatives from the States of Mississippi and Louisiana, Entergy, Claiborne County and Tensas Parish were present. These representatives provided a unified effort by establishing ajoint I information system for delivery of emergency information to the public and media. The State's Director of External Affairs served as the Lead Public Information Officer and was positioned in the Emergency Operations Center with his Deputy serving as the I State's Joint Information Center Manager.

0 The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency's Joint 'Information Center is I collocated with the State Emergency Operations Center. The joint information center served as the official release point for information regarding the response-to this emergency. Activation was accomplished in accordance with jurisdictional plans I following. the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

Four formal media briefings were held and a total of five news releases were- distributed I during the exercise. Message;preparation, including emergency alert system and supplemental news releases were in conflict between the State and Claiborne County.

These minor conflicts may cause confusion among the public in following the protective I actions.

The rumor control function was performed by personnel from the utility and the State and I operated in the confines of the Joint Information,System. Rumors and trends were handled with a sense of urgency and were brought to the attention of the Public Information Officers to be addressed or dismissed during the media briefings.

I Additionally, a State representative monitored multiple social media sites and posted relevant emergency information as needed.

I Ample space and sufficient equipment was available. Redundant communications and sufficient equipment and supplies to support emergency operations were tested and used I during the exercise. Primary and backup communications systems were fully functional and there were no failures during the exercise.

I The combined effort of multiple agencies led to the :successful demonstration *of this core capability through the coordination, development, and dissemination of emergency public information.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 3.d.2, 5.a.1, and 5.a.3 I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: 028-17-5. b. l -L2-01 Condition: Mess.age development protocols wer~ not completely follo~ed by the Joint Information Cener during the exercise, whkh could have confused the public regarding 25

Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness ProgranF After Action Report. * , 2017 Grand GuJf'Nuclear Plant I the actions they were to take.

Analysis: Established pfotdcols for the Executive Director (o/his designee) 'and the I

Director of External Affairs both approving messag)rig was riot observed. Thbse messages did not adequately relay the protective action decisions of the State and County leadership .. Particularly,1 the initial Emergency AlertMessage issued *a Monitor and I

Prepare" order and the fourth supplementary news release modified the order to "Shelter in Place." Durin'g media briefings, the State Lead Public Information Offi~er did not fully explain theprotective actions *of "Monitor and Prepare," Shelter in Place," and I

'"Evacu'ate" as it pertained to what the public should do to comply with these decisions.

' The *geographical boundaries provided to the public Ill press releases were in sync with the safety calendar, however, they did not meet the intent of the State leadership's I

protective action decision to evacuate only to the five-mile boundary of the Protective Action Area. . , I Possible causes: During the Lead Public Information Officer's 1038 update to the State Joint Information Center staff, the protective action decision was briefed as evacuate I

. PAA 1, SA, SB and 6'. and monitor and prepare foithe rest of the 10-miie emergency planning zone. This protective action decision was in conflict with Claiborne County's Public Information Officer who was instructed to use "shelter in place" and n~t "monitor I and prepare" for remaining areas.

• Some of the highlighted inconsistencies are as follows: I

1. The initial pre-scripted Emergency Alert System message stated "government authorities" had directed the evacuation of Protective Action Areas "2 miles around I all sectors" and "out to Smiles for sections 1, SA, SB and 6" a_nd "monitor and prepare for all remaining areas within tiielO-mile Emergency Plaiming Zone." The message did not clearly identify the* government official or agency with the authority I

to order an evacuation. 'J.'he initial EAS message provided imprecise evacuation informdtion to thepublic: The Protective Action Areas were inaccurately described as "sectors" and "sections." in the initial EAS message. Portions of the geographical I

boundaries of Protective Action.Areas 1 and SA'are bothwithiri and exceed the S-mile radius. Further, the geographical boundaries Protective Action Areas SB and 6 are entirely outside of the S-niile radius. The* third supple):nental news release I

prepared in conjunctiori with the initial EAS message reiterated this imprecise evacuation information. The third supplemental news release provideq the

'geographical bouridaries bfthe Protective Action Areas as a whoie, but not the I

• geographical boundaries of the Protecti;e Action Ar~a~ with111' the iritended S-mile

. e\racuation radius'. ' . ' '. ' ' . ., '

I

2. A fourth correction news release was issued shortly'thereaftet to modify "monitor and prepare" to shelter in pface" for the "rest of JO-mile emergency pfanning zone."

However,' the* second page of the: corrected news release wafrtot modified and still I

refe'rericed "All other areas in.the 10-mile EPZ are directed to monitor and prepare."

I 26 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness :Program.

I After Action* Report 2017 Grand,GulfNuclear Plant I Also not modified was the imprecise language of shelter;in place .out to 5 miles for

,- s~ctions 1, 5A, 5B and 6" with respect. to the geographical b,oun,daries of these

'~rotective Action Areas relative to_ th~ 5-mile r<;tdi\-is: . -* , . , '*: . .-.

I ..* 1>*' ;:** . .' ' . . '. ,!

3. TheJollow on Emergency Alert System message and fifth news release was prepared in conjunc;~ion with the order to, evacuate additional Protective Action Areas; The I follow on pr_e.:scripted EAS message stated_that gover~rne~t authorities" 'had '

directed "precautionary evacuations" of Protective Action Areas "sections 1, 2A, 2B, 3A, 4A, SA; 5B, 6 and 7" and "shelter in pl~ce for all remainipg areas within thelO-I mile emergency planning zone." As with earlier messaging, it was not dearly identify the government official or agency with the authority to mder an evacuation. -More significantly, this message included the unusual phrasing of "precautionary I evacuations" in reference to directed evacuatio~s. "Precautionary evacuations" is not defined as an emergency action in the 2017 GGNS Emergency Public Information I I Calendar. )

Supplementary news releases and ~edia* bri6fings \\'.ere not us~d as ~ opportunity .to

. relay and translate the leadership's Protective Action :Oecisio~ intq language that is in I concert with the 'printed safety* materials distributed to the public. ,

Established protocols for the Executive Director (or his designee) and the Director of I External Affairs both approving messaging was not observed. The Director of External Affairs appeared to be the sole approver of messages prior to their dissemination.

• I I Reference(s):

I 1. DHS/FEMA Program Manual, Radiological Eµiergency Preparedness, January 2016.

. Planning Standard E, NUREG 0654, Crit~rion E. 7, G '. Land G.2.

• 2.. The Mississippi Radioiogical Emergel).cy Preparednes; Plan, 20 i 7, revision 17.

I 3. 2015 External Affairs GGNS SOP, revised d6i201s'.'

I 4. 2013 Mississ1ppi E~ergency Publi~ 'In(or~atfo~ Comprehensive Pla~,. section 2, Dissemination of News Releases and Public Iuformation, . . . .

' ** * ' 1 ' **

Effect:. Pqtential existed for the public to be confused on what 19; do in case ci a nuclear

' pow~r plant emergency at Grand Gulf Nuclear .Statioµ. lnfofll)ation in distributed materials were not consistent with information contained in the plans/proe:edures used to make protective action decisions and develop emergency alert system messages and news

. releases .. Press briefings and distriputed materials aided the public in identifying their I corresponding protective action area. However, these briefings and materials did.not indicate a level bf detail for the public to identify ,w,hether they were located within or outside the intended 5-mile. evacuation radius of.. a -.particular protective action area.

I 27 I

Unclassified I Radiological *Emergency Preparedness Progranf After Action Report ,* ' ,,

• • ..... , 2017 Grand Gulf N uciear Plant I Potential for further confusion may have arisen if the public* was . unsute,of specific actions to take when instructed to "monitor and prepare," "shelter -in place," or :to' .:

I "evacuate." Additionally, the "precautionary evacuation" statement given during the exercise did*nOt relay a sense of importance or urgency to the public to evacuate the area and also may have given the impression of being a voluntary or optional evacuation.

I R~commendatirn(s):

I

., 1.. Current plans det~jl a,process for message development and approval. These established procedure's should be followed to ensure the proper vetting, approval and dissemination of accurate and timely messages. I

2. Ensure all information is written in "plain language. and is clear, accurate, consistent, and complete to ensure it is easily understood by members of the public. These I materials must be consistent with respect to geographical descriptic;ms and maps of protective action areas, and protective measures for the public as detailed in the 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Public Information Calendar.

I

3. When instructing the public on protective action decisions, the public information officers must be able to clearly explain what they want the public to do as it relates to I

"Monitor and Prepare," Shelter in Place," and "Evacuate." Supplementary news

• releases and media briefings provide an opportunity to relay and translate leadership's Protective Action Decision intent irito language that is in concert with the printed I

safety materials distributed to the public. ' ' ' ' ' -' ' ' ; '

• c/ Not Demonstrated: *. None*

• I d;' Prior Level 2 Findings' - Resolved:' None .

' ' I e~ Prior Level 2 Firidfugs - Unresolved:* None f~ Plan Issues: None' '

I 3.3.l.3 Departrilent of Radiological Health*/ Dose* Assessment I Envfrortmental Respon~e/Health a:nd Safety Capability Summary:

The Mississippi State bepartniertt of Health, Division of Radiolbgical-Health.personnel I

'demonstrated their ability tb assess radiologicdl 'arid plant conditions in cas*e of a radiological incident at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. I

• Mississ'ippi Divisio'n of Radiological Health personnel were pre~positfoned as-per the

. extent of play agreement prior to 'the site area emergency declaration. Numerous

• briefings were*conducted throughout the exercise, but-there was no information sharing I

I 28 I

I Uncl~ssified Radiological Emergency _Preparedness J:>r.ogram I After- Action Report * .. _ . 2017 Grand -Gulf Nucle_ar Plant I 1::,etween the Emergency Operati_ons Facility Director and, facility.staff during these briefings .. The State of Mississippi dose. assessor used utility provided dose numbers to

~al~ulate off-sjte dose projections anc;l they.agreed with1the utiHty's results.; However, the I State:of:Mississippi dose assessor never.conducted an-independent verification to insure the µtility'. s provided data was correct. A subsequent dose assessment ,calculation by the State of Mississippi dose assessor using field team data yielded results outside the factor I of 10. Instead of allowing the dose assessor to attempt to resolve this issue the State of Mississippi controller prompted the dose assessor to use an alternative input iodine into the Radiological As*sessment System for Consequence Analysis software which resulted I in satisfying the factor of 10 criteria.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.l, 2.a.l, 2.b.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: *None*

I b. Level2Finding: 028-17-2.b.l-L2'-02 I Condition: The State of Mississippi dose assessment team did riot provide the State Emergency Operations Center staff with accurate results in a timely manner:

I Analysis: The Department of Radiological IIealth assigned a State liaison, field team coordinator, anci dose.assessor to the Emergency Operations Facility. They were working as a team to provide information to the State Emergency Operatjons Center for protective I action decision-making. The State of Mississippi dose assessor used a dedicated computer to access the RASCAL 4.3 program to perform dos.e assessment-calculations.

While the State dose assessor brought references to the facility, a review of the manual I revealed that the dose assessment procedure proviqed little detail. . The licensee dose assessor provided the State dose assessor with the DoseCak dose assessment results, including noble gas and iodine release rates, whic_hwere_calculated based on field team I results. The State dose assessor used the release rates as inputs to the RASCAL program and used the program to calculate dose projections. The State dose assessor determined that the comparison with the licensee results were greater than a factor of 10. The dose I ass'essor was not allowed an attempt to r~so:lve this issue, b_ut was prompted by the_do~e assessment Controller to modify the data inputs, changing the totai iod1ne' s to 1-131 equivalent. This resolved the discrepancy between the ,utility and *.Stat~ of Mississippi I results. When the dose assessor was asked how this problem would be resolved should a real event9ccur, the reply was that the person serving as the Contr,oller would be -

contacted, -since the standard OP~~ating procedure was not applicable to this problem.

I .- -

An additional RASCAL field to dose calculation based on a State field teani air sample took an inordinate amount of time to complete, due in part-to poor com;dination between I the .State field tean;i ~oordinator and the State do_se assessor. Another C<?ntributing factor was that there was no i-:ecognition that this was an unmonitored, unfiltered release, in which data was co~pletely reliant upon field team air sample and survey results. Upon I

29 I

- ) ~ ', I*,., t I

Unclassified I

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program AfterActiotr Report, '

..',.'":,11.._.

. ~ , ' ! .. ,;. ': 1 I **11 I  : .~. ,; '

2017 Grand :Gulf Nticl~ar Plant I

• . further review/it was determined that the refoase rates calculated by tfie'1ic'ehsee\iiiing the DoseCalc progtam*were iri error; specufativ*ely due to the filtered release pathway I

'status used for the calculati"6ns.

• The error'iri the iodine release rates calculaie~fbj/the "licensee resulted indose*projection's lower by an'approximate factor of200~3'00 as compared to the; actual thyroid committed dose equivalent value's: Having field teain air I

' sample data: available 1for comparisons earlier in th~ exercise may have avoided soine of the erroneous*irifoi-mation. *

• I Possible causes:

.)

1. The dose assessment team had not received adequate tdining for this* type of I

scenario.

2. The dose assessment procedure did not provide any detail to support this critical task. I Reference(s):

'1 .. "DRH EOF DciseAssessment Procedure"; 2013':

I I

- *** 1 Effect: *State protective action recommendations could be based on inaccurate or incomplete information, resulting in the failure to properly evacuate affected areas. In addition, incorrect data could result in the failure to provide _potassium iodide to special populations, the general public, and emergency workers. ** I Recommendation(s ):

L Revise the' dose assessment procedur'e with critical information needed by the State I

dose assessor in 'the EOF. * *

2. Provide team training for the EOF staff, including the importance.and timeliness of

' the field team to dose assessment comparisons, and the heed to verify licensee data.

I

. .: *~  : .

I

' ' \ '

c. Not Demonstrated: None I ,,

d. Prior ._Level . -

2. Findings:-

Resolved:

., .: . ..None t * .i * ~

I

e. Pri~r' L~vel 2 Findings ~ Pnr~so~ve~: None .

' ,, .1'

f. Plan Issu,es: None.

• ,  : '  ; I 3.3.1.4 Field *Teain Management I Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

The State of Mississippi Radiological Emergency Response Team Coordinator I

successfully demonstrated activation to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency I

30 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

\'/ r

__*. :* ;_'. 4ql,'7; Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant rr1*

• I *, Qp~ratiqp.s Facmty;: State representatives in the Emergency Operations.Fadli{y :i;eceived

• - dosimetty and a tadiological briefing prior to departure to-Grand Gulf. The Radiological I ,*

pmergeP;CY Resp,o;nse_ Team Coordinator. w.as,equippec;l.wi_th,,app{opriate maps and forms

- . lJ..eeded to directthe teams and record field team data.. There were uo communication

, * * : .* * ~- .*. * : ~ ,*  : '  : \ * '. * ' . ' * .

.:rprob,leips rq.counte:i;ed using thy Mi&sissippi Wheless ;(nfqrmation,. Network radio system

"

• t I . which ii p~rmanently instaHedat th~ facility., During the exercise, the fjeld teams were

~irec;tec:l t9,p~oper loc,ations in a timely rµanner. H:owev~r, the Radiological Emergency Response Team Coordinator failed to manage the team to obtain sufficient information to I ** assist in characterizing the release by not relaying proper instructions on the, use of air sample media and delaying information for release characterization.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 1.d.l, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 3.a.1.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: 028-17-4.a.2-L2-03 I Condition: The Mississippi Radiologicaj E;mergfncy Response Team Coordinator failed to instruct the field teams to utilize a silver zeolite cartridge for obtaining an air sample.

I The Radiological Emerg~ncy Response -

Team Coordinator neyer team to make an attempt to locate the cente~line of the plume. The coordinator also

- instructed either field allowed significant time to pass before finalizing airborne activity calcuJations and I providing that data to dose assessment for confiqnation of projected dose. Th~

Radiological Emergency Response Team Coordinator was unprepared and had little knowledge on how to perform the activity calculations on the_Field Estimate of Airborne I Activity Form. Shortly after the release, a field team conducted an air sample in the ph~me .. Th,at _team was then sent to lqw background 3!ya to stag~ .and await further instruction instead of obtaining more data or locating tl).e centerli_ne.

I Analysis: Mississippi representation in the Graqd.Gulf Nuclear Station Emergency Operations Facility consisted of the EOF Team Lead, RERT Coordinator and a Dose I Assessor. During the exercise; the RERT Coordinator s~nt teams to appropriate 1

downwind locations to locate and monitor the plume. 'A simulated release began at 1006.

At 1041 Team 1 arrived at a location about one mile from tq.e plant. Survey results I indicated they were in the plume. The EOF Team Lead instructed the RERT Coordinator to dispatch the team to another location. At 1058 the.RERT Coordinator received results indicating the team was also in the plume at this location: -The EOFTeam Lead made the I decision to have the team collect an air sample. At this point the RERT Coordinator did not utilize procedures on advising the team which type of air cartridge (charcoal or silver I zeolite) to use for the sample. The same lack of advisement was duplicated when Team_ 2.

was instructed to collect an air sample. - - ** * * -- * -

I

) - ,_

I 31 I

Bn*classified Radioldgieal Emergency Preparedness Program' After Action -Report . . 2017 Grand Gulf.Nuclear Plant I

• ... *The RERT .Coordinator,received :the.results of the Team 1 air.sample at 115J>The results, the background and gross counts of the cartridge* and filter paper, *were :recorded.

I The RERT Coordinator did not begin calculating the activity resulting from these counts until about 1220. The RERT Coordinator had a,very.difficult time.using the.Field Estimate of Airborne Activity form and performing the necessary calculations.

I Assistance was provided by the EOFTeam Leader and Dose Assessor,and the final

• . calculations were still not completed until 1240. The final results derived from the air I

. sample data indicated an extreme difference in the projected radiation.dose arid actual dose indicated in the field.. The failure to act on the results and difficulty iri perfom;ring the calculations resulted .in a significant delay in obtaining this information . I

.* After Team .1 had performed the air sample and relocated to a low background area to process and read the sample at 1151, the RERT Coordinator advised the team to stage at a ~ow background location and await further instruction. The team could hav,e been sent for additional monitoring and sampling or locate the centerline and sample in order to provide more data for dose determination.

I Possible. causes:** ' : ** 1 ~ ;

I

• 1. The RERT Coordinator had: not received sufficient training to become familiar with the RERTprocedures on use of air sampling cartridges prior to the exercise.

I

2. The RERT Coordinator had not received sufficient training to become familiar with the RERT procedures on calculating airborne activity using the Field Estimate.of Airborne Activity Form.

I

3. The RERT Coordinator had no specific written*procedures or checklist. I

4. The _delay in calculating the high dose field results and then comparing them to the very *1ow projected dose, resulted in time not being used efficiently to obtain as much data as possible from the field teams;

• I Reference(s): I

1. Procedures for Radiological Emergency Response Team, Function.Annex'17.0, Page 17, advises the Radiological Emergency Response Team will receive instruction from

• the Team Coordinator on which type of air filter cartridge*to use during air sampling ..:

I

2. Procedures for-Radiological Emergency'ResponseTeam, Function.Annex. 17 .O; Page 1 70, General Procedure for Counting Air Samples, Step 8 - Complete the calculations, I

verify tbeir accuracy, and report the results to the Radiological Emergency.Response Team Coordinator at the Emergency Operating Facility. I

3. Procedures for Radiological Emergency Response Team, Function Annex 17 .0, I

32 I

I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness* Program I After Action; Report . . ; .*--~ \ '

2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I ,* *.: Ap:peridix G; contains Forni RH-3,, Field Estimate of, Airborne Activity fot calculating

! ,, :_ *:iodine.and p*articulate *activity. *.. ,~_ -: .; *, r' I 4 .. NURE0-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.rI2;: 1.7;18;vii;*;I.1Jl r1 .= ...

I Effect:* Failure.to.use a silver zeolite cartridge (even ifsimulated for drill purposes) would,have given a more accurate iodine:activity result. There was a significant delay in utilizingJieldteani air sample results to determine if dose projections accurately reflected I actual field data. A more timely understanding, calculation, and utilization of the air sample data would have provided information for decision makers* of any significant radioactive iodine dose that may differ from dose projections. This is vital information in I determining the need for recommendations on use of thyroid blockers-for emergency workers and the general public. The delay also resulted in field team being under.cutilized in providing as much data as possible for dose analysis.

I Recommendation(s ):

I 1. Provide persons who may fill the role of RERT Coordinator periodic training *on the importance and use of field data, use of cartridge procedures, interpreting field data, and calculating airborne activities. A more in-depth knowledge and familiarization I on these topics would allow the RERT Coordinator to quickly determine and recognize significant dose realized, based on the air sample results.

I 2. Develop specific procedures and/or a checklist of actions for the RERT Coordinator.

With a defined set of procedures, the RERT Coordinator would be able to reference them on the importance of field monitoring and air sample data, when to use silver I zeolite cartridges, and how to calculate airborne activities.

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None Planlssues: None*

I f..,

3.3.1.5 Field Monitoring Teams*

• I Environmental Response/Health. and Safety Capability Summary:*

I Personnel from.the Mississippi Department of Health, Division of Radiological Health staffed two field teams to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

I '

I 33 I

Onclassified Radiolcigical'Erhergency Preparedness Prog:ram After Acdon Report 2017 Grand GulfNuclear Plant I

Field team personnel were knowledgeable of their commt.micatibn equipmerit;:dose I limits, and had sufficient supplies to support their operations. The initial briefing was short and did not include all necessary information, which may have been helpful to the teams in the performance of their duties. Communication equipment worked throughout I the exercise and backup equipment was available. . *' ' ,

The field teams had survey instruments and were familiar with their operations. I However; the instruments were not capable of measuring radiation fields in'the range necessary to ensure they would not exceed their dose limits. This could have resulted in the teams exceeding their dose limits. Although the instruments issued worked I throughout the exercise if the instruments had failed there were not any backup

, instruments to replace them. Other instruments that could have been used were available but were either not calibrated or the teams were instructed to not use them. A Plan Issue I (028-17-1.e.1-P-Ol)was decided concerning: Radiation monitoring equipment was not

• appropriate or in sufficient supply to support emergency operations. Field monitoring teams were not sufficiently equipped to monitor radiation levels in a high gamma I

radiation field. The teams did not have backup supplies of calibrated low-level radiation

• survey instruments and calibrated/charged airpumpsfor 'collecting an air sample.

I The teams demonstrated-the ability to collect an air sample. However, they were not familiar with proper air sampling techniques and air sample calculation procedures. Due to procedural and lack of knowledge they did not use the proper sample cartridge or I

purge the cartridge after sampling. One team was asked to calculate air sample results and they had difficulty in calculating the correct concentrations. The procedures for performing these functions were not clear to the team members and some steps were I

confusing. Also, during the exercise the teams were in the plume but were not instructed to ingest potassium iodine. A Plan Issue (028-17-4.a.3-P-02) was decided concerning:

The Division of Radiological'Health procedure needs revision to clarify methodology for I

air sampling to ensure that proper*methodology isfollowedf@r collecting and analyzing

• a quality air sample to itse for making dose assessment calculations and making protective actions for the public.

• Personnel also need to have additional training on air sample procedures and Why certain steps are vital to taking a valid air sample.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 1.d.l, 1.e.l, 3.a.l, 4.a.2, 4.a.3, 4.b.1.

a. Levell Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

I 34 I

I

Unclassified R~di_ological Emergency Pr~paredness Program I After Action Report . .. . ,;_; *. , *. *. 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I e. :Ptior;L,evel 2 Fin,clings - Unr.esolved: *None ,*

-***f

• : ~ - ; !

• I f.,.J:llan Issues: .028-17-1.e.1-P-01 and 028-17-4.a.3-P-02 ;

Condition: (028-17-1.e. l-P-O 1) Radiation monitoring equip.ment was not appropriate or I in sufficient supply to support emergency operations. Field monitoring teams were not sufficiently equipped to monitor radiation levels in a high gamma radiatioRfield. The teams.did not 1;1.ave ba~kup suppiies of calibrated low-level radiation survey instruments I and calibrated/charged air pumps for collecting an air sampl~.

Analysis:* Tbe field monitoring teams were.each equipped with a Ludlum Model 3 I survey meter with a Model 44-38 probe, capable of detecting gamma radiation up to 200 mR/hr. Only two calibrated survey meters were available for the exercise.

• The field team procedures state that the Ludlum Model 3 is interchangeable with the Ludlum I Model 14C for use in characterizing the plume, but the Model 3 does not.have an internal Geiger Mueller tube like the Ludlum Model 14C and is not capable of detec.ting gamma radiation greater than 200 mR/hr. The Ludlum 3 is appropriate for conducting ambient I radiation surveys and is capable. of taking open and closed window measurements to characterize the plume. However, the use of this instrument is limited to gamma exposure levels less than 200 mR/hr. The instrument is not compatible with. the I emergency worker turn-back exposure level of 1.5 R/hr. .

The teams were not supplied with .a backup calibrated and charged air pump or Ludlum 3.

I In addition there were only two calibrated Ludlum Model 19 meters available. If either meter failed there. would not have been any backup instruments. Extra calibrated survey meters and air pumps were not available at the staging area.

I Possible causes: It was evident that Department of Health had an adequate supply of radiation monitoring equipment and air pumps to sufficiently supply the field teams, I however, the instruments were not calibrated. The inventory included several Ludlum Model.14C survey meters as well as Ludlum.Model 2241 instruments. Both instruments are capable of detecting gamma radiation gi;eater than. I R/hr, and both are listed in the I plan.

Reference(s):

I 1. Mississippi State Department of Health Procedures for Radiological Emergency Response Team Function Annex 17 .O; Manual of Procedures for Radiological I Emergency Response Team, Rev. 12, December 16, 2016

2. NUREG-0654, H. 7, 10, I.7,8 I Effect: The team did not have the necessary equipment to manage radiological exposure in accordance with the plans and procedures. As equipped, the field team did not have a I

I 35 I

Unclassified Radiological,Emergency Preparedness Prograni After Action Report * * : * : l *.;

• 2017 Grand GulfNuclear Plant I

verifiable source checked instrument to determine whether they were in a radiation field that exceeds their tum-back exposure limit of 1.5 R/hr.

I Recommendation(s):- ** *' ..

. : .. ~

I

1. Calibrate supply ofradiation detection survey meters and equipment in a'timely manner so that instruments and*equipment are available* for use andihisufficient I

• supply in the everitof an emergency. If the agency is unable to fulfilLthe calibration requirement,it may be necessary to contract this service with an outside agency.

I

2. Develop an instrument calibration tracking system to track where instrument are issued and their calibration status.

I Condition: (028-17-4:a.3-P-02) The Division of Radiological Health procedure needs revision to clarify methodology for air sampling to ensure that proper methodology is

,followed for collecting *and analyzing a quality air sample to use for making dose I assess'ment calculations and inaking protective actions for the public. Personnel also need to have additional training on air sample procedures and why certain steps are vital to taking a valid air sample.

I Analysis: .The field n10nitor1ng .teams did not perform required steps fm taking an air samplebeca:use they were either not' specified fa the procedure, or the procedure itself needs clarification. Difficulties w,ith calculating the field estimate of airborne activity I

were encountered. * * * * * ** * * **

• 1: The procedure doe; not require field teams to take open and closed wind~w readings I

during the sample collection or at the end of the air sample collection period.

Procedure directs team to leave the area during the collection period which is unnecessary.

I

2. 1:~e field teams.did not perfori:n a purge for noble gases.

• **I * ' * *,. ' *- ' * * '

I 3°. On°e of ihe.teains mistalculated.the field estimate 'of airborne a:~d.vity and which if the

. ' incorrect calculations had been cominunicated could have resulted in errors to'

' . protective action reco'mmen'dations ..

I Possible cau~es: The Department of Health procedure is confusing and. needs revision to I to

. clarify protedures be followed in taking an air sample. 'Because the procedure.

instnicts'the_teain to leav~ the ~ea during the collection period if does qot ailow for I

teams to collect information abotit'the pluine while the air sample is befrig'dollected. The emergency workers did'riot imderstand wheri and Why t_o use a sily,er zeolit,e cartridge,

. and the procedure is*' confusing as to whether the field team c~n' fuake the determination to use silver zeolit~ or only the coordinator can make the decision .. ,The emergency workers I

. did.n6t understand that they.neede~ to purge the cartridge 6! noble gase*s before counting, and did riot understand why they shOuld purge an air sample. . .

I 36 I

I

Unclassified' Radi9logical Emergency* Preparedness. Pro gram I After Action*Report .,, iu ,*:,

• 2017 Grand GulfNtlcleat Plant I Reference(s):. * .*

I Mississippi State Department of Health Procedures for Radiological Emergency Response Team Function Annex 17 .0, Manual of Procedures for. Radiological Emergency Response Team, Rev. 12, December 16, 2016 I ~ i .:

Effect:. The.teams.did not collect necessaryipformation to characterize the plume while the air sample was being collected. Errors in calculating the field estJmate of airborne I *activity Were made and could have been communicated to the,coordinator.

Recommendation(s ):

I 1. Revise procedure to include taking open and closed window readings during and after the air collection period. This information is necessary to determine whether the I plume has moved away during the collection period.

2. It is not necessary. to require the teams to move to a background location while the air sample is being collected. The information provided during the air.sample period is I more important than the incurred dose to the emergency. worker during* the short collection period.

3. Train emergency workers on the importance of purging the air cartridge before I counting. Field Team Coordinator should remind the team to purge b~fore they count thesample.* ' ,. ' ' '

'4. Recommend that field teams send raw count data measured on 'the particulate and I filter to the field team coordinator who then can do the calculations. This would eliminate errors in the calculations and expedite results to send to dose assessment.

• : * ' ; ~ ' I I 3.3.1.6 Laboratory Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary:

I As part of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Radiological Emergency Preparedness*

Exercise, radiological laboratory personn~l successfuUy demonstrated the capability to I perform required ra~iol.ogical analyses use1 to suppqrt: protectlv~ action decisions. The laboratory was staffed by personnel from Mississippi Department of Health, Division of Radiological Health. * **

• I Tw.o communiGatiori ~Y.stems were a~ailable to corrunun.icat~ \\'.ith field team~' and dose assessment personnel: Laboratory personnel were issµeci dosimetry and ~anaged I radiological exposure within procedural requirements .. Appropriate sample analysis equiprhent, monitoring equipment, dosimetry and other supplies were available to support I laboratory functions asso~iated with, protective action. decisions .. Laboratory personnel operatioQally checked and used harid-held radiation monitoring instrumentation for measurenient of exposure rates and surface crn;itamination .levels associated with field I samples. All portable instruments were within current calibration. Adequate . ; .

I 37 I

Unclassified Radi~logieal, Emergency Preparedness Program'.

After Action Report .

• 2017 Grand GulfNuclear Plant I

contamination *control techniques* were demonstrated. .* . {~ '

I Eight environmental samples{air, soil; water, and vegetation) were provided tb the

.. laboratory for analysis,. Laboratory :staff received and prepared samples for gamma

, spectrum analysis, conducted the analysis, and-produced sample resu1ts*.using high'purity I

germanium detectors.*! Gamma spectroscopy* systems were calibrated ,with mixed gamma sources traceable to.the National Institute*of Standards and Technology. Daily I

. equipment checks were comprehensive and ensured the equipment operated properly.

For* this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness .criteria* were I MET: 1.d.l, l.e.l, 3.a.l, 4.c.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None.

I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

f. Plan Issues: None 3.3.2 Claiborne County I

Operational Coordination Capability Summary: I The Claiborne County Emergency Management Director effectively demonstrated the capability to coordinate emergency management activities and direct emergency.,

operations in support of a radiological emergency at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

I

• : Claiborne County Emergency Management Agency received a Site Area Emergency, notification, via the automated notification system.. The notification was verified with the I

State Emergency Operations Center.* In accordance with the extent of play agreement, personp.el were pre-positioned in the*general.area. Staff personnel were *notified by the automated. calling system via their home phones, cellular phones, electronic mail, and I

pagers. The system was effective, versatile and alerted key staff and1countyleaders of a plant emergency in a timely mann.er. I The emergency operations center was sufficiently equipped to support emergency operations in support_ of Grand Gulf Nuclear. Station. It was equipped with maps and displays of the emergency planning zones, road network and water ways. Work stations I

were available for all emergency support functions as well as telephones, plans and I

38 I

I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Acticm Report* .. ,.: t) *. ; . 2017 Grand* Gulf Nuclear Plant I procedures. Computer connectivity was:-providedtlu;ough both wireless andEthernet.

Printers and fax machines were also available.

I The Claiborne County Emergency Management Director.Jed Claiborne County .

• emergency.response activities through coordination with the-counties of Adams; Hinds,

. Copiah,and Warren, andMississippi Emergency Management Agency, He mitigated the I  :,impact of .a radiological release on Claiborne County .through prompt evacuation of schools ahdJhe county special needs population and effecfively coordinated for

~

'additic;mal resources and protective action decisions with the, host counties in a timely I manner. His staff addressed local emergencies quickly and without undue delay and critical information was disseminated* down to the lowest: level.

• Claiborne County* and the City of Port Gibson elected officials were raptly involved in the coordination'and I planning process for the County and provided critical support for county emergency management activities.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.l, l.c.l, l.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 3.c.l, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I f. Plan Issues: None

• I I Operational-Communications Capability Summary:,.

Claiborne County Emergency Management staff successfully demonstrated I communications with state, county and local jurisdictions .. Commercial communications systems were also successfully demon~trated with Grand Gulf Nuclear Station throughout

• 1 the exercise. All-systems operated in accordance with plans and procedures. Primary I arid backup communications systems were:functional without failure. The EOC had

. redundant communications which include landline *and cellular phones, a primary .

coordin(;ltion line and a video conferencing line; A statewide 700MHz c'ommunications I network is available in conjunction with the county's -local systems. No equipment or communication failures were observed.

I

• For this capability the.following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was

• MET: 1.d.L I

I 39 I

Un:dassified Radiological *Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report ' 2017 Grand Gulf.Nuclear Plant I

a.. Level*l Finding*:*. None.:*: i~ *.;' 1* *.,

f.

I None .

b; 1 Level 2 Finding:'

I

c.

• Not Demonstrated: None * ~

l .~ ~ .

• • d. Prior Level 2 Findings*..... Resolved: None .

,.j

• I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None .

I

f. Plan Issues: None Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: I The Claiborne County emergency operations center staff were able to provide timely and accurate information and warning to the public in a coordinated fashion. The decision to I activate alerting sirens was made at the appropriate emergency classification level and without delay. The simulated siren activation occurred on time and responders coordinated a rapid response to conduct back-up route alerting for a failed siren. The I

Claiborne County Sheriff's Office demonstrated that deputies had the necessary instruction and procedural references to conduct this activity safely and rapidly.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.l. I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d.. Prior :Level *2 Findings-Resolved: None 1*

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

• f. Plan Issues: -None -* I Environmental Response/H~alth:and Safety Capability Summary:

Monitoring and decontamination ofemergency workers and their-vehicles were*

I successfully demonstrated by members of the Claiborne County Fire Department and Emergency Management Agency. This demonstration was completed as an out of sequence activity on March 15, 2017 at the Pattison Fire Station.

I I

40 I

I

Unclassified-I Radiological Emergency Preparedness ~rogiam 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I Emergency workers demonstrated the procedures and resources avaifable~were sufficient to accomplish the monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their I vehicles. The emergency workers received a safety briefing and were issued personal and simulated permanent record dosimetry at the start of the demonstration. County personnel demonstrated appropriate survey and decontamination techniques of three I emergency workers and two vehicles. During the demonstration, a radiological portal monitor failed the operational check and.was subsequently taken out-of service. In its place, county personnel used handheld radiological monitoring survey instruments.

I Those instruments were properly put into service and used. throughout the demonstration.

All activities were completed in accordance with the stated county procedures. Those I activities were demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I MET: .J.e.1, 3.a.1, 6:b.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None ,

I b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I f. Plan Issues: None On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

I The ability to implement traffic and access control along with the clearance of impediments were successfully demonstrated by officers of the Port Gibson Police I Department and members of the Port Gibson Road Department. The demonstration was completed as an out of sequence activity oh March 14, 201 T

• I Traffic and access control are a combined operation of the two aforementioned agencies.

Initial notification for the establishment of traffic and access control points would come I from the County Emergency Operations Center and go through both the 91:1 dispatch center and agency representatives simultaneously. In tum, Port Gibson Police Department and Street Department personnel would respond to the appropriate pre-I designated points .. The traffic and access control point established for this demonstration was A4. From this point, evacuating traffic would be directed to the Hazlehurst**

reception/congregate care center .in Copiah County.

I I 41 I

Unclassified Radiological 'Emergency Preparedness Pr6grarri:

After Action Report 2017 Grand Gulf.Nuclear Plant I

Communications and equipment to support the operation was sufficient ahd is ivailable 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. The County's Sheriff's Office and Roads Department along with the I

Mississippi Highway Patrol and Department of Transportation*would be called upon to support the city. The emergency workers participating in this demonstration received a I thorough radiological emergency safety briefing which included potassiom iodide' I instructions and were issued personal dosimetry.

I' **1 i I Impediments to evacuation would be cleared immediately by the assigned personnel. If impediment removal was outside of their ability, assistance would be requested and coordinated through the county emergency operations center. Other organizations I available to assist with impediment removal would include additional county and state resources.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.l, 3.a.l, 3.d.l, 3.d.2.

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2Finding: .None I

• c. Not Demonstrated: None- I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

f. Plan Issues: None I

• Critical Transportation Capability Summary:

The responders in the Claiborne County emergency operations center demonstrated, by I

both simulated actions and interview, that they were capable of implementing protective actions for schools. The responders simulated the evacuation of students at the

• . appropriate emergency classification level and initiated actions to perform1the evacuation I

• v\'ithout delay. They properly coordinated with law enforcement resources to ensure

-protection *of the.evacuating students. Finally,. school officials- demonstrated through interview that they could perform the necessary actions to notify parents of their I

children's situation and how to re-unite with them, The Alcorn State University represenatives also demonstrated a capability to simulate prompt actions to protect their students at the appropriate emergency classification level. They also secured I

transport'ation resources without, delay and simulated movement of their students and personnel to the appropriate reception center. I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I

42*

I I

Unclassified R:;idiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action*RepqrL. , ,,__ . 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I _.MET:, 3.c.2.: .

I '*( ,**

• I .a,:* Lev:el 1 Fin,ding: None .

b.,. Leyel 2 Finding: None ,

I c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I f. Plan Issues: None I 3.3.3 Adams County Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I Adams County emergency management personnel successfully,established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure that integrated all critical I stakeholders. Response personnel from several county agencies were knowledgeable of their role as a host county supporting Claiborne County. Their knowledge and attention to detail was essential to an effective response. County personnel as a whole participated I in all coordination video teleconference calls which enabled them to effectively coordinate response actions. Supplies, equipment, and displays were readily available and used to support emergency operations.

I In accordance with the extent of play agreement, county personnel were prepositioned in the emergency operations center. The county's electronic automate.d notification system I used to alert and mobilize essential personnel was explained. Exercise participants activities were limited to receiving the exercise controller*safety*briefirig uqtil their simulated response times had been completed.

I . 1*,

The Adams County Emergency Management Director maintained an open dialog with personnel throughout the exercise. *Many valuable conversations were held amongst staff I that would better prepare them for an.actual emergency;. They made decisions as a. group and brainstormed to anticipate the,potential needs of the evacuee~ and prepare applicable resources. All personnel were familiar with their duties and-accomplished them in I accordanc.e with plans and procedures.

)*

For this capability ithe following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.l, 1.e.1.

I I 43 I

Uriclassified Radiplogical Emergency Preparedness Program After ActioffReport,, .. * , * ;: 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

' '. -~

• ' I

• d.. Prior Level2 Findings ..... Resolved:, None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

.[* Plan Issues: None.

Operational Communications Capability Summary:

\

I Adams County emergency managers leveraged .available emergency management communications equipment and, software to provide valuable input to the response. I Personnel maintained communication with key stakeholders in a real-time chat function withln the Homeland Security Information Network, as well as through the use of cellular and landline telephones. They also shared and accessed important documents in the I st~te,..wide emergency management software.

Frequent video-teleconferencing facilitated good situational awareness for Adams County I

emergency managers and allowed the staff to make deci~ions based. on the most current information available. The*Mississippi Emergency Management Agency area coordinator positioned in the emergency operations center provided valuable assistance I

ensuring important communications were shared between Adarhs,County and the State.

Redundant communications systems, including handheld radios linked within the .

I Mississippi Wireless Integrated Network and a satellite telephone, were available and managed in support of response operations. Those communications .systems used during the exercise operated without fail.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: l.d.l.

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None **.-.-:*

I

... d. Pdor Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None , I e:. Prior Level 2 Findings -Unresolved: None I

44 I

I

Uriclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness program I After Actiori Report -', *<: 1

2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I f. Plan Issues: None II Environmental Response/ Health and Safety Capability Summary:

Emergency Services personnel and volunteers from Adams County *successfully I demonstrated their abilities to provide monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees. This was demonstrated as an out-of-sequence-activity 6n March 15, 2017 at the Adams County Community Safe Room.

I The county reception center had appropriate.space, resources and trained personnel to provide for the evacuating public of the Claiborne County in the event of an* incident at I the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The evacuees were able to easily maneuver the well-laid out reception center area with the assistance of attentive escorts*. Facilities were set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency and in accordance with I county plans and procedures*., Operational checks of the radiological monitoring and survey instruments were properly completed and personal dosimetry was issued.

I Approximately six evacuees were processed through the.monitoring* station, *consisting of four males and two females-: These persbns.aiTived at the monitoring station and were processed through primary and secondary screening, and decontamination as applicable.

I The Adams County reception center anticipated approximately 3,710 evacuees from Claiborne County. Twenty percent of this value within the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of an . *.

emergency would be 742 people. Through this demonstration, it was determined that I 1,440 people could-be monitored witbin a 12-hour period.

For this capability the'.following REP criteria were.MET: l .e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1 I a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None.

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None  :;,,':*. 't

f. Plan Issues: None I Mass Care Services Capability Summary:

I Adams County, Mississippi Department of Humall' Services, arid Department of Health personnel along with the Southwest Mississippi Chapter of the American Red Cross I successfully demonstrated their ability to provide temporary care of evacuees. The mass I 45 I

UIiclassified After Action Report .;..

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I

. care facilitywas,setup,in accordance:with local procedures and agreements; *and had I ample space* and reasonable accommodations for their assigned purpose: The * ' 1 representatives of the forenamed agencies were well trained and. versed in their >.*.

• responsibilities in operating the facility. The processes demonstrated were logical and I effective. The staff and volunteers were extremely knowledgeable in their duties and displayed a commendable dedication to the health and welfare of the public.* .:

I The community safe room is primarily, used to temporarily shelter arriving'evacuees after they have been monitored for radiological contamination and, if necessary decontaminated. For this demonstration six people were processed into the mass care I facility, which was well~equipped and staffed to successfully provide support. The Mississippi Department of Health was also present and able to distribute potassium iodide to the evacuating public. Potassium iodide in both pill form for adults and liquid I

form for juveniles would be transported to the shelter upon activation for dispensing by Department of Health nurses.

I For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

• ,

• f. Plan Issues: None 3.3.4 Copiah *County *

"j * '

I Operational Coordination Capability Summary: I Copiah County Emergency Operation Center -staff successfully demonstrated the capability to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure.

Critical stakeholders were integrated into an effective team that demonstrated the I

county's ability to support Claiborne County. Throughout the exercise, plans and procedures were methodically and proactively instituted by:county personnel. 911 Communication Center staff followed established procedures to notify the Emergency I

... Management Director and key emergency operations center*staff.

I I

46 I

I

U ridassifi:ed Radiological Emergency Preparedness .J;>rograrri I After Action *Report . *; ~* * :. ~

1 2017 Grand "Gulf Nuclear Plant I

• The Director maintained direction and,confrol of the ,emergency operations* center staff.

Briefings were .held at predesignated times .and were focused on host county support I operations; County-personnel displayed excellent coordination'With the other host counties; State -and Claiborne County. * \

'... t, _, t :

I Equipment.and supplies were sufficient to support einergency response operations.

Personnel demonstrated a high degree of competence which demonstrated their ability to

. protect t~e health and safety :of the public and emergency workers in the event of an I incident at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I MET: 1.a.1, l.c.1, l.e.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Pirior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I f. Plan Issues: None Operational Communications Capability Summary:

I The primary means of communication were commercial telephones, cellular phones, pagers, facsimile, and 700 MHz radios. County radios were identified as.their secondary I means of communication. The county recently became part of the Mississippi Wireless Integrated Network. All personnel maintained telephonic and email communication with*

their counterparts at the State and other counties.

I In addition to the above communications systems, the Homeland Security Iriformation Network was used to complete live situational-updates and briefings. This video-

• I teleconference:increased situational awareness of county personnel and enhanced.their response operations.,

• I All communications systems used during the exercise operated without fail..

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: l.d.l.

I I 47 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report

• 2017:;Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I

.. ~;

• Level'); Fin.ding:; None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None ;1 -* ..: .* .~ *

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None _, ...  ;

I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: ))*fone . . . .: ~

I

f. P.lan l1jisues: None

• Enyironmental Response/ Health and Safety. Capability Summary: I Staff and voh.mt~ers from the. Copiah.County Emergency Services and the Bethel Volunteer Fire Department.successfully demonstrated their ability to monitor, I

decoo.t~minate and register evacuees,.. Tpis demo1,1strntion. was completed as an out-of-sequence activity on March 8, 2017 at tl).e Gopiah C01,mty Community Safe Room. This location is primarily used to receive the evacuating/relocating schools from areas 4A and I

, . 4B of;Claiborne Coun,ty.

. As .demonstrated, the. reception -center facility had the appropriate.space and adequate I

resources along with the trained per~onnel to provide radiological monitoring, appropriate decontamination and registration of the Claiborne County evacuees. The

.*: . facility was.set up and demonstrated_,as they would be in an actuq.l.emergency involving I

the Grand. Oulf Nuclear Station. Operational checks of the radiological monitoring and sui;vey instruments wer~ properly completed and person11l dosimetry was issued in acc;ordance with plans and_procedures.. ,. ,

I

' .. *~ ' ' .. .' ' :

Approximately fourteen .evacµees were processed through the monitoring station; consisting of a realistic mixture of children and adults. These persons arrived at the I

monitoring station and were processed through primary and secondary screening, and decontamination as needed. : Tbe facility ant~cipp.ted approximately 2,900 evacuees from

, Claiborn,e Co.unty, T\Venty percel).t 9f t4is vaiue. withj.n the.first 12 h0urs of&n .

I emergei:icy would_ bef580 people .. _Througl;l_.tl;ii13 demonstriltion; it,:was determined that 960 peqple could l;>e monitored within. a J,2:-};loµr period. :, , , , .

• I

'J\

For this capability the following RJ:<::P criteria were M:El': l.e,. l,' 3.a.1, 6,.:;t.l

a. Leyel 1 ;Finding: Nqne

• ' ~ '

• J _, ' .. ; ~ . I

• '}

b. L~vel 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

48 I

I

I

.. ' ; ,. ~  : :' .

Unclassified

~ '; . ~ ,, :* .l~Ji.diological Emergency Preparedness P.rogr_am I After Action Report 2017 Grai1d Gulf Nuclear Plant I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None '*.

, C

~ , l .* /

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I f. Plan Issues: None . -:. ~

I Mass Care Services Capability Summary:

The ability of Copiah County to provide temporary care of evacuees from Claiborne I County was successfully demonstrated by representatives of Copiah County Emergency Services and the Southwest Mississippi Chapter of the American Red Cross: The Copiah County Community Safe Room facility had the space to accommodate and provide the I necessary resources for the evacuating/relocating population of Claiborne County. The American Red Cross shelter manager demonstrated their procedures to set up, operate and demobilize the county shelter in* accordance with American Red Cross guidelines and I the memorandum of understanding with the county.

• II For an incident involving the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, the community safe room is primarily used to receive the evacuating/relocating schools from areas 4A and 4B of Claiborne County. As such, the majority of those evacuees would be minors and they would be accompanied by their teachers and/or staff from their schools. For this I demonstration, six minors and six adults were processed into the shelter. Those processed evacuees were volunteers from the Gallman Baptist Church of Gallman, MS.

The Mississippi Department of Health was present and is responsible tb distribute I potassium iodide to the evacuating public. Potassium iodide would be transported to the shelter upon the activation, and Department of Health nurses would dispense after instructed to do so by the State Health Officer. Potassium iodide, in both pill and liquid I form would be available as stated and safety instructions would also be given at the time of dispense. * *

• I With the majority of'the shelter population being* students from the relocated schools of Claiborne County~ parent notificaticm would be made by Claiborne County'. Copiah County-representatives would also be available to provide additional parental I information. Students and staff would be dropped off at this facility by*bus; those buses are then instructed to go to the staging area located at the Copiah County Multi-Purpose I I and Fairgrounds facility. *Parents of the relocating school students would be instructed to respond to that facility to be reunited with their children. Upon parent arrival at the staging area-facility, their identification would be obtained and verified. With that, their I children would be transported from the congregate care facility to the staging facility for reunification.

I For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. l.

I 49 jl

Unclassified

'Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program .

After Actiort Report',

_. ,r

! 'j\.

2017; Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I

a. Level 1 Finding: None 1 I

. b. Level 2 Finding: Nbne

c. Not Demonstrated: None ')*!I I

d. Prfor Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

f. Plan Issues: None I

3.3.5 Hinds County I

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Hinds County elected officials and emergency managerrierit personnel and assigned staff I

successfully demonstrated the ability to effectively respond to an Emergency Classification Level event at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. All actions taken by the Emergency Operations Center staff during the exercise reflected their plans and I

procedures. The staff was trained and familiar with their responsibilities as they relate to an event at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Both internal and external coordination was competently and professionally performed by the Hinds County Emergency Management I

Director.

The Director and his Assistant Director used effective procedures to alert, notify, and I

mobilize emergency response personnel and activate the Emergency Operations Center in a timely manner. The Emergency Operations Center had multiple redundant means of communications, to include commercial land lines, and cell phones or other hand-held I

• electronic devices. The emergency*notification system and Homeland Security

• • Information Network were very successfully used for coordination of protective actions.

Backup communications included electronic e-mail, facsimile machine*s, 800 MHz I

• radio*s, arid satellite phones. They* also used an electronic incident *management system to maintain situational awaieriess. I The Emergency Operations Center has sufficient supplies, space and equipnient to support emergency response' operations. The 15,000 square foot facility is supported by a 250 kilowatt die*sel generafoi, 1imart boards, Emergency Planning Zorie and State maps, I

projectors, monitors; fax, copiers, clocks, tables, chairs, computers*, response plans, procedures and checklists. I I

I 50 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2QJ7 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I Jbe, Hiqqs Co;unty Department of Emergency Management Director was, involyed in the .

• decision making process throughout the exercise, and continually had his county prepare I for the next upcoming event. He led his staff with a pro~c.tive c,tpproqch to problem solving, and maintained a calm, positive, and confident atmosphere in the Emergency Operations Center. The Director conducted periodic briefings w,I:i,icp. kept th~ Emergency Operations Center staff updated throughout the exercise. Using the Homeland Security Information System video-teleconference system, the Direct<?r cCJordina,te~ closely with the State Emergency Operations Center,. Claiborne County Emergency Management Director, and other counties effectively.. Hinds Cou~ty is a ~ost~countyi. with,tp.e mission of providing a Reception and Congregate Care Center for the public evacuating from designated at-risk areas. The Emergenc;y 1\fanagement Director anq..his EJI1.ergency I Operations Center staff demonstrated the ability to effectively plan and impl~ment their mission during the exercise. 'l .

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I MET: l.a.1, l.c.1, l.e.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: ,None., ..

I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I ..

e.. Prior Leve\~ Findings - Unresolved: None I f. Plalil Issues: None Operational Co111munications Capability Summary: .

I . . ' ~ .. . ' .

The Hinds County_Department of Emerg~ncy Manageine.µt .successfully.demonstrated the capability to establish and maintain communications in support of security, situational I awareness, and operations .among apd between state, risk and host counties, ,and Grand GulfNucle<;1r,Station emergencyresponseforc~S-; Initial an_d subsequent emergency

. notifications, coordination of protectiye action recomm~ndations/decisions ,regarding I evacuation of protective action area 3a and the activation of the reception center was effectively accomplished utilizing the primary and secondary communication resources I SD:Ch, as a rev~rse, caUing notification system. commercial land lines, the Homeland Security .Info,rm!ltion N ~twork, operational hot line, an electronic incident m~nagement system ; emails; fax, ap.d cell phones. The hostc.ounty participated tn all the :coordination calls to maintain. ~itu_atioqal aw,:1.r~l).ess of the event \Vher~ it would affect county r~sidents and/or resources.

• I I 51 I

Uriclassified Radiological Emergency Pr~paredness Ptoghnh After Aotion*Reporf:*, * ' , : _:' 2017 Grand 'CiulfNucleat Plant I

For this capability the following Radiological Em~rgency Prepatedness ctited6n was I MET: l.d.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None

.* ~ ~ ' . _,: '.' ,*

I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

.c. NotDemonstrated: None

.J .

d~ 'Prior Level 2 Fin~gs .:...Resolved: None'

. ,*  ! j I

. e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

f. Plan Issues: None Environmental Response/ Health and Safety Capability-Summary:

I Hinds County first responders successfully demonstrated the courity~s capability to provide radiological Ihoµitoring, decontamination and evacueeregistra:ticin for an I

evacuating populace. This was demonstrated as an out sequence activity on March 16, 2017 at the Hinds County College Utica Caillplis. The community college campus is outside of the 10-mile emergency planning zone of the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and is used as .the county's reception center for the evacuating public of Claiborne County from protective action areas 3A and 3B. I The reception center had the appropriate space as well as sufficient resources to include trained personnel to provide radiological monitoring, decontamirration:and registration of evacuees. The demonstrated activity was completed as it would be in an actual incident.

II Six evacuees were processed through the monitoring station;' consisting of four males and two females. These persons arrived at the monitoring station and were processed through primary screening, and secondary screening as needed. Per-county-plans, approximately I

1,425 evacuees from Claiborne County are anticipated. Twenty percent of that value is 285 persons. As demonstrated, 1,235 people could be monitored within a*12-hourperiod at the reception center.

I For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 1.e. l, 3.a.1, 6.a. l I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None

!.* ,* I

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings .;... Resolved: None I

52 I

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Up,classifie'd I Ra4iological Emergency Preparedness :Program After Action- Repqrt-_ ,,: *. i. :-

• 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I e...friQr: Level2,Fi,;idings -,Unresolved.::. None, I f. Plan Issues: None Mass Care Services Capability Summary:

I The ability of Hinds County to provide temporary care of evacuees from Claiborne County was successfully demonstrated by representatives of the Southwest*Mississippi I Chapter of the American Red Cross, Mississippi Department of Human Services and Mississippi Department of Health. This demonstration tqok place as an out.of sequence activity in conjunction with the reception center demonstration on March 16, 2017. Mass I care services were set up in accordance with county and American Red Cross shelter procedures. The facility had ample space and reasonable accommodations for the expected evacuee population of Claiborne County. The staff and volunteers.were 11 extremely knowledgeable in their duties anq displayed a commendable dedication to the health and welfare of the public .. *. '

I The Mississippi Department* of Health was also present and able to distribute potassium iodide to the evacuating public.* Potassium iodide in both pill form for adult and liquid for juveniles would be transported to the shelter upon activation for dispensing by I Department of Health nurses. The Department of Human Services and American Red Cross staff members wen~ very knowledgeable and professional, worked together as a team, and demonstrated shared responsibilities in meeting the needs of evacuees.

I For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. l.

I a. Level .l Findin,g:

• None

. b.

• Level 2 Finding: None I c.

• Not Demonstrated: None I d.

• Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved:, None*

e. Pd.or Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I f. Plan Issues: None I 3.3.6 Warren County I Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

Warren County emergency operations center staff successfully demonstrated their ability I to respond to an incident at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station .. Warren County is a host county I 53 I

Uriclassified After Actiofl' Report * .*

Radiplogical Emergericy Preparedness Prbgram 2017 Grand Gl).lfNuclear Plant I

, with. the mission *of providing *:a reception and congregate care center for the general public evacuating from designated protective action areas. The emergency oper:ations I

center staff responded in a timely manner upon receipt of initial notification via an electronic crisis communication and mass notification tool. *The.:,, knowledgeable and 11 professional emergency operations center staff, composed of a variety of supporting county agencies, demonstrated their ability to plan and conduct emergeiic'.y response actions through effective coordination. Redundant and reliable communications systems, I along with the readily available equipment and supplies, ensured emergency operations could be sustained for extended operations.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.1, l.c.1, l.e.l.

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: Nohe I

, c. Not Demonstrated: None*

• I

. d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None ,

e. Prior Level 2 Findings- Unresolved: None I

f. Plan Issues: None I Operational Communications Capability Summary:

Warren County communications*equipmentwas redundant ahd capable of supporting I

emergency operations: The Director and his staff used effective procedures to *alert, notify, and mobilize emergency response personnel and activate the emergency operations center in a timely manner. The primary means of communication among the I

• . State and counties was the Homeland Security Information Network Connect, which operated without failure. The system allowed for video c9nferencing capabilities using software in conjunction with a conference call bridge line. This capability permitted fluid I

communications among the emergency response organizations to allow for seamless command and control. I The emergency operations center.had redundant means of communications; to include personal computer Internet access, electronic mail, commercial land lines; cell phones, and other hand-held electronic devices: Backup communications also included facsimile I

machines, low band,.700 and 800 megahertz radios, and satellite.phones. An electronic inci~ent management system was used to maintain situational awareness and track assistance requests.

I I

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action- Report _ 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I For th.is capability the following Radiological Emerg~no'y Preparedness criterion was

,; MEJ:, Ld.L,. __.,_ . : , .'. ,

I a. Level ,1 Finding: None I *,b. Level 2 F~nding: None, .

• *

• f :{' *

' C; ' Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

f. Plan Issues: None I Envirolllmental Response/ Health and Safety Capability Summary:

I Representatives from Warren County Emergency Management, Emergency Services and the Sheriff's Office successfully demonstrated their ability to monitor, decontaminate and register evacuees. Additional Warren County Emergency Services agencies included the I Culkin, Fisher Ferry and Northeast Warren County Volunteer Fire Departments and the Vicksburg Fire Department. This demonstration was completed as an out sequence activity on March 13, 2017 at the Warren Central High School campus.

I The Warren County reception congregate care center had the appropriate space and adequate resources along with the trained personnel to provide radiological monitoring, I appropriate decontamination and registration of the Claiborne County evacuees. The facility was set up and demonstrated as they ~ould be in an actual emergency involving the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Operational checks of the radiological monitoring and I survey instruments were.properly completed and personal dosimetry was issued in

. accordance with plans and procedures. Challenges.were identified with monitoring equipment usage and procedures for processing, evacuees.- With additional,equipment I refresher training, joint agency training, and checklist usage; Warren County can 'ensure an efficient and thorough response. , .

I Approximately six evacuees were processed through the monitoring station. These persons arrived at the monitoring station and were processed through primary and I secondary screening, and .decontamination as needed, The facility anticipated

. approximately 1,704 evacuees fro*m Claiborne County: Twenty percent of this*value within the first.12.hours 6fan emergency would be 341 people.' For each person*.

I - monitored, the portal monitor check, to include transition time, .took 31 seconds on average. As demonstrated, the county could monitor twenty percent of this population within the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of an incident.

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Unclassified After Action Report>:;;

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Grand; GulfNudear Plant I

For this capability the following REP criterta*were MET: *LeA, 3:a.1(6:a)l '.:1,*;-: I

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b: .Level 2 Fihdjng:

• None: " .-. i r, :* ';

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior: Level 2 Findings - Resolved:

• None

... d I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

• f. ' Plan Issues: None I Mass Care Services Capability Summary:

I

'Representatives from the Southwest Mississippi Chapter of the America Red Cross and Mississippi Department of Human Services successfully demonstrated the registration ancJ.::temporary care of evacuees at the Warren CountyCerttral High School reception I

• center. The facility was setup in*accordance with locai procedures and agreements. This facility had ample space and reasonable accominodatioris for its assigned purpose. The aforementioned agency representatives were well trained and versed in their I

responsibilities in operating the facility. The processes demonstrated were logical and effective.. , I The Mississippi Department of Health was *unavailable to participate in this activity.

With that, the County Emergency Management Director stated that the Department of Health is responsible to distribute potassium iodide to the *evacuating public. Potassium I

iodide would be transported to the shelter upon the activation and Department of Health nurses would dispense after instructed to do so by the State Health Officer. Potassium

. iodide;* in both pill and liquid form would be *available as* stated and safety instructions I

would also be given at the time of dispense: This was verified through a latef'interview with the Department of Health representatives'onMarch 14, 2017;. I For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 6.c. l.

a. Level,1 Findirig: None* * *.

I

• b. Level 2*Finding: None*: I

• • c. . Not-Demonstrated

    * None .:

d.

• Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

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56 I

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I U li~lassified RaclioJogical Emergency Preparedness :program After Action Report *,*. 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I e. Prior:Level 2 Fjndings - Unresolved:* None ,.

*,i I f. Plan Issues

None Public lflealth, Healthcare & Emergency Medical Services Capability Summary:

I The Vicksburg Fire Department and Ambulance Servicepersonnel,successfully demonstrated their ability to treat and transport a simulated radiological contaminated I injured individual. Conversely, they demonstrated that the .'county had adequate resources and trained personnel to provide transport and medical services to a contaminated injured individual.

I For this demonstration and in accordance with the extent of play agreement, participants were pre-positioned at Vicksburg Fire Department's Fire Station 5. The incident site was I the vehicle bay of the station. Prior to beginning the demonstration,personnelreceived a safety briefing which included personal safety, radiation safety, dosimetry, reporting requirements, administrative limits and potassium iodide. Emergency Medical Service I personnel wore personal :protective equipment, which is described as level D, basic working uniform, adding disposable cloth over boots,. multiple nitrile surgical gloves and a particulate filtering face piece respirator. Vicksburg Fire Department crewmembers I wore their turnout gear adding surgical gloves and a particulate filtering face piece respirator.

I While enroute to the hospital, the paramedic obtained the victim's medical vitals and relayed same as well as the simulated radiological contamination readings to the hospital.

Personnel* demonstrated good victim care and contamination control,* verbalizing glove I changes numerous. times after changing patient treatment protocols. They were also aware of personal :radiation exposure limits, actions to take at each level and were very conscious of the health and safety of their patient,the public and themselves._ ,

I Warren County Emergency Medical Services, Vicksburg Fire Department, and Merit Health River Regional Medical,Center personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to I conduct the Public Health, Healthcare, -and-Emergency MedicaLServices Cote Capability in response to a radiological incident at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station during this drill.

I The Merit Health River Region Medical Center had sufficient space, equipment, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, and other supplies to support handling a*

I radiologically contaminated injured patient. Medical center personnel provided monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to the contaminated injured individual while minimizing the spread of contamination. Staff were properly trained in their plans I and procedures and executed their duties appropriately. ,They.demonstrated the ability to issue appropriate dosimetry and manage radiological exposure in accordance with the plans and procedures. The radiological emergency area staff.worked together to ensure I

I 57 I

Unclassified After Action Report'-,, * **

Radiological Emergency PreparednessProgtatii; 2017 Grand, Gulf Nuclear Plant I

the medical center was prepar_eq.:td re~eive N:)e patient, that he was well cared for, and that

• he was effectively decontaminated.

I

• , *.l,'

Fpr_this.capability,the foHq~ing .REP criter;ia were ]yIET: l.d.l, l~.eal-, 3.a.1, 6;d.L : .. ~ I I I

a. Level.I Finding: None I

b. Level 2 l'inding: . None

c. Not Demonstrated: None

. d. Prior Level:~ Findings - Resolved: .None * *

e. Pr.ior Level 2 Findings - Uni:esolved: Non~

f. Plan Issu.es: None I

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58 I

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Unclassified I After Action Rep(i)ft J Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

• :,*:,; 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I Section 4: . Conclusion,*

• I Overall, the exercise was a success. Officials and representatives from: the State of Mississippi;ihe risk county of Claiborne; the host counties of Adams, Copiah; Hinds and.

Warren; and numerous other organizations participated in the exercise. The cooperation and I teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

• FEMA identified two plan issues and three Level 2 Findings during the exercise. FEMA will work closely with the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency and the Departme'r1t ofHealth, Division.of I Radiological Health to resolve these findings and issues.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made I this exercise a success. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still, others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their I communities. State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them:

I Highlights of the exercise included the State of Mississippi's continued efforts on technology to enhance the decision-making process and willingness to step outside the exercise box and combine outside and/or parallel critical exercise aspects with the graded radiological emergency I preparedness program exercise. These highlights demonstrate the commitment of all of the jurisdictions involved to improve their preparedness to respond to an incident at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

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Unclassified After Acti\:m Report ..

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 _Grarid Gtilf Nuclear Plant I

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r- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

1 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant Appendix A: Exercise Timeline Em<!rge~cy , 'J;'ime

,, ..... ,. Time That Notification Was Received or:~ction

.: ' 1:,-:.

Was Taken

=" ~

Classification: .. ':,i;' pti!itr'

.','. FIELD CLAIBORNE ADAMS HINDS COPIAH WARREN L~vel'6r Eviiif 'Declared SEOC JIC DOSE EOF COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY TEAM COUNTY COUNTY Unusual Event NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA::.

Alert NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA .

Site Area Emergency 0824 0829 0834 0833 NIA NIA 0832 0836 0833 0833 0833 General Emergency 1016 1027 1030 1016 1017 1017 1026 1027 1032 1026 1030 .

Simulated Rad. Release 1030 1016 1017 1017 1026 1027 1032 1044 1030 1016 1027 Started Simulated Rad. Release NIA NIA 1246 1229 Ongoing 1244 1246

• - 1246 1224 1223 Ended *,

Facility Declared Operational - 0833 0835 0730* 0904 0904 0922 0847 0943 0845 0840 Exercise Terminated - 1247 1242 1245 1246 1246 1246 1241 1247 1244 1245 Declaration of State of Emergency Local: - ' - - 0930 0929 0848 0845 0838 0924 0855 0930 0930 0930 0930 093,0 State: *, "

Early Precautionary Actions: ' '< '

Precautionary transfer of nursing homes, hospital patients, special needs population, schools, inmates 0916 0909 - - ',

- ' 0912 0922 1030 0930 1011 Staffed and opened shelters and reception centers 1st Protective Action Decision: ,,*;

Evacuate Areas: 1, Sa, Sb, 6 1048 1058 - - - 1048 1048 1048 1048 104:8 Monitor and prepare: All others out to IO-miles 1st Siren Activation 1055 1045 ,;, .- - ,, - *, 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 1st EAS Message 1100 1058 ' - - - 1100 1100 2nd PAA:

Evacuate Areas: 1, 2a, 2b, 3a, 4a, Sa, Sb, 6, 7 1148 - - - - 1148 1148 1148 1148 1148 Shelter in Place Zones: All remaining 2nd Siren Activation 1200 - - - - ' 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 2nd EAS Message 1205 ' - .....

)°

- 1200 1205 "

KI Decision: 1052 1052 Issue to Emergency Workers 1048 - - - - 1052 1052 1052 61

Unclassified After Action Report.,

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Grand GulfNuclear Plant I

f' '  ; " -: .. '

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

-1 After Action Report -.. , . , 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders I Regional Assistance Committee Chair: Kevin Keyes North Section Chief: JT Ackermann THEPET Coordination: JT Ackermann I Central Section Chief: Larry Robertson ICF Coordinator/RC: Jill Leatherman I MS Lead Evaluator: Gerald McLemore ICF Admin Support: Erin McCarty Location I Ven1lle "* . * ) S Evaluation 'J'.eani **

0

/'.;*Core Capability'(ies) Evaluated :at* eath y,ert4e:

• I Mississippi Emergency Management Agency: Director - Mr: Lee Smith.son Walt Cushman Operational Coordination

,; ..... '?

Andrew Seward Situational Assessment MEMASEOC I Lisa Rink Glenda Bryson (OJT)

Robert Spence Operational Communications Public Information and Warning MEMAJIC Linda Gee Public Information and Warning I MEMA TCP (OOS)

TomHegele J.T. Ackermann On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement E. Adkins I Mississippi Department of Radiological Healtlj:. Director..:. B.J._.Smith, DRH SEOC Dose DRHEOFDose Jill Leatherman Lloyd Generette Enviroqmental Response/Health and Safety Environmental Response/Health and Safety I Field Team Management DRH Laboratory Bart Ray Marcy Campbell Environmental Response/Health and Safety Environmental Response/Health and Safety DRH Field Team 1 Joe Harworth Environmental Response/Health and Safety I DRH Field Team 2 Deborah Blunt Claiborne Comity: Director -':Iy1at'vin Ratliff Gerald McLemore Operational Coordination Quintin Ivy I EOC Bill Maier Henry Christiansen Operational Communications Backup Route Alerting Bill Maier Public Information and Warning I Schools Bill Maier J.T. Ackermann L. Lewis Critical Transportation I EWD (OOS)

M. Dolder M. Bradley E. Adkins Environmental Response/Health and Safety G. McLemore I TCP (OOS)

J.T. Ackermann E. Adkins Adimis .County: Director ~ Robert Bradfoi:d On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement I EOC Reception Center /

Matthew Bradley John Simpson J.T. Ackermann Operational Coordination Operational Communications Mass Care Services Congregate Care (OOS) L. Lewis I

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Unclassified After Action Report

• Radiological.Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Grand*GulfNuclear Plant I

/', .Lo<;ationJ Yenu¢ ' <,,*, .** Eyajqitfo1:i X~a.n;r.: ...

M. Dolder

,:/.; C<>i;e.;Capabiiity'(ie~) *Evalu~t~clat each: venue I M. Bradley, E. Adkins '. '  ; .~ .

G. McLemore Copiah County: Director~ Randle:Oi:ane :* .. '*

EOC Robert Nash:*

Alex Sera

, Operational Coordination Operational Communications I

J.T. Ackermap.n **

Reception Center /

Congregate, Care (OOS)

L. Lewis E. Adkins G. McLemore I

Mass Care Services

\

I llindsCoupty:' *Director...: Riclcy:Mciore': ,,, >; ,, ,,;: ' ' ,*..: ':,1 ,. ' , * /,j>: ,, . *,

I

'" ' Lorenzo Lewis Operational Coordination EOC Rort Shaw  : Operational Communications J.T. Ackermann Reception Center /

L Lewis M. Dolder

• Mass Care Services*

I Congregate Care (OOS) M. Bradley E. Adkins G. McLemore Warren County: Director - John Elfer I

EOC Mike Dolder Elizabeth Adkins J.T. Ackermann Operational Coordination Operational Communications I L. Lewis Receptic;mCenter /

Congregate Care (OOS)

M. Dolder M. Bradley Mass Care Services I E. Adkins G. McLemore I

J.T. Ackermann MSD (OOS) M. Bradley Public Health, Healthcare & Emergency Medical Services E. Adkins I

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tJnclassified Radi9logical Emergency Preparedhess, Program

-1 After Action.ReporL;;,/~? ;, ':

• 2017 Grand GtllfNuclear Plant I *-

• '*>* >:;_'.!_;,;.-. :App*endix C:_ Exercise Extent of*PlayAgreement* f

. ' !:;. '. \ ' '

I 2017 GRAND GULF' NUCLEAR STATION . ... ; :.

. . - GRADED EVALUATION EXERCISE I . - -

(Full Scale Plume Phase Exercise)

RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE I All activities will be demonstrated fully in a~cordance with respective plan~ and procedu~es as

they would be in an actual event. This extent of play agreement is written by. exceptiqn: If it ~s, .

• I not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard or suggested

• operating guides (SOGs) arn;l/or-procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be redemonstrated if allowed by the RAC Chair or as listed herein. This I allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and mutually agreed to by the MEMA lead controller and FEMA lead evaluator, as designated by the RAC Chair.

I Exercise Date: March 29, 2017 Exercise Start Time: 0800 I Exercise Objectives Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Direction and Control and make protective I action decisions through the State Emergency Operations Centers and County EOCs by exerci.se*

play and discussion of plans and procedures. * * **

Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies) - Response I Operational C~>0rdination; Operational I Communications -* * ** **

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and I County emergency workers, access/functional needs, schools and the public through exercise demonstration.

I - Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies) - Response/Environmental Response Health & Safety; On-Scene Security, Protection & Law Enforcement; Critical Transportation.

I Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to perform plume-phase field measurements and analysis utilizing simulated data'and discussion of plans and procedures with State field teams.

I Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies) - Response I Situational Assessment; Environmental Response Health & Safety I Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate Prompt Alert and Notification System (PNS) and Emergency Alert System (BAS) through exercise play.

Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies)-Response / Public Information & Warning I

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Unclassified After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I

Ohjectiv:e,5:* Demonstrate the effecfrveness of pJans,,policies and procedures in.the Joint . *

• Information System:(JIS) for public,andpriyate sector emergency 1informatioh,communications, ..

I Mission Area / Core Capability (ies) - Response /Public Information & Warning ; ; , '*

I Objective 6: -Demonstrate-the abilityto monitor, decontaminate and register evacuees:.*.,,

Mission Area/ Core Capability (ies ):- Response / -Mass, Care I

Exercise Evaluation *Criteria . ,

Core Capability: Operational Coordination: I Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that apptopriately:integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.,

I Jurisdictions: MEMAISEOC, Risk County (Claiborne), Host Counties (Adams, Copiah, Hinds and Warren)

I Performance Measure:

Demonstrate alert, notification, and mobilization of emergency personnel and facility activation; I

key personnel ability to execute direction and control of response effort; the ability to sufficiently support emergency operations; capability to implement emergency worker exposure control; KI decision for institutionalized individuals and the general public; implementation of protective I

actions forpersons with disabilities and access/functional needs; and establishment of traffic control and resolution of impediments to-evacuation. I Critical Task: - OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, A.I.a, e; A.3, 4; C.l, 1,.

4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion lal).

MEMA/SEOC, MSDH/DRH and County: Prepositioning is authorized and will consist of State personnel (MEMA/SEOC, JIC and DRH), County (Risk and Host) and EOF I

personnel. These positions will be prepositioned near or at designated exercise locations and will respond as plans and procedures dictate. Alert rosters will- be provided to FEMA evaluators for review.

I Critical Task: Key personnel with leadership roles fot the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-I REP-1, A.l.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion lcl).

• MEMA/SEOC and Risk County (Claiborne): Will demonstrate activation and setup of I

HSIN Portal as an additional means of communication for conducting face-to-face coordination and decision making between MEMA/SEOC; Risk :and* Host County Directors for one briefing.

I 11 66 I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness *program After Action*Report .*, :, *t; _, ' *, *

• 2017 Grand Gulf Naclear Plant I Critical Task.",Equipment;maps;displays; monitoring instruments, dosimetry;*potassiumiodide.

(KI), .and other supplies are- sufficient to support* emergency operationsi (NUREG-0654/FEMA-;

I REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7,'8,9; J:10.a, b; e; J.ll, 112;K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion lel).; :

MEMA,MSDH/DRH;Risk County (Claiborne) andHost Counties (Adams; Copiah,-=

I Hinds and Warren): Site Assistance Visits (SAV) will consist of verification of

• calibration dates on survey/monitoring equipment and dosimeters; inspection of ORO REP training records; and inspection and verification of onsite,K.1'stoc:k.: SAV'_s will* ;,.

I occur separately from scheduled OOS activities; dates for SAV's and OOS activities are as follows:  ; . --, <,

I MEMA:.:

Cogiah County:

SAV RCCC Mar 08th Mar 08th 9:00 AM-' 11:00:AM

• 6:00 PM - 10:00 PM* '

I I

MSDH/DRH: SAV Mar f3th 9:00AM-11:00AM I Warren County:

Warren County:

RCCC.

MSD Mar 13th Mar 14th 6:00 PM*- 10:00 PM 8:00 AM - 1:00 PM '

Claiborne County: TCP's Mar 14th 2:00 PM - 3:00 PM I Claiborne County:

Adams County:

EWD RCCC*

Mar 15~h Marl5.th,

• 9:00 AM --12:00 PM 6:00 PM - 10:00 PM Hinds County: RCCC '.,, Mar 16th 6:00 PM - 10:00 PM I Critical Task: The OROs issue appropriate* dosimetry, XI *and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.

I Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each miss'ton read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers.* (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1; * ,

I J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4; Criterion 3al). * - ..

Risk County: There will be no MEMA RECO function demonstrated during the REP I exercise conducted on March 29, 2017; an OOS demonstration at the Risk County will serve in its place.

I Critical Task: Kl and*appropriate instructions,are available*should a decision to recommend use of KI for the general public and institutionalized individuals be made'.* Appropriate rncord I keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, J;lO.e,'f; Critetion3bl).

I Critical Task: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and * '* *:

access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, LlO.o, d, e,.g~ Criterion 3cl). *

• I Critical Task: Apptopr.iate traffic: and access control-is*established: Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, ~.3;-C:1, 4; I J.10.g,j; Criterion 3dl).

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Critical Task: Impediments to.evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3d2).

I Risk County (Claiborne): Procedures for identifying and resolving impediments to.

evacuation will be discussed.in relation to the .exercise scenario. The impediment will be IAW the 2016 REP Program Manual requirements. I Core Capability: Situational Assessment: - * ' * ;* :

• Definition: Provide all decision makers with-decision-relevant information regarding the nature I I and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Jurisdictions:- MEMAISEOC I I Performance Measure: -

Demonstrate protective action decision making by OROs concerning exposure control; I

protective action recommendations for current onsite/offsite conditions; protective action decision for the general public; and protective action decisions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.

I Critical _Task: OROs use a decision-making prncess, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in I

place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP:-1, C.6; J.10. e, f; K.3.a, 4; Criterion 2al). ,

I Critical.Task: Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs} are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data,. and licensee and ORO dose projections, .

I as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10 and Supplement 3; Criterion 2bl). I Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate* factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD)*forthe general public (including, the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). * (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-I 1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J;lO.f; m; Criterion 2b2).,

Critical Task: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with I

disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e; Criterion 2cl). II Core Capability: Operational Communications:

Definition: Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness,:and operations by any and all means available, among:and between affected I

communities in the impact area and all response forces.

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency, Preparedness, Program After Action Report,,, 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear'Plant I

Jurisdictions:, ,MEMAISEOC; Risk County (Claiborne), Host.Counties (Adams, Copiah; Hinds '

I and Warren) '

Performance. M~asure:

I Demonstrate'.alert, -notification;- and mobilization of emergency and management of communications capabilities. * *

• I personnel and facility activation; I Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and m9biljze:emerge11cy personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-:1, A.La, e; A.3,4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion lal).

I MEMA/SEOC, MSDH/DRH and County: Prepositioning is authorized and will consist ,

of State personnel (MEMA/SEOC, JIC and DRH), County (Risk and Host) and EOF I personnel. These positions will be prepositioned near or at designated exercise locations**

and will respond as plans and procedures dictate. ,Alert rosters will be provided to FEMA evaluators for review.

I Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least *one operates properly; and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

I Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.* {NUREG~

0654/FEMA-REP-1; F.l, 2; Criterion ldl) . .*

I Core Capability: Public Information and Warning:.

Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically I appropriate-methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

I Jurisdictions: MEMAISEOC, Joint Information Ceriter, Risk County (Claiborne).

Performance.Measure:

I Demonstrate alert, notification, and mobilizati'on of emergency personnel and facility activation;*

management of communications capabilities; the ability to sufficiently support emergency' *

• I operations; resolution of impediments to evacuation/ primary alerting and notification* of the public; backup alert and notification of the public for siren failure and/or waterway warning; and accurate emergency information and instruction to public and news tnedia.

I Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, A.La, e; A.3, 4; C.1, I 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4; Criterion lal).

MEMA/SEOC, MSDH/DRH and County: Prepositioning is authorized and will consist I of State personnel (MEMA/SEOC; JICand DRH), County (Risk and Host} and EOF

• I 69 I

Unclassified After Action Report .i Radiological Emergency Preparedness; Program 2017 Grand: Gulf Nuclear Plant I

pers0nneL These positions will be prepositioned near or at designated exercise locations I and will respond as plans. and procedures dictate. Alert rosters will be- provided- to FEMA evaluators for review.

. ' .. ; ,, I Critical Task: At least two communications systems are* available, *at Jeast' one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. * (NUREG- . I 0654/FEMA-REP-l,F.l, 2; Criterion ldl). * '

Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide I (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to sµpport emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9;-J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion lel).

I Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k; Criterion 3d2).

I MEMA/SEOC: Procedures for identifying and resolving impediments to evacuation will be discussed in relation to the exercise scenario. The impediment will be IAW the January 2016 REP Program Manual requirements.

I Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency I

officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include, as a minimum, the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6,.7; Criterion Sal).

I Risk County (Claiborne): Initial siren activation will be completed by a "growl" test of that system as exercise*play dictates; subsequent activations will be simulated. Initial I

activation of the EAS will be demonstrated up to the point of actual broadcast to the public in relation to the exercise scenario. No actual EAS broadcast will occur; I MEMA/SEOC: The Mississippi Emergency Management Agencf s Joiht Information Center is now collocated with the MEMAfacility at'#lMEMA Drive, Pearl, Mississippi 39208. Initial activation of the BAS will be demonstrated up to the point of actual.

I broadcast to the public in relation to the exercise scenario. *

• Critical Task: Backup alert and *notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time I

following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system:

(NUREG-0654/FEMA::REP-1, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c; Criterion Sa3). I

. MEMA/SEOC:* Waterway warning will be.discussed with.the appropriate agencies in relation to- the exercise scenario. I Risk County (Claiborne):* Backup route alerting will be demonstrated with a Claiborne I

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U11.classified 11 Radi9logical Emergency Preparedness Program After Ac,tion Report ,:.. 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant 11 *.. , County*Sberiffs Deputy only .if a siren failure is indicated; jf there is no siren failure,

• . : ,b_ackup route alerting procedures will be discussed .in :relation {o the exercise scenario.

I Risk County (Claiborne): Waterway warning will be discussed with the appropriate agen~ies ip. relation to the exercise, scenario'. .* ,;,; .

I Critical Task:, OROs provide accurate emergency information and.instruction to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, E.5, 7; G.3.a,-G.4.a, c; I , Criterion 5b 1).

Core Capability~ Environmental Response/Health and Safety: .

I Definition: Conduct appropriate measures to ensure. the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities.

I Jurisdictions: Dose Assessment (MEMAISEOC and EOF), Laboratory Operations, Field Teams/Management, Risk County (Claiborne)

I Performance Measure:

Demonstrate management of communications capabilities; the ability to sufficiently support I emergency operations; protective action d~cision making by OR Os concerning exposure control; protective action recommendations for current onsite/offsite conditions; protective action decision for the general public; capability to*implement emergency worker exposure control; I manage field teams in gathering radiation release data and.controlling exposure; field monitoring team operations within the plume exposure pathway EPZ performing detection capabilities; collect appropriate measurements and samples to support protective action I decision making; the laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions; and the facility/ORO has adequate procedures and.

resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency Workers and their I equipment and vehicles.

Critical Task:, At least two communications systems are ,available, at least one operates properly, I and communication links. are established and .maintained With appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are*managed-in',support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion ldl). :*

I Critical Task: .Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry; potassium iodide *

(KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency. opei"ations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA~ .

I REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b; e;J.11, 12; K.3.a; .K.5.b; Criterion:lel). , *,:

Critical-Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering-relevant factors' and:

I appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of Kl, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of I administrative Emits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l;' C.6; J .10. e, f; I 71 I

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• 2017 Grand 6ulfNuclear Plant K.3.a, 4; Criterion 2al). ** ,.,

• I Critical Task: Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARsD are based ori*available

• information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge.of0nsite and offsite environ.mental conditions. (NUREG-'065?1/FEMA- I REP-1, I.10 and Supplement 3; Criterion 2bl);

Critical Task:, A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and I

necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public *

(including the recommendation for .the use* of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; }.9;1.10.f, m; Criterion'2b2).

I Critical Task: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and fnanage radiological e:X:posure to. emergency workers in accordanee* with the plans and procedures.

I Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers.* (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I

J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4; Criterion 3al).

.. - . ~

MSDH/DRH: . FEMA Evaluators will observe demonstration of an EW deployment I

briefing, issue of dosimetry and KI.

Risk County and Host Counties: FEMA Evaluators will observe demonstration of an 11 EW deployment briefing, issue of dosimetry and KI as determined by plans and procedures. I Critical Task: Field teams (two or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize. the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.7,.8, 11; J.10.a; Criterion 4a2).

I Critical Task: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low I

background location to_determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or.

procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-

• 0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.l; H.12: I.8, 9; J.10.a; Criterion 4a3).

I Critical Task:, The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to*make appropriate

• measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and I

soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.l; I.8; Lll~ Criterion 4bl).' I Critical Task: The-laboratory.is capabl~ of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l,;C.l, 3; J.11-; Criterion 4cl): I Critical Task: The facility/ORO h~s adequate procedures and resources to accomplish I

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness *Program After Action-Rep6tb*<<; *.- 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant

-1 monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and*¥ehicles.,

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, KS.a, b; :Criterion,6bl). *: *

• I '. i * .'(" . : { ' ~' . *, . {* '\;*

.Risk County: Monitoring ofemergency workers does not have-to meet the 12.:.hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstra:ted for a

'I minimum of two (2) emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles (1) .

. Provisions.for separate showering and same-sex decontamination must be demonstrated

, or.explained. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minifnum,of one I vehicle . .The Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD) Station OOS activity will be conducted at the Pattison Fire Department on Mar 15, 2017 frcim 9AM to*12PM .. * '

I MSDH/DRH: Field Teams will participate as EW?s to be processed through the:

Emergency Worker Decontamination (EWD) Station during the OOS activity at Pattison Fire Department on MarJ5, 2017 from9AM to 12PM.. MSDH/DRH Field Teams will**

I be composed of two, (2) emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles (1) to achieve the FEMA requirement.

• I Core Capability: On Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement:

Definition: Ensure a safe and secure environmentthrough law enforcement and*related'security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for I all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations ..

!I Jurisdictions: MEMA/SEOC and Risk County (Claiborne) (TCP/Waterway Warning)

Performance Measure:*

I Demonstrate management Bf communications capabilities; the ability to sufficiently support emergency operations; capability to implement emergency worker exposure control; and establishment of traffic control and resolution of impediments to evacuation.

I Critical Task:* At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with .appropriate locations.

11 Communications .qpabilities a:re managed in support of *emergency operations. (NUREG.:.

0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2; Criterion,ldl).

• Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide I (KI), and. other supplies are, sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654iFEMA-.

REJJ-J, H.7, 10; 1.7, 8, .9; J.JO:a, b, e; J.11, 12_; K.3.a; K.5.b; .Crjterion lel) . .

I

. , ~ . . ,.

MEMA: A SAV will be conducted at MEMA on Mar 8; 2017 from 9 AM to 11 AM.**

The SAV includes assessment of monitoring instruments, ORO REP Training records, I ** dosimetry, and KI; .The SAV dates/results will be provided to. evaluators by the Site* . *, ,

Emergency Management Specialist. '

• I Critical Task: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and -procedures, and manage I 73 I

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Radiplogical Emergency *Preparedness Program 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I

radiological exposure ,to, emergency worker,s in accordance with the plans and procedures.; *

• I Emergency workers periodically and* at the end of each mission read their dosim~ters arid record the readings on the appropriate exposurn record or chart. OR Os maintain appropr-iate record' keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4; Criterion 3al). . , *;

• MEMA: There will be no MEMA RECO function demonstrated during the REP' * ** , :, I exercise conducted on March 29, 2017; an OOS. demonstration at the Risk County will serve in its place.

I Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is .established. Accurate;insfrrictions are provided.to traffic.and access controLpersonnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l; A.3; C.l, 4; J.10.g, j; Criterion 3dl).

I Risk County: An OOS County Traffic Control Point (TCP) demonstration will be conducted on Mar 14 2017 at 2 PM. TCP A4 (US 61 and South City Limits) and will be I

.the designated TCP* location for demonstration.,

Risk County: TCP coordination and deployment will be discussed in relation to the I

exercise scenario.

• \

MEMA/SEOC: The MEMA Radiation Exposure Control Officer (RECO) will I

demonstrate one EW deployment briefing, issue dosimetry and KI on-location at Traffic Control Point (TCP) A4 (US 61 and South City Limits) during OOS demonstrations on Mar 14, 2017 at 2 PM. There will be no MEMA RECO demonstration during the REP I

exercise conducted on March 29, 2017; this OOS demonstration will serve in its place.

Risk County (Claiborne) and Host Counties (Adams, Copiah, Hinds and Warren):

I Radiation Exposure.Control briefings will be conducted by exercise:participants and observed by FEMA Evaluators at the commencement of all OOS exercise activities for each jurisdiction.

I Critical Task: ,.Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. *(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, JJO.k); Criterion 3d2).

I

• • , Ris~ County: An OOS County Traffic'Control Point(TCP) .demonstration wiU be conducted on Mar 14 2017 at :2 PM. TCP A4 (US 61 and South City Limits) and will be I

the designated TCP location for demonstration.

I MEMA/SEOC: Procedures*for identifying and resolving impediments to,evacuation 1 . ..** Will be discussed in relation to the exercise scenario. The impediment will be IAW the

• 2016 REP.Program Manual requirements. I Core Capability: Critical Transportation:

I 74 II I

Unclassified

-1 Radiological Emergency Preparedness *Program After Action Report,. 2017 Grand Gulf Nuclear Plant I Definition: Provide transportation (including infrastructure access.and accessible;transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals; and * **

I the delivery of vital re.sponse personnel, equipment, and services into the.affected areas~

Jurisdictions: Risk County (Claiborne)

I Performance *lVIeasure:

Demonstrate .the implementation of schools, I Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3c2).

I Risk County: If this criterion is not triggered by exercise events, demonstrate the *ability to implement P ADs for schools through interview.

• I I Core Capability: Mass Care Services:*

Definition: Provide life-sustaining and human services to the affected population, to include I hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies: , , . . .

• I Jurisdictions: Host Counties (Adams, Copiah, Hinds and Warren)

Performance Measure:

I Demonstrate the ability to sufficiently support emergency operations; adequately trained personnel and equipment to support Reception Center operations; and the direction and control exhibited by Congregate Care Managers to provide reasonable accommodations-and I contamination free shelter to evacuees.

Critical Task: Equipment,,maps, displays; monitoring instruments, dosimetry,. potassium iodide I (KI), and other supplies .are sufficient to support emergency-operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, H.7, 10; 1.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion lel).-

I . Host Counties*:: Refer to the Core Capability: Operational Coordination section (page *

3) for specific dates and times of specific OOS events. SAV"s will be conducted in conjunction with the OOS events for each Host County. The SAV includes assessment I of monitoring instruments,* dosimetry, and,KI; The SAV dates/results will be provided to evaluators by the Site:Einergency Management Sp~cialist : *, ..

I Critical Task: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and manage radiological.exposure. to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and:procedures.

I Emergency workers periodically and at the .end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate re2ord keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4; Criterion 3al). ,. .

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~* .i i '. J :, ) ; ; * '. ' : *

• I Host Counties: FEMA Evaluators will observe the Radiation Exposure Cori.trol'briefing for each Host County at or before commencement* of exercise activities.: :. *. * * * :

I Critical Task: The reception center facility has appropriate space, ,adequate tesm.irces, and

• of trained personnel to' provide nionitoring; decontamination, and* registration evacuebs. ',,

I (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-'1; A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12; Criterion 6al).* . .

Host Counties: , Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of eva:cu~es m:ust demonstrate the capability to attain,and sustain, within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; a:monitoring I

productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20 percent EPZ population-planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure.

I For demonstration of .monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified-in the plans/procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated I

evacuees per monitoring teani will be timed by the evahiatbrs to determine whether the 12-hour requirement can be met. Refer to the Core Capability: Operational Coordination section (page 3) for specific events and times.

I

,SAV"s* will be conducted in conjunction with the OOS events for each Host County. The SAV includes assessment of monitoring instruments, dosimetry, and Kl. The SAV I

dates/results will be provided to evaluators by the Site Emergency Management Specialist. I Critical Task: Managers .of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines.* Managers*demonstrate the procedures to assure that evad.iees have been monitored I

for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12; Criterion 6cl). I Core Capability:. Public Health, Healthcare & Emergency Medical Services:*

Definition:. Provide Hfesa:ving. medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services* and related operations,and avbid additional disease and injury by providing target~d public health, medical, I

and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

Jurisdictions: Host County (Warren):

I Performance Measure: * ' *' . *. ' "* I Demonstrate the ability to sufficiently support emergency operations; capability to implement emergency worker exposure control; and adequately trained personnel and resources to support transport, medical and decontamination operations. I Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, I

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-1 and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Co.mmunication~ q:tpabilities* are Illanaged in support of emergency 'operations, .(NUREG-I 0654/FEMA-REP-1, .F. l; 2; Criterionldl). :

Critical Taslc_: E.qµipm~nt, maps, displays:, monitoring instruments,,dosimetry, potassium iodide*.

I (KI), and qther supplies are sufficient to ,support emergency. operations. (NUREG.:0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; 17, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion lel),

I Host County (Warren): .Refer to .the. Core Capability:. Operationa1-Coordination section (pq,ge 3). The SAV dates/results will be provided'to evaluators by the* Site Emergency M~nagement Specialist.

• I Critical Task: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in.accordance with the plans and*procedures.

I Emergency workers periodically and at the erid of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI to emergency*w.orkers. (NUREG.,0654/FEMA-REP-1, I J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4; Criterion 3al),,

• Host County (Warren): "OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency I workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate .direct-reading arid permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items." FEMA Evaluators will observe the Radiation Exposure Control briefing for each I Host County at or before commencement of exercise activities.

Critical Task: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained I personnel to provide trap.sport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to

• contaminated.injµred individ1,1als. (NUREG-0654/FEMA~REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4; Criterion 6dl).

I Host County (Warren): The Medical Service Drill will be conducted in accordance with Warren Qmpty ~mergency Medical ServicesNicksbtirg Fire Department Procedure for* ..

I . Responseto Radiological Emergencies*ancfTh~ Hospitai Emergency Department

. Management OfRadiation Accidents Plan for The River Region Medical Center,

• Vicksburg, MS.

I Host County (Warren): Medical Service Drill locations are Vicksburg Fire Station #5' and River Region Medical Center, Vicksburg MS. The Medical Service Drill will be I conducted on March 14, 2017 at 8 AM.

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