ML13191A823

Millstone, Units 1, 2, 3 and ISFSI 10 CFR 50.59 10 CFR 72.48 Change Report for 2012, and Commitment Change Report for 2012

ML13191A823
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	06/20/2013
From:	MacManus R K Dominion, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC/FSME
References
13-348
Download: ML13191A823 (7)

Text

) DominionDominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.PO. Box 128, Waterford, CT 06385dora.corn JUN 2 0 2013U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555Serial No.MPS Lic/GJCDocket Nos.13-348RO50-24550-33650-42372-47DPR-21DPR-65NPF-49License Nos.DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNITS 1. 2, 3. AND ISFSI10 CFR 50.59. 10 CFR 72.48 CHANGE REPORT FOR 2012,AND COMMITMENT CHANGE REPORT FOR 2012Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2),

the report for changes made to thefacility for Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) and Unit 3 (MPS3) are submitted viaAttachments 1 and 2 respectively for the year 2012. There were no changes made to thefacility for Millstone Power Station Unit 1 (MPS1) and the Independent Spent FuelStorage Installation (ISFSI).During 2012 there were no commitment changes for MPS1, MPS2, MPS3 or the ISFSI.This constitutes the annual Commitment Change Report consistent with the Millstone Power Station's Regulatory Commitment Management Program.If you have any questions or require additional information, please contactMr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.

Sincerely, R. K. MacManusDirector, Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing 47 Serial No. 13-34810 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Change Report for 2012Page 2 of 2Attachments:

2Commitments made in this letter: None.cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 S. J. GiebelNRC Project Manager Millstone Unit 1U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Two White Flint North, Mail Stop T-8 F511545 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852-2738 L. A. KauffmanHealth Physicist-DNMS U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I2100 Renaissance Blvd, Suite 100King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 N. S. MorganProject ManagerU. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Mail Stop 08-C2AOne White Flint North11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852-2738 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Power Station Serial No. 13-34810 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Change Report for 2012Attachment I10 CFR 50.59 REPORT FOR 2012Millstone Power Station Unit 2Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC)

Serial No. 13-34810 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Change Report for 2012Attachment 1/ Page 1 of 2Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2)S2-EV-1 1-0004 Revision 0MP2-10-01016 Revision 0MPS2 Main Turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) System Digital UpgradeThe existing General Electric Mark I Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system for turbinecontrol was replaced with a modern, distributed, General Electric Mark Vie DigitalElectro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system. The new EHC system is a Triple ModularRedundant (TMR), fault tolerant design (including input/output and networking) whichprovides high reliability and supports online maintenance and testing.

The existingTurbine Supervisory Instrumentation (TSI) system will also be replaced with a digitalmicroprocessor based Bently Nevada 3500 system that will interface with the EHCsystem. The Bently Nevada system will be used for indications and alarms and willhave no automatic turbine trip functions.

This evaluation addresses those portions of Design Change MPS2-10-01016 where the10 CFR 50.59 screening determined a design function was adversely affected becausethe change was judged to fundamentally alter the existing means of performing orcontrolling design functions:

The following changes were considered:

• Single train analog to TMR digital control, since the digital controls containdifferent failure modes than the previously installed analog system," Conversion from hard controls to soft controls because it involved more thanminimal differences in the Human Machine Interface (HMI),* Change from diverse mechanical and electrical turbine trip mechanisms toredundant electrical turbine trip mechanisms.

The upgraded EHC system is more reliable than the original system. The softwareprogram undergoes a detailed validation and verification

process, consistent withindustry standards, and includes factory acceptance

testing, on-site acceptance testing,and post modification testing to assure software integrity.

The graphics displays andcontrol features of the HMI workstations were developed in accordance with industrystandards and provide several advantages over the previously installed controls.

As aresult, the new EHC system does not result in a more than minimal increase in thefrequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the Updated Final SafetyAnalysis Report (UFSAR).

Changing from diverse mechanical and electrical turbine tripmechanisms to redundant electrical turbine trip mechanisms impacted the probability that a turbine missile event may occur following a turbine overspeed event caused bythe failure of the EHC system. The overspeed protection system reliability of theinstalled design has been evaluated by the manufacturer.

The evaluation concluded theprobability of an overspeed event is less for the new design than for the previously installed control system. As such, the change did not result in a more than minimalincrease in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system, structure, orcomponent (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR. Themodification does not increase the radiological dose consequences of any accident ormalfunction of SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the UFSAR, does notintroduce the possibility of an accident of a different type, does not result in a Serial No. 13-34810 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Change Report for 2012Attachment 1/ Page 2 of 2malfunction with a different result or an increased challenge to a fission product barrierthan already analyzed in the UFSAR. The change does not result in a departure from amethod of evaluation described in the UFSAR used in establishing the design bases orin the safety analyses.

Protective actions such as reactor scram required to respond to an EHC failure areprovided by other systems external to the EHC and EHC control interfaces.

Theprotective actions for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) inputs were not modified bythis activity.

The protection systems are fully redundant and separate from the EHCsystem.

Serial No. 13-34810 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Change Report for 2012Attachment 210 CFR 50.59 REPORTFOR 2012Millstone Power Station Unit 3Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC)

Serial No. 13-34810 CFR 50.59 and Commitment Change Report for 2012Attachment 2/ Page 1 of 1Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3)$3-EV-04-0001 Revision 1MP3-UCR-2012-002 Revision 0UFSAR Update Related to MPS3 Cycle 10 (Region 12) Fuel DesignThis Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) change was performed when areview of UFSAR Section 4.2 determined a previous change made by UFSAR ChangeRequest 04-MP3-008 was insufficiently detailed.

MP3-UCR-2012-002 updates the fuelproduct description in Section 4.2 to a level of detail consistent with other fuel productdescriptions in this section.

Evaluation

$3-EV-04-0001, originally written for FSARCR04-MP3-008 fully bounds the UFSAR changes made by MP3-UCR-2012-002.

The physical change made in the Cycle 10 fuel design included replacing 72 spent fuelassemblies with 72 feed assemblies labeled Region 12 (Batch M), 8 of which were LeadTest Assemblies (LTAs) of the Westinghouse Next Generation Fuel design. The balanceof the fresh Region 12 fuel was of the RFA-2 design.Section 4.2.2 of the UFSAR now includes text that more thoroughly describes thefeatures of the RFA-2 assembly.

This added text describes those features of the RFA-2assembly which differ from the RFA fuel assembly, previously used in Cycles 7 to 9.The level of detail of the added text is now consistent with that in other portions ofSection 4.2.2.Also in Section 4.2.2, the first sentence of the last paragraph, related to the LTAprogram initiated in Cycle 10, was made to provide clarity.The implementation of the MPS3 Cycle 10 reload core design did not affect any accidents or malfunctions evaluated in the UFSAR, nor did it create a new type of event notpreviously evaluated in the UFSAR. Implementation of the Cycle 10 reload core designdid not create a negative impact on any fission product barrier as described in theUFSAR. The reload core design criteria and licensing basis acceptance criteriaevaluations did not result in a departure from any evaluation methodology used inestablishing the MPS3 design basis or safety analysis.