ML17309A872

Provides Info from Util in NRC Ltr Dtd 961009 Re Adequacy & Availability of Design Basis Info

ML17309A872
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	02/12/1997
From:	PLUNKETT T F FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-97-28, NUDOCS 9702180197
Download: ML17309A872 (150)

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CATEGORYj.REGULATINFORMATION DISTRIBUTIONSTEM (RIDE)lACCESSION NBR'702180197 DOC.DATE:

97/02/12NOTARIZED:

YESDOCKET0*FACIL:50-335 St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPoweraLightCo.0500033550-,389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPowersLightCo.05000389.

AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION PLUNKETT,T.F.

FloridaPower6LightCo.RECIP.NAME, RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

.

ProvidesinfofromutilinNRCltrdtd961009readequacy6availability ofdesignbasisinfo.DISTRIBUTION CODE:A074DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR IENCLlSIZE:I0t'ITLE:Responses to50.54(f)Req.forDesignBasisInfoNOTES:RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-3INTERNALFILECENTERS,KEXTERNAL:

NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11113311RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME WIENS,L.NRR/DRPM/PGEB COPIESLTTRENCL1111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD-5(EXT.

415-2083)

TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR8ENCL' FloridaPoworBcLightCompany,P.O.Box14000,JunoBoach,FL33408-0420 L-97-2810CFR50.410CFR50.54(f)February12,1997U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C,20555RE't.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389RequestforInformation Pursuantto10CFR50.54(f)Regarding AdequacyandThepurposeofthisletteristoprovidetheinformation requested fromFloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)inNRCletter(J.M.TaylortoJ.L.Broadhead) datedOctober9,1996.Yourletterrequested information thatwouldprovidetheNRCwith"addedconfidence" andreasonable assurance thatourplantsarebeingoperatedandmaintained withintheirdesignbasesandthatanydeviations identified arereconciled inatimelymanner.FPL'sresponsewasrequested within120daysofreceiving yourletter(i.e.,byFebruary13,1997).Theengineering design,configuration control,andcorrective actionprocesses arediscussed intheenclosure.

Theseareactiveprocesses thatareundercontinuous changeandimprovement basedonoperating experience, thecorrective actionprogram,andchangingregulatory guidanceorinterpretations.

Theenclosedinformation formsthebasisforourconclusion thatplantdesignbasesrequirements havebeenandwillcontinuetobetranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures; thatsystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withtheplantdesignbases;andthatFPLhasanadequateprocessfortheidentification andcorrection ofidentified deviations.

Theoveralleffectiveness ofourcurrentprocesses andprogramsprovidesreasonable assurance thattheconfiguration ofSt.LuciePlantUnits1and2isconsistent withtheplantdesignbases.$8004h'rr702iSOi'rr7 970212PDRADOCK05000335PPDRanFPLGroupcompany

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Page2TheEnclosure containsnewregulatory commitments whicharelocatedintheresponsetoNRCrequest[fj.Insummary,FPLplanstocompletetheNEIInitiative (96-05)reportbyApril15,1997,resolvethe1996FSARconsistency reviewfindingswithinatwoyearperiod,andcompletetheplantannunciator summaryreviewinDecember1998.Additionally, therecentNRCA/EInspection findingswillbeaddressed following issuanceofthefinalinspection report,andthecorrective actionswillbeprovidedbyaseparateletterorinitiative asappropriate, Theenclosedinformation isprovidedpursuanttotherequirements ofSection182aoftheAtomicEnergyActof1954,asamended,and10CFR50.54(f).

Therequiredoathoraffirmation affidavit executedbymyEngineering VicePresident, isattached.

Pleasecontactusshouldyouhaveanyquestions ontheenclosedinformation.

Verytrulyours,T.F.PlunkettPresident NuclearDivisionTFP/GRMEnclosure cc:Director, OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation, USNRCRegionalAdministrator, RegionII,USNRCSeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Page3STATEOFFLORIDACOUNTYOFPALMBEACHR.S.Kundalkar beingfirstdulysworn,deposesandsays:ThatheisVicePresident, Engineering, NuclearDivision, ofFloridaPowerSLightCompany,theLicenseeherein;Thathehasexecutedthisdocument; thathehasreadthecontentsoftheattachedEnclosure, andinrelianceontheprocesses discussed intheEnclosure andindependent oversight ofitsaccuracy, herebyaffirmsthatthestatements madeinthisdocumentaretrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge, information andbelief;andthatheisauthorized toexecutethedocumentonbehalfofsaidLicensee.

R.S.Kundalkar STATEOFFLORIDACOUNTYOFSworntoandsubscribed beforemesidsj+dayofWr/',19~+byR.S.Kundalkar, whoispersonally knowntome.arneofNotaryublic-StateofFloriROBERTAS.ECONOMYes:.:sjMYQQQssfONgCC993929EXPtQESJune1,199TeoNDE0THRvTMYFhN$$unAHcf,luc, Print,typeorstampCommissioned NameofNotaryPublic

'fl4r4 St.LucioUnitsIand2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure PageIResponsetoNRC10CFR50.54(fjInformation RequestAdequacyandAvailability ofDesignBasesInformation

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page2TableofContents1.0troduction

....................

In~~~~~~~~~32.0ResponsePreparation

.............

~~~~33.0SummatyofConclusions

..........

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~44.0Historical

Background

.~~~~~~~~~~45.0LA1stofActloils~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~7NRCRequest[a]"Description ofengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.".........................

8NRCRequest[b]"Rationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures."

............

~~29NRCRequest[c]"Rationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases."..43NRCRequest[d]"Processes foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actiontopreventrecurrence andreporting toNRC.".....................

65NRCRequest[e]"Theoveralleffectiveness ofyourcurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thattheconfiguration ofyourplant(s)isconsistent withthed1ttesignbases.............................................

76NRCRequest[f]"Supplemental requestforinformation ondesignreview/basis programs."

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~85AppendixA;PartialListofAcronyms.......................................

88AppendixB~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~89TableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindings....,...............................

89TableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviews.........................

93 0

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page31.0Introduction ByletterdatedOctober9,1996,theNuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)requested information toprovideaddedconfidence andassurance thatFloridaPower&LightCompany's (FPL)nuclearunits,St.LucieUnits1and2andTurkeyPointUnits3and4,areoperatedandmaintained withintheirdesignbasesandthatanydeviations arereconciled inatimelymanner.Thepurposeofthisenclosure istoprovidethespecificinformation requested bytheNRCforSt.LucieUnits1and2.Althoughtheengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses aresimilarfortheSt.LucieandTurkeyPointunits,theirlicensing anddesignbasesaredifferent andcertainactivities associated withmaintaining thedesignbasesareplantspecific.

Therefore, therequested information fortheTurkeyPointunitsisprovidedinseparatecorrespondence.

2.0 ResponsePreparation

Theinformation providedinthefollowing enclosure isorganized consistent withthefive(5)Requests[a]through[e]oftheNRC'sOctober9thletter,withSt.LuciefutureactionsprovidedinRequest[f].Additionally, apartiallistofacronymsusedinthisenclosure alongwiththeirdefinitions isprovidedasAppendixAandthedetailsofselectedFPLQualityAssurance (QA)auditsasAppendixB.Wheretheinformation providedtotheRequests[a]throughfe]isthesame,theinformation providedintheinitiallocationislaterreferenced, incontext,fortheotherapplicable questions.

References madetoplantprograms, procedures orinspections, areeithercontained inFPLdocketedcorrespondence orretainedonsite.Thisenclosure wasdeveloped byamulti-disciplined teamrepresenting theSt.LucieEngineering, Licensing, QualityAssurance, Configuration Management,

Training, andCorrective ActionDepartments.

Aninterface betweenSt.LucieandTurkeyPointwasestablished toaidinpreparing theresponses forcommonareas.PlantandFPLstaffmanagement providedguidanceandsupported thedevelopment oftheresponsebyparticipating inteammeetingsandbyreviewing theresponseoutlineanddrafts.Themajorityoftasksinvolvedthereviewofhistorical documents thatdescribeprocesses andresultsofFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)reviewsandDesignBasisDocument(DBD)development.

QualityAssurance auditsoftheseactivities, aswellastheprocesses forcontrolling configuration anddesigncontrol,werealsoreviewed.

Theprocessusedinthedevelopment ofthisresponsewassimilartopreparing anengineering designproduct,inthat,therewereresponsepreparers, independent verifiers, andapprovals byknowledgeable plantandstaffpersonnel.

Thisprocesshelpedtoensurethatthenecessary information wasprovidedtotheRequests, andthattheinformation submitted iscomplete.

Duetotheevolutionary natureofeachoftheprocesses discussed inthisresponse, descriptions ofprocesses areasnapshotintime.Eachoftheprocesses issubjecttocontrolled changeconsistent withFPLprocedures.

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L97-28Enclosure Page43.0SummaryofConclusions FPLunderstands theimportance oftheplantdesignbasesandiscommitted tomaintaining theplantconsistent withthedesignbases.FPLhasconcluded withreasonable assurance thatitsprocesses ensurethattheas-builtplantisanaccuratereflection oftheplant'sdesignbasesandtherefore, thatplantchangesdonoterodeorcompromise thesafetymarginsassociated withrisk-significant systems.Whereperformed, in-depthverticalslicereviewsofdesignbasesdocumentation andtheiruseinplantmodifications, procedures, andoperations, supporttheoverallconclusion thatFPLprocesses areeffective inmaintaining theSt.Luciedesignbases.FPLhasreviewedtheresultsofSt.Lucieaudits,inspections, self-assessments andverticalslicereviews,currentengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, plantconfiguration andperformance documentation, andproblemidentification/corrective actionprograms.

Basedonthesereviews,FPLconcludes withreasonable assurance thattheSt.Lucieunitsareoperatedandmaintained withinthedesignbasesandthatanydeviations arereconciled inatimelymanner.Further,itisconcluded withreasonable assurance, thatthedesignbasesforSt.Lucieareaccurate, thatthedesignbasesandas-builtplantconfiguration andprocedures havebeenmaintained consistent withthelicensethroughreasonably effective processes, andthattheplantcorrective actionprogramsadequately identifyandcorrectdeficiencies inatimelymanner.FPLhasendeavored tokeeppacewiththelatestthinkingoftheindustryandtheNRCondesignbasesandconfiguration management programs.

Bydoingso,FPLhasbeenabletoenhanceitsprogramsandprocesses overtime,improving thedesignbasesinformation andfurtherensuringplantoperation andconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbases.Thenecessary confirmation ofthishasbeenprovidedbythemanyinternalandexternalassessments thatcontinually occuratSt.Lucie.Whiletheseassessments haveconfirmed anoveralldesignbasesprogramadequacy, theyhavealsogenerated corrective actionstoremoveidentified weaknesses.

Thesetypesofassessments provideforacontinual strengthening oftheoveralldesignbasesandplantoperation.

Onerecentexampleofsuchanassessment isthecomprehensive NRCArchitect/Engineer (A/E)Inspection.

Thisinspection concluded thattherewerenomajorweaknesses intheSt.Luciedesignbasesinformation fortwomajorplantsystems.Nevertheless, someimprovement actionshavebeenidentified fromtheinspection.

Similarly, theSt.Luciemanagement initiated self-assessment, conducted inthefirsthalfof1996,foundageneraladequacyinthedesignbasesarea,butidentified weaknesses whichmustbecorrected toenableSt.Lucietoregainitsformerexcellent performance.

4.0 Historical

Background

TheoriginalSt.LucieUnit1FSARwassubmitted totheNRConMarch5,1973.TheoriginalSt.LucieUnit2FSARwassubmitted totheNRConMarch24,1980.Revisions totheFSARsweresubmitted throughout thelicensing processuntiltheoriginalNRCSafetyEvaluation Reportswereissued.ThedesignofSt.LucieUnit2includedenhancements frompreviousindustryeventssuchastheaccidentatThreeMileIslandUnit2andthefireatBrownsFerry.These St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page5enhancements wereaddedtoSt.LucieUnit1asplantmodifications performed inaccordance with10CFR50.59,"Changes, TestsandExperiments,"

and10CFR50.90,"Application forAmendment ofLicenseorConstruction Permit."Similarly, FPLsubmitted theTopicalQualityAssurance Report(TQAR).PeriodicupdatestotheFSARsandtheTQARareperformed inaccordance withtheCodeofFederalRegulations.

Duringthedesignandconstruction phasesofSt.Lucie,FPLperformed projectmanagement functions.

TheA/E(EBASCO)andNSSSsupplier(Combustion Engineering) performed theengineering andmodification controlfunctions, including originaldesignandanysubsequent modifications inaccordance with10CFR50.59.Following theimplementation ofplantupgradesatTurkeyPointinresponsetoNUREG0737,areviewoftheengineering designandconfiguration management processes atTurkeyPointindicated thattheA/Eandplantinterface wasnotasrobustasduringtheconstruction phase.Inresponsetotheactivities atTurkeyPoint,St.Lucieimplemented theCommitment toExcellence Program(CEP).TheCEPdidnotincludeaformaldesignbasesreconstitution program,sincethevintageoftheSt.LuciePlantallowedthecaptureofmostofitsdesignbasesinformation withintheoriginalplantdocumentation.

However,theCEPdidleadtoimprovements totheoperation oftheSt.Lucieunits.Beginning in1989,FPLbegantoassumetheA/Edesignfunctions forbothSt.LucieandTurkeyPoint.St.Luciedesignengineers obtainedtrainingfromEBASCOandworkedhand-in-hand withtheA/Edesignengineers inthepreparation ofdesignchangedocuments.

Bylate1990,FPLEngineering wasperforming design,production engineering, anddesignmodification functions.

Theconfiguration anddesigncontrolmanagement processes wererevisedtoreflectthein-houseprocess.FPLhasconcluded thatthischangewasasignificant steptowardbetterunderstanding andcontrolling theplant'sdesignbases.In1991,aconfiguration management manualwasissuedwhichdelineated designandconfiguration controlresponsibilities aswellastheprocessrequirements forplantdesign,interfaces, reviewsandapprovals.

Engineering andAdministrative QualityInstructions weredeveloped toimplement designandconfiguration controlprocessrequirements.

Inthe1990timeframe,St.Lucieparticipated intheCombustion Engineering OwnersGroupprojectthatresultedinthedevelopment oftheSt.LucieDesignBasisReference System(DBRS).Duringthedevelopment oftheDBRS,itwasconcluded thataprogramwasneededtodevelopsummaryleveldocuments whichwouldconsolidate information contained inreference designbasessources(i.e.,calculations,

analyses, etc.),therebymakingitmoreaccessible torespondtoplantoperational needs.Inthe1991timeframe,inresponsetotheaboveneed,theSt.LucieDesignBasisProgramwasinitiated onanumberofsignificant plantsystemstodevelopthesummaryleveldocuments, referredtoasDesignBasisDocuments (DBD).TheSt.Luciedesignbasisprogramdidnotinvolvereconstituting thedesignbases,however,specificreconstitution effortshavebeenperformed suchastheLOCAcontainment re-analysis andelectrical distribution systembasescalculations.

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page6Inadditiontotheabovechronology ofefforts,St.Luciehasbeeninvolvedinvariousactivities whichhavehelpedtoimproveand/orvalidatetheplant'sdesignbasesanditsdesignandconfiguration controlprocesses.

Theseactivities include:InresponsetoNRCBulletin79-14,"SeismicAnalysisforAs-BuiltSafety-Related PipingSystems,"

FPLperfor'med walkdowns ofdesignated SeismicCategoryIsafety-related pipingsystemsandrevieweddocumentation oftheas-builtconfiguration.

In1981,St.LucieUnit1providedanalysestojustifyanincreased thermalpowerrating.InresponsetoNRCGenericLetter87-02,"Verification ofSeismicAdequacyofMechanical andElectrical Equipment inOperating Reactors,"

(USIA-46),FPLperformed anevaluation fortheseismicadequacyofselectedequipment usingFPLengineers andaSeismicReviewTeamconsisting ofengineering expertsintheareaofseismicadequacy.

In1988,theFPLQualityAssurance Department conducted averticalsliceauditontheSt.LucieUnit2IntakeCoolingWatersystemdesign.In1991,theFPLQualityAssurance Department conducted averticalsliceauditontheSt.LucieUnit1andUnit2feedwater andmainsteamsystems.InFebruaryandMarch1991,theNRCconducted anelectrical distribution systemfunctional inspection.

In1991,FPLperformed atechnical assessment ofthecontainment penetration boundaries forSt.LucieUnits1and2.InSeptember andOctober1991,theNRCconducted aservicewateroperational performance inspection.

InApril1993,FPLupdatedthecontainment LossofCoolantAccidentanalysis.

In1996,FPLperformed aFinalSafetyAnalysisReportreviewforprocedural consistency.

FromNovember1996throughJanuary1997,theNRCconducted anArchitect/Engineer inspection whichinvolvedtwomajorsystemsatSt.Lucie;Unit1auxiliary feedwater andUnit2component coolingwater.In1997,St.Luciewillbeperforming aUnit1steamgenerator replacement.

Inthecourseofpreparing forthisactivity, plantwalkdowns havebeenconducted andFSAR,designanalysis, andotherapplicable designbasesdocuments havebeenreviewed.

Theabovedescribed chronology andactivities, coupledwiththeimproveddesignandconfiguration controlprocesses, providereasonable assurance thattheSt.Luciedesignbasesare St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page7adequateandthattheplantisconfigured andoperatedinaccordance withitsdesign.Inaddition, actionsareinprogressorwillbeinitiated whichwillfurtherimprovethedesignbasesdocumentation andtheprocesses whichcontroldesignandconfiguration ofSt.Lucie.5.0ListofActionsSt.Luciehasseveralplannedandon-goingactionswhichwillprovideadditional assurance thattheunitsareoperatedandmaintained withinthedesignbases.Theseactionsarediscussed furtherinresponses toRequest[fJandarelistedbelow:5.1TheNEIInitiative (96-05)reportwillbeissuedtoNEIbyApril15,1997.5.2The1996FSARconsistency reviewfindingswillberesolvedwithinatwoyearperiod.5.3Theplantannunciator summaryreviewiscurrently scheduled forcompletion inDecember1998.5.4TherecentNRCA/EInspection findingswillbeaddressed following issuanceofthefinalinspection report,andthecorrective actionswillbeprovidedbyaseparateletterorinitiative asappropriate.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page8[a]"Description ofengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses, including thosethatimplement 10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50."Thefollowing outlineprovidestheorganization oftheresponsetorequest[a].1.0Configuration Management Overview2.0DetailedDescriptions ofEngineering DesignandConfiguration ControlProcesses 2.1Engineering DesignControlProcesses 2.2Configuration ControlProcesses

3.0 Implementation

of10CFR50.593.13.23.33.4Unreviewed SafetyQuestionDetermination Process10CFR50.59Screening andEvaluation Process10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluation Non-10CFR50.59Activities

4.0 Engineering

DesignandConfiguration ControlProcessTraining4.14,24.34.4Engineering SupportPersonnel (ESP)TrainingandQualification ShiftTechnical Advisor(STA)TrainingProgramNuclearPlantSupervisor (NPS)TrainingProgramFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)TrainingProgram5.010CFR50.71(e)Implementation Process5.1FSARUpdates5,2DesignBasisDocumentUpdates6.010CFR50,AppendixBImplementation ProcessSt.Lucierecognizes thatmaintaining currentandaccessible designdocumentation isimportant toensurethat,(1)theplantphysicalandfunctional characteristics aremaintained andareconsistent withthedesignbasesasrequiredbyNRCregulation, (2)systems,structures, andcomponents canperformtheirintendedfunctions, and(3)theplantisoperatedinamannerconsistent withthedesignbases.Thisisaccomplished throughtheSt.LucieConfiguration Management (CM)processes, whichencompass engineering designandconfiguration control.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-2SEnclosure Page91.0Configuration Management OverviewConfiguration Management (CM)iscomprised ofprocesses thatareusedtocontroltheplantdesignbasis,design,designchanges,physicalconfiguration, operations, maintenance, testing,procurement, installation, traininganddocumentation.

TheCMprogramgoalsaretoensurethat,throughout thelifeoftheplantthefollowing occur:1.Designbasesareidentified, documented andmaintained.

2,Approveddesigndocuments accurately reflectandimplement thedesignbases.3.Plantphysicalstructures, systems,components, (SSCs),andprocesscontrolcomputersoftwareconformtotheapproveddesignrequirements.

4.Plantphysicalandfunctional characteristics areaccurately reflected inplantdocuments.

5.Plantconditions conformtotherequirements includedinthedesignbases,procedures andotherapproveddocuments whichareusedtocontroltheoperation oftheplant.6.Changestothedesignorphysicalplantareoptimized throughanintegrated reviewprocesswithestablished approvalcriteriatomakenecessary changestothedesignorplant.7.Changestothedesignareapproved, planned,budgetedandscheduled forallphasesofthechangefromdesignthroughimplementation, requiredtestinganddocumentupdate.8.Consistency ismaintained betweendesignbases,designdocuments,

hardware, software, andplantprocedures.

Activities whichaffecttheCMgoalslistedabovearecontrolled byengineering designandplantconfiguration controlprocesses.

Theseprocesses ensurethattheplantdesign,as-builtcondition, andoperation remaininconformance withtheoriginalplantdesignbasesandsubsequent licensing commitments andrequirements.

2.0 DetailedDescriptions

ofEngineering DesignandConfiguration ControlProcesses 2.1Engineering DesignControlProcesses 2.1.1GeneralDescription Theprocesses wherebythedesignanddesignbasesaremaintained andcontrolled includesallplantdepartments.

Theengineering designcontrolprocesses arecontrolled underFPLEngineering QualityInstructions (ENGQl).ENGQIsaredesignedinahierarchical fashionwithreference tointerfacing instructions.

Theoverallgoverning ENGQIfortheengineering designcontrolprocesses isENGQI1.0,"DesignControl."

Thisinstruction leadstheengineer/designer/user toothergoverning instructions formaintaining andcontrolling theplantlicense,designbases,as-builtdesigndocumentation, andoperations, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page10Determination oftheappropriate processvehicletoinitiateadesignchangerequirestheunderstanding ofthescopeoftheproposedchange.ThedesignchangeprocessisdividedintoPlantChange/Modifications (PC/M)andNon-Plant Change/Modifications (Non-PC/M).

ThePC/Mprocessisfurthersubdivided intomajorandminorchanges.Majordesignchangestotheplantarecontrolled underENGQI1.1,"Engineering Packages,"

andareimplemented usingthecompletePC/MEngineering Package(EP)processtoperformmodifications whichconstitute achangetothefacility(physical and/ordocumentation),

requiring a10CFR50.59safetyevaluation.

EPsusuallycontaindetailedimplementation andtestinginformation forcomplexorinvolveddesignchanges.Minordesignchangestotheplantarecontrolled underENGQI1.2,"MinorEngineering Package",

andareimplemented usingtheprocesstoperformminormodifications whichconstitute achangetothefacility(physical and/ordocumentation) butwhichdonotrequirea10CFR50.59safetyevaluation.

MinorEngineering Packages(MEP)include10CFR50.59screening todocumentthata10CFR50.59safetyevaluation isnotrequired.

TheNon-PC/MprocessincludesDrawingChangeRequests(DCR),ItemEquivalency Evaluations (IEE),Condition Reportdispositions, andMaintenance Specifications.

ThisprocessalsoincludesTemporary SystemAlterations (TSA),designdocumentupdates,minorrepairs,andmaintenance activities.

2.1.2PlantChange/Modification (PC/M)ProcessForPC/Ms,theengineering designchangecontrolprocessincludes:

DesignChangeInitiation DesignChangePackagePreparation DesignImplementation Documentation Updates2.1.2.1DesignChangeInitiation Achangetotheplantdesignmaybecomenecessary foranumberofreasons,suchasneworchangingregulatory requirements, equipment reliability

problems, obsoleteequipment, oroperational improvements.

Aplantmodification isusuallyproposedbyusingtheRequestforEngineering Assistance (REA)process.TheREAprocess,AP0005745,"RequestforEngineering Assistance,"

canbeinitiated byanymemberoftheplantstaffrequiring assistance fromEngineering toresolveplantproblems, conductengineering studies,reconcile discrepancies, andupdatedesigndocumentation.

Thisprocessprovidesananticipated scope,purpose,budget,costandbenefit,design/safety significance, andrelativepriorityforthecandidate project.Italsoidentifies thesponsoring organization fortheproposedmodification.

REAsareprocessed usingoneoftwopaths:Real-yVI'yIII,,y St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L97-28Enclosure Page11TimeSupportTeam(RTST)reviewforeasilyimplemented

projects, andPlantReviewBoard(PRB)management reviewgroupforlargerorconstruction-intensive projects.

Following theissuanceofanREA,Engineering performsascope,scheduleandcostestimateforaproposedproject,including theevaluation ofdesignoptions.Ifvariousoptionsarepossible, plantinputissolicited sothatissuesofcost,simplicity, maintainability, usability, etc.,maybefactoredintotheevaluation forthepreferred option.Thisinitialinformation isusedbytheRTSTorPRBreviewgroupsbeforetheydecidetorecommend finalapprovalforEngineering toprepareadesignpackageandfortheimplementor tocompleteprocurement andimplementation activities.

Thereviewgroupsarecomposedofplantmanagement ortheirdesignees whoreviewandapproveprojects, authorizing theuseofEngineering resources bothforestimating anddesigning activities.

Thereviewincludesconsideration ofthenumberofdesignchangesplannedforoutageandnon-outageworkperiod,sothatworkscopecanbescheduled andmanagedproperly.

Ifapproved, theREAisforwarded toEngineering fordesignchangepackagepreparation.

2.1.2.2DesignChangePackagePreparation Thedesignengineers preparedesignchangesinaccordance withthelicense,designbasis,designstandards, andconfiguration management requirements governedbyENGQI1.0,"DesignControl,"

andENGQI1.1,"Engineering Packages,"

andENGQI1.2,'MnorEngineering Package."

Theseprocedures areapprovedundertheQA10CFR50AppendixBprogram.Personnel whopreparedesignchangesareappropriately trainedandexperienced.

Thebasicstepsinthedesignchangeprocessinclude:a.Thedesignengineer(s) conductsresearchandinterfaces withthedesignchangesponsor(s) toobtainafullunderstanding ofthedesignchangejustification, scope,licensing/design impact,interdiscipline designrequirements, affectedengineering/operations documentation, etc.Applicable Operating Experience Feedback(OEF)(lessonslearnedfromotherutilities) isfactoredintodesignsordesignmodifications.

Engineers staycurrentwithFPLandnuclearindustryoperating experience relatedtoengineering activities.

NRCBulletins, Information Notices,otherregulatory requirements, internalFPLcorrespondence relatedtonucleardesignexperience, experience reportsreceivedfrommanufacturers andotherindustrysourcesarecirculated appropriately.

Inthedevelopment ofadesigndocument, thefollowing computerized information retrieval servicesarecurrently available andmaybeusedtoobtaindatarelatedtodesignorsafetyanalysisinput:OEFprogram(FPL),NuclearPlantReliability DataSystem(INPO),Technical LibraryDatabase(INPO),NuclearNetwork(INPO),LERDatabase(INPO),andtheNRCIndex(INPO).b.Thedesignengineer(s) identifies andassembles thedesigninputthatmustbeconsidered inpreparing thedesignordesignchange.Designinputisdefinedasthesetofcriteria, parameters, basesorotherinformation uponwhichdetailedfinaldesignis

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page12based.Designchangesarebaseduponexistingdesignbasesdocumentation.

Designinputsareidentified fromthefollowing sources:~FSAR/I'echnical Specifications

~Regulatory Requirements

~Licensing Commitments

~BasesDocuments (calculations,

diagrams, drawings, designspecifications,

analyses, studies,vendordocuments, DBDs,etc.)Applicable CodesandStandards Requirements

~Equipment/Component Specifications

~Engineering Documents

~RequestsforEngineering Assistance ChangeRequestNotices~Condition ReportsThedesignorganization performsdesignintegration activities toensurethatallnewdesigns/design changesareconsistent withthebaseplantdesign,andthatconsideration isgiventorelateddesignanddesignchangesinprogress.

Thedesignintegration activities includeareviewofinformation sourcessuchasTSAlogs,andabandoned equipment logs.Toaidthedesignintegration, electronic information sourceswhicharepartofthePassPortdatabase(FPL'scomputerized management information system)arealsoavailable.

TheseincludethePC/MIndex,Calculation Index,Engineering Evaluation Index,andTotalEquipment DataBase.Thisreviewprovidesassurance thatnoothermodifications whichareinprogresscanaffectthemodification packagewhichisbeingprepared.

Alimitisimposedbymanagement onthenumberofmodifications thatareprocessed atthesametimeinordertominimizeintegration difficulties.

c.Thedesignengineer(s) performsthedetaileddesignchangeandprepares10CFR50.59screening and/orsafetyevaluations.

ThePC/Mdefinesthescopeofthemodification andactivities associated withthechange.Thesafetyevaluation orscreening isamajorpartofthePC/Mandisrequiredtodemonstrate thattheprovisions of10CFR50.59aremetwhenperforming adesignmodification.

Therequirements of10CFR50.59areasubsetoftheoverallsafetyevaluation objectives.

Thesafetyevaluation addresses theoverallsafetyaspectsofthemodification including description andpurposeofthechange,analysisofeffectsonsafety,failuremodesandeffectsanalysis, effectsonTechnical Specifications, Unreviewed SafetyQuestion(USQ)determination, andplantrestrictions.

Thedetaileddesigneffortincludeswalkdowns ofaffectedsystemsandcomponents toverifytheirfieldconfiguration andtheirconsistency withplantdesigndrawings.

Designchangepackagesundergointerdisciplinary reviews,i.e.,conceptual,

detailed, andfinal,involving Engineering andplantpersonnel.

Aconceptual reviewmeeting S

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page13maybeheldforlargermorecomplexdesignchangestosolicitsuggestions/input priortocommencement ofadetaileddesign.Whentheproposeddesignissubstantially

complete, adraftdesignchangepackageisissuedforImplementation Review(IR)sothatinputcanbesolicited fromtheappropriate departments orgroupssuchasOperations, Maintenance, SystemandComponent Engineers, HealthPhysics,Configuration Management, etc.Theearlyandfinalreviewprocesses ensurethatthedesignchangeisunderstood andmeetsthedesignbasis,designandoperations requirements.

Theyalsoensurethattheimpactofthedesignchangeisreflected intheappropriate plantdesigndocuments andprocedures, andthatthefinalproductwillbeacceptable uponturnovertotheplant.Afterincorporating interdepartmental

comments, thedesignchangepackageisfinalized byEngineering.

d.Thedesignengineer(s) andotheraffectedsiteorganizations identifyandassemblethedocumentation affectedbythedesignordesignchangeforinclusion inthePC/Mpackage.Documentation isupdatedandmaintained toreflectthe"as-built" statusoftheplant.Responsibility forupdatingeachtypeofdocumentation isassignedtotheappropriate department, functional group,ororganization.

ThePC/Maffecteddesigndocuments aretrackedtoaidindesignintegration.

Thetypesofdocuments thatmaybeaffectedinclude:~FSARLicensing Documents

~DesignBasesDocuments

~Engineering Drawings~DesignSpecifications

~Equipment Specifications

~SystemSpecifications

~Calculations

~Analyses~VendorDrawings~VendorInstruction Manuals~Databases

~IndicesThefinaldesignchangepackageisapprovedandissuedbyEngineering management andisprocessed bytheplantforimplementation anddocumentcontrol.2.1.2.3DesignImplementation Thedesignchangepackageisthensubmitted toConfiguration Management.

Theapproveddesignchangepackageisroutedtoaffectedplantdepartments forreviewandpreparation forimplementation.

Theappropriate department identifies trainingrequirements andanyadditional functional testsrequiredtobeperformed following themodification.

Theimplementing departments prepareworkdocuments, i.e.,PlantWorkOrders(PWO),whichprovideinstructions

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page14forimplementing thedesignchange.Eachaffecteddepartment identifies revisions toprograms, processes, anddocuments requiredasaresultofthedesignchange.Theserevisions aremadeinaccordance withplantprocedures ensuringthatplantSSCsareinstalled andoperatedinaccordance withestablished designrequirements andplantdocumentation.

CMsubmitsthePC/MpackagetotheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG),amulti-discipline group,forreviewandrecommendation tothePlantGeneralManager(PGM)forapproval.

UponapprovalbythePGM,thedesignchangemaybeimplemented.

TheCompanyNuclearReviewBoard(CNRB)alsoprovidesanindependent reviewofthedesignmodifications toverifythatthechangedidnotconstitute aUSQ.BoththeFRGandtheCNRBreviewsareTechnical Specification requirements forSt.Lucie.2.1.2.3.1 ChangestoPC/MAfteraPC/Mhasbeenissuedforimplementation andpriortofinalclosure,ifaminortechnical changeoradocumentation changetothePC/Misrequired, itisevaluated fordisposition viatheChangeRequestNotification (CRN)process.Theengineering designorganization reviewsandresolvesCRNs.SpecialgenericupdatestoP/CMsareissuedperiodically.

ThesePC/Msareusedtomakeequivalent replacements, changedrawings, orexecuteminorconfiguration changesboundedbythescopeoftheoriginalPC/M.Thesechangesareprocessed asCRNstothePC/M.IfthechangetothePC/Maffectsthesafetyevaluation, designcriteriaororiginalPC/Mintent,thenthePC/Misrevisedandtherevisions tothePC/MreceivethesamereviewastheoriginalPC/M.2.1.2.3.2 PC/MClosureTheConfiguration Management (CM)department istheplantorganization specifically taskedtosupervise processes affecting configuration management andtoensurethattheplantdesignandconfiguration aremaintained accurately.

Theimplementing department providestheimplementing documents toCMasaturnoverpackage.Formalverification ofcompletion byCMentailsverifying thecompleteness ofopenitemsfromtheimplementing department, satisfactory completion ofPC/Mrequirements including implementation instructions, testsandinspections, andcompliance togoverning procedures.

2.1.2.4Documentation UpdatesDrawingsrequiredbyOperations forthesafeoperation oftheplantaredefinedbySt.LucieandEngineering procedures asPlantOperational Drawings(POD).AspartofthePC/Mclosureprocess,thesedrawingsandappropriate plantoperating procedures areupdatedandplacedintheControlRoompriortotheOperations Department accepting themodification.

Theremaining documentation isupdatedinaccordance withapprovedprocedures,

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page152.1.3Non-PC/MProcessNon-PC/Mprocesses allowadministrative documentupdate,equivalent replacements, andminor,non-nuclear safety-related designchanges.Thenon-PC/Mprocesses, including documentupdatesandequivalent itemreplacements areintendedforchangesthatareoutsideofthescopeof10CFR50.59,butascreening isconducted asappropriate toensurethechangedoesnotrequirea10CFR50.59safetyevaluation orTechnical Specification change.Thenon-PC/Mprocesscontrolstemporary systemalterations, equivalent replacements, minorscopechanges,drawingchangerequests, anddesigndocumentupdates.Theseactivities arecontrolled underEngineering andPlantprocedures.

TheTemporary SystemAlterations (TSA)process,AP0010124,"ControlandUseofTemporary SystemAlterations,"

maintains plantanddesignconfiguration controlfornonpermanent changestoplantSSCs,whileensuringtheapplicable technical andadministrative reviewsandapprovals areobtained.

TheTSAprocessensuresthatpersonnel areawareoftemporary plantconfiguration andthatTSAsmadetoplantequipment donotunacceptably degradetheoriginaldesignintent.Tomaintainplantconfiguration control,theaffecteddrawingsarestampedintheworkcontrolcenterandcontrolroomandidentified asaffectedbyTSA.TheItemEquivalency Evaluation (IEE)processisusedtoperformequivalent itemreplacements requiring implementation thatarewithintheboundsofamaintenance activity.

AnIEEisrequiredifareplacement itemisnotalike-for-like (identical) replacement fortheoriginalitem.IEEsdetermine anddocumenttheacceptability ofnon-identical replacement itemsbyevaluating form,fitandfunction.

Implementation ofthereplacement itemmustfallintothemaintenance arena(nomodifications orconstruction).

Ifnot,theappropriate designchangevehicleisrequiredtoreplaceoraugmenttheIEEs.TheDrawingChangeRequest(DCR)processisusedtoperformadministrative changestodesigndocuments forwhichthereisanapprovedbasis(nophysicalchangeordesignchange).TypicalusesofDCRsareadministrative changestocontrolled documents, orchangesincontrolled documents substantiated byIEEs.TheNon-Nuclear Safety(NNS)modification processisusedtoperformminorNNSchangesinsupportofmaintenance activities whichhaveatechnical relationship orinterface withtheplant,anddonotaffectPODsorplantoperating procedures.

Facilities suchasthewatertreatment plantorcomponents suchasairconditioners fortheservicebuildingmaybemodifiedbythisprocess.Typically theCondition Reportprocessinitiates theseminormodifications.

Certainengineering specifications referredtoas"Re-use,"

providegenericguidance, instructions anddetailswhichcanbeusedforroutinerepetitive maintenance activities.

Theseengineering specifications aresupported by10CFR50.59safetyevaluations, ifrequired.

Eachspecification identifies thescopeofactivities itaddresses.

Theappropriate specifications canbeinvokedwithinplantdocuments e.g.,PWOs,forroutinemaintenance activities, IfplantMaintenance determines 1~

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page16duringtheimplementation ofaPWOthatthemaintenance activitymaynotbecoveredbytheengineering specification andachangeisrequired, anengineering reviewisprovided.

Engineering reviewsthemaintenance activityandeitherapprovesordisapproves thechangerequested.

Ifthedesignchangeprocessisentered,e.g.,anREAmaybeissued.2.1.4TypesofEvaluations Whendesignchangesaredesired/required thesafetyevaluation processisutilizedtodemonstrate thatsafetyismaintained inthemodification process.Therearedifferent typesofevaluations performed byEngineering andotherqualified personnel fordifferent aspectsofplantsupport.Theseincludegeneralevaluations (studies, feasibility assessments),

operability assessment, nonconformance assessment andresolution, condition assessment andresolution, proposedlicenseamendments (10CFR50.90),probabilistic safetyassessment, etc.2.1.4.1Stand-Alone SafetyEvaluations Stand-alone safetyevaluations (SASE)areusedformeeting10CFR50.59requirements inwhichnohardwarechangeisinvolved, thusanEPmaynotberequired.

TheSASEsincludeaconcisedescription oftheproposedchange,whythechangeisnecessary, theeffectonplantoperation andsafety,anychangesindesignoroperating practices orphilosophy, anyrestrictions onplantoperations, whetheraUSQexistsorTechnical Specification changeisinvolved.

Theevaluation alsodescribes thelicensing requirements including theinformation normallycontained inthedesignsectionofanEPandtheactionsrequiredincluding short-term andlong-term actionsbytheplantand/orengineering departments.

Theaffecteddocuments areidentified andtheappropriate changepackageisattachedtotheevaluation, including alistofapplicable documents usedinpreparation oftheevaluation.

Theseevaluations aresubmitted totheFRGforreviewandrecommendation forapprovalbythePGM.Anyactionitemslistedintheevaluation aretrackedusingthePlantManagement ActionItem(PMAI)process.2.22.2.1Configuration ControlProcesses GeneralDescription Theconfiguration controlprocesses integrate allplantactivities.

Theseprocesses accomplish theCMprocessobjectives described inSection1.0abovebydefininganddocumenting therequirements formaintaining theplant'sconfiguration (design,physicalplant,andprocedures) consistent withtheplantdesignbases.Thegoverning procedures fortheseprocesses areEngineering andPlantQIsandotherapplicable plantprocedures someofwhicharelistedbelow:ENGQI1.0DesignControlENGQI1.1Engineering Packages(EPs)ENGQI1.2MinorEngineering Package(MEP) l ENGQI1.3ENGQI1.4ENGQI2.0ENGQI2.1ENGQI2.4ENGQI2.5ENGQI3.0ENGQI3.1ENGQI3.2ENGQI3.3ENGQI3.4ENGQI3.5ENGQI3.6ENGQI4.2ENGQI6.7QI3-PR/PSL-1 QI6-PR/PSL-1 ADM-08.04 AP0006129QI-5-PSL-1AP0010148OP0010122ADM-17.10 ADM-17.03 AP0006130ADM-0010432 ADM-78.01 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page17DrawingChangeRequests(DCRs)ChangeRequestNotices(CRNs)Engineering Evaluations 10CFR50.59Screening/Evaluation NonConformance Reports(NCRs)Condition ReportsQualityAssurance RecordsControlled DocumentDistribution DrawingControlVendorTechnical ManualControlFSARUpdatingDesignBasisDocument(DBD)UpdatingTotalEquipment DataBase(TEDB)Procurement Engineering ControlFSARReviewsDesignControlDocumentControlRootCauseEvaluation PMAICorrective ActionTrackingSystemPreparation,

Revision, Review/Approval ofProcedures Temporary ChangestoProcedures InPlantEquipment Clearance OrdersProcessing SafetyEvaluations Operating Experience FeedbackCondition ReportsControlOfPlantWorkOrdersPostMaintenance Testing2.2.2Integration ofConfiguration ControlProcesses Configuration controlprocesses establish theauthorities andresponsibilities forintegrating plantactivities whichcouldaffecttheplantconfiguration.

Theyensurethattheintegrity ofthedesignbasesismaintained byrequiring changesthatmayimpactthedesignbasestobereviewedbytheproperorganization.

Thesechangesincludephysicalchangestotheplantthatmayoriginate throughthemodification process,ordailyoperational andmaintenance tasks,Thedesignbases,inturn,mustbeaccurately reflected intheengineering, licensing, operating, maintenance, testing,training, andqualityassurance documents fortheplantwithconsistency maintained amongthesedocuments.

Design,Physical, andOperational PlantConfiguration ChangeProcesses ThedesignchangePC/Mpackagepreparation activities areperformed byEngineering andmustaccountforaffecteddesignandadministrative documents.

Designintegration reviewsareperformed toensurethat"open"plantchangesinprogressdonotconflictorcompetewiththe

'Ikd.~

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page18newdesignchange.Relational databases totrackchangedocuments andotherdesignintegration toolsareavailable tofacilitate thisdesignintegration review.Walkdowns areperformed tovalidatethedesignchangepackagesagainstfieldconditions.

As-building ofaffecteddocuments isautomatically triggered bytherelational documentcontroldatabases uponcompletion ofadesignchangepackage.Partofthedesignchangeactivityistheprocurement controlprocessthatprovidesamechanism topurchaseinitialpartsandservicesforPC/Ms,andsubsequent stockreplacement parts.Plantworkiscontrolled anddocumented withthePlantWorkOrder(PWO)process.Thisprocessisamechanism toprovidetheadministrative requirements andworkcontrolsforplantworkactivities onSafety-Related (SR),Quality-Related (QR),andNNSSSCs.ThePWOistheprimaryimplementing documentforPC/Ms.PWOsbecometheplant'shistorical workrecords.Whenworkiscomplete, theinformation providedinthePWOsisenteredintoFPL'sPassPortdatabaseforeasyretrieval.

Changestotheplant'soperational configuration thatarenotcontrolled byprocedures, arecontroHed anddocumented withtheclearance process,OP-0010122, "In-Plant Equipment Clearance Orders."Thisprocesstrackstheremovalandrestoration ofequipment outofservice.Theclearance processprovidesadministrative controlsthatallowfortheisolation ofcomponents formaintenance activities, orforthesafetyofplantpersonnel andequipment.

Eachclearance ischeckedagainstTechnical Specification requirements, andrisksignificance isreviewedpriortotheissuanceoftheclearance.

Multiplereviewsandchecksareperformed toensurethatthecomponents areisolatedandrestoredcorrectly tooperable'status.

Designchangesarerequiredtobereviewedbyinterfacing organization personnel knowledgeable inplantprocesses andconfiguration, andbysystemengineers knowledgeable abouttheaffectedSSCs,Operations, maintenance andtestingpersonnel performinterface reviewsforFRG-affected procedures.

AfinalreviewbytheFRGisperformed forsafetyimpacts.Duringimplementation, anynecessary fieldchangesmustfirstbedocumented andapprovedbyEngineering, viatheCRNprocess,beforetheyareimplemented.

Post-modification testingrequirements arepartofthedesignchangepackageandtestresultsbecomepartofthedesignchangepermanent records.Implementation documents suchastemporary procedures, testresults,etc.,aresubmitted toCMforreviewasanimplementation turnoverpackage(ITOP).Thispackageisthenusedtoprepareasystemacceptance turnoversheet(SATS)todocumentturnoverofthemodifiedequipment/system toOperations.

Thissystemacceptance andturnoverprocesswhichisusedaspartofthefinaldesignchangeimplementation, requiresmandatory approvalfromallaffectedplantdepartments.

Highpriorityaffecteddocuments (operating procedures, plantoperating drawings(POD),etc.)receivefirstpriorityforupdateuponnotification ofdesignchangeimplementation completion.

Thesedocuments mustbeupdatedandavailable aspartofthefinalSATS.Trainingisconducted ondesignchangesandoperations procedures priortofinalsystemacceptance, asappropriate.

NV~LP QeSt.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page192.2.2.2Procedure ChangeProcessThisprocessprovidesamechanism tomakeprocedure changesinacontrolled manner.Procedure changesmaybeeitherpermanent ortemporary.

Newprocedures andchangestoexistingprocedures requireasaminimum,a10CFR50.59screening todetermine ifthenewprocedure orchangeisconsistent withtheFSAR,Technical Specifications orwhetheraUSQexists.Ifa10CFR50.59safetyevaluation ispreparedfornewprocedures orchangestoanexistingprocedure, thechangesarereviewedbytheFRG.Procedures requiredtobereviewedbyTechnical Specification arereviewedbytheFRG.Newprocedures arevalidated priortouseandrevisedprocedures maybevalidated ifthechangeisextensive innature.2.2.2.3DocumentControlProcesseThedocumentcontrolprocessgovernsthepreparation,

issuance, andrevisionofdocuments suchasinstructions, procedures, anddrawingswhichdescribeactivities affecting quality.Documentcontrolprocesses ensurethatdocuments including changes,arereviewed,'pproved forreleasebyauthorized personnel, anddistributed totheresponsible individuals/organizations forimplementation anduseasappropriate.

Databases orhardcopylogsthatidentifythemostrecentapprovedrevisionofdocuments aremaintained.

Controlsthatpreventtheinadvertent useofobsoleteorsuperseded documents areprovided.

Documentcontrolprocessresponsibilities includeidentifying, storing,updating, andretrieving appropriate documents throughout thelifeoftheplant.TheFSARandDBDupdatingprocesses aredescribed insection5.1and5.2,respectively whichaddresses theimplementation processfor10CFR50.71(e)requirements.

2.2.2.4QualityAssurance RecordsRecordsaremaintained toprovidedocumentary evidenceoftheperformance ofactivities affecting qualityincluding designactivities, 2.2.3Discrepancy Documentation andCommitment TrackingProcesses 2.2.3.1Condition Report(CR)ProcessTheCRprocessallowspersonnel todocument,

evaluate, analyzeandcorrectconditions ofconcern.CRsareinitiated fornonconformances andothereventsorconditions thatmayappeartobeadversetothesafeandorderlyconductofplantoperations.

TheCRprocessisnotintendedtoreplaceorduplicate thefunctions ofotherSt.Lucieprogramswhichprovideforidentification, disposition andtrendingofadverseconditions, e.g.,PWOs,REAs.TheCRoriginator deliverstheCRtotheNuclearPlantSupervisor (NPS).TheNPSreviewseachCRforoperability andreportability

concerns, logsitandforwardsittothePGM.ThePGMscreenseachCRandassignstheinvestigating groupresponsible fortheinvestigation, analysisanddetermination ofcorrective actionsifrequired.

TheCondition ReportOversight Group(CROG)reviewsdailytheCRsgenerated inordertoverifyreportability, outagesignificance, andclassification ofcondition.

~I.Il St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page20Thedispositioning Department Headdetermines iftherootcauseisadequately identified andifthecorrective actionsareadequatetopreventrecurrence.

ClosingaCRrequiresthatthePGMacceptssatisfactorily completed evaluations.

Ifthecorrective actionscannotcompleted withinthedesignated timeframe,theremaining openitemsaretransferred tothePlantManagement ActionItem(PMAI)orothertrackingsystem.2.2.3.2Nonconformance Report(NCR)ProcessTheNCRisconsidered asubsetoftheCRprocesswhichprovidesameansforcapturing potential orrealconcernswithrespecttotheplant,andallowsfortheircorrection usingotherexistingandintegralplantprocesses, e.g.,thePC/Mprocess,PWO.Nonconformances havehistorically beenaddressed usinganNCR.TheNCRprovidesamechanism fordocumenting theidentification ofanonconformance, gettingappropriate reviews,andresolving thenonconformance ortakingcorrective actions.Thisprocessisusedtocollectdataforfutureimprovements.

Engineering evaluates theNCRandprovidesanappropriate disposition (i.e.,corrective action,ifany)totheNCRforimplementation.

2.2.3.3PlantManagement ActionItem(PMAI)ProcessThePMAIprocessprovidesamethodforcontrolling andscheduling corrective actionstomeetinternalcommitments andensuresfollow-up andclosureoflong-term corrective actionsgenerated bytheCRprocess.ThePMAIisatrackingsystemwhichfollowsthecorrective actionstocompletion andgivestheitemsvisibility withintheplantorganization.

2.2.3.4Commitment TrackingProcessAcommitment trackingprocessisinplacetoprovideamethodofidentifying andtrackingcommitments.

Sourcesofcommitments includeLicenseeEventReports,NoticeofViolation responses, NRCrequirements, INPOorinternalauditfindings, andNRCsafetyevaluation reports.Themajorobjective oftheprocessistoassurecompletion ofthecommitments inatimelymanner.3.0Implementation of10CFR50.59The10CFR50.59safetyevaluation providesassurance thatthedocumented information usedbytheNRC,asabasisforlicensing thefacility, remainsvalidinlightoftheproposedchanges.FPLusesNSAC125asguidanceforsafetyevaluations and10CFR50.59screenings.

Whenproposeddesignchangesaredesiredorrequired, the10CFR50.59processdetermines ifthechangerequiresarevisiontoTechnical Specifications orifthechangeconstitutes aUSQ.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page213.1Unreviewed SafetyQuestionDetermination ProcessChangestothefacility, procedures described intheFSAR,oratestoranexperiment notdescribed intheFSARarescreenedfortheneedtodetermine ifaUSQexists.Thissectiondiscusses thedefinitions ofachange,the10CFR50.59screening process,andthepreparation ofaformalsafetyevaluation inaccordance with10CFR50.59.3.1.1ChangetotheFacilityChangestothefacilityincludeadditions ordeletions ofSSCsdescribed intheFSAR,modifications whichaffectdesignfunctionormethodofperforming afunctionofanSSC,andtemporary modifications.

3.1.2ChangetotheProcedures FPLrevisesprocedures asdescribed intheFSARwithoutpriorNRCapprovalprovidedthechangedoesnotinvolveaTechnical Specification changeoraUSQ.Procedures thatmayrequirea10CFR50.59safetyevaluation arethosethatareoutlined, summarized orcompletely described intheFSAR.3.1.3TestsandExperiments Testsandexperiments thatrequirea10CFR50.59safetyevaluation arethosethatarenotdiscussed intheFSAR,butarewithinthescopeoftheFSAR,i.e.,testsandexperiments whichcoulddegradethemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations, anticipated transients, orthatcoulddegradetheadequacyofSSCstopreventaccidents ormitigateaccidentconditions.

10CFR50.59safetyevaluations arealsorequiredforchangestotestsorexperiments thataredescribed intheFSAR.3.210CFR50.59Screening andEvaluation ProcessSt.Luciefacilitychangesareevaluated for10CFR50.59applicability.

Thisevaluation isreferredtoasa10CFR50.59screening.

Formalsafetyevaluations arepreparedforthosechangesthatfallwithinthescopeandintentofthe10CFR50.59rule.Theapplicable procedures tothedesignchangeprocesscontainguidanceonscreening criteria.

Thefollowing criteriaareusedinscreening activities for10CFR50.59applicability:

1.Doesthechangerepresent achangetothefacilityasdescribed intheFSAR?2.Doesthechangerepresent achangetoprocedures asdescribed intheFSAR?3.Isthechangeassociated withatestorexperiment notdescribed intheFSAR?

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page224.CouldthechangeaffectNuclearsafetyinawaynotpreviously evaluated intheFSAR?5.DoesthechangerequireachangetotheTechnical Specifications?

Apositiveresponsetoanyofquestions 1-4requiresaformal10CFR50.59safetyevaluation.

Apositiveresponsetoquestion5requiresalicenseamendment inaccordance with10CFR50.90priortochangeimplementation.

Furthermore, adesignchangewhichrequiresachangetotheTechnical Specifications requiresNRCreviewandapprovalofalicenseamendment priortoimplementing thechange.3.3The10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluation Forthepurposeofasafetyevaluation the10CFR50.59criteriahavebeenexpandedintosevenquestions forclarity:1.Doestheproposedactivityincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR?2.Doestheproposedactivityincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR?3.Doestheproposedactivityincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSAR?4.Doestheproposedactivityincreasetheconsequence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSAR?5.Doestheproposedactivitycreatethepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSAR?6.Doestheproposedactivitycreatethepossibility ofadifferent typeofmalfunction ofequipment important tosafetythanpreviously evaluated intheSAR?7.DoestheproposedactivityreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specifications?

Basedupontheanswerstothesequestions, adetermination ismadeifaUSQexistsoraTechnical Specification changeisrequired.

Ifeitherexists,NRCreviewandapprovalofalicenseamendment isobtainedpriortothechangebeingimplemented.

Theprimaryparticipants inthe10CFR50.59safetyevaluation preparation areasfollows;~~~~~~~~~a.Preparer:

Aproperlytrainedandqualified preparerwhoisfamiliarwiththe50.59processdevelopsanunderstanding ofthedesignbasisoftheplantandapplicable St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page23regulatory requirements.

Thedesignchangeunderconsideration typically fallswithinthepreparer's fieldofexpertise.

b.Emmy:Aproperlytrainedandqualified reviewerthathasnotbeenparticipating inthepreparation ofthe50.59evaluation verifiestheacceptability ofthesafetyevaluation.

c.ZRQ:TheFRGiscomposedofdesignees representing thefunctional areasoftheplantandprovidesamulti-discipline reviewofthesafetyevaluations inaccordance with10CFR50.59guidelines andconcurswiththedetermination thataUSQdoesnotexistandnoTechnical Specification changeisrequired.

Additionally, thefollowing after-the-fact reviewsareconducted:

d.Q5RB:Anoffsitesafetyreviewboard,theCNRB,composedofofficers,

managers, orspecialist indesign,operations, safetyanalysisorrelatedactivities, withextensive nuclearplantexpertise isresponsible forthereviewofevaluations preparedaccording to10CFR50.59guidelines.

Thepurposeofthereviewistoconfirmthechangedoesnotconstitute aUSQandnoTechnical Specification changeisrequired, e.~:QualityAssurance performsperiodicauditsoforganizations involvedinthe10CFR50.59evaluation process,Auditresultsaredocumented andreviewedbymanagement havingresponsibility inthespecificareasaudited.Corrective actionsaredocumented andfollow-up auditsareperformed, ifrequired.

The10CFR50.59safetyevaluation processisappliedtopotential design,physicalplantandprocedural changesthatmayimpacttheplantlicense,designbasesortheFSAR.However,therearechangestotheplantwhicharenotgovernedbythe10CFR50.59requirements andaremanagedunderSt.Lucieprocedures.

Thesearereferredtoasnon-10CFR50.59activities asdiscussed below.3.4Non-10CFR50.59Activities Plantactivities, controlled undervariousadministrative, engineering, operations andmaintenance procedures, whicharenotnormallyconsidered designactivities, butwhichcouldpossiblyaffectthedesignbasisarescreenedfor10CFR50.59applicability.

Eachprocedure controlling theseactivities containsarequirement toperforma10CFR50.59screening.

Thesescreenings areperformed byqualified personnel trainedonthe10CFR50.59requirements.

4.0 Engineering

DesignandConfiguration ControlProcessTrainingSt.Lucietrainingincludesindoctrination, technical andcontinuation trainingforengineering andsupporting interface department personnel.

Thistrainingprovidesinstruction andon-the-job trainingrequiredtoensurecompliance withSt.Lucieprocedures/policies regarding plant St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page24activities, including design.Formaltrainingactivities aregovernedbytwoQualityInstructions:

QI2-PR/PSL-2, "Indoctrination andTrainingofSt.LuciePersonnel,"

andQI1-PR/PSL-11, "SiteServicesOrganization."

Trainingmaterials aredeveloped fromandmaintained consistent withcurrently issuedFPLandSt.Lucieplantdesigndocumentation, procedures andpolicies.

TheSt.LucieTrainingDepartment isondistribution forupdatedplantdesignbasesdocuments, procedures andFPLpolicynotices.Inaddition, theSt.LucieTrainingDepartment isondistribution forrelevantNRCandindustrycorrespondence regarding powerplantrequirements andactivities.

Neworrevisedtrainingmaterials aredeveloped whicharecurrentwiththebestindustrypractices.

Trainingassociated withdesignandconfiguration controlprocesses thatimplement 10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),

andAppendixBto10CFRPart50arediscussed inthefollowing sections.

4.1Engineering SupportPersonnel (ESP)TrainingandQualification Initialindoctrination trainingforengineering supportpersonnel includesabasicreviewoftheplantQIsandprocedures associated withtheconfiguration controlprocess,theplantmodification process,theuseofa10CFR50.59safetyevaluation tomodifytheplantoridentifyanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Eachofthereviewsispartoftheinitialindoctrination trainingsectionoftheINPOaccredited ESPTrainingProgramforallnewengineering supportpersonnel.

TheESPQualification Guidesprovideindividual qualification requirements.

Thesequalification requirements arebasedonanevaluation oftheindividual's education, previousexperience andtechnical training.

Thetrainingrequiredforeachindividual isspecified bythedepartment supervisor.

4.2ShiftTechnical Advisor(STA)TrainingProgramTheSTAisresponsible forreviewing procedure changesforapplicability totherequirements of10CFR50.59.STAsaretrainedontherequirements of10CFR50.59andtherequirements oftheCRprocess.4.3NuclearPlantSupervisor (NPS)TrainingProgramTheNPSisresponsible forreviewing CRsforsafetyissuesandoperability concerns.

TheNPStrainingprogramcontainsspecificlessonsonplantchangesinaccordance with10CFR50.59andapplyingtheplant'sdesignbasistooperations.

4.4FacilityReviewGroup(FRG)TrainingProgramTrainingon10CFR50.59requirements ispresented aspartoftheFRGinitialandrequalification training.

Itisdesignedtointroduce FRGmembersandalternates totheirresponsibilities asrelatedtoFRGreviewofprocedure anddesignchanges.

Ngg~'+Ir St.LucicUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page255.010CFR50.71(e)Implementation ProcessTheengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses described intheresponsetothisrequest,detailtheactivities thatensuretheaccuracyofthechangeswhicharemadetotheFSAR.5.1FSARUpdatesTheSt.LucieUnit1andUnit2FSARswereoriginally submitted totheNuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC),aspartoftheoperating licenseapplication, andaremaintained andupdatedinaccordance withtherequirements of10CFR50.71(e)(3)(l).

Amendments reflectFSARchangesuptoamaximumof6monthspriortothedateoffiling.SpecialFSARamendments maybesubmitted totheNRCmorefrequently thantheminimumrequiredby10CFR50.71(e).

ENGQI3.4,"FSARUpdating,"

providestheinstructions forupdatingtheFSARinaccordance with10CFR50.71(e),

FSARamendments considerthefollowing categories ofitemsimplemented, revised,oridentified sincethelastamendment:

~Changesmadeinthefacility/procedures asdescribed intheFSAR~Safetyanalysesperformed insupportoflicenseamendments

~Safetyevaluations performed per10CFR50.59~Safetyevaluations performed attherequestoftheNRC~NewormodifiedNRCrequirements

~Changesmadetodrawingscontained intheFSAR~Commitments inFPL'orrespondence totheNRC~Corrections totheFSAR~Changestodesignbasesordesigncriteriaidentified intheFSAR~Changestoquality,procedural, test,inspection, orothercriteriacitedintheFSAR~Abandoned equipment notedintheFSAREngineering designchangesareprocedurally requiredtoaddresstheimpactontheFSARaspartoftheengineering designchangeprocess,andtoincludeproposedchangestotheFSARwiththeissuanceofeachdesignchangepackage,asapplicable.

Thisprocessprovidesacomprehensive mechanism forcapturing changestotheFSARandfortheirincorporation intothedesignbases.ChangestothefacilitymayaffecttheFSARdescriptions andassociated accidentanalyses.

Engineering designoutputs,e.g.,EPs,stand-alone SafetyEvaluations, whichimpacttheFSARincludeanFSARChangePackage(FCP)asanattachment tothedocument.

FCPsarereviewed, andifadequate, areincorporated intothenextamendment oftheFSARfollowing theimplementation ofthechange,Plantdesignchangesimplemented duringtheupdateperiodandall10CFR50.59safety~~~~~~~~~~evaluations arereviewedforimpactontheFSAR.Whenachangeisproposed, theorganization initiating thechangedetermines whetherthechangewillresultintherevisionofanydocuments.

gdlf'tI!P~'

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page26Changestolicensing documents canresultfromdesignchanges,as-foundconditions, evaluations, procedure revisions, andNRCrequirements.

FPLresponses toNRCInformation

requests, IEBulletins/Circulars/Information Notices,FPLcorrespondence toandfromtheNRC,etc.mayaffecttheFSAR.IncomingandoutgoingNRCcorrespondence isreviewedforimpactontheFSAR.Ifitisdetermined thatanFSARchangeisrequired, anFCPispreparedalongwithanynecessary supporting evaluations.

TheintentoftheNRCcorrespondence reviewistoidentifyanddocumentNRCrequirements thatimpactthedesign,operation, ormaintenance ofthefacility, regardless ofthelevelofdetailassociated withtherequirement.

Commitments inNRCcorrespondence toimplement physicalchangestothefacilityarenotincorporated intothenextFSARrevision.

Physicalchangesareonlyincorporated afterimplementation andturnoverforuse.Stand-alone safetyevaluations thatrequireFSARchangeshaveanFCPattached.

Engineering reviewsstand-alone safetyevaluations forwarded byotherdepartments and/orcontractors forpotential FSARimpact.FCPsaredeveloped asnecessary.

TheFSARusercommentform,whichisproceduralized, permitstheFSARusertoidentifyactualorperceived discrepancies inthecontentoraccuracyoftheFSAR.FSARusercommentsconcerning thecontentoftheFSARareforwarded toEngineering forreviewandincorporation intotheFSAR.TheFSARusercommentisreviewedtodetermine ifenoughinformation isprovided.

Inordertobeprocessed forinclusion inanFSARamendment, theusercommentmustmeetoneofthefollowing criteria:

I)Editorial, suchthatback-updocumentation isnotrequired.

2)Providing sufficient bases,e.g.,safetyevaluation, PC/Mreference, orequivalency justification toshowthatthedesiredchangehasbeenevaluated and/oranalyzed.

Ifthecriteriastatedaboveisnotmet,thedeficiencies aredocumented ontheusercommentformandreturnedtotheoriginator.

Iftheusercommentisadequate, itisforwarded tothecognizant discipline forreviewanddisposition.

(Notethatusercomm'ents aretypically forwarded toEngineering aspartofaCR.)Ifavaliderrororconcernisidentified, thecommentprocesswillinitiatethoseactivities requiredtocorrect/update theFSARpriortosubmittal totheNRC.Acompleted FSARamendment isreviewedforaccuracyandcompleteness bytheappropriate plantdepartments priortosubmittal totheNRC.5.2DesignBasisDocumentUpdatesTheDesignBasisDocuments (DBD)forSt.Luciehavebeenissued.Somechangepackagestothisdocumenthavebeengenerated buthavenotbeenincorporated intothedocument.

Periodicupdatesareplannedonascheduleconsistent withtheFSARandwillfollowtheprocessforupdatinginaccordance withENGQI3.5,"DesignBasisDocument(DBD)Updating."

I'V St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page27DBDupdatesconsiderthefollowing categories ofitemsimplemented, revised,oridentified sincethelastrevision;

~Changestodesignbasesordesigncriteriaidentified intheDBD~Changesmadeinthesystems/components described intheDBD~Safetyevaluations performed per10CFR50.59~Safetyevaluations performed insupportoflicenseamendments

~Safetyevaluations performed attherequestoftheNRC~NewormodifiedNRCrequirements

~Commitments inFPLcorrespondence totheNRC~Changesmadetofigurescontained intheDBD~Corrections totheDBDChangestothefacilitymayaffecttheDBDdescriptions.

ThesechangesmayresultfromdesignchangesissuedbyEngineering, Contractors, orotherSt.Luciedepartments.

Engineering designoutputs,e.g.,EPs,MEPs,DCRs,evaluations, whichimpacttheDBDincludeaDBDChangePackage(DCP)asanattachment tothedocument.

ThelevelofdetailandformatprovidedinDBDupdatesareconsistent withthelevelofdetailandformatcontained intheoriginalDBD.ThereviewofNRC/FPLcorrespondence andstand-alone safetyevaluations forimpactontheDBDisthesameasthemethodusedtoreviewtheFSARupdatesdiscussed inSection5.1.DBDusercommentformsareproceduralized andusedsimilartoFSARusercommentforms(seeSection5.1)toidentifyactualorperceived discrepancies incontentoraccuracyoftheDBD.PriortoissuingaDBDupdate,areviewoftherevisedDBDiscoordinated withapplicable departments andorganizations.

6.010CFR50,AppendixBImplementation ProcessTheFPLQualityAssurance (QA)Programisdescribed intheFPLTopicalQAReport(TQAR)andisstructured tobeincompliance withtherequirements ofAppendixBto10CFRPart50.TheTQARdelineates theQAProgramrequirements andsummarizes theFPLapproachtoactivities relatedtomaterials, parts,components, systemsandservicesincludedintheQAProgram.TheTQARstatesthataQAProgrambeestablished fordesign-related activities.

Morespecifically, theTQARprovidesthegeneralguidancethatthedesigncontrolprogrammustensurethatthedesignisdefined,controlled andverified, thatapplicable designinputsarespecified andcorrectly translated intodesignoutputdocuments; thatdesigninterfaces areidentified andcontrolled; thatdesignadequacyisverifiedbypersonsotherthanthosewhodesignedtheitem;andthatdesignchanges,including fieldchanges,aregovernedbycontrolmeasurescommensurate withthoseappliedtotheoriginaldesign.Thegeneraldesignrequirements described intheTQARareimplemented throughQIs.Foreachapplicable criterion in10CFR50,AppendixB,thereisacorresponding Engineering andPlantQIorseriesofQIsthatcomplywiththecriterion inAppendixB.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page28Thedesignrecordsaredeveloped toprovideevidencethatthedesignprocessanddesignverification wereperformed inaccordance withtherequirements ofSt.Lucie'sQAProgram.QIsaredeveloped asrequiredbyeachoftheimplementing departments thatdescribethemeasurestobeusedtoimplement thequalityassurance requirements.

QIsdescribeactionsandresponsibilities tobeperformed withinadepartment ororganization andaddresstherequirements oftheappropriate TQARrequirements.

QAperformsperiodicauditsoftheconfiguration controlprocesses.

TheFPLTQARrequiresthatauditsberegularly scheduled foron-goingactivities, andthescopeofthoseauditsincludethepreparation, review,approvalandcontroloftheFSAR,designs,specifications, procurement documents, instructions, procedures, anddrawings.

QIsrequireabiennialfunctional areaauditofdesignandconfiguration controltobeperformed bytheQAorganization.

Designcontrolisalsoauditedduringauditsofotherfunctional areassuchasfireprotection, fuels,refueling operations, environmental protection, andprotection andcontrol.Activityauditsofspecificdesignandconfiguration controlissuesmaybeperformed atanytime.Inaddition, reviewsofsafety-related andnonsafetyrelatedSSCshavebeenperformed aspartofauditsandtechnical reviews.Also,St.Lucieprocedures requirethatprocedures andinstructions (including thoserelatedtodesignandconfiguration control)bereviewedbyQAforcompliance withtheTQAR,andotherapplicable industrystandards andrequirements.

TQR18.0,"Audits,"

requiresthatQAAuditFindingsbeissuedtotheresponsible management oftheauditedorganization, whoarerequiredtocorrectthedeficiencies identified intheauditreportandtakeactionstopreventtheirrecurrence.

Thestatusofcorrective actionsaretrackedbyQAuntilthecorrective actionshavebeenaccomplished andverifiedbyQA.

St.LucicUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Pago29[b]"Rationale forconcluding thatdesignbasesrequirements aretranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures."

Thefollowing outlineprovidestheorganization oftheresponsetorequest[b]:1.0Introduction

2.0 ProgramsAffecting

DesignBasis2.1Commitment toExcellence Program2.1.1Operating Procedure UpgradeProject2.1.2Technical Specification Improvement Project2.2DesignBasisProgram2.2.1DesignBasisDocumentDevelopment 2.2.2DesignBasisDocumentUseandMaintenance 3,0RecentDesign-Related Projects3.1PlantProcedure Improvement Program3.2Containment Penetration Review3.3Instrument SetpointVerification

4.0 Functional

ReviewandVerification ofDesignBasisTranslation intoProcedures 4.14.24.34.44.54.64.7FSARProcedural Consistency ReviewAnnunciator SummaryReviewIndependent SafetyEngineering GroupInservice Inspection andTestingProgramsSurveillance TestingNRCInspections 4.6.1Emergency Operating Procedure TeamInspection 4.6.2Operational SafetyTeamInspection 4.6.3Maintenance TeamInspection 4.6.4Equipment Environmental Qualification Inspection 4.6,5Conclusion fromNRCInspection EffortsFPLAudits,Self-Assessments andFindings4.7.1AuditFindingsandStrengths 4.7.21996PlantSelf-Assessment 5.0Conclusion b'

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page301.0Introduction FPLhasreviewedtheprocesses usedtolicense,design,operateandtesttheSt.LuciePlants.Thisreviewhasindicated thattheprocesses willmaintainthedesignbasisandassurethatoperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures preservethedesignbasis.Thisincludestherecentlycompleted FSARProcedural Consistency Reviewandtheself-assessment performed inpreparation fortherecentNRCA/EInspection.

Therationale forconcluding thattheSt.Luciedesignbasisrequirements aretranslated intoplantprocedures isbaseduponthefollowing:

1.Thedesign,procedures andplantmodifications havebeenunderprocedural controlsinceinitialoperation toassurethatchangestotheprocedures, thedesignortotheFSARareconsistent.

TheSt.Lucieprogramsandinitiatives whichhaveaidedinassuringthisconsistency weretheCommitment toExcellence Program,plantprocedure improvement program,andthecontainment penetration review.2.Thestartuptestprocedures verifiedthattheplantoperatedasdesignedandmetthedesignbasesforplantoperation.

p>>3.TheDesignBasisProgramhelpedtoensurethatthedesignbaseswascorrectly incorporated intotheplant'soperating procedures.

4.Currentandpastplantprograms, suchastheplantprocedure improvement programandtheinstrument setpointverification, confirmtheacceptability ofplantprocedures.

5.Self-assessments, FPLaudits,andNRCinspections haveevaluated throughsamplingprogramsthattheprocesses formaintaining procedural consistency withthedesignbasesareacceptable andprovidereasonable assurance oftheireffectiveness.

Theoriginaldesignprocessproduceddesigndocuments suchascalculations,

drawings, specifications, evaluations, andanalysesnecessary tosupportinitialconstruction, testing,operation andlicensing oftheplant.Thedesigndocuments producedbythisprocesswereusedasthebasesforsystemstartupandacceptance testing.Thedesignandconstruction processincludedvariousqualityassurance audits,qualitycontrolinspections, anddocumentation requirements toassureconsistency betweenconstruction anddesign.TheFSARwascreatedduringtheplantdesignprocessandwassubmitted totheNRCforreviewandapproval.

TheFSARincludesdescriptions oftheplant'sdesignandoperating practices requiredtoshowcompliance withNRCregulations.

NRCreviewoftheoriginalFSARresultedinadditional amendments priortoplantoperation.

TheNRCSafetyEvaluation Reportdocuments thisreviewandtheNRCstaff'sfindingsthattheplantdesignandoperating practices wereacceptable, Technical Specifications weredeveloped (inconjunction withtheNRCreview)toidentifyfunctional requirements, controlling parameters, andsurveillance andtestingrequirements thataresignificant tothesafeoperation oftheplant.Themaintenance procedures

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Pago31weredeveloped fromthevendortechnical manuals,andA/EandNSSSsupplierdocuments whichcontained thedesignbasesrequirements forSSCs.Theselicensing anddesignreviewsconducted inconjunction withtheinitialstartuptestingoftheplant,confirmed thatthedesignbasesrequirements wereappropriately translated intoplantprocedures priortoinitialoperation.

Theinitialstartuptestprogramwasdeveloped basedondesignbasisrequirements identified bytheNSSSsupplierandtheA/E.Thecompletion ofthestartuptestingverifiedthattheplant'ssystemsoperatedasdesignedandthattheplantwasconfigured inaccordance withthedesignbasis.Thestartuptestreportwassubmitted totheNRCpriortocommercial operation.

Thesetestprocedures providedabasisfortheoperating andtestingprocedures.

TheCommitment toExcellence Program(CEP)includedprojectstoupgradeoperating procedures andtoestablish betterconsistency inplantoperations thro'ughtheuseofastandardformatforTechnical Specification.

TheDesignBasisDocumentdevelopment programconsolidated information contained inreference designbasessourcesandcomparedplantprocedures todesignbasisrequirements.

Theplantprocedure improvement program,containment penetration review,andinstrument setpointverification projectareexamplesofeffortsthathelptoconfirmthatcurrentplantprocedures correctly implement theplantdesignbases.Inaddition, thenumerousFPLplantreviews,self-assessments andaudits,andNRCinspections, haveallcontributed toensuringthattheplantdesignbases,arecorrectly reflected intheplant'sprocedures.

Theseprojects,

programs, initiatives andprocesses collectively supporttherationale forconcluding withreasonable assurance thattheoperations, maintenance andtestingprocedures atSt.Lucieareconsistent withtheplant'sdesign,andthatdiscrepancies betweendesigndocuments, theFSARandtheplantareidentified andresolved.

2.0 ProgramsAffecting

DesignBasisThefollowing projectssupporttherationale thattheprocedures reflectthedesignbasis.2.1Commitment toExcellence ProgramTheSt.Lucie"Commitment toExcellence Program"wasmodeledaftertheTurkeyPoint"Performance Enhancement Program(PEP)"andwasdeveloped tomeetfourspecificgoals:~Continued safeandreliableplantoperation.

~Improvedplantandsitematerialcondition.

~Increased emphasisonqualityperformance insystems,controls, andpersonnel.

~Continued responsiveness toregulatory requirements andcorporate goals.

I,1 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page32Variousimprovement elementswerebroughtunderonebroadprogramtoenhancecoordination efforts,betterutilizeresources, andprovidethepropercontroltoensureaccomplishment oftheprogramgoals.TheCEPprogramwasspecifictoSt.LuciePlantandincorporated, whereappropriate, theresultsandlessonslearnedfromthePEPimplemented atFPL'sTurkeyPointPlant.TwooftheCEPprojectsthatrelatetoprocedure improvements are:~CEPProject3-Operating Procedure UpgradeProject~CEPProject9-Technical Specification Improvement Project2.1.1Operating Procedure UpgradeProjectCEPProject3wastheSt.Lucieprojecttodevelopandimplement aprogramtoupgradeandmaintainplantoperating procedures.

Theprogramincludedtheestablishment ofoperating procedure upgraderesources, revisionofemergency operating procedures (EOP),establishment ofconsistent procedure formats,revisionandupgradeofplantoperating procedures, trainingofpersonnel onupgradedprocedures, andimplementation oftherevisedprocedures.

Theplantemergency operating procedures wererevisedinaccordance withCEN-152,thegenericEOPguidelines forCombustion Engineering plants,andNUREG0737commitments.

Thereviewandupgradeoftheplantoperating procedures addressed format,technical

accuracy, Technical Specifications, sourceandreference documents, acceptance

criteria, andapplicable humanfactorscriteria.

2.1.2Technical Specification Improvement ProjectCEPProject9wastheSt.Lucieprojecttodevelopandimplement aprogramfortrackingproposedTechnical Specification changesandtoprovideuniformity betweenUnit1andUnit2Technical Specifications.

Theprojectconsisted ofareviewandvalidation ofthedifferences betweentheUnit1andtheUnit2Technical Specifications andthesubmittal ofchangestotheNRC.2.22.2.1DesignBasisProgramDesignBasisDocumentDevelopment TheDesignBasisPrograminvolvedthedevelopment ofasetofunit-specific system-level documents, referredtoasdesignbasisdocuments (DBD),thatcontainaroadmaptothereference regulations, codes,standards, calculations,

analyses, specifications, etc.,thatformthebasisforsystemdesign,testingandoperation.

EachDBDwasreviewedagainstplantdrawingsinanefforttoensureconsistency withthedesignbasesandtheplantconfiguration andoperating procedures.

TheDBDsexplainsystemdesignandprovideadefinition ofthebasesforthedesign,component designconstraints, anddesignfeatures.

TheresultsoftheDesignBasisProgramsupporttheconclusion thattheoperating, testing,andmaintenance procedures areconsistent withtheplant'sdesignbasis.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page332.2.2DesignBasisDocumentVseandMaintenance TheDBDsprovideameansforfacilitating thesearchandretrieval ofdesignbasessourcedocuments, Inthisregard,theDBDsprovideareference forfutureprocedure revisions andtherefore willhelpmaintainconsistency betweenthedesignbasesandplantprocedures.

TheDBDsalsoprovideausefultoolfordesignengineering tosupportplantmodifications andoperability evaluations.

Maintenance oftheDBDsisimportant toensuringdesignandconfiguration controloftheplant.TheDBDswereintendedtobeupdatedatapproximately thesamefrequency astheFSAR.ACondition Report(CR)wasissuedin1996againsttheDBDprogramconcerning theuntimelyincorporation ofDBDupdates.Theproposedcorrective actionstothisCRincludeshavingtheDBDupdatesincorporated onascheduleconsistent withupdatingtheFSAR.3.03.1RecentDesign-Related ProjectsPlantProcedure Improvement ProgramTheSt.LuciePlantProcedure Improvement Programisfocusedonregulatory performance improvement.

Thescopeoftheprojectistoidentifyandimproveoperation andmaintenance activities byupgradedtaskinstructions.

Includedintheupgradeprocessisreviewofthedesignbasisdocuments toensureregulatory commitment compliance.

TheProcedure Improvement Programincludesoperations, maintenance, andadministrative procedures.

Theinitialstepincludedcentralizing procedure writersfromOperations, Electrical Maintenance, Instrument andControlMaintenance, Mechanical Maintenance, andAdministrative Departments underaprocedure development supervisor.

Thisnewgroupprovidesasinglepointofcontactforprocedural issues.Thegoalofthisnewgroupistotakethecurrentsetofplantprocedures andidentifytasksforwhichprocedures donotexist,andidentifyexistingprocedures thatneedtobeupgraded.

Theseprocedures willbeplacedintoastandardized formatanduseindustry-proven languagetechniques togivetheend-usertechnically correct,firsttimeimplementable procedures.

Theimprovedprocessincludesthefollowing fundamental attributes:

~Definethescopeofatechnical subcommittee

~Reviewprocedures forcriticalcharacteristics andattributes

~Includeindustrystandardmethodsforprocedure validation

~Validatebyend-usertoensuretheprocedure issoundandimplementable

~Establish asiteprocedure writer'sguidewhichincorporates INPOandindustryapprovedwritingstandards Anotherfundamental attribute oftheimprovedprocessistoreviewapplicable designbasesdocuments thatgoverntheactivities andcontrolthetasksdescribed ineachprocedure.

These St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page34basesdocuments include,butarenotlimitedto,St.LucieTechnical Specifications, FSAR,Off-siteDoseCalculation Manual,NRCcorrespondence, ABB-CEbulletins, calculations,

analyses, evaluations, specifications andplantdrawings.

3.2Containment Penetration ReviewIn1991,anevaluation, "Technical Assessment ofContainment Penetration Boundaries,"

wasissuedforeachunit,toaddressplanteventsrelatedtothecontrolofcontainment isolation boundaries.

Theobjectives oftheseevaluations wereto:1)performatechnical assessment ofeachmechanical containment penetration todetermine thosecomponents whoseintegrity oroperational positionwerevitaltocontainment integrity; and2)providesketchesidentifying containment boundarycomponents toassistplantpersonnel involvedinoperations andmaintenance activities.

Theevaluations establish, foreachindividual penetration, thecontainment penetration boundary~~including components thatarevitaltocontainment integrity.

Inpreparing theevaluations, eachpenetration configuration wasevaluated to:1)confirmthattheintentofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC),requiring adoublebarrierissatisfied foreachlinepenetrating thecontainment; and2)identifythosecomponents thatformthecontainment penetration

boundary, including thosecomponents thatcanbemanipulated (e.g.,valvesopened,capsremoved,orpipingblindflangesremoved)suchthatthedoublebarriercriterion couldbeviolated.

Ineachcase,appropriate designandconstruction documentation wasconsulted and,wherepossible, thesystemcomponents werewalked-down togenerateandconfirmthecontainment penetration sketches.

TheUnit1evaluation concluded thattheisolation systemmeetstheintentofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria, inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetrating thecontainment.

However,certaincontainment penetration valvingdidnotconformineverydetailtotherequirements ofGDC54throughGDC57,sincetheGDCwerepublished aftertheConstruction Permitwasissued,andhence,werenotavailable asaguide.TheUnit2evaluation concluded thattheisolation systemmeetstherequirements ofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(exceptions takentoGDCprovisions arediscussed inSection6.2.4.3oftheStLucieUnit2UFSAR)inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetrating thecontainment.

~IVP St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page353.3Instrument SetpointVerification Between1991and1993,FPLperformed aninstrument setpointreviewfortheSt.LuciePlanttoverifyanddocumentcurrentsetpoints.

Approximately 250safety-related andimportant-to-safety instrument loopswereevaluated withapproximately 150loopsrequiring documentation orrecalculations.

Plantoperating andmaintenance procedures werecomparedtothecurrentfieldconditions anddesigndocuments toverifyconsistency.

Therewerenodesignbasisinconsistences foundwhichwereofamagnitude whichrequiredNRCnotification.

Thisprogramprovidesabasistoconcludethatthecurrentplantsetpoints arecorrectly translated intoplantprocedures andthatthedesignbasisisavailable.

TheoriginalSt.Lucieinstrument setpoints werefurnished bytheA/E,theNSSSdesigner, orotherequipment vendors,andhavebeensupplemented throughtheyearsbyengineering

packages, whichweretypically producedbytheA/E.Priortotheinstrument setpointverification effort,controlofinstrument setpointchangewasgovernedbyaseparateprocessthatinvolvedplantandengineering procedures.

Inaddition, itwasanacceptedpracticeatthetimethatsomeofthesetpoints couldbechangedbytheplantbasedonA/Eorvendorinputwithlimiteddocumentation.

Historically, thesetpointbaseshavebeenmaintained invariousdocuments including

drawings, vendormanuals,andmaintenance procedures, andthecalibration/scaling values(typically calculated bymaintenance) weremaintained inthecalibration procedure.

Thesetpointverification effort(inadditiontodocumenting orrecalculating instrument setpoints) changedtheoldprocessbyincorporating instrument setpointchangesintotheconfiguration management process.Theprocesschangeconverted thesetpointlistintoanengineering drawingandplacedinstrument setpoints underengineering controlintheconfiguration management process.Plantprocedures wereupdatedasappropriate toreflecttheinstrument setpointbasesdescribed inthedesigndrawings.

4,0Functional ReviewandVerification ofDesignBasisTranslation intoProcedures Sinceinitialstartup,therehavebeennumerousQualityAssurance andEngineering audits,self-assessments, NRCinspections, andthirdpartyreviewswhichhaveverifiedconsistency betweentheplant,andtheoperations, maintenance, andtestingprocedures inuseatthetimeoftheinspection.

Theseauditsandinspections helpprovidereasonable assurance thatthedesignandconfiguration controlprocesshasincorporated designbasischangesresulting fromplantmodifications intoplantprocedures.

Theengineering designandconfiguration management processes providethenecessary controlstoensurethattheSt.LuciePlantdesignbasesrequirements areaccurately translated intoplantoperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures.

Forexample,therehavebeenseveralmajorself-assessment andimprovement projectsperformed byFPLwhichhaveservedtoimprovetheSt.Lucieconflguration controlprocesses.

Theeffectiveness oftheseinitiatives havebeenconfirmed throughformalNRCinspections andFPLauditsoftheengineering processes, designbasisandprocedures.

Someoftheseimprovement projectsandinspection resultsareprovidedinsupport tIt St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page36ofourrationale forconcluding thattheSt.LuciePlantdesignbasesrequirements areproperlytranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures:

FSARProcedural Consistency ReviewAnnunciator SummaryReviewIndependent SafetyEngineering GroupInservice Inspection TestingProgramSurveillance TestingNRCInspections QAAudits,Self-Assessments andFindings4.1FSARProcedural Consistency ReviewOiDuring1995and1996,NRCinspections foundthatplantoperators wereusingprocedures whichhadprocessstepsnotfoundintheFSARandthatthenormalprocessstepsfoundintheFSARwerenotbeingfollowed.

NRCInspection Report96-03documented thatlicensedoperators weredilutingthereactorcoolantsystembydirectlyinjecting waterintothechargingheaderwhiletheprocessstepsdescribed intheFSARweretoinjectthewaterintothevolumecontroltanktoallowmixing.Asaresultofthiseventandothersimilarinconsistencies, FPLinitiated acomprehensive FSARreviewtoimproveconsistency betweenoperating procedures andtheFSARs.Thiseffortwascompleted inDecember1996.ThereviewoftheSt.LucieUnit1FSARidentified 219plantprocedures ashavingsomeFSARtie.ThereviewoftheSt.LucieUnit2FSARidentified 236procedures ashavingsomeFSARtie.Therewerenoplantmodifications requiredasaresultofthesereviews.Thefinalconclusion oftheseFSARreviewsispendingthefinalresultsofsomeCRs,however,theseCRshavehadoperability reviewsandnoneareconsidered safetysignificant.

ThesmallnumberofFSARinconsistencies requiring aCRindicates thattheredoesnotappeartobelargedifference betweentheFSARsandtheplantoperating procedures, 4.2Annunciator SummaryReviewAplantannunciator summaryreviewiscurrently inprogress.

Asannunciators provideanearlyindication/announcement ofpossibledegrading plantconditions, theyareanimportant aidtooperators inidentifying appropriate procedural actionstotakeinresponsetothesechangingconditions.

Thisprogramwillreviewselectedannunciators forthecontrolrooms,wastemanagement panels,emergency dieselgenerators, steamgenerator blowdownbuilding, boricacidconcentrators, wasteconcentrators, watertreatment plant,oxygenanalyzer, andtheliquidwastepanels,asappropriate.

Thisprogramreviewsselectedlogicconfigurations, annunciator setpoints, procedural references, andcorresponding operatoractionsfoundintheannunciator summaryprocedure foreachunitagainstthedesigndocuments.

Thealarmsetpointisreviewedagainstthesetpointlistwhichisacontrolled engineering document.

Thisprojectisapproximately 10%completewithover200annunciator setpoints, configurations andprocedural responses reviewed t4 St.LucieUnitsland2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page37andhasnotidentified anyinconsistencies whichwouldbeconsidered safetysignificant.

Thisprogramcontinues tosupporttheconclusion thatthecurrentplantprocedures areconsistent withtheplant'sdesignbasis.4.3Independent SafetyEngineering GroupFrom1983to1994,theIndependent SafetyEngineering Group(ISEG)performed technical reviewsofplantsafetysystems.Concernswereforwarded tocognizant organizations alongwithrecommendations toimprovesafetyandperformance.

Systemwalkdowns withplantandmaintenance personnel wereusedtoidentifyinconsistencies betweentheoperating, testing,andmaintenance procedures andtheplant'sconfiguration.

Procedural adequacywasalsoverifiedaspartoftheeffortanddocumented inreports.Thisprogramalsosupportstherationale toconcludethattheoperating, maintenance, andtestprocedures areconsistent withtheplant'sdesignbasis.4,4Inservice Inspection andTestingProgramsInservice inspections andtestsareperformed inaccordance withISIandISTprocedures.

Thescheduleofinspections andtestsisincompliance withtherequirements oftheASMECode.Theprocedural stepstoperformasurveillance testincludestherequirements tohaveplantoperators inthecontrolroomreviewandapproveperformance ofthetest.Theplantisplacedinanacceptable configuration (consistent withthedesignbasis)forthetest,considering thecurrentplantoperating modeandTechnical Specification requirements.

Aftercompletion ofthetest,thetestresultsarereviewedwiththecontrolroomoperators toassurecomponents areoperablepriortotheirreturntoservice.CRsissuedforcomponents whichdonotmeetacceptance

criteria, ensurethatarootcauseofthefailureisdetermined andresolved.

TheISTprocedures ensurethatplantoperation remainswithinthedesignbasisconfiguration duringthetesting.4.5Surveillance TestingTechnical Specification surveillance testsandtheirschedules areperformed inaccordance withplantprocedures.

CRsissuedfortestswhichdonotmeetacceptance criteriaensuretherootcauseofafailureisdetermined andresolved, Surveillance testprocedures ensurethatplantoperation remainswithinthedesignbasisconfiguration duringthetesting.Inaccordance withtherecommendations ofGenericLetter96-01,eachreactorprotection andsafeguards surveillance testwillbereviewedagainstthedesignbasisforthesysteminvolvedtoassurethatdesignbasisrequirements havebeentestedandthatthesurveillance testcompletely teststheentireactuation circuitandlogicinvolved.

Theresultsofthisreviewwillbeincorporated intotheclosureofGenericLetter96-01,"TestingofSafety-Related LogicCircuits."

4 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page384.6NRCInspections SelectedNRCinspections andtheirresultsarediscussed inthefollowing sections.

Theresultsoftheseinspections wereusedtofurtherimprovethedesignandconfiguration controlprocesses andalsohelptoconfirmthattheSt.Luciedesignbasesrequirements havebeenmaintained andproperlytranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestprocedures.

Theseinspections alsoconfirmFPLfindingsthatdiscrepancies foundarenotsafetysignificant.

4.6.1Emergency Operating Procedure TeamInspection InApril1988,theNRCconducted anEmergency Operating Procedure (EOP)TeamInspection atSt.Lucie.Theresultsofthisinspection aredocumented inNRCInspection Report88-08datedAugust26,1988.Thisspecialannounced inspection wasconducted intheareaofEOPsandincludedtheimplementation ofvendorGenericTechnical Guidelines, validation andverification, andtrainingconducted ontheEOPs.Nounsafeoperational conditions wereidentified.

Onedeviation fromalicenseecommitment wasidentified inthereport.BasedontheNRCobservations oftheEOPsinuse,thestaffconcluded thattheEOPswereadequateforusebytrainedoperators.

Thestaffdidexpressconcernswithanumberofthefindingsmadeduringtheinspection whichrepresent impediments totheeffective implementation oftheEOPs.Specificareasofconcernidentified includedtechnical adequacyoftheprocedures (e,gvagueness, omissions, anddeviations fromsuggested procedural steps),humanfactors(e.g.,opticalresolution offigures,notenoughcopiesavailable tooperators, andplantlabelingdeficiencies),

andtrainingweaknesses (e.g.,technical basispresented inlessonplansoccasionally disagreed withtheEOPsandanoperatorwasobservedtofollowthegeneralguidanceratherthantheEOP).Furtherinspector follow-up wasperformed forthenoteddiscrepancies duringNRCInspection 90-32,whichdetermined thattheadequacyofcorrective actionswassufficient toclosethefindings.

4.6.2Operational SafetyTeamInspection InAprilandMay1990,theNRCconducted anOperational SafetyTeamInspection (OSTI)atSt.Lucie.Theresultsoftheinspection weredocumented inNRCInspection Report90-09.Thisspecialannounced inspection utilizedarisk-based inspection guideandevaluated StLuciescurrentlevelofperformance intheareaofplantoperations.

Theinspection includedanevaluation oftheeffectiveness ofvariousplantgroupsincluding Operations, Surveillance/Inservice Testing/Calibration, andAdministrative ControlsandEngineering support.Plantmanagement's awareness of,involvement in,andsupportofsafeplantoperations werealsoevaluated.

Emphasiswasplacedoninterviews ofpersonnel atalllevels,observations, andsystem Nll1 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page39walkdowns.

Theinspectors alsoreviewedplantdeviation reports,LicenseeEventReportsforthecurrentSALPperiod,andevaluated theeffectiveness oftheSt.Lucie'srootcauseidentification, short-term andprogrammatic corrective actions,andrepetitive failuretrendingandrelatedcorrective actions.Withintheareasinspected, severalstrengths werenoted,however,someweaknesses andenforcement itemswerealsoidentified.

Corrective actionstoaddressenforcement itemshavebeencompleted.

4.6.3Maintenance TeamInspection InOctoberandNovember1989,NRCconducted aMaintenance TeamInspection attheSt.LuciePlant.Theresultsoftheinspection aredocumented inNRCInspection Report89-24datedJanuary23,1990..This specialannounced teaminspection consisted ofanin-depthinspection ofthemaintenance programanditsimplementation.

Theoverallresultsdetermined themaintenance programtobegoodwithgoodimplementation.

Significant strengths wereidentified inthereport,TheNRCrecognized thatplantmanagement isinvolvedinthemaintenance programandappearedtobeaggressive inimproving theprogram.Commitment ofengineering foranewmaintenance

facility, theexistingtrainingfacility, otherplannedprogramimprovements, andreceptiveness toteamfindingsindicated apositiveattitudetowardprogramimprovements.

Generally, themaintenance staffandsupervision wereknowledgeable andqualified.

Workobservedwasaccomplished inanorganized professional mannerwithemphasisonfollowing procedures.

Inparticular, theI&CandElectrical groupswerefoundtobestrong.Twoviolations wereidentified regarding controlofclassIEpanelcomponents anddiscrepant maintenance records.Corrective actionstoaddressidentified enforcement itemshavebeencompleted.

4.6.4Equipment Environmental Qualification Inspection InFebruaryandMarch1989,theNRCconducted aninspection ofthe10CFR50.49requirements forenvironmental qualification (EQ)ofelectrical equipment atSt.LuciePlant,Theinspection includedareviewoftheFPLimplementation programtomeettherequirements of10CFR50.49,walkdowninspections ofEQequipment insidecontainment, reviewofEQmaintenance activities, reviewofEQdesignchangesandFPLactionsinresponsetoNRCinitiatives (NRCNotices86-71and88-89),andfollow-up onFPLactionsinresponsetolicenseconditions.

Theresultsoftheinspection weredocumented inNRCInspection Report89-07datedApril6,1989.Noviolations ordeviations wereidentified.

Theresultsofthisinspection supported theNRCspreviousassessment inMarch1986,thatFPLhadimplemented anadequateprogramandthattheprogramcontinues tobeadequate.

Thewalkdowns ofEQequipment resultedinnoopen

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page40orunresolved items.EQdocumentation fileswereconsidered wellorganized andcomplete, requiring minimaladditional information tosupporttheanalysisprovidedinthefile.EQmaintenance programprocedural compliance wasgood,andthespecialmaintenance requirements described intheEQdocumentpackageswereconfirmed tohavebeenincorporated intotheprocedures forthosesampleitemsreviewed.

Theinspection teamnotedthatthetrackingmechanism usedbytheplanttoensurescheduling andcompletion ofEQmaintenance tasksappearedtobefragmented withseparatelistsforcalibration, surveillance, preventive maintenance (PM),andreplacement.

Therewasnooverallprogramtoensurethatmaintenance activities werebeingaccomplished.

Thiswasconsidered aweaknessinFPL'sEQmaintenance program.FPLacknowledged theconcernandcommitted toimplement aformalized maintenance trackingsystemasoutlinedintheinspection reportdetails.Theinspection teamconsidered theseactionstobeadequatetoresolveconcerns.

Thisinspection supportsFPL'spositionthatSt.Lucieequipment undertheEQProgramwasperformance testedandmaintained inaccordance withtheplantdesignbases.4.6.5Conclusion fromNRCInspection EffortsTheseinspections evaluated theSt.Lucieprocesses foroperating andmaintaining theplantasdesigned.

Plantconfiguration, SSCmaintenance, component testingandplantoperation wereevaluated bytheseteamsandfoundtobeacceptable.

Deficiencies notedbytheinspectors wereenteredintothecorrective actionprogramforresolution asnecessary.

Follow-up inspections verifiedthecorrective actionprocess.Therefore, theseinspections supporttherationale thattheprocesses inplacewillassurethatdesignbasisinformation ismaintained inmaintenance, operating andtestingprocedures 4.7FPLAudits,Self-Assessments andFindingsTheeffectiveness ofSt.Lucieinitiatives,

projects, programs, andprocesses havebeenauditedbyFPLQA.ProvidedbelowandinAppendixB,TableB4.7.1aredetailsofselectedQAaudits.Theoverallreviewoftheseauditssupportstheconclusion, withreasonable assurance, thatSt.Luciedesignbasesrequirements havebeenmaintained andproperlytranslated intooperating, maintenance, andtestprocedures, andthatdiscrepancies foundarecorrected inatimelymanner.4.7.1AuditFindingsandStrengths Sincetheinitialstartupoftheunits,numerousformalauditshavebeenperformed bytheQualityAssurance organization inareasrelatedtothecontrolofdesignbases,design,configuration, testing,andplantprocedures atSt.Lucie.Designprogramauditstypically reviewedengineering processes, implementing procedures, andtheimplementation ofdesignchangesandassociated records(i.e.modification packages).

QAauditsconsistently foundthatQualityAssurance Programelements(including designrequirements) wereadequately addressed byprocedures, andthattheimplementation ofthoseprocedures waseffective, Theprogramsandprocedures for clhg' St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page41translating designrequirements intoprocedures andinstructions wereconsistently determined tobeadequate.

AuditFindingswereresolvedthroughthecorrective actionprocess,andresultedinimprovements ofEngineering, Operations andTestingprocesses andprocedures.

OnetrendnotedbyQAwasrepeatedinstances oflessthanadequatetranslation ofdesignbasesintoprocedures anddrawings, In1996,QAAuditQSL-PCM-96-11 identified thattherewereinsufficient procedure requirements toensurethatprocedures affectedbydesignchangesorsafetyevaluation requirements wereidentified andupdatedpriortoimplementation.

ThethreeFindingsissuedinAuditQSL-PCM-96-11 resultedinimprovements tothemodification packageimplementation processes toincludeaProcedures WritingGroupreviewofthePC/Mpriortoimplementation.

OtherrelevantexamplesofQAauditswhichpromptedplantandprocessimprovements arehighlighted inAppendixB,TableB4.7.1,"QAAuditFindings,"

andaresummarized below.~QAS-JPN-91-8, "JunoNuclearEngineering

-Production Engineering Group(PEG)forSt.Lucie."~QAS-JPN-92-3, "NuclearEngineering."

~QAS-JPN-93-3, "NuclearEngineering

-St.LucieDesignControl."

~QAS-JPN-95-1, "NuclearEngineering Audit."QSL-PM-96-18, "Performance Monitoring Audit."OtherQAauditsandself-assessments listedinAppendixB,TableB4.7.1resultedinfindingswhichdirectlyrelatedtothepropertranslation ofdesignbasesrequirements intooperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

Resolution offindingsfromthefollowing auditslistedinAppendixB,TableB4.7.1promotedsignificant improvement intheSt.Luciedesignbasismaintenance andprocedure consistency processes:

~QSL-PM-96-06, "Performance Monitoring Audit."Discrepancies betweentheFSARandSt.Lucieimplementing procedures wereidentified andprocedures didnotadequately addressdesignrequirements.

~QSL-PM-96-08, "Performance Monitoring Audit."Adiscrepancy betweentheFSARandSt.Lucieimplementing procedures wasidentified.

Corrective actionforthesefindingsalsocontributed totheprocesschangetoaddtheProcedures WritingGrouptothePC/Mprocessforreviewofaffectedprocedures beforethePC/Misapprovedforimplementation.

4.7.21996PlantSelf-Assessment InOctober1996,St.Luciecompleted afiveandonehalfmonthself-assessment ofsiteperformance duringthetwoyearperiodfromJanuary1994toMay1996.OnOctober18,1996,theSelf-Assessment Teampublished acomprehensive reportwhichdocumented theirevaluation oftheperformance ofoperations, engineering, maintenance, andplantsupportfunctional areas,aswellasmanagement policiesandthecorrective actionprogram.Theevaluation ofthe St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page42engineering functional areaincludedengineering designcontrolandconfiguration management.

Theteamconcluded thattheoverallqualityofengineering workwassuperior.

However,plantdrawings, procedures andlicensing documents werenotalwaysupdatedtoreflectchangestotheplant.Inaddition, guidanceforupdatingoperating procedures, as-builtdocuments, andtheFSAR,toreflectchangesduetoplantmodifications, wasunclear.Theissueswereaddressed inthesummerof1996withtheimplementation ofnewguidelines forimplementing plantmodifications.

ThecompletehistoryofQAauditsandself-assessments hasresultedincontinual processimprovements indesignandconfiguration control,andinplantprocedure development andcompliance withtheplantdesignbases.5.0Conclusion Thereisadequaterationale forconcluding withreasonable assurance thattheoperations, maintenance, andtestingprocedures atSt.Lucieareconsistent withthedesignandthatdiscrepancies betweendesigndocuments, theFSAR,procedures andtheplantarenotsignificant withrespecttosafetybaseduponthefactsthat:~Theverification atinitiallicensing oftheplant,FSARandthedesignareconsistent.

~Theprocesses inplaceassurethatconsistency ismaintained.

~Variousimprovement projectsandprogramsthroughout thehistoryoftheplantconfirmtheacceptability ofplantprocedures.

~Thevariousaudits,inspections, andself-assessments haveverifiedconsistency ofdesignwiththeplantanditstranslation intotheprocedures.

~Processes havebeenandareinplaceforidentification, evaluation andcorrection ofdiscrepancies betweenthedesignandtheplantprocedures.

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page43Ic]"Rationale forconcluding thatsystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases."Anoutlineoftheorganization oftheresponsetothisrequestfollows:1.0Introduction 2.0St.LucieProgramsandInitiatives 2.1DesignBasisProgram2.2Containment Penetration Review2.3LOCAContainment Re-analyses 2.4Instrument SetpointVerification 2.5Unit1SteamGenerator Replacement Project(SGRP)2.6Simulator Validation Project2.7Operating Experience Feedback(OEF)Program2.8Surveillance Testing2.9Maintenance RuleProgram2.10PlantProcedure Improvement Program2.11Annunciator SummaryReview3.0Walkdowns, Inspections, AuditsandReviews3.1FPLPlantWalkdowns 3.2FPLSeismicWalkdowns 3.3FPLUnit1SteamGenerator Replacement Walkdowns 3.4NRCElectrical Distribution Functional Inspection (EDSFI)3.5NRCServiceWaterSystemOperational Performance Inspection 3.6NRCInspection ofPlantChangesandModifications 3.7NRCIntegrated Inspections 3.8NRCEquipment Environmental Qualification ProgramInspection 3.9NRCInspection oftheMotorOperatedValveProgram3.10NRCCheckValveInspection 3.11NRCArchitect/Engineer TeamInspection 3.12FPLAuditsandReviews4.0Conclusion St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page441.0Introduction Therationale forconcluding withreasonable assurance thattheSt.LuciePlantsystem,structure, andcomponent (SSC)configuration isconsistent withthedesignbasesisbasedonthefollowing:

1.Theplantconfiguration wasverifiedtobeconsistent withdesigninformation andtheFSARpriortoinitialoperation.

2.Startuptestingverifiedplantperformance conformed withthedesignbasesforplantoperation.

3.Plantchangeshavebeenunderprocedural controltoassureconsistency withthedesignbasessinceinitialoperation.

4.Processimprovement initiatives haveresultedinimprovedeffectiveness oftheprocesses usedtomaintaintheplantconfiguration andperformance consistent withthedesignbases.5.Routineaudits,inspections andverticalslicereviewsconfirmthatplantperformance andconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbases.St.LucieUnits1and2werelicensedin1976and1983,respectively.

Theplantconfiguration wasverifiedtobeconsistent withdesigninformation andtheFSARpriortoinitialoperation.

Theoriginaldesignprocessproduceddesigndocuments suchascalculations,

drawings, specifications, evaluations, andanalysesnecessary tosupportinitialconstruction, testing,operation, andlicensing oftheplant.Thedesigndocuments producedbythisprocesswereusedasthebasesforsystemstartupandacceptance testing.Thedesignandconstruction processincludedvariousqualityassurance audits,qualitycontrolinspections, anddocumentation requirements toassureconsistency betweentheas-builtsystems,structures, andcomponents, andthedesign.TheFSARwasproducedaspartoftheplantdesignprocessandsubmitted totheNRCforreviewandapproval.

TheFSARincludessufficient descriptions oftheplant'sdesign,configuration andperformance requirements todocumentcompliance withNRCregulations.

NRCreviewoftheoriginalFSARresultedinamendments priortoplantoperation, TheNRCSafetyEvaluation Reportdocuments thisreviewandthestaff'sfindingsthattheplant'sdesign,configuration, andperformance parameters wereacceptable.

Technical Specifications weredeveloped (inconjunction withtheNRCreview)toidentifyconfiguration andfunctional requirements, controlling parameters, andsurveillance andtestingrequirements thataresignificant tothesafeoperation oftheplant.Theselicensing, design,andas-builtconfiguration reviews,conducted inconjunction withtheinitialstartuptestingoftheplant,confirmed thatthesystem,structure, andcomponent configuration andperformance wereconsistent withthedesignbasespriortoinitialoperation.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page45Startuptestingverifiedplantperformance conformed withthedesignbasesforplantoperation.

Theinitialstartuptestingprogramwasdeveloped basedondesignbasisrequirements identified bytheNSSSsupplierandtheA/E.Abstracts forthestartuptestprocedures wereprovidedtotheNRCforreviewandacceptance, Thesuccessful completion oftheinitialstartuptestprogramverifiedthattheplant'slicensedconfiguration andperformance wereincompliance withitsdesignbases.Astartuptestreportwassubmitted totheNRCpriortocommercial operation.

Thisreportformedthebasisforsubsequent plantoperation andinservice testing.Sincestartup,plantchangeshavebeenunderprocedural controltoassureconsistency withthedesignbases.Asdiscussed intheresponsetoRequest[a],theevolutionary andcurrentengineering designandconfiguration management processes haveprovidedthenecessary controlstoensurethattheSt.LucieSSCconfiguration andperformance havebeenandremainconsistent withthedesignbases.Inaddition, FPLhassufficient documentation (calculations and/orpre-operational, startup,andsurveillance testdata)toconcludethatthecurrentplantconfiguration isconsistent withitsdesignbases.TheFPLengineering designandconfiguration controlprocesses weredeveloped andmaintained toensurethattheplantdesign,as-builtcondition, andoperation remaininconformance withtheoriginalplantlicense,designbases,andsubsequent licensing commitments.

Theseprocesses areusedtocontroltheplantdesignbasis,design,designchanges,physicalconfiguration, andoperations, maintenance, testing,installation, procurement andtrainingrequirements anddocumentation.

2.0St.LucieProgramsandInitiatives StLucieprogramsandinitiatives supporttherationale thatSSCconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases.Togethertheyhavehelpedidentifyprocessimprovements, correctprocedural/plant configuration inconsistencies, improvecontentandaccessibility ofdesignbasesinformation, andimproveplantperformance.

Theseprogramsandinitiatives, whichsupporttherationale thatsystems,structures andcomponent configuration andperformance areconsistent withthedesignbases,arediscussed inthefollowing

sections, 2.1DesignBasisProgramTheDesignBasisPrograminvolvedthedevelopment ofasetofunit-specific system-level documents, referredtoasdesignbasisdocuments (DBD),thatcontainaroadmaptothereference regulations, codes,standards, calculations,

analyses, specifications, etc.,thatformthebasisforsystemdesign,testingandoperation.

EachDBDwasreviewedagainstplantdrawingsinanefforttoensureconsistency withthedesignbases,andtheplantconfiguration andoperating procedures.

TheDBDsexplainsystemdesignandprovideadefinition ofbasesforthedesign,component designconstraints, anddesignfeatures.

TheresultsoftheDesignBasisProgramsupporttheconclusion thatSSCconfiguration andperformance areconsistent withtheplant'sdesignbasis.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page462.2Containment Penetration ReviewIn1991,anevaluation, "Technical Assessment ofContainment Penetration Boundaries,"

wasissuedforeachunittoaddressplanteventsrelatedtothecontrolofcontainment isolation boundaries.

Theobjectives oftheseevaluations wereto:1)performatechnical assessment ofeachmechanical containment penetration todetermine thosecomponents whoseintegrity oroperational positionwerevitaltocontainment integrity; and2)providesketchesidentifying containment boundarycomponents toassistplantpersonnel involvedinoperations andmaintenance activities.

Theevaluations documented thecontainment penetration

boundary, including components thatarevitaltocontainment integrity.

Inpreparing theevaluations, eachpenetration configuration wasevaluated to:1)confirmthattheintentofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)requiring adoublebarrierissatisfied foreachlinepenetrating thecontainment; and2)identifythosecomponents thatformthecontainment penetration

boundary, including thosecomponents thatcanbemanipulated (e.g.,valvesopened,capsremoved,orpipingblindflangesremoved)suchthatthedoublebarriercriterion couldbeviolated.

Appropriate designandconstruction documentation wasconsulted and,wherepossible, thesystemcomponents werewalked-down togenerateandconfirmthecontainment penetration sketches.

TheUnit1evaluation concluded thattheisolation systemmeetstheintentofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetrating thecontainment.

However,certaincontainment penetration valvingdidnotconformindetailtotherequirements ofGDC54throughGDC57,sincetheGeneralDesignCriteriawerepublished aftertheConstruction Permitwasissued,andhence,werenotavailable asaguide.TheUnit2evaluation concluded thattheisolation systemmeetstherequirements ofthe10CFR.50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(exceptions takentoGDCprovisions arediscussed inSection6.2.4.3oftheStLucieUnit2UFSAR)inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetrating thecontainment.

2.3LOCAContainment Re-analysis

~~~In1993,theLOCAcontainment analysesofrecordwereupdated.Priortotheupdate,thecontainment sectionoftheFSARsincludedmuchoftheoriginaldesignbasissensitivity studies.

VJ\

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page47Plantchanges,(e.g.,poweruprate),hadbeenaddressed, however,thisinformation wastypically updatedwiththemostlimitingcaseofrecord,andasaresult,portionsoftheFSARhadbecomeunclear.There-analyses andassociated FSARupdates,incorporated changesintooneevaluation foreachunit.Itutilizedoperating experience wherenecessary tosupportinputsincluding thefinalproductofpeakandtransient containment pressureandtemperature, andinputfortheDesignBasisProgram.Theresultsofthere-analyses showedcontainment pressuretobewithinboththepeakcontainment designpressureandtheTechnical Specification integrated leakratetestpressure.

Thepeakcontainment temperature wasalsowellwithinthepeakcontainment vesseltemperature limit.Thelongtermtemperature responsewasalsoshowntobewithintheexistingequipment environmental qualification (EQ)envelopeforUnit2.Althoughthelongtermtemperature responseforUnit1wasshowntoslightlyexceedtheexistingequipment EQenvelopeforalimitedtimeinterval, whentheequipment testcurveswerereviewed, theyboundedthenewanalyses, andtheEQcurvewasrevised.Additionally, there-analyses evaluated theCCWtemperature responseusingatimedependent containment heatload.TheCCWandICWloopswereconservatively modeledwithoutcreditforthetimelagsassociated withlooptransittimesandpipingvolumes.Inthismanner,arealistic approachtopeakCCWtemperature calculations wasconducted, therebyproviding anaccuratebaselineofpredicted CCWtemperature foranyfutureanalyses, andvaluableinputforplantoperation.

2.4Instrument SetpointVerification Between1991and1993,FPLperformed aninstrument setpointreviewfortheSt.LuciePlanttoverifyanddocumentcurrentsetpoints.

Approximately 250safety-related andimportant-to-safety instrument loopswereevaluated withapproximately 150loopsrequiring documentation orrecalculations.

Plantoperating andmaintenance procedures werecomparedtothecurrentfieldconditions anddesigndocuments toverifyconsistency.

Therewerenodesignbasisinconsistences foundwhichwereofamagnitude whichrequiredNRCnotification.

Thisprogramprovidesabasistoconcludethatthecurrentplantsetpoints arecorrectly translated intoplantprocedures andthatthedesignbasisisavailable.

TheoriginalSt.Lucieinstrument setpoints werefurnished bytheA/E,theNSSSdesigner, orotherequipment vendors,andhavebeensupplemented throughtheyearsbyengineering

packages, whichweretypically producedbytheA/E.Priortotheinstrument setpointverification effort,controlofinstrument setpointchangeswasgovernedbyaseparateprocessthatinvolvedplantandengineering procedures.

Inaddition, itwasanacceptedpracticeatthetimethatsomeofthesetpoints couldbechangedbytheplantbasedonA/Eorvendorinputwithlimiteddocumentation.

Historically, thesetpointbaseshavebeenmaintained invariousdocuments including

drawings, vendormanuals,andmaintenance procedures, andthecalibration/scaling values(typically calculated bymaintenance) weremaintained inthecalibration procedure.

,I St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page48Thesetpointverification effort(inadditiontodocumenting orrecalculating instrument setpoints) changedtheoldprocessbyincorporating instrument setpointchangesintotheconfiguration management process.Theprocesschangeconverted thesetpointlistintoanengineering drawingandplacedinstrument setpoints underengineering controlintheconfiguration management process.Basesdocuments suchascalculations wereupdatedasappropriate toreflecttheinstrument setpoints described inthedesigndrawings.

2.52.5.1Unit1SteamGenerator Replacement Project(SGRP)Evaluation ofAccidentAnalysisTheaccidentanalysespresented inChapter15oftheSt.Lucie1FSARwereevaluated todetermine theeffectsofuseofthereplacement steamgenerators (RSG).Theobjective ofeachevaluation wastodemonstrate thattheSt.Lucie1plantresponsewiththeRSGswouldmeetallNRCapprovedFSARacceptance criteria.

Thespecifictransients considered intheStand-Alone SafetyEvaluation (SASE)weregroupedaccording tothecategories described inNRCRegulatory Guide1.70,withacrossreference totheSt,Lucie1FSAR.Thecategories are:e1.Increases inheatremoval2.Decreases insecondary heatremoval3.Decreases inreactorcoolantsystemflow4.Reactivity andpowerdistribution anomalies.

5.Increases inreactorcoolantinventory 6.Decreases inreactorcoolantinventory 7.Radioactivity releasesfromsubsystems TheFSARwasreviewedtodetermine theeffectsofusingtheRSGs.Thesafetyevaluation oftheFSARChapter15accidentanalyses, themainsteamlinebreakandlossofcoolantaccidentanalysesforreactorbuildingpressureresponseinFSARChapter6,andtheoverpressure protection andnaturalcirculation analysesinFSARChapter5arealsodiscussed inSASE.2.5.2Evaluation ofReactorBuildingResponseTheRSGscanaffectthemassandenergyreleasesforprimaryandsecondary systemruptures.

Consequently, theeffectsofuseoftheRSGsontheSt.Lucie1reactorbuildingpressurecalculations inChapter6oftheFSARwereassessed.

2.5.3Evaluation ofStructural Response~~~Theloadingsresulting fromaLOCA,MainSteamLineBreakandseismiceventswereevaluated fortheRSGsandreactorcoolantsystem.Theobjective oftheseevaluations wastoverifythat r04I~A St.LucicUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page49theexistingcomponents,

supports, andrestraints wereadequatetoaccommodate theRSGsundernormalandaccidentloadingconditions.

Theevaluations addressed allprimarycomponents.

2.5.4Evaluation ofOtherRCSInterfaces Generally, theuseoftheRSGsdoesnotaffectthebalanceofthereactorcoolantsystemoritssupporting analyses.

However,certaininterfaces withotherplantfeatureswereevaluated withrespecttouseoftheRSGs.Itemsconsidered include:1.EffectsofRSGhydraulics oncorelift2.Nozzledams3.Overpressure protection analysesinAppendix5AoftheFSAR4.Lowtemperature overpressure protection (LTOP)analysesinAppendix5BoftheFSAR5.Naturalcirculation analysesinAppendix5CoftheFSAR6.Internalmissileevaluation inSection3.5oftheFSAR7.Looseparts8.Feedwater control2.5.5Evaluation ofPlantDocumentation

~~Comprehensive reviewsoftheSt.Lucie1Technical Specifications, FSAR,plantemergency andoff-normal operating procedures, andtheexistingstressanalysiswereperformed toidentifychangesthatmayberequiredduetouseoftheRSGs.Thetechnical specification reviewincludedlimitingconditions foroperation, surveillance requirements, andbases.TheFSARreviewincludedapage-by-page reviewoftheFSARtextandtables.2.5.6SGRPProjectSpecificDesignBasisDocuments TheSGRPdeveloped specificdesignbasisdocuments fortheprojectspecialprocesses andotherprojectspecifictasks.RiggingandhandlingCuttingandbevelingSteamgenerator replacement weldingTemporary supports/restraints andstructures Blowdownsysteminterface Replacement steamgenerator insulation Steamgenerator manwayplatforms RCSdecontamination Thesedocuments wereusedduringthedevelopment ofthevariousprojectengineering

packages, Theapplicable St.LucieDBDswillbeutilized, alongwithotherappropriate basesdocuments, duringthe1997reconciliation phaseoftheSGRPdesigndocuments priortoimplementation.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page502.5.7Conclusion Theevaluation oftheexistingplantdesignandlicensing bases,steamgenerator physicalinterfaces, thermal-hydraulic aspects,structural

supports, safetyanalyses, technical specifications, andoff-normal andemergency procedures showedtheRSGdesigntopreservetheexistingplantdesignandlicensing bases.Therefore, useoftheRSGsatSt.Lucie1meetsallrelevantcriteriaandguidance, theexistinglicensing anddesignbasesremainvalid,theTechnical Specifications andtheirbasesremainvalid,andnounreviewed safetyquestions exist.2.6Simulator Validation ProjectSt.Luciehasareference plantsimulator.

Itwasdeveloped asanoperatortrainingtoolandisbasedonextensive reviewsofthedesign,designbases,and,operational dataandprocedures, toensureconsistency betweentheactualplantandtheresponseofthesimulator.

Ininstances whenthesimulator predictsanunexplained plantresponse, thefeedbackprocessinthetrainingprogramsprovidesforresolution ofdifferences.

Anotheruseofthesimulator istovalidatethatproposeddesignchangestotheplantaresafeandeffective.

Byfirstsimulating majorchanges,St.Luciehasbeenabletoidentifyandcorrectdesigndifferences priortoimplementation intotheplant.Thesimulator isalsousedtoimproveoperatorunderstanding oftheplantresponsetounexpected events,suchthatcorrective actionsareidentified, andcontributors, orresponses thatmaybepreventative, arealsoidentified.

TheTrainingDepartment assiststheOperations Department invalidation ofprocedures byusingdraftprocedures duringthesimulator portionoflicensedoperatorcontinuing training.

Thedraftprocedures areprovidedtotrainingbytheOperations Department andthefeedbackfromthecrewsareforwarded totheprocedure development group.2.7Operating Experience Feedback(OEF)ProgramIndustryeventsandreports'are reviewedandprocessed basedonapplicability toSt.Lucieinaccordance withtheOperating Experience Feedback(OEF)Program.Operating experience eventsandreportsarereviewedandscreenedforapplicability toSt.LuciebytheOEFCoordinator.

Operating experience feedbackwhichmeritanalysis, specificactions,oradocumented plantrevieworresponse, areprocessed asCondition Reports.TheCondition Reportprocessensuresthoroughanalysisoftheeventandpreparation ofareportsuchthatrelevantissuesareaddressed including updatetotheplantdocumentation ifrequired.

Operational experience feedbackisusedtoimproveplantprocesses, andwhereprocessenhancements improveplantsafetyand/oroperation, procedures arerevised.TheOEFprogramendeavors tominimizethepotential foraninitiator ofaneventnotbeingrecognized inthechangeprocessofaprocedure.

'IM St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-2SEnclosure Pago512.8Surveillance TestingSurveillance testingisusedtoverifytheoperability ofSSCsbyensuringtheirperformance remainswithinthespecified designbases,Theidentification ofdegradedequipment priortofailureincreases equipment availability andassuresthatcomponents requiredtooperateduringanaccidentareoperable.

Surveillance requirements areobtainedfromtheFSAR,Technical Specifications, ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXIPumpandValveprogram,andothercriteriaspecified asnecessary.

Programsareinplacetoassurefailedormissedsurveillances areappropriately evaluated forreportability andnecessary corrective actionsareimplemented.

2.8.1Technical Specification Surveillance TestingTechnical Specification surveillance testingprovidesassurance thatSSCsoperatetoperformtheirintendedfunction.

Surveillance testingisaccomplished andtrackedbyoperating andadministrative procedures.

Components whichfailthesurveillance testsareenteredintothecondition reporting processforrootcausedetermination andresolution.

Thisprocessidentifies degradedequipment andallowstimelyrepairs.2.8.2Inservice TestingProgram~~~~~~Theinservice testingisusedtoverifytheoperational readiness ofpumpsandvalveswhichhaveaspecificaccidentmitigating orsafeshutdownfunction.

Thegeneralrequirements ofASMEParagraphs IWV-1100andIWP-1100forClass1,2and3pumpsandvalvesapplytoSt.Lucie.Theserequirements establish theinputsusedintheFSARsafetyanalyses.

Thefollowing describeSSCfunctions, andwerereviewedfortheInservice TestingProgramscope:UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportTechnical Specifications Systemdescriptions forTrainingSpecialanalysesCommitment correspondence Plantprocedures 10CFR50,AppendixJleakratetestprogramTheASMEInservice TestingProgramsforSt.LucieUnits1and2areforthesecond10-yearintervalandwillbeineffectthroughtheendofthesecond120-month (10-year) intervalunlessrevisedandreissuedforreasonsotherthantheroutineupdaterequiredatthestartofthethirdinterval, TheNRChasreviewedandapprovedthesetestprograms.

TheASMEInservice TestingProgramteststhespecificas-builtconfiguration values(i.e.,individual orintegrated component characteristics/parameters foreachpumpandvalve)usedin St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page52theFSARsafetyanalyses.

Inthisway,thespecificsystemandcomponent capabilities usedinthesafetyanalysesarebetterassuredunderallplantconditions.

2.9Maintenance RuleProgramTheSystemandComponent Engineers implement the10CFR50.65maintenance ruleprogram.Systemengineers monitortheperformance ofsystemsandsystemcomponents againstsetcriteria.

Maintenance activities tocorrectdegradedequipment aremonitored.

Maintenance preventable functional failures(MPFF),akeyindicator, aretrackedandtrendedandenteredintothecondition reporting processforrootcauseevaluation andresolution.

Systemengineers performthefunctionfailureevaluation inaccordance withadministrative procedures.

Theprogramadministrator hastheresponsibility totrack,monitor,andidentifyrepetitive MPFFsandtoreturnthesystem,structure, orcomponent toitsprescribed acceptable limits.2.10PlantProcedure Improvement ProgramTheSt.LuciePlantProcedure Improvement Programisfocusedonregulatory performance improvement.

Thescopeoftheprojectistoidentifyandimproveoperation andmaintenance activities byupgradedtaskinstructions, Includedintheupgradeprocessisreviewofthedesignbasisdocuments toensureregulatory commitment compliance.

TheProcedure Improvement Programincludesoperations, maintenance, andadministrative procedures.

Theinitialstepincludedcentralizing procedure writersfromOperations, Electrical Maintenance, Instrument andControlMaintenance, Mechanical Maintenance, andAdministrative Departments underaprocedure development supervisor.

Thisnewgroupprovidesasinglepointofcontactforprocedural issues.Thegoalofthisnewgroupwastoupgradeprocedures asnecessary andtopreparenewprocedures fortaskswithoutprocedures.

Thebasicformatforprocedures willbestandardized anduseindustry-proven languagetechniques togivetheend-useratechnically correct,firsttimeimplementable procedure.

Theimprovedprocessincludesthefollowing fundamental attributes:

~Definethescopeofatechnical subcommittee

~Reviewprocedures forcriticalcharacteristics andattributes

~Includeindustrystandardmethodsforprocedure validation

~Validatebyend-usertoensuretheprocedure issoundandimplementable

~Establish asiteprocedure writer'sguidewhichincorporates INPOandindustryapprovedwritingstandards Anotherfundamental attribute oftheimprovedprocessistoreview,asappropriate, designbasisdocuments thatgoverntheactivities andcontrolthetasksdescribed ineachprocedure.

Thesebasisdocuments include,butarenotlimitedto,St.LucieTechnical Specifications, FSAR,Off-siteDoseCalculation Manual,NRCcorrespondence, ABB-CEbulletins, calculations,

analyses, evaluations, specifications andplantdrawings.

I St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page532.11Annunciator SummaryReviewAplantannunciator summaryreviewiscurrently inprogress.

Annunciators provideanearlyindication/announcement ofpossibledegrading plantconditions, andassuchtheyareanimportant aidtooperators inidentifying appropriate procedural actions.Thisprogramwillreviewselectedannunciators forthecontrolrooms,wastemanagement panels,emergency dieselgenerators, steamgenerator blowdownbuilding, boricacidconcentrators, wasteconcentrators, watertreatment plant,oxygenanalyzer, andtheliquidwastepanels.Thisprogramwillincludereviewofselectedlogicconfigurations, annunciator setpoints, procedural references andcorresponding operatoractionsfoundintheannunciator summaryprocedure foreachunit,againstthedesigndocuments, asappropriate.

Thisprojectisapproximately 10%completewithover200annunciator setpoints, configurations andprocedural responses

reviewed, andhasnotidentified anyinconsistencies whichwouldbeconsidered safetysignificant.

Thisprogramcontinues tosupporttheconclusion thattheSSCconfiguration andperformance isconsistent withtheplant'sdesignbasis.3.0Walkdowns, Inspections, AuditsandReviews3.1Therehavebeennumerousplantwalkdowns, NRCInspections, andFPLAuditsandVerticalSliceReviews,whichhaveverifiedconsistency betweentheSSCsandthedesignbases.FPLPlantWalkdowns Asonemeansofensuringthattheplantconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbases,plantwalkdowns areperformed aspartoftheSystemEngineerProgram.SystemEngineers arecognizant oftheirsystem'soperating status,including scheduled andunscheduled maintenance, periodictestingandresults,systemarrangement andoperational configuration, systemperformance margins,andperformance trending.

3.1.1SystemEngineerWalkdowns AP0005750,"DutiesandResponsibilities oftheSystemEngineer,"

isthegoverning documentwhichprovidesthebasisforthesystemengineerprogram.Thesystemengineeristhe"owner"oftheplantsystemandremainscognizant ofthesystemsdesignbases,itsperformance

criteria, systemoperation, andmaintenance requirements.

Thesystemengineerreviewsproposedplantmodifications tothesystem.Materialcondition ismonitored bysystemwalkdowns.

Engineers performsystemwalkdowns inaccordance withGuideline SCEG-003, "Guideline fortheCondition SurveyofStructures andSupportsbyPlantPersonnel."

Theresultsofthesewalkdowns areusedtodemonstrate compliance withthemaintenance rule.Procedural anddrawinginconsistencies identified bythesystemengineers areenteredintotheCRprocessforresolution.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page543.1.2QAWalkdowns QAsafetysystemwalkdowns provideanothermeansofensuringthattheplantconfiguration isconsistent withthedesignbases.SinceJanuary1996,walkdowns areconducted onaquarterly basisaspartoftheQATechnical ReviewsandAssessments (TRA)groupfunctions.

TheTRAgroupwasformedtoencompass theformerISEGfunctions, whichfocusesonissuesaffecting nuclearsafetyandplantreliability.

Priorto1996,QAperformed verticalsliceauditsofsafetysystems,whichalsoincludedsystemwalkdowns.

AsnotedinAppendixB,TableC3.12thewalkdowns havehelpedverifyplantconfiguration toplantdrawingsandprocedures.

Duringsomeoftheseaudits,minorinconsistencies betweentheplantanddesigndocuments wereidentified andenteredintothecorrective actionprogramforresolution.

3.2FPLSeismicWalkdowns 3.2.1IEBulletin79-14IEBulletin79-14,"SeismicAnalysisforAs-BuiltSafety-Related PipingSystems,"

addressed anNRCconcernthattheseismicanalysisofsafetyrelatedpiping,coupledwithpressure, thermal,operating weight,andotherapplicable systemoperating parameters, beverifiedinaccordance withactualas-builtdrawingsforitsimpactonthestressanalysisofrecord.AtSt.LucieUnits1and2,theverification processconsisted ofaprogrambywhichtheas-builtconfigurations ofSeismicCategoryIsafety-related pipingsystemsweredocumented, evaluated, andmodifiedasnecessary, byateamofexperienced engineers anddesigners undertheFPLQA/QCprogram.Thisprogramconsisted ofwalkdowns ofdesignated SeismicCategoryIsafetyrelatedpipingsystemsanddocumentation oftheas-builtconfiguration including pipingsize,components, andgeometry;

location, orientation, andtypeofvalves;locationandconfiguration ofpipesupports; andfloorandwallpenetration details.Thesedetailswerethenevaluated bytheteamtoassessifdocumentrevisions and/orplantmodifications wererequiredand,ifnecessary, acceptable undertheconstruction codeofrecord.Commitments madebyFPLwithregardstoNRCBulletin79-14,whichincludedwalkdowns, packagepreparation, evaluation, andmodifications, werecompleted forSt.LucieUnits1and2.3.2.2GenericLetter87-02GenericLetter87-02,"Verification ofSeismicAdequacyofMechanical andElectrical Equipment inOperating Reactor,"

(USIA-46),requiredareviewofSt.LucieUnit1equipment requiredtoachieveandmaintainhotshutdownoftheplantforaperiodofeighthours.FPLselectedsafety-relatedandnon-safety-related equipment fortheirreview.Thisequipment wasevaluated forseismicadequacybyFPLengineers andaseismicreviewteamconsisting ofengineering expertsintheareaofseismicadequacyofequipment andequipment performance duringearthquakes.

Thefourbasicrequirements fortheGL87-02/USI A-46reviewofSt.LucieUnit1,whichwere St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page55addressed inthewalkdownare;theequipment seismiccapacitybeinggreaterthandemand,theconstruction adequacyoftheequipment, anchorage adequacyandnoseismicspatialinteraction.

Thewalkdowns resultedintheidentification ofthreeequipment items,andtwootheritemswhichwereacceptable butrequiredmaintenance ontheanchorage.

Modifications weremadetoallequipment identified withdeficiencies, andareportwasissuedtotheNRCin1992.ByletterdatedFebruary9,1995,theNRCissuedaSafetyEvaluation Report(SER)addressing theSt.LucieandTurkeyPointresponseto87-02withseveraloutstanding issues.Anauditwasperformed atTurkeyPointinDecemberof1995,andtheNRCissuedasupplemental SERonOctober22,1996,addressing outstanding issuesfoundduringtheaudit.InthisSER,openitemsforSt.LucieUnit1wereclosed.3.3FPLUnit1SteamGenerator Replacement Walkdowns A10CFR50.59safetyevaluation an~",tofdesignpackagestobeusedduringthe1997steamgenerator replacement outagehavebveloped.Thesedocuments arenowundergoing adesignreviewandverification processpriortoimplementation.

Plantwalkdowns wereconducted inthecourseofdoingthisdesignwork,andtheplantFSAR,designanalysisandotherapplicable licensing basisdocuments werereviewed.

Walkdowns wereconducted insideandoutsidecontainment intheareasaffectedbytheSGRP.Thespecificareasofinterestweretemporary structures whichinterface withpermanent plantstructures andwhereinterferences willneedremovaltoaccommodate movementofthenewsteamgenerators.

Duringthewalkdowns, minorpipeandHVACsupportdiscrepancies betweenthedesigndrawingsandtheas-foundcondition, weredocumented, evaluated anddispositioned.

Inallcasesphysicalchangeswerenotnecessary andtheappropriate drawingsweremodified.

AninputerrorintheFSARaccidentanalysiswasdocumented, evaluated andcorrected bythesourcefuelvendor,anddetermined nottoaffecttheconclusion oftheaccidentanalyses.

3.4NRCElectrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection InFebruaryandMarch1991,theNRCconducted aspecialannounced teaminspection intheareasofdesignofelectrical systemsandrelatedengineering andmaintenance activities.

Thisinspection specifically focusedontheElectrical Distribution System(EDS)as-builtconfiguration conformance todesignbasesrequirements anddesignoutputdocuments.

Theinspection includedareviewofdesign,calibration, maintenance, andthe"as-built" configuration oftheelectrical distribution systemincluding mechanical systemsandequipment associated withtheEDS.3.4.1FPLPreparation fortheEDSFISt.LucieEngineers andPlantStaffexpendedover13,000man-hours between1990andearly1991inpreparation fortheinspection andconducted twoselfaudits.Keyelectrical designandconfiguration aspectsofSt.LucieUnits1and2werereviewedandupdatedasrequired.

Someoftheareaswere:

~~

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page56~Electrical systemshortcircuitandvoltagedropanalyses~Batteryandbatterychargersizing~DCsystemminimumandmaximumvoltage~Breakercoordination

~Fusesizing~Cablesizing~Protective Relaysettings~Emergency DieselSystem-Electrical design8caccidentloading~Emergency DieselSystem-Mechanical design,fuel8ccoolingsystem~As-installed configuration versusdesigndrawingsUponcompletion ofthiseffort,severalcalculations wereupdatedorrevised.Inaddition, anumberofinconsistencies wereidentified intheFSARandplantconfiguration drawings.

Theseinconsistencies werescheduled forcorrection.

DuringtheFPLreview,nooperability problemswereidentified withtheSt.Lucieelectrical distribution system.3.4.2NRCInspection TheNRCconducted anannounced teaminspection duringthefirstquarterof1991.Duringthisextensive technical audit,thefollowing areaswerereviewedbytheteam:~Transmission System-Theteamreviewedthecharacteristics ofthe240kVelectrical transmission system.Maximumandminimumrangeofvoltageandfrequency wasreviewed.

~MediumVoltage(4.16KV)Class1EElectrical System-areviewofthe4.16kVandemergency dieseldesignwasconducted.

Manyofthecalculations andanalysesforequipment loading,shortcircuit,andvoltageregulation werereviewed.

Alsoincludedwasareviewofthediesels'apability tostartandaccelerate theassignedsafetyloadswithintherequiredtimesequence.

Theteamconcluded themaximumcalculated faultcurrentlevelsandvoltageregulation forthesystemwasdemonstrated tobeacceptable inalldesignconditions.

~Class1E480VACSystem-shortcircuitandvoltagedropcalculations werereviewedforthe480Vacelectrical system.Shortcircuitratingswerefoundtobewithintheequipment rating.Cableswereadequately sizedandbreakercoordination wasacceptable.

~ClasslE120VACSystem-theClass1E120Vacdesignwasreviewed.

Severalshortcircuitandvoltagedropcalculations wereperformed todemonstrate thatcablesizingwasacceptable fortheequipment.

~Class1E125VDCSystem-revieweddesigndocumentation, calculations, andevaluations whichdemonstrated sizingandloadingforthe125Vdcsystemand St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page57equipment.

Thisdocumentation includedshortcircuitandlowvoltagecalculations, MOVdesignstudies,highvoltageanalysis, andcoordination studies.Thedocumentation appropriately verifieddcequipment wasadequately sized.Minordocumentation errorswereidentified bytheteam.FPLinvestigated theerrorsandagreedtocorrectthedocuments intheforthcoming revisions.

~DCMotorOperatedValves-voltagedropcalculations fordcmotoroperatedvalveswerefoundnottomeetpresentdayvendorrecommendations.

Additional information suppliedbythevendorconfirmed thatacceptable torquewasprovidedtooperatevalvesunderplantstatedconditions.

Theteamconcluded thatnooperability concernexistedinthisarea.~Maintenance, Testing,Calibration, andConfiguration control-variouswalkdowninspections wereconducted toverifythe"asinstalled" configuration oftheelectrical systemanddetermine compliance withthedesigndrawingsanddocuments, Completed calibration andsurveillance procedures werealsoreviewedtoverifythatsystemfunctions weretestedinaccordance withdesignspecifications.

Althoughtheteamidentified someminorissues,itwasdetermined thatacomprehensive programforthemaintenance, testingandcalibration oftheelectrical equipment wasinplaceatSt.Lucie.Overall,theteamdetermined theresultsofthewalkdowninspections wereverysatisfactory.

Theresultsofthisinspection weredocumented inNRCInspection Report91-03datedMay17,1991,andnoviolations, deviations oroperability concernswerenoted.TheNRCconcluded thattheElectrical Distribution System(EDS)atSt.Luciewascapableofperforming itsintendedfunctionundernormalandaccidentconditions, andthatadequatecontrolsareinplacetomaintaintheEDSinanoperableconfiguration.

Theengineering technical supportanddesigngroupssupporting theEDSwerealsofoundtobeadequate.

Theirperformance demonstrated involvement inproblemidentification andresolution aswellasroutineactivities inmaintenance, testing,operations, andprocurement.

Plantmodifications totheEDSwereperformed inaccordance withtheapproveddesigncontrolprocesses.

Minordiscrepancies werenotedintheareasofthestartuptransformer, thenon-safety coolingfanintheemergency dieselgenerator rooms,fusecontrolandrelaysettingdrawings, therelaysettingcalibration procedure andpreventive maintenance todetectfailedmoldedcasecircuitbreakers.

Thesediscrepancies wereresolvedundertheSt.LucieCorrective ActionProgram.Theresultsofthisinspection demonstrated thattheEDSatSt.Luciewillperformitsintendedfunctionundernormalandaccidentconditions andthatFPLhadadequatecontrolsinplacetomaintaintheEDSinanoperableconfiguration.

3.5St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page58NRCService%'ater SystemOperational Performance Inspection InSeptember andOctober1991,theNRCconducted aspecialannounced pilotteaminspection intheareaoftheservicewateroperational performance.

Thisinspection specifically focusedontheservicewater(i.eintakecoolingwateratSt.Lucie)systemas-builtconfiguration anddemonstrated operational performance regarding theapplicable designbasesrequirements.

Theinspection includedamechanical designreview;detailedsystemwalkdowns; reviewofsystemoperation, maintenance, andsurveillance; andassessment ofqualityassurance andcorrective actionsrelatedtotheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)system.TheteamalsoassessedFPL'simplementation ofactionsrequiredbyGenericLetter89-13,"ServiceWaterSystemProblemsAffecting Safety-Related Equipment,"

aswellassystemunavailability togainadditional insightsforprobabilistic riskassessment applications.

Theresultsoftheinspection weredocumented inNRCInspection Report91-201.TheNRCinspection teamconcluded thattheServiceWaterSystemas-builtconfiguration wouldbecapableofperforming itsintendedsafetyfunctionunderdesignbasesconditions.

Discrepancies werenotedintheareasoftestingthestandby"C"pump,ICWtemperature controlvalvestroketimetesting,ISTofICWmanualvalves,FSARinconsistencies andtrainingmaterialinconsistencies.

Overall,thisNRCSWSOPIfoundnodiscrepancies intheplantdesignbases,however,thereviewcontributed toimprovements intheSt.Lucieprocesses formaintaining itsplantconfiguration, performance, andtestingprocedures consistent withitsdesignbases.3.6NRCInspection ofPlantChangesandModifications InNovember1993,theNRCconducted aroutineannounced inspection oftheareaofdesignchanges,plantmodifications, andengineering andtechnical supportactivities.

Thisinspection specifically focusedontheadequacyofthePlantChange/Modification (PC/M)processtoensurethatchangestotheplantdesignand/oras-builtconfiguration wereimplemented suchthatthemodifiedconfiguration andsystem/component performance wereincompliance withtheplantdesignbasesrequirements.

Theresultsweredocumented inNRCInspection Report93-25,datedDecember1,1993.Intheareasinspected, noviolations ordeviations wereidentified.

FPLhaddemonstrated theuseofanadequateprioritization processforidentifying andimplementing plantmodification.

Theoverallqualityandtechnical contentofthePC/Mpackagesreviewedwereadequateandsufficiently documented toverifyclosure.The10CFR50.59safetyevaluations providedsufficient discussion andjustification tocomplywithregulatory requirements.

FPLhadimplemented acontrolprocesswhichwouldreduceandmaintainthePC/Mbacklogtoanacceptable level.Thisinspection supportsthepositionthattheplantdesignand/oras-builtconfiguration andperformance parameters havebeenmaintained consistent withthedesignbasesandthatdesignchangecontrolprocessactivities areadequate.

3.7NRCIntegrated Inspections St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page59During1996,theNRCperformed severalintegrated inspections atSt.Lucie.Inspection Reports96-01,96-04,96-06,96-08and96-09documentinspection reviewsoftheFSAR,plantconfiguration, plantprocedures, plantpractices, andplantparameters forconsistency.

Thegeneralconclusions fromthesereportsaresimilartotheFPLfindingsconcerning theFSAR.Thedesignbasesinformation iscorrectbutthereexistsminordeficiencies betweentheFSARandtheplantdocumentation.

Thenoteddeficiencies havebeenenteredintotheplantcorrective actionprogramforresolution bytheissuanceofCondition Reports(CR).Thisinspection effortsupportsthepositionthattheSt.Luciedesignbasesandlicensedconfiguration andperformance ismaintained consistent inplantareasinspected.

3.8NRCEquipment Environmental Qualification ProgramInspection InFebruaryandMarch1989,theNRCconducted aninspection ofthe10CFR50.49requirements forenvironmental qualification (EQ)ofelectrical equipment atSt.LuciePlant.Theinspection includedareviewoftheFPLimplementation programtomeettherequirements of10CFR50.49,walkdowninspections ofEQequipment insidecontainment, reviewofEQmaintenance activities, reviewofEQdesignchangesandFPLactionsinresponsetoNRCinitiatives (NRCNotices86-71and88-89),andfollow-up onFPLactionsinresponsetolicenseconditions.

Theresultsoftheinspection weredocumented inNRCInspection Report89-07datedApril6,1989.Noviolations ordeviations wereidentified.

Theresultsofthisinspection supported theNRC'spreviousassessment inMarch1986,thatFPLhadimplemented anadequateprogramandthattheprogramcontinues tobeadequate.

Thewalkdowns ofEQequipment resultedinnoopenorunresolved items.EQdocumentation fileswereconsidered wellorganized andcomplete, requiring minimaladditional information tosupporttheanalysisprovidedinthefile.EQm'aintenance programprocedural compliance wasgood,andthespecialmaintenance requirements described intheEQdocumentpackageswereconfirmed tohavebeenincorporated intotheprocedures forthosesampleitemsreviewed.

Theinspection teamnotedthatthetrackingmechanism usedbytheplanttoensurescheduling andcompletion ofEQmaintenance tasksappearedtobefragmented withseparatelistsforcalibration, surveillance, preventive maintenance, andreplacement, Therewasnooverallprogramtoensurethatmaintenance activities werebeingaccomplished.

Thiswasconsidered aweaknessinFPL'sEQmaintenance program.FPLacknowledged theconcernandcommitted toimplement aformalized maintenance trackingsystemasoutlinedintheinspection reportdetails.Thisinspection supportstheFPL'spositionthatSt.Lucieequipment undertheEQProgramwasconfigured, qualified, performance tested,andmaintained inaccordance withtheplantdesignbases.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page603.9NRCInspection oftheMotorOperatedValveProgramTheFPLMOVprograminvolvedadesignbasisreviewandplantconfiguration verification byengineering andplantmaintenance todetermine parameters criticalforMOVoperation inresponsetoGL89-10,Thirdpartyreviewsbycontractors andINPOprovidedguidanceonmethodology fortestingandlessonslearnedfromotherutilityprograms.

Someoftheaspectsofthisprogramincludetheincorporation ofMOVdata,setpoints, andparameters intoengineering

drawings, performance testing,andplantmodifications toimprovetheoperation/reliability ofMOVs.Theincorporation oftheMOVdataintotheengineering processaddsprocesscontrolswhichmaintains consistency betweentheMOVdesignbasisandtheplantconfiguration.

InSeptember 1991,theNRCconducted aspecialannounced teaminspection toexaminetheprogramdeveloped inresponsetoNRCGenericLetter(GL)89-10,"Safety-Related MotorOperatedValveTestingAndSurveillance."

Theresultsoftheinspection weredocumented inNRCInspection Report91-18datedNovember18,1991,andfoundthatthebasicprogramadequately addressed mostoftherecommendations.

However,NRCconcernsresulting fromtheinspection includedsomepotential deviations fromtherecommendations ofthegenericletter,avendorrecommendation thatwasnotbeingmet,andprogrammatic detailsthatwerenotsufficiently definedtoassessatthetimeoftheinspection.

Twopotential programdeviations wereresolvedwiththeNRCinsubsequent correspondence.

TheNRCinspection teamalsonotedthatthepersonnel involvedintheprogramwereknowledgeable oftheissuesinvolvedinthegenericletter.Goodrefresher trainingwasbeingprovidedfortheupcomingOctober1991refueling outage.FPLrecognized thatstandardindustryvalvefactorsarenotwhollyadequateforgatevalvesettingcalculations.

Positivestepshadbeenundertaken toaddressindustryconcernsatthetimeregarding thecapabilities ofthediagnostic testingequipment previously used.Preventive maintenance procedures provideddefinitive information regarding theattributes tobeassessed.

3.10NRCCheckValveInspection InJanuary1993,theNRCconducted aroutineannounced inspection intheareasoflicenseeprogramsassociated withsafetyrelatedcheckvalves.Theresultsoftheinspection weredocumented inNRCInspection Report93-01,datedFebruary23,1993.Thereportconcluded thatFPLhadimplemented asatisfactory checkvalveprogramtoensuretheoperability ofcheckvalves.Theynotedthatknowledgeable andexperienced personnel wereinvolvedintheprogramtoensureadequateactionsweretakentoaddresscheckvalveproblemswhenidentified, andthattherewasadequatemanagement attention tothecheckvalveprogram.TheNRCfoundthatFPL'sinvolvement withtheNuclearIndustryCheckValveUsersGroupwasapositiveinitiative, thatcheckvalvesintheISTprogramwereincludedinthecheckvalveprogram,thatcheckvalvesinsystemsbeyondthoseidentified inINPOSER86-03wereincludedinthecheckvalveprogram,andtheuseofacheckvalvedatabasetoidentifyindividual valveparameters andsummarize valve St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page61maintenance historywasastrength.

Onenon-cited violation andoneunresolved itemwereidentified inthereport.(Corrective actionsassociated withthisinspection havebeencompleted.)

Thisinspection supportstheFPLpositionthatSt.Lucieimplemented asatisfactory checkvalveprogramtoensureoperability ofcheckvalves.3.11NRCArchitect/Engineer TeamInspection FromNovember4,1996toJanuary10,1997,theNRCconducted aspecialannounced teaminspection intheareaofsafetysystemoperational performance capability.

Thisparticular inspection ispartofanewNRCinspection initiative, calledanArchitect/Engineer (A/E)TeamInspection.

TheNRCinspection teamconsisted ofanNRCteamleaderand5A/Einspectors (2mechanical engineers, 1instrumentation andcontrolsengineer, 1electrical engineerand1fieldengineer).

TheNRCteamutilizedtheguidanceofNRCInspection Procedure 93801,"SafetySystemFunctional Inspection (SSFI),"duringtheinspection withtheemphasisonengineering d'esign.Theprimaryobjective ofthisinspection wastoassesstheoperational performance capability ofselectedsafetysystemsthroughadetailedengineering designreview.TwosafetysystemswereselectedforreviewbytheNRC:theUnit1auxiliary feedwater (AFW)system,andtheUnit2component coolingwater(CCW)system.Theinspection focusedonidentifying thedesignbasisfunctions oftheselectedsystemsthroughadetailedreviewoflicenseanddesignbasesdocumentation.

Confirmation thattheselectedsystemscouldperformthesedesignbasisfunctions wasperformed throughareviewofengineering analyses/calculations, operating procedures, maintenance procedures andsystem/component testing.Inpreparation fortheinspection, FPLconducted anextensive self-assessment oftheselectedsystemdesignbasesanddesign/configuration controlprocesses.

Documents reviewedduringthisself-assessment includedcalculations, originalequipment specifications andpurchaseordercorrespondence, FSAR,NRCSERs,DBDs,Technical Specifications, licenseamendments, as-builtdocumentation, accidentanalyses, vendortechnical manuals,PCMs,TSAs,plantoperating procedures, testingprocedures, andcorrective actionprogramfindings.

Discrepancies andinconsistencies identified throughthisself-assessment weredocumented usingtheCRprocess.Noneofthediscrepancies identified throughtheself-assessment weredetermined toinvolveanissuethatcompromised operability oftheselectedsystemsoritscapability toperformitsintendeddesignbasisfunctions.

Duringtheconductoftheinspection, theNRCinspection teamperformed extensive anddetailedreviewsinthefollowing generalareas:~Engineering designandconfiguration control~Consistency indesignbasisdocuments (FSAR,DBD,etc.)~Systemmodification historyandassociated 10CFR50.59safetyevaluations

~Designinterfaces withoperations andmaintenance St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page62~Adequacyofoperating procedures

~AdequacyofTechnical Specification surveillance testingforoperability determinations

~Corrective actionhistoryThepreliminary NRCfindingsindicated thattherewerenomajorprogramweaknesses orfailures, andthatthesystemsinspected werecapableofperforming theirintendeddesignbasisfunctions.

TheNRCinspection finalreportisscheduled tobeissuedinlateFebruary1997.3.12FPLQAAuditsandReviewsNumerousformalQAauditsandreviewshavebeenperformed bytheQualityAssurance organization sincetheinitialstartupoftheunits,inareasrelatedtothecontrolofdesign,configuration, andtestirigoftheSt.LuciePlant.Designprogramauditstypically reviewedengineering processes, implementing procedures, andtheimplementation ofdesignchangesandassociated records(i.e.modification packages).

QAauditsconsistently foundthatQualityAssurance Programelements(including designbasisrequirements) wereadequately addressed byprocedures, andthattheimplementation ofthoseprocedures waseffective.

Additionally, verticalslicereviewsandsafetysystemwalkdowns wereperformed onasamplingbasistoverifythattheexistingplantconfiguration matchedthedesign.QAconsistently foundthatplantsafetysystemswerebuiltasdesigned, withminorexceptions.

Minordiscrepancies wereidentified andformallyresolvedthroughthecorrective actionprogram.ExamplesofQAauditsandself-assessments whichevaluated whethertheSt.Luciesystems,structures, component configuration andperformance wereconsistent withthedesignbasesarelistedinAppendixB,TableC3.12.AuditFindingshaveresultedinenhancements toengineering, operations, andtestingprocesses andprocedures.

~QSL-OPS-88-595, "Vertical SliceAuditoftheUnit2IntakeCoolingWaterSystem."(5findings-Nofindingsinvolveddiscrepancies betweenas-builtconditions, Inservice Testing(IST)systemperformance andthesystemdesignbases).~QSL-OPS-88-672, "Verification oftheUnit2ReactorCoolantSystemDesign,Operation andMaintenance, toAssureSystemOperability."

(1finding-regarding instrument calibration

-noconfiguration, performance, designbasisdiscrepancies).

~QSL-OPS-90-739, "Verification oftheUnit1and2Auxiliary Feedwater SystemDesign,Operation andMaintenance, toAssureSystemOperability."

(1finding-regarding aninstrument rootisolation valveposition-noconfiguration, performance, designbasisdiscrepancies).

~QSL-OPS-91-821, "Verification oftheUnit1ReactorProtection SystemModifications, Testing,Maintenance, andProcurement, toAssureSystemOperability."

(Nofindings).

St.LucioUtiitsland2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page63~ISEG-PSL-A93-017, "ISEGAssessment Activities Associated WiththeSpring1993St.LucieUnit1Refueling Outage."Performed toensurethatthekeysafetyfunctions forshutdownconditions (i.e.RCSinventory, decayheatremoval,poweravailability, reactivity control,andcontainment integrity) werenotcompromised byoutagework.(Nofindingsregarding configuration, performance, designbasis).~ISEG-PSL-A93-019, "ISEGAssessment Activities Associated WiththeSpring1993St.LucieUnit1Refueling Outage."Performed reviewsoftheimplementation ofshutdownmarginverifications, andpressurizer safetyreliefvalvemodifications.

(Nofindings).

~ISEG-PSL-A93-020, "ISEGActivities Associated WiththeSpring1993St.Lucie-1Refueling Outage."Independent oversight oftheACandDCpoweravailability duringtheoutage,ensuringapplicable requirements weresatisfied.

(Nofindingsregarding configuration, performance, designbasis).I~ITR95-002,"ReviewofLER335/94-006; Containment Integrity OutsideofFSARAssumptions UnderLimitedCircumstances duetoDesignError."Evaluated therootcauseoftheeventwhichinvolvedadesignerrormadeduringthe1978additionoftheiodineremovalsystemforUnit1.(Nofindings).

~ITR96-013,"SafetySystemWalkdown(Partial):

Auxiliary Feedwater System,Unit1."Verifiedthatplantdrawingsreflectas-builtconditions.

(Nofindings).

II~QR96-0006,"FourthQuarter1996ESFWalkdownoftheUnit2HighPressureInjection System."Verifiedas-builtconditions arereflected inplantdrawingsandmetUFSARrequirements, Valvelineupswereperformed usingoperating procedures, andcomponents wereverifiedtomatchdesigndocumentation.

(Nofindings).

OtherQAauditsandassessments listedinAppendixB,Table3.12resultedinfindingswhichdirectlyrelatedtoSt.Luciesystem,structure andcomponent configuration andperformance consistency withthedesignbases.Resolution ofthesefindingsfromthefollowing auditslistedinAppendixB,TableC3.12resultedinimprovement intheSt.Lucieconfiguration andperformance consistent withthedesignbases:~QSL-OPS-88-624, "Unit1and2Emergency DieselGenerators andSafety-Related Switchgear Systems."

(5findings-regarding drawing/as-built discrepancies, ISTdiscrepancies, anddesignbasiscomponent sizingdocumentation; discrepancies wereresolvedthroughthecorrective actionprogram).

~QSL-OPS-91-800, Supplement 1,"Vertical SliceAuditoftheUnit1and2Feedwater andMainSteamSystems."

(2findings-regarding drawing/as-built discrepancies andprocedures/as-built discrepancies; discrepancies wereresolvedthroughthecorrective actionprogram).

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page64~ITR96-015,"SafetySystemWalkdown(Partial):

SectionsofEmergency CoreCoolingSubsystems intheUnit1ReactorContainment

Building, andPressurizer CodeSafetyValveModifications."

(3findings-regarding updateofdesignbasisdocuments following designmodification implementation; discrepancies wereresolvedthroughthecorrective actionprogram).

~QSL-PM-96-18, "September 1996PSLQAPerformance Monitoring Audit."Performance-based observations intheareasofoperations, maintenance,

services, andengineering.

(6findings-regarding drawing/as-built discrepancies, procedures/as-builtdiscrepancies, updateofdesignbasisdocuments following designmodification implementation, and2findingsthatwereindicative oflessthanadequateimplementation of10CFR50.59requirements; discrepancies wereresolvedthroughthecorrective actionprogram).

4.0 Conclusion

Thereisadequaterationale forconcluding withreasonable assurance thatthesystems,structures andcomponents areconsistent withthedesign,andthatdiscrepancies betweendesigndocuments, theFSAR,procedures, andtheplantarenotsignificant withrespecttosafety.Thisconclusion isbaseduponfollowing:

~Theverification atinitiallicensing thattheplant,FSARandthedesignareconsistent.

~Processes areinplacetoensurethemaintenance ofthatconsistency.

~Recentprogramsandinitiatives haveaidedinverifying andenhancing thedesignbasesforconfiguration andperformance requirements onplantsystems.~Auditsandinspections haveverifiedconsistency betweenthedesignbasisandtheplant.~Processes havebeenandareinplaceforidentification, evaluation andcorrection ofdiscrepancies betweenthedesignbasisandtheplantsystems,structures andcomponents.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page65[d]"Processes foridentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actions,including actionstodetermine theextentofproblems, actiontopreventrecurrence andreporting toNRC."Thefollowing outlineprovidestheorganization oftheresponsetorequest[d]:1.0Introduction

-Background

2.0 ProblemIdentification

Processes 2.12.22.32.42.52.6OperatorRoundsWalkdowns Operating Experience Feedback(OEF)/GenericImplications Management Self-assessment QualityAssurance (QA)AuditProgramsNuclearSafetySpeakout(SPEAKOUT)

3.0 Corrective

ActionPrograms3.1Historical Discussion 3.2QualityInstructions (Qi)3.3Condition Reporting (CR)System3.4EventResponseTeams3,5Commitment andCorrective ActionsTracking(CIRAC)Systems3.6ChangeRequestNotices(CRN)3.7Nonconformance Reports(NCR)3.810CFRPart21/Significant SafetyHazardEvaluations 3.9Operability Determination 3.1010CFR50.72and50.73Reportability Determination 3.11Corrective ActionProgramTraining4.0NRC/St.LucieInterfaces St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page661.0,.Introduction

-Background TheSiteVicePresident andDirectorofNuclearAssurance areresponsible fortheoverallimplementation oftheprogramsdescribed inthisresponse.

Operations personnel areresponsible foroperating theplantinaccordance withthedesignbases,Technical Specifications andtheapplicable regulations.

Alongwithaquestioning attitudeexhibited byplantpersonnel andtheidentification ofissuesduringroutinework,St.Luciehasmanyprogramswhicharespecifically designedtoidentifyissuesneedingresolution.

Exampleswhicharediscussed inthisresponseare,operatorrounds,programinatic andspecialwalkdowns, Operating Experience

Feedback, management self-assessments, theQAprogram,theCondition Reportprocess,andNuclearSafetySPEAKOUT.

Conditions foundmaybedocumented byanyemployee, permanent ortemporary, onaCondition Report(CR).AfterreviewbytheNuclearPlantSupervisor andthePlantGeneralManager(PGM),theorganization assignedresponsibility forresolution ofthecondition conductsananalysisanddevelopsappropriate corrective actions.Thecorrective actionsidentified intheresolution toeachCRaretrackedbypersonnel responsible forcompletion oftheassignedactivities.

TheCRprogramisadministered bytheServicesorganization.

Rootcausesaretypically determined bypersonnel fromtheorganization assignedresponsibility forresolution oftheCR.Thedepthofanalysisandresources devotedtocorrective actioniscommensurate withthesignificance ofthenotedcondition.

TheNuclearPlantSupervisor andtheon-shiftoperations staffareauthorized andrequiredtomaketimelyreportability andoperability decisions andfollowthroughtheapplicable procedures tocompletion.

Forthoseconditions whichareofanaturewhichalloworrequiremoredetailedevaluation, theEngineering staffaidsinthedetermination ofoperability andtheLicensing staffaidsinthedetermination ofreportability.

2.02.1ProblemIdentification Processes OperatorRoundsOperatorroundsarerequiredbyplantprocedures.

Theprocedure insomecasesimplements therequirements ofTechnical Specifications andisalsoareflection ofmanagement expectations fortheoperatortokeepabreastoftheoperation oftheequipment intheplant.Operatorroundsuseacomputerized dataloggertoprovidetheoperatorwithdetailedplantinformation.

Thisinformation isusefulindocumenting plantstatusandismoreuser-friendly thantheprevioushardcopylogs.Thecomputerprovidestheoperatorwiththerangeofnormalvaluesassociated withequipment performance.

ItalsohasTechnical Specification information, trendingcapabilities, anddoesnotallowtheoperatortoexittheprogramuntiltheroundshavebeen St.LucieUqits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page67completed.

Theavailability oftheinformation inthecomputerized datasetsimplifies theidentification ofanabnormalcondition andprovidesamoreefficient meansforsupervisor review.Plantprocedures providebroadscoperequirements, aswellasspecificdepartmental instructions governing theaspectsofeachwatchstation.Satisfactory completion ofasetofroundsonaparticular watchstationinaccordance withtheseinstructions (underthesurveillance ofasupervisor) isarequirement forqualifying onawatchstation.Theinstructions areperiodically usedasamonitoring toolbymanagement toinsurethattheroundsareperformed inaccordance withtheirexpectations.

Theroundshelptotrendandrespondtodegrading conditions inatimelymanner.Plantworkordersaregenerated fordeficiencies, andcondition reportsaregenerated foritemsoutsidetheworkorderprocess.2.2Walkdowns Operating Experience Feedback(OEF)/GenericImplications Systemengineers andcomponent engineers arerequiredtoperformwalkdowns oftheirsystemsonaregularbasis.Directions forwalkdowns areprovidedbyprocedure.

Engineering Department instructions areinplaceforwalkdowns ofcomponents andsystems.SeeSection4.0intheresponsetoquestion[c]formoredetailsonprogrammatic andspecialwalkdowns.

Ifnonconforming conditions arefound,theCRsystemisusedtodocumentthecondition and~~provideavehicleforthecorrection ofthecondition.

2.3Industryeventsandreportsarereviewedandprocessed basedonapplicability toSt.Lucieinaccordance withadministrative procedures.

IndustryeventsandreportsarereviewedbytheOEFcoordinator andprocessed basedonpotential genericapplicability toSt.Lucieinaccordance withAdministrative Procedure ADM-17.03, "Operating Experience Feedback."

IndustryeventreportsscreenedbytheOEFCoordinator include:NRCGenericLetters(GL)NRCInformation Notices(IN)NRCDailyEventReportsNRCPressReleases(PR)INPOSignificant Operating Experience Reports(SOER)INFOSignificant EventReports(SER)INPOSignificant EventNotifications (SEN)INPOSignificant byOthersReports(SO)INPOOperations andMaintenance Reminders (0&MR)INPOOperating Experience Reports(OE)Westinghouse, GeneralElectric, andCombustion Engineering VendorandTechnical ReportsOperating experience itemswhichmeritanalysis, specificactionsorathorough, documented plant~~~~~~~revieworresponse, areprocessed asCRs.Implementation oftheCRprocessensuresthatathoroughevaluation andanalysisoftheeventorreportismadeandthattheplant'sresponse(if St.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page68applicable) adequately addresses theconcerns.

Ifanupdatetotheplant'sdesignbasesdocuments istcquiredinresponsetotheoperating event,itwillbeidentified andimplemented throughtheCRprocessusingtheappropriate engineering processes.

Whereenhancements orchangesareidentified whichwouldbenefittheplantormitigatetheconsequences ofanevent,procedure/process changesaremadeasnecessary.

OneoftheOEFprogramgoalsistoaidinthedevelopment ofplantprocedures, suchthatthepotential fortheintroduction ofastepwhichcouldinitiateaneventisminimized duringprocedure changeprocess.Violations whichhavebeencitedatotherlicensees arereviewedonaperiodicbasisforapplicability toSt.Lucie.Contractors thathavecompileddocketedinformation oninternalaswellasgenericcommunications fromtheNRChavebeenretainedbyFPL.Thisbodyofinformation isavailable inanelectronically searchable format,andaidsinthetimelyreviewofinformation potentially applicable toSt.Lucie.RecentaccessviatheInternethasmademanyofthesedocuments available toFPLonthesamedayasreleasedtotheindustrybytheNRC.2.4Management Self-assessment St.Luciedepartments haveaseriesofformalandinformalprogramswhichprovideforself-assessment.

Theself-assessment processes usedatSt.Lucieinclude:PostOutageAssessments PostTripReviewsOffHoursToursTrainingObservations PlantManager's WalkdownEventResponseTeamsCondition ReportSystemTrendingQuarterly TrendAnalysisEachoftheseprocesses providetheopportunity toidentifyprocedure, designorconfiguration issuesinneedofresolution.

Beginning inAugust1995,aseriesofsignificant problemsandeventsindicated thatSt.Lucieplantperformance haddeclined.

St.Lucieplantmanagement tooktheinitiative toconductacriticalandcomprehensive self-assessment ofSt.LucieOperations, Engineering, Maintenance andPlantSupportfunctional areas,aswellasmanagement policiesandthecorrective actionprogram.WithrespecttotheSt.Luciedesignbases,theassessment didnotidentifyanysafetysignificant issues,However,someopportunities forimprovement wereidentified inrelatedareassuchasconfiguration management.

Forexample,theaccountabilities forthemaintenance oftheFSARwasnotclearlyestablished, someplantdrawings, procedures andlicensing documents werenotupdatedtoreQectmodifications, andtherewasinsufficient trainingprovidedtoengineers assigned

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page69toidentifyandperformrequireddrawingupdates.Corrective actionshavebeeninitiated fortheweaknesses identified bytheself-assessment.

2.5QualityAssurance (QA)AuditProgramsTheQAorganization atSt.Lucieisanindependent organization reporting throughanoffsiteDirectordirectlytothePresident oftheNuclearDivision.

QAhasaprogramofauditswhichisrequiredbyTechnical Specifications.

Auditsarealsoconducted attherequestoftheCNRBandupperNuclearDivisionmanagement.

Thefindingsandrecommended corrective actionsresulting fromtheauditprogramaredocumented throughthegeneration ofaCRforeachitem,aswellasintheQAauditfiles.(Alsoseediscussion intheresponsetorequest[a],Section6.0,ontheTopicalQualityAssurance Report(TQAR)Section18.0requirements foraudits.)2.6NuclearSafetySpeakout(SPEAKOUT)

TheSPEAKOUTprogramisaseparateconfidential reporting processforidentification ofconcerns.

Thisprogrammaybeusedbypersonnel wishingtoremainanonymous orusedasamethodoutsidethenormalchainofcommandreporting process.Thisprogramisdesignedtomaintainanonymity whileseekingcausesandcorrective actionsfortheidentified issues.Adesignated committee reviewssignificant SPEAKOUTissuesforthoroughness ofinvestigation, documentation andcorrective actions.Summaryreportsoneachissuearereturnedtotheidentifying individual fortheirinformation.

3.03.1Corrective ActionProgramsHistorical Discussion Theoverallmethodandprocessforaddressing corrective action,asrequiredbyCriterion XVIof10CFR50AppendixB,hashistorically beenacontrolled process,withengineering supportprovidedasnecessary.

Issuesareraisedthroughsuccessive management levels,uptoandincluding thePresident NuclearDivision.

Thisprocessisprogressive, andtheindividual maycontinueupthischainifsatisfactory actionisnottakenatanylevelonanindividual concern.Thisprocessissupplemented bytheNuclearSafetySPEAKOUTprogramwhichprovidesamechanism foranonymously identifying concerns.

Seesection2.6ofthisresponseforfurtherdetailsonSPEAKOUT.

TheTQARforSt.Lucieisthetoptierdocument(approved bytheNRC)whichdefinestheQAprogram.TheTQARiswrittensuchthatthenumbering andtopicofeachsectionmatchesthatof10CFR50,AppendixB.QualityInstructions andplantadministrative procedures provideimplementation levelguidanceforTQARrequirements.

Thishierarchy ofqualityprocedures hasexistedsincethenuclearunitconstruction timeframe.Thebasicrequirements forcorrective actionprocesses aredescribed inthefollowing TopicalQualityReports(TQR):

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page70ThisTQRrequiresthatmeasuresbeestablished tocontrolnonconforming itemstopreventthemfrombeinginstalled orused.Physicalcontrolssuchassegregation ortaggingensurethatinadvertent useofnonconforming itemsdoesnotoccur.Measuresarealsoprovidedfortheevaluation anddisposition oftheitems.Forexample,nonconformances whichaffectdesignintegrity orcreateadeviation fromdesignspecifications requireEngineering reviewforidentification ofappropriate corrective actions.Adocumented technical evaluation isrequiredwhenanitemisaccepted"as-is"orrepairedtoanacceptable evaluation.

Theseevaluations assurethatthefinalcondition doesnotadversely affectsafety,operability ormaintainability oftheitemorcomponent.

ThisTQRrequiresthatmeasuresbeestablished toensurethatconditions adversetoqualityarepromptlyidentified, trackedandcorrected.

Thesemeasurescurrently existintheformoftheCondition Reporting systemdescribed below.Iftheidentified condition issignificant, aRootCauseAnalysisisperformed, theextentofthecondition isdetermined (genericimplications),

appropriate actionsaretakentopreventrecurrence, andresultsarereportedtoappropriate management levels.Conditions whichmayaffectplantsystemoperability receiveadocumented operability assessment withinspecified timeframes.Requirements havebeeninplacetoensurethatcorrective actionnotonlycorrectstheimmediate condition butalsopreventsadverseconditions fromrecurring.

ThisTQRrequirestheconducting ofacomprehensive systemofplannedandperiodicauditsofthequalityassurance programtodetermine theeffectiveness oftheprogram.Auditresultsarereviewedbythemanagement oftheauditedorganization andsubsequently bytheCompanyNuclearReviewBoard.3.2QualityInstructions (QI)QualityInstructions areprocedures writtentodelineate actionsandorganizational responsibilities whichaffectqualityintheoperation oftheSt.LuciePlant.QualityInstructions provideimplementation leveldetailfortheQualityAssurance Programrequirements outlinedintheTQR.SimilartotheTQR,thesetofQualityInstructions alsofollowsthecriterion structure of10CFR50AppendixB.QualityInstructions withintheQI15andQI16serieshavehistorically definedthemethodsforrequesting, implementing, documenting andreporting actionstocorrectidentified deficiencies.

Theseprocedures providefordisposition byEngineering ofnonconformances affecting designintegrity ordeviations fromdesignspecifications.

Provisions havebeenincludedtoaddressconcernsofanimmediate nature,totrackopenitemsuntilclosureandtoprovideforreporting ofsignificant conditions tomanagement.

St.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page713.3Condition Reporting (CR)SystemPriorto1994,St.Luciehadseveralproblemreporting andresolution systems.In1994,mostwereconsolidated intoasinglesiteprocess.TheCRprocessiscontrolled byanadministrative procedure (AP0006130, "Condition Reports").Theprocessisusedthroughout theNuclearDivision, althougheachplanthasitsownimplementing procedure.

Thesystemisalsodesignedtohaveaverylowthreshold forusebyanyoneworkingintheNuclearDivision.

Thisallowstrackingandtrendingoflowlevelaswellashighlevelissuestoaidplantmanagement tosetpriorities onissuesastheyarise.TheCRprocessincludesrequirements thateachCRbereviewedbytheNuclearPlantSupervisor (NPS)forthepurposeofmaintaining hisawareness ofplantconditions andtheperformance ofaninitialoperability assessment.

Subsequent tothisreviewbytheNPS,condition reportsreceiveareviewbyaninterdisciplinary panelofplantpersonnel.

Inaddition, thispanelmakesrecommendations tothePlantGeneralManagerregarding thelevelofrootcauseanalysisrequiredandtheappropriate department forassignment.

Subsequent tothisreview,thePlantGeneralManagerreviewsallCondition Reports.TheCRprocessincludesthefollowing corrective actionevaluations:

1.CRsarescreenedforsafetysignificance, operability andreportability issues(10CFR50.72-Notification Requirements; 10CFR50.73-LERs,and10CFR21)andareprioritized according totheirpotential impactoncontinued safeoperation.

2,ForCRsofsafetysignificance, operability, andreportability evaluations areinitiated immediately following initialscreening inthecorrective actionprocess.3.Rootcauseanalysisandreviewforgenericimplications isperformed commensurate withthesignificance ofthecondition.

4.Corrective actionsaredeveloped, reviewedbymanagement oftheassigneddepartment andimplemented.

5.Corrective actionimplementation isscheduled according totheprioritization oftheissue(including consideration ofimpactondesignbasesdocumentation).

6.Condition Reportsreceiveanindependent reviewforclosure.7.TrackingandtrendingofCRsisperformed onaperiodicbasisforthepurposeofidentifying performance trendsandproblemareasrequiring management attention.

Corrective actionswhicharegenerated bytheCRprocessaretrackedinaPlantManagerActionItem(PMAI)trackingsystem.Thisisaplantspecifictrackingsystemwhichfollowsthecorrective actionstocompletion andgivestheitemsvisibility withintheorganization.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page723.4EventResponseTeamsAnEventResponseTeam(ERT)programprovidesforafastactinggroupofknowledgeable plantpersonnel toinvestigate therootcauseofplanteventssuchas,automatic reactortrips,unplanned unitshutdowns, andrecurring maintenance/repair issues,Significant equipment problemscanalsobethesubjectofinvestigations byanERT.TheERTprocessisdefinedwithinanERTGuideline document.

AnERTmayberequested byanymemberoftheNuclearManagement Team.ThePGMorEngineering ManagerappointsanERTleaderandconcurswiththeselection ofteammembers.IncaseswhereanERTisformed,aCRisinitiated.

Teammeetingsareheldasoftenasnecessary untiltheERTaccomplishes thefollowing tasks:~Determination oftherootcauseoftheevent.~Determination ofshort-term countermeasures.

~Determination ofcountermeasures topreventrecurrence oftheevent.~Identification ofpossiblegenericproblemsthatmaycausesimilarevents,anddevelopment ofactionplanstoaddressthem.TheERTusestoolssuchaseventtimelines,drawings, causeandeffectdiagrams, failuremodesandeffectanalysis, possiblerootcauseevaluation

matrices, systemoperators, vendorapplication experts,systemengineers, andcomponent specialists toaidinthedetermination ofrootcause.Aformalplantprocedure, ADM-08.04, "RootCauseEvaluation,"

isalsoinplacetoprovidedetailedguidanceindetermination ofzootcause.Thisprocedure providesforuseofthefollowing provenrootcausetechniques:

taskanalysis, changeanalysis, barrieranalysis, eventtimelineandcausalfactorcharting, causalfactorscategorylisting,causeandeffectanalysis, andfaulttreeanalysis; Aformalprocedure, OP0030119, "PostTripReview,"isinplacetoprovideasystematic methodforensuringtheproperfunctioning ofsafety-related andotherimportant equipment duringareactortrip.TheposttripreviewisusedasinputtotheERTandprovidesmanagement withthenecessary information todetermine whentheplantcanbesafelyrestarted.

EventResponseTeamrecommendations andcountermeasures aredocumented andtrackedusingtheCRsystem.3.5Commitment andCorrective ActionsTracking(CTRAC)SystemsIn1985St.Luciebegantrackingcommitments madetotheNRC.Thetrackinggoalistomeetthecompletion dateforallcommitments.

Commitment toExcellence Program(CEP)Project6wasimplemented toenhancetheeffectiveness oflicensing activities andtoimprovethecoordination andcontrolofNRC-related projects.

Thistrackingsystemprovidedaprocessforclosingeachcommitment item,suchasthosemadewithinanapplication foralicenseamendment, anexemption request,aresponsetoanoticeofviolation, acorrective actionwithinaLicensee St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page73EventReport,orothercommitment madetotheNRConthedocket.Thecommitment trackingsystemtodayismoredetailedbutessentially thesameinfunctionasthatgenerated aspartofProject6.NRCcommitments arenowtrackedusingthePMAITrackingSystem.Anadditional featureofthesystemistomakeavailable asearchtoolwhichcanascertain ifaparticular issueisinfactacommitment andprovidealinktotheoriginating document.

Procedures oftenhavecommitment references intheintroductory sectionsoftheprocedure andinmanycasesinthebodyoftheprocedure nexttothestepwhichimplements thecommitment.

3.6ChangeRequestNotices(CRN)Whenanengineering designpackageisissued,thereisalwaysapotential thatsomefieldcondition orminorchangemayberequiredafterthepackageisissued.TheEngineering procedures permitadesignpackagetoeithergothroughaformalrevisionortohaveaCRNbeissuedtoresolvetheminorchange.TheCRNistheprimarymethodusedtomakeminorchangestoanissuedengineering package,wheretherequested changedoesnotaffectthedesignorsafetyanalysisoftheengineering package.ACRNmayalsobeinitiated foradesignpackagebyanyindividual andprovidesamechanism forformallycorrecting minorpotential problemswithanissueddesign.3.7Nonconformance Reports(NCR)TheNCRprocesswasadministered bytheQualityControlDepartment until1994,atwhichtime,itwasmadepartoftheCondition Report(CR)processwhichisnowadministered bytheServicesDepartment.

TheNCRprocessprovidesameansforcontrolling thedisposition ofnonconforming itemsreportedduringreceiptinspection orfieldinspection ofSSCswhereEngineering isrequiredtoevaluateandresolvethenonconformance.

TheNCRprocessalsoprovidesfortheconductofanoperability assessment fornonconformances identified onin-service equipment.

Nonconforming itemsthatareacceptable byvirtueofexistingdesigndocumentation donotrequireEngineering evaluation andarecorrected byaPlantWorkOrderorRelayWorkOrder.3.810CFRPart21/Significant SafetyHazardEvaluations Onemechanism forevaluating designorequipment problemsisthroughthe10CFR21reporting process,Whenfirstinstituted in1977,Part21wasusedextensively toaddressdesignandequipment issuesidentified bothinternally andbyexternalvendors.10CFR21evaluations havealmostexclusively beenperformed byengineering personnel ifthedesignorequipment isfoundtohavebeenprovidedtoFPL.Theseevaluations providedameansforFPLtoevaluateandaddressspecificissuesfromeitherexternalorinternalsourcesandtodocumentrequiredcorrective actionsandreporting toNRC.Subsequent changesinthisruleandthepromulgation of10CFR50.72and50.73aresuchthatevaluations arenowprimarily performed with"operability" criteriaasthefocusratherthanagainstsubstantial safetyhazardscriteria.

Operability isincorporated St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page74withinthecondition reporting processandismorerestrictive than10CFR21.10CFR21evaluations areperformed forequipment receivedbythewarehouse, butnotyetinstalled inthepowerplanttoevaluateifasubstantial safetyhazardexists.Thereporting criteriaof10CFR50.72and50.73andtheirusewillbediscussed insection3.10.3.9Operability Determination Theinitialoperability reviewforallconditions isconducted duringtheNuclearPlantSupervisor's reviewoftheCondition Report.Ifamoredetailedreviewiswarranted, theCRisassignedtoEngineering.

Recommended

guidance, considerations, andmethodology forperforming assessments ofoperability onnonconforming ordegradedconditions areproceduralized inaNuclearEngineering QI.TheQIisbasedontheinformation contained inNRCGenericLetter91-18,"Information toLicensees Regarding TwoNRCInspection ManualSectionsonResolution ofDegradedandNonconforming Conditions andonOperability."

Thefollowing aspectsofoperability determination arediscussed intheQI:~Operability vs.fullqualification

~Operability vs,singlefailure~Operability andtheuseofmanualactionvs.automatic action~Operability andtheuseofprobabilistic safetyassessment

~Operability vs.environmental qualification

~Technical Specification operability vs.ASMESectionXIoperative criteria~Operability vs.pipingandpipesupportrequirements

~Operability vs.flawevaluation

~Operability vs.operational leakage(GenericLetter90-05)~Operability vs.structural requirements Inaddition, adesign/operability reference guideisintheEngineering QIstoprovideadditional guidanceonoperability considerations aswellasdesign,safety,quality,andregulatory considerations whichmayfacilitate development ofthoroughdesigninputs/analyses andoperability assessments.

Theguidanceisintendedtobeachecklist toensurethatapplicable considerations arenotomittedduringadesignoroperability assessment activity.

3.1010CFR50.72and50.73Reportability Determination Conditions whichmaybereportable aredocumented onaCondition Report.EachCRisreviewedbytheNuclearPlantSupervisor for10CFR50.72reportability inaccordance withadministrative procedure AP0010721,"NRCRequiredNon-Routine Notifications andReports."

ThesiteFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)reviewsspecificeventsforreportability andtheLicensing Department preparesallLicenseeEventReports(LER).

St.LucioUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page753.11Corrective ActionProgramTrainingTrainingonidentification ofproblemsandimplementation ofcorrective actionsincludesthefollowing:

TheEngineering SupportPersonnel (ESP)TrainingPlanincludesinitialtrainingontheCorrective ActionProgram.ThistrainingispartoftheInitialIndoctrination trainingsectionoftheINPOaccredited Engineering SupportPersonnel (ESP)TrainingProgram.Thistrainingconsistsofabasicreviewoftheplantprocedures associated withthecorrective actionsprogramincluding theCRprocess.Specifictraininginrootcauseanalytical techniques hasbeenperiodically providedtoSt.Luciepersonnel.

Thismaterialiscontained inahandbookentitled"ProblemIdentification andCorrection" (PIC).Thishandbookincludestopicssuchas,definingtheproblem,determining rootcauseandthedevelopment ofappropriate corrective actions.ThePICprocesstrainingisofferedtoappropriate management andengineering personnel.

Methodsavailable forthereporting ofproblemsatSt.LucieisasubjectoftheGeneralEmployeeTrainingProgrampresented toplantemployees andcontractors onanannualbasis.Additionally, theopportunity toprovideinformation directlytotheNRCinaccordance withtheprovisions ofForm3isasubjectofthistrauung."Notification ofPlantEvents"isalessonplanwhichincludesthereporting requirements of10CFR50.72.andisusedforthetrainingoflicensedoperators 4.0NRC/St.LucieInterfaces FPLhasapolicythatrequiresopenandcandidcommunications withNRCpersonnel.

Frequentcommunications aremadewiththeNRCresidentinspectors andtheNRCprojectmanagerforSt.Lucie.Aregulatory liaisonofficeismaintained inWashington D.C.toallowexpedited face-to-facecommunications withtheNRCstaff,ifrequired, foranyissuewhichmayarise,

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page76[e]"Theoveralleffectiveness ofyourcurrentprocesses andprogramsinconcluding thattheconfiguration ofyourplant(s)isconsistent withthedesignbases."Anoutlineoftheorganization oftheresponsetothisrequestfollows:1.0Introduction 2.0ProgramReviewsWhichLeadtoDesignBasesVerification 2.12.22.32.42.52.62.72.82.9NRCBulletin79-14PipingWalkdownProgramTechnical Specification Improvements Electrical PowerSystemDesignBasesEnhancements UpdatedLOCAContainment AnalysisSt.LucieUnit1ThermalPowerUprateContainment Penetration BoundaryReviewSt.LucieUnit1-USIA-46SeismicAdequacyProgramSt.LucieUnit1SteamGenerator Replacement Project(SGRP)FSARProcedural Consistency Review3.0FPLVerticalSliceAuditsandConclusions 3.13.23.3VerticalSliceAuditoftheSt.LucieUnit2IntakeCoolingWaterSystem(ICW)VerticalSliceAuditoftheUnits1and2Feedwater andMainSteamSystemsQualityAssurance AuditConclusions 4.0NRCVerticalSliceAudits4.1Electrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection (EDSFI)4.2ServiceWaterSystemOperational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)4.31996-1997 Architect/Engineer Inspection

5.0 Conclusions

ontheOverallEffectiveness oftheFPLProgramatSt.Lucie

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page771.0Introduction FPL,withreasonable assurance, isconfident thatthecurrentprocesses andprogramsareeffective inensuringthattheSt.Luciedesignandconfiguration areconsistent withthedesignbases.Thisconclusion isbaseduponthefollowing:

Theinitialplantverification process,startuptesting,surveillance testing,andcontrolofthemodification processresultsinconsistency betweenplantdesignandprocedures.

Inaddition, previously performed designbasesverification effortssuchasSSFI-type inspections, theFSARprocedural consistency review,andrelatedreviewsshowtheconsistency betweentheplant,plantprocedures, andthedesignbases.2.Theplantdesignchangeprocessensuresthecompatibility oftheplantphysicalandfunctional characteristics withthedesignbasesandplantdocumentation.

Changesareevaluated andreviewedtofullydetermine theimpactofeachchangeonothersystemsanddocuments andensureadherence toestablished requirements.

3.Theprocesses foridentifying, analyzing, andresolving conditions includetheCondition Reportprocess(whichincludesthereviewofpotential defectsandnoncompliances andEngineering reviewofselectedCRs),theNuclearSafetySPEAKOUTprogramandtheQAauditprogram.Forcaseswhereproblemswereandareidentified, appropriate rootcauseanalysesandcorrective actionswereandareimplemented.

Baseduponinformation presented intheresponses toNRCrequestsandtheitemspresented above,FPLconcludes thatitsdesigncontrolprocesses providereasonable assurance andconfidence thattheplantisbeingoperatedandmaintained withinitsdesignbasesinamannerthatdoesnotadversely impactthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Thedesigncontrolprocessintegrates plantchangesandmodifications intotheplant'soperating, maintenance, andtestingprocedures andassuresthattheplant'sperformance isconsistent withitsdesignbases.FPLhasassessedtheaccessibility andadequacyofitsdesignbasesdocumentation.

Theresultsofthisassessment formthebasisfortheFPLconclusion thatsufficient designbasesreconstitution hasbeenaccomplished toprovideanadequatebaselinefortimelyoperability determinations andplantdesignchanges.Thedesignbasesaresufficiently understood, documented, andauditable.

Operability determinations and10CFR50.59evaluations thatmayneedtobemadequicklyinresponsetoplantissuescanbesupported.

TheSt.Lucierecordforcompleteandaccurateoperability determinations supportsthisoverallconclusion regarding designbasesadequacy.

Information usedsolelytosupportdevelopment ofdesignmodification packagesneednotberetrieved asexpeditiously butisreadilyretrievable asevidenced bythepreparation forandresultsoftheSt.LucieNRCA/EInspection.

QeSt.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page78TheFPLmethodology usedindesignbasesreconstitution decisions considers thesafetysignificance ofanymissingorerroneous information.

TheFSARprocedural consistency review,theNRCA/EInspection preparation effort,andtheNRCA/EInspection resultsidentified discrepancies amongdesignbasesinformation resources, noneofwhichconstituted asignificant safetyconcern.TheNRC'sA/EInspection performed atSt.Luciefoundthatthedesignbaseschangesforthesystemsinspected hadbeenadequately implemented.

Theseassessments andinspections didnotidentifyprogrammatic failurestoadequately maintaintheplant'sdesignbases.FPL'sconfidence isbasedontheevaluation ofanumberoffactorsandprog'rams discussed inprevioussectionsofthisenclosure.

Designandconfiguration controlprogramsdescribed inNRCRequest[a]andtheresultsofevaluations described inresponsetoNRCRequests[b]and[c]supportourconclusion thatthedesignandconfiguration controlprocesses usedatSt,Lucieareinaccordance withregulatory expectations.

Theseprogramshavebeenimprovedovertimeasindustryandcompanyexpectations havechanged.Theseprogramimprovements haveculminated ineffective designcontrolandconfiguration management andhavecorrectly translated designbasesinformation intotheplantoperating, maintenance andtestingprocedures.

Specificactivities whichvalidatetheoveralleffectiveness ofmaintaining St.Lucie'sdesignbasesinformation arediscussed below.2.0ProgramReviewsWhichLeadtoDesignBasesVerification 2.'1NRCBulletin79-14PipingWalkdownProgramNRCBulletin79-14"SeismicAnalysisforAs-BuiltSafety-Related PipingSystems"addresses theconcernthattheseismicanalysesofsafety-related piping,coupledwithpressure, thermal,operating weight,andotherapplicable systemoperating parameters, beverifiedinaccordance withactualas-builtdrawingsforitsimpactonthestressanalysisofrecord.AtSt.LucieUnits1and2,theverification processconsisted ofaformalprogrambywhichas-builtconfigurations ofSeismicCategoryIsafety-related pipingsystemsweredocumented, evaluated, andmodifiedasnecessary undertheFPLQA/QCprogramasappropriate, byateamofexperienced engineers anddesigners.

Thisprogramconsisted ofwalkdowns ofdesignated SeismicCategoryIsafety-related pipingsystemsanddocumentation oftheas-builtconfiguration including pipingsize,components, andgeometry;

location, orientation, andtypeofvalves;locationandconfiguration ofpipesupports; andfloorandwallpenetration details.Thesedetailswerethenevaluated bytheteamtoassessifdocumentrevisions and/orplantmodifications wererequiredand,ifnecessary, acceptable undertheconstruction codeofrecord.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosttre Page792.2Technical Specification Improvements TheSt.Lucieunitswerelicensedtothestandardtechnical specification formatsatthetimetheoperating licenseswereissued.Overtheyearstherehavebeen147amendments totheSt.LucieUnit1operating licenseand86amendments totheSt,LucieUnit2operating license,themajorityofwhichwererevisions totheunitstechnical specifications.

St.Luciehasreviewedandimplemented manyoftheTechnical Specification lineitemimprovements issuedasNRCGenericLetters(GL)andhasadoptedanumberoftheNUREG1432,"Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants,"improvements.

2.3Electrical PowerSystemDesignBasesEnhancements In1991,FPLcompleted areviewoftheSt.LucieElectrical Distribution System(EDS).Theobjective ofthisactivitywastoassesstheperformance capability oftheEDSbyreviewing thedesignparameters astheyrelatetoonsiteandoffsiteemergency powersourcesandassociated safety-related equipment whichisreliedonduringandfollowing designbasisevents.Additionally, keyparameters ofplantconfiguration anddrawingswerereviewedforconsistency withthedesign.Uponcompletion ofthereview,severalcalculations wereupdatedorrevisedtoreflectcurrentdesignstandards.

Inaddition, anumberofinconsistencies wereidentified intheFSARandplantconfiguration drawings.

Theseinconsistencies werescheduled forcorrection andclosedfollowing theaudit.Duringthisreviewtherewerenosignificant operability concernsidentified intheSt.LucieElectrical Distribution System.2.4UpdatedLOCAContainment AnalysisIn1993,theLOCAcontainment analysesofrecordwereupdated.Priortotheupdate,thecontainment sectionoftheFSARsincludedmuchoftheoriginaldesignbasissensitivity studies.Impactofpreviouschanges,suchasanincreaseintheratedpowerlevelfrom2560MWtto2700MWt,hadbeenaddressed.

Typically, thisinformation wasupdatedwiththemostlimitingcaseofrecord.Analyses, however,hadbeenperformed usingacase-by-case

approach, makingportionsoftheFSARunclearandoutdated.

This1993updatetotheLOCAcontainment analysisincorporates applicable plantchangesintooneconciseevaluation utilizing operating experience wherenecessary tojustifytheinputs.2.5St.LucieUnit1ThermalPowerUprateIn1981,FPLprovidedanalysestojustifyanincreased thermalpowerratingforUnit1from2560MWtto2700MWt.Thisresultedinnumerouschangestotheplant'sdesignbases.Thesechangesarediscussed intheproposedlicenseamendment requestwhichwasprovidedin

St.LucieUttitsland2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page80accordance with10CFR50.90.Thisamendment requestincludedanengineering evaluation tojustifytheproposedchanges.Thethermaluprateprojectevaluations werereviewedbyFPLin1996aspartofpreparations fortheNRCA/EInspection.

FPLidentified thatthecondensate storagetankrequirements forauxiliary feedwater hadnotbeenupdatedtocorrespond totheapproximately 5%increaseinthermalpower.Thedecayheatgenerated bythereactorcoreisincreased duetotheincreaseinthermalpower.ACondition Reportwasgenerated toresolvethisinconsistency.

Shouldtheanalysisconcludethatthecondensate requirements arenotboundedbythecurrentTechnical Specification minimum,thenanamendment tothetechnical specifications willberequested inaccordance with10CFR50.90.Additionally, the1996FSARprocedural consistency reviewfoundseveralupdatinginconsistencies resulting fromthethermalpoweruprate.Condition Reportswereissuedforresolution oftheseinconsistencies.

2.6Containment Penetration BoundaryReviewTechnical assessments ofcontainment penetration boundaries forUnits1and2werecompleted in1991.Theobjectives oftheseevaluations weretoperformatechnical assessment ofeachmechanical containment penetration todetermine thosecomponents whoseintegrity orpositionwasvitaltocontainment integrity, andtoprovidesketchesidentifying thecontainment boundarycomponents.

Theevaluations show,foreachindividual penetration, thecontainment penetration

boundary, including components thatarevitaltocontainment integrity.

TheUnit1andUnit2evaluations concluded thatingeneralthecontainment isolation systemmettheintentof10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria, inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetrating thecontainment.

2.7St.LucieUnit1-USIA-46SeismicAdequacyProgramNRCGenericLetter(GL)87-02,"Verification ofSeismicAdequacyofMechanical andElectrical Equipment inOperating Reactors,"

(USIA-46)requiredareviewofSt.LucieUnit1equipment requiredtoachieveandmaintainhotshutdownoftheplantforaperiodofeighthours.FPLselectedsafetyandnon-safety-related equipment fortheirreview.Thisequipment wasevaluated forseismicadequacybyFPLengineers andaseismicreviewteamconsisting ofengineering expertsintheareaofseismicadequacyofequipment andequipment performance duringearthquakes.

Thefourbasicrequirements fortheGL87-02/USI A-46reviewofSt.LucieUnit1,whichwereverifiedthroughwalkdowns are:theequipment seismiccapacitybeinggreaterthandemand,theconstruction adequacyoftheequipment, anchorage

adequacy, andnoseismicspatialinteractions.

St.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page812.8St.LucieUnit1-SteamGenerator Replacement Project(SGRP)TheSGRPdeveloped a10CFR50.59evaluation andasetofdesignpackagesthatwillbeusedduringthe1997steamgenerator replacement outage.Inthecourseofdoingthisdesignwork,plantwalkdowns wereconducted andtheFSAR,designanalysesandotherapplicable designbasisdocuments werereviewed, Walkdowns wereconducted insideandoutsidecontainment intheareasaffectedbytheSGRP.Thesewalkdowns foundminorpipeandHVACsupportdiscrepancies betweenthedesigndrawingsandtheas-foundcondition.

Eachdiscrepant condition wasdocumented, evaluated anddispositioned.

Theaccidentanalysespresented inChapter15wereevaluated todetermine theeffectsofusingthereplacement steamgenerators (RSG).Theobjective ofeachevaluation wastodemonstrate thattheSt.LucieUnit1plantresponsewiththeRSGswouldmeetallNRC-approved FSARacceptance criteria.

Theseevaluations oftheexistingplantdesignandlicensing bases,steamgenerator physicalinterfaces, thermal-hydraulic aspects,structural

supports, safetyanalyses, technical specifications, andoff-normal andemergency procedures showedthattheRSGdesignpreserves theexistingplantdesignandlicensing bases.Therefore, useoftheRSGsatSt.Lucie1meetsallrelevantcriteriaandguidance, theexistinglicensing anddesignbasesremainvalid,theTechnical Specifications andtheirbasesremainvalid,andnounreviewed safetyquestions exist.2.9FSARProcedural Consistency ReviewFPLdevotedabout8000man-hours in1996tothereviewoftheFSARs.Thiseffortinvolvedacomprehensive reviewoftheFSARswiththeprimaryfocusbeingtheidentification ofprocedural processes includedintheFSARandtheircomparison tothecurrentplantprocedures toassureconsistency.

Theconclusion ofthiseffortisthattherewerenooperability issuesofsafetysignificance.

ThefinalresultsofsomeCondition Reports(CR)arestillpending,however,theresultstodatehavenotposedanyunresolved safetyconcerns.

ThesmallnumberofCR-related inconsistencies indicatethattheredoesnotappeartobemajordiscrepancies betweentheFSARsandtheoperating procedures.

Therefore, thisprogramsupportstheoverallconclusion thatplantprocedures andthedesignbasisareconsistent.

3.03.1FPLVerticalSliceAuditsandConclusions VerticalSliceAuditoftheSt.LucieUnit2IntakeCoolingWaterSystem(ICW)In1988,theFPLQAdepartment conducted averticalsliceauditontheUnit2ICWsystemdesign,procurement ofparts,andsystemoperation andmaintenance, toassuresystemoperability.

TheICWsystemandcomponents wereinspected toevaluateconfiguration control,andtodetermine whethertheywerecapableofperforming thesafetyfunctions requiredbytheirdesignbases.Plantmodifications werereviewedtodetermine ifanyunreviewed safetyquestions were St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page82introduced.

Systemwalkdowns verifiedas-builtconfiguration.

Pre-operational testingandhydrostatic testingmettheobjectives ofthedesignbases.Theauditresultedinfivefindings, noneofwhichinvolveddiscrepancies betweenas-builtconditions andthedesignbases.Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandwereclosed.3.2VerticalSliceAuditoftheUnits1and2Feedwater andMainSteamSystemsIn1991,theFPLQAdepartment conducted averticalsliceauditonthedesign,operation, andmaintenance oftheUnit1andUnit2feedwater andmainsteamsystems.Thedesignbases,asdescribed intheFSAR,werereviewedtoassurethatconfiguration controlwasmaintained.

Safetyevaluations forsystemmodifications werereviewedtoensureunreviewed safetyquestions didnotexist.Systemwalkdowns verifiedtheas-builtconfiguration, component identification, orientation, accessability, andgeneralplantconditions.

Operating procedures, plantdrawings, maintenance activities, andpostmaintenance testingwerealsoreviewed.

Discrepancies betweenplantdrawingsandprocedures resultedintwofindings.

Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandwereclosed.3.3QualityAssurance AuditConclusions TheQAAuditProgram,alongwithothertechnical reviewsandassessments performed bytheQualityDepartment orIndependent SafetyEngineering Group(ISEG),haveconsistently evaluated theimplementation ofplantmodifications, comparedsystemas-builtconditions toplantdesign,andevaluated whetherdrawingsandprocedures wereconsistent withtheplants'esign bases,withoverallsatisfactory results.4.04.1NRCVerticalSliceAuditsElectrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection (EDSFI)InFebruaryandMarch1991,theNRCconducted aspecialannounced teaminspection intheareasofdesignofelectrical systemsandrelatedengineering andmaintenance activities.

Thisinspection specifically focusedontheElectrical Distribution System(EDS)as-builtconfiguration, conformance todesignbasesrequirements, anddesignoutputdocuments.

TheNRCconcluded thattheEDSatSt.Lucieasevaluated wascapableofperforming itsintendedfunctionundernormalandaccidentconditions.

Itwasalsoconcluded thatadequatecontrolsareinplacetomaintaintheEDSinanoperableconfiguration.

4.2ServiceWaterSystemOperational Performance Inspection InSeptember andOctober1991,theNRCconducted ateaminspection intheareaoftheservicewateroperational performance atSt.Lucie.Thisinspection specifically focusedontheservicewatersystem(i.e.,intakecoolingwatersystem)systemas-builtconfiguration andoperational performance regarding theapplicable designbasesrequirements.

Theinspection includedamechanical designreview,detailedsystemwalkdowns, andareviewofsystemoperation,

QoSt.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page83maintenance, andsurveillance procedures.

Italsoincludedanassessment ofqualityassurance andcorrective actionsrelatedtotheintakecoolingwatergCW)system.TheNRCinspection teamconcluded thattheICWas-builtconfiguration wouldbecapableofperforming itsintendedsafetyfunctionunderdesignbasesconditions.

4.31996-1997 Architect/Engineer Inspection FromNovember1996throughJanuary1997,theNRCconducted anArchitect/Engineer Inspection oftwosystemsatSt.Lucie;theUnit1Auxiliary Feedwater andtheUnit2Component CoolingWaterSystems.Thisinspection wasperformed inaccordance withNRCInspection ManualChapter93801,SafetySystemFunctional Inspection (SSFI)guidance.

FPL'spreparation forthisinspection identified 17concernsassociated withdesignbases,designorconfiguration control,orplantconfiguration/performance.

Condition Reportsweresubmitted fortheseitemswhichenteredthecondition intothecorrective actionprogramforresolution.

OneCondition Reportidentified undervoltage tripdevicesondcmolded-case circuit-breakers whichhadnotbeentestedforoperation.

ThefindingresultedinanNRCnotification concerning the125Vdcswing-bus tie-breakers beinginacondition whichalonecouldhaveprevented fulfillment ofasafetysystem.Therewerenootheridentified designbasesinconsistencies whichrequiredNRCnotification.

TheNRChasnotissuedtheinspection reportatthetimeofthisresponse, however,atthepublicexitmeetingfortheNRCA/EInspection effort,theNRCnotedthattherewasnobreakdown ormajorfailuresintheconfiguration controlprocessoroperationally significant concernswiththedesignbasesfortheplant.TheFPLself-assessment andtheNRCinspection supporttheconclusion thatthedesignbasesinformation isavailable andadequateandthatmajorprogramfailuresdonotexist.5.0Conclusion ontheOverallEffectiveness oftheFPLProgramatSt.LucieTheevents,inspections, audits,andreviewprogramsdiscussed above,providethebasistoconcludewithreasonable assurance thatthedesignbasesinformation isadequateandavailable.

Thecorrective actionprogramassuresthatidentified problemsorconcernsaretracked,evaluated, andcorrective actionsimplemented.

Theprocessalsotrendsplanteventstoidentifyrepetitive problemswhichcouldindicateaprocess/program problem.Thisallowscorrective actionstobeimplemented onarangeofissues.ThefocusofrecentFPLactivities hasbeentoreducethenumberofchangesoccurring atitsnuclearunitssuchthattheimpactonthedesignbasesisreduced.Backlogsofdesignchangesandrequiredequipment repairs/replacement arebeingreduced,resulting inimprovedcontroloftheplant'sconfiguration.

Baseduponinformation presented inthis'section, aswellasintheFPLresponsetorequests[a]through[d]ofthisenclosure, FPLhasconcluded thattheexistingcontrolprocesses provide St.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page84reasonable assurance andconfidence thattheplantisbeingoperatedandmaintained withinitsdesignbases,Thevalidityoftheseconfiguration controlprocesses areconfirmed bycontinued safeplantoperation, self-initiated evaluations, andNRCassessments ofplantperformance.

Theevents,inspections, audits,andprogramsdiscussed aboveprovideadditional basistoconcludethatwithreasonable assurance, thedesignbasesinformation isadequateandavailable.

Thecorrective actionprogramassuresthatproblemsorconcernswhichareidentified aretracked,evaluated andcorrective actionsimplemented toresolvetheproblemsorconcerns.

St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page85[f]"Supplemental requestforinformation ondesignreview/basis programs."

Thefollowing outlineprovidestheorganization fortheresponsetothisadditional information request.1.01.0NuclearEnergyInstitute (NEI)96-05Initiative 2.0FSARReviewsandSelf-Assessments 3.0DesignBasisProgram4.0ListofActionsNuclearEnergyInstitute (NEI)96-05Initiative InresponsetoNRCInformation Notice96-17,"ReactorOperation Inconsistent withtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,"datedMarch18,1996,NEI96-05,"Guidelines forAssessing ProgramsforMaintaining theLicensing Basis,"wasissued.St.Lucieiscurrently proceeding withtherevieweffortproposedbyNEI,whichwilladdressprogratnmatic andnon-programmatic FSARchangesandassesstheaccuracyoftwosafetyandtwonon-safety, risksignificant systemsdescribed intheFSAR.2.0FSARReviewsandSelf-Assessments Thefollowing St.Lucieprogramsandinitiatives arecurrently inprogressorarecompleted.

2.1FSARProcedural Consistency ReviewDuring1995and1996,NRCinspections foundthatplantoperators wereusingprocedures whichhadprocessstepsnotfoundintheFSARandthatthenormalprocessstepsfoundintheFSARwerenotbeingfollowed.

Asaresultofthiseventandotherexamplesofsimilarprocedural inconsistencies, FPLinitiated anFSARreviewforprocedural consistency.

This1996effortinvolvedacomprehensive reviewoftheFSARs(~8000man-hours) withtheprimaryfocusbeingtheidentification ofprocedural processes intheFSARandacomparison withtheplantprocedures toassureconsistency.

Theconclusion reachedfromthiseffortisthattherewerenooperability issueswhichrepresented asubstantial safetyhazard.Thefinalresultsofsomecondition reportsarestillpending,however,theyhavehadoperability reviewscompleted toensurethattheydonotposeanyunresolved safetyconcerns.

ThesmallnumberofCR-related inconsistencies identified indicatethattheredoesnotappeartobemajordiscrepancies betweentheFSARandtheplantoperating procedures.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page86Instrument SetpointReviewBetween1991and1993,FPLperformed aninstrument setpointreviewfortheSt.LuciePlanttoverifyanddocumentcurrentsetpoints.

Plantoperating andmaintenance procedures werecomparedtothecurrentfieldconditions anddesigndocuments toverifyconsistency.

Thiseffortiscomplete.

Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprogramandwereclosed.2.3Annunciator ReviewAplantannunciator summaryreviewiscurrently inprogress.

Thisprogramwillreviewselectedannunciators forthefollowing alarmpanels:controlroom,wastemanagement, dieselgenerators AandB,steamgenerator blowdownbuilding, boricacidconcentrators AandB,wasteconcentrators, watertreatment plant,theoxygenanalyzerandliquidwaste.Thisprojectisapproximately 10%completewithover200annunciators reviewed.

Discrepancies foundinthisreviewwillbeenteredintothecorrective actionprogrambymeansofacondition report.2.4NRCA/EInspection FindingsFPLpreparedfortheNRCA/EInspection effortbyself-assessing threesystems.TherewereseveralfindingsnotedwhichwereenteredintotheSt.Luciecorrective actionprogram.Atthetimeofthisresponse, thewritteninspection reporthasnotbeenissued,buttheNRCresultswereprovidedatapublicexitmeetingonJanuary28,1997.TheNRCexitresultsindicated thattherewerenomajorprogramweaknesses orfailures, however,itwasnotedthatfutureself-assessments wouldbebeneficial.

3.0DesignBasisProgramAdesignbasisprogramwascompleted atSt.Lucieonaselectednumberofsystems.Thisprogramdeveloped summaryleveldocuments whichconsolidated information contained inreference designbasessources(i,ecalculations,

analyses, etc.),therebymakingitmoreaccessible inresponding toplantoperational needs.Designbasisimprovement activities willcontinuetobeperformed onanas-needed basisthroughout thelifeoftheplant.Suchimprovement activities havebeenprimarily performed duringthedevelopment ofdesignmodification packagesandascorrective actionsfromvariousself-assessments andinspections throughtheyears,andareexpectedtocontinue, althoughtoalesserextent,inthefuture.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page874.0ListsofActionsSt.Luciehasseveralplannedandon-goingactionswhichwillprovideadditional assurances thattheunitsareoperatedandmaintained withinthedesignbasis.Theseactionsare:4.1TheNEIInitiative (96-05)reportwillbeissuedtoNEIbyApril15,1997.4.2The1996FSARconsistency reviewfindingswillberesolvedwithinatwoyearperiod.4.3Theplantannunciator summaryreviewiscurrently scheduled forcompletion inDecember1998.4.4TherecentNRCA/EInspection findingswillbeaddressed following issuanceofthefinalinspection reportandthecorrective actionswillbeprovidedbyaseparateletterorinitiative asappropriate.

AppendixA:PartialListofAcronymsSt.LucieUjtitsIand2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page88A/EAFASAFWCMCNRBCRCRNCIRACDBDDBRSDCRDERDWAEDGEDSEDSFIENGQIEOPEPEQERTESPFCPFPLFRGFSARGLHPSIIAICWIEEININPOISIITOPJ/LLLERLPSILOCAMEPMOVMPFFMWtNCRNEINNSNon-PC/MNPSArchitect/Engineer Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation SystemAuxiliary Feedwatcr Configuration Management CompanyNuclearReviewBoardCondition ReportChangeRequestNoticeCommitmcnt TrackingDesignBasisDocumentDesignBasisReference SystemDrawingChangeRcqucstNRCDailyEventReportDeliveryWorkAuthorization Emergency DieselGenerator Electrical Distribution SystemElectrical Distribution SystemFunctional Inspection Engineering QualityInstruction Emergency Operating Procedure Engineering PackageEquipment Qualification EventResponseTeamEngineering SupportPersonnel FSARChangePackageFloridaPowerandLightCompanyFacilityReviewGroupUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportNRCGenericLettersHighPressureSafetyInjection Instrument AirIntakeCoolingWaterItemEquivalency Evaluation InHouseEventNRCInformation NoticesInstitute OfNuclearPowerOperations Inservice Inspection Implementor TurnoverPackageJumperandLiftedLeadLicenseeEventReportsLowPressureSafetyInjection LossofCollantAccidentMinorEngineering PackageMotorpcratcd ValveMaintenance Prcventablc Functional FailureMegaWatts

-ThermalNon-Conformance ReportNuclearEnergyInstitute Non-Nuclear SafetyNon-Plant Change/ModiTication NuclearPlantSupervisor NRC08'cMROEOEFOSTIPC/MPCRPEGPEPPMPMAIPMTPODPRPRAPRBPSLPTNPWOQAQIRCSREARTSTSALPSARSASESATSSDNSENSERSITSOSOERSQADSSFISSCSSHSTARSWSOPITEDBTQARTSANuclearRegulatory Commission Operations andMaintenance ReminderOperating Experience ReportOperating Experience FeedbackOperational SafetyTeamInspection PlantChange/Modification Procedure ChangeRequestProduction Engineering GroupPerformance Enhancement ProgramPreventative Maintenance PlantManagerActionItemPost-Maintenance TestingPlantOperating DrawingsProcurement Requisition Probabilistic RiskAssessment PlantReviewBoardSt.LuciePlantUnitsIand2TurkeyPointUnits3and4PlantWorkOrderQua!ityAssurance QualityInstruction ReactorCoolantSystemRequestforEngineering Assistance RealTimeSupportTeamSystematic Assessment OfLicenseePcifoflilailce SafetyAnalysisReportStandAloneSafetyEvaluations SystemAcceptance AlloverStatusSupplierDeviation NoticeSigniTicant EventNotification SafetyEvaluation ReportSafetyInjection TankSignificant byOthersReportSignificant Operating Experience ReportSpecialQADocumentSafetySystemFunctional Inspection System,Structure andComponent Significant SafetyHazardSt.LucieActionReportsServiceWaterSystemOperational Performance Inspection TotalEquipmcnt DataBaseTopicalQualityAssurance RcportTemporary SystemAlteration St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page89AUDITAppendixBTableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindingsRESULTSQAS-JPN-91-8, "JunoNuclearEngineering-Production Engineering Group(PEG)forSt.Lucie."SummatgTheauditteamfocusedontheSt.LucieProduction Engineering Group(PEG),andtheJunoNuclearEngineering group.Auditorsreviewedmodiflication

packages, associated safetyevaluations, designbasesdocuments, theenvironmental qualification program,andengineering procedures andqualityinstructions.

ThreeauditFindingsidentified programinatic andadministrative areasforimprovement.

Plantchangesandmodiflication ofoperating plants.ControlofFPLoriginated design.IdcntiTication ofsafety-related structures, systemsandcomponents.

Environmental qualification ofelectrical equipment ControlofcomputersoftwareEndmgr.¹1.Someinternaldesigninterfaces withnewJPNorganizations arenotdocumented.

¹2.Somedesignbasisinformation inthcTotalEquipmcnt DataBasegK)B)isnotup-to~e.¹3.DeliveryWorkAuthorizations (DWAs)wereissuedforsafety-related servicestoasupplierwhowasnotontheapprovedsupplierlistforthelocationdesignated ontheDWA.QAS-JPN-92-3, "NuclearEngineering."

Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandarcclosed.Summary;TheauditteamfocusedonASMESectionXI,safetyevaluations, designinputs,designbases,designanalyses, engineering

packages, specialprocesses, engineering procedures, andtheJunoNuclearEngineering QualityAssurance Program.ThreeauditFindingswereissued,butthedeficiencies didnothaveasignificant impactonsafetyorqualityrelatedactivities.

ASMESectionXISafetyclassification andsafetyevaluations Technical specifications Designinputs/design basisDesignanalysisMinorengineering packagesEndings:¹1.Implementing proccdurcs andassociated trainingdidnotalwaysmeetQAManualrequirements fortheQARecords/DocumentControlCenters.¹2.Non<estructive testingprocedures conflicted withtheQualityInstruction.

¹3.Receiptacknowledgments thatwerenotreceivedwithin30daysofdistributing QArecordswerenotalwaysfollowedup.Thcfindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page90AUDITAppendixBTableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindingsRESULTSQAS-JPN-93-3, "NuclearEngineering

-PSLDesignControl."

Sualrrtarg Theauditteamevaluated 12engineering packagesandtheirassociated calculations, alongwithdocuments andprocedures associated withthePSLProbabilistic RiskAssessment (PRA).OneFindingwasissuedforfailingtoupdatedesigndocuments following changestotheplant.Engineering packagesMnorengineering packagesDesignandsafetyanalysesCalculations ComputersoftwarecontrolPCsoftwarecontrolEndingr.¹LHardwarechangesweremadetovalvesintheplant,buttheTotalEquipment DataBasegKK)wasnotupdatedtoreflectthosespecificchanges.QAS-JPN-95-1, "NuclearEngineering Audit."Thefindingswercformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed.Btttrrtrrarg Thisfunctional areaauditevaluated engineering packagesdeveloped forthePSLUnit2cycle9refueling outage,real-time supportforcorrective actionrcqucstsinvolving engineering, andlongtermenhancement projectssuchasthePSL24monthfuelcycle.Allmajorengineering processes andproccdurcs usedtoprovidedesignoutputwereevaluated.

Therewerenoauditfindingsorconcernsidentified duringtheaudit.DesigncontrolEngineering packagesMinorengineering packagesCalculations Designinputverifications Environmental qualifications Engineering evaluations 10CFR5059screening/evaluations 10CFR21SSHevaluation andreporting Operability determinations safetyclassifications Vendortechnical manualcontrolsFSARupdatingDesignbasisdocumentupdatingTEDBComputersoftwarecontrolEindirtgz None St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page91AUDITAppendixBTableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindingsRESULTSQSL-PM-9M6, April/May 1996PSLQAPerformance Monitoring Audit.Snmmary;Thisroutineauditfocusedonperformance-based observations intheareasofoperations, maintenance, servicesandengineering, andresultedin6Findings.

Intheengineering area,discrepancies betweentheFSARandPSLimplementing procedures wereidentified, andprocedures didnotadequately addressdesignrequirements.

Endittgr.

¹1.TheFSARwasnotupdatedtoreflectchangesinradwastestoragepractices.

¹4.Noprocedural guidanceexistedwhichdescribed whatconstituted alossofstationair,andtherequiredcontingency actionstoisolateanopenpenetration isstationairwaslostduringcorealterations.

QSL-PM-9648, May/June1996PSLQAPerfonnance Monitoring Audit.Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed.Snmnnuz:Thisroutineauditfocusedonperformance-based observations intheareasofoperations, maintenance, servicesandengineering, andresultedin3Findings.

Intheengineering area,discrepancies betweenthcFSARandPSLimplementing procedures wereidentified.

Ending¹1.Theprocedure andmethodsusedtotransferresinfromtheblowdownbuildingdidnotmatchthesystemoperating description intheFSAR.QSL-PCM-96-11, AuditofthePSLprogramforreviewandimplementation ofplantchange/modification

packages, andstand-alone engineering safetyevaluations.

'Ihefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed.SttmmargTYisauditfocusedonStLucieUnit1Cycle14refueling activities.

The"Reload"modification packagewasreviewed, andQAidentified thatprercquisites forspentfuelpoolcoolingwerenotmetpriortofuelmovement.

Additional modiflication packagestobeimplemented duringthercfucling outagewerereviewed, aswellasthemodification packageandsafetyevaluation reviewprocesses.

QAfoundthatthepre-implementation reviewofdesignchangesandsafetyevaluations bycognizant organizations ispoorlydefined,anddonotprovideadequateassurance thattherequirements oftheseengineering documents willbecapturedandsatisfied priortoimplementation, resulting in3significant Findings.

Endingr.¹1.Plantprocedures andinstructions donotadequately definetheprocessforthereviewofPC/Mpackagesbyapplicable departments, andtheresolution ofcomments, duringthePC/Mpreparation stage(beforeissuancetotheplant).¹2.Plantprocedures andinstructions donotadequately definetheprocessforthereviewofPC/Mpackagesbyapplicable departments, theresolution ofcomments, ortheidentification ofplantprocedures impactedbyPC/Mpackagesduringthefinalreviewstage(afterissuancetotheplant).¹3.Plantprocedures andinstructions donotadequately addressthereviewofengineering safetyevaluations forimpactonplantprocedures andinstructions.

Noprocedure existswhichspcciTies howPSLreviewsandimplements requirements statedinsafetyevaluations.

Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page92AUDITAppendixBTableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindingsRESULTSQSL-PM-96-18, September

~1996PSLQAPerformance Monitoring Audit.Bmnmxr.Thisroutineauditfocusedonperfonnance-based observations intheareasofoperations, maintenance, servicesandengineering, andresultedin6Findings.

Intheengineering area,twoFindingswereindicative oflessthanadequateimplementation of10CFR5059requirements.

Ettditgr.

¹3.Changestoplantsystemsweremadeusingtheminormaintenance processwithoutadequately addressing configuration controlrequirements, ortherequirements of10CFR50.59,"Changes, TestsandExpcrimcnts."

¹5.Theprocessforconverting plantprocedures toGuidelines, andforrevisingGuidelines donotmeet10CFR5059requirements.

Thefinding¹3wasformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandisclosed.Finding¹5isstillbeingresolved.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page93AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSQSL4PS-88-595, VerticalSexualSliceAuditoftheUnit2TheauditteamfocusedontheICWsystemdesign,procurement ofparts,andsystemIntakeCoolingWaterSystem.operation andmaintenance, toassuresystemoperability.

TheICWsystemandcomponents wereinspected toevaluateconfiguration control,andtodetermine whethertheywerecapableofperforming thesafetyfunctions requiredbytheirdesignbases.PlantmodiTications werereviewedtodetermine ifanyunreviewed safetyquestions wereintroduced.

Systemwalkdowns verifiedas-builtconfiguration.

Pre-operational testingandhydrostatic testingmetthcobjectives ofthedesignbases.Theauditresultedin5Findings, nonewhichinvolveddiscrepancies bctwcenas-builtconditions andthedesignbases.SystemdesignProcurement In-service Inspection Testing¹1.¹2.¹3.¹4.¹5.Drawingsdidnotreflectas-builtconditions.

ICWsystemprocedures contained discrepancies.

Improperormissingcomponent identification tags.Externalcorrosion wasnotconsidered, andevidenceofdamageanddeterioration wereidentifie.

Nonconforming conditions werenotalwaysdocumented.

Thcfindingswereformallyaddressed bythccorrective actionprocessandareclosed.

St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page94AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSQS~PS-88424, Unit1and2Emergency DieselGenerators andSafety-RelatedSwitchgear SystemsSmnmatr.ThisauditfocusedonEDGsystemdesign,procurement ofparts,andsystemoperation andmaintenance, toassuresystemoperability.

TheEDGsystemandcomponents wereinspected toevaluateconfiguration control,andtodetermine whethertheywerecapableofperforming thesafetyfunctions requiredbytheirdesignbases.Plantmodifications werereviewedtodetermine ifanyunreviewed safetyquestions wereintroduced.

Systemwalkdowns veriTiedas-builtconfiguration.

Theauditresultedin5Findings, whichwereformallyaddressed throughthecorrective actionprogram.Designoperability Configuration controlofdesignparameters PC/Msafetyevaluations Testingforoperability Corrective maintenance configuration changesIndividual timingrelaysandloadblocksLoadsequencer blockvoltagedropElectrical cablingStretchpowereffectsEindiomr.

¹1.EDGfueloiltransferpumpsweretested,butnotincludedintheISTplan.¹2.EDGdrawingsdidnotreflcctas-builtconditions.

¹3.EDGprocedures describing systemsandcomponents wereinaccurate.

¹4.Numerousitemswerefoundnottagged,ortaggedincorrectly.

¹5.'Inherewasnodocumentation available thatdemonstrated thatthe16,450gallonstoragetanksfortheUnit1EDGsmetthedesignbasisrequirement ofhavingsufficient fuelonhandtooperatebothEDGsintandemfor4days,oroneEDGfor8days.Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page95AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSQSLPS-89472, Verification oftheUnit2ReactorCoolantSystemDesign,Operation andMaintenance, toAssureSystemOperability.

Summary:ThisauditfocusedonReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)components andprocedures, withparticular emphasisoninstrumentation, evaluating 93RCSinstruments duringthcaudit.Safetyevaluation forsystemmodifications werereviewed, andplantdrawingwerecomparedwithas-builtconditions.

Systemwalkdowns wereperformed, andoperating, maintenance andtestprocedures werereviewed.

OneFindingwasissuedregarding instrumentation.

Designoperability Configuration controlofdesignparameters PC/Msafetyevaluations Replacement pansOff-normal procedures Operating procedures maintenance procedures PlantdrawingsAnnunciator drawingdetailsComponent taggingZhtdtttgr.

¹1.Onesafety-related instrument and8instruments usedtoverifycompliance withtechnical specifications wercnotonaperiodiccalibration schedule.

QSLIPS-90-739, Verification oftheUnit1and2Auxiliary Feedwatcr SystemDesign,Operation andMaintenance, toAssureSystemOperability.

Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed.BttmmargThisauditfocusedonthedesignbasesoftheAFWsystemasdescribed intheFSAR,andconfiguration controlofdesigninformation.

Safetyevaluations forsystemmodifications wereevaluated, andtheas-builtconfiguration oftheAFWActuation System(AFAS)wasinspected.

Walkdowns oftheUnit1and2AFWsystemwereperformed, andOperating procedures andmaintenance activities wercalsoevaluated.

OneFindingdocumented inadequate procedures atUnit2.Designoperability Configuration controlofdesignparameters PC/Msafetyevaluations Replacement partsPlantdrawingsAnnunciator drawingsComponent taggingAFWline-upprocedure Entutgr.¹1.AFWoperating procedure positiondescription forinstrument rootisolation valvesdidnotmatchthedrawingsandas-foundconditions.

Thefindingswereformallyaddrcsscd bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed.

St.LucieUpits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page96AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITQSL4PS-91-800, Supplement 1,VerticalSliceAuditoftheUnit1and2Feedwater andMainSteamSystems.RESULTSSuuuxxr.Thisauditfocusedonthedesign,operation andmaintenance oftheUnit1and2feedwater andmainsteamsystems.Thedesignbases,asdescribed intheFSAR,werereviewedtoassurethatconfiguration controlwasmaintained.

Safetyevaluations forsystemmodifications werereviewedtoensureunrcviewed safetyquestions didnotexist.Systemwalkdowns verifiedtheas-builtconfiguration, component identification, orientation, accessability, andgeneralplantconditions.

Operating procedures, plantdrawings, maintenance activities andpostmaintenance testingwerealsoreviewed.

Discrepancies betweenplantdrawingsandprocedures resultedin2Findings.

Designoperability Configuration controlofdesignparameters PC/Msafetyevaluations Maintenance TestingHadmu;¹1.Flowdiagramsdidnotreflectas-foundconditions.

¹2.Plantprocedures didnotaccurately reflectheplantconfiguration.

QSLNPS-91-821, Verification oftheUnit1ReactorProtection SystemModiTications, Testing,Maintenance, andProcurement, toAssureSystemOperability.

Thefindingswereformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandareclosed.Smltllarg Thisauditfocusedonmodiflication stotheRPStoensurethatsystemmodifications didnotintroduce unreviewed safetyquestions.

RPSsetpointswereevaluated toensuretheywereadequatetomitigatepostulated accidents.

RPSinstrument tolerances wereevaluated.

Maintenance andoperating procedures werereviewed.

RPSSetpointsPC/Msafetyevaluations Replacement partsFunctional testingInstrument calibrations ZbldillgS.

None.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page97AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDlTRESULTSISEG-PSL-A93417, ISEGAssessment Activities Associated WiththeSpring1993St.LucieUnit1Refueling Outage.StannaryISEGperformed anindependent riskassessment ofnuclearsafetyduringthe1993Unit1refueling outage.Reviewswereperformed toensurethatthekeysafetyfunctions forshutdownconditions (i.e.RCSinventory, decayheatremoval,poweravailability, reactivity control,andcontainment integrity) werenotcompromised byoutagework.Oneconcernwasidentified involving thelackofverification ofthedesignbasesforthespentfuelpoolasstatedintheUFSAR,whichcouldbejeopardized byoutagework.Canuhmhns; Outagescheduling andrevieweffortsareperformed withhighregardtonuclearsafety.¹1~Incorporate thespentfuelpooloperability criteriaintoapplicable outagemanagement procedures.

ISEG-PSIA93419,ISEGAssessmcnt Activities Associated WiththeSpring1993St.LucieUnit1Refueling Outage.BumnturgISEGperformed reviewsoftheimplementation ofshutdownmarginverifications, andpressurizer safetyreliefvalvemodifications.

Cnnuhtsinnr.

Shutdownmarginverifications wereperformed inaccordance withtechnical specifications.

Pressurizer safetyreliefvalvetailpipeloadingmodiTications resultedinzeroleakageofthereliefvalves.ISEG-PSL-A93420, ISEGActivities Associated WiththeSpring1993St.Lucic-1Refueling Outage.NoneSummzgISEGprovidedindependent oversight oftheACandDCpoweravailability duringtheoutage,ensuringapplicable requirements weresatisfied.

Theintegrated safcguards testwasobserved, andaplantmodifications ofthestationblackoutcrosstiebreakerswasevaluated.

Canubtsinns; Powerwasadequately maintained duringtherefueling outage.Fansforthepressurizer heaterbusshouldbeconsidered forroutinecleaningeachoutage.Prewperational testingoftheStationBlackoutplantmodifications revealedproblemsthatshouldhavebeendctectcdthroughthemodiTication reviewprocessorthepost-modiTication inspcctionhest process.¹LReviewtheadequacyofthcprocessforensuringthatmaincircuitbreakersarerackedoutandtaggedwheneverthe480-voltbussesarecross-tied.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page98AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSITR95402,ReviewofLER335/94406:

Containment Integrity OutsideofFSARAssumptions UnderLimitedCircumstances duetoDesignError.Sttmmarz:

Thistcchnical reviewevaluated thecausalfactorsandcorrective actionsassociated withLER335/94406.

'Iherootcauseoftheeventinvolvedadesignerrormadeduringthe1978additionoftheiodineremovalsystemforUnit1.Cezbtsianr.

Causalfactorsforthelossofcontainment sumpinventory inexcessofthedesignbasiswereextensively developed.

Genericimplications wereadequately addressed.

Corrective actionsboundedthcevent.None1TR96413,SafetySystemWalkdown(Partial):

Auxiliary Feedwatcr System,Unit1.Summary;TheQAIndependent Technical Reviewgrouppcrformcd walkdowns oftheUnit1AFWsystemtoverifythatplantdrawingsreflecteas-builtconditions.

Condmhms:

listQuarter1996ESFsystem-Theas-installed configuration wasaccurately rcflccted inplantdrawings.

walkdowns]Generalcleanliness andmaterialconditions weresatisfactory.

NoneITR96415,SafetySystemWalkdown(Partial):

SectionsofEmergency CoreCoolingSubsystems intheUnit1ReactorContainment

Building, andPressurizer CodeSafetyValveModiTications.

[3rdQuarter1996ESFsystemwalkdowns]

Sumac.TheQAIndependent Technical Reviewgroupperformed walkdowns ofportionsoftheUnit1highandlowpressuresafetyinjection andcontainment spraysystems,toverifythatplantdrawingsreflected as-builtconditions.

Thercplaccment ofthepressurizer codesafetyvalvesunderamodiTication packagewasalsoevaluated.

Concernswereidentifie regarding theplant'sevaluation ofanNRCinformation notice(IN),and3recommendations weremadetoaddressadministrative problems.

Cant:lusim:

Theas-installed configuration wasaccurately rcflccted inplantdrawings.

Generalcleanliness andmaterialconditions weresatisfactory.

Operating procedures properlyimplemented thcrequirements oftheUFSARforthesystemsevaluated.

ThePSLengineering evaluation ofNRCIN96-31(regarding thepotential foroperation inanunanalyzed condition byoperating withSafetyInjection Tanks(SIT)cross-tied) didnotcontainaquantitative evaluation forthepeakcenterline fuelcladdingtcmpcratures resulting fromcross-tying SafetyInjection Tanks(SITs).Condition ReportCR96-1726wasissuedtotrackthcresponse.

¹l.¹2.¹3.Revisethepressurizer designbasisdocuments toreflecttherecentplantmodification.

Enhancetheminorengineering packagepreparation form.UpdatetheUFSARtoincludetheUnit1Cycle13largebreaklossofcoolantaccidentanalysisdata.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Enclosure Page99AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSPSLNuclearAssurance QualityReportQR964006,"FourthQuarter1996ESFWalkdownoftheUnit2KghPressureInjection System."SmnmargTheQAIndependent Technical Reviewgroupperformed walkdowns ofportionsoftheUnit2highpressuresafetyinjection systems,toverifythatas-builtconditions werereflected inplantdrawingsandmetUFSARrequirements.

Valvelineupswereperformed usingoperating procedures, andcomponents wereverifiedtomatchdesigndocumentation.

Canclttsiatm:

Theas-installed configuration wasaccurately reflected inplantdrawings.

Valveswereintheirrequiredpositions.

Minoridentification tagdiscrepancies werenoted.41installed components wereverifiedtomatchthePASSPORTdescriptions.

Apotential lackofseparation betweenHPSIdischarge isolation valveswasevaluated andfoundtobesatisfactory.

Ecsttltr.

Satisfactory QSL-PM-96-18, September 1996PSLQAPerformance Monitoring Audit.SttmmargThisroutineauditfocusedonperformance-based observations intheareasofoperations, maintenance, servicesandengineering, andrcsultcdin6Findings.

Intheengineering area,twoFindingswercindicative oflessthanadequateimplementation of10CFR5059requirements.

Ezimgr.N3.Changestoplantsystemsweremadeusingtheminormaintenance processwithoutadequately addressing configuration controlrequirements, ortherequirements of10CFR5059,"Changes, TestsandExperiments."

N5.Theprocessforconverting plantprocedures toGuidelines, andforrevisingGuidelines donotmeet10CFR5059requirements.

FindingN3wasformallyaddressed bythecorrective actionprocessandisclosed.FindingN5iscurrently inthecorrective actionprocess.

i~\