ML20199L344: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000327/1986015]]
| number = ML20199L344
| issue date = 04/01/1986
| title = Insp Repts 50-327/86-15 & 50-328/86-15 on 860206-0305. Violation Noted:Failure to Comply W/Tech Spec 6.2.3 Re Independent Safety Engineering Group
| author name = Harmon P, Jenison K, Watson L, Weise S
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000327, 05000328
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-327-86-15, 50-328-86-15, IEIN-86-004, IEIN-86-4, NUDOCS 8604100353
| package number = ML20199K437
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 12
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000327/1986015]]
 
=Text=
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        SS REcg                                UNITED STATES
                  o                  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
  w" \        g/                                REGION li
  f . k .N                              101 M ARIETTA STREET.N.W.
                                          ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323
  *'g v /          f
      .
    s,
        +...+
  Report Nos.:        50-327/86-15, 50-328/86-15
  Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
                  6N38 A Lookout Place
                  1101 Market Street
                  Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
  Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328                                License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79
  Facility Name: Sequoyah Units 1 and 2
  Inspection Conducted:        February 6 - March 5, 1986
  Inspectors:                M              I 2__                              T at Signed  b
                  K. M. Jenison, denior KsidfiPE Inspector
                  L!&J. ilatsog, esident[spe[orJ~ Ae/f%                          Da't'e' Si g ned
                                n'e
                      . Harmen, w de t 'In
                                                                                  $            bh___                                      l
                                                efr~
                                                            -
                  P.                                                              Dafe ig ed
  Approved by:              .    ,-  4    Mb                                          / h
                    S. P. Weise, Section Chief                                    Date Signed
                    Division of Reactor Projects
                                                SUMMARY
  Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved 265 resident inspector-hours
  onsite in the areas of: operational safety verification (including operations
  performance, system lineups, radiation protection, safeguards and housekeeping
  inspections); surveillance and maintenance observations; review of previous
  inspection findings; followup of events; review of licensee identified items;
  review of IE Information Notices; and review of inspector followup iterrt.
  Results: One violation (failure to comply with Technical Specification 6.2.3,
  Independent Safety Engineering Group) was identified.
                              7
    kk
    G
            N Ck
 
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                                    REPORT DETAILS
  1.  Licensee Employees Contacted
      H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director
    *P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager
    *L. M. Nobles, Operations and Engineering Superintendent
    *B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Superintendent
    *J. M Anthony, Operations Group Supervisor
    *R. W. Olson, Modifications Branch Manager
      M. R. Sediacik, Electrical Section Manager, Modifications Branch
      H. D. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager
      C. W. LaFever, Instrument Engineering Supervisor
      M. A. Scarzinski, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
    *M.  R. Harding, Engineering Group Manager
    *D. C. Craven, Quality Assurance Staff Supervisor
      D. L. Cowart, Quality Surveillance Supervisor
    *D. E. Crawley, Health Physics Supervisor
    *G. B. Kirk, Compliance Supervisor
      M. L. Frye, Compliance Engineer
      H. R. Rogers, Compliance Engineer
    *R. C. Burchell, Compliance Engineer
    *E. W. Whitaker, Licensing Engineer
      D. H. Tullis, Mechanical Maintenance Group Supervisor
      J. H. Sullivan, Regulatory Engineering Supervisor
      C. E. Chmielewski, Nuclear Engineer, NSS
      Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, shift
      engineers, security force members, engineers and maintenance personnel.
    * Attended exit interview.
  2.  Exit Interview
      The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the Plant Manager and
      members of his staff on March 10, 1985. The licensee acknowledged the
      inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of.
      the material reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. During the
      reporting period, frequent discussions were held with the Site Director,
      Plant Manager and other managers concerning inspection findings. At no time
      during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the
      inspectar.
  3.  Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
      (Closed) Unresolved Item 328/81-34-01.      The unresolved item concerned the
      control of system lineup with the System Operating Instructions (SOIs)
      during preoperational testing.      The licensee implemented a configuration
      control program which controls valves by tagging if the valve is placed in a
 
                                                                                  _ _ _ _
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                                        2
    configuration other than that prescribed by the SOI. In addition, S0Is have
    been reviewed to assure the accuracy of the valve listings. This item is
    closed.
    (Closed) Violation 328/82-31-01. This item was closed for Unit 1 in NRC
    Inspection Report 327,328/84-34. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
    response of February 1,1983. The licensee maintains positive control of
    health physics training and determination of occupational dose by requiring
    completion of these requirements prior to issuance of dosimetry. Personnel
    entering the Auxiliary Building and Control Building are checked by security
    personnel for dosimetry and proper placement of the dosimetry prior to
    entrance. This item is closed.
    (Closed) Violation 327,328/84-01-01. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
    response dated March 15, 1984. An audit of the review cycle was conducted
    and it appeared to be adequate. This item is closed.
    (Closed) Violation 327/85-17-02.      The inspector reviewed. the licensee's
    response dated August 28, 1985.      The licensee's efforts in the area of
    Radiation Work Permit adherence have been audited by the inspector. This
    item is closed.
    (Closed) Violation 327,328/85-26-11.    The inspector reviewed the licensee's
    response dated October 7,1985. An audit of the licensee's identification
    of items requiring Maintenance Request initiation was conducted. This item
    is closed.
    (Closed) Violation 327,328/85-32-01. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
    response dated November 26, 1985. A review of subsequently completed
    surveillances was conducted. This item is closed.
    (Closed) Violation 328/85-35-01. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
    response dated January 9, 1986. The licensee's corrective actions appear to
    be adequate. The licensee's commitment date of April 1, 1986, for revision
    of SI-1 will be reviewed under Inspector Followup Item 327,328/86-15-01.
    This item is closed.
    (Closed) Violation 327,328/85-23-02.    The inspector reviewed the licensee's
    response dated August 29,      1985.  A revised response to violation
    327,328/83-31-01 was submitted on September 9, 1985, deleting the commitment
    for checks of key card records. This item is closed.
    (Closed) Violation 327,328/85-23-03. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
    response dated August 29, 1985. Observations of individuals over the past
    six months have indicated that personnel are properly displaying picture
    badges. This item is closed.
    (Closed) Violation 327,328/85-26-03. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
    responses dated October 7, 1985, and January 3, 1986. Corrective steps
    identified in the responses have been verified. The inspector has reviewed
    the QA audits of surveillances for personnel dosimetry and frisking. These
 
        .
    .
                                                  3
          audits indicate an improvement in these areas. The licensee's audits for
          strict compliance to health physics practices has improved and the inspector
          has noted an increased awareness among plant personnel of proper placement
          of dosimetry and frisking te:hniques. This item is closed.
      4. Unresolved Items
                                                                                          !
          Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
          determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or
          deviations.    No unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
      5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
          a.    Plant Tours
                The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
                logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed shift
                turnovers, and confirmed operability of instrumentation.            The
                inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems,
                reviewed  tagout records,      verified  compliance with Technical
                Specification (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and verified
                return to service of affected components. The inspectors verified that
,
                maiatenance work orders had been submitted as required and that
'
                followup activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the
;                licensee.
                Tours of the diesel generator, auxili a ry , control, and turbine
                buildings and containment were conducted to observe plant equipment
                conditions,  including potential      fire hazards, fluid leaks, and
                excessive vibrations and plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions.
                One concern was identified regarding the connection of scaffolding to
                the ERCW supply to the IB-B Auxiliary Feedwater pump. The inspect'n'
                discussed the concern with the licensee and will verify removal of the
                scaffolding prior to startup.
                The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following
                safety-related systems on Unit I and Unit 2 to verify operability and
                proper valve alignment:
                      Residual Heat Removal System (Units 1 and 2)
                      Diesel Generator 1A-A and 1B-B Air Start System, ERCW Supply
                        and Fuel Oil System (Units 1 and 2)
                      Auxiliary Control Air (Units 1 and 2)
                      125 VDC Vital Battery Boards and Vital Batteries
                      120 VAC Vital Instrument Power Boards
                The inspector observed security and health physics activities for
                movement of new fuel casks into the protected area.
                No violations or deviations were identified.
  .-                                                                                  .-
 
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                                        4
    b .' Safeguards Inspection
        In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a
        review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of
        various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of
        daily activities including: protected and vital area access controls;
        searching of personnel, packages and vehicles; patrols and compensatory
        posts; badge issuance and retrieval; and escorting of visitors.      In
        addition, the inspectors observed protected area lighting, protected
        and vital areas barrier integrity and verified the interface between
        the security organization and operations and maintenance. The
        inspectors visited the central alarm station and interviewed security
        personnel regarding the concern identified below.
        During the inspection period the inspector identified concerns
        regarding crowding and searches at the control point to the protected
        area. These concerns were discussed with the licensee and additional
        administrative controls have been implemented. Additional training has
        also been conducted for security personnel controlling access. The
        inspector has observed activities at the control point and determined
        that ' improvements have been made in these areas. The inspector will
        continue to monitor these controls during routine security inspections.
        No violations or deviations were identified.
    c.  Radiation Protection
        The inspectors observed Health Physics (HP) practices and verified
        implementation of radiation protection control. On a regular basis,
        radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work
        activiti    were monitored to assure the-activities were being conducted
        in accordance with applicable RWPs.      Selected radiation protection
        instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were
        reviewed.
        On January 15, 1986, the licensee determined that cracks in the walls
        of the condensate demineralizer waste evaporator (CDWE) building were
        allowing seepage of radioactive water into a non-regulated area. An
        NRC specialist reviewed this event and the results of the inspection
        are provided in NRC Inspection Report 327,328/86-06. In addition to
        the radiclogical aspects of the inspection, several concerns were
                                                                          ~
        raised regarding maintenance of the evaporator recirculation pumps and
        COWE ventilation. These items will be identified for resident
        inspector followup as Inspector Followup Item 327,328/86-15-02.
        No violations or deviations were identified.
 
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                                          5
  6. Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71710)
    The inspector verified operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)
    on Units 1 and 2 by conducting a partial walkdown of the EDGs. This
    walkdown will be completed in the next inspection period. The following
    specifics were reviewed and/or observed as appropriate:
          a.  that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant
                drawings and the as-built configuration;
          b.  that equipment conditions were satisfactory and items that might
                degrade performance were identified and evaluated (e.g. hangers
                and supports were operable, housekeeping etc, was adequate);
          c.  with assistance from licensee personnel, the interior of the
                breakers and electrical or instrumentation cabinets were inspected
                for debris, loose material, jumpers, evidence of rodents, etc;
          d.  that instrumentation was properly valved in and functioning, and
                calibration dates were appropriate;
          e.  that valves were in proper position, breaker alignment was
                correct, power was available, and valves were locked as required;
                and
          f.  local and remote instrumentation was compared, and remote
                instrumentation was functional.
    Several concerns involving minor leakage in the air start system, support of
    the local gauges for the air receiver tanks, failure to include one drain
    valve on the ERCW cooling water checklist, and one hanger discrepancy were
    identified to the licensee for corrective action.          These items will be
    followed under Inspector Followup Item 327,328/86-15-03.
    No violations or deviations were identified.
  7. Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)
    The inspectors observed Technical Specification (TS) required surveillance
    testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate
    procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated;          that Limiting
    Conditions for Operation were met; that test results met acceptance criteria
    and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test;
    that deficiencies were identified, as appropriate; that any deficiencies
    -identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by
    management personnel; and that system restoration was adequate. For
    complete tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met and
    tests were performed by qualified individuals.        - . .
    The inspector witnessed / reviewed portions of the following surveillance test
    activities:
 
      .
  .
      As
            SI-120    Diesel Generator Monthly Electrical Inspection
            SI-7      Electrical Power Systems: Diesel Generators
            SI-8      Boric Acid Flow Paths - Temperature Verification
            SI-16      BIT Heat Tracing
            GOI-6H    System Apparatus
'
            No violations or deviations were identified.
    8.      Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
            a.    Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components
,
                  were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in
!'                accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes
                  and standards, and in conformance with TS.
                  The following items were considered during this review: LCOs met while
                  components or systems were removed from service; redundant components
a                  operable; approvals obtained prior to initiating the work; activities
                  accomplished using approved procedures and inspected as applicable;
                  procedures adequate to control the activity; troubleshooting activities
                  controlled and the repair record accurately reflected what actually
                  took place; functional testing and/or calibrations performed prior to
                  returning components or systems to service; quality control records
                  maintained; activities accomplished by qualified ' personnel; parts and
                  materials used properly certified; radiological controls implemented;
                  QC hold points established where required and observed; fire prevention.
                  controls implemented; outside contractor force activities controlled in
                  accordance with the approved Quality Assurance (QA) program; and
                  housekeeping actively pursued.
<
            b.    The inspector reviewed a modification to the control circuits for
                  containment isolation valves 1-FCV-30-15 and 1-FCV-30-56 implemented to
                  comply    with environmental qualification requirements.        The
                  modifications relocated a diode and resistor from potentially harsh
                  environments inside containment to the control room. The inspector
                  noted that one jumper was installed with the letter designation
                  transposed. The licensee corrected the error. The inspector verified
                  that the circuit was installed in accordance with drawings 45N1648-5,
                  Rev. 18 and 45N1648-3, Rev. 18 and mounting detail 47A348-284.      The
                  inspector also observed QC review of holdpoints.      No violations or
                  deviations were identified.
            c.    The inspector reviewed a modification to reactor protection set I
;                  involving reroute of potentially submerged cables for the hot leg and
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                  cold leg RTDs. The inspector reviewed WP 11896, ECN L6533 and drawing
                  45N1661-2, Rev. 5. The licensee identified that although the wiring
                  connections had been made correctly, the wiring connections had been
                  made using the wire numbers and not considering wire colors on the
                  outboard cable to the instrument board cabinet. In order to assure
                                                                                                  l
    -  - .          -    -        -
                                                                    -                .    -- -_
 
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                                          7
          that color coding dces not affect future work on the circuit, the
          licensee is modifying the connections to also match wire colors. The
          inspector observed the QC review of holdpoints.        No violations or
          deviations were identified.
      d. The inspector reviewed installation of the remote operators for the
          Main Steam pressure operated relief valves (PORVs). The remote
          operators were installed to assure that the PORVs could be operated in
          the event of a fire in the steam vaults.        Work Plans (WPs) 11714
          (Unit 1) and 11715 (Unit 2) were reviewed. The inspectors noted during
          a walkdown of the installation that the remote handwheel open/close
          permanent indication had been marked in pencil to indicate th2: the
          handwheel should be operated in the opposite direction.        Interviews
          with +he cognizant engineer indicated that the post modification test
          has not been completed. The cognizant engineer was not aware of the
          pencil markings but stated that the indication would be verified for
          proper labeling. The engineer indicated that two operator extensions
          were being redesigned to provide appropriate seismic support.      Seismic
          qualification and verification of the operator instructions for valve
          operations will be reviewed prior to startup.        No violations or
          deviations were identified,
f      e. On January 16, 1986, during post modification NDE examinations, the
          licensee determined that two 2 inch tees welded into the CVCS piping at
.'
          the boric acid transfer pumps were cracked.      Followup on procurement
          and issuance of material and reportability under Part 21 is identified
          as Inspector Followup Item 327,328/86-15-04.
      f. During this inspection report period the licensee performed a
          modification to the reactor trip breakers on both Unit I and 2. The
          modification involved the placement of a shunt coil in parallel with
          the already installed undervoltage coil.        This modification was
          accomplished by installing a rotary type interposing relay between the
          trip breaker undervoltage coil circuit and the shunt trip coil circuit.
          The installed interposing relay is energized from the Solid State
          Reactor Protection System in parallel with the undervoltage coil
          resulting in the trip bar of the breaker being actuated by both coils.
          The reactor trip bypass breakers did rot receive a similar
          modification. The modification process was observed by the inspectors
          and the following documents were reviewed:
                Work plan 11691, 9418, 11762
                M ana AI - 7, Cable Terminations, Splicing and Repairing Damaged
                  Cables
                Vendor Instructions 6848056 and 072584
                Engineering Change Notices L5458, L6293
                Field Change Notice TVA-0-40559
                Hold Order 1109
 
                                                                                      . _ _ _ _ _ .
    .
  .
                                            8
            During the performance of this modification one practice was questioned
            with respect to industrial safety practices and discus:ed with licensee
            management.
        No violations or deviations were identified.
    9.  Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)
        The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that:
        reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; corrective
4
        actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; the
        LER forms were complete; the licensee had reviewed the event; no unreviewed
        safety questions were involved; and violations of regulations or Technical
        Specification conditions had been identified.
        LERs Unit 1
        327/84-024
        327/84-052
        327/85-046
        327/86-001'
        327/86-01 Special Report
        327/84-030, Rev. 1
    10. Event Followup (93702, 62703)
        a.  On February 2, 1986, the licensee identified that Rod Bow Penalties
            calculated after a core redesign on Unit 2 Cycle 3 were in error as a
            result of an incorrect rod loading pattern being entered into a
            computer program.    This item was communicated to NRC Region II
            management and will be assigned to a specialist inspector, Inspector
            Followup Item 327,328/86-15-05.
        b.  On February 12, 1986, while performing Surveillance Test (SI 197 -
            Periodic Calibration of Control Building Heating, Ventilating and Air
            Conditioning) on the fresh air intake to the Control Room Air System
            intake temperature switches, an Instrument Maintenance technician
            failed to follow a prescribed action. This error resulted in a Control
            Building Ventilation isolation and a startup of the emergency cleanup
            system.  Because both units were in mode 5, there was little safety
            significance associated with this event. This issue is closed based on
            licensee corrective actions.
        c.  On  February 20, 1986, while performing a non-safety related
            surveillance, an Auxiliary Unit Operator tripped a breaker in error.
            This action resulted in a loss of power to Radiation Monitor RM-90-101
            and resulted in an Auxiliary Building Isolation.      Because both units
;            were in mode 5, there was little safetyspignificance associated with
            this event. This issue is closed based on' licensee corrective actions.                I
                                                                                                    !
                                                                                                    !
                                                                                                    l
 
                                                                            -. - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
  .
                                        9
    d. As a result of an audit of the licensee's actions associated with
      several onsite issues, the inspector reviewed the activities of the
      Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG). Technical Specifications
      6.2.3 requires the ISEG to:
      -
              examine plant operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry
              advisories, Licensee Event Reports and other sources which may
              indicate areas for improving plant safety
      -
              maintain surveillance of plant activities to provide independent
              verification that these activities are performed correctly and
              that human errors are reduced as much a practical
      -
              make detailed recommendations for revised procedures, equipment
              modifications, or other means of improving plant safety to the
              Assistant Director for Maintenance and Engineering of the Division
              of Nuclear Power
      A one year audit period was chosen to examine ISEG performance. It was
      determined that the ISEG performed an adequate review function with
        respect to LERs and those documents that support the managerial
      decision-making process on NRC reportability.        However, there is no
        formal documentation that the ISEG examined industry advisories or NRC
        issuances.      In addition, there have been no formal detailed
        recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modification,
        improvements to plant safety or reduction in personnel errors that have
        resulted from the above reviews.        The efforts of five full-time
        engineers, involving approximately ten thousand manhours, appeared not
        to generate any formal recommendations with the exception of the LER
        issuances. This is a violation of TS 6.2.3, and will be identified as
        violation 327,328/86-15-06.
i
        The basic reporting stature of the ISEG was not being complied with in
        that ISEG is reporting to the Site Director instead of a corporate
        Assistant Director off-site.      The Assistant Director for Maintenance
        and Engineering of the Division of Nuclear Power has not received
        reports from the ISEG for over two years. The position was apparently
        changed during one of the previous TVA reorganizations that has
        occurred. TS changes have not been approved to allow this. This is a
        further example of violation 327,328/86-15-06.
        The process with which the ISEG maintains surveillance of the plant for
        independent verification of plant activities and reduction of personnel
        errors is limited to the processing of LERs and the documentation used
        to determine NRC reportability. This is not a violation of the TS,
        however, it is a weakness in the practices of the ISEG.                                        <
                                                                                                        !
        The inspectors reviewed those ISEG reports published during this audit
        period,
                                                                                                        i
                                                                                                        l
                                                                                                        1
                                                                                                        !
                                                                                                        l
                                                    .
 
  .
.
                                            10
            TITLE                                DATE      INITIATING FACTORS
            Breaches and Fire Watches            3/85      Commitment to NRC
            Shutdown Activities                  4/85      Request by NRC resident
            AFW isolation                        6/85      4/85 event
            Containment Spray room              6/85      4/85 event
                cooler isolation
            Spent fuel pit level drop            1/86    12/85 event
            Containment Hydrogen                  1/86    Evaluation of
                analyzer failures                            documentation used to
                                                              determine NRC
                                                              reportability
            Based on the above reports, the inspectors agree with the findings
              stated in inspection report 327/84-24, with respect to the ISEG
            activ'ities in response to events and special requests. The inspectors
            found that the reports and evaluations included adequate descriptions
            of the scope of work to be performed, background, technical
              information, sequence of events, causative factors and recommended
            corrective actions. With respect to staffing, the inspectors again
            agree with the findings stated in NRC Inspection Report 327/84-24 in
            that combined Compliance staff and ISEG staffing, training schedules,
            and training requirements (STA qualification) did not appear to prevent
              the ISEG from performing its intended function.
              Further inspector review of ISEG functions determined that the safety
              significance of the above violation was lessened in this case because
              each of the functions was being conducted onsite by another
              organization. In some cases there was even duplicate effort to review
            documents by        several TVA organizations.  Nonetheless, the TS
              requirements discussed above were not being performed in any formal
              documented fashion by the ISEG.
    11. IE Information Notices (92701)
        The following IE Information Notices (IENs) were reviewed and closed. The
        inspector verified that: corrective actions appeared appropriate; generic
        applicability had been considered; the licensee had reviewed the event and
        that appropriate plant personnel were knowledgeable; no unreviewed safety
        questions were involved; and that violations of regulations or TS conditions
        did not appear to occur.
        IEN 86-04    Transient Due to Loss of Integrated Control System
                              -                                    -              .
 
    .
.
                                          11'
    12. Inspector Followup Items (92701)
        Inspector Followup Items (IFIs) are matters of concern to the inspector
        which are documented and tracked in inspection reports to allow further
        review and evaluation by the inspector. The following IFIs have been
        reviewed and evaluated by the inspector. The inspector has either resolved
        the concern identified, determined that the licensee has performed
        adequately in tne area, and/or determined that actions taken by the licensee
        have resolved the concern.
        IFIs
        327/84-24-04                  Generic Fittings
        327,328/85-10-01              Annunciator Adequacy
        327,328/85-16-02              Use of Single Cell Chargers on Vital Batteries
        327,328/85-16-04              Drawing Revisions for DG Battery Rack Brace
        327,328/85-16-06              Battery Equalizing Charges
        327/85-17-08,328/85-17-07    Clarify RCS Unidentified Leakage Procedure
        327/85-17-03,328/85-17-02    Control of material surveys
        327/85-17-07,328/85-17-06    Aux.iliary Building Isolations
        327,328/85-23-05              Radiation Records
        327,328/85-26-01              Repair of DG Air Reducer Valve
        327,328/85-23-06              Proper Use of Yellow Bags
        327,328/85-43-09              Installation and Testing of Containment Rad
                                        Monitors
        327,328/85-43-10              Nameplate Correction on Containment Pressure
                                        Transmitter
        327,328/85-43-12              Air Supply to Hydrogen Monitors
        327,328/86-06-02              Verification of Maintenance on Containment
                                        Rad Monitors
        327,328/86-06-04              Verification That ESF Has No Override Features
    13. Cold Weather Operations (71714)
        The licensee's preparations for cold weather operations were audited by the
        inspectors and found t be adequate for safety related systems.
                                                                            .
                                                  Y %
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