IR 05000155/1986004: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20203L263
| number = ML20213F304
| issue date = 04/24/1986
| issue date = 11/12/1986
| title = Insp Rept 50-155/86-04 on 860124-0408.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Operational Safety,Maint,Ler Followup & Licensing Actions
| title = Forwards Evaluation Re Util Commitment to Replace Diesel Engine for Diesel Fire Pump,Per Insp Rept 50-155/86-04
| author name = Boyd D
| author name = Keppler J
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Buckman F
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.),
| docket = 05000155
| docket = 05000155
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-155-86-04, 50-155-86-4, NUDOCS 8605010198
| document report number = NUDOCS 8611140144
| package number = ML20203L251
| package number = ML20213F307
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, NRC TO UTILITY, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| page count = 8
| page count = 1
}}
}}


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NOV 121986 Docket No. 50-155 Consumers Power Company ATTN: Dr. F. W. Buckman Vice President Nuclear Operations 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Gentlemen:
On April 24, 1986, Region III issued Inspection Report No. 50-155/86004(DRP)
documenting your commitment to replace the diesel engine for the diesel fire pump at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant. This commitment was required by my staff following discussions with your staff on the diesel engine reliability and maintainability.


==REGION III==
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Report No. 50-155/86004(DRP)
Pursuant to NRC Manual Chapter 0514, "NRC Program for Management of Plant Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," we have prepared an evaluation setting forth the justification for our position. A copy of this evaluation is enclosed for your informatio Please call me if you have any questions regarding this evaluation. If you wish to appeal our decision, the basis for your appeal should be addressed to me with a copy to the NRC Executive Director for Operation
Docket No. 50-155  License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI 49720 Inspection Conducted: January 24 through April 8,1986
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Inspector: S. Guthrie Approved By: D. ,
YM Reactor Projects Section 2D  Date Inspection Summary Inspection on January 24 through April 8,1986 (Report No. 50-155/86004(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by the Senior Resident Inspector of Licensee Actions on previous Inspection Findings, Operational Safety, Maintenance, Licansee Event Report followup, and Licensing Action Results: Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. No significant safety items were identified. However, the question of diesel fire pump dependability in light of its age and difficulties encountered in obtaining parts and experienced repair service is a source of increasing concern because of that pump's crucial role in providing low pressure core spray water as well as water for fire protection purpose C*
In 8605010198 860424 PDR ADOCK 05000155 O  PDR


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Sincerely, cr!ainnl
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    .' r r, O. KeT(19@orD P
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James G. Keppler Regional Administrator Enclosure: As stated cc w/ enclosure:
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted
4 Mr. Kenneth W. Berry, Director Nuclear Licensing
*D. Hoffman, Plant Superintendent G. Petitjean, Planning and Administrative Services Superintendent G. Withrow, Engineering Maintenance Superintendent R. Alexander, Technical Engineer R. Abel, Production and Plant Performance Superintendent
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*L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent R. Barnhart, Senior Quality Assurance Consultant P. Donnelly, Senior Review Supervisor, Nuclear Activities Department D. Swem, Senior Engineer G. Sonnenberg, Senior Technical Analyst D. Staton, Shift Supervisor W. Trubilowicz, Operations Supervisor
D. P. Hoffman, Plant
  *J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent E. Evans, Senior Engineer J. Tilton, General Engineer D. Kelly, Maintenance Supervisor D. Ball, Maintenance Supervisor W. Blosh, Maintenance Engineer L. Darrah, Shift Supervisor J. Horan, Shift Supervisor R. May, Shift Supervisor R. Scheels, Shift Supervisor J. Warner, Property Protection Supervisor T. Fisher, Senior Quality Assurance Consultant S. Bartosik, General Quality Assurance Consultant R. Krchmar, General Quality Assurance Analyst
{ Superintendent DCS/RSB (RIDS)
*D. Hice, Technical Engineer (Acting)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan  s611140144 861112 5 Public Service Commission PDR ADOCK 0500 P
*R. Schrader, Engineering, Maintenance Superintendent (Acting)
Nuclear Facilities and -
The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection, and Technical department * Denotes those present at exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Section 10 of Inspection Report No. 85021 describes the licensee's administrative procedures permitting the Shift Supervisor (SS), as the only licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) on shift, to be absent from the control room and, in his abrence, delegating an operator holding c Reactor Operator (RO) license to assume command of the control room. Both of these activities are prohibited by 10 CFR 50.54(m).
Environmental Monitoring Section T. H. Cox, ED0    p
 
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The staff of NRR, by letter May 2, 1980, accepted the licensee's proposal to assign " primary management responsibility" for the plant to the SS and recognizes that certain emergency situations may require the SS to leave the control room in the interests of plant safet Subsequent to this acceptance by the staff the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(m) were imposed by regulatio .
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The licensee indicated their intention to submit a change to technical specification During this review the inspector noted that Administrative Procedures Volume I, Chapter 4, Section 1.4.a.l.5 states that the SS may leave the control room during emergency situations other than site or general emergency "provided the Shift Technical Advisor / Shift Engineer remains in the control room during his absence." The Shift Technical Advisor / Shift Engineer positions is no longer staffed at Big Rock as the licensee fulfills that positions requirements with an On-call Technical Advisor (OTA). The OTA is required to be onsite during certain evolutions and within one hour of being summoned by the SS and thus it is not reasonable to require an OTA, who does not hold an SRO license, to be present before the SS is allowed to leave the control room in the interest of plant safet The licensee agreed to review the procedural requiremen b. Section 5.d of Inspection Report No. 85021 described failure of the diesel fire pump (DFP) to start within the required start time during performance of weekly Surveillance T7-20, DFP Start Test. Corrective maintenance efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, and on February 4, the DFP was declared inoperable based on excessively long start time Technical Specification 11.3.1.4. requires both the Electric Fire Pump and the DFP to be operable at power, and declaring the DFP inoperable placed the facility in a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
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requiring a shutdown to be initiated with 24 hour At Big Rock the DFP performs a core spray function as well as providing water for fire fighting. On February 4 the licensee initiated a change to Procedure T7-20 to increase the maximum start time from 20.4 seconds to 45 seconds, citing as engineering justification the Safety Evaluation performed by NRR supporting the approval of Amendment No. 44 to the units Operating Licens This amendment, dated June 9, 1981, revised reactor operating limits based on a new Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis. Section 2.3 of the Safety Evaluation concludes that a delay in DFP start time of an additional 25 seconds (45 seconds total) does not affect the LOCA-based reactor operating limit All DFP starts, including those which had exceeded the former 20.4 second limit, were within the revised 45 second limit, thus relieving the licensee of the requirements of the technical specification LC On February 4 the inspector reviewed the problen with the licensee and expressed a concern that the erratic starting behavior of the DFP and the inability of maintenance personnel and vendors to positively identify and correct the cause of the poor performance was a problem that could not be corrected solely by increasing allowable starting times no matter how valid the engineering justificatio The licensee agreed to operate the DFP continuously from February 4 until entering an upcoming scheduled outage period where DFP operability was no longer required by technical specification. The DFP ran continuously except for daily maintenance trouble shooting sessions until February 11. During the outage the licensee brought in manufacturer's representatives to diagnose and correct the problem. Diagnosis and repairs were hampered by the age of the equipment, prompting the
 
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licensee to consider the DFP engine for total replacement during the 1986 refueling outage. Unavailability of parts and a shortage of maintenance personnel experienced with the outdated engine make future repairs questionable. Electrical components cleaning, fuel line leak tightness verification, and valve adjustments produced satisfactory start time performance and a pump output capacity test was satisfactorily performed February 15. Following the DFP's return to operability the licensee conducted daily performances of T7-20, n '.h maintenance personnel present, from February 17 to March 3. All tests had start times of less than 7 seconds, a figure consistent with the pump's long term surveillance histor The inspector will monitor the licensee's activities related to DFP engine replacemen . Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the containment sphere and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of main-tenanc The inspector, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control During the inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Liquid Poison, Emergency Condenser, Reactor Depressurization System (RDS), Post Incident, Core Spray and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit Throughout the report period the licensee experienced problems with high turbine gland seal steam pressure. Turbine gland seal steam normally runs about 2 psig but increased for reasons that remain unclear to about 8 psig, a pressure at which gland seal steam escapes from the turbine shaft gland and condenses to become mixed with lubricating oil at the turbine shaft bearin Presently the quantity of water becoming mixed with oil is minimal and easily removed by a centrifugal purifier and by evaporation from the warm oi Pending determination of corrective action by turbine specialists, operators are reducing load in one mwe increments to keep seal steam pressure under 8 psig. Power has been reduced from 70 mwe to 66 mwe for this purpos .
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b. On February 10 at 10:00 p.m. the licensee attempted to perform Quarterly Surveillance T90-07, RDS Isolation Valve Test. To perform the test, RDS-101 valves (bypass manual isolation) must be open and the piping between the upstream isolation valve and the depressuri-zation valve pressurized. Erosion of the pilot valve assembly on SV-4985 (B train depressurization valve) caused lifting of that valve and the test was terminated. RDS valves 101 B and C were reclose The licensee, in anticipation of this situation preventing performance of the required surveillance, had scheduled an outage period to perform RDS valve maintenanc The following morning of February 11 the licensee performed primary plant leak rate calculations and determined total unidentified leak rate to be 1.126 gpm. Technical Specification 4.1.2.(c) requires the plant be placed in hot shutdown condition within 12 hour Big Rock Emergency Procedures require that declaration of an Unusual Event be made when plant shutdown is required by a technical specification LCO. All Unusual Event notifications were completed, and the reactor was shutdown within the required period. Leak rate calculations performed after shutdown indicated total unidentified leakage of 0.349 gpm. The licensee suspects leakage through the RDS valves which were manipulated during the surveillance attemp During the outage the licensee replaced depressurization valve top assemblies on SV-4985, SV-4986, and SV-498 Valve RDS 101 B was also replace The reactor was returned to service February 1 Unidentified leakage following startup was 0.192 gp c. On March 7 the inspector discussed with the licensee an event at the Lacrosse facility in which heat generated in a silver zeolite sampling cartridge in use at the offgas sample line caused hydrogen ignition in the sample line and offgas system pipin The licensee had discussed the incident with the Lacrosse licensee and evaluated the use of silver zeolite cartridges at this facilit Currently the silver zeolite cartridges are used for emergency general sampling for all areas but are capable of sampling at the offgas sample poin The licensee had already determined the need for a warning sign at the offgas sample poin d. On March 23 the unit experienced an increase of offgas flow of 6-8.5 CFM with no significant changes in any other plant paramete Investigation revealed a hole in a 10 inch steam line piping elbow downstream of bypass valve CV4014. This was apparently caused by erosion from steam impinging on the elbow's interior surface from a
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warming line. The line is normally under vacuum from the main condenser but the size of the hole when first discovered was small enough to be within the capacity of the air ejectors to maintain vacuu _ . _ _ . ... - .- . - . , _ _ - - - - - . . - - _ - - - - . , - _ . , _ _ . _ - _ -
 
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e During the period of increased offgas flow the licensee observed a slight increase in radionuclide activity exhausting to atmosphere as short lived nuclides were rushed through the offgas system's hold up volume. This hold up volume, given normal offgas flow rates, provides sufficient time for short lived radionuclides to decay within the volume, thus reducing the total activity discharged to the atmosphere via the stack. Xenon 138, a short lived nuclide monitored by the licensee, increased from a typical valve of 400 uci/sec to around 800 uci/sec. Licensee monitoring of Xenon 133, a long lived nuclide which does not linger in the hold up volume long enough to decay, significantly showed no change. Discharges are limited by 10 CFR 50, Appendix On March 24 a temporary patch was affixed to the elbow's exterio Following fabrication, on March 31, a patch was welded to the elbo During the installation process, declining condenser vacuum required operator action to increase air ejector flow to prevent a reactor scram from low vacuum (22 in. hg). Permanent elbow replacement is planned for the 1986 refueling outag On March 26 the inspector observed portions of hands-on fire training conducted at the sit No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Wor k requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc On March 24 the licensee entered a 72 hour LC0 for replacement of Solenoid Valve SV-9153 on Control Valve CV-4094, Exhaust Ventilation Downstream Isolation Valve. Solenoid Replacement was completed within seven hours.
 
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. On April 1, during the performance of T7-20, DFP Start Test, the operator observed dripping leakage of fuel oil from a fuel oil filter on the engine. Vibration of the filter during operation brought it in contact with its support bracket, eventually wearing through the filter housing. Filter replacement and bracket modification required entry into a LCO as required by Technical Specification 11.3. Repairs were completed with the 24 LCO requirement During the inspection period the licensee received notification from the Consolidated Pipe and Valve Supply Company that officials of the Golden Gate Forged Flange Company, a supplier of forged flanges sold to the licensee by Consolidated Pipe, had been charged in Federal Court with criminal false statements related to falsified test certification The licensee promptly researched all purchase orders from the vendor and all records of transfer of materials from the terminated Midland Plant and informed the inspector that none of the suspect forged flanges were installed or are in storage at Big Roc No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specification (Closed) LER 86001 and 86001, Revision 1, Failure to Perform Required Surveillance Test. This LER describes the licensee's failure to test fire detection instruments located in the recirculation pump room during the 1985 refueling outage, as required by Technical Specification 4.3.3. The omission was attributed to procedural inadequacy which called for testing of several detectors with different surveillance frequencies under a single procedure, thus creating the potential for the oversight. The omission was discovered on January 17, 1986 and the test was performed on February 15, 1986 during the next period permitting recirculation pump room entr The LER was revised by the licensee after determining that wording in the original submittal gave the incorrect impression that the Senior Resident Inspector had granted permission to continue plant operations in violation of a LCO. In fact, Big Rock technical specifications do not include an action statement requiring plant shutdown to perform the required surveillance. When informed of the situation the inspector concurred with the licensee's decision not to voluntarily shutdown the plant to perform the fire detector surveillance. The inspector based his position on the detectors successful surveillance history and the recognition that the
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threat to plant safety and operational stability resulting from plant shutdown and restart exceeded the threat to operational safety posed by three untested fire detector .
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The missed surveillance was discussed in Section 5.e of Inspection Report No. 8502 (Closed) LER 86002, Exceeding Technical Specifications Unidentified Leak Rate Limit. This LER discusses the licensee's action to take the unit from 90% power to cold shutdown as required by Technical Specification 4.1. This action was in response to an unidentified leak rate in excess of 1.0 gpm observed during performance of surveillance testing on RDS Valves on February 1 The event is described in detail in Section 3.b of this repor . Licensing Activities By letter dated March 10 the commission issued Amendment No. 83 to Facility Operating License No. DRP-6 for Big Rock Point. The amendment changes technical specifications to reflect a plant staff reorganization implemented in 198 By letter dated March 20, 1986, the Commission issued an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(5) to install an automatic recirculating pump trip to trip the reactor under conditions indicative of an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) event. The letter references several engineering evaluations and concludes that the existing installed oversized safety valve capacity at Big Rock is sufficient to limit primary coolant system pressure rise within acceptable limits without an automatic pump tri . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar .
 
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Latest revision as of 17:50, 18 December 2021

Forwards Evaluation Re Util Commitment to Replace Diesel Engine for Diesel Fire Pump,Per Insp Rept 50-155/86-04
ML20213F304
Person / Time
Site: Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/12/1986
From: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Buckman F
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
Shared Package
ML20213F307 List:
References
NUDOCS 8611140144
Download: ML20213F304 (1)


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NOV 121986 Docket No. 50-155 Consumers Power Company ATTN: Dr. F. W. Buckman Vice President Nuclear Operations 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Gentlemen:

On April 24, 1986, Region III issued Inspection Report No. 50-155/86004(DRP)

documenting your commitment to replace the diesel engine for the diesel fire pump at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant. This commitment was required by my staff following discussions with your staff on the diesel engine reliability and maintainability.

-

Pursuant to NRC Manual Chapter 0514, "NRC Program for Management of Plant Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants," we have prepared an evaluation setting forth the justification for our position. A copy of this evaluation is enclosed for your informatio Please call me if you have any questions regarding this evaluation. If you wish to appeal our decision, the basis for your appeal should be addressed to me with a copy to the NRC Executive Director for Operation

Sincerely, cr!ainnl

.' r r, O. KeT(19@orD P

James G. Keppler Regional Administrator Enclosure: As stated cc w/ enclosure:

4 Mr. Kenneth W. Berry, Director Nuclear Licensing

'

D. P. Hoffman, Plant

{ Superintendent DCS/RSB (RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Ronald Callen, Michigan s611140144 861112 5 Public Service Commission PDR ADOCK 0500 P

Nuclear Facilities and -

Environmental Monitoring Section T. H. Cox, ED0 p

/

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rab /mnj N i avis Ke pjer g N*% 0 * gs l} u MBL h

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