ML20137W708

Discusses 970408 Public Meeting Re Four Apparent Violations Identified During Inspection Conducted on 970203-28. Results of Predecisional Enforcment Conference Pending & Will Be Issued Under EA 97-099.List of Attendees Encl

ML20137W708
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	04/15/1997
From:	Gwynn T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Dugger C ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
References
EA-97-099, EA-97-99, NUDOCS 9704180195
Download: ML20137W708 (63)

Text

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g""%g UNITEo STATES

.,$ It NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGloN IV h^$.'

1 3 #* '#

' 611 RYAN PLAZA oRIVE. SUlTE 400 ARLINGTON, TE XAS 76011 8064

% . . .'* . . /

EA 97-099 I

l Charles M. Dugger, Vice President Operations - Waterford 3 Entergy Operations, Inc. l P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066

SUBJECT:

WATERFORD 3 PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE I l

This refers to the public meeting conducted in the Region IV office on April 8,1997. This meeting related to four apparent violations which were identified during an inspection conducted February 3-28,1997. The apparent violations were related to the design, operation, and testing of the containment cooling system.

l l

The licensee acknowledged that containment cooling system licensing and design bases were poorly documented and contained inconsistent information. Waterford personnel also 1 indicated that the Technical Specification surveillance test failed to simulate postaccident

{

lineup conditions and the required component cooling water flows for all containment fan ]

coolers could not be achieved. As part of the presentation, the licensee stated that for all l the apparent violations little or no actual or potential safety significance existed. I i

l The results of the predecisional enforcement conference are pending and will be issued I under Enforcement Action 97-099.

l In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code l of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you. l Sincerely, 1

/ l

,.s , y A' 9*'c -

T mas P. n, irector

vision of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

I

1. Attendance List }

2. Licensee Presentation 9704180195 970415 $jJll[jggjg[l'J[jlg[g PDR ADOCK 05000382 G PDR

- 9

_. . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . _ . . . _ _ . . . _ . . .. .. ....~_ ~_.___. . . . _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .

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Entergy Operations, Inc.  !

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cc: I Executive Vice President and i Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995 l

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Vice President, Operations Support l t Entergy Operations, Inc. l

i. P.O. Box 31995

j. Jackson, Mississippi 39286 1995 1 j Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway -

! P.O. Box 651

Jackson, Mississippi 39205 l General Manager, Plant Operations j Waterford 3 SES 1

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 l

Manager - Licensing Manager Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.  !

P.O. Box B l Killona, Louisiana 70066  ;

1 Chairman Louisiana Public Service Commission One American Place, Suite 1630 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70825-1697 Director, Nuclear Safety &

Regulatory Affairs Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 William H. Spell, Administrator Louisiana Radiation Protection Division P.O. Box 82135 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70884-2135

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1 Entergy Operations, Inc. .

Parish President St. Charles Parish P.O. Box 302 Hahnville, Louisiana 70057 l Mr. William A. Cross Bethesda Licensing Office 3 Metro Center Suite 610 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Winston & Strawn l 1400 L Street, N.W. I Washington, D.C. 20005-3502 l l

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Project Engineer (DRP/D) RIV File '

i Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) i Director, WCFO l OE: OWFN 7H5

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TOFFICIAL RECORD GOPY

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TOFFIClAL RECORD 80PY l

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180023

Enclosure 1 e PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ATTENDANCE l 1

LICENSEE / FACILITY Entergy Operations. Inc.

Waterford-3 DATE/ TIME April 8. 1997. I p.m. (CDT)

CONFERENCE LOCATION Region IV. Training Conference Room EA NUMBER EA 97-099 i NRC REPRESENTATIVES NAME (PLEASE PRINT) ORGANIZATION TITLE Ci Ar21 SAMGCM NRC itEGION I 4' WNFORCEMENT OFFIC@k 3 ,m D 4 E,2. O i) E P, R E 6 tct d L ADr/M TTRATC&

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l WATERFORD 3 PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE April 8,1997 Component Cooling Water (CCW) To Containment Fan Coolers (CFCs)

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%$hh Problem Statement l e Poorly Defined Design and Licensing Basis '

Related to Containment Fan Cooler (CFC)

System Since initial Licensing e Tech Spec Surveillance for CFC Did Not Simulate Post Accident Conditions i

7 i

Background and RCA J

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w; Sequence of Events 1983-1984 StartupTesting s

CFCA 1350 CFCA&C 2708 CFC B 1289 CFC B&D 2715 CFC C 1358 CFC D 1426 i

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Accepionce Criteria 1340 2700

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Sequence of Events

. May 1988 Enforcement Discretion and Emergency TS Change

- Only One CFC Required Per Train January MSLB Peak Pressure Analysis Error 1991

July 1995 Essential Chilled Water (CHW) System Flow

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Degradation identified  ;

Corrective Action Plan included Testing on CCW System I

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Background and RCA pwey.;g Sequence of Events October Special Test on CCW System Performed (Flow 1995 Balance)

STARTUP RF07 (RF07) TEST (10/95)

CFC A 1350 1300 CFC B 1289 1200 CFC C 1358 1320 CFC D 1426 1290 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 1340 1350 10

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? 2' Background and RCA .

ww tern,a Sequence of Events October Operability Evaluation Completed on Degraded Flow 1995 Condition for CCW System (RF07) a CFC Minimum Flow of 1100 gpm

= 1 CFC Fan Per Train i

a Corrective Action Plan Developed 11 1

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c Background and RCA l

m ,i ENT*QfS Sequence of Events October Satisfactorily Completed Surveillance 1995 Procedure, OP-903-029, SIAS Test (RF07)

CFC Flow Verified >1325 gpm, But Lineup Did Not Simulate Post Accident Conditions (Never Didj l

January- Cleaned DCT Bundles on Both Trains CCW l March 1996 Management Decision to Schedule Post l Maintenance Flow Balance Test for RF08 -

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c Background and RCA wsei c: ,

Sequence of Events July RCP Seal Forced Outage 1996 -

Initial Decision Not to Perform CCW Flow Balance Test - Test Not Ready and Expected a Short Outage Decision Not Re-visited i

August 12, Self Assessment of Ultimate Heat Sink 1996 Questioned if Intent of TS for CFC's Being Met 13 i

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< Background and RCA WPj Sequence of Events August initial Actions Taken 1996 Reviewed Past Surveillance Testing Investigated Basis for TS Surveillance Contacted Other Plants Re-Reviewed Operability Evaluation Done RF07 Requested a Re-Run of Contempt Code to Determined impact of Degraded Flow (Initial Feedback - Little Chance That Model Could Be Re-Run)

Determined if Flow Balance Test Can Be l

Performed On-Line u

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Background and RCA

$M Sequence of Events August 23-24, CCW Flow Balance Test Performed as an 1996 Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE)

STARTUP RF07 AUGUST TEST (10/95) 1996

i. CFC A 1350 1300 1340 CFC B 1289 1200 1250 CFC C 1358 1320 1310 CFC D 1426 1290 1370 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 1340 1350 1350 15

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=ms Sequence of Events August 1996 Flow Condition Still Considered Degraded -

Additional Investigation CCW System Flow Model Employed to Compare Actual Test Results (Agreed Within 5%)

Loop Uncertainties Reviewed (Test Results Within Uncertainty Band)

Reviewed Possible Bypass Flowpaths (None Credible)

Reviewed Historical CCW Pump Performance 16

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Background and RCA tk f hb Results of Review of TS on CFC's e TS Bases Contained No information on intent of Surveillance Requirements e No Other TS Surveillance on Safety Related Heat Exchangers l Require Flow Balance Test (including CCW TS Itselfi e W3 TS Surveillance Modeled After CE Standard TS's (CE-STS) l (NUREG 0212)

+ 31 Day Test - Start and Run Fans from Control Room and Verify Flow to Cooler [ Intent - Detect System Degradation]

+ 18 Month Test - Verify Fans Start on SIAS [ Intent - Verify Functionality of System] i e W3's Unique Design. Required a Change to CE-STS

+ Control Board Handswitch Does Not Start CFC's in Slow Speed,

Does Not Provide High Flow Rate Through Flow Control Valve nor l Provide Indication of Valve Position 17

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" 2- Background and RCA aa 89M gg '

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Results of Review of TS on CFC'S

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W3 TS's Altered to Accommodate Design l

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+ 31 Day Test - Start and Run Fans From Control Room and Verify Flow to Cooler > 625 gpm [ Intent - Detect System Degradation]

+ 18 Month Test - Verify Fans Start on SIAS Signal and Verify Flow to Cooler > 1325 gpm [ Intent - Verify Functionality of System]  ;

s e Startup Test Procedures Demonstrated That Not All of the CFC's Attained > 1325 and Therefore Could Not Support a TS

_ i Surveillance Requirement of 1325 gpm in an Accident Flow ,

Lineup

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Background and RCA E~4#' Sequence of Events August 1996 Conclusion and Corrective Action Plan CCW System Flow Balance Test was Not the intent of Surveillance for Verifying CFC Operability Surveillance Verified CFC's Operability by Assuring  ;

that Flow Control Valve Moves to Accident Position i During SIAS System Operability Not in Question Reconstitute Design Basis and Run GOTHIC Code ,

Revise Design and Licensing Basis and Submit TS Change to Correct Original Discrepancies and Regain Margin 19

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7 Background and RCA wem pyy Sequence of Events February 1997 Special inspection - Conducted By Waterford 3 Senior Resident Based on Response to TIA Additional Concerns Relative to Application of instrument Uncertainty were Raised CONTEMPT Code Re-Run With 2 CFC's Running Post Accident- 1100 gpm Each 50.59 Completed 20

I e ,

Background and RCA Causal Factors Original Design Documentation Did Not Establish Adequate Design Basis for CFC's Resulted in:

+ Failure to Maintain Adequate Design Control i

Licensing Basis and TS Surveillance intent for CFC's are Unclear Resulted in:

+ Failure to Establish Adequate Surveillance Test Procedure

+ Failure to Maintain At Least One CFC Operable Per TS's

+ Failure to Irnplement Timely Corrective Actions Following identification of Design Basis Deficiencies 21

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October 1995 Operability Evaluation Performed Using GOTHIC Code Key Assumptions Were:

e 1100 gpm Flow To CFCs

e 2600 gpm Flow To SDCHX i e 1 CFC Per Train Operable (l' 23

Safety Significance

.mi i s t m es i4: October 1995, Operability Evaluation Results:

1 GOTHIC Analysis Demonstrated: lr e Still Within Design Pressure of 44 psig e Pressure at 24 Hours Exceeded Value of Record By Small Delta of 3.1 psi ,

e Negligible impact on Offsite Dose e No Safety Significance

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t 24

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c Safety Significance

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IONNis W5 Use of GOTHIC For Operability Was Judgment Based On Technical and Thoughtful Factors e Widely Used By Industry For Containment Pressure Analysis e Qualified Under Numerical Applications, Inc. QA Program Which Fully Conforms to 10CFR50 Appendix B e Extensive Qualification By Comparison to Analytical Problems and Experimental Data e Personnel are Trained and Have Experience in Using GOTHIC e GOTHIC Model Benchmarked Against CONTEMPT 25 o . . _ _ _ _ ______ _.. _._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __

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" '~ Safety Significance e

3 4 \ t ?G si t*[do'ti NRC Reviewed CONTEMPT Analysis, NRC SER, July 1981, Section 6.2.1.1

" Additionally the staff has performed confirmatory analyses on the applicant's DBA LOCA and two MSLB cases utilizing the computer code CONTEMPT-LT/28. Each of the confirmatory analyses was performed with the applicant's assumptions and initial conditions, which were reviewed for adequate conservatism, including the i assumption of most severe single active failure."

"All the peak values of the NRC's confirmatory analyses are lower than the applicant's values. In addition, the staff's confirmatory DBA

. LOCA pressure response showed a decrease to less than 50% of the calculated peak at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />"

" Based on these confirmatory analysis results, and review of the applicant's analysis, the staff finds acceptable the applicant's analysis...."

26 i

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Safety Significance t

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February 1997 Design Basis Changed Key Assumptions Were:

t i

e 1100 gpm Flow To CFC e 2550 gpm Flow To SDCHX i

e 2 CFCs Per Train Operable i

27 i

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'a Safety Significance a -

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Design Basis Results Were:  :

o CONTEMPT Analysis Demonstrated:

I -

, + Peak Pressure Less Than Design Pressure of 44 psig, 43.57 psig

+ Pressure at 24 Hours Post LOCA Significantly Less Than 1/2 Peak,13.80 psig

+ No impact on Design Basis Offsite Dose l

e Administrative Requirement For 4 CFCs e No Reduction in Safety Margin 28

,9 /

l 2-Safety Significance h!k i;91kiitpj CFC Timing Discrepancy e MSLB Analysis CFC Delay Time is 8 sec e Actual CFC Delay Time is 19.5 sec e impact Offset By Greater Spray Flow e Existing FSAR Analysis Has Higher Peak Pressure e impact Of Change is Small, .03 psi 1

I 29 I

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?TM Summary e GOTHIC Results Conclusively Demonstrated No i Safety Significance 4

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e Design Basis Reanalysis Using CONTEMPT Preserved Margin

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c v y Corrective Action 1

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.9 Corrective Actions Address Specific Problems e October 1995 Evaluation Promptly Established No Safety Significance e Special Testing Confirmed Actual Operational Performance and Provided Baseline for Analysis e Peak Pressure Analysis Completed e TS Amendmentin Preparation e Plan To Do Comprehensive Upgrade Of Design Basis Analysis Using GOTHIC 32

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Corrective Action

w Corrective Actions were Prompt, Once Current Problems identified e October 1995, Special Testing Results,

+ October 1995, Operability Evaluation Completed i

e March 1996, DCT Cleaning Complete e August 1996, UHS Independent Team Raised Question

+ August 1996, CR-96-1250 Documented Concern

+ August 1996, Special Test At Mode 1 Performed 33

. - . -- - - = _ __ - .

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. ' Corrective Action gw:q

' Corrective Actions were Prompt, Once Current Problerns identified (Continued) e January 1997, Waterford 3 Informed About NRC TS Interpretation l + February 1997, Evaluation Completed to Change Design

Basis 4

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o 7 Corrective Action siise Comprehensive Corrective Actions to Address Broader issues .

e Committed to Better Define Original Design and Licensing Basis and Realign Appropriate Procedures e Committed to Significant Upgrade or Rework of Original Design and Licensing Basis i e Position Documented in Waterford 310CFR50.54(fl

Response

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? Corrective Action

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'UJ Design and Licensing Basis Upgrade or Rework

. Includes:

4 e Review and Upgrade of Basis for Design and Testing

+ Containment isolation Design Basis

+ Ultimate Heat Sink Design Basis

+ Tornado Missile Design Criteria

+ Inservice Testing Basis Reconstitution

+ Emergency Feedwater Flow Design Basis

+ TS LCO Instrument Uncertainty Evaluation Project i

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36 l

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7 ~~ Corrective Action idiise' T7" Design and Licensing Upgrade or Rework includes:

e Upgrade Selected DBDs for Safety Significant Systems e Upgrade Selected Mechanical Calculations for Safety Significant Systems e Development Process and Relational Data Base to Establish J Links Between Design Basis, Licensing Basis, and Plant Procedures e Review Selected Sections of UFSAR for Accuracy

_ e Full Conversion to New CE-STS I

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3 Corrective Action

!!$ts; wff Other Significant Corrective Actions to improve Design Basis Awareness and Verification

. ; e Operations, Maintenance, Licensing, and Engineering Design Basis Training e Review of Certain Operations and Maintenance

!.. Procedures To Ensure They incorporate Necessary Design Basis Information and Configuration Controls

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o Continued implementation of Self Assessments 38

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Corrective Action 4

"~% Reviewed TS Flow Tests to Ensure: i e Tests Performed in Accident Configuration Where Necessary -

1 e Tests Appropriately Verify Applicable Design Basis Values i

i 39

(, ' it Corrective Action i .. u .

re: .; ni Summary e Prompt Corrective Action was Hampered By Misunderstanding of Design and Licensing Basis ,

i e Corrective Action To Address Specific Problem Areas of Issue i e Corrective Action To Address Broader issues  ;

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( 'J J Regulatory Perspective N,,Ns_,is i Failure to Establish or Maintain Adequate Design Control Example 1: CCW Flow To CFCs e issue Originated From Initial Construction e issue Was Not Willful e issue Was Self identified t

e Corrective Actions Completed and in Progress Will  !

Establish a Clear Design and Licensing Basis in the SAR, Technical Specifications and Supporting Analyses e Analysis indicates Little Safety Significance t

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l UNV$ Conclusion e The Violation Meets the Criteria for Discretion As an Old Design issue i

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• W Failure to Establish or Maintain Adequate Design Control i

Example 2: Credited 3 CFCs vs 2 in MSLB Analysis-e issue Resulted From an isolated Design Error in 1991 e issue Was Not Willful e issue Was Self Identified, With Some Help From the Resident, but Would Have Been identified During Design Bases Review e Analysis Has Been Corrected e Analysis indicates No Safety Significance e Unrelated to Other issues 44

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I6Ei5sl j Trq Conclus. ion e The Violation Meets the Criteria for Discretion As an Old Design issue  ;

e Or At a Minimum Meets the Criteria for a Level IV ,

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b!ns mem Inadequate Test orocedure for Surveillance 4.6.2.2.b.2 e Was Self Identified e issue Was Not Willful i e Caused by interpretations of Poorly Developed Technical Specifications, Unique Plant Design, and Past Operating History Dating to Original Construction

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e Corrective Actions Will Resolve Issue and Assure Agreement Between SAR, Tech Specs and Test Procedures and Methods. l

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e Little Safety Significance 46

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Conclusion e The Violation meets the Criteria for Discretion as an  ;

Old Design issue t

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Regulatory Perspective bh%bl0 Failure to Maintain at Least One CFC Operable Per Train e issue Was Self Revealing e issue Was Not Willful .

e Caused by interpretations of Poorly Developed Technical Specifications, Unique Plant Design, and Past Practices .

e Corrective Actions Were Not Effective e Resulted in Non-Compliance With TS

. e Analysis Indicates Little Safety Significance 48

b Regulatory Perspective h Conclusion e Corrective Actions Delayed o Corrective Actions were Comprehensive e is Old Design issue, Does Not Meet All of the 1

Criteria for Discretion e Was a Failure to Comply With the Action Statement and Required Extensive Analysis 4

e Meets the Criteria for a Level ill Violation, Deserving of Mitigation for Comprehensive Corrective Action 49

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E~ Regulatory Perspective k! i Failure to implement Adequate Effective Corrective Action e Not an Old Design issue e Not Self Identified e Corrective Actions Verified Operability e Resulted From Belief System Was Operable Based on Interpretation of Spec Which Was Discussed in Previous Violation e Planned Actions Will Resolve Design Basis, Technical Specification, and Verify Valve and Fan Performance and Monitor System for Flow Degradation '

e No Safety Significance 50

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q F Regulatory Perspective EisPN! l mg Conclusion e Related to an Old Design issue e Corrective Actions Were Underway e Actions Would Not Be Completed by the End of the Outage Under the Plan of Action e is a Violation of Regulatory Requirements, With No Safety Significance e Should Be Considered a Level IV Violation 4 L 51

. P. 2' Regulatory Perspective sus "Tas

E~ Corrective Action e Address Specific Design and Licensing Bases issues e Are Comprehensive in That They Go Beyond the Specifics to identify Other Similar issues in Other Systems e include improvements to Design and Licensing Bases e Address Regulatory Culture and Conservative Decision Making s2

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Safety S.ignificance e No Threat to Containment Design e No impact on Offsite Doses e No Degradation of Safety Margins

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Summary e Two of the issues Are Old Design issues and

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e One issue Qualifies As a Level 111, With Mitigation e One issue Qualifies As a Level IV  ;

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