ML16081A353

Draft Written Exam (Folder 2)

ML16081A353
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/09/2015
From:	Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Todd Fish Operations Branch I
Shared Package
ML15135A303	List: ML15159B204 ML15342A448 ML16050A330 ML16050A331 ML16081A285 ML16081A304 ML16081A334 ML16081A353 ML16081A364 ML16081A397 ML16081A406 ML16145A208
References
TAC U01910
Download: ML16081A353 (118)

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolutio~ List . I Outline Changes. I iCluestion Topic i IRO 1 I Unit 2 is operating at 60% power with rod control in auto when Turbine Steam line Inlet Pressure transmitter 2-PT-505 fails high over 10 s.econds.

\

of the following describes the effect on the rod control system from this failure?

Control rods will move in the ___ direction, and the Power Mismatch signal will initially cause rods to move_ _ rapidly than if the circuit was not!

part of rod control.

'11

~a~* I I

~!inward, more.

rs I outward. less.

I

ct.j loutward, more.

.. l 12/21/201511

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[System/Evolution Title i [Continuous Rod Withdrawal KA Statement; Knowled e of the operational implications of the followin concepts as they ap ly to Continuous Rod Withdrawal:

Effects of turbine-reactor power mismatch on rod control

[Expla"nationof i 55.41.b(6) The power mismatch section of the Reactor Control Unit compares the difference in the rate of change of turbine power i

iAnswefs: *** .* and rx power, and adds a signal to the temperature error circuit. With turbine power (PT-505) rising rapidly over 10 seconds and rx power not changing at all, the power mismatch signal will cause control rods to move out at a higher rate than what would be j expeected from the Terr signal alone, in an attempt to raise Rx power at a rate similar to what turbine power was doing.

ReforenceTitle .*  :<' ::'"; . i 1 Facility Reference.Number** * .! [Retererice Section '*I i*Page No."l :Revision!

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List J SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes. I lcfoestion Jo pie  !RO 2 I j Which of the following describes the reason for the sequence of diagnostic steps in EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safetl'. Injection? I I

~ SGTR diagnosis has the higher priority because of the highest probability of radioactive release. I I

~I SGTR diagnosis has the higher priority to minimize the potential for component failure due to water in the Main Steam lines. I, 11

[201 Main Steam Line break diagnosis has the higher priority because a high energy steam break could potentially mask other failures.

11 ict.*l 1Main :team Line break diagnosis has the higher priority because AFW must be isolated to remain within accident analysis assumptions for containment pressure. I 1Ansi,Ver!I~ [Exam Level! IR l iC:oflnitiy~'Leyel. *!I Memory  ! jF~ciljty: \ ISalem 1 &2 I iExam'bate: j I

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12/21/20151 IKA:il 000007K301  !\EK3.01 ) \RO'.Value:;j 4.0j !SRQVaflJe:JI 4.6j fsectiojl: .lj~ [~{)(3tbup::i 11 JsRO Grbi.Jp:!j 1! ;~~ 0

[s.YStem/Evo,ll.ltionTitle ! I Reactor Trip  ! \007 I

!.KAStatement:l Knowledqe of the reasons for the followinq responses as they apply to Reactor Trip:

Actions contained in EOP for reactor trip

~xplanation of:

1 55.41.b(1 O) SG pressure is checked prior to tube rupture criteria in TRIP-1 to see if any SG is faulted, as that can mask other

'Answers: . accidents.

~ Reterence Title

• Ii 'Facility Reference Number 'i, ifReference section :Ji?age No.I. [Revision!

lj Rx Trip or Safety Injection !I EOP-TRIP-1 I ii j 2a lTRIP-1 Lesson Plan II NOS05TRP001 I lj 59 11:..=7===

l lj I !I j_ __.

t(q.~N:timbei; /' * *>I Objectives _I ITRP001E017 I

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.--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

9u~s\ion's()IJrce c9rllf!lentsl 44816

RO SkyScraperJ SRO Skyscraper. ( RO System/Evolution List .* I SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes. I IUue~tign topic! l,_R_0_3_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _11 Given the following conditions:

..,ZR Safety Valve has developed a very small leak with the unit operating at J% power.

- Uperators are lowering power to take the unit off line.

- During the power reduction, operators take manual control of PZR pressure due to a Master Pressure Controller malfunction, and the operator maintains PZR pressure at 2240 psig.

Which of the following describes the effect this will have on the leakrate from the affected PZR Safety Valve as compared to the leakrate when PZR pressure was being maintained at normal operating pressure?

Assume the PRT pressure remains constant.

The leakrate will. ..

I

~ remain the same because PZR pressure is being maintained at normal setpoint.

'b.'i I rise because RCS temperature will rise above program during the downpower.

ic.11 rise because the upstream pressure of the valve will force more leakage past the valve.

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~ 1 ' '

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~I ooooosK102 j 1AK1.02 'I.Rb Value: iQ] SROValue:j[.D};sectiqn:lj~ jROGrol:iJ'.l.:lLJisRC>§l"obp:ILJ D

~yste1:T1IEvolutio11 "'[itle I lPressurizer Vapor Space Accident KAStaternent:j Knowledqe of the operational implications of the followinq concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:

Change in leak rate with change in pressure I

'ltion of !I 55.41.b(5) A is incorrect because PZR pressure setpoint is 2235 psig. B is incorrect because while RCS temp will rise above I s: . .*. r setpoint during a downpower, the stem states that PZR pressure is at 2240 psig. c is correct because with a constant downstream 'I temperature, increasing the upstream pressure (to 2240 vs normal 2235) will force more leakage past the valve. Dis incorrect because the downstream pressure will determine what the temp will be if saturated after the leaking valve. I

• ~efererl.ce Title * * *** *..* \[ * *Fa~ilityReference Number. *1 !Fefefencesection .; IPageNo.j !RevisiOn:

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RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List ...

( SRO System/Evolution List f Outline Changes I

!q!lestion Topic i RO 4 I I I.Which of the following is the basis for establishing I maintaining SG Narrow Range level between 9-33% (non-adverse containment) for small or

!nt,,rrnediate LOCA's IAW 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant? I I

~ Ensures SG available if a RCP has to be started later in the event. I

~,

I

!b. ! Maintains a static head of water to reduce any existing SG tube leakage.

I I

[SJ I Ensures adequate feed flow or SG inventory to ensure a secondary heat sink.

I

@'.] I. Maintain the water level above the top of the U-tubes to prevent depressurizing SG.

I

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KAsta~emeiit:i Knowled e of the interrelations between Small Break LOCA and the followin SI Gs

,Expfanatiorl.of 55.41.b(10) Distractor Bis incorrect because it is the basis for SIG level I feed flow for a LARGE break LOCA. Distractors A and D

'(°Ai{iiw;;fr_~;:;;**

• are incorrect because the Basis document states that the reason for maintaining adequate feed flow I SIG level is to ensure a secondary heat sink. C is correct because EOP-LOCA-1 Basis Document states the purpose of establishing 9% level is .. "To ensure adequate feed flow or SIG inventory to ensure a secondary heat sink for small or intermediate size LOCAs and secondary break l

accidents" 33°?, is the SIG oarrnv.t ranae I 1nner control hand ljroit 1::: * * . *.t . ** Reference Title/ .: i F**.Facility Reference Numbec :.JJ [Reference section _,-;l f Page N9**l !Revisfori1,

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Ro s 1I Given the following conditions:

t 2 is operating at 100% power.

charging pump is in service.

- 22 charging pump is err.

- Subsequently, 21 charging pump trips.

- 23 charging pump is placed in service after its suction is aligned to the RWST.

Which of the following identifies a subsequent action which will be directed by S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, and why?

• i'd Shutdown Unit 2 due to boration of the RCS from the RWST.

'b: Restore normal letdown to establish adequate VCT level for normal 23 charging pump operation.

~ Place Excess Letdown in service to establish adequate VCT level for normal 23 charging pump operation .

.d,: Open 2CV464 Charging Cross-Tie Isolation valve to prevent requiring a Unit 2 shutdown due to boration of the RCS from the RWST.

FAns.ver I~!Exam Level! lli:J' i¢ognitivet.eyel .! I Memory I [f<ltility;,11 Salem 1 & 2 11Ex~m1JC1te: 11 121211201sj,

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. 111 11*t~go....Group:\ *. ... , I r5stt3i D 1 '";;;J "systeiTI!Evofutiontitfe j I Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup I ~022 KA Statement: i Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup:

Actions contained in SOPs and EOPs for RCPs, loss of makeup, loss of charoino, and abnormal charoing I

~

Explanatiol} of! 55.41.b(10) When the inservice charging pump tripped, letdown automatically isolated with all charging pump breakers open . If 23

.Answers: ,i

• <*.** charging pump is placed in service from the RWST, it means it was not able to be placed in service with VCT as suction source at step 3.7. The note prior to placing 23 charging pump in service from Unit 2 RWST states that a unit S/D will be required because of berating the RCS from the RWST.

~ '

I Loss of Charging R.efElrerice Titre ... ,] ~:./ Fj:icility Reference Number>

!I S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 o:l l~eference Section II Bases Doc

.*I I Pag8, t<Jo.1 11 3 '19 IRevisiOnl I

l I II II 11 1 I I I ll lj II ll I 1):.;o. Nu[nber >

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Objectives I ABCVC1 E003 I Material RE1tjuiredJC.>rE:xalllination ol I q I sv'estion. s,§urce~:;c; !I New .. . JLQue~tf~p ,M6qifiF1Wo n IVieth<?<t 1' I I \usei:i Qllriilg Jralnil)g Program "l D I;ou~sucin'~o.1Jr~~porilmeritsJ 1;:::====:'...:::::::::::::==.:::::::::::.:.::::::::::=::::::=.========::::'...'.:=:::::::.:::::.::::::::::.:::::.::::::::::.::::::::::.:=:'.__'.:=:'.,I!

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System!Evolution list f SRO System!Evolution List I Outline Changes I louestiqn'(opicJ I RO 6 I Given the following conditions:

't 2 is in MODE 4.

RHR loop is in service providing SOC.

- 22 RHR loop is aligned for ECCS.

- Subsequently, 21 RHR pump trips on overcurrent.

Which of the following describes how SOC flow will be established IAW S2.0P-AB.RHR-0001, Loss of RHR?

22 RHR pump supplying flow .....

[] I through 21 RHR HX and ONLY 21 SJ49 RHR Disch to Cold Legs.

I

~I through 22 RHR HX and ONLY 22SJ49 RHR Disch to Cold Legs.

I I through 21 RHR HX and BOTH 21 SJ49 and 22SJ49 RHR Disch to Cold Legs.

I I

I ;ct. II through 22 RHR HX and BOTH 21 SJ49 and 22SJ49 RHR Disch to Cold Legs.

11 I:Answer 1 Id I iEx~m:'):.evel 11 R I !cognitive LeveC;J IMemory  !~!Salem 1 &2 I [~x,a,mpate: 11 12/21/20151 J<A:[I 000025K201 J'AK2.01  ! IRO Vah.Je: q2.9llSROValue: I 2.9!(SeCt!cm: q~ !RoGrciup:\j 1 j 1sR.q <3roup:J I 1j illl D jSysteJ11!Eyoluticin Titre' I [Loss of Residual Heat Removal System KA Statement:] IKnowledoe of the interrelations between Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following:

RHR heat exchanqers

!Explanattci'n of! 55.41.b(10,8) With a single loop of RHR in service for SOC, the loop cross-tie valves 21/22RH19 are open. They would only have fJ;.;,5wers~* > **.*.* <: been shut if BOTH loops were in SOC mode, to split out the RHR loops to verify minimum flow requirements are being maintained (S2.0P-SO.RHR-0001, page 36). There is no direction to close either cross tie valve in Attachment 2 of AB.RHR when swapping the ECCS loop to SOC mode. There is also no direction to shut either SJ49 RHR to RCS valves, since cooling flow to all 4 RCS

~

locos is desir:ed Ibe 2j loop el:lE<...1::1.X Oli+/-let Hail1e 2:1el:lj8 iAlill be cl.oserl /A>+ ') ~*"";' ') n n\ tn *---;n,,ta ,,_ " * * - .-h ')1 O>;O >;Y l [ReferenC:e Section< ' ! [PageJ'fo.1

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• ReferenceTitle.* . * ' I' Faeii ityReference. Number*

ILoss of RHR ii S2.0P-AB.RHR-0001 11 11  ! I1s I I Initiating RHR 11 S2.0P-SO.RHR-0001 I! 11 I j2s I IRHR Simplified drawing 11205332-SIMP II 11 112 I Objectives I ABRHR 1E004 1_ _ ___,

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[ouestion Topic I l,_R_O_?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~

Given the following conditions:

t 2 is operating normally at 100% power steady state.

- _Jnsole alarm RC PRESS DEVIATION HI, annunciates.

- Subsequently, the board operator then observes the following indications:

- PZR pressure master controller output dropping slowly

- Both PZR spray valves closed

- All PZR heaters energized

- PZR pressure channel I (selected for control) dropping slowly

- PZR pressure channels II, Ill, & IV rising slowly I

I Which of the following procedures should be used for these conditions?

'a.I S2.0P-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow. 1,

~I S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. '1 l

[c.: S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak.  !

__ @J_*_~'S=2~12-J

'Answer J

• =0=P=-A; :;: B=.P=Z=R=-0=0=0=1=,=P=re~s=s=ur=iz=e=r=P=re=s=s=u=re=M= al=fu=nI=c=tio=n=.; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;I; ; ; ; ; ; ;: : : := =: :; : ;:= = = = = = =: : :=j___

!Exam Level.: I~ :cognitive Level'  ! Application I !Faqility: 1 Salem 1 & 2 I jExamD(ite:J

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KAstafonient:J . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

l f E. xr 1:;;'1a.ti9ri cif. I55.41.b\5. 10) The three distracters would cause all the bu!leted. items except the last o_ne to occur. The 3 unaffected channels rising I

ii

A s

. **

• would discount the 3 items (steam leak, RCS leak, or rod 1nsert1on) that could be causing the event.

I

• * ' Reference Title * *** k . *F~4illty Re.fE!rehce Nunib~r : 'I !Referenc~ sedio11 , I' Page' No. ! !RevisfonJ

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RO SkyScraper J SRO Skyscraper . ! RO System/Evolution List . ( SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes J I RO s iauestion Topic!

Which of the following describes the effect if a PZR level instrument reference leg were to develop a leak with the Master Flow Controller in auto?

I ted PZR level would initially .....

l l

ra. ! rise, then actual PZR level would rise.

I I

~ rise, then actual PZR level would lower.

II t2J Ilower, then actual PZR level would rise.

II fd.l jlower, then actual PZR level would lower.

I

!'.Answer i fD" !Exan(Level j IR I !cognitive Level I 1 Application I lf~diitH ISalem 1 & 2 I !Exauipate: il 12/21/2015!

I Jt"*v>r'!?v:**,1 II~ [RO Group:il ~Et~ D

\KA:JI 000028K101 I !RO Value: \12.s*j \SROV?lue:H 3.11 \section: 2j 1,SROGrQup:1! 21 ISyste'iri!EvolutloriTitle: IPressurizer Level Control Malfunction ,028

l<A Statement: i Knowledge of the operational implications of the followino concepts as thev apply to Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction: I PZR reference leak abnormalities l 1Expt~n(l!i9'1 ()f ! 55.41.b(7) As level in the reference leg lowers, the pressure of the actual wight of water in the PZR would appear to be greater than Answer!):"** * ! it was, as it is pushing against a lower reference pressure from the reference leg. This would result in indicated PZR level rising.

The rising level would cause an automatic response of the Master Flow Controller to lower charging flow, which would cause actual PZR level to lower.

~

I  : Reference Title<"  ; \:<.i 'Facility R~ferl:}nc.eNulTlber *![~eferenCe ~eCtion *I* PageNoJ jRevi~ion IGeneral Physics Lesson Plan Components II PC071r4 Sensors I ii 114 I I II I 11 11 I I

l II l 11 11 I I

.. *' ~

i:LO:'Number

.. .. . . ..:, Objectives I

.. . ~l PZRP&LE015 fauestfolls~~tCe: iJ IFacility Exam Bank I[O:tiestiOnMocilfi(;atio~ ¥ethod:' ~concept used IJusefo11ril'lg.Jraining program l o l9~e!)tio~?"l1~~~*s9rrln)~ht§I =======.'.:=============================-================--!

159797

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List J SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes l<lue~tionJqpic §_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,I' Which of the following describes the difference in effect of a rapid boration performed during an ATWS at BOL or EOL?

, the rapid boration will insert more reactivity due to the 2) differential boron worth.

fal 11)2) EOL

- HIGHER lb* I I~\ ~g0ER

~ j 1) BOL

..___, 2) HIGHER d.i j ~\ ~g0ER

!AnswE!rl ~ !Exam Level; ~ !C6gnitive Level i IMemory I \Facility: i ISalem 1 & 2 I jE~a,moate: 1 I 12/21/20151

~I 000029K 103 I /AK 1. 03 1IRO Value: jQ]" :SRO Valu.e: I[}] ise(:tion: !I~ jRo Group:j LJ )~RO Grollp:j LJ D 1~ysteiri/EvolutionTit!e I j Anticipated Transient Without Scram IKAStateinenl: I Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they appl to Anticipated Transient Without Scram:

Effects of boron on reactivity

[~~~~(O,~ O.' J[ 55.41. b(5) Dmoceotial bocoo worth '" " " coco life, aod "'" '"" morn " " ' ' ' " doriog ao ATWT " EOL I,..... I I,.,_.--,..,-:~--c-c-~*. *-R-e-fe_r_e-n_c_e_T-it-le-*,,---------,--,------,q,---..,,-F-a-*c-il-it_y_R_e-fe_r_e-nc_e_N_u_m_b_e_r_*.**.~,,.1 1c-R-e-fe_r_e-ric_e_s_*_ec-t-io_n_*~1 ' Page No l !Revision'

• • • • i' . 1" i ICurvebook 11 S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0016 I 11 I j7 I I II I 11 11 I I II I 11 11 I

~~\Rr,:N~*mh~r  :>*j:'.I Objectives IFRSMOOE004 t

1_ ____,

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RO Skyscraper I...

SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List J SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I lciuestion Top~ I RO 1o I Given the following conditions:

'2 experiences a Rx trip from 100% power when a Main Generator trip

.ses a Main Turbine trip.

- Upon transition to TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response, the PO reports OHA A-6 RMS HI RAD has annunciated, and Radiation Monitor 2R19C - 23SG Slowdown, is in alarm with rising counts.

Which of the following describes how the crew should proceed?

I

[a:! Initiate SI and go to TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. I I

(6, II Enter S2.0P-AB.SG-0001, Steam Generator Tube Leak, while continuing in TRIP-2.

I lsJ IDo NOT initiate any procedures based solely on a 2R19 alarm immediately following a Rx trip.

! I' I

'd. i Enter S2.0P-AB.RAD-0001, Abnormal Radiation, to verify validity of alarm while continuing in TRI P-2.

I

!Answer J Id j IExam :t,everj j R I icog11itive Leyel ;IApplication I !Facility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I IEx?111()at~:

• 11 12/21/20151

!KA:Jj oooo37A201 1.AA2.01 I jROVatue:!I 3.0j iSRoValue:il 3.4j 1

Section:il~ [Ro GrOuri!JI 2j ISRO Group:: I 21 r&11 D isysteri'tJi:;:yolutionTitfe I j Steam Generator Tube Leak 11037

KA statement:! IAbility to determine and interpret the followinq as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak:

I Unusual readings of the monitors; steps needed to verify readings fExpf'.1~~t.i§~ of \I 55.41.b(10) AB.SG says in note un.der entry conditions that R19s are not accurate immediately following a. unit trip and should not Answers: * * . *ii be used as the sole basis for entering 1t. However, AB.RAD should be entered and the alarm venfied as directed at step 3.2. The I

ISI is not warranted without corroborating indications

,___ I 1

Reference Title "

')>*.~*}!< . 11:: *facility Refer~llce Numbef<  :.j .~eference Section *: ' '* .' ,.

[ * * ; i Page.No.

. .... I ... " "

I 1Revisio£li ISteam Generator Tube Leak !I S2.0P-AB.SG-0001 I 112 1129 I I

Abnormal Radiation I 1 S2.0P-AB.RAD-0001 I ii 1 1130 I I II I II 11 I I ABSG01 E003 Objectives 1-----~

II

[qtrestiqr.s.1),urce:\ J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ _.l lQ~e~i,i()h ~62Jfic'e~i()~~.M~t~od: *.*I _________,I !t.15,e~ During l:rainlf1fi P,Fo9rairl1 o to~~.~tk}n sCiut~e ~oiriffi~nt~l I I

!~---------------~----------------------~

11 .**.**** . .

i,COiTI01ent *.* *.

I  !

I I

RO SkyScraper I..

SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I fQuestie>nTopiC 11 RO 11 Given the following conditions:

- 2 is performing a controlled shutdown and cooldown from 100% power due

'"a 5 gpm tube leak on 22 SG !AW S2.0P-AB.SG-0001, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

- After completing the Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, following the Rx trip from 20% power, the RO reports that control rod 202 is stuck in the fully withdrawn position.

Which of the following identifies the action, if any, the crew will perform in response to the stuck rod?

~I Initiate a rapid boration for 35 minutes during performance of EOP-TRIP-2.

~I Initiate a rapid boration for 35 minutes in S2.0P-AB.SG-0001 after exiting the TRIP series procedures.

I

'c.: No actions are required for a single stuck rod because SDM for the cooldown to 503 degrees is adequate.

'c!*l I No actions are required for a single stuck rod until the Auto SI Block is performed during RCS depressurization to 1900 psig.

• Answe~'l I b  ! ii:xam Level i IR I !Cognitive Level.: IApplication I !Fadmy: 11 Salem 1 & 2 1 IEx;a~pate: 11 12/21/20151 t<A: ! I 000038G416 l ,2.4.16 i iROVatue: II 3.5j 'SROVallle:Jl4.4 I !.se'ctiofo~j~ [Ro Gro&p:ll 1j !sROGroup:ll 1j ~~ll D

'systerri/Eyolution Title I j Steam Generator Tube Rupture I 1038

• KA sfatenieht: I ,--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--:

Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating

. procedures, abnormal operatin procedures, and severe accident mana ement guidelines.

~swers:. I

[*.EX** * *

• plan. ,,atic;>*!1******~.f 55.41.b(10) Step 3.26.H in AB.SG states to trip the turbine, then trip the Rx at 20% power during the shutdown. The 5 gpm s_ize of

• 1

c* , : the leak will allow for a controlled shutdown, and will also allow the crew to transition to TRI P-2. There are no SGTR diagnostic steps in TRIP-2 that would cause a transition to SGTR-1. AB.SG would be re-entered at step 3.27 following exit of TRIP-2, and 3.28 directs rapid boration for each stuck rod for 35 minutes. The rapid boration will be initiated before any depressurization starts I ***r *. *" .:t. :Reference Title *'  : ij .: F~cilfty Reference N~mber .: *: ItReference Section Page No.i IR~vision I;;;;;;;::============================:::;:;

Steam Generator Tube Leak II S2.0P-AB.SG-0001 j j 29

.=:======================:::=:::

.

IR=e=a=c=to=r=T=ri=p=R=e=sp=o=n=s=e========='-112-EOP-TRIP-2 1

.=:===========~====~~==:=::!

l I

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-' -~~~~~~~~~~~--'!~~~~~~~~-' -~~---'~1==~

t~:o~Number< . , ,,.,.

Objectives I ABSG01 E005

[O~e~!i.~P,~BW°~e:\*J IPrevious 2 NRC Exams Ii~.Li~stiori ¥odif!f~t~~b.N.~tJi~d: ;};, Direct From Source I !use,ciPuringJrainfn!JPrograin I D tbliestio11solJ(cec6rn,ments' j_1_1_-0_1_(_1_2_12_0_1_2_e_x_a_m_J_R_o_o_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes J

..-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-,.!

~Question Topic! IRO 12

• ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I How does the INITIAL Tavg response for a large steam line break (SLB) compare to the Tavg response for a large feed line break (FLB)?

Tavg response is before automatic protective actions occur)

~ I Rises for a SLB and lowers for a FLB.

I

~I Lowers for a SLB and rises for a FLB. ,,

[SJ I Rises for both a SLB and a FLB, rises more for a SLB. I I

I

'd. ! Lowers for both a SLB and a FLB, lowers more for a FLB.

I

[Answer I ["O" iE?<alllLeveli fK:J !Cognitiye'LeveL:j JApplication I jFacility:j jsalem 1 &2 1!Examtiate:*j I 12/21/20151

~Joooo54K101 i!AK1.01 liROValue:tB!sR.o'latye:i[D}isectiori:ll~IR0Group:lLJi5R0Gr6Up:lLJ ~~:lj D

.Systenl/Evolution Title;! ILoss of Main Feedwater I !054 I

i<Astaternei:it:i Knowled e of the operational implications of the following concepts as they appl to Loss of Main Feedwater:

MFW line break depressurizes the S/G (similar to a steam line break f.*f?J~.n~t.*. q.f.1. 55.41.b(5) A steam line break will cause MORE steam to be drawn from the SG, causing Tc to go down, causing Tavg to go down.

. iori 1 1..

,Answers: . . . A Feedline break will send LESS cold water into the SG so it's Tc will rise, and Tavg will rise. KJA match because the operational implication of the SG depressurization (similar to a steam line break) is that an operator would have to use diverse and alternate II I indication to discern what is acrually happening to the SG.

Reference Title * [ . Fa~Hity Reference Nul1'Jbe~. .  !!Reference Section. l i Page No. [ IRevisiOn

=;

;;::::=::::=::::=:.::::::::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=~~====::::=:::::::::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=::::::.:::.

I

'~==========l;:l========ll~=====-1:=1 II ll 11 =='11~=1'i.==='

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,li, _ _ _ _ _ ____,1! ii 11-~'

,'i:;,o. NUmb'er \

Objectives II CN&FDWE016 1_ ___.

'Ma.terialReql.lirecl forE~i:lll'Jiriation**** 11 !j

,oq~s~ioi'! Soyr(:e; xi IFacility Exam Bank Ilqllestig~ Modlfica\iC>n M~t~pd: '. dDirect From Source I!l!sW' Dur@i'Jraii}ing' Pl'<foram l D

',qu~i.~p,!l~0Ar~e,:corr1~~~~j I  :::::======-========::'.=====================:...===============::.._,

so1s9 j

• ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

!Comment I I I I I I

RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List. J Outline Changes J iQuestion Topic I IRO 13 I

~

Given the following conditions:

m Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

- :;,alem Unit 2 is in Mode 4 with 21 loop of RHR in SOC mode.

- Subsequently, a loss of all off site power occurs.

- ALL Unit 2 EDGs fail to start or trip shortly after starting, and ALL Unit 2 4KV vital buses are de-energized.

- The RO reports 21RH18 RHR HX FLOW CONT VALVE indicates 6% open and 2RH20 RHR HX BYP VALVE indicates 15% open, and questions their actual position.

Which of the following describes the operation of the 21RH18 and 2RH20?

~I BOTH the 21RH18 and 2RH20 fail AS IS on a loss of air and the indication is correct.

fbl 'The 21 RH18 fails open and the 2RH20 fails shut, and the board indication shows last known position before the loss of power.

I

c. i BOTH.the 21RH18 and 2RH20 fail SHUT on a loss of air, and the board indication shows how far they shut before losing all air pressure for operation. II r--cc

~rd tb~forA lodon...alJ...gj~

'rl ;

l..:_J I! ROTH tbA 21RH18 '2nd ?RH?O fail OPFlll on" loss of gjr for operation.

• indic'2+/-ion s:hrnw: ho"' far

, * ~ *

Answer1 ~ !Exam Level l ~ !c()gnitive Leve( I!Memory I !Facility:J j Salem 1 & 2 I JExaml:)~t~:l l___1_2_12_11_2_0_15__.I

~I oooossA201 I EA2.01 I iRc)Vatlle: 0"1sRC> Valu.e:.§'se'diof'l: 1 I~ :Ro Group:! LJ 'sRo Groll?:' LJ D

,SysteJil!Ev9lution Title i l_s_ta_t_io_n_B_la_c_k_o_u_t_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___. ~0_55_ _~

KA Statement: i Ability to determine and interpret the followin as they appl to Station Blackout:

Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air system

'Ex :lion ,ot,d 55.41.b(7) The 21RH18 and the 2RH20 fail AS IS on a loss of control air, and both are supplied air exclusively from the "A" header.

iAns~v~rs: : : * ** !I Unit 2 ECAC supplies the "A" air header. With the Unit 2 ECAC also failing to start, control air pressure will bleed away fairly

• * *I rapidly. The console indication will indicate actual valve position since 115VIB power should be available from the inverters for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following a LOPA The valve positions given in the stem are what would be expected with a loop of RHR in SDC mode.

Reference Title It Facility Reference Number.: >.I t~eferehce Section frPage f>:'o. I [R_evision

=

:==:::=:::::::::::=:::::::=::::=::::::::::=:::=::====::=::~~==========::=::::=::::=::::::::::.

~IL=o=ss=o=f=C=o=nt=ro=I=A=ir=========I S=2=.0=P=-=A=B=.C=A=-0=0=01=====i========'..1~3=6===:II:.=1=8===

!=I

\====================='~===============~=========~!

---

~ ______________, -------~'-~~~!~~~

=~'

i[~o:'.N'iimber.>:"

Objectives I LOPAOOE010 iQu~stio~~oprb~.'.!l'! j_N_e_w__________, itlli}'t~Ho,nMoaiticati~nMethod: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___. :u~~cl .ouHr19orrairjJri9 Program ! oI

!Que;;;non,sourc~co.hlrrienfsi *-----------------------------------------~'

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes iQuesti96'l'9plc'l 1Ro 14 I Given the following conditions:

- 2B Vital Instrument Bus (VIB) Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) Static

~*vltch has been placed in the Bypass to Alternate position !AW 2B VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS UPS SYSTEM OPERATION.

- ALL power supplies to the 2B VIB UPS are available.

- Subsequently, the breaker from 2B 230VAC bus to the 2B VIB AC Line Regulator fails and opens.

What will be the effect on 2B VIB?

The 2B VIB will. ..

I

~ NOT deenergize because the Static Switch will automatically swap to the Preferred Source.

I

~I NOT deenergize because the inverter will automatically power the 2B VIB through the inverter auctioneering circuit from its DC source.

I

[Gl Ideenergize until manual operator action is taken to re-energize the 2B VIB by placing the Static Switch in Normal and placing the Test Transfer switch to N (Normal). I id.!

Ideenergize until manual operator action is taken to re-energize the 2B VIB by placing the Static Switch in Isolate (Alternate) and placing the Test Transfer Switch to N (Normal).

I

Answer'! c  ! !exam Levell !R I  !

cognitive l..evel

• 1 AQQlication i IFa.dlity: WSalem 1 & 2 l~E:xanipate.~ W 12/21/20151, i!<A:il 000057A101 i1AA1.01 1IRoNalue:!13.7*1 !SRO Value: ii 3. 7j lsec~ion: q~ i.Ro Group:!!-2J iSR.o 'Group:! I 1 ! D

!System/Evolutlori Title I !Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus I !o57

[!<'A Statement:! Abilit to operate and I or monitor the followin as they apply to Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:

. Manual inverter swapping fEXplanaHciri*'of  ! 55.41.b(7) The VIB UPS static switch is transferred from norm to alt by placing the test transfer switch to ALT JAW Section 5.4 of

!Answers:  ! S0.115-0012. Then the Manual Bypass Switch is placed in Bypass to Alternate to physically position contacts B 1, B2, and B4 I (closed) and 83, B5 open. The VIB will deenrgize when power is lost to the AC line regulator, which is the Alternate source.

Placing the static s'0tch in Normal .and test transfer ~witch to N (from alte~nate) is directed by S0-115-0012, Section 5.'..3 and.

Icould be powered fro~ another source. A-is incorrect because automatic transfer is unavailable with the staic switch not in the Normal posiiton. B is incorrect because the static switch is aligned to alternate, and While the DC power is supplying the inverter, I the inverter output cannot flow through static switch with B3 and B5 contacts open.

[\:: ;;.* <:; *:. *J~efere@e'.1me * *** * * *** *'I t:: Fac!lity Rete.re.hse r-i~mber il!3efer.erice sectr6ri '" .l i i;>age No. 1 IRevisioTll 128 VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS UPS SYSTEM 0 iIS2.0P-S0.115-0012 i15.4 iI19 11!=6==::'.

j 2B VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS UPS SYSTEM 0 II S2.0P-S0.115-0012 !I Exhibit 1 (Static Switch I156 116

!------------'!----------' I ===

1-~

fL~q;}lµmber . :*.. * *I Objectives I 115VACE014

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper j

RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I

iauestiof\ Topic'.! I RO 15 I Given the following conditions: I

- 2 tripped due to a transformer problem.

- ,_,-..and 2C Vital Susses are energized in SEC Mode 2.

- 28 Vital Bus is de-energized because 28 Diesel Generator failed to start.

- OHA B-10, 28 125VDC CNTRL BUS VOLT LO, just actuated.

In accordance with S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0002, Overhead Annunciators Window B, which of the following describes the required action?

~ IPlace the 2B2 Battery Charger in service.

I fb.l ITransfer the 281 Charger to its alternate power supply.

I

!c. i Transfer 2B 125 VDC bus loads to their alternate source.

I

[ctl Ensure the 282 Battery Charger has automatically energized.

'Answer i a  ! I !Exam Level ! IR I !cognitive ~eve( J IApplication I iFa~H~ty: j ISalem 1 & 2 1 !ExamDat~: 11 12/21/20151, JI~ rRO Group:j LJ ;SRO Group:; LJ j!~m D

?<*

~I 000058A 101

,~m~

~

IIAA 1.01 I [RO Value: I§ 1SRO Value::@ ;Section: '

I

• Systein/E:,)()11.JtrohTitle j !_L_os_s_o_f_D_C_P_ow_er_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I '058 I iKA. Statement: I IAbility to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of DC Power: I I Cross-tie of the affected de bus with the alternate supply I i~~.Pl?nation otH 55.41.b(8) The 281 battery charger is normally in service. The use of 282 Battery charger is limited to 7 days per Tech Specs and

!'Answers: .  !! is n~t normally in service. There is no auto swap. Transferring loads is only done if the backup battery charger cannot be placed in service.

..** Reference'Jitle * :> * .* .  :'. *. F?cilityReferenceNumber **** ! lkefereryceSectfon 1

.* l 1. P~9:$ N~-1 t~~y!s!Oh IOverhead Annunciators Window B 11 S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0002 11 I j 21-22 1136 I

~,=================1i1=============q~========::::i1 ii I 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,ll1----------'lll _____ ___,q~:::~11~=:_=_=_.::::,!

Lo. Number "':* ... j I DCELECE005 I

• !Vlateria)Re'quirecl,fo~~aminanon ,*I I f(luesti~!:?o~f?~:);j IFacility Exam Bank I [Q~e~~ion,M§c![~!(;atigh:'Meth§c!: >~Editorially Modified I illseCI [)urirJ.gTratrling Program j O

~=====-=:::::.:::=:::::.:=::=:::::::.::::::.:::::::::.============-================--1 iql(~.~tion souice,comrrli~t¥i 1so249

!------~--~~----------------~------------------~----------------------'

'I I I I

. RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I iQuestion Topic 11 RO 16 I Which of the following identifies when the 21/22SW122, CC HX SW INLET VALVES automatically reposition, and why?

,/22SW122 valves ...

I

['.] Iopen on ANY SI signal to ensure cool CCW is supplied to the RHR HXs and pump seals.

I

[gJ I close on ANY SI signal to ensure SW pump runout does not occur with all CFCUs running.

I

[211 open on a SI signal coincident with a LOOP to ensure cool CCW is supplied to the RHR HXs and pump seals.

11 I

eJ 'dose on a SI signal coincident with a LOOP to ensure SW pump runout does not occur with all CFCUs running.

I

'A.nswel" i Id I iExatn Level J ~ lcog~itive Leyet .** i IMemory I !facility: J ISalem 1 & 2 I IExam Date: 'I i . . <."*'*

12/21/2015j

_._,,ii 000062K302

'KA: IjAK3.02 1 IR.0)1aiue:rj 3.6j 1sRo\ft:11ue:1I 2.91 !s~~ti9ii:H~ [RC>,9mup:ll 11 [sR.o G~()tiP=I! 11 ~~I~ D

,system/Evolution Title l ILoss of Nuclear Service Water 11062 iKA. Statement

I Knowledqe of the reasons for the following responses as thev apolv to Loss of Nuclear Service Water:

1

!The automatic actions (alionments) within the nuclear service water resulting from the actuation of the ES FAS I

~~plan'afic\i1 pf :1 55.41 (7,8) The SW122 valve are normally open and operate in conjunction with the CCW HX SW outlet valves SW127. During a SI IAflsw~fs:*: \ ..J coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power, the SW122 valves are automatically repositioned from open to shut. SEC Mode Ill closes 1SW122's due to SW Pump runout (and potential loss of all SW) concerns with all CFCU's l/S if only 2 SW pumps are operating, I. Rn l

due to EOG/SEC failure. Also, the SW122's must stroke closed in less than 30 seconds to ensure the CFCU's are operational within s----"~ '-"-* inn "-..lo Ill '-'"~tinn IT--'-

C::---

'<Ill '< 'l T.,hlo '< ':l_C::\

. Reference Title < I!O: Facility Reference Number *  ! ff{efe_r'ence Sectfon l

• ;Page No: J jRevisicm:

I;::::::::::::=:====::=:::=:::=:==::=:::::::=:::=:::::::=:====::=:::::~===========::::::=:======::=::::::::.~======::=:::::::::::====::::

Service Water System - Nuclear 11 NOS05SWONUC 11 I j 34-35 1113 I 1~===========1i1=======:1.~1=======q ii I l, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.11 _ _ _ _ __.i,l _ _ _____,ll II I

\;o:cN"timbef :* '! Objectives I SWONUCE006 I I

[<;lties'ti6i,i;$Ci~rce:fl I Facility Exam Bank I i}:l~estioll Modifica~ic>§M~fu~c:tS{: ~Direct From Source I .lls~dpi,iripg Trafnirlg prpgram'j D I!9~~S:ti9ti,~,ource,co~fii~~ts[ ;======~==========:'.::'.::::'.::'.::::'.::'.:::~===========-================--,,1j 1125675 I *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

f-

RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper J __ R_o_s_y_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_ti_on_u_st_ _ _ sR_o__sy_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_tio_n_L_is_t__, Outline Changes

[Question 'ropiC I RO 17 I I 80'h Salem Units are operating normally at 100% power when Unit 2 recieves OHA A-7 FIRE PROT FIRE.

v. , of the following is a correct response when assessing the affected Fire Zone(s) on 2RP5, and why? I

~I If ANY rows "Fire" light is illuminated ensure at least one Fire Pump is running to supply fire protection water by verifying OHA A-15 FIRE PUMP 1/2 RUN. I I

~ If a fire is indicated in the Relay Room select Fire Outside Control Area in both control rooms to prevent smoke from entering control rooms.

I l

tc. j If ANY C02 I Halon Discharge lights are lit then ensure EOG control room ventilation has automatically stopped to prevent egress of gas to

- adjoining areas. I

ct.)

I If fire indication for BOTH Zones 59 and 74 are received, then open 2FP147 Fire Protection Containment Isolation to provide normally isolated fire protection water to containment.

I l'Ans'(>'er I d l I i.f::xam Levi:;! !IR I l<;ognitive Level ! I Memory I ifacility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I IE:x<irllb<ite: 11 12/21/20151 i

KA: 000067K302 IAK3.02 : !R.0Va1ue:lj 2.5I :sR.ova1t.ie:C'!j 3.3I fsectiC>ri:H~ IRc:>Grpup:ll 21 tsRdGrouiJ~ll 2j ~1~ D

[Sy5,tern/Evpltiti8r'i Title I _P_la_n_t_F_ir_e_o_n_S_ite_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I !057 1

i KAstatement:I Knowledqe of the reasons for the followinq responses as they apply to Plant Fire on Site:

Steps called out in the site fire protection plan, FPS manual, and fire zone manual I

'.Expianatlon of I 55.41.b(10,4) A is incorrect because the FIRE light can illuminate if a manual fire pull box is activated, which only gives indication

!Answers: *.*. I and does not initiate fire protection water flow. C is incorrect because Halon supplied to relay rooms would not indicate stopping EOG supply ventilation. B is incorrect because for a fire in Relay Room (physically located outside CR but using same AC system)

Fire Outside Control Area would not be selected. D is correct because the fire protection line to containment is normally isolated

---1 ic- lf '--"- c::a -~....1 7A .... 1--C" - - - ----: ...... -J

• ,** 'Referenc¢ Title*, '"" . :. <it. **'f?si\ity Refer~nce Ni.irfitje'f <* ! [Reference Section

• j rPag~ No~! !R.evi!;ion' IControl Room Fire Response iIS2.0P-AB.FIRE-0001 I ii 2 11 9 I

!Overhead Annunciators - Window A II S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0001 I 1123-24 I 156 I I

I II I ii !I I I

I I Objectives I

FIRPROE008

!ht.fes,tlonSource.:.::1 ,_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.I r9uestionlV!Od[fipationMeth(id: n I!l)sed,Durin9Trainh19 Program I DI

[C1Y~tio~S§u~c~.9C>r11!1'.1~°"t~i I I

!~----------------------------------------~

I I I I l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__,I 1-

RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List .  ! SRO System/Evolution List _I Outline Changes I lduestion Topic 11 RO 1 a I Given the following conditions:

.rators are performing actions in 2-EOP-FRCC-1, Response to Inadequate vvre Cooling.

I- Containment pressure is 2 psig and stable.

Which of the following describes the SG level and AFW flow requirements PRIOR to initiating the SG Depressurization to Inject ECCS Accumulators?

SG NR level in at least one SG must be greater than ___

I

.<L 119% OR total AFW flow must be >22E4 lbm/hr.

11

[i>:j 115% OR tot'I AFW fl~ m"'t be >22E 4 lbm/h1. 1I re.! 19% AND total AFW flow available of >22E4 lbm/hr. I

~ 115% AND total AFW flow available of >22E4 lbm/hr. Il IAFW pump I l.E~pj~~~tioll**~f! 55.41.b(10) Step 13 asks if any SG NR level is >9% (15% adverse). Since containment pressure is stated as 2 psig, it is below the Answers:*>*'* l 4 psig at which adverse numbers would be used. If SG NR level is >9% in at least one SG, the step for asking if >22E4 lbm/hr AFW flow is present is bypassed. If SG NR level is <9%, then it requires 22E4 lbm/hr. So you need at least 9% OR actual total AFW flow >22E4 lbm/hr. The availability is plausible as it is used in other Emerg procedures, but in this case a secondary heat sink l

is c:emiir:ed ~d£blcb i._... ...J-.C:---' ..,._... ..... not~ r-r -....'1'1~A tt--11-.- &1-u1 I i **.*.*Reference Title *1'

• Facility Reference Nufriber i [Reference Section

• l IPage No.! !Revision' I Response to Inadequate Core Cooling 112-EOP-FRCC-1 ll ii 2 1122 I I II ii II 11 I I II II ll II I I

Objectives I FRCCOOE005 loue~tlo~.§9ii(c~: J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ _I ~to u~e::.sc.cti::.o'::.li-::.JV.....

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RO Sky Scraper. I. SRO Skyscraper J --R_o_s_y_st...e_m_1E_v_o_1u... ti_on_u_st......, SRO System/Evolution List .1. Outline Changes f (Question Topic I !_R_o_19_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,

Ur"? is at 80% power when RMS channel 2R31, Letdown Line-Failed Fuel Process Rad Monitor starts a rising trend.

v, responding with S2.0P-AB.RC-0002, High Activity in Reactor Coolant System, how will operators differentiate between a crud burst and failed fuel as the cause of the rising 2R31 indication?

~I By monitoring 2R31. Fuel damage will cause the indication to rise at a higher rate than a crud burst.

I

[gJ I By raising letdown flow rate to 120 gpm. The 2R31 readings will lower if crud burst caused the rising trend but will NOT lower if failed fuel caused the rising trend.

~!By requesting Radiation Protection to survey the letdown pipe area in the Auxiliary building. Radiation levels will be higher due to failed fuel 1

than from a crud burst. I 1

,d. i 'By requesting a Shift Chemistry Technician perform a radiological analysis of the RCS. A crud burst will show different concentrations of certain radionuclides than will failed fuel. I!

Answer I@=] jE:xamLevet: ~ jcogniti'/eLevel I IMemory I [Fa,cmty::i ISalem 1 & 2 l JExamDate:j ! 12121120151

~I oooo76A203 IIAA2.03 : JRo vaiue:'j IJ]" fsROya1ue:I~ ;secti911: iI~ [Ro Group:! LJ is RO Gfol.li:):! LJ ~'l~ D

System/Evolutiem Title. j j High Reactor Coolant Activity I ~0_7_6_~

l<A Stat'eh'lent:: IAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to High Reactor Coolant Activity*

RCS radioactivity level meter

!ExplaT)atior\ of! 55.41.b(5,10) Dis correct.This is the method as directed by procedure to determine if there is failed fuel. A is incorrect because

AnsW~fs: * "*; there is no procedural guidance for the operator to use to determine source of elevated readings by how fast indications are rising.

C is incorrect because Radiation Protection is sent to perform surveys to repost areas as necessary for personnel protection, not to determine source of activity .. B is incorrect because Letdown is maximized to expedite RCS cleanup for valid elevated activity, not to determjne ca1 !SP of the elevated actj~£it I

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• '.:<.\

I Objectives BRC02E001 I ABRC02E003 j_ __,

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I. RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I

-~--~~ ;:::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::-:-~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::~.::'.'.'.'.:::::::::::::::::::::'._.:._.:.__;_.:._.:.__;__;__;_:...-,I

!Question Topic! RO 21 I

• ~------~~--~-----------~---~---~~--------~---~

Given the following conditions:

- 3LOCA has occurred.

- I ne crew is performing the actions of EOP-LOCA-2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DE PRESSURIZATION.

- SI pumps have been stopped.

- Normal Charging is aligned.

- The crew is depressurizing the RCS using normal spray.

Which of the following describes the strategy for controlling RCS subcooling during the depressurization?

~a.j l Subcooling will be ...

minimized to reduce RCS break flow.

I I

~ maximized to ensure continued RCP operation.

I tsJ Imaximized to prevent a challenge to the core cooling critical safety function.

11

'cf.

Iminimized to ensure pressurizer level remains above the lower limit to allow heater operation during the RCS cooldown.

I Ariswer I Fl :Exam Lever I fR=J [cognitive Level i !Memorv I !Facility~ W Salem 1 & 2 l~ExamDate:;*H--_1_2_12_1_12_0_15__,j

!<AiJI OOWE03A103 D 1$yst~J!iiE.v_olution Title i I LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

!KA Staterne!lt: [ IAbility to operate and I or monitor the followinq as they apply to LOCA Cool down and Depressurization:

Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

..... **. . . . *.**I

!}O:~ptaqation ofl 55.41.b(10) Strategy of step 31 is to depressurize and attempt to minimize subcooling so that break flow is reduced, due to the

• Ariswers: ; . < i minimal makeup provided by charging pumps. Bis incorrect because RCP operation is not required for this event. although I desired. C is incorrect because core cooling should not be challenged on loss of subcooling at these temps and pressures(this point in the cooldown) D is incorrect because PZR heater operation may be required to reduce the rate of increase in pressurizer I

, leHel b1 it is oaf tbe r::easoc fat wicimizicc:i s11bcocfico d

1:.*. :C:("

,:.~ef~!"~nC:e"J"ttJe .**... *..

• 1:I ~ ('; .f~(;ilityRef~rerice-Nu[nber *. *,*I 'Reference,$~'cticm . ImPage No,*! i~eviSi()n: I I Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 112-EOP-LOCA-2 Basis Doc ii step 31 1159 1125 I I II I 11 11 I

! II I lj II I l LOCA02E001 Objectives looe~trciry;$o~i'c~':,;,l IFacility Exam Bank 1 l.(l~f:!¥tr&i\ M:i:~d\~fatl9r;iMeihod: . *II Direct From source I jli$~p ot1rii-}9.Tl"~r:trr19<p[6grahtl o

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List I. s.Ro System/Evolution List I. Outline Changes I

[Question Topic I IRO 22 l I

Given the following conditions:

1 2 is attempting to identify and isolate a LOCA outside containment.

- L.-EOP-LOCA-6, LOCA Outside Containment. has just been entered.

- The source of the water is backleakage from the 23 cold leg injection line.

Assuming that any valves required to be operated during LOCA-6 operate correctly, which of the following leak locations would NOT be isolated while using 2-EOP-LOCA-6?

[]I On the valve inlet flange on 22SJ49, RHR DISCH TO COLD LEGS.

I

[§]I On the valve outlet flange on 21SJ49, RHR DISCH TO COLD LEGS.

I

[SJ I Between the 2RH20, RHR HX BYP VALVE and the 2RH26, HOT LEG ISOL VALVE.

I fd.11 Between the 2RH2, RHR COMMON SUCT VALVE, and 22RH4, RHR PMP SUCT VALVE.

I I I *Answer 1 b I I IExaIT!i...eveJ 11 R I !cognitive).evel i IApplication I !Fasility~ !ISalem 1 & 2 I !ExamDate: 11 12/21/2015!

I [Tii iSRO Value:d~ rSect1on: 11~ [RQGroup:/LJ i~r~:~ 0

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I  ! . -~ ;*,

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I' OOWE04K202 11 EK2.2 j IRQYalue: I jSRQ Groµp:10 I jE04 iKA Statemeht: 1 i Knowledqe of the interrelations between LOCA Outside Containment and the followinq:

I Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations

. between the proper operation of these svstems to the operation of the facilitv. l IExplanatren

~swer~: :

~f i!

Ji 55.41 (3,8) 2-EOP-LOCA-6 closes/checks closed the following valves: 2RH 1 OR 2RH2, 21 and 22RH19s, 2RH26, 21 and 22SJ49s. Using drawing 205332-SIMP. it shows that any leak between the RH1/2 and the SJ49s will be isolated with the above I valves closed. The only location which wouldn't be.affected. by those valve being close.din the downstre~m/outlet .side of the SJ49 I valves. The stem statement of proper valve operation was inserted to preclude a candidate from assuming a leaking valve may not

'close fJ i!l~' M11- Vt I\ - ;,... h .... ,... ...... ~ ,...,..., L'- - ~ - L.. - - * ..,, ,..., *-"' i,...,,...i,...,.... - - - * ,: ....[ ......... ,...,,...,..,......

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,* ~1 F:'f'i,3cUityReferei\c;eNurriber. *A [R~feforceSect\o~**. ;>j* 1*[.Page,No.d: .. . ... ,, ..... "I

!Revision 1 I LOCA Outside Containment 112-EOP-LOCA-6 I 11 1 j21 I I 11205332-SIMP I ii 11 I l

I ii 11 11 11 I

[L.(). Nµrr1be~ :>

I LOCA06E002 Objectives

[Ou!:'.stion.~()lltc;:~: ~11 Facility Exam Bank I [a1:1esti~n.~9~lf!q~ti0~.M~th<>,d: ~Direct From Source I iLI.se~J:i@r:19:l'l'<1fofo9 Progral11j O j

[ou~stlon S@rc~ C~m'O{~~tsj 1133792. Used 3 NRC exams ago Sept 2011 RO exam I

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!6tiestionToplp 11 RO 23 I Giv 0 ri the following conditions:

- , crew is in 2-EOP-FRHS-1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, and the criteria for initiating RCS bleed and feed has been met.

- Prior to the actual procedure steps there is a CAUTION statement that reads:

TO ESTABLISH RCS HEAT REMOVAL BY RCS BLEED AND FEED, STEPS 24 THRU 29 MUST BE PERFORMED QUICKLY AND WITHOUT INTERRUPTION Which of the followinQ describes the basis for that statement?

§]I Stopping RCP's is the first step in the process. This terminates all RCS heat removal until bleed and feed is initiated.

I I

~ Expeditious performance of the steps allows time for other compensatory actions if bleed and feed actions are unsuccessful.

I

!SJ IDelay allows core cooling to degrade further. RCS pressure rises such that ECCS flow is lower when bleed and feed is initiated.

I I

~ Establishing SI flow and then delaying opening the PZR PORVs may lead to damage to the PORVs and Code Safety Valves when they pass water.

I' IAnswerj c I I [ExamLevetJ j R I lC:ogllitive L.~vel ,IMemory I if~ci.Hty: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I' .. **.***** ... i I

. iEx<!lll.D<!fe; I . 12/21/20151 4.3!\Section:1l~iRO,Group:!I fi~1~J D t"~ ,.,.,r'l,~q iKA: 11 OOWE05G420 J 2.4.20 l!R()Value::j 3.SliSROValtJe:il 1l!SRO.Group:lj 11

'"-;:::=====-=======-====-=======:..:=:::::..:.::=====..:..:::::::..:.:::::::..:.::======::.=:::::..:.::======:::::..:.:::::::..:.:::_

'Systef1l/E11C>lution Title I j Loss of Secondary Heat Sink I E05

'KA S t a t e m e n t : : . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

I KnowledQe of operational implications of EOP warninos, cautions, and notes.

i'.;' (.; L:* 'Refere~pefltle'.;*;

=~~;;;;

;:;;:::;:::;:;;;;;:;;;;;;;;~~~~::::::::::.::.:::::~

i j *. Facility Referehce,t:fomber I[Refer$nce SectiC>~ *.* l f Page No.1 n~.elfiS.i()ni L=o=s=s=of=S=e=c=on=d=a=ry=H=e=a=t i.::1 ========ii 2-EOP-FRHS-1 ii Basis Doc 117 1124 I

~1===================lll===============:ll~======~i1 1

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,ll, _ _ _ _ _ ___.11 _ _ _ ___.q IIII II t1,.;o,.r;rilrnber*H.,1:,,*

!FRHSOOE009 Objectives I

!Material Req~ifedfor Examfoatlon II I!

tali~stiC>n Sourcii' <j IFacility Exam Bank I!que~tionModtficatioil,M,~ihpd: ~ ~Direct From Source 111.Jsed r5uri~g'>rra!rjipg ~r()grafu*:j DI

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[O~~~tion s~µr~e 9()rl1in~nt§! 80840 1,----------------------------------------,l,

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RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List f SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I.....

louesficinTopicj I RO 24 Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- JCA has occurred.

- vvnile performing 2-EOP-LOCA 1 "LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT" 22 RHR pump motor seizes and power is lost to 21 RHR pump.

- The crew enters 2-EOP-LOCA-5, "LOSS OF EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION".

- A cooldown has been initiated as directed in 2-EOP-LOCA-5.

- During the cooldown, the crew restores power to 21 RHR pump.

- RWST Level is 30' Based on current plant conditions, which of the following describes the mitigation strategy?

~I Continue with the cooldown and start 21 RHR pump when directed in 2-EOP-LOCA-5.

I I

fb. j Return to 2-EOP-LOCA-1 and continue recovery actions with the step previously in effect.

I

[Cl l Start 21 RHR pump and continue actions of 2-EOP-LOCA-5 until the RWST LO Level alarm actuates. I I

~I Start 21 RHR pump and transition to 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, to verify recirculation flowpath.

I

!Ansvveri Ib I IEXam Levelj IR I !cognitive Lever i IMemory 1 lfa~ility; 11 Salem 1& 2 I t~~c:i~i;>~te: l I 12/21/2015!

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~I OOWE11A103 Valµe:,@[sect1on:J!~ ;Ro Gro1Jp:(LJ;SR,()C3JPIJP::LJ f.rl:~ D

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1IEA1.3 I 1ROValue:1[IiJ1sRO Systefo/Evoh:ition Titl~ l ILoss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation I ~'E_1_1_ _

iKA. Statement:: IAbility to operate and for monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation:

IDesired operatin results durin abnormal and emer enc situations.

(Explatj~ti~1}:1,f j 55.41.b(10) B is correct because Continuous action step states that if any train of emergency recirculation capability is restored th]n

• Answers: .* <\<<\*: the crew should return to the procedure and step in effect. This is consistent with the organization of the EOPs. C is incorrect because Continuous action Step 6.1 directs return to evaluate train status and a return to the procedure in effect; A is incorrect because continuation of the cooldown in LOCA-5 is not required. The purpose of the procedure is mitigation and recovery of 1

~ redrc1 ilation canahiljh1 D is jncorrect bpca11se a transfer to I OCA-3 is not initiated 1intj! R\A/ST level is AHali 1ated jn t OCA-1 Th' Iquestion is not considered SRO level based on only requiring general mitigative actions. I

. ,**** ). Reference TiUe *' ;, ; *.* *.** ., ii ;; Facility ~~fer~nce Nulllber ,; I:*Reference S~ctiqll .*. xj rf.?agf No:! L~~yisl~n:

I:=::=======================.:::.::::

Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation 112-EOP-LOCA-5 j 25

===

I ~I===

-~-----------~-~-~*--------~------'*~-------~ -----~~--'

Lo: Nljrpber. I I LOCA05E008 Objectives r('.;hl~~Eci,h.,~pc!fc~: *11 Facility Exam Bank I !pue~tion llJlpdifiq~ti~n.~!tft§ct:'-::11 Direct From Source Iivs.~cipllf!ri91r~[rliQQ Pr9gram.1 DI IC2uestf<>n~ourc,~~omij\enfa! ,_s_1_0_9_5--------------------------------------~'I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper* 1 RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List (

Outline Changes I

!qu,~sti6nTopic l I RO 25 11 G* - the following conditions:

- - ... t 1 has experienced a MSLB at the mixing bottle.

- MSLI has failed to close ANY MS167.

- Operators have transitioned out of 1-EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant.

- RCS pressure is 1345 psig and dropping slowly.

- RCS Tes are dropping.

Which of the following describes Reactor Coolant Pump strategy, and why?

RCPs should ...

~I be tripped to minimize the heat input into the RCS.

I

µ;;: Icontinue to be run, because RCP pressure dependent trip criteria are only applicable during a LBLOCA.

I I

,c.: continue to be run, since RCP pressure dependent trip criteria is not used when a cooldown is in progress.

I I

~I be tripped so that 2 phase flow doesn't develop if they were to be tripped later in the event, leading to higher peak clad temperatures.

I

'Aris.Yet: I jc I !Ex~nf Level j IR I i,C:9gnltive Level I

Application I !Facility: j J Salem 1 & 2 I le~*~1;noat~: 11 12/21/2015!

.KA:il OOWE12A202 1IEA2.2 jiRb}/a1ue~:j 3.4J.sR6Varll~~ll 3.9jtse'cti91"1=ll..~-~=~-LffoGfoup:il 1j[s.R0Grolip:I! 1j ~~ 0

systero/EvolutiorfTiire: j Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators I 1E12

[KA Statement:! Ability to determine and interoret the followino as they apply to Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators:

Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

~~pf~~31tio~ of! 55.41.b(10,3)The RCP trip criteria with regards to pressure in a LOSC condition is for pump protection only. The Generic issues

!Answers: .*.*, .* i segment of the ERG executive volume describes the SBLOCA scenarios where pumping coolant out the break then stopping RCP's l

leads to peak clad temps in excess of 2200 degrees. That is not applicable here. What is more important in the LOSC is forced flow. LOSC-2 basis document page 12.

I 1 I!:1

' < };*/' ** *.. R,ef~rerice Title. * <IF *,facHity R.~fefe~Ce Num6e'H j [R~ference s~cfion * . j f.Page t'fo. J lRevisiOn 1 iIMultiple Steam Generator Depressurization Ij 1-EOP-LOSC-2 !I 1112 J I22 I ii II ll ii 1I I 111-----------'H--------il*---~il 11 I

~i.;~,o~::~,~.mb,er:: ,;~:\. -~

I LOSC02E003 Objectives

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'comment **.. **

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper J RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I

!ouestjol1 Topic'! I RO 26

!~~-~~~~~-~~~-~---~~-----~-~-~~~--~~--~~~~--~

I Given the following conditions:

2 has experienced an event which has resulted in 24 SG pressure rising to 1115 psig.

- , , 1v1SLI has been performed.

How many total SG Safety Valves will be open if 24 SG pressure remains at 1115 psig and all Safety Valves operate when expected?

~I 2

[a.::

I I

[!:_] 13 I

rc~: 14 l:..:.::...:...

I ict.I 15 I

Answerj rD° IExarn Leyei I~ [Cogriiti,_;e L.evel  ! IMemory I' * 'j Salem 1 & 2 I [ExamDat~: .j j 12/21/20151

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[Systel'll/Evot'utiohTltle  ! ISteam Generator Overpressure I _E_1_3_ _

KA Staternent: ! IKnowledge of the interrelations between Steam Generator Overpressure and the following:

' Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations I between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

~~~zt!~on of! 55.41.b( 4) Each SG has five safeties, with lift setpoints of 1070, 1100, 1110, 1120, 1125 psig c--~~~cc-- *. ~-R-e-'fe~.r_e_ll_c=e.'~T-it-,e-**-*. --~~--~i ..-.-N_V_!Tl_Q_e_r_:_,,u [Reference Section, .i rF'<i9eNo. ! IRevision!

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.il _ _ _ _ _~l _ _ _~li ii 1I I I

ISTMGENEOOS Objectives. I I

IQyestien sdU'rce:c,j IFacility Exam Bank I :d~~~iic)1frv1s>(jiflc~E()~.l'flf:tl')()~: .J Direct From source I f!:Jsed owing*f~i:iirling'i>ro9rarri j o I lduestfoh Source Gorliffl~n~sl 1152360 used 3 NRC exams ago Sept 2011.

I fcommerlt *

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper. . I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List ..

I Outline Changes I (Qi.l(!~tion Topfo! RO 27 l I j..Qf +hq following choices, which is the only automatic action expected to occur as containment pressure rises from 12 psig to 18 psig during a LOCA? l

~ IPhase A Isolation 1.

[b."11 Feedwater Isolation.

I

,i::.i IMain Steam line Isolation.

I

---c j

I

,cl. 1 Containment Vent1lat1on lsolat1on Ii

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~jooWE14A101 liEA1.1 liROVa!ue:l[2:2j:sRqya1ue:'lfEjtsectiorl:ij~[RoGr.oup:;LJ:~RQ.GroGp:ILJ  !!'N D ts.Yst~Yp{Eyqlµtfon Title I j_H....;ig::..h_C_o_nt_a_in_m_e_n_t_P_r_es_s_u_re_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.l [EILC-*

li<Astat'emenl:I Ability to operate and I or monitor the followinq as they apply to Hicih Containment Pressure:  !

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

~~~l~~::I~~'~j;~l ;;~~~~(?~::~~:i~ ::~::~\~~ ~~~~~! ~~ :~~ ~: ~i(~~* ~~i~~=t !~~~:ryJ:~:~:~~~i~:~=o~~tf~~r~~:Utr: ~:~g5i~s~~~t~~~:i~1:enn~tVen isolation occurs any SI, RMS alarm of associated monitors, Phase B. The SI signal would have already actuated.

. ,, **Reference Titie *

• i b:,, FC1cilifyRefel'.enceNtnhber ,. I !Retef.erice sE!.~~ion .*** j ! Page N():J IRevjsionl

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L=ic=e=ns=e=d=O=p=er=a=to=r=F=lu=en=c=y=Li=st======::.JINOS05FLU NCY

.::I I JI 13-16 1 9 l I I II I ii II I i_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,11 I ii 1I I iL,O. Nuniber<;c*

Objectives IFLUNCYE002 I

l2!:!~sji'§lj,~o~fceFj IFacility Exam Bank I j.(luestjq~]:Mf??ifitati?h,M~~~d: concept Used

• '!I I!used pul".iri~Tralnirig PJ'ograllfl D 1.0.uE!sti§~ sourc,~S9iilm~nts 1 j

=

====~:::::==:::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=====..:.:..==:==......==:===========----:1 I

!~--~--~-~~--~--~~--~~~~~--~--~-~~-~~-~~~~

I I  !

1- I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper

• 1

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RO System/Evolution List .....

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I *SRO System/Evolution .*

List ( *.Outline Changes I ............... ....

[<foestjop Topic\ RO 28 I Which of the following identifies when will OHA E-48 ROD BOTTOM will clear during a reactor startup?

1) rods are withdrawn past 2)

-\ steps.

~ 11) Control Bank A 2)20 I fir] 11) Control Bank A

~

.~

2)35 I

~ 11) Control Bank D

2) 20 I!

fAnswer] ~ !EXarn Level i ~ l,cpg~itive Level J j Memory I if~cmty: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !Exa,fnf:)ate: !I 12/21/2015 j

~l 001000A302 l A3.02 1

!Rp,Vaitie:i[]l_nsRo Va1tie;I[Ifil,sedi6n: II~ !R6Grbtip:\LJ ~rn*o Group:l[JJ D 1

'systerTI/Evoll.ltibnTitlel l_c_o_n_tr_ol_R_o_d_D_riv_e_S_.Y,_s_te_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I i001 KAStatement:! Abili to monitor automatic operations of the Control Rod Drive S stem including:

Rod hei ht 1EJ<:pla11ation of ! 55.41.b(6) There are 3 Rod Bottom Bypass Bistable Modules, for Control Banks B, C, and D only 1

Answers

' . 1)Blocks OHA E-48, ROD BOTTOM for its own bank when entire bank is <35 steps 2)When all banks are on bottom, OHA E-48, ROD BOTTOM alarm is illuminated.

I 1

3)When Control Bank A is >20 steps alarm is cleared (Control Banks B, C, D, bypassed)

-  ! 4\lf no hvnass alarm \Ato1 ild stav jn 1 rnti1 hank D \MaS >20 stens Rvnassino control hanks R C D

!a.dropped rod *on any shutdown* bank and control bank and each bank >3s steps.

[>:,i ** * * * > * *. Reference Title! " *,. F;aci[ity Re-ference Numper * : !Reference'.SectJon;: :* I II P~ge;No. I IR~visiqn:

IRod Control and Position Indications Systems L ! NOS05RODSOO j 51-52 I I12 I f================:::::::,~==========~*~======:;'

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.! _ _ _ _ _ ___.I JI'~'_== ___.

Objectives I RODSOOE008 t9.~~S'tior:i ~<:)Ljrce:;: *11 Facility E-;::xa=m=B=a=n=k=::::::..J=1a=.IJ::**t:::7::.t10::"n=:"::M::}?:::d::if::jc="a::t::i'R::D::""~::. e::J::*~=B=~*=:=**::::.l:.:c:::o:.:nc:.:e:::p:::t:::U:.:s:::ed====l~!=ll=se=d=*****=*ti=ll:.:ri=rg=*"=J=ra=l=ri=n=g=P=r=O=g"r=a=m=* .**=-;I_o__,.j

~~~~~~~~._5_1_1_2_4------------------------------------~ll i

RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper J. RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . l Outline Changes I i:~e~ti::;:,::1~g1-:-~-n-:-:-io-ns-:------------------------------------------'1

.. c 2 is in MODE 6.

- The Reactor vessel head is removed and on its storage stand.

- The Refueling Cavity is being filled from the RWST !AW S2.0P-SO.SF-0003, FILLING THE REFUELING CAVITY. (Assume RWST level was at 40.5' when the unit was shutdown)

- Refueling cavity water level is 11 O' and rising.

Which choice identifies the indications which will be present on the Control Room Console?

PZR Cold Calibrated level is ...

~ 13%; RWST level is 27'. I

~ 180%; RWST level is 20'. II

~ I off-scale low; RWST level is 40'. I

~ I off-scale high RWST level is 1O'. I I i'Answerl ra==J 'ExamLevel' fR=J *Cognitive Level * !A~n I !Fac;mty:WSalem 1 & 2 IJExam[)ate:W _ _ _1_21_2_1_12_0_1_,5IJ

~joo2000A111 !iA1.11 l:Fiova1u~::§*sFibva1µkl@~seCtiol1:il~iROGroup:iLJfSRO"G~LJ ~lt] D S##~~~ooru~ij_R_e_a_ct_o_r_C_o_ol_a_~_S~y~s-~_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I;~ I

KA Statement:[ Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operatino the Reactor Coolant f--'-'---'--'-'-.;;_;;_-'--'-;..__;;c_;_.....;...._;_;.;;..;._.;;_:--.£.;;..;;...;.;..;._c;..;..;..~.;;...;.;..-"-':...;;..;;.-'-'-.;.,..;.;;...;;;.__;_...;;.,!.;...;....;.~o<...;;..;.,;._;._...:..;...;.__

System _controls

_ _.;__,___;...._ __;;.__includino:

Relative level indications in the RWST, the refuelino cavity, the PZR and the reactor vessel durino preparation for refuelino EXpfanation of : 55.41.b(3,)The refueling cavity at 11 O' will hold -112,000 gallons. The RWST normal operating level is a minimum of 40.5 feet prior

'A.n~*"<;rs: *.* * ** i to refueling (364,500 gal). Subtract and the total left in RWST will be 253,000 gallons, which will be -27.5'. The corresponding PZR cold cal level will be > the 0% level at the 108' 11" elevation in containment. This question does not require memorization of tank levels, but rather an understanding of the physical ccnnections and relative elevations of the systems.

Reference Titre  :; f ?Cility Refei:enceNuinber: Ir~~ference Sectiqri *. l*Page No. i !~evision/

!Draining the Refueling Cavity I 1 S2.0P-SO.SF-0004 I 1129-30 1117 I

,~===============q I lj I! I l! _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,q _ _ _ _ _~I ll lj I tL.9>Number,*****

I RCSOOOE006 Objectives

!IVlatefial ~equfredfor Ex?.rriihati(jrl :,J I

.<;it1esfion Sou.rce: ' l IFacility Exam Bank I:.chies'tion r';l(idm~.~Qcln "5.e~od('.* II Direct From source IlOseer:[)uringTralning f>rogram:l D f9~esti~ri.s5l~Ec~car11ment51 148947  :::======..:::================~===========-===============~1

!~~--~~~~~-~~-~--~~-~~--~~~-~~~~~~~~~~-~~

I I  !

I I I I

RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List . I . Outline Changes .I

[al.lestidrytot:>ic jRO 30 I IPrior to opening 1CV114, RCP Seal Bypass Valve IAW S1 .OP-SO.RC-0001, RCP Operation, all of the following conditions must be met EXCEPT: I

~ IRCS pressure < 100 psig.

I

!,b* I I Any RCP seal leakoff flow< 1 gpm.

I

~I 11-14CV104, SEAL LEAKOFF valves open.

I

\d, l ISeal water flow to each RCP is at least 6 gpm.

I

'Answer j a I I JExam Level 1 IR I !Cognitive Le\rel i I Memory I fFacit[ty~l ISalem 1 &2  ! iExamD I 12/21/201511 l<A:q 003000A407 liM.07 [RO Vall.le: JI 2.6*1 !SRO Value: q 2.6j:Sectiorn l~_j!RO Group:il 1!iSRO Gl"6'up:' I 1J II~ D SystemiEll'olution Title I IReactor Coolant Pump System I 1003

'l<A Statement: I 1-A_b_il_itv,__to_m_an_u_a_ll,,__vo.._p_er_a_te_a_n_d_lo_r_m_o'-n_it""o_r_in-'t_he;.c..;.c..co'-n-'tr"""o"-1"""ro-'o"-m...;.:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,_

RCP seal bypass 55.41.b(3) RCS pressure must be between 100-1,000 psig. If pressure is less than 100 psig, the CV114 is required to be shut. All distracters are listed in SO.RC-1 step 5.2.1.

[' ,, Reference.Title . <.*J [ \facility~eference Number:

~:::;:':;:;::=::::=::::=:::::::;:':;:;::=:::::::;:':;:;::=::::=::::=::::~~

• l f.ReferenceSection ***.* I~.Page!:~o.j iRevision'

~IR=e=a=ct=o=r=C=oo=la=n=t:::P:::u:::m::::p:::O:::p=e=ra=tio=n======-!I S1 .OP-SO.RC-0001 I q 13 I j 34 I

':===========!!

l, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,q I iiii 11 lj I I

iL;o::;Nllfober*

Objectives I RCPUMPE013 l'P~,e,.~ti8fl.58ufoe: ,(j j Facility Exam Bank I i9u~.s!i<)n ~6~i~if<:tti()l:1 ~~!.~§<f: *I Concept Used I!Used bllfing i"r4lhihg Program .! O I loti.e,~@fi:s0,yr~~ . ~orr1f!l~fits; " " 4 _ 3 _ 0 _ 0 _ 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . , , l l 1gomment'.

RO SkyScraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes. I

[Clue'stior(ropicj I RO 31 I OpP.rators are preparing to start 21 RCP IAW S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation .

\ . of the following would prevent the RCP from starting when its START PB is depressed?

21 RCP ...

~ I#1 seal D/P < 200 psig.

I I

lb.I 4KV breaker trip springs not charged.

I

c.11 STANDPIPE LEVEL LO alarm locked in.

I fcLl IOil Lift Pump discharge pressure <500 psig.

I IAnswer I @=] I.Exam levE\1 IB::J !Cognitive Lev,eL I j Memory J  ! jFC1cility:j ISalem 1 & 2 I [E)(ar\:H{?t~;*i I 12/21/201511

~I 003000K101 l IK1.01  : :Rova1ue;*l~:sRo)fa1ue~l[Ifil'sectlorl':jl~tR6Gfoup:iLJ!sR.9'Groi.ip:![]

'SystenlJE./oluUonTitle I lReactor Coolant Pump System I 003

'KA Statement:' i Knowledoe of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between Reactor Coolant Pump Svstem and the following:

I RCP lube oil

• ExpliilnatiOrfof I! 55.41.b(3) A is incorrect because it is a manaul RCP trip setpoint stated at Step 3.2.9 third bullet. B is incorrect because the trip

\l\flswets:': : '*if'! Isprings are charged when the breaker closes, it woiuld be the closiong springs not charged which would prevent the 4KV braker

! form closing. C is incorrect because the standpipe level low has no interlock to prevent pump starting. D is correct as shown on I drawings.

• ======*==.,*==*R=e==f==e=re=n=c==e=T==}t=le=*===*==**.*==;'=**.::.;]

.r j

. Facility RefereiiCeNumher 'I [R~fer~nce)ection ~l IPageNo,'j jRe'Jision 1 R=e=a=c=to=r=C=o=ol=a=nt=P=u=m=p=ln=st=ru=m=e=n=ta=ti=o=n==

=:.11:.=2=2=0=42=4========:=:.I:.=========' ::::[==::::=.I 05 I i;.===========================- !I

.

:I I RCPs and RCPs Lift Oil Pumps 11224405 I 114 I 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.!11, - _ _ _ _ ___.! ii lj _ __.I I RCPUMPE006 Objectives

'tii.ie@~rj;~'.9~tc~::;;:J IFacility Exam Bank J I ~Question r>J1C>d.,ifip~ti9i).M~~hod: : Concept Used I,used During training Program I D

======.::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.::::==========---===============:___,,1

!ouestit)nS~ur~e.(;~inrnents,! 1_s_o2_2_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I I

I I I I J

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes . I iUuestion Topic I RO 32

!------~-------------------------------------'

Wi"- riormal charging and letdown in service, which of the following valves failing closed is interlocked to cause 1CV4, Letdown Orifice Isolation

_::. to automatically shut?

~ 11CV18, Letdown Pressure Control valve.

~I 1CV77, 23 Loop Chg Line Stop valve.

r-I, fc.: 1CV7, Letdown HX Inlet Isolation valve.

II I

id.i 1CV2, Letdown Isolation valve.

11 I!Answer I @=]" )ExamLevet i ~ :cognitivelevel'J IMemory I lf:acU!ty ISalem 1 & 2 :Exarri.c.>:at~i*! I 12/21/201511

jf~T31 D

~I 004000K413 I!K4.13  : :R.6Value:l@}j[sfs'6Vaill~:lf}]"lsection: JI~ [R6Group:ILJiSRO Gr~up:iLJ !r'kii51~

[SysfemJEvolutionJitle ! IChemical and Volume Control System 11004 iK.A, Statement:! ! Knowledoe of Chemical and Volume Control System design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

! Interlock between letdown isolation valve and flow control valve I

,~,..,.,,,.,

I 11.E:x;J:ll?f]aticin ofi 55.41.b(7) The 1CV2 being closed would cause any of the 3 open orifice isolation valves to shut. 2CV4 is stated in the stem to be

.... !I th,,,,,'"'"",,,,,

I Reference Title ,>! ~*Y Facility Reference Numbe.r* Ii~M~rl?nceSectip,r .* '*:!!.Page No'.*! IRevision!

11 CV4 Logic Diagram 11224430 ii lj I js I I !I II 11 II I I II II ii II I I I .... ***. . . . .

1LO. Number

• Objective I CVCSOOE006 f9uestfotj ~.~l1£5~:]'j IFacility Exam Bank I :used During Training Program iD

[C\ue5t19~s~Hts~,c~:r1lm~rits'i l,..6_1_6_2_2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._ __,I

[colTlmeht I

I I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I. RO System/Evolution List I I SRO System/Evolution List*. .. Outline Changes I iciue~tJon Topic l IRO 33 I W'-*~i, of the following methods is used prior to cooldown to remove hydrogen from the RCS after a unit shutdown to enter a refueling outage, and l

\ hydrogen removed?

degassification is used to remove hydrogen from the RCS to prevent II] l Chemical, an inadvertent crud burst during RCS cooldown.

I

[! I Mechanical, an inadvertent crud burst during RCS cooldown.

I

[] I Chemical, having an explosive concentration present when oxygen is introduced to system.

I

dl I Mechanical, having an explosive concentration present when oxygen is introduced to system.

I i.~nswer] j d I !Exam Le,ve,l 11 R I icognitlveLe,yel H! I Memory I !Facility: I ISalem 1 & 2 I [E:xamDate,: .i I 12/21/20151 KA:l I004000K549 I1K5.49

• lR.o Vafue: :I 2.7j ~SRO.Valtie:lj 3.31 [section':' II~ lR.oGroup:!I 1 j ,$RO Group:[ I 11 ~~ti D

$yst~ri1tEvolutlC:fo Titlfl I Chemical and Volume Control System 11004

'KA staterneht:! Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Chemical and Volume Control System:

Purpose and method of hydroqen removal from RCS before openinq system: explosion hazard, nitrogen purge

[ex~la,\:}?~l9'\o,t.j 55.41.b(3,5) Both chemical (addition) and mechanical (replacement of H2 with N2) degasses are performed during a 1Ansvvers:< .'<.> shutdown/cooldown. Mechanical is most effective at NOP/NOT (see P&L 2.1.5) A is incorrect because chemical degass is performed when RCS temp is less than 250 (see pre-req 3.1.7). B is incorrect because of wrong reason for mechanical degas. C is Iincorrect because chenical degass is performed to initiate crud burst (addition of H202).

... .. l

,/*,:*:.' '"*:~'

• Referehce Title '"

v:, *. Facility Ret~r~nce Ntlrnher ItRe'ference s.ection *.>J t Page

,, .. No. I i~evisia:ni I RCS Degassification I 1 S2.0P-SO.CVC-0011 II !I 1115 I I II II ii !I I I

l I! II 11 !I  !

Objective I CVCSOOE013 1ouestiC>n *soB.rse: Al_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ __.I i~uestiov Mq~J!ic~tioit'@e,thod;;{jl l !us~~ oyrin9'Jraihi11s Pto9ram ! o l9ue~tio,ns~p~~~.(;()mN.~M~l ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,I

," r;~=::*~T~(:,*.

I i I 1-

RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes I jduesti:on Topic  ! IRO 34 I Gi'""n the following conditions:

- .t 1 is operating at 100%.

- RWST level is 41.0 feet.

- At 1200, a LBLOCA occurs, and RCS pressure rapidly lowers to containment pressure.

- 21 RHR pump fails to start, and cannot be started.

Which of the following is the CLOSEST to the time that swapover to Cold Leg Recirc will be commenced.

Note: Use ECCS pump runout capacities, and assume all available pumps immediately begin delivering design flow.

rn 1 1212.

I

~11214.

I

[SJ 11218.

I fcj. ! 11222.

I

'A~s...,,er 1 Ic I !EX:aml.eveq IR I [cognitive J..eve1 IApplication I jFaci!ity: !ISalem 1 & 2 I [ExarriD.ate_:.J j 12/21/20151 J

l?t~~~ DI W"'"">'<J;':"

~

J<t.:d 005000K305  !!_K_3._05_~1 *RO Value:Jl3.7 *I1SROV<1!ue:J!3.8*I;Sect1on: II' SYS !;RO Gxo1,1p:JI 1j 1SRO (3roup:1!

[

1j

~Systegl/Ev9lllti(Jn Title I IResidual Heat Removal System 1 005 I

KA Statement:'! Knowledqe of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Residual Heat Removal System will have on the followinq:

ECCS

\tjcptan.atrcifl(lfl 41' =370,000 gallons. 15.2' is where swapover starts. 15.2'= 150,000 gallons. 370,000-150,000=220,000. Pump design data is

.Ariswe~s:** ** t RHR = 4500, charging pumps 560 gpm SI pumps 675 gpm cs pumps 2600 gpm. One RHR pump fails to start. total injection flow is 1 RHR pump 4500, 2 charging pumps 1120, 2 SI pumps 1350, 2 CS pumps 5200 = 12, 170 gpm. 220,000/12170=18.1 I ~~~~e~~. Time 1214 is if RHR pump flow is not removed. Time 1212 is if 150,000 gallons is used with correct flow.1220 is used for Fac~lity Reference N~mbe( <IIRE!ferenc¢;:s~i::tion ***.It. Page No~ : !Revjsfqn:

~'L=o=ss=o=f=R=e=ac=to=r=C=o=ol=an=t===============!l~E=O=P=-L=O=C=A=-1=============::;.I~==============-'~'==='~I====='

i::jT=an=k=C=urv=e=s============ljs1.0P-TM.ZZ-0002 I q28 I l.=18=:=::.I 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____,ll _ _ _ _ _ _~l _ _ ____,lj_~l !_~I 1

Objectives IECCSOOE016 1Material Requiredf6r)~*~§i~incitr9r() Is1 .OP-TM.ZZ-0002, page 28 RWST f,C}p~~tfan,'So~rc~~; *. 11 Facility Exam Bank

!question SourceCo~'fu,~ntsl , , . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , .1 1

I I

! I I I

RO SkyScraper I_s_R_o_s_k_ys_c_ra_p_e_;..... ~-R_o_s...y_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_ti_on_u_st........ __sR_o_sy_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_tio_n_L_is_t-.a Outline Changes

~guestion Topic 11 RO 35 I Gi .. -.., the following conditions:

- _, ( 2 is operating at 100% power with 22 charging pump in service.

- 23 charging pump is out of service and operable.

Which of the following Tech Spec LCO's would be applicable if 22 charging pump were to trip?

fal ,3.5.4 - Seal Injection Flow.

I

[b.i 13.5.2 -ECCS Subsystems >350°F.

r-:--'.'71 I

/c. J , 3.1.2.4 -Charging Pumps - Operating.

@;], 3.1.2.2 - Boration Flowpaths - Operating.

• ~Answer j fO" iE:<arnJevef:I ~ !cognitive Level _j j Application Facittty: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I IExamp~te,: ! I 12/21/20151

~I 006000G242 Ii2.2.42 I\ ~o Value: ! fJ2J [SRO Value: 1 ITIJ [section: 11~ [RO di'o'tip:j LJ is Ro GrC>uil:i LJ D f system/EVolutibr'l Jitle j I Emergency Core Cooling System

'KA Statement:!

!,....A_b_i_lit-y-to_re_c_o_g_n_iz-e-in_d_i_ca_t-io_n_s_fo_r_s_y_s_te_m_o-pe_r_a-ti-ng-p-ar_a_m_e_t-er_s_w_h-ic-h-ar_e_e_n-try--1-ev_e_l_c_o-nd-i-ti-on_s_fo_r-te_c_h_n-ic_a_Is_p_e_c-if-ic-at-io_n_s-.----...,.

'.~pra'rlatki'O"'of l 55.41.b(6, 10) RO candidates are responsible for "Above the Line" knowledge of Tech Spec LCO's. A is incorrect because the LCO 1

A:tiswers': *  ! is for maximum seal injection flow which is set by adjusting manual seal injection throttle valves. Plausible because many procedures direct establishing 6-12 gpm seal injection flow per pump not to exceed 40 gpm total. Bis correct because the LCO states 2 complete trains of ECCS are required, and 22 charging pump (hi head ECCS) is required for the B train of ECCS. C is

! incorrect beca11se onlv 2 charajno rn 1mo5 are reai 1ired ta he onerahle and the I CO \M01 i!d not he entered 1rnti! 2 of 3 charaina L 2

pumps were inoperabie. Dis incorrect *because boration flow paths from RWST through charging pumps remain available: as I

, does the Boric Acid tank flowpath with one BAT pump and one charging pump.

11 Facility Reference Numb'ef: , ..*,_. *. iReference *I I section .,, .. <l !Page No. i !Revision!

I Salem Tech Specs I I II 11 I I l I II 11 I I

I I I ii 11 I I I

Objectives I ECCSOOE010 fque~~J9~*s21,i~s~*:.,;*/ j_N_e_w________,L'-':o-"-uL.e"-'.~_;_t*i-'-o~n"-M'""o"-dL.r"'--fi-"'c;'-'~t'-")o-"-_,h"'"**-'-M'-'e~t:-..:.'1.:..o_;_d_;'-**_**,~--------~I [used l:)uri119Jra1ning Pr()gramj D t~uesti?lfsOtifc:~t~rn~~iiisi I  !

iC9mfuent . -_ *.

I I 1- I

[

RO SkyScraper ._I SRO Skyscraper.

I - -RO-System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . ~ Outline Changes lou~~tiol1Topic I RO 36 I Gi""'ri the following conditions:

- ,t 2 was operating at 100% reactor power when a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection were initiated due to lowering Pressurizer pressure.

- Five minutes after the SI actuation, containment humidity and pressure have just begun rising.

Assuming NO operator actions were taken, which of the following would result in those conditions?

§:] I RCP #1 Seal failure.

I

~ I Pressurizer Spray Valve failed open.

I f§J I Pressurizer Safety Valve failed open.

I l:!J ISteam Generator Slowdown piping failure.

Ans~er ! Ic I IExarn Level ] j R I ;cognitive Level l IComprehension I [Fa~ltity: ! j Salem 1 & 2 I i~x?n1oate: i I 12/21/20151 fl{A;j I007000K101 i .K1.01 .iROValu~::j 2.9j!SROValue:!j 3.1jisectioll:ij~IRoGr6up:!I 1j:SROGroup:lj 1j l~l D

~

'systerilJEvoli.i~idn Title I IPressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System I joo7

[KAStaternent:,, Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System

. and the following:

Containment system

[E)(pl~.~atiori 6ti I 55.41.b(9)The failure of a RCP #1 seal will not be seen in containment outside of closed systems. The excess seal leakoff flow past

I the #2 seal will be seen as a rise in RCDT level. The PZR safety failing open will cause the PRT to pressurize and the rupture disk I

.:.rs:<*.

I

! to rupture, causing the saturated steam in the PRT to continuously be vented to containment. The SGBD piping failure would not

~:~~-~,.,a:ise i~~~_,~'.~-t~o_n levels. The Spray valve failing open would cause the lowering PZR pressure, bit would not cause changing I

v  :::**/::,;'(, '.Reference Title . <>>),:.,' .

-: :'.'.-,~.-:, *, "'l !(**.* Facility 13,eference Number ' lReference Section I ~*Page Nci.l fRevisi6ni J

INo. 2 Unit Reactor Coolant II 205301-1 I ii I 159 I I II I ii ii I I !I I 11 ii I

[L()'..[\illrnber . *.. >j Objectives I PZRPRTE008 fqll~s.ti;er}.~f'.lirde:,. \ IFacility Exam Bank Iiaue~ti4,rl,;J\1'1:9difipatior\'M.'etho.Ci: .~Direct From Source i lus~d Dllring J:ralnir\g Program I D I

~~}:les'tlc)i:iSd:urp~goi-Ilw~:n~sj Salem May 2010 RO NRC exam, created from Point Beach 112012006 NRC exam j I I l I l

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I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I lOuestiori JC:lpie I IRO 37 I Gi"~'l the following conditions:

- .t 2 is operating normally at 100% power.

- Excess Letdown is in service due to a problem with an orifice isolation valve.

- The 2CC215, EXCESS LETDOWN HX CC INLET Vair supply line breaks, and all air is vented from valve.

Which of the following describes the effect this failure will have on Excess Letdown temperature, and how will operators respond?

Excess Letdown temperature will. ..

1 I

~ rise and the 2CC215 bypass will be throttled open to restore normal letdown temperature.

I I

~ lower and the 2CC215 bypass will be throttled open to restore normal letdown temperature.

I I

c.

rise and Excess Letdown flow will be secured to prevent lifting 2CV115 eve RCP SEAL WTR INJECTION RETURN RELIEF VLV.

1, i

d. I lower and Excess Letdown flow will be secured to prevent VCT temperature from lowering to the point where 23 charging pump must be

'-----' I secured. I

'Answer I jc I [Exam Level l IR I !Cognitive Level 11 Application I jFaCiiity: ! j Salem 1 & 2 I IExamDate: j j 12/21/20151

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YsteJ"ri/Eve>lutionTitle j I Component Cooling Water System I ~oos IKA.Statement:: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

Effect of loss of instrument and control air on the position of the CCW valves that are air operated l

JE)(plan~tfonof 55.41.b(?) The Excess Letdown HX CC isolation valves 2CC113 (outlet) and 2CC215 (inlet) are fail close (air and power) isolation

~- <rs:'; t'*I valves. With excess letdown in service and no cooling flow, temperature and pressure will both rise. Excess letdown flows into the I

seal return header and rising pressure causes seal return line relief valve to open. Knowledge of both the effect (valve failure position) and operator action (isolate excess letdown) required. SO.CVC-3 P&L 3.3 states to maintain excess letdown pressure I

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IExcess Letdown II S2.0P-SO.CVC-0003 I Ij I !6 I Ieves drawing l j 205228-2 I I :.=I==:::.1184 I l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.11 1

_____ ___.l _ _ _ ___.q l l_~I

• t;o~ Nuriib'er. ..** **

• 1 Objectives I CCWOOOE012 1--~

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!Ouestfon Topic I 1,_R_0_3_8_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,

Gi..-~ the following conditions:

.cm Unit 2 is operating normally at 100% power.

- The controlling PZR level channel fails low.

- As the operators respond IAW S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, and before an operable channel is selected for control, the RO reports that PZR backup heaters in auto are energized with the controlling PZR level channel indicating 0%.

Which of the following describes the operation of the PZR B/U heaters?

PZR heaters in auto 1) be energized because 2)

.;_;~~a~;~1~1~)~s~h~ou~l~d.::.=.:c=....;-'=~~=":..:;...;:;;..;..:;~==.::....::..::.=.:::.=.=.=...::~~~...:....------------------------------'ll I

1I 1

~ 2) PZR level has risen 5% above program.

[bl 11) should I

'-----' 2) PZR pressure has lowered to the auto on setpoint of 221 O psig. 1 le. i 11) should NOT

'----' 2) PZR low level cutoff at 17% should be keeping heaters OFF.

rd.111) should NOT L_.J 2) PZR pressure has remained above the auto on setpoint of 2218 psig.

jAnswer! ~ jE~am Level j ~ lcognitiveLevel  ! IApplication I 1f~cmty:1 ISalem 1 & 2 1 IEx~tl"lo,ate<! I 1212112015!

~I o10000A402 I A4. 02 i [Ro Value: IfJ] ;sROVaiue: ![))" !SectiOri: I!~ !Ro Group:! LJ !SR() (;rolip:: LJ ~N;~l D

[systelTI/Evolution Title! IPressurizer Pressure Control System I ~10_1_0_ _

KA Statement: I Abili to manuall operate and/or monitor in the control room:

PZR heaters

[f:~planati8,t:J ot Il 55.41.b(7,5) The low level on the contra! channel will cause an automatic letdown isolation. Char~ing flow ~II continue. and rais.e 1Answers: ** * 'I PZR level. The backup heaters are designed to energize at 5% above program to ensure staurat1on cond1t1ons are maintained 1n the PZR. However, either an alarm or control channel failing low deenergizes all PZR heaters. Nothing has occurred which would I cause a PZR pressure change except for the rise in PZR level. Pressure will not lower. PZR B/U heaters are designed to energize at 2210 nsia dpcreasin . . .

• • . * *~e~,~r$nCe: Titie. _:*. * , :

• FacilifyReference Nm11ber <.d tRefer,enc~ Section >i I Page No, lgevisiop'.

1 j Loss of Charging I 1 S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 I1 ~'====-  :.::19=~

IOverhead Annunciator Window E II S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0005 ii OHA E-20 1129 I 2=0 1.::l ==

,______________.I _________..., _______,, j_ ___,

.I l PZRP&LE006 Objectives ic:JuesU<?nsolirce: J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _~I [9~~sti()n M,odificaticml\hethod: ' il ________~I jus~d burir'lg Trairii'!jg'Progral111 DI foqe,~,uon ~qurc;~ cf)rnmer:ts1, I 1 I I

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RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List .. ( Outline Changes I lquestionJqpi~ I l_R_0_3_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,I l,.YJf-'~11 of the following describes how the PZR Spray Nozzle is prevented from being thermally shocked during normal operation? I I

~ Initiating spray flow when the Spray Nozzle delta T exceeds 320°F. I I

I

~ PZR Backup heater groups operating in auto forces continuous spray flow.

fSystern(E;vo!Uticm lHle I j Pressurizer Pressure Control System

'KA Statement: i I Knowledge of Pressurizer Pressure Control System design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following: I I Sprav valve warm-up I

¢cBlanati()~ of I! 55.41.b(5,7) PZR spray bypass flow is set during unit startup while@ NOT/NOP to ensure spray line temp is >500°F with both

'Answers: T: :C:;j I spray valves shut. Salem runs with one PZR B/U heater group in MANUAL which forces the spray valves open a small amount to provide continuous spray for boron mixing also, but that is not a choice. Spray flow is NOT initiated if spray line delta T exceeds I

I 320°F. Control groups are SCR controlled and normally fire to maintain pressure ON program, and do not force spray flow.

I

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,, <ReferenceTitle *. *  :[* ' FacilitYReference.Nufl1ber

• I[ReferencE! ~ection * ! i Page No. J !Revision; I

• f""

ISetting Pressurizer Spray Bypass Flow 11 S2.0P-SO.PZR-0008 I ii 114 I I II I ii 11 I I II I ii II I I Objectives I PZRP&LE012 fQuestiq'n.,soµ,r.c~*:, ':.11_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___,l '--IQ~u""'e""..; .:.: ~i" p" ,~"'*.M.:.: *IA'(). :.~*"'rt" \~" *~" tlc.]:9.:.: *~.:.: Ji.G*"e"'t'""}i""o~d_:*.:.::>*'""J, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I iUsed During J[airjing f'fogf~'11 i 0 l'C}uestiqp~§ufce c<:>:ti'i!il~.~t~j 1, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.l i fcomment i

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I I

RO Skyscraper .. ~ROSkyscraper 1... RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List .. I. Outline Changes I louestio'h 'ropi9! IRO 40 Gi**-., the following conditions:

- ,( 2 was operating at 90% power with 21 charging pump in service when the controlling PZR Level Channel I failed low.

- The Charging Master Flow Controller was placed in Manual when directed by S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging.

- The alternate PZR level channel has been selected as the controlling channel.

- Letdown has been restored.

Which of the following identifies a consequence of returning the Master Flow Controller to auto PRIOR to returning PZR level to program as directed in S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 ?

~ l Charging flow will. ..

rise, and VCT auto makeup may initiate.

I

[bl I lower, and flashing in the Letdown line could occur.

Ii

!t.l j rise, and RCP seal injection flow could exceed Tech Spec limit total seal injection flow.

11

~J lower, and 2CC71 LTOWN HX CC CONT VALVE will not respond quickly enough to prevent Mixed Bed Dem in isolation on high inlet temperature.

llulswer I I~ JExarri Levell 1£__J :cognitive Level i IAppli~tion 'j ,Fac,lfitY: , ISalem 1 & 2 I [Ex~mDat~.:fl _ _ _1_2_12_1_12_0_1s_,I

~I 011 OOOA404 j /A4.04 *:Ro Value: I § ;sRO Value: If.}]" (Section: 1 I~ iRO Gfoup:;j~ 'sRb Group:! LJ !i':t~i D

'System/E\lolution Title j IPressurizer Level Control System I 011

'KA Statemen.t:i Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Transfer of PZR LCS from automatic to manual control

[E*. x~'"natio..n. o. f. i 55.41.b(7)With a CCP in service, the failure LOW of the controlling PZR level ch~nnel .will cause charging .flow to RIS~.

1* The stem

~ I stated that MFC was taken to manual when directed IAW AB, so there was sufficient time for actual charging flow to nse I

s:: .* * * ,

substantially. With actual level higher than programmed level, if the MFC were placed in auto it would force charging flow to lower.

I 11:~ha~L;i~;;1~:s1~:~r'~~,;~d ::~~,;p;h~n~g;~~~t~a~~o~il~; ~~1~~:d100';'~ :~:ow~~~d hoa~c~~;:htrh~/r~~:~~a~~:nh~~~t~:~~~~;:~ ~,~~re to ii Il rise downstream o(the letdown HX, and temps would n~t reach demin isolation levels. The 2 rises ar~ incorrect because charging flow wouldn't rise, but the actions associated with higher flow are correct. I ReferE!ncE! Title

.=================

.;====

:::::=======:::!' ~ *** * ,*

• • • • f"adlity RefE!rE!nce. Number i iRE!ferE!nC:e Section 11 P,a9e No.1 :Re\llsionl I I Loss of Charging lj S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 c""

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Obj I PZRP&LE015

RO SkyScraper J. SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes I

I louesticmTopic ! RO 41 I I

\N"' -'1 of the following describes the interface between the Reactor Trip Handles on 2CC2 and the Reactor Protection System?

ii 1 c.. .. 1g either Reactor Trip Handle to the trip position is designed to operate I I

la;j the UV trip ONLY for Reactor Trip AND Reactor Trip Bypass breakers.

I ib.1 Ithe shunt trip ONLY for Reactor Trip AND Reactor Trip Bypass breakers.

L-c l I 121 lBOTH the shunt trip and UV trip for Reactor Trip AND Reactor Trip Bypass breakers.

l I

d. j , BOTH the shunt trip and UV trip for Reactor Trip breakers, and the shunt trip ONLY for the Reactor Trip Bypass breakers ..

11 Answer! c I I !Exani Level ; IR I !cognitive Leyel l 1 Memory I IFagHity: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I :ExamDate: i I 12/21/2015jl

• t-, "<:W<'<(: ~

l<A=il 012000A401 I A4.01 J@[sROValue: i@Jsection:1 I~ ;Ro,Group:\LJ !SRO Group:'LJ ~i!i, LJ

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SystemfEvolutiO'n Title, I l_R_e_a_ct_o_r_P_ro_te_c_r_io_n_s....y_st_e_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...I io12

'KA Statement: i IAbility to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: I I Manual trip button I

[Expla'iiation ofll Salem has 2 Reactor Trip Handles/Switches. Either switch operates BOTH the UV and shunt trips for BOTH the reactor trip

~wers: t I breakers and bypass breakers. The distracters are plausibler because: 1) an automatic reactor trip ONLY actuates the UV trip; 2) j manually tripping the reactor trip breakers from the control console ONLY actuates the shunt trip.

I I

Reference Title .*** :L *Facility Reference Number , j 'Reference Section **. I i Page No. 1 jRevision 1 I

IReactor Protection System Reactor Trip Signals 11221051 Ii ii ljE__J I II II ii 11 I I II !I ii ii I I

• -*: j I RXPROTE010 I RXPROTE007

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I RO oue~tion TC>pic I ~o ~2 m . * .

• m u m

• m .. * ** * *** * * * . . . * * * * ** * * * ** '!

i_V1 1'- -+would be the effect on the Reactor Protection System if the 2B Vital Instrument Bus were to become deenergized with the unit at 100% power? 1 1 ra:J j SSPS Train B slave relays would not actuate on a Safety Injection signal. I I

I

~ OHA A-34 SSPS TRN A TRBL in alarm due to loss of 1 of 2 45VDC power supplies to Train A logic cabinet. 1,

c;i Logic coincidence for Containment Spray actuation would go from 2/4 to 1/3 due to channel 11 bistable tripped.

~,

II fd.l,~2=R=P=4=b=i=st=a=bl=e=li=g=ht=s=fi=a=sh=i=ng==fo=r=a=11=c=ha=n=n=e=1=11=in=d=ica==ti=on=s=d=u=e=t=o=t=ra=in=d=i=sa=g=r=ee=m=e=n=t=b=e=tw=e=e=n=s=s=P=S=T==ra=in=s=A==an=d==B=.================~,!

Answer I ~!Exam Level! ~ iC9gnitive Level j IApplication I !Facility

i j Salem 1 & 2 I [Exa111Date: 11 12/21/20151  !

~I 012000K201 i IK2.01 iROVatue::[IfilsR0Va1ue:1[Titsection: II~ [ROGrpup:jLJlsRO Group:![] ~~~~! D Systein!Evolution Title I 1_R_e_a_ct_o_r_P_ro_te_c_ti_o_n_S~y_st_e_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~l 1012

.KA Statement:! I Knowled~e of bus power supplies to the following:

I RPS channels, components, and interconnections Explariati9r\of !155.41.b(?) Bis incorrect because Train A 45 VDC power comes from A and D vital power. C is incorrect because CS bistables are I

Answers:*:*

• i energize to actuate. Dis incorrec because there is no disagreement since none of the slave relays have energized with the other I Itrain ot having energized.

I I I***** . i:: .* I:Page No. I IRevision' 1** Reference Title IOverhead Annunciators Window A FacHityReferenC:e Nufober ii S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0001

' i '.Reference Section

_J

,, Ii 56 I I l

J Solid State Reactor Prot Train A AC Power Distr !I Drawing 240136 I 11 114 I I II I ii 11 I Objectives l RXPROTE011 IRXPROTE020 I

I ,Questiori.Modific~tion N\eth(Jd: .*I Direct From Source I[Used ouririg';rrafri(hg Progr~Jrij DI I

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c;iuestton fopic I _R_o_43_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,I Gi* *-.,the following conditions

.. c 2 is operating at 100% power when a turbine trip event and subsequent switchyard disturbance result in an undervoltage condition (<70%) on the 2A & 2C 4160 V vital buses.

- 2 minutes later, a Safety Injection signal is generated.

Which of the following describes the plant response when the SI occurs?

~ I EOG output breakers remain shut and safeguards loads sequence on each vital bus.

I I

~ EDG output breakers remain shut, blackout loads are stripped, then safeguards loads are sequenced on each vital bus.

l

c. j EOG output breakers open,

. !bus.

blackout loads are stripped, EOG output breaker shuts, then only safeguards loads are sequenced on each vital I, td. !EOG output breakers open, blackout loads are stripped, EOG output breaker shuts, then safeguards and blackout loads are sequenced on j!

- each vital bus. ij fAnswer 1 ~ 1Exam Levei '. ~ I

!cognitive Level * : Application I !Facirity: ! ISalem 1 & 2 I iExamDate: I l 12/21/20151 I 11<A:*l1013000K112 K1.12 'iROValue:!l 4.1!sRoya1u~:q 4.4l[Section::j~ ROGroui>:H 11:sROGroup::j 11 f~~ D

• syst~'m/Evolution Title'*; IEngineered Safety Features Actuation System 11013 J(A Statement:: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and the following:

! ED/G I

1.t.::o:.t:Jumber

• ESFOOOE005 Objectives . I lsECOOOE010 i

!tMaterial Requli'ect tor E:xarriinafio'r1 *** ** 1 I 11 1comn1ent I I I

I- I I~~.~~~~~~~~~~~~----"

RO SkyScrap:r J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List I. SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes

~::::::::~::'.::'.:::::::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::~-'--'--'-'--'-"-'--'

[Question Topic 1 RO 44

, . ~ !~~-------------~-----~~-----~-~-----~---~----~

IYJ~* *'1 of the following describes why control and protection circuits are electrically isolated from each other?

.---------------:1

a;*: To prevent a single failure from actuating a protective action.

1

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~~=============================================================~111

,c. i To ensure there is no electrical feedback from control system to the protection system.

~ To maintain the minimum number of channels required for safe shutdown outside the control room. I 12/21/201511

~I 015000Kso1 I Ks.01  : IROVa1ue:J[3.2jisR0Vaiue:l§'secuo11: II~ :RoGfoup:)[}LsRoGrol.i?:'.LJ ~i1~j D lsystem/Evollltioii'ritle: INon-Nuclear Instrumentation System I 1016

'KA Statement:! Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System:

Separation of control and protection circuits

Exptanatforiotl 55.41.b(7) "Control" is designed to maintain steady-state operating conditions, ensure adequate margin to trip setting and suppress

'Answhs; i excursions imposed by operational transients before protective action is required. Maintained separate and distinct from the protection system by physical separation and electrical isolation. Electrical isolation provided by Isolation Amplifiers Ensures there is no electrical feedback from control system to the protection system Refere11ceJitle * . 1 * *.Facility Reference Number l '.Reference Section Ji Page NO.I [Revision!

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Objectives IRXPROTE006 1_ ____,

It!IJ\ateriat Requireci to~ §~aiuination\ *** ! I !I

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RO Skyscraper .... I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I

Questi9nTopic 11RO45 A Jr-- of off-site power resulted in a reactor trip. The operating crew is attempting to confirm natural circulation flow but neither SPDS NOR the Plant c ter is operating. You are the 3rd NCO and have been assigned to monitor and log CET's at the GET Control Panel.

Which of the following describes the "ALL" Mode at the Train A GET Control Panel?

It displays ......

I

~ Train A GET temperatures in sequential order.

~I Train A GET temperatures from lowest to highest reading .

• • c./ I.any Train A GET >700°F, then remainder of Train A CETs from lowest to highest.

I I

'.d. ! the two highest reading Train A CET's in each quadrant then sequentially display all Train A CETs.

I

'Answerate:

f *.-I 1j 12/21/2015!

'l<f..:Ji 017000K402 IjK4.02  ! (RO va.1µ'e':q 3.1 !!$RO Value: ii 3.6psectihn;'lj~ fRO Gtdup::I 21 isRO Grbup:ll 2j I~~~~ D System/Evolution "fitle I Iin-Core Temperature Monitor System 11017 l

KAStatement:l Knowled e of In-Core Temperature Monitor System desi Sensin and determination of location core hot spots iExpt~natio~ of '1155.41.b(?) Table C of CFST-1 states that in ALL Mode the display will progress through the first and second highest GETS in each

!Answers: .* :-: Iquadrant, then sequentially display all cETs assigned to that channel. Ais incorrect because does not display in sequential order without first displaying the 2 highest in each quadrant. B is incorrect because it doesn't display lowest to highest. C is incorrect l because the 700°F noted in choice is criteria for purple path CFST for Core Cooling.

Rfe erence* 1e <::

F ac11y Tt Rf.e erence Num b er . ;1I jReference s*ec1on r i'p

~ i age No.* IRey1s1.on ICritical Safety Function Status Trees 112-EOP-CFST-1 I I j 15 1125 I I II I !I II I I Ii  ! !I 1I I I

!L.O.. NUmb'er '

IINCOREE016

!Mat~riC11 .Requir~~ f<?r,pcamination

• II

'Question Source: *J IFacility Exam Bank l IOuestion Modificatiq~M~tl:lod:, IEditorially Modified

~~~~...:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::=::~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I!us'ed . Durih9Ir~I11ih9 Program':)

• (;ly~s~i-~~-~~~~~~*F?N.rr,~piSi 143165

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I I I I 1-*

RO SkyScraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I. Outline (;hanges iOu,estio!1 Topic; IRO 46 I IG' I

the following conditions:

- v* 11t 2 is operating at 100% power.

- A Main Steamline break inside containment occurs.

- The Rx was tripped, but the MSLI failed to shut ANY MSIV.

Safety injection was initiated successfully.

Containment pressure has risen steadily and is currently 11 psig.

I

- RCS pressure is 1700 psig and lowering slowly.

- Safeguards reset actions have just been completed in 2-EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization.

Which of the following describes how the Containment Cooling system will respond if containment pressure were to rise to >15 psig?

ia. !I Both Containment Spray pumps will start and Containment Spray valves will reposition.

I

'.b.*11 Neither Containment Spray pump will start, and Containment Spray valves will reposition.

l

'tl IBoth Containment Spray pumps will start, and Containment Spray valves will NOT resposition.

I I

eel I Neither Containment Spray pump will start, and Containment Spray valves will NOT resposition.

I.

Answe~l IE__] JEX.am Levelj j~ !Cognitive Level

jApplication I [Facility: I ISalem 1 & 2 I :E)('.ampat~;j !___12_12_1_12_0_15_,I

~I 022000A301 I'A3.01 I !R9\fa11Je:.!GJ}'sRo varue:l@tsect\on::j~ :.Rb§roup:f[J}sRo'droup:!LJ D

.*systeryj/E:volution Title J IContainment Cooling System I '.022

KAStater'nenbl l Ability to monitor automatic operations of the Containment Cooling System includin Initiation of safe uards mode of operation IEx,...* -.,ation of j 55.41.b(9,7) Containment Spray Pump Sequencing fA:

L.::_

s: 1 1)If the SSPS Containment HI-HI Pressure signal is not present when the SEC initially tries to start the Spray Pumps, the SEC contact will re-open I. 2)0n~: the SEC has completed the last step of its loading sequence, the CS Pump start contact is re-closed

' >* ' . '* . Reference tme . *....

• n  ; i ~\';'Faciiity'Reference Number. <I[Reference Sectioh<I jf Pag~;Np. j !Revision' 11 Safeguards Equipment Controller Lesson Plan 1INOS05SEC000-06 I II17 I l;.=6==::.

1

.==================ll~==========

=:::'.'l=========::'i 11 ~~~~~~~~~~~__,111~~~~~~~~-'1!~~~~~~!1~~~1~__, I I** . . ' . *'

tL,O. Number**

Objectives I CSP RAYE009

Mate[i<1,l;R,e9t,iire<:f .. t9J,~~mi'natT6iiJ'fi I

[.9.u~sti 8 n*~oqrce j:ornfllents: I

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

, .,** *~ .,,.,,.*.:'*;\*.*)<. '<\'.~A*<.,,..,

ico.minent ;;> ,,, :..:**,.{'>*:';.. ':;*;

I I 1- I

[~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'

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SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List f

SRO System/Evolution List l Outline Changes I

QuestionJopic 11RO47 I G' the following conditions:

- ~,;erators are responding to a LBLOCA JAW 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

- RWST level is 8.9' and lowering as expected.

Which of the the following describes the effect if 21 CS2 Containment Spray pump discharge valve experienced a short and motored closed?

Containment Spray Header flow will. ..

~I lower to O gpm.

I

~I lower but remain> 0 gpm.

I SI be unaffected since 21CS36 RHR CS STOP VALVE is open supplying all spray flow I

~I be unaffected since 22CS36 RHR CS STOP VALVE is open supplying all spray flow.

I

!Answer! a I 1 li::xamtevel ! IR I (ccigr{l~ive Level 11 Application I !FaciUty: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !Exan;i,q(lte: j I 12/21/20151 iKA.:il 026000K302 IiK3.02 11:Ra Vallie:! j4.2*1 ;sRo. value~! I 4.3 I:section::! I~ !Ro Group:; I 11 'sR6Group:! I 11 ;~~ D

'system/Evo!ufipiiJitie I j_c_o_n_ta_in_m_e_n_t_S..;..p_ra-'y_S_,y,_s_te_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,11026 KASfaterrierit:! I Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Sprav Svstem will have on the followino:

l Recirculation sprav system J

I

ex~I;;ir\atf<?t'.t ?f 155.41.b(S, 1O~ When RWST level reaches. 15.2', operators will beging alig.nment ~o Cold Leg Recir_c. IAW LOCA-3. 22 Containment

Answe"' * * * . Spray pcmp" 'topped'"' tf both Coommm'ot Spray pcmp' am op,rabog. Wtfu fu' "'m ooodtboo of ounoot RWST '"* 21 CS pump will still be running. When RSWT level reaches lo-lo setpoint, the remaining CS pump (21) will be stopped, and 21 CS36 opened to supply recirculation spray flow. II i' ** \Reference Title .* ... :I Facilit}'Reference Numbef.. /!Reference Section*

• 11 Page No./ !Revision

\Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc !12-EOP-LOCA-3 I !I 1129 I I II I ii II I I II I 11 11 I I

I LCA3U1E006 Objectives

_J i~aterial R.eqo.ir~qf()rExamination 11 II

auestion~o';lrce: l l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ __,l !titi~~tionMO~if!4ation.M~tho~: :*;f _________,I [lls'e:ciDuringi,:rainih~1Progral11! O

[gu~~~;§.~~?~*~s~c?~fn,entsj I j

!------------------------~---------------------~

'=========================================

r== i

RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper . RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List m I Outline Changes J fQuesUon Topic  ! IRO 48 G the following conditions:

- ~-.dm Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a LOCA occurred.

- A manual reactor trip and manual SI were initiated.

- When the Main Generator output breakers opened, a loss of off-site power occurred.

- 1A vital bus locked out on bus differential.

Which of the following identifies which Containment Iodine Removal Units (IRUs) can be started if required?

[a;i 111 IRU ONLY.

I rMI

& 12 IRU ONLY.

~ 111or12 IRUs.

I IAriJi~~ ;:~::::bl~ l<;o9rilt1vO LOv01 i IMemmy I ifaomfyo i ISolem 1& 2 1l"'~")P" i I 1212112015! I

~I 027000K201 I'K2.01 IRo'va1lle:![DjSROValue::J[IBjseCtidrl::j~ ;Ro Group:ILJlsR.qGrolJ!lELJ ~! D

~System/E;VoiutiOri 'Titre*:: IContainment Iodine Removal System 11027 I

'KA Statement:! Knowled e of bus power sup lies to the followin Fans

~E.~.p.la.11~.tion.*',otJ! 55.41.b(9) Containment IRUs are powered from G and Enon-vital 460VAC. With the loss of off-site power, none of the non vital

~w'efs: . ,* . *** 1Ibusses are energized. The distracters are based on the operator knowing that the loading of a vital bus in Mode IV doesn't have any bearing on !RU operation.

II

,

• Reference Title* ** 'E *.* Facility Reference Number;* I[Referef19e Sectic)n *,I *.page, No~ 1 !Revision!

I1E1 Aux Building 460-230V One line !1207916 I I ~I===-I j 26 j

~'1=E=1=A=ux==Bu=il=di=ng=4=6=0=-2=30=V=O=n=e=li=ne======:::::!l~l2=07=9=1=9==============:::::!1~============1l~====ll23 I

'! ___________,!l, _ _ _ _ _ _~l----~11 11-~'

!Lo. Number** Objectives I CONTMTE003 IMffe.forial Required for ES<ar!lin~tlor( ***.! I

_Ol.Ie~tlon ,Spurc~:i{1 IPrevious 2 NRC Exams Ii,(;tue~ti?~ M.9di!ic~~ior.:i rJ{e~npd:, JDirect From Source Iii.iseclpurih~i"rnining Pr()gram .j o i'ouesiion~ourc~ (;§,rrim~iit~1 1_1_1_-0_1_R_o_N_R_c_o_4_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,

'..:: ..:;::.: *1

',.* :,<:: ' ..::. /j I I I I l I 1-

RO SkyScraper I ~S:R:O:S:ky:s!c:ra:p:er:::'._:::::R:O:S:y:st!:e:m:/E:v:o:lu:tio:n::L::i::st:::~I::*:::S:RO:::S::ys:t:'.em:/::E::vo::l:ut::io::n:L:is:t:::'.l~o:::u:tl:in:e::C:h::a:n:g::e:s:::'.'.._~'-'--'-"-:....;..:.--~-~

\Question Tqpfo \ ,_R_0_4_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~

Given the following conditions:

I

- . 2 has experienced a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

- Containment H2 concentration has risen to 2%.

- 21 H2 Recombiner has been placed in service with containment pressure at 4.1 psig.

- 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> later, containment H2 concentration has remained at 2%, and containment pressure has risen to 5.1 psig.

Which of the following describes the effect the higher containment pressure has on H2 Recombiner operation, and how should the crew proceed?

H2 Recombiners are _ _ effective as containment pressure rises with a constant power setting. The power setting must be ___ IAW S2.0P-SO.CAN-0001, Hydrogen Recombiner Operation.

r:-111 ess, raise

~ . d.

ib:i Imore, raised.

~1

[] I more, lowered I

'Ariswer I

~I 02soooA201 System/EvolUUon Title I IA2.01 J

1

=

ra-1 !exam Level rR! 'coa!litive Level ! IApplication iRO Value: I~[SRO

~gen Recombiner and Purge Control System I :Facilit : I Salem 1 & 2

'{.al~e:J[§j,sectiori: 1j~ fRO Group:! [JI \SRO Grol!pi! [JI iE:XamDate: I 1212112015!

D KAStatemen1::! Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

Hydroqen recombiner power settinq, determined by usinq plant data book

~Explanati~n .* oq The 55.41.b(?,8, 10) H2 recombiners are placed in service when directed in the EOPs with containment H2 concentration between 2-4%.

hydrogen recombiners use electric heating elements to elevate the temperature of the containment atmosphere. As shown in

Ar *s: *** * .1 Attachment 2, RE COMBINER POWER CORRECTION FACTOR CURVE, a higher containment pressure would result in a higher power correction factor, which would cause recombiner power setpoint to rise. So initially the higher pressure would cause the

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,_,re...c.woJ..!.mJ.J..bJ.Ujn_,,p"'-r-"toc.w.Jb=..Jecame..lass effcient_ and the po\A/pr setpoint \l!/Ol dd he raised as directed at Step 5 1 g c \Mhjch sya'"" ;+ W'1 t - - - -=--. . . .

I or remained constant and Containemnt pressure has changed, perform attachment 1 and adjust power.

Referen2,eTHle  ::'i*>.>: :t . .*_**facility R,eference: Number" I iRefereMe;section J [g~ge No:.:! !Revisiori*

r=;;;:::=:::=::::::::::::=:::=:::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::=~======:::::::=========:::=::':::::==c.'"=:::::::::::::::::::::==:::==

~IH=y=d=ro=g=en=R=ec=o=m=b=in=e=r=O=p=er=a=tio=n====='~~'=S2=*=0=P=-S=O=.C=A=N=-=0=00=1====~1~======~I14. 7 ,8 I !.::19===1 ll======================~ll================l~l===========ll  !'~!===I I 1, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~l _ _ _ _ _~l _ _ _~il 11_~1 I

J I CONTMTE012 Objectives iM~terial Requir~~f()~aj?~'rriinatic)ri'. rl IS2.0P-SO.CAN-0001 (because KJA says so!)

icomn}eht I

l- I

[_ I

RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I. Outline Changes loue.~tionToplc.l I RO 50 Gi"-.., the following conditions:

- _,m Unit 2 is 7 days into a refueling outage.

- The core is partially offloaded with 7 bundles remaining in the Rx.

- Fuel movement is in progress, and S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0010 SPENT FUEL POOL MANIPULATIONS is in effect.

- SFP temperature is 120 deg. F.

- 21 SFP becomes air bound, trips on motor OL, and can NOT be restarted.

- 22 SFP pump will NOT start.

- SFP hi level alarm is in alarm.

I

- SFP heatup rate is 12 deg F/ hr.

If SFP cooling can NOT be restored, which of the following choices describes an adverse consequence of this loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling?

I

~ Rx cavity overflow due to rising SFP level if the Gate Valve remains open.

ti.! I Increased production of radioactive waste liquid as the tell-tale drains flow rises to the FHB sump.

I

~ Increased radiation levels at the FHB charcoal filter due to Spent Fuel off-gassing at temps> 150 deg. F. I I

[d,-: Inability to place a raised Spent Fuel bundle into any location in the pool due to rising radiation level on 2R32 Fuel Handling Crane Area l

l I

I An,swer,!

Monitor.

I~ JExam Levell I~

I

!Cognitive Leve! , Memory I !faciHty; : ISalem 1 & 2 I iE.x.arn.Date: 1' !___12_12_1_12_0_15_.I J

~1033000K303 I K3.03 iROVafue:![I§J~:~oyarue:i@r~ec~iob:ij~:RoGroup:(LJlsROGrolip:iLJ D Syste'rij/Efolutiori Title 'i [Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System

'.KA Statement:: IKnowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System will have on the following:

ISpent fuel temperature

!ExP'"n~yqn of JI 55.41.b(13, 10) Distractor b is incorrect because the pool would overflow into the ventilation system, not come over the physical wall I

'AI s:>

• I

'I of the pool. C is correct because rising radiation will be seen as fuel off-gassing and is expected to occur as temp increase to 150

, deg. Distractor a is incorrect because any overflow will go out the ventilation openings in the SFP. Distractor d is incorrect I because it is always possible to lower a SF bundle.

i.'"

1.: Reference Title.*. ii

• I Facility)~~fe~enee Number** >I* IL

• Reference Section '

. . .  ! I* ~age No . ! l.Revisicml I Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling !I S2.0P-AB.SF-0001 I 11 q12 I I I II I lj II I I II I 11 iI I I SFPOOOE007 Objectives J

[gi1~spM~§~rc~!;1 IFacility Exam Bank 11(.llle;;p,on Modms~tr9.~Met_hod: A Editorially Modified I:Used ou'rlng'rfaiqing ~rogram I D

[ouesti?n§C>orce Comm~nt.s IUsed on Salem June 2004 NRC RO exam (6 exams ago) I

• ----------~-~~-~~~~~~-~~~~-~~~~~~~~~-~~

ltonimt:mt* *

• I I I I 1- I

RO Sky Scraper ..  ! .SR~ Skyscraper. I __R_o_s_y_s_te_rn_IE_v_o_iu_ti_on__u_st..- _._s_R_o_s_y_st_ern_._iE_v_oi_ut_io_n_L_is_t....:i Outline Changes . I

~Question tcipic: RO 51 I Gi""l the following conditions:

- , 1 is operating at 95% power performing a 1% per minute load reduction due to high radio frequency in the Main Generator.

- 11 SG Narrow Range Level channel II is undergoing a channel calibration IAW S1 .IC-CC.RCP-0035, 1LT519 #11 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL PROTECTION CHANNEL 11, and all associated bistables are tripped.

Which of the following identifies the consequence if a second channel of Narrow Range level on 11 SG were to fail to 30% with NO operator action?

11 SG level will become ...

I

~ higher than program because 11BF19 and 11 BF40 ONLY swapped to manual and will be over feeding 11 SG.

j6,; I lower than program because 11BF19 and 11 BF40 ONLY swapped to manual and will be under feeding 11 SG.

I I

ic: ! higher than program because both SGFPs and 11BF19 and 11 BF40 swapped to manual and will be over feeding 11 SG.

I @]I lower than program because both SGFPs and 11BF19 and 11 BF40 swapped to manual and will be under feeding 11 SG.

J !Answer i Ia I IExam Level I ~ :cognitive Level i IApplication I !Facility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I 'Examoate:I

' ***. ... . II 12/21/2015!

KA::! 035000K603 !IK6.o3 '!RO Value: :j 2.6ltSRO Value: i 3.ol ;section: q~_j(Ro Grotrp:; I 2j [SRO Group:i I 21 ~~ D tSysterT11E:V:91Ation Jit!eJ j Steam Generator System _o_3_5_ _

iKA Statement:! I Knowledge of the of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Steam Generator System:

SIG level detector EXplanatiorl pf.I 55.41.b(7) SG NR level is programmed from 33-44% up to 100% power. As the downpower continues, the BF19 will be closing in 11,I Answers:* **** ., response to the lower steam flow requiring less feed. The 11 BF19 and 11 BF40 (expected to be shut at this power level) swap to I manual upon the second NR level channel failure. The SGFPs do not. When the 11 BF19 swaps to manual, it will have a certain I demand on it. As power (and steam flow) continues to lower, the demand will be higher than required, and SG NR level will b@r-f"'lmc h: .... h ....... .i.h..,n n ....... ,.. .............. 1,...., ,,,.,1 Ii J -

Reference Title**

.""le Fac!lity Refere11ce Number * ! [Reference Section *... l ! Page NCi'. J IRevisicml I*

IOverhead Annunciators Window G I 1 S1 .OP-AR.ZZ-0007 I lj 17 1142 I Il I I 11 11 I I I I 11 11 I

l,;io. Number ..**. I I CN&FDWE004 Objectives i.Mater.ial Requiredfor ~xa.gir~;:itiori * .: I 11

!9~e~!!e11~ourc;~;. j j_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.l l9u~5n0n M0Clificbtio6'r1~~h9q: j 1IOsedburirig TratnfhgProgram I oI i~~~~~i'9n'$,~~r~e.con1~eptsi 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.ll 1

tcomrrient .*. **

I I I I

RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper I __R_o_s_y_s1_em_1_E_vo_1_ut_io_n_L_is_t..... __s_Ro_s_ys_t_em_1_E_vo_1_ut_io...n_L_is_t..... Outline Changes iouestion Topic I IRO 52 I s~ 10 m Unit 2 is operating at 95% when the PO reports steam flow is rising on all SGs with no readily apparent reason.

Al of the following describes how the steam flow will affect the plant, and how operators should proceed if steam flow continues to rise significantly IAW S2.0P-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow?

Reactor power will rise at 1) rate as the increased steam flow. The crew will 2)

§] 11) a higher

2) initiate a MSLI to determine if a safety injection is required. I

~ 11) the same

2) Trip the reactor and confirm the trip, then initiate a MSLI to determine if a Safety Injection is required. I

~ 11) a higher

2) Initiate a power reduction to ensure reactor power remains <100% while attempting to identify and isolate the leak. I

a.i 11) the same c::::_i 2) Initiate a power reduction to ensure reactor power remains <100% while attempting to identify and isolate the leak.

!Answer 11 b I !Exam Level 11 R I !Cognitive Level 1 I Comprehension I !Facility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I JExamDate: ; I 12/21/20151

~1039000A2os j,A2.05 I I

,RO Value.*l,@,SRO Value.1 I! !J]" ,Section. ,I~ 1RO Group.. *!1LJ 1SRO Group.1LJ '"MD I i 0 , **xcA~

Jtl. , ,

system/Evolution Title I I Main and Reheat Steam System I [039-1

'KA Statement:' Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Main and Reheat Steam System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

lncreasina steam demand, its relationship to increases in reactor power 1Expla:nation of i 55.41.b(1,5, 10) AB.STM does direct a power reduction at Step 3.8 if the EHC system is not causing the turbine to be the source of

Ar *qrs: i the rising steam flow. The stem states that there is no readily apparent reason for the rising steam flow, and EHC malfunction would be apparent. Also, the Continuous Action Summary is in effect at Step 1. CAS Step 1.1 states that at any time if reactor power is rising uncontrollable, trip, confirm, initiate MSLI. If sauce of steam leak is isolated, then go to TRIP-1. If not, initiate SI and

~~ +~ TDID_1 I

I Reference Title If, Facility Reference Nu'mber I !Reference Section II Page No.: !Revision'

=

;::;;;;;:;::;;;;;:;====================~~==================!i===========;;;;;;;;;;

l~E=x=ce=s=siv=e=S=te=a=m=F=lo=w===============;il:FS=2=.0=P=-A=B=.S=T=M=-0=0=0=1=======;!F===========::=;.l~I =====lj9 I i~================="~============'~=========q

,1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~1,1 _ _ _ _ _~1, _ _ _ _.Jj 11~==='

-~'

LO.Number Objectives MSTEAME008 IABSTM1E001 iMaterial Required for Examinatfon ,, J I iouestion Source:* J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ ___.l jouestion Modification Method: I I !used During Training Program I D 1

ouestionSource Comments; I I

!~---------~-~-~-~--~-~~-----~~~~-~~~~~~----'

Icomment I I I I L I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I

RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I IQµesUoh Topic: IRO 53 G;. .., the following conditions:

- . ,,t 2 has experienced a loss of all feedwater flow initiated by a Feedwater Isolation signal (P-14) condition on 23 SG.

I

- To mitigate the event after the P-14 has cleared an NCO has been directed to start 21 SGFP in accordance with S2.0P-SO.CN-0007, Rapid SGFP Recovery.

II

- The NCO successfully relatches the 21 SGFP but the speed of the pump does not rise automatically to minimum speed as he anticipated.

Which of the following is the cause of this response?

~I The P-14 signal "seal-in" feature.

L:.........:J I

\b.J, 21 SGFP PUMP SPEED CONTROL is in AUTO.

I c. 121 SGFP ENABLE/DISABLE switch is in the DISABLE position.

@iJ 121 SGFP speed was >160 rpm when the latch push button was depressed.

!'Answer l Id I IExam l..evei .i IR I iC?gnitive'l..evel i IMemory I iF~i;ility.:'J ISalem 1 & 2 I lexarl1 oate: I I

• • • ,' ,*, l 12/21/20151

.l<A::I osgoooA107 I1A1.07 , lRPYalue:ll2.5*l'skovaltleSlj2.6*i 'Section:!I~ !ROGroup:il 11 's1m Group:ll 1j ~i:i D System/Evoll.itiOn'Thle I l_M_a_in_F_ee_d_w_a_t_e_r_s.._ys_t_e_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I !059 l<AstatemenEi Ability to predict and/or monitor chanqes in parameters associated with operatinq the Main Feedwater System controls includinq:

Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICS I Explanation of .i 55.41.b(4, 10). A is incorrect because the P-14 signal automatically clears when the SG level lowers <setpoint, there is no seal in 1:ArisVv'ifrs*:: :"' t j circuit. B is incorrect because auto speed control prevents latching of the SGFP. C is incorrect because the Enable/Disable switch in the disable position only removes the ADFWCS from controlling SGFP speed, the switch is placed in Disable when starting the SGFP. Dis correct because the SGFP may be latched with speed <160 rpm, but it will not automatcally raise speed to minimum 1~ 1 nn --~ ;ri1~ -----n

. -Referente Title . : ~* FatH[ty Reference Number

• j iRefereflcesection I!* page No. j !R,evision*

ISGFP Prompt Recovery iIS2.0P-SO.CN-0007 I 116 11 4 I

'I II I ii 11 I 11 i! I !I 11 I Objectives ISGFPLOE006 Illlse1:fouri@Trc_;inif19"F>rograrri] o 191f~~t[()fj:~o).l'.~~,'coll,l!henf?! 144112. Removed second part of question which asked what you had to do to get speed to raise. Replaced I

• • * *

• 1 _i_m~p_la_u_s_ib_le~d_is_tr_ac_t_e_r*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-J

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fduestibllTopic 11 Ro 54 1 1.r;*'- f-ioth 11 and 12 AFW pumps in service providing 6E4 lbm/hr flow to each SG, what would be the response if both 13AF21 and 14AF21 were shutl

~ 111 AFW pump automatic recirc valve would open. I

~I The single automatic recirc valve for the MDAFW pumps would open. I

..=J I The Pressure Override Circuit would actuate to prevent dead heading 11 AFW pump. J

[J I Normal MDAFW pump recirc flow would rise through the orificed continuous recirculation line. I Answ:r: ~ !Exam Level j ~ jcognitiye Level  ! j Application I !Faci,lity:,l iSalem 1 & 2 I :E)(a[T'Jp~tef.l j 12/21/20151 1

~I 061000K503 j 'K5.03 i *RO Value:if))'fsRo Vaiue:l[IB"!s~ctie>n(il~ 1~0 Gre>up::LJ!SRCfGroup:iLJ ~]I~ D SysteffiJEvolution Title j IAuxiliary I Emergency Feedwater System  ! '-jo_6_1~

KA Statement: I ! Knowledge of the operational implications of the followinq concepts as they apply to the Auxiliary I Emergency Feedwater Svstem: I

! Pump head effects when control valve is shut I iE~p.laoa,tron :otd 55.41.b(?,8) The MDAFW pumps each has its own dedicated recirc line and associated automatic recirc valve, which opens to iAnswe'l-s:* '>  !:' qmaintain aFW pump flow >180 gpm. With the 6E4 lbm/hr in stem for each of the 2 SGs being supplied from 11 AFW pump that=

240 gpm, the valve would initially be closed and open when flow lowers <180 to prevent the increased pump head from causing 1

1. fhU.,mgr~:~ ~;~;~~:d~v~~~~~ ti~2ts 1 ?0 i~ 1 ~n5~o~~~c~~~\~lf~~~\~/:'.;~ 0t~~~;:1t1 ;:~~~ 1~r: 1~of~r~~~;:,~:~1 1~n1 ~~ 1 ~ ~~ ~~~:ecA ~;cause Iincorerect but plausible because that is how the recirc line for 'the TDAFW pump is setup for continuous recirc.. .

• • • . . :* * .. Reference Title'* * ***.* . *** *' l** facility Reference Number..*  %*! 'Reference Section .* * .j f.Pagef'.19.i !R.evislpri'

=;;===============

;========~~==================~;::===========~

j Auxiliary Feedwater System Lesson Plan I 1 NOS05AFW000-14 I 1119-20 1 I I lj 1l=====11 i l=I==

L 11 I 11 11 _ __.

1 Lo>Numl:lei'.:" ' *

• Objectives

! AFWOOOE008

[

1_ _ _ ____.

'Matel"iaLf{equfredfoi- Ex~mii'tati<?n :**; I i9.l1esH?~ ~g~rC,~: *,I l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ __,I ~9,U,~;>fi<>n M9.ciifiC:atiC>l1 Method: *: :I I ius~d otiriil9 Training ProgramJ o fol1e~tiC>n s~~\S~ pornm~lltsi I J

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RO SkySera per I -~SR::O::::S::ky:s::cr::ap::e::r~~::R::O::S:y::st:e::m::/E::v:ol::ut::io::n::L::is:t'.:::!~::S::R::O::S::y::st::ern::/::E::vo::l::ut::io::n::L::is::t::!.:::::O::u::tl::in:e::C::::ha::n:g:e::s::.:.j-=..:._;_;.:...;...;;;___;_;_..:__;_;;;;__;;;;

[O.uestloriJ6pi~\ ,_R_0_5_5_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I Given the following conditions:

, 2 is performing a normal shutdown at 20% per hour IAW the IOP's.

LL SGFP is shutdown.

Current Rx power is 24%.

21 SGFP trips.

With NO operator action, what will be the status of the Auxiliary Feed Pumps?

~I ONLY the MDAFW pumps start immediately upon the trip of 21 SGFP.

I

~I ONLY the MDAFW pumps start when SG NR level in 1/4 S/G's lowers to 14%.

I I

• c. i The MDAFW pumps AND the TDAFW pump start immediately upon the trip of 21 SGFP.

t!:..J IThe MDAFW pumps AND the TDAFW pump start when NR level in 1/4 S/G's lowers to 14%. I

• Answer.! ~!Exam Level i ~!Cognitive ~evel '"I j Application l IFacmty:l lSalem 1 & 2 I 1.E~~rnD~.t~:.:j j 12/21/201511

~I 061000K602 IIK6.02  ;!Ro IJ"afoe:l[2BtsRova.1lle:![TI":section:jl~ [Ro'Grollp:iLJisR6Group:1LJ !~~ D i,SystemtEv,'olutiOri:Titfe J f Auxiliary I Emergency Feedwater System I :061 KA s tatement:* . j I K nowi ed1qe of th eo f t heeffect o a loss or ma Ifunction on t he f0 II OWJnQWI*11 have on the AUXIT1arv IE merqencv Fee dwa er system:

Pumps

Expf#°natlo n of\ 55.41.b (4) MDAFW pumps auto start when both SGFPs are tripped as shoen on logic drawing 221064. The TDAFW pump does l

.ArisWets: r~ 'i'.'<f not. The MDAFW pumps also auto start on 2/3 NR level channels in one SG lowers to 14%, but in this case they will already be running. The TDAFW pump starts on 2/3 NR level channels on 2/4 SGs.

,....__ ' I I :2.L:"Reference rn1e .*

1**

,;:,*"' Fadlity" ReferehceNumber **I [Reference Secti~rf !kPageNo.f [~evision; I RPS AFW pumps startup 11221064 II 11 1 Is I I I II I

AFW System LP II NOS05AFW000-14 II ll 1133

!I 1114 11 I

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Lo/NiJmbifr:Xi! .. Objectives I AFWOOOE006 1.9ue~!l6fi.§?.P.tce:,.l'J IFacility Exam Bank i \q~es~iofi Mo<;Jificati~!i.r,<t~tflo~;:. 11Editorially Modified Ifu~edbl!rin9 ;rrarnii1g Prograrnl o j'ot1~5t!9tisC>D[c:~*¢,9rti!J1e~ts.i I;:======-::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~===========-===============:::__,

41751

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R__o s_ k_yS_ c_ r_ap_er_ - '~ SRO Skyscraper --~~' I I RO SysternlEvolution List_ L

• SR? System/Evolution List _ " _ _ Outline Changes loue~tion Toplcj _R_0_5_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,

Giv"'n the following conditions:

emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) is operating in parallel with the 500KV grid for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> endurance run IAW 82.0P-ST.DG-0014, 2C DIESEL GENERATOR ENDURANCE RUN, following a complete overhaul.

- Cumulative run times for all individual EOG load limits are less than 10% of rated.

- While operating at 2525 KW three hours into the test, the operator mistakenly adjusts 2C EOG speed control resulting in MW loading rising to 261 O KW.

What are the consequences, if any, of continued EOG operation at this KW load?

Operation for the remaining 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> of the test. ..

~'will not have any adverse effect on 2C EOG.

I L.~ will result in exceeding the 30 minute load limitation for 2C EOG.

6 jwill result in exceeding the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> load limitation for 2C EOG. l

~ !will result in 1

exceeding the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> load limitation for 2C EOG. 1 fAnswer i~ IExam Level I !B::J !Cognitive Level I! Application  ! ;Facility:W Salem 1& 2 j_ExamD~te: w___12_1_21_12_0_1~51J

~!062000A101 1:A1.01 1 jRo'lalue:l~.:sR6Va1ue:l[I~Jisectiori:Jl~:ROGroup:{.J]lsR()~Group:il~ D

'System/Evollltion Title J j_A_.c_._E_l_ec_t_ric_a_l_D_is_tr_ib_u_ti_on_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ ~--~

'KA statement:' Ability to predict and/or monitor chanqes in parameters associated with operatinq the A.C. Electrical Distribution controls including:

Significance of DIG load limits

~p1ara!ion ~ti 55.41.b(S) The EOG load limitations are maximum of: 2600KW continuous, 2600-2750KW for 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />, 2750-2860KW for 2 Answers:---.- >i hours, and 2860-3100KW for 30 minutes. With the EOG operating at 2610KW for 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />, the EOG will not exceed any limits, operation between 2600 (cont) and 2750(2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />) KW, since the stem stated that the cumulative run time for ALL EOG load I limits was <10%, which would be 210 hours0.00243 days <br />0.0583 hours <br />3.472222e-4 weeks <br />7.9905e-5 months <br /> for this limit.

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• Reference Title--_

I FaCinty"Referehce Numbef-. \ IReferEH1ce Section I\' Page J'lo. j !Revlsio~n:

I2c DIESEL GENERATOR SURVEILLANCE TE 1IS2.0P-ST.DG-0003 llP&L 3.5 II !152 I

! II ll 11 11 I I II II 11 11 I

~~9~:-N\i'ffibet;/'. <.:*

I EDGOOOE012 Objectives l9ti~~~[o~ ~?:U,rce:}*;j j Facility Exam Bank I[use~'burillg Tfaining Program ] D

[olJ~~~ionSo~~C:e Ccir"J!'gt~~~~l 163989 replaced 2000 hr distracter (implausible) with 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> distracter I

!comment >

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.R? SkyScra~er I SRO Skyscraper. . ROSystem/Ev?lution List j SRO System/Evolution List I .Outline Changes J louestibn Topic j l , . . . R _ 0 _ 5 _ 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , 11 I-IAW Salem FSAR Section 8.3.3.2, Station Batteries, on a total loss of all AC power the station vital 125 VDC batteries are designed to s* loads for a minimum of . hours. I

!.a:.111

!~~--------~----------------------~---------------'

!Answer] ["O" :Ex<1m Levefj ~ lcbgnitiveLevel d IMemory I jFcidt\ty: I j Salem 1 & 2 I J,ExariiDat~:j j 12/21/20151

~I 062000K303 i ,K3.03 I[RO.Value:/[DJ [sR.oVaiu~:lr.2] isecti6ri: Jl..=_j ['ROGroup:ILJ iSRO Group:/ LJ D Sy~teaj/Evd!O(i9ri Titre"j j_A_.c_._E_l_ec_t_ric_a_l_D_is_tr_ib_u_ti_on_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ ~--~

iKA Statem"ent";"J Know!edqe of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the A.C. Electrical Distribution will have on the followinq:

DC system

'Expl~natiori C>fi 55.41.b(?,8) IAW Salem FSAR Section 8.3.3.2, Station Batteries, states ... "The batteries are sized for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of operation after a

A1\sWefs'; **' I loss of ac power, based upon the required operation of the de emergency equipment."

"'<' .*.,Reference

Title:

• .; \'

• Facility Reference Number I[Reference Sedr9n ~ l i Page No. I i.Revis\9n(

!salemFSAR ll 118.3.2.2 118.3-18 1114 I

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• .:* .. ::,;.J lL_o.Number * """<i Objectives I DCELECE002

(,pu~stkJnSoµrce: !IFacility Exam Bank I J r9uestid~;~c)~ifii::~tionM,~~hod: .* Direct From Source I !Used outing 'Tr~infrigfrogram l D

9qMtfon.sour<:~.som~~h!s,l j.-L_o_9_1_0_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___, 1 I I I

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes I

[Question Topic i !RO 58 Given the following conditions:

- control room receives Auxiliary Typewriter alarm point 0676. 2G 4KV

~~OUPBUSLOSS125VDCCONTROLPWR.

- An operator investigates and reports 125 VDC breaker 2BDC1AX12, 2G 4KV Bus Control Power Supply (Reg) tripped.

Which of the following identifies the effect, if any, this will have on 24 RCP 4KV breaker?

If 24 RCP is running it will ...

fal Itrip immediately.

lb; 11 continue to run but will not trip if required. I II I

c,i trip if a RPS trip signal is subsequently developed, but would not be able to be re-started if directed.

I' I

,d. l continue to run and be unaffected as emergency control power from the alternate control power supply will automatically be provided.

I

[Answer 11 b I !Exam Level 11 R I i~ogllitlve Level

• I Application I !Facility: !ISalem 1 & 2 I i.Examoate: I j

,_,. . '.** _- l 12/21/20151 iKA=,I 053000K401 1IK4.01 1 IROVahJe:q 2.71 tsROValue::j3.0*I Section: II SYS IiRo Group:l I 1 j ist,m Group:' j 11 ~~~1 D

!Systein/Evolution Title.I 1_0_.c_.E_le_c_tr_ic_a_ID_is_tr_ib_u_ti_on_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~l j063

'KAStatement: i Knowledge of D.C. Electrical Distribution design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Manual/automatic transfers of control  !

[§plaf1~tloh, of! 55.41. b(8) 4KV Group bus control power is supplied from the DC electrical system. Thr alternate supply must be manually provided 1Answers: ** * ** * 'I when the normal supply is lost. 4 KV breakers cannot be tripped remotely without 125VDC available to energize trip coil. A is incorrect because there is no power to energize the trip coil. plus no trip signal would be present. B is correct. C is incorrect because it would not trip if required (different from A is "immediate" vs. "subsequent"). Dis incorrect because the control power s~Ota!J is perfoc:rop.4 n-1..:in1 ,,..,n~

. ..... Re~eren&Title',/: .

• li FadlitY Reference. Number  : tRefererice,3'ectio~.* ij.Page No~ J [R.evisfon:

INo. 24 Reactor Coolant Pump 11211538-2 I 11 1122 I I II I 11 11 I

'I II I II II I

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' ~ *)

Objecti I DCELECE007

[au'estion SolJr~e,:(j I Facility Exam Bank J i0ll~~ti9~ Jl4?c!Jfi9~~iori~eth6d: :j Editorially Modified

~~~~-'.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::==::::::::__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I Irus~~ During Trafni(lg ,Program I D

!Question Source Comrtien~#! 129217 j

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comrrie'nt Oi *. *'. . ** *'[

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List. I Outline Changes

\duestionTopic I IRO 59 I GivAn the following conditions:

- .Jiesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank indicated level is 96.0".

- 22 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank indicated level is 96.1 ".

- 21 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump is selected to REGULAR.

- 22 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump is selected to BACKUP.

- The Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank area C02 Tank fails, and a projectile opens a hole in the bottom of 21 DFOST which completely empties.

Assuming no other damage from the C02 Tank failure has occurred, which of the following identifies how makeup flow to the EOG Day Tanks will be provided, if at all, if the 2C EOG starts automatically to provide power to 2C Vital bus on a single bus UV condition?

Makeup flow to the EOG Day tanks will be provided by ......

~I BOTH DFO Transfer pumps because DFOSTs are normally cross connected but check valves will prevent 22 DFOST from draining out the rupture. I

~ 121 DFO Transfer pump ONLY because the REGULAR pump is aligned to the highest storage tank level during normal surveillance testing.

I ftl INEITHER DFO Transfer pump because DFOSTs are normally cross connected and both will be empty.

I

~I 22 DFO Transfer pump ONLY because 21

~d. ! DFO Transfer pump is aligned to an empty tank.

I i

Answer !~ !Exam Level 11~ !Cognitive. Level** ; j Application I ifacility:j ISalem 1 & 2 I j~X~f!1Date: IJ_ _ _12_12_1_12_0_15_,j

~I 064000K608 I K6.08 1 IRO\/alue: !~'SRO\tal1,1~:!02j;s~'ctfop: II~ rRO Group:1[::]'sRO,Grnup:!LJ 0

s~tern/Ey'olution:Jitle ! I Em erg ency Diesel Generators 11064 tKAStafement; II Knowledge of the of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Emergency Diesel Generators:

l Fuel oil storaoe tanks I.E.

• .. fCplan~.t.i*o**.n* o.tji 55.41.b(S) DFOSTs are normal isolated from each other on the outlet side by the closed 2DF35, 21/22 DFO STOR TANK X-CONN

~ 's: .;, I

• j VAL VE. Each tank is supplied by its respective transfer pump. Return (overflow from DFO Day tanks) is directed to the tank which

• • ~-~!has its DFO transfer pump selected to lead, so that overflow won't be directed to the storage tank from which suction is not being I taken. With an empty 21 DFOST, 21 transfer pump will still receive a start signal (at 33"), but has no fuel to pump. As Day Tank l I level conii!JllAS to l

tov.tpr 22 fRack110) 011mo 'OliU s+,....+ f'.:lt ?7"\ ......... .-4

......,...,,;,-l,,., ~,.....

,,,, - * - * - - +........ r,..

/ .** Reference Title Il* F#cJHty R,efere~cE! Nul!lber l;Reference Section <:j l Page No. i iR,evision 1

~'F=ue=I=O=il==========!i.~l2=05=2=49=-3======='*!lf:= = = = = : : : : : ; ! !.=j=====-1130 I

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11, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,\l _ _ _ _ ____..lj _ _ ____,lj _ __.l l_ __.I Objectives J I FUEOILE004

!Matefi~I ~E!ci1Jireci for p,~mii:iation ::' I I 11

[S~~~ji~~:;~p~i;c~:.'. Il_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _-11 [9y~stiori'.M§dffi~ati9~*r.it~th2,c1:*..* --------~I [(fs@ plifi,ng Training Program l oI

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes

\ouesti6n*ToP!1£tl I RO 60 I I Gi,,~.-, the following conditions:

- , 1 is operating at 100% power.

- Control room operators are preparing to perform a Containment Pressure Relief !AW S1.0P-SO.CBV-0002, CONTAINMENT PRESSURE-VACUUM RELIEF SYSTEM OPERATION.

I- Containment radiation levels are NORMAL for 100% power operation with no failed fuel.

After opening the 1VC5 and 1VC6 CONT PRESSNAC RELIEF !SOL valves to initiate the pressure relief, which choice describes how the respective radiation monitors indication will respond?

• 1R12A- Containment Gas Effluent

• 1 R41 B - Plant Vent Noble Gas Intermediate Range

• 1 R41 D - Plant Vent Noble Gas Release Rate

[al 11 R12A rises; 1R41 B rises; 1R41 D rises.

I

.b. \ 11R12A rises; 1R41 B constant; 1 R41 D constant.

I, ls] 11R12A constant; 1R41 B constant; 1R41 D rises.  !

t.a. j I1R12A constant; 1R41 B rises; 1R41 D constant.

'.Answer I ~ !Exam Level j rE=J tccignitive Level i IApplication I lf'<!9ifi~.:,:J ISalem 1 & 2 I !E~1u11P<ite: J !___12_12_1_12_0_1s_.!

KA:! I073000A 101 I A 1. 01 1 IROValue: IO] r~RO Value;:] G] :section: 11 SYS I[RO Group:J LJ ;sRO Gtoup:! [ ] D Radiation levels 55.41.b(11)1R12A is sampling containment atmosphere, so it will NOT rise when the pressure relief is started. 1 R41 B is an intermediate range monitor that normally does not have sample flow through it. It's sample flow will start when the lo range 1R41A monitor nears its high end of monitoring range. It's indication will not change during a pressure relief with NORMAL containment radiation levels. The R41 D provides the gaseous effluent release rate (uCi/sec) by combining (product of) the on-range R41A r . . . . .

t.i'/i: . R,eferenceffjtle. * < I ~":yi=acil)tyRe~etf)fice Num.ber : *. ;Re;ff)~f)nce Sectigni t';J 1 Page.~o'..j [Reyision:

=

=:::::::::::::::::::::=:::::.::::::::::;::::::=.:::::::==.::::::::::::::::::==:.

J l~c=o=n=ta=i=nm==en=t=V=e=n=til=at=io=n=S=y=s=te=m==O=pe=r=at=io=n====~!l!=S=1=.0=P=-=S=O=.C=B=V=-0=0=0=1========~1~l==============='-q~======'-!j2s I 1

~!A=b=n=or=m=a=IR=a=d=ia=ti=on================:=:.l~ls=1=.0=P=-A=B=*=R=A=D-=0=00=1========~':~==========::::::::1j:======'l~3=2==:::::.I II 111 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,l, _ _ _ ____.!l _ ___.l j_~I Objecltives ~

I RMSOOOEOOS

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List i SRO System/Evolution List j Outline Changes I

l~ue~Hohtop.ic! IRo 61 Giv 0 ri the following conditions:

- i 1 is operating at 25% power.

- 1B EOG is running in parallel with station power on 1B 4KV Vital Bus.

- 13 and 16 SW pumps are in service, 11 SW pump is in AUTO.

- 1A 4KV Vital bus becomes deenergized due to a Bus Differential signal.

1 minute after the 1A 4KV Vital bus deenergizes, with NO operator action, which of the following contains ALL the SW pumps which will be running?

bll

~

[b.T1. 15.

~

I

[]113,16.

,d.j 115, 16.

[Ariswe.r !Ia  ! IEJ{al11 L,evel i IR I i<:;ogn'itlve Level !IApplication I jFa'cility: i ISalem 1 & 2 I I**.*.

iExamDate:. **.* .*** f I 12/21/2015!

I iKA:f 076000K201 I K2.01 iR-OValue::l2.7*1

SROValu~

1I

• i 2.7! \Sectioh:il~_j:RO,Group:tl

-.=:====:.::=======::..:::::=====.:::==-==================-======:.:=:=-

11 iSRO Group:!! 1] em D tK'*~

.:r

Sys t~m/EvolutiorjTitle I l_s_e_rv_i_ce_w_a_t_er_S_y~s_t_em_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~l 076

'KA Staterne.llt:! I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the followinq:

I Service water I

e

x:plahatloil'*otl 155.41 (7) A bus powers 15, and 16 SW pumps. On a single bus UV as described in the stem, only that bus would load in blackout tAftSWefS>~ce >;i lo.dlog. A b"' ;, looked oct oo ""' Dlffocooti*I {doooe'l)l"d), '"' ~e lo" of 16 SW pc mp wocld "'"'e he*dec pee""" to lowee to where the auto pump (11) would start. Only one SW pump is aligned for AUTO which is the normal at power configuration for the SW pumps, one in auto, and the rest in manual. 12 SW pump would never start unless 11 pump did not on a SEC initiation, that is 1-- 1 b~l it is oat listed io ao~£ of tbe cboices j 4. S~l::il 011r:oo lMCll !Id cot stact sincP B bi is CP ...... ,,. 1............... ..............,,. .h: ....h i~ ..h, it: ....... '+ r~ ............ ,.J in l - - . . . -

II any of the choices. There can be confusion about the running EOG and the loss of A vital bus causing a MODE II (Blackout), which would strip busses and load the primary SW pump on each bus. The unit 1 SW pump power supplies are reversed from unit 2 (21/22 pumps A bus, 25,26 pumps C bus)

• , -'./\:;; -><*'.' ;,'<:;:  ::k I;Reference section" , , ....... ,, ... *. *I , . * * ,

IService Water Pump Operation

• R.eterencerme ,;- Facility Reference Number II S1 .OP-SO.SW-0001 I l ::Page No.':j \Rev1s1,on; 11 1127  !

I IUnit 1 4KV Vital Buses One line II 203002 I ii 1134 I

! I! I ii II i

!Lo. tjug16er I SWBAYSE005 Objectives J faµesti~(isC>ur~~: 11 Facility Exam Bank I[9~~~~tio,nM8ctlff~~tiori!'Aettfo~~2 JDirect From Source I!Used buring'.trai'ni'ng Prograrri l o

~qM~~lorf,~. ~~r,~'e,£~fu!Tlen~~j 1152970, used on Sept 2011 NRG RO exam (3 exams ago)

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper J RO System/Evolution List .* f SRO System/Evolution Ust *. Outline Changes I

ouesti9nJppi6! I Ro 62 I Giw.., the following conditions:

- , 2 is in MODE 3, NOT, NOP.

- # 2 ECAC was manually placed in operation to collect bearing vibration readings IAW S2.0P-SO.CA-0001, Control Air System Operation.

- PRIOR to starting the# 2 ECAC, BOTH Control Air headers were at 96 psig.

- 2C 4KV vital bus senses an UV condition, and the bus loads in MODE II*.

- 2A and 2B 4KV vital buses remain powered from SPT's.

- 5 minutes after the UV signal, Unit 2 ECAC oil pressure indicates O psig and has been O psig for> 1 minute.

With NO operator action, which of the following describes the effect this will have on the Control Air System?

Assume the ECAC Motor Overload has not actuated at any time.

1. 2 ECAC is and Control Air header(s) is/are a~ 11 NOT running, "A", lower than "B" header.

• ~

I

~ running, "A", higher than "B" header.

~I NOT running, BOTH, 96 psig. II

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'

~I running, BOTH, 96 psig.

Answer I @=] \Exam lever! ~ l~o'gllitive Le'{el ! IApplication 1 Faqility: l ISalem 1 & 2 .Ex~Mpate:l I 12121120151

~I o7aoooA301 I'.A3.01 r;7; r;-::;J ~

il~OVa!ue:l 1 .2.:_l 'S~oY~!lle:i 1 EJ (section:'.11~ '~oGroup:! 1 _2] isR'O'c3.roup:] 1_2]

~ Jt"*"'Hf-1;1

~~

D lSysterfl/Evc)lution Titie i IInstrument Air System 11~0-7-8-~

K,  !

ernent:<i Abilit to monitor automatic operations of the Instrument Air S stem includin Air pressure

[Ei<plariatlon o~ J 55.41.b(7) The ONLY trip which remains active for the ECAC after ANY SEC start is motor overload. The ECAC operating

[Answers:

• i characteristics are such that at 95 psig and above header pressure, the ECAC will NOT be supplying the CA header. With the stem

. conditions of 96 psig prior to and after the ECAC was originally started, the subsequent (SEC) stop and restart of the ECAC will I~~~e ~2e ~~=~t ~;a~~ ~~~~~~a~~nrc:c;~oen s!~tit~~ :a~~:ed;:~~~ip~~:;a;:~s ~:t~~~~:r ;~~~n~~~~:~;~~ftb!r bhse ~~cl~:~~n~f ~~\2C.vital

!pressure per PT.CA-001 (Rev. 17) P&L 3.4 bullet 3' could not be ~sed as justification for selecting a~ incorrect distracter.

)ReferenceJitJ,e1;;, *;*", *** FacilitY:.F{~f~reoceNu01bef

• It~efefer\c~.sectfori j ~P~~e"'NC?.\ jf{evisi611/

1;=::============================~~======================-.~============~

~!C=o=n=tr=ol=A=ir=S=y=s=te=m=O=p=e=ra=t=io=n=====:::::;l.li.= S=2=.0=P-=S=O=.C=A=-=00=0=1====~11,~=======l j 1114 I C=o=nt::::ro=I=A=ir=Le=s=so=n=P=la=n=======:'..llii=N=O=S=05::::C::::O=N=A=IR=-=12=====1!l=======q 30-31 l-=I I! I

!l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,ll 11---~!I Ii I Objectives ICONAIRE008

RO SkyScraper J SRO Skyscraper. I RO System/Evolution List .. I . SROSystem/EvolutionUst *.. 1. . Outline Changes . I faue~tlon Topic I RO 63

!-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--'

II in :>rlrJition to providing a source of water for Fire Protection, Fresh Water and Fire Protection Storage Tank water can be aligned to which one of the I

!5 g systems?

I la. I Service Water.

I

~I Main Condensate. I l

~ Auxiliary Feedwater. l

~ I Spent Fuel Pool Cooling. I1

>Ans\Ner1~iExamlevel1 ~;cognitive L~\/er. *i IMemory I j,FaciH!y:.11Salem1 & 2 I 'Examo~1:e: 11 121211201511

~loseoooK103 1:K1.03 . llRO'Va1ue:.J§[S,Rb\fa1ue!1§ise~t10n;1j~tR0Grour):f=JJ1sR().GroU?:!LJ ~!r~J D tsystetOIEyoiutionTiffe I j Fire Protection System I ~10_86_ _

IKA Statement:: IKnowledoe of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between Fire Protection System and the following:

AFW Svstem

Explanation of/ 55.41.b(4) Fire protection water can be aligned to theh AFW system through a normally disconnected spool piece.

Ailsw~fs: '"'*I

'-"--- ~~~_l::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::J.

Refer~nc;e rme INo. 1 & 2 Units Fire Protection 1l205222-4 Il Ij 1163 j I II !l~===::::;q:.=~1 ==! l=I I

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,lll _ _ _ _ ______.ll ii 11_~1 I

rL.C>. ('.lymber ;/; ; Objectives I FIRPROEOO?

1_ ___.

~Quei;ti~l} s(iy~~e:~ 11 Facility Exam Bank

[p@~i,idn S:p.ur9e: C()rrf@~~1#1 I

• -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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RO SkyScraper j SRO Skyscraper l ~O Syste111tEvolutionList J SRO System/Evolution List j Outline Changes

!Ollestion Topic, RO 64

!------------~~-----------------------~---------'

1Wr'-" of the following describes the effect if BOTH Containment Phase A and Phase B isolations occur during a LBLOCA, and when will they be rE 'len operating in the EOP network?

I containment penetrations not supporting ECCS functions will be isolated.

Phase A and Phase B will be reset in

~I ONL y NON-ESSENTIAL. EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

I l§J IONLy NON-ESSENTIAL. EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant.

I I

/c. ! ALL. EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. I I

I

~1ALL. EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant.

I (Answer 1 @=] !Ex<im Leyetl lR I !Cogn!tive'Level 1 IApplication  ! j.Facmty: i ISalem 1 & 2 I 1ExarJ1oate: 11 12/21/2015!

I ~IA_2._03_~! :RO V;:ilu~; if 3.5*1 ts Ro Valu~:J j3.8*1 [Section: JI~ fRO Grpup:J I 1j [SR() Group:: j

., fF*~'"I?, *'

~j~ D

~ r* .. ,.,.

il<A: 11103000A203 1j

system/Evolution Title J l_c_o_n_ta_i_nm_e_n_ts_y'-s_te_m_______________________________ __,I J103 l!V\'Stat&ment: i Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Containment System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitiqate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

Phase A and B isolation I!AriE~pla~~tlo.ne>f I rs: * ,

! 55.41.b(9,7) ~uring LBLO~A.

a defined as RCS pressure below the shutoff head of the RHR pumps,

expected to nse above 15 ps1g. The stem states that both Phase A and Phase B actuate. Phase A 2 isolates all non-essential c~ntainment pressure is_

I- --- line's penetrating containment, and Phase B isolates remaining containment penetrations not supporting ECCS functions. TRIP-1 I 1 verifies automatic actions and identifies the optimal recovery procedure. The SI, Phase A, and Phase B would be reset as directed iln I rV'll_1 -"'-- *--*"'*'-- 1 nf"/\ ;~th=------*-----"'"=

i . ,

I IH( F:\ ** . * * . * ,* .*. R~f~rerice Tille , . '.

• 1):: .; !V '*:'Fa¢ilityRef~reni:e N!Jml{~r****.* i:~eference seC'.tion:> *****I [P,age,No. / !Re\/isiotj 11 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection j j 2-EOP-TRIP-1 I ii I j2s I I! Loss of Reactor Coolant 112-EOP-LOCA-1 I ii lj2s I II I 11 11 I 11 I CONTMTE008 Objectives I lPU7stion ..1ollfoe.:J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ __.I i9H~~ti()r:Mc>'~,ifi~a,ti0~,i'v1~tho~: 1__________,I rµsecl puringTfafnirig Pfr)gi'ainJ D

9llestl()~ sc,iurce. cofrim~rt~i I I

!~-----------------------------------~-----~

l'Comrrient **** - .

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I [Questidil Topic I I RO 65 I I

l.".'.V"'~h of the following identifies a condition in which the Unit 2 LCO for Containment Integrity, 3.6.1.1 Modes 1-4, would NOT be met?  !

~I A manual valve or Blind Flange outside containment required to be to be closed during accident conditions cannot be visually verified in

~ correct position due to its location in a High Radiation Area. I t!fJ  ! The containment 100' elevation airlock doors are operated by procedure to allow entry into containment for Rad Pro to take radiation surveys.

I I

~ A eves Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve fails to fully close on a failure of the controlling PZR level channel LOW.

I fa.11 A SW Accumulator nitrogen cover gas pressure falls below the minimum required.

I 1Ar1swer 11 d I :Exam Level 1IR I !c:osnitive Level  ! j Application I !f.ac\Hty: i ISalem 1 & 2 I [Ex11mDate: 11 12/21/20151

KA

11103000G240 112.2.40 :IROYalue::Jj 3.41'sROValue:il4.7 I iSection:.:il~ 'Ro'(;follp:JI 11 :SRO Groi.ip:i! 1j E~i D

system/Eyolution Title'.! l_c_o_n_ta_in_m_e_nt_S_y~s_t_em _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I j103 KAStatement:~----------------------------------------------

Abili to ap ly Technical S ecifications for a system.

explanation of i 55.421.b(9, 10). A is incorrect because 4.6.1.1.a specifically states that a manual valve or blind fiange in a high radiation area may

,Ahswers:

• i be verified using Admin controls. B is incorrect because while containment airlocks are required to be operable IAW 4.6.1.1.b (per I spec 3.6.1.3 airlock), the doors are allowed to be opened for normal transit entry and exit. C is incorrect because CIV have their Iown TS 3_.~.3 which is less r~strictive that containm.ent integrity and is ~ot included in surv requirements. for 3.6.1. '.. ~ is correct Ii> '* Reference TJtle *  : *

• Facility Reterefic.e NuinBe6 .*1 ;Reference section l' Page Nii I !Revision!

jsalemTechSpecs 11 113.6.1.1 II II

,~==================~11*~============~1~13=.6.=2.3======::=,11~===1~1==~,

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____.ll, _ _ _ _ _ _~,,3.6.1.3 ii II I Objectives ICONTMTE010

[atiest.ie~ Spuf(:~:".l l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ____,I iQuestfory Mhdifickti~p:Method:*i **1--------~I [lJsetfbllfi~gJrainin9 Pi-ografu j o

[°"i.i;s~jc)fi !:)oLirc~ q¢r}irne~~s:l I I

• ~---------------------------------------~

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes

\ouesti9nTopic\ ..----------------------------------------------,1

!_R_0_6_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I I

1 When an on-coming operator recieves turnover in the field for a task in progress. who is responsible IAW OP-AA-112-101, Shift Turnover and Relief, I!(' 'uring the oncoming operator receives a follow-up shift turnover briefing?

~ IShift Manager. J

~ Iwee Supervisor. I f2] IAffected unit CRS. j

((! IAffected Unit NCO. I IJ\ns~eri ~ IExarnleyei1 ~ l<;ognitiveLevel i j Memory 1 !~~§i\iiy~i ISalem 1 & 2 I ~~ii.?~[)ate: ! I 12121120151

!l<A:Ji 194001G103 1;2.1.3 [\RoVa!Ue:\[TIJ~sR.bva1ue:\Uij!sedioh:H~'ROGroup:j[]rsR.o;Gr()'iJp:ILJ \9~ D s.Y~~e'tji{EvolutionTitle I iGENERI I

!~------------------------------------~

KA sfateirieiit

!

. ~IK_n_o_wl_e_d_lg_e_o_f-sh_i_ft_o_r_s_ho-rt---te-rm-r-el-ie_f_tu-r-no_v_e_r-pr_a_c-tic_e_s-.--------------------------,

!,.,;s;.:,e;:.ut 'rill

'EX:pr~riatiOn'otJ! 55.41.b(10) OP-AA-112-101, Step 4.1.5.2 states ..."If a turnover occurs in the field during performance of a task, the Shift Manager eo'"rn the ;odi'id"'I(') ce~;,e' follo~op 'hlft \OmO'eC briefiog."

i>* , . ****

• Refer~nce.Tit1e* * * ,:' * ! l* Fa~mt.Y ReferenceNuillher),*.:,j [Refe~en~es~~tion*  :-! t~age;f.fo-! !Revision!

1

~!S=h=ift=T=u=r=no=v=er=a=n=d=R=el=ie=f============:::::::1.~IO=P=-=AA=-=1=12=-1=0=1===========!1il.===============-lj~2=====ll~6====='

li===========================ll~===================~~=============,11~~'~'

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.ll l!, _ _ _ ___.ll _ ___.ij

====

I

'.L(). No'rnber} **

CONDOPE005 Objectives I I_ ____.

jdp~faiPll.~:§g~c~:. J j_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.I :auestiot\ Modificafio~:~~!;h§~:' '*'!

~()U'~~t~?.ffS.~ufce'.~orn~e~t~.11 l

!~---------------------------------------'

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Outline Changes I ... . .

jd.l.le!;tio'riTopic 11RO67 I I GivPn the following conditions for Unit 2:

- .sin Mode 3, NOT, NOP.

- RWST concentration - 2450 ppm

- 21 BAT concentration - 6650 ppm

- 22 BAT concentration - 6650 ppm

- 22 BAT level - 43%

Which of the following describes the LOWEST level for 21 BAT that meets or exceeds the operability requirements for the BAT?

~,43%.

I

[§B 154%.

I ic.i 192%.

I

@] 196%.

I

[Ariswer 1 ~ IE:~am Lev~r 1 IR I 1<:;ognitive Level. ! j Application I !Facility:! ISalem 1 & 2 I** .... **' I IEJ(arnoaw: 11 12/21/2015!

KA:ll 194001G125 112.1.25 *lrfo Value:!! 3.9j [SRO \Fahie: !j 4.2 I\sectidn::/I PWG I 'RO Grdup:,I 11 /sRo:Group:q 11 ~~li~ ~

~s~teITltE:'i~ruuon T.itle I ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. IGENERI I

KA staterri'ent: I

~IA-b-il-izy-to_i_n-te-rp_r_e-tr-e-fe-r-en_c_e_m-at-e-ria-1-s,-s-u_c_h_a_s_g-ra_p_h_s-.c-u-~-e-s-.-ta-b-le-s-,e-t-c-.---------------------:-

E****.~P.*.l~~.'~!.Jo.,J.*!.*,,*o.f. ii 55.41.b(6, 7) TS 3.1.2.6 requir~s a ce~ain an

ount of borated water a_vaila~le. The BASTs are normal!Y cross connected so the

'Answers:** * *;* dTOTAL volume of the 2 tanks 1s what 1s required to be above the l1m1t. With RWST boron concentration of 2450, and both BAT

• *

• 1tanks at 6650, the intersection is - 93.5%. If 1 tank is at 43 % the other tank must be at 50.5%. To preclude picking the wrong answer because of interpolation, the correct answer of 54% is 3.5% higher than required.

- I

• • ;, .* Reference Title . *

,;;;;;;;;==~~;;;;::;:;;~==;;;:;;;:;~;;;::;;;;:;;;;;::;:::=:::=~:;;;;:;;;=

i' >'Fadlity ~ef~rence Nl.lrribef *"I !Ref.erenee SectloriL :j : PagfNo. I !R~visiont I:.=S=aq=le=m=T=e=ch=S=p=ec=s======::::::::::.! I Ij 1I I I I I ii II I j_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,! I !I !j I II IJJ;o. NutTlqe( ; ** .*.

ICVCSOOE010 1

Objecti~es

• I illiriite~ia!Requjr~d fgr EX:arril11ati0n.:' 11 TS Figure 3.1-2 Boric Acid Tank Contents

[9y;~sftor's§\Jf(::f ~ IFacilizy Exam Bank I lC19:s~i(>ri MBd,ifi~~t!gfi'f,vi~t~§~[ ,A Editorially Modified 1qHe~ti?n S();lr~e s~tfoll~rit.sl 1135342 replaced a distracted and slightly modified correct answer.

_J 1co1niTient *

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes J

[Question:ropiC.i I RO 68 I I£'

At what point will the NCO record in the Narrative log that MODE 6 - Refueling is entered when refueling the Rx JAW S1 .OP-10.ZZ-0009, Defueled to

• ng?

I I

~ When the Refueling SRO in containment, has established command and control in containment with communications with the Control Room.

I I

b. j When all "Requirements and Reviews for Core Alterations and Mode 6 Entry" have been completed and the SM has signed as completed.

I

6,! IWhen the first fuel assembly is lowered into the Rx vessel.

I fd.11 When the first fuel assembly arrives in containment.

I lt..11~~er 11 c I !Excl.01 Lever! IR 11.<;:~gnitly~ L.e.\fe1 l IMemory I jFacHit)': 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !e,~afl}~~t~H I 12/21/20151

~j 194001G136 I:2.1.36 i IRO Valµe:

I[Ifil :SRO Value: i @I] ~Sei::t101:1:1!~ r.RO

~ ., <-=.:. l ~: .- ..; .,

' Group:; LJ .**c . . *:

!SRO Group:i i~ : .. <- I LJ !!1'~

nWt'>l D

sy~Ni+liE:volution Titre .I 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' IGENERI I K:Astaiement:l . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . , .

... . IKnowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations.

I iExp!ar\atiorfotl 55.41.b(10) Refueling is the act of placing fuel assemblies into the Rx. Merely having a fuel assembly in containment doesn't

!P.nsv*ie~s: : ' ' j constitute refueling. The Requirements and Reviews is the Attachment 1 of the IOP, and while it is true that the SM signs it to authorize moving fuel, it is not the entry into Mode 6. While station of required personnel and verification of communication is L

It' required, it is not what defines the Mode change.

• .Ref.ererii:'etit1e' **

l~lo=e=fu=el=ed=t=o=R=ef=u=el=ing==============:::::::.lji~s=1.=o=P=-10=.=zz=-=00=0=9========~ll==l==========~l~l4=====lj19 I r~1=_=_=_=_=~~~~~~~~::===:::~:._=_=_=~~~~~~~::::~~:._=_=_=_=_=_=_=_==-~::=1_=_=~=: il-=_=~~:

Lo,Nu.mber'** .,v****

I I JOP009E004 1_ ____,

iQ~~~;pg~,~,*'~fC:~j*;j IFacility Exam Bank 119'.~*~S,~J;g:~;~<?'?.i.ficaii~h Method:

..----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-:-!

ij Editorially Modified I[9§~~ gliring'rraining ProgramJ D i,9u~~tlo~*s9y~~!f,,!J8lffe~e.~tS,:l j 11 s9so I

!-~~~~~---~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~-'

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RO. Sk.y.. sc. ra. pe***r* *.~~... SRO Skyscraper ~~ RO System/Evolution List i' SRO System/Evolution List !d Outline Changes ... I iOuestion.Topic'l ,_R_0_6_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,,

jWhich of the following describes how the control room(s) would be alerted to a problem with the Salem Fresh Water System? I

[] I An Auxiliary Typewriter alarm on BOTH units.

I

[lLl I An Auxiliary Typewriter alarm on Unit 1 ONLY.

I j

jc. I An OHA specific to Fresh Water system on BOTH units.

I fd.! I An OHA specific to Fresh Water system on Unit 1 ONLY.

I

, f.AiiS'wel'1 ~ [Ex~m t.E!vel j ~ ICogriitiv~TeV,e1 I !Memory I !f'..acjlfty: / j Salem 1 & 2 I 1Exampate:j j 121211201 s/

\KA:Jl 194001 G203 I 2.2.3  ! l~o va1UEEJI 3.s11sRpyalue:Jl3 g l tsectio5*:11 PWG ltFH:> Gfoup:/I 1 j lsRb Grfop:lj 1j I~~ D

[system/f:yoh.Jtion tltte I ll<A statement::

r---------------------------------------------,.

(multi-unit license) Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between units.

fE~planatiori ofi 55.41.b(4) OHA B-1 is present on BOTH units OHA system, although the equipment is located outside Unit 2, and the Unit 2

'Ah$1!Vefa: ' .;~* *: Secondary Operator is responsible for that equipment (fresh water, fire pumps, Salem Unit 3, House Heating Boiler)

r.

:;.*===*: ; .::;;..:;;;. ::;;. R::::e::;;f::;;;e::;;re:;;;n:;;;c::;;e:::;'T:.::it=Je:::;**:;;;:':::;"-:::;**:;;;'==***::;;*****:;;;**.:;:;j ;:f::;;.*:::;**=F:;;;ac::;;'i:; ;Ht;: ;y;: ;J: :;.e~: :;f: ; er:; ;e: :;'r:i: ; c:; ;e.:; ;N: :;u;: ;m: ; b:; ;e:; ;r': :;.='~I ;:::fR;;;:e::;;fe;::;j:::;e:::;ric:;;;e:::":;;;s:::;ec:::;t:;;;.lo:::;n:;;;:;;;:::::::;! l Page No. j IReyision!

IOverhead Annunciator Window B 1IS1 .OP-AR.ZZ-0002 I lj~5==~11~2=9=:::::!1 IOverhead Annunciator Window B II S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0002 I !j s I j 36 I l, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,ll 11_ _ _ _--'lj I :.==~

j_ __.I Objectives

[oqestfofi~ol!rc~: . 1 l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _......I i8Ye!;.ti9~/~oq~tt~,~Y6ri'.rJl~t~6?!ll !I 11 l.Jse~Ilur,ing trainiljg Pr()gra111. ! oI f9ue~tipn'~o~sc~p9~.in~.rts! I*~~~~~~~~~--~-~~~~~~~~~-~~~-~~~~--~~~~~-~

I I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes I

....-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--,

!UuestionTopic i RO 70  !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'

An Independent Verification (IV) of valve position is required in an area with a 75 mrem/hr dose rate .

.:; job, which of the following is the longest time allowed for the IV before "hands-on" verification may be waived?

nl5 .

a,, minu tes.

.*j*1 7 minutes.

ir-b .

lEJ 19 minutes.

I

[ } 111 minutes 11 tAnswerj IU !Exarnl..evell ~ JC::oglliti;;el.evel i jApplication I IF~#ilfty:! jsalem 1 &2 I IExamDate:l I 12121120151

§1194001G214 I12.2.14 ilROvatlle:1G2}tsR9va1ue:i[illlsedion:ll~ fROGroup:JLJisROGroup:ILJ iltl ~

[System/EvolutionTitle:.I  ! IGENERI

• Knowledqe of the process for controllino equipment configuration or status.

!EXplariatioii of!' 55.41.b(10) 10 mrem is the dose above which an IV is not required to be performed. A= 6.25 mrem. B=S.75 c=11.25 mrem

[Ailswers: '< .;* * !

- I Refererice'iitre \ *** /'I 1L , Fcicil ity Refer,ente f'/uinber ., * .* J jReferefic~ $f;!~tion * '

• 1!*PaM Nd.  : IRevi.sial1:

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1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____.!I =========::::.'I IIII Ii1l I I

IL.a. Nd~b~r ...*.*.*.. I Objectives IMJSCAP007

'--~ 11 D

i?uestJ,~ri S,:o~rc~~grn?TI~~t~J j 60955 changed dose rate which changes correct naswer to a previous distracter.

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper J RO System/Evolution List ..

SRO System/Evolution List *.~ Outline Changes I----------~-------""

~Question Topic I 1,_R_0_7_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,

Given the following conditions:

~m Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

- L 1 SW pump is C!T.

- 22, 25, and 26 SW pump are in service.

- Subsequently, 22 SW pump discharge strainer clogs, 22 SW pump is stopped, and 22 SW pump is declared inoperable.

- 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after being secured, maintenance discovers a crack in the strainer drum which will take 1 day to repair.

Of the following, which is the only method of tracking SW pump status which is NOT performed JAW OP-SA-108-115-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program?

Updating the is NOT required.

[a; i I Operational Status Board.

~ I Control Room Narrative Log.

Tech Spec Action Statement Status Board.

fd1 IT~ificgtiqn s+~+/-Aw:I01lJ;;QjQO.<..tluo:><O:l----------------------------------i-'

Lei l . Actjon

~

[A,n~werJ ~ iExainp~\feU fCJ !cognitive Level I j Memory I lfa4ilityt! j Salem 1 & 2 I lExampNe:j ,_ _ _1_2_12_1_12_0_15~1

~ 1194001 G223 112.2.23 1 IRO Value:'. f}JJ ~SROV(llu~: fifJ [S~! I~ [~bgroup:j LJ :SRO c;roup:i LJ 1 D isystem/Ev()lt!tiorj. 11tre i

---1 KA statement:!

~A-b-i-lit-y-to-tra_c_k_T_e_c_h_n-ic-al_S_p_e_c-ifi-ca-ti-.o-n-l-im-it-in_g_c_o_n_d-iti-o-ns_fo_r_o-pe_r_a-tio_n_s-.-------------------~

[E. . . .. Vo.

.a. ri.**o. f. . .*155.41.b(10) Initially, actions wil be attempted to clear the strainer clog, so it won't be readily apparent that the repair would take iAn'-' ** <:!rs: : * : longer than one shift. (Sect 5.2.4) When it becomes apparent that it will take longer than one shift, Section 5.2.5 will be

• * * * * * * , performed also. The Operational Staus Board is used during emergencies and is located in the control room area.

I

!);'"'* *r; / ' . . * *<* Ref~rence 'fitre -:,i*i , . :;c *.; * : *.

• FacllitY ~eferenc:eNumber. *** I!Referenc~ ~ectiori :j** :, I~~?] IRevisfanl I Operability Assessment and Equipment Control !l:.::o=P=-=S=A=-1=0=8=-1=1=5-=1=0=01====='i= = = = = = = = I :.:I==:::::::117 I I

'l 11;=======;1~====:!,11=1==11=1 ij ___________.1 1_ _ _ _ ___.l l__~l j_ ___,I

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Objectives I TECHSPE015 j_ ____,

[,8q~~M,nsou~C:k;;j l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.l la~~~it<:)~"M§~fti4~!iory ~~thOd; *. . 11 Ilused puring Tra@.n'ggrogr'am I D

[ot1e~tior.~cillrc~:sc:i~m,~§~S,l I I

!~--------------------------------------~

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I

RO SkyScraper f SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List J Outline Changes

• 1

[oiiestioriTopicl l.-R-0_7_2-----------------------------------------~!1

• -------------------------------------------~

Given the following conditions:

.1it 2 shutdown is in progress.

- A containment entry is required to inspect an INOPERABLE component on elevation 78' outside the bioshield.

- The Unit is being shutdown at 10% per hour.

Which of the following additional approvals is required to authorize a containment entry other than the SM/CRS under these conditions?

!a.j I Operations Director - Salem.

[b,J I Station Vice President - Salem.

I

[c.j Work Control Center (WCC) Supervisor.

systeffi!Ev61utfon *Titre 1 IGENERI I

• -------------------------------------~

KAStatemel1t:I Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handlinq responsibilities, access to locked hiqh-radiation areas, aliqninq filters, etc.

'~~rn~;J~~g?t I ~:::~dc~;~~i~~~~~~iri~o~!~~~~ a~~c~~~e~~~~a~m:~i8!;: p~~~~~s b~i~;~~~~~~~- ~0~~~~~~~~:~i~~i~~s~~~~~~ii~~ent is 1

Supervisor's approval is required. (Pre-req 2.4)

I

[ *; ,.. : , *

• Rerereqce Tit]e,::* .;;r * ** ' i :. u. Facim:Y'R.etererice Number,, Yi \Reference $e,ctioli ',,.;*I f'PageNd. j !Revision, ISALEM CONTAINMENT ENTRIES IN MODES ii SC.SA-ST.ZZ-0001 I 1 l 11 s

.====

I II I II iI I I II I lj 1 l I Objectives I RADCONE004 ra@~~1,<'fi~9~~c~:*.::j IFacility Exam Bank ,;J I lau~~t.i,9U.l'flcl,cJiflCationMethod,: Editorially Modified I llJ.~e:qptil"ipg)'rairifng'Prograrrr,j D

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/O,l.le,si~<?h~:O:~rc~<t,§.~m"~:~~§i 178014 added abbreviation to each title because its found that way in the procedure. I I

I I

. RO Skyscraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes tuuestipriTopic I IRo 73 I Which of the following Area Radiation Monitors (ARM) will cause a ventilation system alignment change when it reaches its High Radiation Alarm I I f 'lt?

~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~ I 2R44A, Containment High Range.

I ib.'i 2R32A. Fuel Handling Crane.

~ l 2R9, New Fuel Storage.

~I 2R52, Liquid PASS Room.

!'Answer.!~ !Exam Le\jeI i ~ !coghi~i"'.eLevel  ! j Memory l I !Facmty: 1 Salem 1 & 2 I JE:~aj'Hp~te: j I 12/21/20151

~11940018315 Ij2.3.15 jiROValue::[IB S~OValue~![Dlsectidn:lj~ ,RO G.r6up:l0iSRO_Groyp:'LJ ~5~ l_~g~~~;{-~d D

<systemtEy'c}1Jifon Jitfe I *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----

!GENER! I

• KA statelTlent: : .--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-..,

Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitorin!'.l equipment. etc.

lEx:planatlori'.of I 55.41.b(11) C is correct because it realigns FHB ventilation through the charcoal filters and starts both FHB Exhaust fans. Bis

'I fA.ri),;;',~'f'~':;: * *

• incorrect but plausible because its auto function is to prevent Fuel Crane motion except in downward direction. D is incorrect since it only has alarm light outside the PASS room which activates, but plausible because of the high radiation levels which would be 1 :~c~c~~~~~ ~~:~ ~~~~~~~h:,:r~sb~~~~nc1af~~o:~~; h~~aadc~~~1:~:*i: ;~~~~i~:e~~ 1s~~:~~~'~°a,~~i~~!i~0:u~c;~o~~~~~t.~s~f,:~~=~ble i Isystems (VCS and VC6 auto closure)

• I

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RO SkyScraper I

SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List j SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I LouestionTop!dl IRO 74 I I Given the following conditions:

- Jm Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

- '--' EOG is CIT for maintenance.

- A 500KV switchyard malfunction causes a loss of offsite power, and 1B and 1C EDGs do not load due to 1B and 1C 4KV vital buses locking out on Bus Differential.

Of the following, which one states a procedure entry and its correct flowpath allowed by the rules of procedure IAW OP-AA-101-111-1003 Use of Procedures?

ra:'j IEnter EOP-LOPA-1 directly and perform immediate actions, which states to trip the Rx then trip the Turbine.

I

!b:I L_j IEnter EOP-LOPA-1 directly and perform immediate actions, which states to trip the Rx and confirm the Rx trip, then trip the Turbine.

11 I

~ Enter EOP-TRIP-1 and perform immediate actions, which states to trip the Rx and confirm the Rx trip, trip the Turbine, initiate SI, then transition to EOP-LOPA-1 based on no vital buses energized. I

@JI Enter EOP-TRIP-1 and perform immediate actions, which states to trip the Rx and confirm the Rx trip, trip the Turbine, initiate SI ONLY if conditions warrant, then transition to EOP-LOPA-1 based on no vital buses energized. I fAns,,..,erl I~ [Exam Level 11 R I lcog~itive'i.:eve1* 11 Application  ! !Fa!=!'\!~/:. IISalem 1 & 2 I !Exam(!ate:; 11 12/21/20151

!KA,:j, 194001G401 112.4.1  !RO Vallie~ il 4.6j!sR.o yalue:ll 4.S I Secti()H:jj PWG HRo Gr6up;ij 1 j *sR6(3rdi.ip:ll 11 ~~~ D

,system/Evotution')*itre I iGENERI I

~-------------------------------------'

'KA statement:!

Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.

!EXpicinatJohof 55.41.b(10) Either TRIP-1 ot LOPA-1 can be entered upon a total loss of all AC power. If entered, the flowpath for TRIP-1 does not

[Ari.sWers: * * *

• reach the Si evalution step before the kickout to LOPA-1 on no 4kv vital buses energized, so both TRIP-1 distracters are incorrect.

LOPA-1 does not confirm the Rx trip (since there is no power to do anything about it anyways).

1

> ' *><:1:v Reference Jitle **!Hi! Facility Reference Number >I !R.eterence Section HP.age: No.*l [Re:vJ~fonl

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ILOPAOOE009 Objectives J I

1--~

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RO Skyscraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes fQuesUohtopicl IRO 75 I Given the following conditions:

- ..\lert has been declared at Salem, and all required notifications have been made by me Primary Communicator.

- Conditions degrade to the point where a Site Area Emergency is declared.

Which of the following identifies the PRIMARY method which the Primary Communicator will use to make notifications to the States of Delaware and New Jersey, and how long from the SAE declaration do they have to make those notifications IAW Attachment 6, Primary Communicator Log of the Salem ECG?

~I NETS phones within 15 minutes.

I

~I NETS phones within 60 minutes.

11

c;i / ESSX phones within 15 minutes.

I

~ I ESSX phones within 60 minutes.

I 12/21/20151

~I 194001 G429 !12.4.29 I IRo Value:*J [DJ is Ro Value: i8 'secti(>il;l I~ [Rb Grclup:; LJ is go <:;~()up:! LJ

~syst~Wi::votutiori Title I , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____, IGENERI .

KJ>. staternent: !

.. . .. . . ~,K_n_o_wl_e_d_g_e_o_f_th_e_e_m_e_r_g-en_c_y_p_la-n-.-----------------------------------------------------------------,.1 IE)<plan~tfon ()f I 55.41(10) Salem ECG, lists the communications systems in order of preference. The NETS (Nuclear Emergency

'Ji:n5;;.Je'i5:' \'ii Telecommunications System) is the primary closed circuit communication system for off-site notifications. The ESSX is also a I

1 closed circuit system, which is used as a backup for NETS. The notifications to the States must be made within 15 minutes of the I~=~~~aat:~~h~~:~ 1~~~~=~~~~::~:~:,~;i~,:~~~~s:~~~i~:;,::;_~r;~~~~'i1s8~li~~~dy in progress. The 60 minutes is plausible if the 1 ~ ~

I1

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!Primary Communicator Log 1

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I 11, _ _ _ _ _ _~1 1 ______ !1_~ ==::::::::.\=I lt.:te>,'Nu!Jlbef ** ,.

• 1 Objectives I GENISSE013 i :lvlater'latR.equiredtor. Ex:amir:iatiorl .*. 1 I

! l~l1~;~lC>!J~~,o~r~~;::,,;,J I. F~~ility ~~~: Ba~k I 19~~~#e>~friodificati()A;fyi'~thp~2*H: Direct From Source I!Oue7ti9~Sourc;e,,<::om!fie,,nt5! Used on Salem Sept 2011 NRC exam (3 exams ago)

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RO SkyScraper I .SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List

. .. r" I Outline Changes I

• oueslicihtopis:l sRo 1 I Given the following conditions:

iit 1 is performing a Rx startup lAW S1.0P-10.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load.

- Power is stable at 1x10-8 Amps for Low Power Physics Testing.

- A Shutdown Bank "A" rod drops fully into the core.

- The Rx does not trip.

Which of the following identifies:

1) How the CRS should proceed

2) Why rod withdraw! is not allowed?

I Direct the RO to ...

[]. 1) trip the Rx . I

2) A dropped rod recovery would constitute an approach to criticality.

fb.l 1) fully insert all Control Bank and Shutdown Bank rods.

2) A dropped rod recovery would constitute an approach to criticality.

'c;* 1) trip the Rx.

- 2) The depressed power distibution profile in the area around the dropped rod may cause power production in other parts of the core to rl exceed Tech Spec limits.

'd1 1) fully insert all Control Bank and Shutdown Bank rods. 'I

~

2) The d!pressed pow.er distibution profile in the area around the dropped rod may cause power production in other parts of the core to lt:;AVC:CU I C\....11 Vf-JC:\..o lllllll;'.::I.

I

'Answer j ~ :Exam Level! ~ ;cog11itive Level 11 Application J IFacHlty: i J Salem 1 & 2 I ,ExamD~te: j j 12/21/2015!

~I 0000038409 I 2.4.9 RO Value:: [Ifil iSR,O YalueL~:3J ;section: II~ !RO Group:: LJ !SRO Group:! LJ ~

System/Evolution Title I j_D_r_op'""'p_e_d_C_o_n_t_ro_l_R_o_d_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.. '---~

KA Statement::,,

j Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

r=-l .* .

. iation of l j 55.43.b(6,5) This question is. SRO leve! based on the knowledge of in'.ernal effects on core reactivity of a. drop~ed.rod while exa~tly

,An:::>wers: ,. ' cnt1cal, and the procedural d1rect1on to insert all rods based on becoming subcnt1cal. The bases for that insertion 1s that performing a dropped rod recovery when th eproblem has been fixed, which would normally be done at power, would NOT be done if the Rx I I

1:;',:'~~-su.~:~t~~~~ ~,:'~~u~e ~wi,t~drawing that rod would constitute an approach to criticality and is required to be performed lAW the

,1 I' Page No. I RevisiOn' I Referen,ce Title I< ** FaellitYFMerence Numbe,r *; ;geference Section j Dropped Rod II S1.0P-AB.ROD-0001 I ii 119 I

I  ! !I lj I I II I 11 I ll I LO. Nurnber . .  :*1 Objectives IABROD2E002

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List L SRO System/Evolution List J . O~Ui~e Cha~ges I

[Que~tior1Topfol ISRO 2 j Given the following conditions:

.1it 2 is operating at 100% power.

- 21 charging pump is in service.

- 22 and 23 charging pumps are operable.

- Subsequently, 21 charging pump trips due to a breaker malfunction.

- The CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 and places 23 charging pump in service.

Which of the following:

1) Identifies ALL the Tech Spec LCO(s) which will be entered

2) What the required action(s) is/are if 21 charging pump remains inoperable for the next 4 days?

The CRS will enter .....

~

1a *. 1 1) LCO 3.1.2.2.b for not having required boration flowpaths, LCO 3.1.2.4 for not having required charging pumps, and LCO 3.5.2.a for not having required ECCS subsystems available.

, 2) Be in Mode 3 and borated to a SOM equivalent to at least 1 % delta k/k within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> of pump trip.

'fJ 11) LCO 3.1 2.2.b foe oat h";og eeqo;rnd bocotioo flowp'th', LCO 3.124 foe oat h"'1og rnqo;rnd oh,cg;og pomp,, " ' LCO 3.5.2 ' foe oat having required ECCS subsystems available.

2) Be in Mode 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of pump trip.

[SJ 1) LCO 3.5.2.a ONLY for not having required ECCS subsystems available.

2) Be in Mode 3 and borated to a SOM equivalent to at least 1 % delta k/k within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> of pump trip;..,,

II

ct:j 1) LCO 3.5.2.a ONLY for not having required ECCS subsystems available.

2) Be in Mode 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of pump trip .

Answer, l.:!_J fa:am Leve.1 J ~ I

!Cognitive Level i Memory l \Facility: i J ISalem 1 & 2 I iExamDate: i ,___1_2_12_1_12_0_1_,51

~I 000022G222 1122.22 i iRO Value: i ~'SRO VallleL~z.J iSection: :I~ ,R() Group:I LJ ;SR() Group:j LJ 55'.431 !vl i 0,;&,L*i ~

[Syst~m/EvolutionTitle  ! ILoss of Reactor Coolant Makeup I :022

[!</' 8tatement: I . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. I Expfa.*-n-a-tio-. n-.-o~(.il 55.42.b(2) This question is SRO level based on NUREG-1021, ES401, Attachment 2, page 17, 11.B, 1st bullet for application of 1 rAnswers:

• i .* .

'I required actions.

Reference Title lnoperability of a single charging pump in Modes 1-3 only results in entry into the ECCS LCO. The 2 other LCOs

. would be entered upon inoperability of the second charging pump. The required action is to restore within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in Hot 1 Shutdown within next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The incorrect action in the distracters is for when 2 charging pumps are inoperable.

.,. * 'i Facility Reference Number IiReferen1ce ~ecF<),~' .. ' H Pag~ No.I iRevisionl 1

1 1

1

!s:a:le:m:T:e:ch::sp:e:cs:::::::::::::::::! I lj 3.5.2, 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 11 Ij I ll II II Ij I

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____.q II lj Ii l ILCl~ Num.ber Objectives I CVCSOOE010

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RO S~yScraper .. I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List J Outline Changes I 1ouesti611Jopic I ,-.-----------------------------------------------,.

l_s_R_o_3_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.

!r* <n the following conditions:

1

-_ _,nit 2 is in Mode 5.

Rx vessel level is 97.4'.

1* - 22 RHR loop is in service.

- RHR HX inlet temperature is 125°F.

- 21 RHR loop is available.

- 21,24, and 26 SW pumps are in service.

- 21 charging pump is in service.

- Subsequently, a complete loss of Service Water occurs.

Which of the following identifies a procedure the CRS will enter, and the FIRST action operators will perform in that procedure?

I

a,! S2.0P-AB.SW-0005, Loss of All Service Water. Start 23 charging pump. I b.: I S2.0P-AB.SW-0005, Loss of All Service Water. Stop 21 charging pump. .'.I

c. , S2.0P-AB.RHR-0002, Loss of RHR at Reduced Inventory. Start 21 RHR pump.

@,] IS2 .OP-AB .RHR-0002, LP% of RH R Red"oe<l I"°"'- Stop 22 RH R P"m p. 1 I Answer! I~ 1Exam Level I ~n iCognitive Level i IApplication i I iFacility: ! s:1em 1 & 2 I iExamDate: ; ,_ _ _1_2_12_1_12_0_1~51

~I 000025G120 \ 12.1.20 I iRO Value: II~ :SRO Valuej~ Section: 1 I~ iRO Group:\ LJ )SRQGroup:j LJ ~

System/EvolutionTitl~ j ILoss of Residual Heat Removal System KA Statement:!

'Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

1 F *,natrori of iI 55.43.b(S) This question is SRO level based on having to assess facility conditions, select the correct operating procedure, and 1i c'._ ers: dknow specific actions taken in that procedure. BOTH procedures may be entered, however, AB.SW-5 has a CAS that states if RHR

! is in service GO TO AB.RHR-1 or RHR-2 depending on RPV level. AB.SW-5 distracters are plausible because procedure states I______ _,l~'.~!i:~;c~~:~tni~ ~~:,fc~~~~~l:i~!;~ t!:~~~~*1 ~oe~i~~a~e ;~~;~=~~~ b~~~~~:~~1~1~~ 1!~~~~:di~~~,:iae;t~~~a\he 11 I condition; that ALL SI and charging pumps EX.CEPT one are required to be cleared and tagged with RCS temp< 312°F, and that Ithere will not be another charging pump to go to. 21 charging pump WILL be stopped, but not before letdown is isolated. AB.RHR

! checks a RHR pump in service, so starting a second RHR pump will not be performed. The in service RHR pump will be stopped to Ipreclude damage to the pump with RPV level <97.5' Ii.. r: . ' . : *.

• Referetu:e Title Facility Reference Number i; ,Reference Section * *.* l i Page No.* \Revision 0

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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,11-----~ll, _ _ _~ll  ! j_ __,I 1.::0. Number Objectives IABRHR1E004 i

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List ~ SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I ioueS:u~n Topic'.] IsRo 4 I l-" *-.n the following conditions:

- tlerators are responding to a 650 gpm tube rupture on 22 SG which occurred while operating at 100% power, lAW EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

- All off-site power was lost when the Main Generator breakers opened.

- The RCS was cooled down to Target Temperature, and then depressurized to stop primary-to-secondary leakage.

- Subsequently, off-site power is restored, and all 4KV Group Buses are now energized from off-site power.

- The crew is evaluating RCP re-start.

- RVLIS Upper Range indication is 98%.

Which of the following contains:

1) ONLY the criteria in addition to RCS Subcooling which are checked to determine if RCP re-start will be performed

2) How the re-start of the RCP be accomplished if allowed The crew will check ....  !

a,: 11) PZR level and the PZR saturated.

- 2) Start a RCP directly at SGTR-1 Step 49 based on RCP support conditions being desired but not required to start the RCP.

-b;.11) RVLIS Full Range indication and SG NR level.

I

~ 2) Start a RCP directly at SGTR-1 Step 49 based on RCP support conditions being desired but not required to start the RCP. I

• c;: 11) PZR level and the PZR saturated.

-~ 2) Start a RCP using S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation to ensure all support systems and P&Ls for starting a RCP are met.

@] I1) RVLIS Full Range indication and SG NR level.

2) Start a RCP using S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation to ensure all support systems and P&Ls for starting a RCP are 1met.

!1Answerl ~ j'ExamL~ve1l@=J !Cognitive Level I !Memory  ! [Facmty:l !salem 1 &2 I :E:xarnDa~e~l I 12121120151

~ 'l00038A217 J 1 EA2.17 ',RO Value:  :[I.~JlsRo Value~ 4.41 :section: j~ RO Group: !_~~SRO GrC>u1f LJ ~

S)--~m/Evolution Tltle j ISteam Generator Tube Rupture KA sfatement: ! Abilit to determine and interpret the followin as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Rupture:

RCP restart criteria Explanatlon or:i 55.43.b(5) This question meets SRO only criteria listed in NUREG-1021, ES-401, Attachment 2, 11.E. Figure 2, 1st bullet for 5th

,'Answers: 'II Block for assessment and implementation of a procedure or section of procedure, namely SO.RC-0001 vs direction strictly in the IiI I EOP. SGTR-1 does not contain a step which directly starts a RCP, rather it directs RCP start lAW SO.RCP-0001, which will require 1 I support conditions satisfied to start the RCP. There are other places in EOP network where RCPs are started without regard to i s11oort caodjtionsfl=RCC) \Nith R\/1 IS 1mner r:anae <10000 PZR le"el and sah 1rated capdjtjons jn PZR are re *

• 1 Isubcooling to start the RCP. ** - . * - I I* *.Reference Title*** ' I.

• Facility .Reference Number

• J [Reference Section .*.*< : [ pagE! NC>. I \Revision1 I'. Steam Generator Tube Rupture 112-EOP-SGTR-1 I 1 Flowchart 117  ! l\:::7===-

II11;.=:===================~==============!==========ilI

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i.=::==

LO.,f,Jumber *

• Objectives ISGTR01E009 I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution list I Outline Changes I

Question Topic I j SRO 5 I I

- unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

- 21, 24 and 26 SW pumps are in service.

- 21 and 22 SW header pressures are 108 psig.

- The following OHAs annunciate sequentially in this order:

- B-13, 21 SW HOR PRESS LO

- B-14, 22 SW HOR PRESS LO

- B-15, TURB AREA SW HOR PRESS LO.

- B-48, SW VLV RM FLOODED.

The standby SW pump starts automatically, and OHAs B-13, B-14, and B-15 clear.

l Which of the following describes where a SW leak could be located which would produce these alarms, and the procedurally directed actions which would mitiqate the event?

'a.j I On a CFCU supply piping in the 78' Mechanical Penetration Area. S2.0P-AB.SW-0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure, will direct isolating multiple CFCUs IAW Attachment 5 CFCU leaks, until header pressure stabilizes and sump pump runs stop. I I

,b.: Upstream of the 2ST901, TURB LO CLR ST RET VLV. S2.0P-AB.SW-0002, Loss of Service Water-Turbine Header, will direct operators to

- adjust 2ST901 TURB LO CLR ST RET V, and 2ST1 TG AREA SW PRESS CONT VLV, to compensate for the SW leak. l

c.

• 1On a CFCU supply piping in the 78' Mechanical Penetration Area. S2.0P-AB.SW-0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure, will direct 1

isolating a single CFCU which would be readily identifiable from the control room. I tJ IUpstream of the 2ST901, TURB LO CLR ST RET VLV. S2.0P-AB.SW-0002, Loss of Service Water-Turbine Header, will direct removing the 11vrarr1 1ururr1e 11urr1::;erv11.;e111 µreaf.>ri:iuur1 rur 1::;u1au11~ ure 11.:iA r1eauer.

iAnswer I ~ Exam Level j ~ I

!Cognitive Level ! Application I :Facility:! ISalem 1 & 2 J 'Exam Date: i j___1_2_12_1_12_0_1~5I gj 000062G445 1.2.4.45 RO Value: {IifisRO Value~~ Section: II~ RO Group:]LJ SROGroup:iLJ I~~ ~

iSystemfEvolution Title 1 ILoss of Nuclear Service Water I 062 r :KA'statement: '

Answers:

lrA-b-i-lit-y-to-p-rio-r-it-iz_e_a_n_d_i_n-te-rp_r_e_t-th_e_s-ig-n-ifi-1c_a_n_c_e_o_f_e_a_ch_a_n-nu_n_c-ia_t_o_ro_r_a_l-ar-m-.--------------------,

nation of 1155.43.b(S)Thi' q"ootioo 1

moo~ SRO ooly crtteci' li'ted io NUREG-1021, ES-401, Afu>chmeot 2, 11.E. Fig"rn 2, 1 'tb"llet foe 5th Block for assessment and implementation of a procedure or section of procedure in knowing where the leak could be (assessment), then correct procedure implementation and steps taken in the peocedure. The leak location could be in the TGA with I I the conditions in the stem except for the SW valve room flooding. Knowledge of where the SW valve room and what piping is there is oeeded ta anS\Mpr q11as.tion The 2£TQ01 lOlO!J(d r.o.c~ ....... "" nn ".:! Tr-ti. 1.......... i ".'In~ ,..4 ...... :-- ........ '""'in: nn l.o.".:11.r e:- .... l"n1 ii~ ,...~ re.o. ".:! * .i........... . r header pressures. If it did not operators would be directed to ake manual control of 2ST901 and 2ST1. If it is thought that the TGA header must be isolated to stop the leak, then removing the MT from service would have to occur. The multiple cFCU isolations directed in attachment 5 is for leaks of undetermined CFCUs in containment, and refers to containment sump pump runs and trying to isolate the leak by stopping a bunch of CFCUs. Step 3.11 states if a single component can be isolated, and it can, to isolate it.

1Additionally, the SW indication in control room would identify that a single CFCU is affected. The sump pump runs referred to are I containment sump pump runs, and are if the SW leak is in containment.

Reference Title :1 Facility Reference Number , 1 iReference Section  : i Page No. : !Revision:

I Loss of Service Water Header Pressure II S2.0P-AB.SW-0001 ll II 1116 I IOverhead Annunciators Window B I! S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0002 11 !181 1136 I I II II 11 II I LO. Number:

Objectives I ABSW01 E004 c'===:::::::.

!Matef,i?I ~equired tor EXamina\i(in;;J JI I 11 ia~est\~9::sg~[se;' j IFacility E;:::xa=m=B=a=n=k==:...'.l!=O=u=e=st=io=*n=**=M=o=d=ifi=1c=a:::::ti=o=n=M=e=t=ho=d=:=*: :.:~=S=ig=n=ifi=ca=n=tl=y=M=o=d=ifi=1e=d==l..::lu=s=e=d=D=u=r='in=g=T=.=ra=in=i=n=g='f>=r=o=g=ra=m=*:..i_D_ ,

iOw=:~I,iC!~;~~-Y[ceCS'Tffi~~~s! 1153928 used on Salem SRO NRC exam more than 2 exams ago. Modified to add actions required. 1 I I I I I I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List J. SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I fOuestion tC>piC:; l l_s_R_0_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.

1 G'"'"'n the following condition:

I L . Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms have been evacuated due to a toxic gas release on site.

When performing local actions to stabilize the plant:

1) Where will PZR level be determined

2) How will PZR level be controlled rCl

~ 11) At the Hot Shutdown Panel 213.

2) By ensuring the Charging System Master Flow Controller is controlling PZR level on program.  !

~ *11) At the Charging Pumps Flow and Pressure Panel 216-2.

2) By ensuring the Charging System Master Flow Controller is controlling PZR level on program.

I

,c.!,~1=)=A=t=th=e=H=o=t=S=h=ut=d=own===P=an=e=l=2=13=.=====================================================================::. ;1

~ 2) By establishing local control of the CV55 CHARGING FLOW CONTROL VLV to maintain PZR level 22%-77%.

d. l 11) At the Charging Pumps Flow and Pressure Panel 216-2.

-*~ 2) By establishing local control of the CV55 CHARGING FLOW CONTROL VLV to maintain PZR level 22%-77%.

1 I

Answer I ~ !Exam Level I~ 'cognitive Level

• iMemory I !Facility: 1lSalem1 & 2 I !Ex~111[)afe* !I 12/21/2015j,

~I 000068A207 I AA2.07  ! :RO ValuE::i@'sRo Valuej~ ;section: 1!~: ~o Group:! LJ SRO Group:][]

System/Evo!Utlon Title j !_c_o_n_tr_o_IR_oo_m_E_v_a_c_u_at_io_n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,l i068 I

1KA Statement:' Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Control Room Evacuation:

!PZR level IE~P,f;3riat[o~ of' I55.43.b(5) This question meets SRO only criteria listed in NURE~-1021 I ES-401 Attachm.ent 2, .11.E. Figure 2, 1st bullet for 5th I ij Answers:  : I Block for assessment and implementation of a procedure or section of procedure 1n knowing which procedure will be used to II..

I evacuate the control room, and how the RO will maintain PZR level, and where it will be indicated. AB.CR-1 contains field actions j which will be directed by the CRS. AB.CR-3 for toxic gas directs the control room evacuation to occur using AB.CR-1, but does not I t contain field actions foe estahlishina a/ant coatml

!level, manual field control is establlshed for positive plant control.

\A/bile th.p ~!l.as.i~allv he majntainina arleor 1ate PZR Reference Title  : ~. d Fadlity Reference Number : j !ReferenceSection

• i I Page NC>.' !Revision

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o:n:tr:o:I:R:o=o==m= :1

1. Control Room Habitability SC OP AB CR 0003 Ij 16 1

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LO.*~ur'nber I ABCR01 E003 Objectives

!'Mat~da[R~quired for Examination *: i I 1

• Ql!e~tiori S()ur:c~; ) j_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___,l LlO-"u-""e--'sLtiLoL . 11c.:.ML*****L*~_dLlfLi~L'a""!'i"'-o-"n_MLeLJ,;;c*~"'-o"'-dc::.*:. -"-*.,cJl*1! _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'! 'Used Dudn'g' Trainiri9 Prograrri .I LJ

,Oue~Uim sollr¢~:c;;orrimentsl I I

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rCe>rrfrnent ** * *. ;.. re**

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RO S~yS~raper I SRO Skyscraper .f __R_o_s_y_st_em_1_E_vo_1u_t_io_n_L_is_t..... __sR_o__sy_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_tio_n_L_i_st.-;i Outline Changes fQuesti()f1ToplC: i ISRO 7

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I1 I~'- "n the following conditions:

. .SBLOCA has occurred on Unit 2 outside containment.

- Actions of EOP-LOCA-6, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, have failed to isolate the break.

- RCS pressure is 1440 psig and continues to lower.

Which of the following identifies the procedure that will be used upon transition from EOP-LOCA-6 and the actions that will be directed in that procedure after the transition?

(a'.J IEOP-LOCA-1. Add makeup to RWST, initiate a cooldown, and minimize injection flow.

I

~I EOP-LOCA-5. Add makeup to RWST, initiate a cooldown, and minimize injection flow.

11

c."! IEOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant. Check for subsequent failure and conserve makeup inventory.

11

[]I EOP-LOCA-5, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. Check for subsequent failure and conserve makeup inventory. I

_Answer I ~ [Exam Level I @=]" !cognitive Leyel ! j Application I ~ ISalem 1 & 2 I !E:xamDate:j I 12121 /20151.

~I OOWE04A201 _ 'EA2.1 J :Ro Value: l[I+/-i !SRClValuej~ [Section: : I~ 'Rd Gn:mp:: LJ !SRO Group:i LJ ~ii:~ ~

System/Evolution Tjtle j j LOCA Outside Containment  ! '-IE_0_4_~

KA Statement: I Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to LOCA Outside Containment:

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures durinq abnormal and emergencv operations. I Explanation of! 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on having to assess facility conditions, select the correct operating procedure, and

1

'Ariswers: ,* know specific actions taken in that procedure. B is correct, because an unisolable break will transition out to LOCA-5. LOCA-1 is incorrect because it would be the appropriate transition if the break were isolated. 43.5 because the SRO is required to understand the actions of the LOCA-6 procedure to identify the appropriate procedure to transition to when it is complete, and actions I

,.oeriar:med 1a tbat orocedru:e I

' Reference Title Fadiity Reference Nurnber I,Reference Section I[.Page No. : !Revision[

ILOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCU 112-EOP-LOCA-5 II !I 1125 I I l

~!IL=O=C=A=O=u=t=s1=de==C=on=t=a1=nm==en=t=============!l2EOPLOCA6 ii I I 1~2=1==~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~___,11~~~~~~~~~~~--'1~~~~~~~--' ~~~. . . !~~--'

.,LO. Number I LOCA06E008 Objectives I M<t~erlal Requiredfor.~~aminatio'n,) 11 I

[Question Source: 1IPrevious2 NRC Exams I.Question Modification Method:**' Direct From Source I I\used ouring'Training Program 'l o j

aue~tron s<?urc~c9ajme'nts/ 113-01 NRC SRO exam (Dec. 2014) l icommerlt

• I I I i I

RO Skyscraper I ...

SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List* i Outline Changes I..

i<luestlon Topic I ISRO 8

(" 'ri the following conditions:

- _,nit 1 has experienced a Main Steam line Break (MSLB) inside containment from 100% power.

- Main Steam Line Isolation has failed to close any MS167.

- Safety Injection was manually initiated, with all components operating as expected.

- 11 AFP is CIT.

- 12 and 13 AF P's tripped after starting.

- Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1100 psig.

- All Reactor Coolant Pumps have been tripped.

- Containment pressure is 16 psig and rising.

- All Wide Range (WR) Steam Generator (SG) levels are 35% and dropping. I

- All Steam Generator pressures are 465 psig and dropping.

- Reactor Coolant System Tc's have dropped from 540 to 438°F in 40 minutes.

If these condition were present when transitioning out of 1-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip Response, which procedure must be entered and what action lI must be taken upon that transition? I

a. j 11-EOP-FRTS-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions. Reset Safeguards Actuation and restore normal charging and I letdown.

~ 11-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Initiate feed and bleed ONLY when 3/4 SG WR levels have dropped <32%.

I

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[c.,; I 1-EOP-FRTS-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Cond1t1ons. Shut all MS10's and steam dump valves. ,,

ct.I 1-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Initiate feed and bleed immediately.

Answdr 1 @=] !Exam Level I @=]" 'Cognitive Level** 1 j Application I !Facility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !ExamD~te: j j___1_2_12_1_12_0_1_.5I

~I OOWE05A202 I!EA2.2 1 IRO '\/ah.ie:l[Jli SRO Vall1e1~ !Section: 1j~ tRO Group:jLJ!SRO Gro'up:[LJ ~

isystem/Evoluti6t1Title'I ILoss of Secondary Heat Sink if j

'atement:I Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink:

IAdherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

bas~d II *AilsWers: I

[.Exp.la***n.ation . o. . f.!155.43(5) 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level on having to asses_ the conditions given in sten: _and determine both what I procedure will be entered and the act1on(s) required in that procedure. D 1s correct because the cond1t1ons given 1n stem would transition to FRHS-1 due to a RED path of no AFW flow and <9% NR level The Bleed and Feed initiation criteria are when S/G 11 WR levels are <36%(adverse), NOT 32% (normal) as in distracter B. Distracters A & C are incorrect because it is a lower priority

• RFD path tho119h ifs action is correct for the proced11rp II

' Reference Title" I

. Facility Reference Number*.*  ! 'keterence:sectrdrl .*

• I[,Page No., 'Revision* I I Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink ii 1-EOP-FRHS-1 l 11 1121 I I Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Sh 111-EOP-FRTS-1 I II !122 I I I' Critical Safety Function Status Trees II 1 1-EOP-CFST-1 I ii 1122 I

!Lo-:Norriber Objectives I FRHSOOE005 I FRHSOOE013

i,~~~),\~,!;!~~9~,~i~~~l l_F_a_c_il_ity"-E_x_a_m_B_a_n_k___.l ~~j;~1(e~~~gW!!£J!iei~~~~g~[fi{~I Direct From Source i~~~iilI~!q~;[i:fil~~rt'~sl 143189, Used on Salem SRO NRG exam more than 2 exams ago.

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ROSkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper J __ u...st-..;i R_o_s_y_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_ti_on__ SRO System/Evolution List J Outline Changes jauestioh Topic i SRO 9

• ~-------------------------------------~~--------'

Gi" 0 n the following conditions:

- dt 2 is responding to a degraded core cooling condition in accordance with 2-EOP-FRCC-2, "Response to Degraded Core Cooling."

I

- After depressurizing to inject the accumulators, the STA reports a RED priority on the Thermal Shock Status Tree, and recommends transitioning to 2-EOP-FRTS-1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock."

I Which actions describe the operator response?

[) I Do NOT implement 2-EOP-FRTS-1 until 2-EOP-FRCC-2 is completed because thermal shock is a lower priority CFST.

[b:J I Implement 2~EOP-FRTS-1 immediately because the potential damage done to the RPV by delaying entry into FRTS after entry conditions are met may be irreparable.

[c. I Do NOT implement 2-EOP-FRTS-1 until 2-EOP-FRCC-2 is completed because while in FRTS the core will continue to boil away injected accumulator water, and could lead to a RED path for CC.

I id. I I Implement 2-EOP-FRTS-1 immediately because it is a higher priority CFST and rules of usage stipulate the transition to a higher priority I!Answer I

, procedure always takes precedence over notes and cautions.

l.::_j !Exam Level! IS i ;cognitive Level i j Memory I 1Facility:

' f ISalem 1 & 2 ! IExamDa.te: ! [ 12/21/2015!1 l

• ~~=====:::::::====~==~~====~==~~:::::::::====~~~::::=~~~~-

~I OOWE06G423 112.4.23 I'Ro Value: iO]" rSRO Value}~ ,SeCtion: 11~ RO Group: LJ 'SRO Group:l !-3.l ~§:~; ~

isysternlEvolution Title : l_D_e..;:;g_ra_d_e_d_C_o_r_e_C_o_o_li_n;;;:.g_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,._E_0_6_ _

!KA statement: i Knowled e of the bases for prioritizing emergenc procedure implementation durin emergency operations.

'!EXpfanatfon of: 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in EOP that involve transition

'Answers: *; points to event specific emergency contingency procedures. Knowledge of the bases for when NOT to implement a RED priority CFST even when indications are present is just as importanct as knowing when to implement, in this case to preserve and inventory 1in the reactor pressure vessel. Stopping the depressurization to go to FRTS would cause the cooldown to be stopped, and a i thermal soak to he neriormed The care \Atil! contin11e to bojl a\i\!f!\l joiected acc11m.J..J.La+/-.a.r:.ater and heoin to  ! IOCQ)l8C once aoain

!Eventually, CETs and/or RVLIS level values could exist which would require transition to FRCC-1 via -a RED path CFST. The I stop ing of the cooldown could lead to a de raded core cooling condition to deteriorate to an inadequate core cooling condition.

Reference Title*.* I'

• Facility Reference Number *I Reference Section l

• * *Page No. i !Revisioni r==========================~==================

~IR=e=s=p=o=n=se==to=D=e=g=r=ad=e=d=C==or=e=C=o=o=li=ng========~l-~!2=-=E=O=P=-F=R=C==C=-2============:::::: j j21

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_ _ _ _ _ _ ___,q I 1 I~I_=== ___.

!Lo. Nurnber I FRCCOOE006

Matel-ial Required for Exfilnination<i II 1j Queistl-0.1"1 Sourc~.; I

\ Facility Exam Bank I \Oue~tlo~;~odiflcation Meth,()cr: ***.***~Direct From Source I .used During Training Prc)'gfaJTi\I DI

auestion source Comments 159315 II

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. RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List _ .. ?.utiine Changes . j I

!~~~~~~~-~~~.~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~*

II 1-j- .:;alem Unit 2 tripped from 100% when a loss of off-site power occurred.

All systems respond as expected, and operators progress normally through the EOP's .

. _ It has been determined a rapid natural circulation cooldown will be performed.

Which of the following describes procedures/actions which are REQUIRED to be performed PRIOR to transitioning to either 2-EOP-TRIP-5, Natural I1Circulation Rapid Cooldown Without RVLIS, or 2-EOP-TRIP-6, Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown With RVLIS, and the bases for them?

• a;! 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Rx Trip Response, must be performed to ensure adequate SOM and natural circulation have been established, containment

~ I cooling remains in service, and equipment not needed for the cooldown has been secured.

,b.' 2-EOP-TRIP-4, Natural Circulation Cooldown, must be performed to ensure adequate SOM and upper head cooling have been established,

~**~ SI signals have been blocked, and initial cooldown/depressurization have been performed.

c. ! j 2-EOP-TRIP-4, SI Initiation Criteria step must be performed to ensure SI will not be required prior to blocking SI before a cooldown can be

- Iinitiated.

ill 2-_EOP-TRIP-2, SI Initiation Criteria step must be performed to ensure SI will not be required prior to blocking SI before a cooldown can be  !

rnitrated. j i !Answer [ ~ Exam Level: ~ !Cognitive Level i j Memory I iFacility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I IExamDate: !I 12/21/2015! !

!KA:I !OOWE10A202 I 'EA2.2 1 RO Value: I~ SRO Value[J]" Section: 11~ .RO Group:![]lsgo Group:ILJ ~~1~~ YI KA Statement: l IAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS: I Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facili 's license and amendments. I ii E}(plcinationof 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on having to asses the conditions given in stem and determine both what procedure  !

Answers:. ii must have been performed and the bases behind that performance. Both TRIP-5 and TRIP-6 contain a caution at Step 1 which says 1 I- I that TRIP-4 must be completed steps 3-17 prior to entering TRIP-5 or 6. Also, the reson is correct in the bases. TRIP-2 must be I I Ii~~g~~~~_:~~:~c~/~~1 ~1a~~~~~~~ndm:~~ c~gli~~~e~a (other than CAS), other reasons are correct. !I

!l Natura!Circulati:ne:~::c::~~::wn with. RVLI S : I* 2 -~~ap~~~::ference Number *,.*_* 1i=:R=e=fe=r=e=n=c=e=S=e=c=ti=o=n==', Page No. I ::vision i I II Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown without RVLI! 2-EOP-TRIP-5 Ii 1 Ji===== ,~2=3===-

11 11 _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.l======:!,11 ,_ ____,

I jL.o. Number TRP004E005

_Objec~ives_ I I;:~:i:nR::::~,:~;:::n::: ;:~;  :======'..::IO=.*=u=e.s::'.:t=fo=n=****=M=o=d=if=ic=a='t=io=n=M=et=h=o=d=;='*=*.* D:..:i:..:re:..:c:..:t:..:F:..:ro:..:m=S:..:o:..:u:..:rc:..:e==::..I='U=s=e=d=D=u=r=in:g=*:T:ra=i:n:in=g=P=r=o=g=ra=m=*

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l_D__,.I Qllest10!1soLu'c:ecommentsj j 153335 *I I!

1~1========================================

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1- - - -

• RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I. Outline Changes ictuEistion"fopic  ! ISRO 11 I

('" ~n the following conditions:

~11it 2 is operating at 75% power.

21 Waste Holdup Tank (WHUT) is being processed via the Portable Liquid Radwaste I

Processing System.

- Console alarm SURGE TANK LEVEL HI-LO for the CC system alarms.

- Surge tank levels are 59.3% and 59.2% on Channels A and B, and rising slowly.

- No other alarms are present.

Which of the following describes the effect if Surge Tank Level were to continue to rise, and what action the control room will take in response to the rising level?

[] I 2CC149 CC SURGE TANK VENT VLV will auto close to prevent overflow. Stop processing 21 WHUT as directed in the S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0011, Control Console 2CC1. 11 I

~ Overflow of the Surge Tank will contaminate the Waste Holdup System with chromates. Close 2CC149 CC SURGE TANK VENT VLV from 2CC2 as directed in the S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0011, Control Console 2CC1. I ic. ! I 2CC149 CC SURGE TANK VENT VLV will auto close to prevent overflow. Open the CC Surge Tank Drain Valve from 2CC1 as necessary to maintain Surge Tank Level <100% as directed in S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality.

11 rdl I Overflow of the Surge Tank will contaminate the Waste Holdup System with chromates. Direct a NEO to locally drain the Surge Tank to 55 gallon drum as necessary to maintain Surge Tank Level <100% as directed in S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality. I!

!Ansi,\fer i Id  ! 1 Exam Level I js I !Cognitive Level* .! IApplication I ;Facility,:'! ISalem 1 & 2 I i'E~amDate: l I 12/21/2015J

KA:!!l 008000A202

~-~*

I iA2.02 I:Ro \Ja;h.ie: il 3.21:sRO\/aluel~ 1 Secti61l: II~ [RO Group:J! 11-S.RQGroup:il 1I ~~~l~ lY'J

[System/Evoll.ltiOn Titre  ! IComponent Cooling Water System I _o_0_8_ _

iKAStatement: 11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use l procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

High/low surge tank level

.Expf~t_1*_,atfo_._"_n_*_of j 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on having _to asses t~e conditions given in stem and determine which action i~ which I'! *ers: ... I i procedure will be taken. The 2CC149 auto closes on h1 rad1at1on 1n the CCW systen, nnot high pressure, to prevent rad1at1on release from the CCW system. The Surge Tank will be locally drained. The overflow from the tank will go to the Waste Holdup j ~:!t!~kai~da~~n~~:~:~ehthe WHUT. WHUT processing will be stopped in both the AB.CC and ARP procedures. Locally draining I

<' Reference Title  : ! F,acility Reference Number

• i fReferehce Section *.*

• ii Page NO.j IJ~evis!Onl r==========================~~====~===========:;;;.

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I:.:C=o=n::tr::o::IC=o=n=s=o=le=2=C=C=1=========::::,1 IS2.0P-AR.ZZ-0011 li.=6=0====

\ !_2_05_3_3_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,lj 205331 Sheet 1 !_54_~

i).~::9~'.~_N.uhl.t?ef *, '. * ".:=l I CCWOOOE008 Objectives il\'lateriar R.ecfuifed,~orf:#minauoh *** 'l l 1a~~stion S?urc~:>1 I Facility Exam Bank I r*q~~st~o,n.M'.2~,ificati9n rw1,ethod:.i :1 Concept Used j jusedb~ring Tr?i~(iig'Program  ! DI lOlie~tio,n ~,o,yice c~inmenlsi 182785 modified to make SRO level and fit KA.

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, .Question Topic l _S_R_0_1_2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ll 11 'n the following conditions: 11

- unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

11 - 2PR1 fails open and remains open.

II Which of the following identifies how this affects the PZR Master Pressure Controller (MPC) response, and what consequences, if any, are Iassociated with the actions performed by the crew IAW S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001. Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction?

a.: j MPC output will RISE. A unit shutdown will be required if 2PR1 cannot be restored to operable status.

l

~I MPC output will LOWER. A unit shutdown will be required if 2PR1 cannot be restored to operable status.

-1 I

'c, 1 MPC output will RISE. The unit may continue to operate indefinitely after the initial mitigative actions are completed.

I

d. i IMPC output will LOWER. The unit may continue to operate indefinitely after the initial mitigative actions are completed.

I 12/21120151 I

KA Statement:! Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Pressurizer Pressure Control System and (b) based on those predictions.

~*u_s_e~p_r_o_c_ed_u_r_e_s_to~co_r_re_c_t.~c_o_n_tr_o~l._o_r_m_it-'i~a_te~th_e_c_o_n_s_e~qu_e_n_c_e_s_o_f_th_o_s_e_a_b_n_o_rm_a_l_o~p_e_ra_t_io_n_:_ _ _~--------~*

l PORV failures I II Explanation of vers:

1! 55.43(2)

Imalfunctions.

This question is SRO level because of the Tech Spec knowledge required, and what actions TS directs for different PORV Add1t1onally, while the question doesn't specifically ask what procedure to use (too easy for AB.PZR). 1t does require

• knowledge of the actions IN that procedure The MPC raises output when actual pressure rises. and lowers as actual pressure I lowers. As pressure lowers due to the open PORV, the output will lower to turn on heaters and close spray valves. When the PORV

_ _ _ _ _ __.l"""B"'lo_..c_,,k""""1a.,_h.,..1e._.,,is_,,sb1 it to isolate the..E.QRlLi..o...A..ELR Iech SneC-3.....4 5 action b if tbe POR\/ is oat n::istoreruMitbin 72 ba1 irs shl~L1 l is required. A PORV isolation that DOESN'T require shutdown if not fixed is a leaking PORV. which is isolated by its Block Valve I l

. with power maintained to the Block valve. I Reference Title Facility Reference Number.

• i .Reference Section

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j PZR Pressure and Level Control LP 11 NOS05PZRP&L j 1O t~1 s=a::::le::::m:::::::T=e=ch==S=p=ecs::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::==::::::.ll~~~~~~~~~~~--' ~~~~~~~~ ~~~_. ~j======-

I I

L.O.Number ABPZR1 E002 Objectives J

I PZRP&LE010 I I I 'Material. Required.tor Exarnination *... \ I I!Qw~stio~ I Source:... J Facility Exam Bank j *ouestionModificatio,n Method.: j Direct From Source I'Used During Training Program I CI louestfon SourceCommellts! 1125725 used on Salem SRO NRC exam more than 2 exams ago i I

l ;*comment ****

1 _ 1_ _

RO System/Evolution List .* I __ SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I ~n the following conditions:

- ~11it 2 is conducting a rapid plant shutdown due to a loss of condenser vacuum.

I

- Two IRPls in control bank D go dark, and their P-250 readings are 0 steps.

- Maintenance Controls Dept. will be unable to repair the IRP ls until after shutdown.

- Rx Engineering has made no specific recommendations outside of procedural direction regarding boration.

Which action is required when the plant is placed in Hot Standby?

!a:) I Borate to Cold Shutdown SOM to prevent a Yellow Path on FRSM from occurring during the shutdown.

,b'. JI Borate an additional 540 ppm to prevent a Yellow Path on FRSM from occurring during the shutdown.

!c.; IBorate an additional 540 ppm since it is assumed that the reactivity associated with the affected rods is unavailable for shutdown. ,

~I:.========================================================::::::::.

~I Borate to Cold Shutdown SDM since it is assumed that the reactivity associated with the affected rods is unavailable for shutdown. Ii1 I :Answer I ~ !Exam Level j ~ !Cognitive Level i j Application I I fFacility: 1 Salem 1 & 2 I ;Exam Date: j j 12/21/2015! I

~I 014000A202 i IA2.02 I iRO,Value: !122.J !SRCJValueL~~ isectioll: 1I~ [~Cl-Group:! LJ *sRo. Group:' [JJ 1>>r:.i.f!i

Ell ~

~

iSystern!Evolution Title : I Rod Position Indication System I 014 KA Statement:' Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Rod Position Indication System and (b) based on those predictions, use 1 procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

, Loss of power to the RPIS

• _*Expla_tf~--.*t. lo_ n o_*_f_} 55.43.b(6,5) This question is _SRO lev_el based _on having to detemiine_ the effect on core reactivity based on the 2 control rods which  !

J> *ers: ._  : : have to be assumed to remain fully withdrawn 1n the absence of IRPI 1nd1cat1on. Add1t1onally, the sRO must select the portion of II,

• .1AB.ROD-4 (CAS action 2.0) which requires an additional 270 ppm boration for each failed IRPI if a shutdown is performed before I

I!

the !RPI is declared op_erable. Bo ration to col_d shutdown _conditions is not requi_red for a shutdown to_ h_ot standby. It assumes the

' , ..... . ~

Ii:- < >". c --,.-.* . ** Reference Title I ; *... Facility Refere11ce Number_ *. :i Reference s~ction Ii*-R=o=d=P=**=os=it=i~=n=l=n=di=ca=t=io=-~=F=a=i=lu=re=*======lj S2.0P-AB. ROD-0004 r 'li==================~===========-

l1

~=========================11~*===================~==============-!.=:====

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}'.'.,o: Number * ** *,!

Objectives i ABROD4E002 l(l~7~ti9n So1.(rce: J jFacility Exam Bank I i(luestion,Mo~m¢ation¥ethod:* >il __________;I :used During Training Progralll 'I D lauest,i~ ,....1_4_o_s_2_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _....,.l 1 11

• sourc~.c()fri{l:t~n~sl rcomment l * *.

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List ( SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

auestiol"l;ropicJ !SRO 14 I Ir *11 the following conditions:

- unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

- Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument (IRNI) Channel I (2N35) failed yesterday.

- The CRS entered TSAS 3.3.1.1, action 3, and the crew removed the channel from service IAW S2.0P-SO.RPS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Trip I Restoration.

- Subsequently, the RO reports IRNI Channel II (2N36) just started indicating erratically, oscillating between 1x10-11 amps and 1x10-5 amps.

- The reactor remains at power.

The CRS shall. ..

Q

a*i Enter S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction. Remove IRNI Channel 2N36 from service. Power operation may continue with no restrictions. I

~

~

Enter S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction. Remove IRNI Channel 2N36 from service. Initiate actions within one hour to I place the unit in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. J

,c.: Direct the RO to trip the reactor based on an ATWT. BOTH Source Range Nuclear Instrument Channels must be manually energized in EOP-

~

TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response. if the Rx trip is successful, or 2-EOP-FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation, if the reactor does not trip.

I

d. ! Direct. the RO to trip the reactor based on an ATWT. ONLY Source Range Nuclear lnstr~mentation Channel II (2N.32.) will automatically ___

1"""1'"-"'* '-'"'"-a'"'" \"-'""'I '"u;ocuc "'aoouauy """1'"-"'U "' L..vr-"r-.:., ""'ac,cv* I 1 ltJ * ,V.'.:>tJVI l.'.:>C::, II LI IC n.A ll q...1 I;:) ;:>UVVCJ;:).'.:>lUI, VI £.-1-vr -

FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation, if the reactor does not trip.

Answer I ~ !Exam Level i' ~ [Cognitive Level. 11 Application I ;Facility: 11 Salem 1&2 I IExamDate: j !___1_2_12_1_12_0_1_.51

~1015000G107 1!2.1.7 llROValue:l~;SROValueL.~:IJSection:!I~ ROGroup:'[}j:sROGroup:(LJ !f'j~j ~

'system/Evolution Title! INuclear Instrumentation System l !015 Statement*..i

'KA I Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

rxplanation of 55.43.b(5) Thi' qo,,boo SRO l"el b"ed oo h3'iog lo '"e' ti" oonditiooo gi° in olem ond dete,mine bolh wh*I prnoodo~

II I 1

Answers:  ! will be entered and the action(s) required in that procedure, as well as the TSAS which is applicable and actions required. Loss of a

---

~ single !RN! channel is specifically excluded from entry into LCO 3.0.3 even though the minimum operable channel requiremnt is 2.

Loss of the second channel would require entry into TS 3.0.3, which requires actions initiated within one hour to place unit in Hot lC'+,.. .......a.._, ii-i n'"'""" ~ hn ire: n .......... :10.r! ,..., ,1,......-lrt.o ic: ' tn +h,...+

other channel going below 7x10-11 Amps would automatically energize Source Range Ni's if not for the fact that *the P-1 O interlock prevent Source Range instruments from enerqizinq >10% power.

' LL "r">'"'- IDt-..11 .-.h  : .... .Lt- +ri- ...1 ' ' - .LL..

I: * *: * * ** ** . Reference Titl.e .* **. I'11 Facility Reference Number  ! [Reference Section i I Page No. 1 .Revision1 11 Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction 11 S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001 ii !I 117 I I Nuclear Instrumentation Lesson Plan 11 NOS05EXCORE-09 II 11 119 I I Salem Tech Specs II 113.3.1.1 I! 11 I iL.O. Number Objectives IABNIS1E003 I EXCOREEOO?

j_ ___,

!llllaterial Required for Examination 1 I lj jou~~;tio~Sj)i:frcii:'ij l_N_e_w_______,I [Q~estion ~()c:li.fis.;a,tic.>r1.~et~od: A, ________~l lOsecfouringTrai11ing p~ogram I 0 1 1uuesiio~:'.~0W{ce¢?\TIP1~~i~[ I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

!Question Topic j SRO 15 I I I -"" ---

c;urruruur,., .

- ...init 2 is operating at 100% power.

- At 1200 on December 5th, 21 CFCU was CIT for an emergent electrical repair window.

- A very small SW leak is noticed by a NEO on his rounds on the 21 SW52, 23 CFCU SW INLET Vandis isolated by closing the 21SW52 at 1200 on December 7th.

After the 21SW52 is shut and the leak isolated, which of the following describes 21 -23 CFCU operability, and the required actions if 21-23 CFCUs remain in their current status?

ia.: 121 and 23 CFCUs ONLY are inoperable. Restore BOTH inoperable CFCUs to operable status by 1200 on December 12th or be in Hot

'---' Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I

'b'.* 121 and 23 CFCUs ONLY are inoperable. Restore EITHER inoperable CFCU to operable status by 1200 on December 14th or be in Hot

~ Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I

[SJ 121, 22, and 23 CFCUs are inoperable. Restore at least ONE of the inoperable CFCUs to operable status by 1300 on December 7th or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I

'd.121, 22, and 23 CFCUs are inoperable. Restore at least TWO of the inoperable CFCUs to operable status by 1300 on December 7th or be in I*  ! Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I Answer* a I I iExam Level IS I !cognitive Level : j Application I !Facility;

• 1Salem 1 & 2 I iExamDate: 11 12/21/20151

• KA:JI 022000G242 I 2.2.42 l:ROValue:Jj 3.9j SROValueL+/-~JSection:ll~ ROGroup:fl 11,SROGroup:ll 1j ~~;~~; D System/Evolution Title I IContainment Cooling System ,022

'KA Statement*'

I Abilitv to recognize indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.

!Explanation of I This is not considered solely RO Tech Spec knowledge based on the ability to determine CFCU status based on SW header

~nswers:

• availability. SO.SW-5, Attachment 2, page 34 of 35 states "Enter the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 if during Modes 1, 2, or 3, Containment Fan Coil Unit #23 is isolated from either SW supply header, i.e. if the manual header cross-connect supply valve 21 SW52 OR 22SW52 for one SW header is CLOSED. Additionally, knowledge of where the SW isolation valve is cbi1s.ical!i1 loca!ed in !be s.1100!11 In tbe CECI Is. lMill be 11S?d In de!e1:mioe if 22 CECI I is. al-- ;_ ..h;-h ;t k __ , " - * +h;_ - - - - I I;,.,,ith one .ot two CFCU's ino*p-erable, BOTH CFCUs must be restored to operable within 7 days.of the FIRST CFCU being declared -

I inoperable, not from when the 2nd CFCU becomes inoperable. The 3 CFCU distracters are plausible if it is thought 22 CFCU loses

_its SW supply.

I I Reference Title Facility Reference Number .

I:Reference Section L

, :' Page No. I . Revision' IService Water System Operation I 1 S2.0P-SO.SW-0005 II 11130 1141 I ISalem Tech Specs Ii lj 3.6.3 ll 11 I Ii No. 2 Unit Service Water Nuclear Area 11205342 II Sheet 6 11 l I7o I

'LO. Number Objectives I CONTMTE009

'Material Required for Examination I ISRO 15 205342 Sheet 6 JI Question Source: : New

~

I I'Question Modification Method: II I iUsed During Training Program II D

,Question Source Comments I I

!Corr .. ""< I I I

~

I I

RO SkyScr.a. p. ... ~

er.. *d******* SRO Skyscrape..r.....1.

_ RO System/Evolution List

• 1;_ SRO System/Evolution List

• 1 Outline. Changes ..I lauestionJ9pif*i 1_s_R_o_1_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.

I' 1 the following conditions:

- unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a catastrophic failure of 12 SG steam piping occurred inside containment.

- The Rx tripped and SI was initiated.

- 12 SG rapidly blew down to containment pressure, and containment pressure peaked at 16 psig prior to transition out of EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant.

- Operators have just transitioned out of LOSC-1 to EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant, with the following conditions:

- RCS pressure is 1780 psig and rising slowly.

- RCS subcooling is 100°F.

- PZR level is 22% and stable.

- 11, 13, and 14 SG levels are 17% and rising slowly.

Which of the following describes containment spray operation during subsequent EOP performance?

Containment Spray will be secured in ......

~ lin LOCA-2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, when containment pressure is< 4 psig. Containment Spray Additive Tank will be isolated based on normal radiation levels in containment.

'b. j ,in EOP-TRIP-3, SI Termination, when containment pressure is< 4 psig. Containment Spray Additive Tank will be isolated based on normal

- radiation levels in containment.

I c.; EOP-TRIP-3, SI Termination if ccntainment pressure is less than 13 psig. CFCUs will continue to operate in Low Speed.

rctJ I LOCA-2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. CFCUs will continue to operate in Low Speed.

At1s~er ~ J jExam Level I@=] [Cognitive Level  ; j Application l IFadnfY: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !E~~~[)ate: I j___12_12_1_12_0_1~5j IKA:il 026000A208 IiA2.08 . !RO Valu~:[!J]isROValuej_EJ ,.sedion: II~ [RO Group:1[]is~OGroup:1 LJ ~

m/Evoh.ition Title I IContainment Spray System KA Statement:: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Containment Spray System and (b) based on those predictions, use 1*

procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

Safe securing of containment spray when it can be done) I i'ExpJanafion of! 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on having to asses the conditions given in stem and determine both what procedure I

'Answers:  !

.* 1 will be entered and how containment cooling/spray equipment will be operated. With conditions in stem, the transition out of LOCA-11 to TRIP-3 will be made at step 9 based on adequate subcooling, SG NR level status, and PZR level, otherwise the transition

':~~~~s~~;~~hee~ els°~;~~' a;d~i~;,; ~a:t~s~l;;o~r~~~~: ;:~~~1 ~~~t ~~;~ ~~~~~~~r;,~e~~~: :;t~~: ::~~e~~ ~le~~~ p~~~~~~~

0

, operation, which would. be. goverened by the System operati.ng Procedure when EOP network weas exited to the Integrated I operatin Procedure (IOP)

1) * * * *FatilityReference Number

• IfReference Section*.*. Il Page No. j 1Revlsion

'I SI Termination !IEOP-TRIP-3 II lj q25 I P=o=s=t=LO=C=A=C=oo=l=do=w=n=a=n=d=D=e=p=re=ss=u=ri=za=t=io=n==l~l~===========li ii I! 25 I

!l

I l, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____,11._ _ _ _ _~ll ll I Objectives jcsPRAYE012 I TRP003E005

i.tlE~~it;~Q'.~8!!t¢'.!~~~tl l_N_e_w_________.l J<l@ifig~f6&gM1B~i.~i~~,$alY:rJ._________~I ~(f5~~:~~!~£1"9Tr.aini~gPr9~?~rii~I D j l81!~§~fgl~B'gr:~i~§1Pmi~t,~11

• ~--~---~~~~~~~~~~-~~---~~~~-~--~~-----~~~~~----~--

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. ROSkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List .. I .SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes

.----~---~~--~---~-----~---------~~--~---~--~~---.,.!

1

[au'estionJ9'Pi<:q _s_R_o_17_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1

_,I

!r* '1 the following conditions:

- -* iit 2 is in Mode 5.

- 2C EOG was err yesterday for scheduled outage window.

- The normal 31 day surveillance test of 2A EOG was completed SAT 2 days ago while in Mode 4.

- Subsequently, the Unit 2 CRS notices that the 18 month Hot Restart surveillance for 2A EOG, was NOT performed as scheduled after the normal 2A EOG 31 day run surveillance, and is now outside its required periodicity including any allowable grace time.

Which of the following describes:

1) The status of 2A EOG

2) When the associated Hot Restart test must be performed

~I Operable. The Hot Restart test must be performed prior to entering Mode 4. I 1

b; i I Operable. The Hot Restart test must be performed prior to entering Mode 6. 1 I 8  ! Inoperable. The Hot Restart test must be performed prior to entering Mode 4. 1 I lct.:j !Inoperable. The Hot Restart test must be performed prior to entering Mode 6. I I I I

.Answer 1 ~ :Exam Level I ~ :cognitive Level*. i IApplication I ;Facility: I lSalem 1 & 2 I :Exar11Date: j j___12_12_1_12_0_15~!

KA

ll 064000G120 I12.1.20 . ;Ro Value:ij 4.altsROValueL~ 1Section:i1 SYS IEW.Group:'j 11 l~Ro Group:q 11 ~

iSJ'stem/EvolutionTitle l IEmergency Diesel Generators KA Statement:!

~IA_b_i-lify~to-in-te_r_p-re_t_a_n_d_e_x_e-cu_t_e_p-ro_c_e_d_u-re-st_e_p-s.-~~~~-~~--~~-~~~--~~~~~~~~-~~~I t

-1at-fo_n_o_.f_,J 55.43.b(2) This question is SRO level based on being able to apply TSAS 3.8.1.2 for electrical power in Modes 5 and 6, and the .,1

• -ders: * *

• I action required based on the conditions in the stem. RO knowledge would be "above the LCO line", and SRO level for actions below the line. LCO 3.8.1.2 requires 2 operable EDGs, and the stem states 2C is already tagged out. The surveillance l I~~~ui~~~a~~!~e 0Ja~~*,;1~~~~:~:~c~l~~t~~ea!:~11~~~~J~h ~~~~~~~t~e!a~:rNn~~,;o~~u~~e~1~~:1~~:t:~:x~~~ ~~:~:~~1~% d'.r~i~~ases for 1 Icircuit

'I performance of the surveillance requirement, and to preclude de:energizing a required ESF bus or disconnecting a req~ired offsite during performance of surveillance requirements ...... It is the intent that these surveillance requirements must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and the offsite circuit are required to be operable.

I1 During startup, prior to entering Mode 4, the surveillance requirements are required to be completed if the surveillance frequency has been exceeded .... " The provided reference does not give answer, but allows the operator to interpret the surveillance 1requirement, and in any case does not contain the action required which is located in the bases.

• • • Reference Titie **. ' r <. i [ FacilityR~ference Number H:Reference,S~ctic:>n **. j ! Page No. I 1.~evisior1

================================

:::.~=======::::::::===::::::::::::::;;::::::::::::;:::::::::=:.;:===:::::::::::'.::'.:::==::=:::::.::::::::::.

I S=a=le=m=T=ec=h=S=pe=cs=========ll:.==========~'~'=3.=8.=1.=2===:::::::::.l13/4 8-7a 1!~2=46==!

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\.=I j1Salem Tech Specs 11 1 Bases 1183/4 8-3 I 1!=2=82=:::::.

11 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _11 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.ll, _ _ _ _ ___,q 11 _ ___,

LQ.. Ntlmber ,

• l EDGOOOE011

I lM~1~fl~r,B~g~~1i~~j'9!;.,!2,i~IUlil,~tj§!),JIJ SRO Q17 Tech Spec 3/4.8.1 Electrical Power Systems, A.C Sources ISi!~l\l!llt~~~tii~~;j j_N_e_w__________,l ~g~#tf:g,~tM~(1Jfi~~t~~ll~$:~~~~1 rs&~~!ia~IE:~~r:~1rg;2mw1:~1~11

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Outline Changes I

fatiestiohJopiCI lsRo 1a I

' 'l the following conditions:

- ,.mit 2 is operating at 60% power, steady state.

- 21 A Circulator is CIT.

- The Condensate Polisher is O/S and in standby.

- Subsequently, the 13 KV South ringbus breaker D-E opens causing a loss of 23 SPT.

Which of the following describes the plant status 15 minutes after the loss of 23 SPT as operators respond to this event?

~!The reactor remains at power. Operators will be performing S2.0P-AB.CW-0001, Circulating Water System Malfunction, and establishing Low Pressure Turbine Hood Spray.

I 1 fb.11 The reactor was manually tripped. Operators will be utilizing S2.0P-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, in conjunction with the L"--' ITRIP series of EOP's, to break condenser vacuum.

'cl The reactor remains at power. Operators will be performing S2.0P-AB.CHEM-0001, Abnormal Secondary Chemistry, and placing the

'---' Condensate Polisher in service for the expected rise in Dissolved 02.

[5!J IThe reactor was manually tripped. Operators will be utilizing S2.0P-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater I Condensate System Abnormality in

!conjunction with the TRIP series of EOP's to respond to the loss of condenser hotwell levels and possible Condensate pump cavitation.

/Answer1 ~ :ExamLevet! rI=J jCognitiveL~velJ jApplication I :Facility:J jsalem 1 &2 I :ExamDate: j 12/21/20151 mI 075000A202 I 1A2.02 I /RO Vallie: '@:sRO.Valuej--2Z] ,Section: iI~ /ROGroup:J LJ lsRo Group:: LI ~

1Systeh1IEvolution Title i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ ---~

j_c_ir_c_u_la_ti_ng...._W_a_t_e_r_s.._ys_t_em

!KA Statement: I Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Circulating Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use j procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the conse uences of those abnormal operation:

Loss of circulatin water pumps

[Exp Ian. atio. n. . o.f. j 155.43. b(5) This question is SRO level based on knowing the appropriate procedure or section of procedure used in applying the 11

I

• * 'I ers: . ' conditions which will occur based on the initial conditions in the stem. 23 SPT powers 23 CW bus, and 24 SPT powers 24 CW bus.

• 23 CW bus powers the "A" circulatros and 24 SPT powers the "B" circulators. The loss of 23 SPT will cause a loss of 2 additional l circulators in addition to ~1A which is CIT. The op~rator must know how many circulators a.re now not runni~g, 3 or 4. If it i~ .

0 Ithought condense~ vacuum would degr~de or DO increased based on losing h;twell levels and its effect on condensate pump 1

I seals. Manually bypassing the Turbine Hood Spray is allowed (and directed) in AB.CW-1, even though normally it remains secured I> 15% power. (AB.CW-1page5) l'{eference Title

=

::::::::::::::=:::=:::::::::::::::=:::::::::~

11

• Facility Reference Number I iReference Section !i Page No. J jRevisionJ

!~C=i=rc=u=la=t=in=g=W=a=t=e=r=S=ys=t=em==M=a=lf=u=n=ct=io=n======:::::.i~!S=2=.0==P=-A=B=.=C=W=-=0=00=1==========~1::::::==============qs I 1~3=5=====

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[L,;o..Number* Objectives

___,ll  !, _ _ _____,ii _ __.

I I

ABCW01 E004

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper J __R_o...s_y_st_e_m_1E_v_o1...ut-io...n...L_is_1_ _ _sR_o_sy_s_te_m_1_Ev_o_1u...ti...on_u_st.....a Outline Changes lauestion Topic i SRO 19I I I 'Jse the answer which contains ONLY actions directed to be performed IAW S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0007, Cold Shutdown to Refueling, BEFORE Rx el Head detensioning would be initiated for a refueling outage starting in November.

I. The Rx shall be subcritical for at least 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br />.

II. Direct, continuous communication between the control room and refuel floor is established.

Ill. The RCS is drained to < 104' elevation.

IV. Unit CRS AND SM approval.

[J,1. II.

I

~1111, IV.

I 11,

!C** Ill.

l

@;]Ill, IV.

II

!Answer 11 b I 1Exam Level J lS j iCognitive Level :IMemory I tFacility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 1 IExamDate: 11 12/21/201511

!KA:!f 194001 G141 I 2.1.41 I :RO Value:; [Ifil" ,SRO Valuej.22.J ,Section: :I~

I RO Group:j LJ 1SRO Group: LJ ,S~~l D

v'-"""'*,,~,, :",~

Isystem/Evolution Title 1 IGENERI  !

---

~--~---~----------------~---------'

'KA Statement: I . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!Knowledge of the refueling process.

I!Explanation of! 55.43(6,2) This question is SRO level based on knowing the requirements which must be met before alterations affecting core

!Answers: I configuration will be started entering a refueling outage. The reactor does not have to be subcritical for 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> (Oct 15-May 15th) prior to moving fuel in the reactor (TSAS 3.9.3) Direct communications is required during CORE AL TS, and detensioning the head is NOT core alts.

! Reference Title Facility Reference Number i Reference Section  !: Page No. j !Revision!

iCold Shutdown to Refueling II S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0007 I ii 1117 I

! !I I 11 11 I l II I 11 11 I

.LO. Number Objectives IIOP007E002 l

!Material Required for Examination* :I II

!.Question Source:

• IFacility Exam Bank I jOuestion Modification Method: .! Editorially Modified l IUsed During Training Program j D iOuesticm .Source Comments I I iComment

! I I I ii I I_

RO SkyScraper  ! SRO Skyscraper

• I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List ....

I Outline Changes I

[Cluestron Topic i ISRO 20 11 r

, the following conditions:

- unit 2 is in MODE 6 with core reload in progress.

- 10 fuel assemblies have been moved into the Rx.

- Rx cavity level is 26' above the RPV flange. l 21 RHR loop is in service in Shutdown Cooling.

22 RHR loop is 0/S and available. I Which one of the followinq would prevent continuation of fuel movement into the reactor?

lfJ lLoss of Control Air to containment.

I

bl I.Racking down the 22 RHR pump 4KV breaker.

I

~ Both 100' elevation containment airlock doors are opened. I l

~ With both SRNls operable, only ONE is capable of providing audible indication in the control room.

II I ' "

I!

12/21/201511 1

~I 194001 G201 I 2.2.1 lRo Value:  !@lsRo ValueL~:.:.U section: H~ 'Ro Group:;f:=::IJ SRO Group:\ LJ System/Evolution Title / .GENER! i

!~-----~-----~----------~-----------~~--~

KA Statement: I

~IA-b-i-lity_t_o_p_e_rf_o_rm-p-re---st_a_rt_u_p_p_ro_c_e_d_u-re_s_f_o_r-th_e_f_a-ci-lity-,-in-c-lu-d-in_g_o_p_e-ra-t-in_g_t_h_os-e-co_n_t_ro_ls-as_s_o_c-ia-te_d_wi_.t_h_p_la_n_t_e-qu-i-pm-e-nt_t_h_a_t- -

i could affect reactivit .

1

,Eiolanation of I 55.43(7, 6) This question is SRO level because of the knowledge require for fuel handling procedures, and the ability to 11

~rs:

• i 1

~

/

'I continuously apply that knowledge when operating the fuel handling equipment. The requirement for SRNl's is BOTH operable and providing VISUAL indication in the Control room, with ONE providing AUDIBLE indication in the control room. The manipulator I

.f:!:~5i~8~~,Fr~;~~ei8f?: ~:~~;~;~ ~~ ;~~~~s6of ~i~eRc70n;~~n~r~nr~~~~~~~~e~~~ep~e~n;8~~~,'.~!e~i;~a~'.:iea~1;~;e ~~~~o~~ RHR l . ' . . .

I

• . ); * ***Reference Title

• FacilityRefE!rence Nurribe( .* J *Reference Section* 1 i,.Page No. f !Rexision' l~R=e=fu=e=lin=g=O=pe=r=at=io=ns================l!~*S=2=.0=P=-S=F=-0=00=9==========~1.1~===========;.ll~====~ll18 I

!Reac Pene Area & Cont Control Air n205347-1,3 II " l j 42,36 I

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'*-~~~~~~~~~~~~!~~~~~~~~~

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'L~O. Niimber I REFUELE007 Objectives I IOP009E002 1_ ____,

!Matifrial Requireqfor Examrlla,ti<:ln <II I

9;u~~ti,o,r1So~rce

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Ccnninent I I I I I

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I ¥"t SRO Skyscraper f RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes f

auestiontopic 1 lsRo 21 11 l.v '1 of the following Salem events requires a 15 minute notification? I

~I A unit shutdown is initiated to comply with Technical Specifications.

I

[§] I An oil discharge directly into the Delaware River with a visible sheen.

I

c.'i I An endangered species of sturgeon is found deceased during circ water trash rack cleaning.

I

ct.! I Rx power is determined to be greater than 3459 MWth after removing a Feedwater Heater from service.

I

' I ,c;,..*,.

' .: 12/21/2015jl

!B' .5£4!1 0 l:>::::-li$t.'f~

!--------------------------------------'* \GE NERI '1 i [.EX.'pl~.nat*i*o* n. of:i* 155.43.b(1) This q.ue~ti~n is SRO level based on the knowledge required of Conditions and Limitation required in the facility 1.icense,

!Answers:','

• and meets the cntena 1n ES-401, Attachment 2, page 17, II.A, 4th bullet. Knowledge of events which require 15 minute not1ficat1ons

'---- * . is critical for SRO to know from memory to faciliate timely and correct notifications. RAL 11.5.2.b contains conditions for which an I .~~0~~1; ~s0~e6oi~a.,~l~~ns;; ~~~u:~~'~ :~~~is~~~:~!:~~ ~~l~~c~~a~~~h 1! . .

2  :~~ti:~~~~~t;( :~a~~~~p~0r!J ~ i~:~ *~~2~~ ~~~.r-~~ hour

=*=**;***==

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ii Salem ECG I! RAL 11.5.2.b 11 I !::14===

Il,!_ _ _ _

Salem ECG I Attachment 16 Ij 4-5 l j4

_ _ _ . l _ _ _ ___., _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _____.:.=I====.

'L.o'.f:tumber,<,

Objectives J IEL0_11.d I :M?teriaJ,Required for Ex:aminatiorf. II II 1

ques(i_on ~PP~c:e: , j l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _~l ><l<lesiio~ Mo~ltfcatioll J111eff1od( . -*~--------~' :used During rrain\rig Progran(I D tou~§;tion~<:i~fce CorliliJents.! I I

• comment.-. y:.

I I 11- I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I .

louestionJopic*l 1SRO22 r 1 the following conditions:

- unit 1 is in Mode 2, with all Shutdown Banks withdrawn.

- Unit 2 is at 100% power.

- All Unit 1 & 2 Circulating Pumps are in service.

- 21, 23 & 26 Service Water Pumps are running.

- 21 CVCS Monitor Tank is being released via 22 CCW Hx to the Circulating Water System.

Choose the condition that would require termination of the liquid release?

§JI IUnit 1 Rx trips.

l

'b. l 21 CCW Pump trips.

I ic,; The 11 A & 11 B Circulators trip.

I An:J, 1 ~',:::;::;I ~ ~::::~~.,~::.:';~::::,::0 23 1 10 1 I OS ' ;:aojt!o/ i ISolem 1 & 2 1 iEx!TD*' j I 12/21/20151

~ j 194001 G311 I:2.3.11  !RO Value: IQ] ~SRO Vatuej_~ ~Seeti()n: I!~ !Ro Group: LJ fSRO Group:; LJ 1

1 System/Evolution Title I KA S t a t e m e n t : : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!Ability to control radiation releases.

EJ(!Jlanatfon ofi 55.43.b(4) This question is SRO level based on the knowledge required that loss of required dilution flow may result in a release

• 1*

~swers: * . *i1 above limits, and could happen during this normal evolution. SO.WL-001 states at step 5.5.9 that the released is to be terminated upon loss of dilution water flow. 22 SW header discharges into the outlet of 11A and 11 B circulators. A unit 1 trip does not I  !\

co~;~~u~~ a~,~~~~:~~~r?;;',Rs~;:~:~~~~~~a~~t~ of OP-SA-106-101-2001 Operating with an Emergency on the Opposite Unit is not l* * *. * *. . ' Reference Title * *. ***.< * * * * ' 'I ' *Facility Reference Number *'.:I ,Reference ~~(;ti on " I! Page fllo. ! jRevision jRELEAS~ ~F RADIOACTl~E uo~1~ ~~STE II s2.0P-SO.WL-0001 II I I25 I I l=I==  !=i::==:::::.

I I !______.

Lo. Number

• IWASLIQE012 Objecti~== . I

[MateriaLRequired for Ex.an:iih~ti'(j'r{J.j I fq~E!stioll Sciurce;<i j Facility Exam Bank A I [aue~tfop M,odififcition Metil?cff Direct From Source I .Used oudngJr~fr)ing Program, 1D

!aiiestiol1 sol.ire~ Cofri[Uentsl  :::======-=::::=::::=::::=::::=:=::==:=::~==============-================--!

11913s I:Commeob , . . .. .* *. /}C ' *

-~' '=***

I I

! I L I

RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List .(,_ I SRO System/Evolution List . . Outline Changes . I iouestion Topic;: I SRO 23 I 1' r* '1 the following conditions:

- _,nit 2 is operating at 100% power.

- The operating crew entered S2.0P-AB.RC-0002, High Activity in Reactor Coolant System, when RMS channel 2R31, Letdown Line Monitor, went into WARNING.

Which of the following is required to be performed JAW S2.0P-AB.RC-0002, and why?

The CRS will. ..

~I direct Radiation Protection Technician to take surveys to determine if radiation levels may have changed access requirements.

I

~I direct Radiation Protection Technician to survey the letdown line in the vicinity of 2R31 to confirm the suspected rise in RCS activity. II

• c. ! I direct Chemistry Technician to sample hourly for isotopic analysis to determine predominant radiation hazard (gamma, neutron, beta, alpha).

I

, ~ direct Chemistry Technician to initiate confirmatory sample analysis because the 2R31 reads in CPM and therefore has no correlation to dose level changes.

II I:Answer! ~ (Exam Level \ [CJ 1Cognitive Level I 1

1 Memory I !Facility~ j j Salem 1 & 2 I lExamDate: J I 12/21/20151 I

~I 194001G314 j ;2.3.14 1 IROValue:1[Ei SROValuej~ Section: II~ tRO Group:'LJ[SR() Group::[] ~~;1~1 ~

.System/Evolution Title i iGENERI

• KAStatement:! - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ , .

! Knowledqe of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emerqency conditions or activities. I

• e***.xpl<;ln.ati.on***ofl!55.43(4) This question is SRO level based on the "why" the action will have to be taken, as knowledge of radiation hazards which is iJ..nswers: I occurring during an abnormal situation. A is correct as described in S2.0P-AB.RC-002 basis, so that prompt identification and

~ I subsequent notification of plant personnel is ensured. B is incorrect because chemistry sampling ccnfirms 2R31 readings, not I survey results. D is incorrect because rising counts does indicate dose level changes. C is incorrect because the hourly isotopic I ...,--1 ..... :,... --~----...J ic- L-- ,........,,...,..,.-n.., f,-.. ~.- .,... _ __...;....,.,..., nC:/ &_,,.,. '-.---..J:-- /C::to.I""! ') 1Q\

I I ~1------R~e-fe_r_e~n-c_e_T~it-le_ _ _ _ _ _i ' Facility Reference Number * . j Reference Section I; Page Noj ;Revision:

I High Activity in Reactor Coolant System II S2.0P-AB.RC-0002 l I 1-==~  :..=Is==

I ~==::::; =::::::;

I II I i II I 1=1 I _ _ _ _ 1_ __.

'LO. Number\ , i Objectives I ABRC02E003

[ou,~stion scwrc;e:: 11 Facility Exam Bank Irguestion Modificati9p Meth~d: ** ;,I Direct From Source I'Use~ Di,Iring Training Program I DI lpu$~tion ~?un;.a s?rr,Jiiientsj I=======-==========::::::==::::::==:::.============-================--1I Used on Salem SRO NRC exam more than 2 exams ago.

l I

1-

RO SkyScraper . I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

!Ques~onTopic\ ,_s_R_0_2_4_ _ _ _ _ ~-------~------~---~-------~-------~-~~

' ' '1 the following conditions:

1t time T-0, while operating at 100% power, the Auxilary Typewriter prints an alarm without OHA A-41, AUX ALM SYS PR! NT annunciating.

- Operators enter S2.0P-AB.ANN-0001, Loss of Overhead Annunciator System and begin assessing the OHA system functionality.

- AT +5 minutes, and prior to verifying if either SER is in command, the Rx trips.

- At T +14 minutes, the PO reports that neither SER is in command.

Which of the following identifies the correct ECG classification, and time at which it should have been made?

'a.I I

~!Alert at T+14 minutes. II

~ IUnusual Event at T +5 minutes.

@] l Unusual Event at T +14 minutes. 11 Answer I ~ Exam Level* 11=J !Cognitive Level I I Application I [Faci!ity: ! ISalem 1 & 2 I :ExamDate: ! I 12/21/20151 KA::l 194001G432 I 2.4.32 . 'RC>valUelf]}J[sRO Valuei~ Section: II~ RO Group:ILJISRO Group: LJ ~

System/Evolution Title !

IKA Statement: I ,Know1ed ..------------------------------------------------

e of o erator response to loss of all annunciators.

i.Explanation of:. 55.43.b(1) This question is SRO level based on the requirement to declare an emergency. The requirement to declare an

'Answers:  : emergency under any of the loss of annunciators (S5) EALs is the loss for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. Declaring at T +5 minutes with 10 minutes of assessment time left is not indicated even though the significant transient (Rx trip) has occurred, I

1_ _ _ _ _ _....LJlbn.;e31 caJ.1.u.u:s12eW.ll.th el<l;AraBo..DJfa:nNo.N=.ta.rrkJEeus 5

B:1J~u.~.:.t~>.1:~:..t~"-i.u:i~w~l:l~lr!l.!.tr.r::i.a;;nnpa)..J.@f~k~e5s;o~~' f~:~~~!I~~ ~~ 01~~:~~1t~;1r~~~~~~i~hna~t0~:~bne~ ~r:~~ out procedure.

IT +14, the even't *should be declared. *

• i Reference Title j' Facility Reference Number * !Reference Section  : I Page No~ j jRevision

===

:=::=::=::=::=::;;;;;;;;;;;;;=::=::=::;;;;;;;;;;;;;=::~~====~============o;==::=::=::;;;;;::;;;;=::;;;;;;;;;;;

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'i-::====================ll,~=============11~========1~1

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __Jl, _ _ _ _ _~11---~ll_~l l_~I

===~===l iLO. Number I ABANN1 E002 Objectives

!Material Required for Examination I j SRO 024 ECG Section S5 II iOuestionSource: . I INew IIOuestion Modification Method:

i . - ,:.. ____J

~ I iUsed During Training Program i D I

!Question Source _comments!

I I

'Comment I I

I I I

I I

I I *-

RO SkyScraper j SRO Skyscraper J RO System/Evolution List f SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

~-PG*i:t:~,::~::~w,_i:-:-O-id-:-:-tifi-1e_s_a_c_on-d-it-io_n_d_u_r-in_g_a-de-c-la_r_e_d_E_m_e-rg_e_n-cy_w_h-ic_h_R_E_Q_U_I R_E_S_a_P_r_o-te-c-ti-ve_A_c-tio_n_R_e-co_m_m_e_n_d-at-io_n_, -e-it-he_r_i-ni-tia_l_o_r-~ll I l~ .de, when the TSC/EOF have NOT been activated yet?

[a;*j 1ANY General Emergency initial declaration.

I I

~ ANY event which results in a radiological release to the environment.

I fcl I I

ANY time the wind shifts after the initial 15 minute notifications have been made during a General Emergency.

'd. II ANY event which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator could result in exceeding 10CFR Part 100 limits.

'Answer!!~ !Exam Level I@=]" :cognitive Level,; j Memory I :f'acility: /I Salem 1 & 2 I :E:xamp~te: I J 12/21/2015\j

~1194001 G444 I 2.4.44 I:RO Value:  :[TI" ~sR.o ValueJ~ !section: n~ ;Ro Group:ILJ/SRO Grdl1p;I [ ] mxai %1::.;Aii o

• systein/Evolt.ifion Title.1

!----------------------------------- )GENERI kA statement:,

I Knowledge of emer'1ency plan protective action recommendations.

Iit;/'P)?n*tton of 11 "

t!'"~lers: .*. * ** i 43.b( 5' 1) Thto '""'"°' ;, SRO ' ' " ' ' ' " ' 00 " ' koowt e<lg* of. how to im pl*mcot " ' " " " " ' '

111-F4, Attachment 4, General Emergency, and the cond1t1ons which require making a PAR or PAR upgrade. The ICMF for a GE

"°" o1 " ' ECG, EP-SA-I requires a PAR; see Appendix 1. There is a PAR for a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident, a PAR for Hostile Action, and a I ,

1defualt PAR, one of which must be made. Bis incorrect because a radiological release is defined as "Any release above normal, It,..,.i,..;. .. ;h11t"::!hlot,...,.i.1.-. .................... .i. 11c-o.if'::l~ ............:.i... ,....".l 1C"o.r(*u--~c ,..,r1,.....:.--- - "*---_.

11 f"'iC"' i... .............. r:: ...... ..,fic- .i.... ..... .i.l----::ir"'l"O * - - i ..

for a wind shift (see Appendix 1). D is incorrect because there is no "judgement" directed in the PAR based- on exceeding radiation limits, the PAR is determined based on the the GE that directed its implementation.

• Reference Title ***

'1 i

~ '

Facility Reference ~umber *. ! Reference Section j i Page No. i !Revision! I l General Emergency II EP-SA-111-F4 II II 1102 I I I  ! n ll ii I I I II ii ll I I

LO/Number Objective jEL0_24.a

,Oue~ti(}n sq~rcei  :,\ l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.l *c:tue~tlo~,¥~ci~ic~~id'n Nleth()d:'j. J I ru~ed Du~i~g *Trafn(ng' Pro9r.<1'rrt l DI

~~~~~~~~i1_________________________________________~l1 I

I I

I I

RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolutio~ List . I Outline Changes. I iCluestion Topic i IRO 1 I Unit 2 is operating at 60% power with rod control in auto when Turbine Steam line Inlet Pressure transmitter 2-PT-505 fails high over 10 s.econds.

\

of the following describes the effect on the rod control system from this failure?

Control rods will move in the ___ direction, and the Power Mismatch signal will initially cause rods to move_ _ rapidly than if the circuit was not!

part of rod control.

'11

~a~* I I

~!inward, more.

rs I outward. less.

I

ct.j loutward, more.

.. l 12/21/201511

~I 000001K105 I:AK1.05 IIRo,\fa1u'e:IQ]"[sRO\laiue:l[Ifilisectioh: 11~ iRo:Group:i[]fsROGrotif:}:I D

[System/Evolution Title i [Continuous Rod Withdrawal KA Statement; Knowled e of the operational implications of the followin concepts as they ap ly to Continuous Rod Withdrawal:

Effects of turbine-reactor power mismatch on rod control

[Expla"nationof i 55.41.b(6) The power mismatch section of the Reactor Control Unit compares the difference in the rate of change of turbine power i

iAnswefs: *** .* and rx power, and adds a signal to the temperature error circuit. With turbine power (PT-505) rising rapidly over 10 seconds and rx power not changing at all, the power mismatch signal will cause control rods to move out at a higher rate than what would be j expeected from the Terr signal alone, in an attempt to raise Rx power at a rate similar to what turbine power was doing.

ReforenceTitle .*  :<' ::'"; . i 1 Facility Reference.Number** * .! [Retererice Section '*I i*Page No."l :Revision!

~'R=o=d=C=o=nt=ro=l=Le=s=s=on=P=l=an==============~l~IN=O=S=0=5=R=O=D=S=OO==========~l~===========:::::.il28 '~'1=2==:=:::,

~I_

1 ==================!11===============1~==========1!

_ _ _ _ _ _____,11 _ _ _ _ _~1, _ _ _~lj 'I~===

11 _ ____.

L(). Num_ber ..* Objectives IRODSOOE006 fMat~rial Reqqiredfor),:xaminationg**1 I lpuestiori Sour~_e: Lj l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___,l [9pe§ti()f1M§~~tfsau?ff:fyt~th.od:<c :

totiesljC>f! .§,o~rqe'E?ffi.~e~!~,i

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.:it,*-.:-.;{):;<;~ ' \ ,;~ :'> : /\' :";\;'.>:'.]'~~:!..;* *::i-,

1-

RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List J SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes. I lcfoestion Jo pie  !RO 2 I j Which of the following describes the reason for the sequence of diagnostic steps in EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safetl'. Injection? I I

~ SGTR diagnosis has the higher priority because of the highest probability of radioactive release. I I

~I SGTR diagnosis has the higher priority to minimize the potential for component failure due to water in the Main Steam lines. I, 11

[201 Main Steam Line break diagnosis has the higher priority because a high energy steam break could potentially mask other failures.

11 ict.*l 1Main :team Line break diagnosis has the higher priority because AFW must be isolated to remain within accident analysis assumptions for containment pressure. I 1Ansi,Ver!I~ [Exam Level! IR l iC:oflnitiy~'Leyel. *!I Memory  ! jF~ciljty: \ ISalem 1 &2 I iExam'bate: j I

[*. *. : ..,

12/21/20151 IKA:il 000007K301  !\EK3.01 ) \RO'.Value:;j 4.0j !SRQVaflJe:JI 4.6j fsectiojl: .lj~ [~{)(3tbup::i 11 JsRO Grbi.Jp:!j 1! ;~~ 0

[s.YStem/Evo,ll.ltionTitle ! I Reactor Trip  ! \007 I

!.KAStatement:l Knowledqe of the reasons for the followinq responses as they apply to Reactor Trip:

Actions contained in EOP for reactor trip

~xplanation of:

1 55.41.b(1 O) SG pressure is checked prior to tube rupture criteria in TRIP-1 to see if any SG is faulted, as that can mask other

'Answers: . accidents.

~ Reterence Title

• Ii 'Facility Reference Number 'i, ifReference section :Ji?age No.I. [Revision!

lj Rx Trip or Safety Injection !I EOP-TRIP-1 I ii j 2a lTRIP-1 Lesson Plan II NOS05TRP001 I lj 59 11:..=7===

l lj I !I j_ __.

t(q.~N:timbei; /' * *>I Objectives _I ITRP001E017 I

[a4~~~.i§~,s911fRe:\,-j lFacility Exam Bank

.--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

9u~s\ion's()IJrce c9rllf!lentsl 44816

RO SkyScraperJ SRO Skyscraper. ( RO System/Evolution List .* I SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes. I IUue~tign topic! l,_R_0_3_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _11 Given the following conditions:

..,ZR Safety Valve has developed a very small leak with the unit operating at J% power.

- Uperators are lowering power to take the unit off line.

- During the power reduction, operators take manual control of PZR pressure due to a Master Pressure Controller malfunction, and the operator maintains PZR pressure at 2240 psig.

Which of the following describes the effect this will have on the leakrate from the affected PZR Safety Valve as compared to the leakrate when PZR pressure was being maintained at normal operating pressure?

Assume the PRT pressure remains constant.

The leakrate will. ..

I

~ remain the same because PZR pressure is being maintained at normal setpoint.

'b.'i I rise because RCS temperature will rise above program during the downpower.

ic.11 rise because the upstream pressure of the valve will force more leakage past the valve.

~~~~~nLe,n tho dO'"l0£.trnr..tw::u:as..s.u.u;w1f_f:.bA '1al,10 in a caost:;i ..... .i. *L-- ,... ,;...,,... ---

~ 1 ' '

(Answer:! E=J !Exam Lever i~ iC9gnitive Ley¢Ff j Application I [F~?ifi~:J j Salem 1 & 2 I j,ExamDat~: ! j___1_2_12_1_12_0_15_.I

~I ooooosK102 j 1AK1.02 'I.Rb Value: iQ] SROValue:j[.D};sectiqn:lj~ jROGrol:iJ'.l.:lLJisRC>§l"obp:ILJ D

~yste1:T1IEvolutio11 "'[itle I lPressurizer Vapor Space Accident KAStaternent:j Knowledqe of the operational implications of the followinq concepts as they apply to Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:

Change in leak rate with change in pressure I

'ltion of !I 55.41.b(5) A is incorrect because PZR pressure setpoint is 2235 psig. B is incorrect because while RCS temp will rise above I s: . .*. r setpoint during a downpower, the stem states that PZR pressure is at 2240 psig. c is correct because with a constant downstream 'I temperature, increasing the upstream pressure (to 2240 vs normal 2235) will force more leakage past the valve. Dis incorrect because the downstream pressure will determine what the temp will be if saturated after the leaking valve. I

• ~efererl.ce Title * * *** *..* \[ * *Fa~ilityReference Number. *1 !Fefefencesection .; IPageNo.j !RevisiOn:

I !I I II 11 I I II I 11 II I l_ _ _ _ _ _ ____.l! 1_ _ _

1

____.ll 1 I I Lo:. l'J:.i,1rrl.'berit.*> ***

I PZRPRTE014 Objectives 1C!!X~~tI9t1~~9yrc~: *.I l_N_e_w______~I \Uuer!{~~.Mo4if~pati.§h:M~thoti:** --------~ \usecl 011rin9 Tr~i.fiJllg Pr9gr~w* I

[~M~.stroiJ.*~~µr,~ti SP!J1~r11en!ei c

RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List ...

( SRO System/Evolution List f Outline Changes I

!q!lestion Topic i RO 4 I I I.Which of the following is the basis for establishing I maintaining SG Narrow Range level between 9-33% (non-adverse containment) for small or

!nt,,rrnediate LOCA's IAW 2-EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant? I I

~ Ensures SG available if a RCP has to be started later in the event. I

~,

I

!b. ! Maintains a static head of water to reduce any existing SG tube leakage.

I I

[SJ I Ensures adequate feed flow or SG inventory to ensure a secondary heat sink.

I

@'.] I. Maintain the water level above the top of the U-tubes to prevent depressurizing SG.

I

~Ah~wef ! 12-___J jExam L~vel 11 R I lcog11i1:1ve,Cevel, 11 Memory I ifW~iJity; i J Salem 1 & 2 I lsxamoa.te: 11 12121120151 KJ\:11000009K203 I EK2.03 !ROY~lue:ll 3.0i!SROValue:!l 3.3l[sedlon:Jl~fROGroup:lj 1jisRbGroup:d 11 II~ D f~Y~tem!Eybfuti9n "fitl_el l_s_m_a_ll_B_r_e_ak_L_o_c_A_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,! 1009

KAsta~emeiit:i Knowled e of the interrelations between Small Break LOCA and the followin SI Gs

,Expfanatiorl.of 55.41.b(10) Distractor Bis incorrect because it is the basis for SIG level I feed flow for a LARGE break LOCA. Distractors A and D

'(°Ai{iiw;;fr_~;:;;**

• are incorrect because the Basis document states that the reason for maintaining adequate feed flow I SIG level is to ensure a secondary heat sink. C is correct because EOP-LOCA-1 Basis Document states the purpose of establishing 9% level is .. "To ensure adequate feed flow or SIG inventory to ensure a secondary heat sink for small or intermediate size LOCAs and secondary break l

accidents" 33°?, is the SIG oarrnv.t ranae I 1nner control hand ljroit 1::: * * . *.t . ** Reference Title/ .: i F**.Facility Reference Numbec :.JJ [Reference section _,-;l f Page N9**l !Revisfori1,

=:==========::::::::==============::===~========:::;::;:::::::::=::===:::;::;::::::::.

ILoss of Reactor Coolant lj 2-EOP-LOCA-1 ii Bases Doc !j 12  ! 2s J I 1:=====================,,:==============~,~1=========11~==::,~! ===1 l, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____.111 _ _ _ _ _ ___.!!, _ _ _ _,q _ __,l l_ ___.l I LOCA01 E009 Objectives jpomm_ent' h*; .. ~ .'~ ~  ; .

RO SkyScraper I ;:::SR::O::::Sk::y::s::cr::ap'.:'.'.e::r::_:::::::::_::R::O::S::y:::'.st'.:'.'.e::m::/E::v::ol::ut::io::n::L::is::t::*='~::S::R::O::S::y::st::em::/::E::vo'.:'.'.lu::t::io::n::L::is::t::_:I::*::O::u::tl::in::e::C::::ha::n::g::e::s::*:_l-'=--'----'-------'-i looestion Topic 1I!~------------------------------------------~

Ro s 1I Given the following conditions:

t 2 is operating at 100% power.

charging pump is in service.

- 22 charging pump is err.

- Subsequently, 21 charging pump trips.

- 23 charging pump is placed in service after its suction is aligned to the RWST.

Which of the following identifies a subsequent action which will be directed by S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, and why?

• i'd Shutdown Unit 2 due to boration of the RCS from the RWST.

'b: Restore normal letdown to establish adequate VCT level for normal 23 charging pump operation.

~ Place Excess Letdown in service to establish adequate VCT level for normal 23 charging pump operation .

.d,: Open 2CV464 Charging Cross-Tie Isolation valve to prevent requiring a Unit 2 shutdown due to boration of the RCS from the RWST.

FAns.ver I~!Exam Level! lli:J' i¢ognitivet.eyel .! I Memory I [f<ltility;,11 Salem 1 & 2 11Ex~m1JC1te: 11 121211201sj,

u.il "KA

. 000022K302 11.AK3.02 . \RO Value:\i1 3.5 1*:s~o.. va1ue:1 I' " . . I 3.8 I:sectiori:; ,.. 1EPE ,.,RO 1 *.. *Group:

. 111 11*t~go....Group:\ *. ... , I r5stt3i D 1 '";;;J "systeiTI!Evofutiontitfe j I Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup I ~022 KA Statement: i Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup:

Actions contained in SOPs and EOPs for RCPs, loss of makeup, loss of charoino, and abnormal charoing I

~

Explanatiol} of! 55.41.b(10) When the inservice charging pump tripped, letdown automatically isolated with all charging pump breakers open . If 23

.Answers: ,i

• <*.** charging pump is placed in service from the RWST, it means it was not able to be placed in service with VCT as suction source at step 3.7. The note prior to placing 23 charging pump in service from Unit 2 RWST states that a unit S/D will be required because of berating the RCS from the RWST.

~ '

I Loss of Charging R.efElrerice Titre ... ,] ~:./ Fj:icility Reference Number>

!I S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 o:l l~eference Section II Bases Doc

.*I I Pag8, t<Jo.1 11 3 '19 IRevisiOnl I

l I II II 11 1 I I I ll lj II ll I 1):.;o. Nu[nber >

• 1.

Objectives I ABCVC1 E003 I Material RE1tjuiredJC.>rE:xalllination ol I q I sv'estion. s,§urce~:;c; !I New .. . JLQue~tf~p ,M6qifiF1Wo n IVieth<?<t 1' I I \usei:i Qllriilg Jralnil)g Program "l D I;ou~sucin'~o.1Jr~~porilmeritsJ 1;:::====:'...:::::::::::::==.:::::::::::.:.::::::::::=::::::=.========::::'...'.:=:::::::.:::::.::::::::::.:::::.::::::::::.::::::::::.:=:'.__'.:=:'.,I!

'! I I I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System!Evolution list f SRO System!Evolution List I Outline Changes I louestiqn'(opicJ I RO 6 I Given the following conditions:

't 2 is in MODE 4.

RHR loop is in service providing SOC.

- 22 RHR loop is aligned for ECCS.

- Subsequently, 21 RHR pump trips on overcurrent.

Which of the following describes how SOC flow will be established IAW S2.0P-AB.RHR-0001, Loss of RHR?

22 RHR pump supplying flow .....

[] I through 21 RHR HX and ONLY 21 SJ49 RHR Disch to Cold Legs.

I

~I through 22 RHR HX and ONLY 22SJ49 RHR Disch to Cold Legs.

I I through 21 RHR HX and BOTH 21 SJ49 and 22SJ49 RHR Disch to Cold Legs.

I I

I ;ct. II through 22 RHR HX and BOTH 21 SJ49 and 22SJ49 RHR Disch to Cold Legs.

11 I:Answer 1 Id I iEx~m:'):.evel 11 R I !cognitive LeveC;J IMemory  !~!Salem 1 &2 I [~x,a,mpate: 11 12/21/20151 J<A:[I 000025K201 J'AK2.01  ! IRO Vah.Je: q2.9llSROValue: I 2.9!(SeCt!cm: q~ !RoGrciup:\j 1 j 1sR.q <3roup:J I 1j illl D jSysteJ11!Eyoluticin Titre' I [Loss of Residual Heat Removal System KA Statement:] IKnowledoe of the interrelations between Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the following:

RHR heat exchanqers

!Explanattci'n of! 55.41.b(10,8) With a single loop of RHR in service for SOC, the loop cross-tie valves 21/22RH19 are open. They would only have fJ;.;,5wers~* > **.*.* <: been shut if BOTH loops were in SOC mode, to split out the RHR loops to verify minimum flow requirements are being maintained (S2.0P-SO.RHR-0001, page 36). There is no direction to close either cross tie valve in Attachment 2 of AB.RHR when swapping the ECCS loop to SOC mode. There is also no direction to shut either SJ49 RHR to RCS valves, since cooling flow to all 4 RCS

~

locos is desir:ed Ibe 2j loop el:lE<...1::1.X Oli+/-let Hail1e 2:1el:lj8 iAlill be cl.oserl /A>+ ') ~*"";' ') n n\ tn *---;n,,ta ,,_ " * * - .-h ')1 O>;O >;Y l [ReferenC:e Section< ' ! [PageJ'fo.1

, I*

!Revision 1

~,,

t**

• ReferenceTitle.* . * ' I' Faeii ityReference. Number*

ILoss of RHR ii S2.0P-AB.RHR-0001 11 11  ! I1s I I Initiating RHR 11 S2.0P-SO.RHR-0001 I! 11 I j2s I IRHR Simplified drawing 11205332-SIMP II 11 112 I Objectives I ABRHR 1E004 1_ _ ___,

i.qoest!o~,~§y'rce: fl l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ __.l t(Ji:\es,ticin ~o<lifi?atton ~etl19d~ .1_________.l lt}sec,1Jl,udri9 'rr?(ni'.hg Program I o f,pue$ti,~~~<?urce~?r"nrri~.rit~*i  ! I I

I I

R~ ~kyScraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes i--'-'--'-'--'-'--'-'--'-'--'-...:;;;......;.._;;;..:.__::.:=:;;___;__:__.:==-'--'--===:;;___'--'-;;_:.__:::::'--'-'--'-;..;_;__.:c.:....'--'-'--'-.::._:_;;'--'-'--'--=:.=:_-'-'-'--'-'--'-~-'--"'--'-_;.;_-'--

[ouestion Topic I l,_R_O_?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~

Given the following conditions:

t 2 is operating normally at 100% power steady state.

- _Jnsole alarm RC PRESS DEVIATION HI, annunciates.

- Subsequently, the board operator then observes the following indications:

- PZR pressure master controller output dropping slowly

- Both PZR spray valves closed

- All PZR heaters energized

- PZR pressure channel I (selected for control) dropping slowly

- PZR pressure channels II, Ill, & IV rising slowly I

I Which of the following procedures should be used for these conditions?

'a.I S2.0P-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow. 1,

~I S2.0P-AB.ROD-0003, Continuous Rod Motion. '1 l

[c.: S2.0P-AB.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant System Leak.  !

__ @J_*_~'S=2~12-J

'Answer J

• =0=P=-A; :;: B=.P=Z=R=-0=0=0=1=,=P=re~s=s=ur=iz=e=r=P=re=s=s=u=re=M= al=fu=nI=c=tio=n=.; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;I; ; ; ; ; ; ;: : : := =: :; : ;:= = = = = = =: : :=j___

!Exam Level.: I~ :cognitive Level'  ! Application I !Faqility: 1 Salem 1 & 2 I jExamD(ite:J

= := : ; : ;:=: = = = = = =I.

1_2_12_1_12_0_1~5I

,KA;q 000027G107 I ~12_.1_.7_ _ _' !R:bVafu~:j I 4.41[SRQVafi.Je::i14. 7 I'Sectloh:"il~ [RQ Group:j I 1j [SRO Group:! j 1 I D System/Eyqlution 'Xitie J IPressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction

KAstafonient:J . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

l f E. xr 1:;;'1a.ti9ri cif. I55.41.b\5. 10) The three distracters would cause all the bu!leted. items except the last o_ne to occur. The 3 unaffected channels rising I

ii

A s

. **

• would discount the 3 items (steam leak, RCS leak, or rod 1nsert1on) that could be causing the event.

I

• * ' Reference Title * *** k . *F~4illty Re.fE!rehce Nunib~r : 'I !Referenc~ sedio11 , I' Page' No. ! !RevisfonJ

~jP=r=e=ss=u=r=iz=e=r=P=re=s=su=r=e=M=a=lf=u=n=ct=io=n==========~1.~IS=2=.=0=P=-A=B==.P=Z=R=-0=0=0=1==========-l!~===============lj I 118 I

,I_ ===================111~============1!1~========11

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____.q 1,.---  !! ___ ____.1r=-I11 I I

1 fLOd~ll.lm!Jet/

Objectives IABPZR1E001 I

alles~),on so1.1tc~;:' 1 Facility Exam Bank I[QuestiOn Modificati'O'n Method:j ,I Direct From source I!used cidririg fralning Program I DI 18lJE1~tipn sddrpe C~m,m~ritsi 142682

!~-~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~-~-~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~

I I

I l

RO SkyScraper J SRO Skyscraper . ! RO System/Evolution List . ( SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes J I RO s iauestion Topic!

Which of the following describes the effect if a PZR level instrument reference leg were to develop a leak with the Master Flow Controller in auto?

I ted PZR level would initially .....

l l

ra. ! rise, then actual PZR level would rise.

I I

~ rise, then actual PZR level would lower.

II t2J Ilower, then actual PZR level would rise.

II fd.l jlower, then actual PZR level would lower.

I

!'.Answer i fD" !Exan(Level j IR I !cognitive Level I 1 Application I lf~diitH ISalem 1 & 2 I !Exauipate: il 12/21/2015!

I Jt"*v>r'!?v:**,1 II~ [RO Group:il ~Et~ D

\KA:JI 000028K101 I !RO Value: \12.s*j \SROV?lue:H 3.11 \section: 2j 1,SROGrQup:1! 21 ISyste'iri!EvolutloriTitle: IPressurizer Level Control Malfunction ,028

l<A Statement: i Knowledge of the operational implications of the followino concepts as thev apply to Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction: I PZR reference leak abnormalities l 1Expt~n(l!i9'1 ()f ! 55.41.b(7) As level in the reference leg lowers, the pressure of the actual wight of water in the PZR would appear to be greater than Answer!):"** * ! it was, as it is pushing against a lower reference pressure from the reference leg. This would result in indicated PZR level rising.

The rising level would cause an automatic response of the Master Flow Controller to lower charging flow, which would cause actual PZR level to lower.

~

I  : Reference Title<"  ; \:<.i 'Facility R~ferl:}nc.eNulTlber *![~eferenCe ~eCtion *I* PageNoJ jRevi~ion IGeneral Physics Lesson Plan Components II PC071r4 Sensors I ii 114 I I II I 11 11 I I

l II l 11 11 I I

.. *' ~

i:LO:'Number

.. .. . . ..:, Objectives I

.. . ~l PZRP&LE015 fauestfolls~~tCe: iJ IFacility Exam Bank I[O:tiestiOnMocilfi(;atio~ ¥ethod:' ~concept used IJusefo11ril'lg.Jraining program l o l9~e!)tio~?"l1~~~*s9rrln)~ht§I =======.'.:=============================-================--!

159797

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----

I I I I I I

RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List J SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes l<lue~tionJqpic §_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,I' Which of the following describes the difference in effect of a rapid boration performed during an ATWS at BOL or EOL?

, the rapid boration will insert more reactivity due to the 2) differential boron worth.

fal 11)2) EOL

- HIGHER lb* I I~\ ~g0ER

~ j 1) BOL

..___, 2) HIGHER d.i j ~\ ~g0ER

!AnswE!rl ~ !Exam Level; ~ !C6gnitive Level i IMemory I \Facility: i ISalem 1 & 2 I jE~a,moate: 1 I 12/21/20151

~I 000029K 103 I /AK 1. 03 1IRO Value: jQ]" :SRO Valu.e: I[}] ise(:tion: !I~ jRo Group:j LJ )~RO Grollp:j LJ D 1~ysteiri/EvolutionTit!e I j Anticipated Transient Without Scram IKAStateinenl: I Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they appl to Anticipated Transient Without Scram:

Effects of boron on reactivity

[~~~~(O,~ O.' J[ 55.41. b(5) Dmoceotial bocoo worth '" " " coco life, aod "'" '"" morn " " ' ' ' " doriog ao ATWT " EOL I,..... I I,.,_.--,..,-:~--c-c-~*. *-R-e-fe_r_e-n_c_e_T-it-le-*,,---------,--,------,q,---..,,-F-a-*c-il-it_y_R_e-fe_r_e-nc_e_N_u_m_b_e_r_*.**.~,,.1 1c-R-e-fe_r_e-ric_e_s_*_ec-t-io_n_*~1 ' Page No l !Revision'

• • • • i' . 1" i ICurvebook 11 S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0016 I 11 I j7 I I II I 11 11 I I II I 11 11 I

~~\Rr,:N~*mh~r  :>*j:'.I Objectives IFRSMOOE004 t

1_ ____,

iP~e.sjJ,~f(So.urce: '! ,_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ __,/ .uu es~J()fi.Mo~ific.~{i()11 M~th(lcJ:. .:~ __________.! ;use<(Ourirlg '"[rainfhg Progfam l D

[q~~~!ip.~Sollrc~f.?ITlrne'ntsl j_________________________________________.I I l I l

RO Skyscraper I...

SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List J SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I lciuestion Top~ I RO 1o I Given the following conditions:

'2 experiences a Rx trip from 100% power when a Main Generator trip

.ses a Main Turbine trip.

- Upon transition to TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response, the PO reports OHA A-6 RMS HI RAD has annunciated, and Radiation Monitor 2R19C - 23SG Slowdown, is in alarm with rising counts.

Which of the following describes how the crew should proceed?

I

[a:! Initiate SI and go to TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. I I

(6, II Enter S2.0P-AB.SG-0001, Steam Generator Tube Leak, while continuing in TRIP-2.

I lsJ IDo NOT initiate any procedures based solely on a 2R19 alarm immediately following a Rx trip.

! I' I

'd. i Enter S2.0P-AB.RAD-0001, Abnormal Radiation, to verify validity of alarm while continuing in TRI P-2.

I

!Answer J Id j IExam :t,everj j R I icog11itive Leyel ;IApplication I !Facility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I IEx?111()at~:

• 11 12/21/20151

!KA:Jj oooo37A201 1.AA2.01 I jROVatue:!I 3.0j iSRoValue:il 3.4j 1

Section:il~ [Ro GrOuri!JI 2j ISRO Group:: I 21 r&11 D isysteri'tJi:;:yolutionTitfe I j Steam Generator Tube Leak 11037

KA statement:! IAbility to determine and interpret the followinq as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak:

I Unusual readings of the monitors; steps needed to verify readings fExpf'.1~~t.i§~ of \I 55.41.b(10) AB.SG says in note un.der entry conditions that R19s are not accurate immediately following a. unit trip and should not Answers: * * . *ii be used as the sole basis for entering 1t. However, AB.RAD should be entered and the alarm venfied as directed at step 3.2. The I

ISI is not warranted without corroborating indications

,___ I 1

Reference Title "

')>*.~*}!< . 11:: *facility Refer~llce Numbef<  :.j .~eference Section *: ' '* .' ,.

[ * * ; i Page.No.

. .... I ... " "

I 1Revisio£li ISteam Generator Tube Leak !I S2.0P-AB.SG-0001 I 112 1129 I I

Abnormal Radiation I 1 S2.0P-AB.RAD-0001 I ii 1 1130 I I II I II 11 I I ABSG01 E003 Objectives 1-----~

II

[qtrestiqr.s.1),urce:\ J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ _.l lQ~e~i,i()h ~62Jfic'e~i()~~.M~t~od: *.*I _________,I !t.15,e~ During l:rainlf1fi P,Fo9rairl1 o to~~.~tk}n sCiut~e ~oiriffi~nt~l I I

!~---------------~----------------------~

11 .**.**** . .

i,COiTI01ent *.* *.

I  !

I I

RO SkyScraper I..

SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I fQuestie>nTopiC 11 RO 11 Given the following conditions:

- 2 is performing a controlled shutdown and cooldown from 100% power due

'"a 5 gpm tube leak on 22 SG !AW S2.0P-AB.SG-0001, Steam Generator Tube Leak.

- After completing the Immediate Actions of EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, following the Rx trip from 20% power, the RO reports that control rod 202 is stuck in the fully withdrawn position.

Which of the following identifies the action, if any, the crew will perform in response to the stuck rod?

~I Initiate a rapid boration for 35 minutes during performance of EOP-TRIP-2.

~I Initiate a rapid boration for 35 minutes in S2.0P-AB.SG-0001 after exiting the TRIP series procedures.

I

'c.: No actions are required for a single stuck rod because SDM for the cooldown to 503 degrees is adequate.

'c!*l I No actions are required for a single stuck rod until the Auto SI Block is performed during RCS depressurization to 1900 psig.

• Answe~'l I b  ! ii:xam Level i IR I !Cognitive Level.: IApplication I !Fadmy: 11 Salem 1 & 2 1 IEx;a~pate: 11 12/21/20151 t<A: ! I 000038G416 l ,2.4.16 i iROVatue: II 3.5j 'SROVallle:Jl4.4 I !.se'ctiofo~j~ [Ro Gro&p:ll 1j !sROGroup:ll 1j ~~ll D

'systerri/Eyolution Title I j Steam Generator Tube Rupture I 1038

• KA sfatenieht: I ,--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--:

Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating

. procedures, abnormal operatin procedures, and severe accident mana ement guidelines.

~swers:. I

[*.EX** * *

• plan. ,,atic;>*!1******~.f 55.41.b(10) Step 3.26.H in AB.SG states to trip the turbine, then trip the Rx at 20% power during the shutdown. The 5 gpm s_ize of

• 1

c* , : the leak will allow for a controlled shutdown, and will also allow the crew to transition to TRI P-2. There are no SGTR diagnostic steps in TRIP-2 that would cause a transition to SGTR-1. AB.SG would be re-entered at step 3.27 following exit of TRIP-2, and 3.28 directs rapid boration for each stuck rod for 35 minutes. The rapid boration will be initiated before any depressurization starts I ***r *. *" .:t. :Reference Title *'  : ij .: F~cilfty Reference N~mber .: *: ItReference Section Page No.i IR~vision I;;;;;;;::============================:::;:;

Steam Generator Tube Leak II S2.0P-AB.SG-0001 j j 29

.=:======================:::=:::

.

IR=e=a=c=to=r=T=ri=p=R=e=sp=o=n=s=e========='-112-EOP-TRIP-2 1

.=:===========~====~~==:=::!

l I

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-' -~~~~~~~~~~~--'!~~~~~~~~-' -~~---'~1==~

t~:o~Number< . , ,,.,.

Objectives I ABSG01 E005

[O~e~!i.~P,~BW°~e:\*J IPrevious 2 NRC Exams Ii~.Li~stiori ¥odif!f~t~~b.N.~tJi~d: ;};, Direct From Source I !use,ciPuringJrainfn!JPrograin I D tbliestio11solJ(cec6rn,ments' j_1_1_-0_1_(_1_2_12_0_1_2_e_x_a_m_J_R_o_o_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes J

..-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-,.!

~Question Topic! IRO 12

• ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I How does the INITIAL Tavg response for a large steam line break (SLB) compare to the Tavg response for a large feed line break (FLB)?

Tavg response is before automatic protective actions occur)

~ I Rises for a SLB and lowers for a FLB.

I

~I Lowers for a SLB and rises for a FLB. ,,

[SJ I Rises for both a SLB and a FLB, rises more for a SLB. I I

I

'd. ! Lowers for both a SLB and a FLB, lowers more for a FLB.

I

[Answer I ["O" iE?<alllLeveli fK:J !Cognitiye'LeveL:j JApplication I jFacility:j jsalem 1 &2 1!Examtiate:*j I 12/21/20151

~Joooo54K101 i!AK1.01 liROValue:tB!sR.o'latye:i[D}isectiori:ll~IR0Group:lLJi5R0Gr6Up:lLJ ~~:lj D

.Systenl/Evolution Title;! ILoss of Main Feedwater I !054 I

i<Astaternei:it:i Knowled e of the operational implications of the following concepts as they appl to Loss of Main Feedwater:

MFW line break depressurizes the S/G (similar to a steam line break f.*f?J~.n~t.*. q.f.1. 55.41.b(5) A steam line break will cause MORE steam to be drawn from the SG, causing Tc to go down, causing Tavg to go down.

. iori 1 1..

,Answers: . . . A Feedline break will send LESS cold water into the SG so it's Tc will rise, and Tavg will rise. KJA match because the operational implication of the SG depressurization (similar to a steam line break) is that an operator would have to use diverse and alternate II I indication to discern what is acrually happening to the SG.

Reference Title * [ . Fa~Hity Reference Nul1'Jbe~. .  !!Reference Section. l i Page No. [ IRevisiOn

=;

;;::::=::::=::::=:.::::::::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=~~====::::=:::::::::::=::::=::::=::::=::::=::::::.:::.

I

'~==========l;:l========ll~=====-1:=1 II ll 11 =='11~=1'i.==='

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,li, _ _ _ _ _ ____,1! ii 11-~'

,'i:;,o. NUmb'er \

Objectives II CN&FDWE016 1_ ___.

'Ma.terialReql.lirecl forE~i:lll'Jiriation**** 11 !j

,oq~s~ioi'! Soyr(:e; xi IFacility Exam Bank Ilqllestig~ Modlfica\iC>n M~t~pd: '. dDirect From Source I!l!sW' Dur@i'Jraii}ing' Pl'<foram l D

',qu~i.~p,!l~0Ar~e,:corr1~~~~j I  :::::======-========::'.=====================:...===============::.._,

so1s9 j

• ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

!Comment I I I I I I

RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List. J Outline Changes J iQuestion Topic I IRO 13 I

~

Given the following conditions:

m Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

- :;,alem Unit 2 is in Mode 4 with 21 loop of RHR in SOC mode.

- Subsequently, a loss of all off site power occurs.

- ALL Unit 2 EDGs fail to start or trip shortly after starting, and ALL Unit 2 4KV vital buses are de-energized.

- The RO reports 21RH18 RHR HX FLOW CONT VALVE indicates 6% open and 2RH20 RHR HX BYP VALVE indicates 15% open, and questions their actual position.

Which of the following describes the operation of the 21RH18 and 2RH20?

~I BOTH the 21RH18 and 2RH20 fail AS IS on a loss of air and the indication is correct.

fbl 'The 21 RH18 fails open and the 2RH20 fails shut, and the board indication shows last known position before the loss of power.

I

c. i BOTH.the 21RH18 and 2RH20 fail SHUT on a loss of air, and the board indication shows how far they shut before losing all air pressure for operation. II r--cc

~rd tb~forA lodon...alJ...gj~

'rl ;

l..:_J I! ROTH tbA 21RH18 '2nd ?RH?O fail OPFlll on" loss of gjr for operation.

• indic'2+/-ion s:hrnw: ho"' far

, * ~ *

Answer1 ~ !Exam Level l ~ !c()gnitive Leve( I!Memory I !Facility:J j Salem 1 & 2 I JExaml:)~t~:l l___1_2_12_11_2_0_15__.I

~I oooossA201 I EA2.01 I iRc)Vatlle: 0"1sRC> Valu.e:.§'se'diof'l: 1 I~ :Ro Group:! LJ 'sRo Groll?:' LJ D

,SysteJil!Ev9lution Title i l_s_ta_t_io_n_B_la_c_k_o_u_t_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___. ~0_55_ _~

KA Statement: i Ability to determine and interpret the followin as they appl to Station Blackout:

Existing valve positioning on a loss of instrument air system

'Ex :lion ,ot,d 55.41.b(7) The 21RH18 and the 2RH20 fail AS IS on a loss of control air, and both are supplied air exclusively from the "A" header.

iAns~v~rs: : : * ** !I Unit 2 ECAC supplies the "A" air header. With the Unit 2 ECAC also failing to start, control air pressure will bleed away fairly

• * *I rapidly. The console indication will indicate actual valve position since 115VIB power should be available from the inverters for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following a LOPA The valve positions given in the stem are what would be expected with a loop of RHR in SDC mode.

Reference Title It Facility Reference Number.: >.I t~eferehce Section frPage f>:'o. I [R_evision

=

:==:::=:::::::::::=:::::::=::::=::::::::::=:::=::====::=::~~==========::=::::=::::=::::::::::.

~IL=o=ss=o=f=C=o=nt=ro=I=A=ir=========I S=2=.0=P=-=A=B=.C=A=-0=0=01=====i========'..1~3=6===:II:.=1=8===

!=I

\====================='~===============~=========~!

---

~ ______________, -------~'-~~~!~~~

=~'

i[~o:'.N'iimber.>:"

Objectives I LOPAOOE010 iQu~stio~~oprb~.'.!l'! j_N_e_w__________, itlli}'t~Ho,nMoaiticati~nMethod: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___. :u~~cl .ouHr19orrairjJri9 Program ! oI

!Que;;;non,sourc~co.hlrrienfsi *-----------------------------------------~'

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes iQuesti96'l'9plc'l 1Ro 14 I Given the following conditions:

- 2B Vital Instrument Bus (VIB) Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) Static

~*vltch has been placed in the Bypass to Alternate position !AW 2B VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS UPS SYSTEM OPERATION.

- ALL power supplies to the 2B VIB UPS are available.

- Subsequently, the breaker from 2B 230VAC bus to the 2B VIB AC Line Regulator fails and opens.

What will be the effect on 2B VIB?

The 2B VIB will. ..

I

~ NOT deenergize because the Static Switch will automatically swap to the Preferred Source.

I

~I NOT deenergize because the inverter will automatically power the 2B VIB through the inverter auctioneering circuit from its DC source.

I

[Gl Ideenergize until manual operator action is taken to re-energize the 2B VIB by placing the Static Switch in Normal and placing the Test Transfer switch to N (Normal). I id.!

Ideenergize until manual operator action is taken to re-energize the 2B VIB by placing the Static Switch in Isolate (Alternate) and placing the Test Transfer Switch to N (Normal).

I

Answer'! c  ! !exam Levell !R I  !

cognitive l..evel

• 1 AQQlication i IFa.dlity: WSalem 1 & 2 l~E:xanipate.~ W 12/21/20151, i!<A:il 000057A101 i1AA1.01 1IRoNalue:!13.7*1 !SRO Value: ii 3. 7j lsec~ion: q~ i.Ro Group:!!-2J iSR.o 'Group:! I 1 ! D

!System/Evolutlori Title I !Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus I !o57

[!<'A Statement:! Abilit to operate and I or monitor the followin as they apply to Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:

. Manual inverter swapping fEXplanaHciri*'of  ! 55.41.b(7) The VIB UPS static switch is transferred from norm to alt by placing the test transfer switch to ALT JAW Section 5.4 of

!Answers:  ! S0.115-0012. Then the Manual Bypass Switch is placed in Bypass to Alternate to physically position contacts B 1, B2, and B4 I (closed) and 83, B5 open. The VIB will deenrgize when power is lost to the AC line regulator, which is the Alternate source.

Placing the static s'0tch in Normal .and test transfer ~witch to N (from alte~nate) is directed by S0-115-0012, Section 5.'..3 and.

Icould be powered fro~ another source. A-is incorrect because automatic transfer is unavailable with the staic switch not in the Normal posiiton. B is incorrect because the static switch is aligned to alternate, and While the DC power is supplying the inverter, I the inverter output cannot flow through static switch with B3 and B5 contacts open.

[\:: ;;.* <:; *:. *J~efere@e'.1me * *** * * *** *'I t:: Fac!lity Rete.re.hse r-i~mber il!3efer.erice sectr6ri '" .l i i;>age No. 1 IRevisioTll 128 VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS UPS SYSTEM 0 iIS2.0P-S0.115-0012 i15.4 iI19 11!=6==::'.

j 2B VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS UPS SYSTEM 0 II S2.0P-S0.115-0012 !I Exhibit 1 (Static Switch I156 116

!------------'!----------' I ===

1-~

fL~q;}lµmber . :*.. * *I Objectives I 115VACE014

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper j

RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I

iauestiof\ Topic'.! I RO 15 I Given the following conditions: I

- 2 tripped due to a transformer problem.

- ,_,-..and 2C Vital Susses are energized in SEC Mode 2.

- 28 Vital Bus is de-energized because 28 Diesel Generator failed to start.

- OHA B-10, 28 125VDC CNTRL BUS VOLT LO, just actuated.

In accordance with S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0002, Overhead Annunciators Window B, which of the following describes the required action?

~ IPlace the 2B2 Battery Charger in service.

I fb.l ITransfer the 281 Charger to its alternate power supply.

I

!c. i Transfer 2B 125 VDC bus loads to their alternate source.

I

[ctl Ensure the 282 Battery Charger has automatically energized.

'Answer i a  ! I !Exam Level ! IR I !cognitive ~eve( J IApplication I iFa~H~ty: j ISalem 1 & 2 1 !ExamDat~: 11 12/21/20151, JI~ rRO Group:j LJ ;SRO Group:; LJ j!~m D

?<*

~I 000058A 101

,~m~

~

IIAA 1.01 I [RO Value: I§ 1SRO Value::@ ;Section: '

I

• Systein/E:,)()11.JtrohTitle j !_L_os_s_o_f_D_C_P_ow_er_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I '058 I iKA. Statement: I IAbility to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to Loss of DC Power: I I Cross-tie of the affected de bus with the alternate supply I i~~.Pl?nation otH 55.41.b(8) The 281 battery charger is normally in service. The use of 282 Battery charger is limited to 7 days per Tech Specs and

!'Answers: .  !! is n~t normally in service. There is no auto swap. Transferring loads is only done if the backup battery charger cannot be placed in service.

..** Reference'Jitle * :> * .* .  :'. *. F?cilityReferenceNumber **** ! lkefereryceSectfon 1

.* l 1. P~9:$ N~-1 t~~y!s!Oh IOverhead Annunciators Window B 11 S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0002 11 I j 21-22 1136 I

~,=================1i1=============q~========::::i1 ii I 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,ll1----------'lll _____ ___,q~:::~11~=:_=_=_.::::,!

Lo. Number "':* ... j I DCELECE005 I

• !Vlateria)Re'quirecl,fo~~aminanon ,*I I f(luesti~!:?o~f?~:);j IFacility Exam Bank I [Q~e~~ion,M§c![~!(;atigh:'Meth§c!: >~Editorially Modified I illseCI [)urirJ.gTratrling Program j O

~=====-=:::::.:::=:::::.:=::=:::::::.::::::.:::::::::.============-================--1 iql(~.~tion souice,comrrli~t¥i 1so249

!------~--~~----------------~------------------~----------------------'

'I I I I

. RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I iQuestion Topic 11 RO 16 I Which of the following identifies when the 21/22SW122, CC HX SW INLET VALVES automatically reposition, and why?

,/22SW122 valves ...

I

['.] Iopen on ANY SI signal to ensure cool CCW is supplied to the RHR HXs and pump seals.

I

[gJ I close on ANY SI signal to ensure SW pump runout does not occur with all CFCUs running.

I

[211 open on a SI signal coincident with a LOOP to ensure cool CCW is supplied to the RHR HXs and pump seals.

11 I

eJ 'dose on a SI signal coincident with a LOOP to ensure SW pump runout does not occur with all CFCUs running.

I

'A.nswel" i Id I iExatn Level J ~ lcog~itive Leyet .** i IMemory I !facility: J ISalem 1 & 2 I IExam Date: 'I i . . <."*'*

12/21/2015j

_._,,ii 000062K302

'KA: IjAK3.02 1 IR.0)1aiue:rj 3.6j 1sRo\ft:11ue:1I 2.91 !s~~ti9ii:H~ [RC>,9mup:ll 11 [sR.o G~()tiP=I! 11 ~~I~ D

,system/Evolution Title l ILoss of Nuclear Service Water 11062 iKA. Statement

I Knowledqe of the reasons for the following responses as thev apolv to Loss of Nuclear Service Water:

1

!The automatic actions (alionments) within the nuclear service water resulting from the actuation of the ES FAS I

~~plan'afic\i1 pf :1 55.41 (7,8) The SW122 valve are normally open and operate in conjunction with the CCW HX SW outlet valves SW127. During a SI IAflsw~fs:*: \ ..J coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power, the SW122 valves are automatically repositioned from open to shut. SEC Mode Ill closes 1SW122's due to SW Pump runout (and potential loss of all SW) concerns with all CFCU's l/S if only 2 SW pumps are operating, I. Rn l

due to EOG/SEC failure. Also, the SW122's must stroke closed in less than 30 seconds to ensure the CFCU's are operational within s----"~ '-"-* inn "-..lo Ill '-'"~tinn IT--'-

C::---

'<Ill '< 'l T.,hlo '< ':l_C::\

. Reference Title < I!O: Facility Reference Number *  ! ff{efe_r'ence Sectfon l

• ;Page No: J jRevisicm:

I;::::::::::::=:====::=:::=:::=:==::=:::::::=:::=:::::::=:====::=:::::~===========::::::=:======::=::::::::.~======::=:::::::::::====::::

Service Water System - Nuclear 11 NOS05SWONUC 11 I j 34-35 1113 I 1~===========1i1=======:1.~1=======q ii I l, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.11 _ _ _ _ __.i,l _ _ _____,ll II I

\;o:cN"timbef :* '! Objectives I SWONUCE006 I I

[<;lties'ti6i,i;$Ci~rce:fl I Facility Exam Bank I i}:l~estioll Modifica~ic>§M~fu~c:tS{: ~Direct From Source I .lls~dpi,iripg Trafnirlg prpgram'j D I!9~~S:ti9ti,~,ource,co~fii~~ts[ ;======~==========:'.::'.::::'.::'.::::'.::'.:::~===========-================--,,1j 1125675 I *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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[Question 'ropiC I RO 17 I I 80'h Salem Units are operating normally at 100% power when Unit 2 recieves OHA A-7 FIRE PROT FIRE.

v. , of the following is a correct response when assessing the affected Fire Zone(s) on 2RP5, and why? I

~I If ANY rows "Fire" light is illuminated ensure at least one Fire Pump is running to supply fire protection water by verifying OHA A-15 FIRE PUMP 1/2 RUN. I I

~ If a fire is indicated in the Relay Room select Fire Outside Control Area in both control rooms to prevent smoke from entering control rooms.

I l

tc. j If ANY C02 I Halon Discharge lights are lit then ensure EOG control room ventilation has automatically stopped to prevent egress of gas to

- adjoining areas. I

ct.)

I If fire indication for BOTH Zones 59 and 74 are received, then open 2FP147 Fire Protection Containment Isolation to provide normally isolated fire protection water to containment.

I l'Ans'(>'er I d l I i.f::xam Levi:;! !IR I l<;ognitive Level ! I Memory I ifacility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I IE:x<irllb<ite: 11 12/21/20151 i

KA: 000067K302 IAK3.02 : !R.0Va1ue:lj 2.5I :sR.ova1t.ie:C'!j 3.3I fsectiC>ri:H~ IRc:>Grpup:ll 21 tsRdGrouiJ~ll 2j ~1~ D

[Sy5,tern/Evpltiti8r'i Title I _P_la_n_t_F_ir_e_o_n_S_ite_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I !057 1

i KAstatement:I Knowledqe of the reasons for the followinq responses as they apply to Plant Fire on Site:

Steps called out in the site fire protection plan, FPS manual, and fire zone manual I

'.Expianatlon of I 55.41.b(10,4) A is incorrect because the FIRE light can illuminate if a manual fire pull box is activated, which only gives indication

!Answers: *.*. I and does not initiate fire protection water flow. C is incorrect because Halon supplied to relay rooms would not indicate stopping EOG supply ventilation. B is incorrect because for a fire in Relay Room (physically located outside CR but using same AC system)

Fire Outside Control Area would not be selected. D is correct because the fire protection line to containment is normally isolated

---1 ic- lf '--"- c::a -~....1 7A .... 1--C" - - - ----: ...... -J

• ,** 'Referenc¢ Title*, '"" . :. <it. **'f?si\ity Refer~nce Ni.irfitje'f <* ! [Reference Section

• j rPag~ No~! !R.evi!;ion' IControl Room Fire Response iIS2.0P-AB.FIRE-0001 I ii 2 11 9 I

!Overhead Annunciators - Window A II S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0001 I 1123-24 I 156 I I

I II I ii !I I I

I I Objectives I

FIRPROE008

!ht.fes,tlonSource.:.::1 ,_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.I r9uestionlV!Od[fipationMeth(id: n I!l)sed,Durin9Trainh19 Program I DI

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!~----------------------------------------~

I I I I l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~__,I 1-

RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List .  ! SRO System/Evolution List _I Outline Changes I lduestion Topic 11 RO 1 a I Given the following conditions:

.rators are performing actions in 2-EOP-FRCC-1, Response to Inadequate vvre Cooling.

I- Containment pressure is 2 psig and stable.

Which of the following describes the SG level and AFW flow requirements PRIOR to initiating the SG Depressurization to Inject ECCS Accumulators?

SG NR level in at least one SG must be greater than ___

I

.<L 119% OR total AFW flow must be >22E4 lbm/hr.

11

[i>:j 115% OR tot'I AFW fl~ m"'t be >22E 4 lbm/h1. 1I re.! 19% AND total AFW flow available of >22E4 lbm/hr. I

~ 115% AND total AFW flow available of >22E4 lbm/hr. Il IAFW pump I l.E~pj~~~tioll**~f! 55.41.b(10) Step 13 asks if any SG NR level is >9% (15% adverse). Since containment pressure is stated as 2 psig, it is below the Answers:*>*'* l 4 psig at which adverse numbers would be used. If SG NR level is >9% in at least one SG, the step for asking if >22E4 lbm/hr AFW flow is present is bypassed. If SG NR level is <9%, then it requires 22E4 lbm/hr. So you need at least 9% OR actual total AFW flow >22E4 lbm/hr. The availability is plausible as it is used in other Emerg procedures, but in this case a secondary heat sink l

is c:emiir:ed ~d£blcb i._... ...J-.C:---' ..,._... ..... not~ r-r -....'1'1~A tt--11-.- &1-u1 I i **.*.*Reference Title *1'

• Facility Reference Nufriber i [Reference Section

• l IPage No.! !Revision' I Response to Inadequate Core Cooling 112-EOP-FRCC-1 ll ii 2 1122 I I II ii II 11 I I II II ll II I I

Objectives I FRCCOOE005 loue~tlo~.§9ii(c~: J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ _I ~to u~e::.sc.cti::.o'::.li-::.JV.....

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RO Sky Scraper. I. SRO Skyscraper J --R_o_s_y_st...e_m_1E_v_o_1u... ti_on_u_st......, SRO System/Evolution List .1. Outline Changes f (Question Topic I !_R_o_19_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,

Ur"? is at 80% power when RMS channel 2R31, Letdown Line-Failed Fuel Process Rad Monitor starts a rising trend.

v, responding with S2.0P-AB.RC-0002, High Activity in Reactor Coolant System, how will operators differentiate between a crud burst and failed fuel as the cause of the rising 2R31 indication?

~I By monitoring 2R31. Fuel damage will cause the indication to rise at a higher rate than a crud burst.

I

[gJ I By raising letdown flow rate to 120 gpm. The 2R31 readings will lower if crud burst caused the rising trend but will NOT lower if failed fuel caused the rising trend.

~!By requesting Radiation Protection to survey the letdown pipe area in the Auxiliary building. Radiation levels will be higher due to failed fuel 1

than from a crud burst. I 1

,d. i 'By requesting a Shift Chemistry Technician perform a radiological analysis of the RCS. A crud burst will show different concentrations of certain radionuclides than will failed fuel. I!

Answer I@=] jE:xamLevet: ~ jcogniti'/eLevel I IMemory I [Fa,cmty::i ISalem 1 & 2 l JExamDate:j ! 12121120151

~I oooo76A203 IIAA2.03 : JRo vaiue:'j IJ]" fsROya1ue:I~ ;secti911: iI~ [Ro Group:! LJ is RO Gfol.li:):! LJ ~'l~ D

System/Evolutiem Title. j j High Reactor Coolant Activity I ~0_7_6_~

l<A Stat'eh'lent:: IAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to High Reactor Coolant Activity*

RCS radioactivity level meter

!ExplaT)atior\ of! 55.41.b(5,10) Dis correct.This is the method as directed by procedure to determine if there is failed fuel. A is incorrect because

AnsW~fs: * "*; there is no procedural guidance for the operator to use to determine source of elevated readings by how fast indications are rising.

C is incorrect because Radiation Protection is sent to perform surveys to repost areas as necessary for personnel protection, not to determine source of activity .. B is incorrect because Letdown is maximized to expedite RCS cleanup for valid elevated activity, not to determjne ca1 !SP of the elevated actj~£it I

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l______________.!, __________.11, ________.I 11=,_=_=_=_=......lj _ ___,I

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• '.:<.\

I Objectives BRC02E001 I ABRC02E003 j_ __,

i()tiest\c>ri spurc~:.' ~; IFacility Exam Bank I !Qi.i~~t!o~ ~"C1cti,fili~t.l()nMetf1od:'* I Direct From source I fU~ed ol.l'ringirairtriig ~rogram I DI

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I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I. RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I

-~--~~ ;:::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::-:-~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::~.::'.'.'.'.:::::::::::::::::::::'._.:._.:.__;_.:._.:.__;__;__;_:...-,I

!Question Topic! RO 21 I

• ~------~~--~-----------~---~---~~--------~---~

Given the following conditions:

- 3LOCA has occurred.

- I ne crew is performing the actions of EOP-LOCA-2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DE PRESSURIZATION.

- SI pumps have been stopped.

- Normal Charging is aligned.

- The crew is depressurizing the RCS using normal spray.

Which of the following describes the strategy for controlling RCS subcooling during the depressurization?

~a.j l Subcooling will be ...

minimized to reduce RCS break flow.

I I

~ maximized to ensure continued RCP operation.

I tsJ Imaximized to prevent a challenge to the core cooling critical safety function.

11

'cf.

Iminimized to ensure pressurizer level remains above the lower limit to allow heater operation during the RCS cooldown.

I Ariswer I Fl :Exam Lever I fR=J [cognitive Level i !Memorv I !Facility~ W Salem 1 & 2 l~ExamDate:;*H--_1_2_12_1_12_0_15__,j

!<AiJI OOWE03A103 D 1$yst~J!iiE.v_olution Title i I LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

!KA Staterne!lt: [ IAbility to operate and I or monitor the followinq as they apply to LOCA Cool down and Depressurization:

Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

..... **. . . . *.**I

!}O:~ptaqation ofl 55.41.b(10) Strategy of step 31 is to depressurize and attempt to minimize subcooling so that break flow is reduced, due to the

• Ariswers: ; . < i minimal makeup provided by charging pumps. Bis incorrect because RCP operation is not required for this event. although I desired. C is incorrect because core cooling should not be challenged on loss of subcooling at these temps and pressures(this point in the cooldown) D is incorrect because PZR heater operation may be required to reduce the rate of increase in pressurizer I

, leHel b1 it is oaf tbe r::easoc fat wicimizicc:i s11bcocfico d

1:.*. :C:("

,:.~ef~!"~nC:e"J"ttJe .**... *..

• 1:I ~ ('; .f~(;ilityRef~rerice-Nu[nber *. *,*I 'Reference,$~'cticm . ImPage No,*! i~eviSi()n: I I Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 112-EOP-LOCA-2 Basis Doc ii step 31 1159 1125 I I II I 11 11 I

! II I lj II I l LOCA02E001 Objectives looe~trciry;$o~i'c~':,;,l IFacility Exam Bank 1 l.(l~f:!¥tr&i\ M:i:~d\~fatl9r;iMeihod: . *II Direct From source I jli$~p ot1rii-}9.Tl"~r:trr19<p[6grahtl o

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~~~~__:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=::::::::::::~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List I. s.Ro System/Evolution List I. Outline Changes I

[Question Topic I IRO 22 l I

Given the following conditions:

1 2 is attempting to identify and isolate a LOCA outside containment.

- L.-EOP-LOCA-6, LOCA Outside Containment. has just been entered.

- The source of the water is backleakage from the 23 cold leg injection line.

Assuming that any valves required to be operated during LOCA-6 operate correctly, which of the following leak locations would NOT be isolated while using 2-EOP-LOCA-6?

[]I On the valve inlet flange on 22SJ49, RHR DISCH TO COLD LEGS.

I

[§]I On the valve outlet flange on 21SJ49, RHR DISCH TO COLD LEGS.

I

[SJ I Between the 2RH20, RHR HX BYP VALVE and the 2RH26, HOT LEG ISOL VALVE.

I fd.11 Between the 2RH2, RHR COMMON SUCT VALVE, and 22RH4, RHR PMP SUCT VALVE.

I I I *Answer 1 b I I IExaIT!i...eveJ 11 R I !cognitive).evel i IApplication I !Fasility~ !ISalem 1 & 2 I !ExamDate: 11 12/21/2015!

I [Tii iSRO Value:d~ rSect1on: 11~ [RQGroup:/LJ i~r~:~ 0

?~*-"".*-'!"""""'>~

I  ! . -~ ;*,

KA

I' OOWE04K202 11 EK2.2 j IRQYalue: I jSRQ Groµp:10 I jE04 iKA Statemeht: 1 i Knowledqe of the interrelations between LOCA Outside Containment and the followinq:

I Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations

. between the proper operation of these svstems to the operation of the facilitv. l IExplanatren

~swer~: :

~f i!

Ji 55.41 (3,8) 2-EOP-LOCA-6 closes/checks closed the following valves: 2RH 1 OR 2RH2, 21 and 22RH19s, 2RH26, 21 and 22SJ49s. Using drawing 205332-SIMP. it shows that any leak between the RH1/2 and the SJ49s will be isolated with the above I valves closed. The only location which wouldn't be.affected. by those valve being close.din the downstre~m/outlet .side of the SJ49 I valves. The stem statement of proper valve operation was inserted to preclude a candidate from assuming a leaking valve may not

'close fJ i!l~' M11- Vt I\ - ;,... h .... ,... ...... ~ ,...,..., L'- - ~ - L.. - - * ..,, ,..., *-"' i,...,,...i,...,.... - - - * ,: ....[ ......... ,...,,...,..,......

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I".

)::_;;;~:~'; _,,." Reference

'ritJe.<

,* ~1 F:'f'i,3cUityReferei\c;eNurriber. *A [R~feforceSect\o~**. ;>j* 1*[.Page,No.d: .. . ... ,, ..... "I

!Revision 1 I LOCA Outside Containment 112-EOP-LOCA-6 I 11 1 j21 I I 11205332-SIMP I ii 11 I l

I ii 11 11 11 I

[L.(). Nµrr1be~ :>

I LOCA06E002 Objectives

[Ou!:'.stion.~()lltc;:~: ~11 Facility Exam Bank I [a1:1esti~n.~9~lf!q~ti0~.M~th<>,d: ~Direct From Source I iLI.se~J:i@r:19:l'l'<1fofo9 Progral11j O j

[ou~stlon S@rc~ C~m'O{~~tsj 1133792. Used 3 NRC exams ago Sept 2011 RO exam I

I I I

I 11-

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

RO SkyScraper . SRO Skyscraper I __R_o_s_y_s1_em_1_E_vo_1u_1_io_n_L_ist.-...J __sR_o_sy_s_1e_m_1_Ev_o_1u_1i_on_L_is_t...... Outline Changes

!6tiestionToplp 11 RO 23 I Giv 0 ri the following conditions:

- , crew is in 2-EOP-FRHS-1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, and the criteria for initiating RCS bleed and feed has been met.

- Prior to the actual procedure steps there is a CAUTION statement that reads:

TO ESTABLISH RCS HEAT REMOVAL BY RCS BLEED AND FEED, STEPS 24 THRU 29 MUST BE PERFORMED QUICKLY AND WITHOUT INTERRUPTION Which of the followinQ describes the basis for that statement?

§]I Stopping RCP's is the first step in the process. This terminates all RCS heat removal until bleed and feed is initiated.

I I

~ Expeditious performance of the steps allows time for other compensatory actions if bleed and feed actions are unsuccessful.

I

!SJ IDelay allows core cooling to degrade further. RCS pressure rises such that ECCS flow is lower when bleed and feed is initiated.

I I

~ Establishing SI flow and then delaying opening the PZR PORVs may lead to damage to the PORVs and Code Safety Valves when they pass water.

I' IAnswerj c I I [ExamLevetJ j R I lC:ogllitive L.~vel ,IMemory I if~ci.Hty: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I' .. **.***** ... i I

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'"-;:::=====-=======-====-=======:..:=:::::..:.::=====..:..:::::::..:.:::::::..:.::======::.=:::::..:.::======:::::..:.:::::::..:.:::_

'Systef1l/E11C>lution Title I j Loss of Secondary Heat Sink I E05

'KA S t a t e m e n t : : . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

I KnowledQe of operational implications of EOP warninos, cautions, and notes.

i'.;' (.; L:* 'Refere~pefltle'.;*;

=~~;;;;

;:;;:::;:::;:;;;;;:;;;;;;;;~~~~::::::::::.::.:::::~

i j *. Facility Referehce,t:fomber I[Refer$nce SectiC>~ *.* l f Page No.1 n~.elfiS.i()ni L=o=s=s=of=S=e=c=on=d=a=ry=H=e=a=t i.::1 ========ii 2-EOP-FRHS-1 ii Basis Doc 117 1124 I

~1===================lll===============:ll~======~i1 1

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,ll, _ _ _ _ _ ___.11 _ _ _ ___.q IIII II t1,.;o,.r;rilrnber*H.,1:,,*

!FRHSOOE009 Objectives I

!Material Req~ifedfor Examfoatlon II I!

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RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List f SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I.....

louesficinTopicj I RO 24 Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- JCA has occurred.

- vvnile performing 2-EOP-LOCA 1 "LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT" 22 RHR pump motor seizes and power is lost to 21 RHR pump.

- The crew enters 2-EOP-LOCA-5, "LOSS OF EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION".

- A cooldown has been initiated as directed in 2-EOP-LOCA-5.

- During the cooldown, the crew restores power to 21 RHR pump.

- RWST Level is 30' Based on current plant conditions, which of the following describes the mitigation strategy?

~I Continue with the cooldown and start 21 RHR pump when directed in 2-EOP-LOCA-5.

I I

fb. j Return to 2-EOP-LOCA-1 and continue recovery actions with the step previously in effect.

I

[Cl l Start 21 RHR pump and continue actions of 2-EOP-LOCA-5 until the RWST LO Level alarm actuates. I I

~I Start 21 RHR pump and transition to 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, to verify recirculation flowpath.

I

!Ansvveri Ib I IEXam Levelj IR I !cognitive Lever i IMemory 1 lfa~ility; 11 Salem 1& 2 I t~~c:i~i;>~te: l I 12/21/2015!

.. . _.,, ,, .. p:w' ~ "'

~I OOWE11A103 Valµe:,@[sect1on:J!~ ;Ro Gro1Jp:(LJ;SR,()C3JPIJP::LJ f.rl:~ D

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1IEA1.3 I 1ROValue:1[IiJ1sRO Systefo/Evoh:ition Titl~ l ILoss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation I ~'E_1_1_ _

iKA. Statement:: IAbility to operate and for monitor the following as they apply to Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation:

IDesired operatin results durin abnormal and emer enc situations.

(Explatj~ti~1}:1,f j 55.41.b(10) B is correct because Continuous action step states that if any train of emergency recirculation capability is restored th]n

• Answers: .* <\<<\*: the crew should return to the procedure and step in effect. This is consistent with the organization of the EOPs. C is incorrect because Continuous action Step 6.1 directs return to evaluate train status and a return to the procedure in effect; A is incorrect because continuation of the cooldown in LOCA-5 is not required. The purpose of the procedure is mitigation and recovery of 1

~ redrc1 ilation canahiljh1 D is jncorrect bpca11se a transfer to I OCA-3 is not initiated 1intj! R\A/ST level is AHali 1ated jn t OCA-1 Th' Iquestion is not considered SRO level based on only requiring general mitigative actions. I

. ,**** ). Reference TiUe *' ;, ; *.* *.** ., ii ;; Facility ~~fer~nce Nulllber ,; I:*Reference S~ctiqll .*. xj rf.?agf No:! L~~yisl~n:

I:=::=======================.:::.::::

Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation 112-EOP-LOCA-5 j 25

===

I ~I===

-~-----------~-~-~*--------~------'*~-------~ -----~~--'

Lo: Nljrpber. I I LOCA05E008 Objectives r('.;hl~~Eci,h.,~pc!fc~: *11 Facility Exam Bank I !pue~tion llJlpdifiq~ti~n.~!tft§ct:'-::11 Direct From Source Iivs.~cipllf!ri91r~[rliQQ Pr9gram.1 DI IC2uestf<>n~ourc,~~omij\enfa! ,_s_1_0_9_5--------------------------------------~'I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper* 1 RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List (

Outline Changes I

!qu,~sti6nTopic l I RO 25 11 G* - the following conditions:

- - ... t 1 has experienced a MSLB at the mixing bottle.

- MSLI has failed to close ANY MS167.

- Operators have transitioned out of 1-EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant.

- RCS pressure is 1345 psig and dropping slowly.

- RCS Tes are dropping.

Which of the following describes Reactor Coolant Pump strategy, and why?

RCPs should ...

~I be tripped to minimize the heat input into the RCS.

I

µ;;: Icontinue to be run, because RCP pressure dependent trip criteria are only applicable during a LBLOCA.

I I

,c.: continue to be run, since RCP pressure dependent trip criteria is not used when a cooldown is in progress.

I I

~I be tripped so that 2 phase flow doesn't develop if they were to be tripped later in the event, leading to higher peak clad temperatures.

I

'Aris.Yet: I jc I !Ex~nf Level j IR I i,C:9gnltive Level I

Application I !Facility: j J Salem 1 & 2 I le~*~1;noat~: 11 12/21/2015!

.KA:il OOWE12A202 1IEA2.2 jiRb}/a1ue~:j 3.4J.sR6Varll~~ll 3.9jtse'cti91"1=ll..~-~=~-LffoGfoup:il 1j[s.R0Grolip:I! 1j ~~ 0

systero/EvolutiorfTiire: j Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators I 1E12

[KA Statement:! Ability to determine and interoret the followino as they apply to Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators:

Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

~~pf~~31tio~ of! 55.41.b(10,3)The RCP trip criteria with regards to pressure in a LOSC condition is for pump protection only. The Generic issues

!Answers: .*.*, .* i segment of the ERG executive volume describes the SBLOCA scenarios where pumping coolant out the break then stopping RCP's l

leads to peak clad temps in excess of 2200 degrees. That is not applicable here. What is more important in the LOSC is forced flow. LOSC-2 basis document page 12.

I 1 I!:1

' < };*/' ** *.. R,ef~rerice Title. * <IF *,facHity R.~fefe~Ce Num6e'H j [R~ference s~cfion * . j f.Page t'fo. J lRevisiOn 1 iIMultiple Steam Generator Depressurization Ij 1-EOP-LOSC-2 !I 1112 J I22 I ii II ll ii 1I I 111-----------'H--------il*---~il 11 I

~i.;~,o~::~,~.mb,er:: ,;~:\. -~

I LOSC02E003 Objectives

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!ouestjol1 Topic'! I RO 26

!~~-~~~~~-~~~-~---~~-----~-~-~~~--~~--~~~~--~

I Given the following conditions:

2 has experienced an event which has resulted in 24 SG pressure rising to 1115 psig.

- , , 1v1SLI has been performed.

How many total SG Safety Valves will be open if 24 SG pressure remains at 1115 psig and all Safety Valves operate when expected?

~I 2

[a.::

I I

[!:_] 13 I

rc~: 14 l:..:.::...:...

I ict.I 15 I

Answerj rD° IExarn Leyei I~ [Cogriiti,_;e L.evel  ! IMemory I' * 'j Salem 1 & 2 I [ExamDat~: .j j 12/21/20151

~loowE13K202 l;EK2.2 .rR()Vaii.ie:iO]"l$ROVa1ue:IQ}J;sectlOil~d~1~0. c;roup:J[JJisRo.<:;rollf:l:![] ~~~~ D

[Systel'll/Evot'utiohTltle  ! ISteam Generator Overpressure I _E_1_3_ _

KA Staternent: ! IKnowledge of the interrelations between Steam Generator Overpressure and the following:

' Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations I between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

~~~zt!~on of! 55.41.b( 4) Each SG has five safeties, with lift setpoints of 1070, 1100, 1110, 1120, 1125 psig c--~~~cc-- *. ~-R-e-'fe~.r_e_ll_c=e.'~T-it-,e-**-*. --~~--~i ..-.-N_V_!Tl_Q_e_r_:_,,u [Reference Section, .i rF'<i9eNo. ! IRevision!

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ISTMGENEOOS Objectives. I I

IQyestien sdU'rce:c,j IFacility Exam Bank I :d~~~iic)1frv1s>(jiflc~E()~.l'flf:tl')()~: .J Direct From source I f!:Jsed owing*f~i:iirling'i>ro9rarri j o I lduestfoh Source Gorliffl~n~sl 1152360 used 3 NRC exams ago Sept 2011.

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I Outline Changes I (Qi.l(!~tion Topfo! RO 27 l I j..Qf +hq following choices, which is the only automatic action expected to occur as containment pressure rises from 12 psig to 18 psig during a LOCA? l

~ IPhase A Isolation 1.

[b."11 Feedwater Isolation.

I

,i::.i IMain Steam line Isolation.

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---c j

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,cl. 1 Containment Vent1lat1on lsolat1on Ii

~--c!,::;";==~-;::::::::::::=::;:::::::::-;::::==::;-;:=::;::::;::==:::::::::::::;r:::========~::::::::::::::::::;-r==========~====:::::::::;r==========71 lAnswe'rl ~ !Exam Levell ~ 1Cogriitive l.eye(I IMemory I I jF'adrity:! Salem 1 & 2 I !Exarpo,~W;*:J I 12121120151!

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li<Astat'emenl:I Ability to operate and I or monitor the followinq as they apply to Hicih Containment Pressure:  !

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

~~~l~~::I~~'~j;~l ;;~~~~(?~::~~:i~ ::~::~\~~ ~~~~~! ~~ :~~ ~: ~i(~~* ~~i~~=t !~~~:ryJ:~:~:~~~i~:~=o~~tf~~r~~:Utr: ~:~g5i~s~~~t~~~:i~1:enn~tVen isolation occurs any SI, RMS alarm of associated monitors, Phase B. The SI signal would have already actuated.

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• i b:,, FC1cilifyRefel'.enceNtnhber ,. I !Retef.erice sE!.~~ion .*** j ! Page N():J IRevjsionl

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L=ic=e=ns=e=d=O=p=er=a=to=r=F=lu=en=c=y=Li=st======::.JINOS05FLU NCY

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Objectives IFLUNCYE002 I

l2!:!~sji'§lj,~o~fceFj IFacility Exam Bank I j.(luestjq~]:Mf??ifitati?h,M~~~d: concept Used

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[<foestjop Topic\ RO 28 I Which of the following identifies when will OHA E-48 ROD BOTTOM will clear during a reactor startup?

1) rods are withdrawn past 2)

-\ steps.

~ 11) Control Bank A 2)20 I fir] 11) Control Bank A

~

.~

2)35 I

~ 11) Control Bank D

2) 20 I!

fAnswer] ~ !EXarn Level i ~ l,cpg~itive Level J j Memory I if~cmty: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !Exa,fnf:)ate: !I 12/21/2015 j

~l 001000A302 l A3.02 1

!Rp,Vaitie:i[]l_nsRo Va1tie;I[Ifil,sedi6n: II~ !R6Grbtip:\LJ ~rn*o Group:l[JJ D 1

'systerTI/Evoll.ltibnTitlel l_c_o_n_tr_ol_R_o_d_D_riv_e_S_.Y,_s_te_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I i001 KAStatement:! Abili to monitor automatic operations of the Control Rod Drive S stem including:

Rod hei ht 1EJ<:pla11ation of ! 55.41.b(6) There are 3 Rod Bottom Bypass Bistable Modules, for Control Banks B, C, and D only 1

Answers

' . 1)Blocks OHA E-48, ROD BOTTOM for its own bank when entire bank is <35 steps 2)When all banks are on bottom, OHA E-48, ROD BOTTOM alarm is illuminated.

I 1

3)When Control Bank A is >20 steps alarm is cleared (Control Banks B, C, D, bypassed)

-  ! 4\lf no hvnass alarm \Ato1 ild stav jn 1 rnti1 hank D \MaS >20 stens Rvnassino control hanks R C D

!a.dropped rod *on any shutdown* bank and control bank and each bank >3s steps.

[>:,i ** * * * > * *. Reference Title! " *,. F;aci[ity Re-ference Numper * : !Reference'.SectJon;: :* I II P~ge;No. I IR~visiqn:

IRod Control and Position Indications Systems L ! NOS05RODSOO j 51-52 I I12 I f================:::::::,~==========~*~======:;'

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Objectives I RODSOOE008 t9.~~S'tior:i ~<:)Ljrce:;: *11 Facility E-;::xa=m=B=a=n=k=::::::..J=1a=.IJ::**t:::7::.t10::"n=:"::M::}?:::d::if::jc="a::t::i'R::D::""~::. e::J::*~=B=~*=:=**::::.l:.:c:::o:.:nc:.:e:::p:::t:::U:.:s:::ed====l~!=ll=se=d=*****=*ti=ll:.:ri=rg=*"=J=ra=l=ri=n=g=P=r=O=g"r=a=m=* .**=-;I_o__,.j

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.. c 2 is in MODE 6.

- The Reactor vessel head is removed and on its storage stand.

- The Refueling Cavity is being filled from the RWST !AW S2.0P-SO.SF-0003, FILLING THE REFUELING CAVITY. (Assume RWST level was at 40.5' when the unit was shutdown)

- Refueling cavity water level is 11 O' and rising.

Which choice identifies the indications which will be present on the Control Room Console?

PZR Cold Calibrated level is ...

~ 13%; RWST level is 27'. I

~ 180%; RWST level is 20'. II

~ I off-scale low; RWST level is 40'. I

~ I off-scale high RWST level is 1O'. I I i'Answerl ra==J 'ExamLevel' fR=J *Cognitive Level * !A~n I !Fac;mty:WSalem 1 & 2 IJExam[)ate:W _ _ _1_21_2_1_12_0_1_,5IJ

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KA Statement:[ Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operatino the Reactor Coolant f--'-'---'--'-'-.;;_;;_-'--'-;..__;;c_;_.....;...._;_;.;;..;._.;;_:--.£.;;..;;...;.;..;._c;..;..;..~.;;...;.;..-"-':...;;..;;.-'-'-.;.,..;.;;...;;;.__;_...;;.,!.;...;....;.~o<...;;..;.,;._;._...:..;...;.__

System _controls

_ _.;__,___;...._ __;;.__includino:

Relative level indications in the RWST, the refuelino cavity, the PZR and the reactor vessel durino preparation for refuelino EXpfanation of : 55.41.b(3,)The refueling cavity at 11 O' will hold -112,000 gallons. The RWST normal operating level is a minimum of 40.5 feet prior

'A.n~*"<;rs: *.* * ** i to refueling (364,500 gal). Subtract and the total left in RWST will be 253,000 gallons, which will be -27.5'. The corresponding PZR cold cal level will be > the 0% level at the 108' 11" elevation in containment. This question does not require memorization of tank levels, but rather an understanding of the physical ccnnections and relative elevations of the systems.

Reference Titre  :; f ?Cility Refei:enceNuinber: Ir~~ference Sectiqri *. l*Page No. i !~evision/

!Draining the Refueling Cavity I 1 S2.0P-SO.SF-0004 I 1129-30 1117 I

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I RCSOOOE006 Objectives

!IVlatefial ~equfredfor Ex?.rriihati(jrl :,J I

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[al.lestidrytot:>ic jRO 30 I IPrior to opening 1CV114, RCP Seal Bypass Valve IAW S1 .OP-SO.RC-0001, RCP Operation, all of the following conditions must be met EXCEPT: I

~ IRCS pressure < 100 psig.

I

!,b* I I Any RCP seal leakoff flow< 1 gpm.

I

~I 11-14CV104, SEAL LEAKOFF valves open.

I

\d, l ISeal water flow to each RCP is at least 6 gpm.

I

'Answer j a I I JExam Level 1 IR I !Cognitive Le\rel i I Memory I fFacit[ty~l ISalem 1 &2  ! iExamD I 12/21/201511 l<A:q 003000A407 liM.07 [RO Vall.le: JI 2.6*1 !SRO Value: q 2.6j:Sectiorn l~_j!RO Group:il 1!iSRO Gl"6'up:' I 1J II~ D SystemiEll'olution Title I IReactor Coolant Pump System I 1003

'l<A Statement: I 1-A_b_il_itv,__to_m_an_u_a_ll,,__vo.._p_er_a_te_a_n_d_lo_r_m_o'-n_it""o_r_in-'t_he;.c..;.c..co'-n-'tr"""o"-1"""ro-'o"-m...;.:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,_

RCP seal bypass 55.41.b(3) RCS pressure must be between 100-1,000 psig. If pressure is less than 100 psig, the CV114 is required to be shut. All distracters are listed in SO.RC-1 step 5.2.1.

[' ,, Reference.Title . <.*J [ \facility~eference Number:

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':===========!!

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iL;o::;Nllfober*

Objectives I RCPUMPE013 l'P~,e,.~ti8fl.58ufoe: ,(j j Facility Exam Bank I i9u~.s!i<)n ~6~i~if<:tti()l:1 ~~!.~§<f: *I Concept Used I!Used bllfing i"r4lhihg Program .! O I loti.e,~@fi:s0,yr~~ . ~orr1f!l~fits; " " 4 _ 3 _ 0 _ 0 _ 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . , , l l 1gomment'.

RO SkyScraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes. I

[Clue'stior(ropicj I RO 31 I OpP.rators are preparing to start 21 RCP IAW S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation .

\ . of the following would prevent the RCP from starting when its START PB is depressed?

21 RCP ...

~ I#1 seal D/P < 200 psig.

I I

lb.I 4KV breaker trip springs not charged.

I

c.11 STANDPIPE LEVEL LO alarm locked in.

I fcLl IOil Lift Pump discharge pressure <500 psig.

I IAnswer I @=] I.Exam levE\1 IB::J !Cognitive Lev,eL I j Memory J  ! jFC1cility:j ISalem 1 & 2 I [E)(ar\:H{?t~;*i I 12/21/201511

~I 003000K101 l IK1.01  : :Rova1ue;*l~:sRo)fa1ue~l[Ifil'sectlorl':jl~tR6Gfoup:iLJ!sR.9'Groi.ip:![]

'SystenlJE./oluUonTitle I lReactor Coolant Pump System I 003

'KA Statement:' i Knowledoe of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between Reactor Coolant Pump Svstem and the following:

I RCP lube oil

• ExpliilnatiOrfof I! 55.41.b(3) A is incorrect because it is a manaul RCP trip setpoint stated at Step 3.2.9 third bullet. B is incorrect because the trip

\l\flswets:': : '*if'! Isprings are charged when the breaker closes, it woiuld be the closiong springs not charged which would prevent the 4KV braker

! form closing. C is incorrect because the standpipe level low has no interlock to prevent pump starting. D is correct as shown on I drawings.

• ======*==.,*==*R=e==f==e=re=n=c==e=T==}t=le=*===*==**.*==;'=**.::.;]

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. Facility RefereiiCeNumher 'I [R~fer~nce)ection ~l IPageNo,'j jRe'Jision 1 R=e=a=c=to=r=C=o=ol=a=nt=P=u=m=p=ln=st=ru=m=e=n=ta=ti=o=n==

=:.11:.=2=2=0=42=4========:=:.I:.=========' ::::[==::::=.I 05 I i;.===========================- !I

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:I I RCPs and RCPs Lift Oil Pumps 11224405 I 114 I 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.!11, - _ _ _ _ ___.! ii lj _ __.I I RCPUMPE006 Objectives

'tii.ie@~rj;~'.9~tc~::;;:J IFacility Exam Bank J I ~Question r>J1C>d.,ifip~ti9i).M~~hod: : Concept Used I,used During training Program I D

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!ouestit)nS~ur~e.(;~inrnents,! 1_s_o2_2_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes . I iUuestion Topic I RO 32

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Wi"- riormal charging and letdown in service, which of the following valves failing closed is interlocked to cause 1CV4, Letdown Orifice Isolation

_::. to automatically shut?

~ 11CV18, Letdown Pressure Control valve.

~I 1CV77, 23 Loop Chg Line Stop valve.

r-I, fc.: 1CV7, Letdown HX Inlet Isolation valve.

II I

id.i 1CV2, Letdown Isolation valve.

11 I!Answer I @=]" )ExamLevet i ~ :cognitivelevel'J IMemory I lf:acU!ty ISalem 1 & 2 :Exarri.c.>:at~i*! I 12/21/201511

jf~T31 D

~I 004000K413 I!K4.13  : :R.6Value:l@}j[sfs'6Vaill~:lf}]"lsection: JI~ [R6Group:ILJiSRO Gr~up:iLJ !r'kii51~

[SysfemJEvolutionJitle ! IChemical and Volume Control System 11004 iK.A, Statement:! ! Knowledoe of Chemical and Volume Control System design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

! Interlock between letdown isolation valve and flow control valve I

,~,..,.,,,.,

I 11.E:x;J:ll?f]aticin ofi 55.41.b(7) The 1CV2 being closed would cause any of the 3 open orifice isolation valves to shut. 2CV4 is stated in the stem to be

.... !I th,,,,,'"'"",,,,,

I Reference Title ,>! ~*Y Facility Reference Numbe.r* Ii~M~rl?nceSectip,r .* '*:!!.Page No'.*! IRevision!

11 CV4 Logic Diagram 11224430 ii lj I js I I !I II 11 II I I II II ii II I I I .... ***. . . . .

1LO. Number

• Objective I CVCSOOE006 f9uestfotj ~.~l1£5~:]'j IFacility Exam Bank I :used During Training Program iD

[C\ue5t19~s~Hts~,c~:r1lm~rits'i l,..6_1_6_2_2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._ __,I

[colTlmeht I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I. RO System/Evolution List I I SRO System/Evolution List*. .. Outline Changes I iciue~tJon Topic l IRO 33 I W'-*~i, of the following methods is used prior to cooldown to remove hydrogen from the RCS after a unit shutdown to enter a refueling outage, and l

\ hydrogen removed?

degassification is used to remove hydrogen from the RCS to prevent II] l Chemical, an inadvertent crud burst during RCS cooldown.

I

[! I Mechanical, an inadvertent crud burst during RCS cooldown.

I

[] I Chemical, having an explosive concentration present when oxygen is introduced to system.

I

dl I Mechanical, having an explosive concentration present when oxygen is introduced to system.

I i.~nswer] j d I !Exam Le,ve,l 11 R I icognitlveLe,yel H! I Memory I !Facility: I ISalem 1 & 2 I [E:xamDate,: .i I 12/21/20151 KA:l I004000K549 I1K5.49

• lR.o Vafue: :I 2.7j ~SRO.Valtie:lj 3.31 [section':' II~ lR.oGroup:!I 1 j ,$RO Group:[ I 11 ~~ti D

$yst~ri1tEvolutlC:fo Titlfl I Chemical and Volume Control System 11004

'KA staterneht:! Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Chemical and Volume Control System:

Purpose and method of hydroqen removal from RCS before openinq system: explosion hazard, nitrogen purge

[ex~la,\:}?~l9'\o,t.j 55.41.b(3,5) Both chemical (addition) and mechanical (replacement of H2 with N2) degasses are performed during a 1Ansvvers:< .'<.> shutdown/cooldown. Mechanical is most effective at NOP/NOT (see P&L 2.1.5) A is incorrect because chemical degass is performed when RCS temp is less than 250 (see pre-req 3.1.7). B is incorrect because of wrong reason for mechanical degas. C is Iincorrect because chenical degass is performed to initiate crud burst (addition of H202).

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• Referehce Title '"

v:, *. Facility Ret~r~nce Ntlrnher ItRe'ference s.ection *.>J t Page

,, .. No. I i~evisia:ni I RCS Degassification I 1 S2.0P-SO.CVC-0011 II !I 1115 I I II II ii !I I I

l I! II 11 !I  !

Objective I CVCSOOE013 1ouestiC>n *soB.rse: Al_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ __.I i~uestiov Mq~J!ic~tioit'@e,thod;;{jl l !us~~ oyrin9'Jraihi11s Pto9ram ! o l9ue~tio,ns~p~~~.(;()mN.~M~l ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,I

," r;~=::*~T~(:,*.

I i I 1-

RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes I jduesti:on Topic  ! IRO 34 I Gi'""n the following conditions:

- .t 1 is operating at 100%.

- RWST level is 41.0 feet.

- At 1200, a LBLOCA occurs, and RCS pressure rapidly lowers to containment pressure.

- 21 RHR pump fails to start, and cannot be started.

Which of the following is the CLOSEST to the time that swapover to Cold Leg Recirc will be commenced.

Note: Use ECCS pump runout capacities, and assume all available pumps immediately begin delivering design flow.

rn 1 1212.

I

~11214.

I

[SJ 11218.

I fcj. ! 11222.

I

'A~s...,,er 1 Ic I !EX:aml.eveq IR I [cognitive J..eve1 IApplication I jFaci!ity: !ISalem 1 & 2 I [ExarriD.ate_:.J j 12/21/20151 J

l?t~~~ DI W"'"">'<J;':"

~

J<t.:d 005000K305  !!_K_3._05_~1 *RO Value:Jl3.7 *I1SROV<1!ue:J!3.8*I;Sect1on: II' SYS !;RO Gxo1,1p:JI 1j 1SRO (3roup:1!

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1j

~Systegl/Ev9lllti(Jn Title I IResidual Heat Removal System 1 005 I

KA Statement:'! Knowledqe of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Residual Heat Removal System will have on the followinq:

ECCS

\tjcptan.atrcifl(lfl 41' =370,000 gallons. 15.2' is where swapover starts. 15.2'= 150,000 gallons. 370,000-150,000=220,000. Pump design data is

.Ariswe~s:** ** t RHR = 4500, charging pumps 560 gpm SI pumps 675 gpm cs pumps 2600 gpm. One RHR pump fails to start. total injection flow is 1 RHR pump 4500, 2 charging pumps 1120, 2 SI pumps 1350, 2 CS pumps 5200 = 12, 170 gpm. 220,000/12170=18.1 I ~~~~e~~. Time 1214 is if RHR pump flow is not removed. Time 1212 is if 150,000 gallons is used with correct flow.1220 is used for Fac~lity Reference N~mbe( <IIRE!ferenc¢;:s~i::tion ***.It. Page No~ : !Revjsfqn:

~'L=o=ss=o=f=R=e=ac=to=r=C=o=ol=an=t===============!l~E=O=P=-L=O=C=A=-1=============::;.I~==============-'~'==='~I====='

i::jT=an=k=C=urv=e=s============ljs1.0P-TM.ZZ-0002 I q28 I l.=18=:=::.I 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____,ll _ _ _ _ _ _~l _ _ ____,lj_~l !_~I 1

Objectives IECCSOOE016 1Material Requiredf6r)~*~§i~incitr9r() Is1 .OP-TM.ZZ-0002, page 28 RWST f,C}p~~tfan,'So~rc~~; *. 11 Facility Exam Bank

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RO SkyScraper I_s_R_o_s_k_ys_c_ra_p_e_;..... ~-R_o_s...y_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_ti_on_u_st........ __sR_o_sy_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_tio_n_L_is_t-.a Outline Changes

~guestion Topic 11 RO 35 I Gi .. -.., the following conditions:

- _, ( 2 is operating at 100% power with 22 charging pump in service.

- 23 charging pump is out of service and operable.

Which of the following Tech Spec LCO's would be applicable if 22 charging pump were to trip?

fal ,3.5.4 - Seal Injection Flow.

I

[b.i 13.5.2 -ECCS Subsystems >350°F.

r-:--'.'71 I

/c. J , 3.1.2.4 -Charging Pumps - Operating.

@;], 3.1.2.2 - Boration Flowpaths - Operating.

• ~Answer j fO" iE:<arnJevef:I ~ !cognitive Level _j j Application Facittty: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I IExamp~te,: ! I 12/21/20151

~I 006000G242 Ii2.2.42 I\ ~o Value: ! fJ2J [SRO Value: 1 ITIJ [section: 11~ [RO di'o'tip:j LJ is Ro GrC>uil:i LJ D f system/EVolutibr'l Jitle j I Emergency Core Cooling System

'KA Statement:!

!,....A_b_i_lit-y-to_re_c_o_g_n_iz-e-in_d_i_ca_t-io_n_s_fo_r_s_y_s_te_m_o-pe_r_a-ti-ng-p-ar_a_m_e_t-er_s_w_h-ic-h-ar_e_e_n-try--1-ev_e_l_c_o-nd-i-ti-on_s_fo_r-te_c_h_n-ic_a_Is_p_e_c-if-ic-at-io_n_s-.----...,.

'.~pra'rlatki'O"'of l 55.41.b(6, 10) RO candidates are responsible for "Above the Line" knowledge of Tech Spec LCO's. A is incorrect because the LCO 1

A:tiswers': *  ! is for maximum seal injection flow which is set by adjusting manual seal injection throttle valves. Plausible because many procedures direct establishing 6-12 gpm seal injection flow per pump not to exceed 40 gpm total. Bis correct because the LCO states 2 complete trains of ECCS are required, and 22 charging pump (hi head ECCS) is required for the B train of ECCS. C is

! incorrect beca11se onlv 2 charajno rn 1mo5 are reai 1ired ta he onerahle and the I CO \M01 i!d not he entered 1rnti! 2 of 3 charaina L 2

pumps were inoperabie. Dis incorrect *because boration flow paths from RWST through charging pumps remain available: as I

, does the Boric Acid tank flowpath with one BAT pump and one charging pump.

11 Facility Reference Numb'ef: , ..*,_. *. iReference *I I section .,, .. <l !Page No. i !Revision!

I Salem Tech Specs I I II 11 I I l I II 11 I I

I I I ii 11 I I I

Objectives I ECCSOOE010 fque~~J9~*s21,i~s~*:.,;*/ j_N_e_w________,L'-':o-"-uL.e"-'.~_;_t*i-'-o~n"-M'""o"-dL.r"'--fi-"'c;'-'~t'-")o-"-_,h"'"**-'-M'-'e~t:-..:.'1.:..o_;_d_;'-**_**,~--------~I [used l:)uri119Jra1ning Pr()gramj D t~uesti?lfsOtifc:~t~rn~~iiisi I  !

iC9mfuent . -_ *.

I I 1- I

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RO SkyScraper ._I SRO Skyscraper.

I - -RO-System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . ~ Outline Changes lou~~tiol1Topic I RO 36 I Gi""'ri the following conditions:

- ,t 2 was operating at 100% reactor power when a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection were initiated due to lowering Pressurizer pressure.

- Five minutes after the SI actuation, containment humidity and pressure have just begun rising.

Assuming NO operator actions were taken, which of the following would result in those conditions?

§:] I RCP #1 Seal failure.

I

~ I Pressurizer Spray Valve failed open.

I f§J I Pressurizer Safety Valve failed open.

I l:!J ISteam Generator Slowdown piping failure.

Ans~er ! Ic I IExarn Level ] j R I ;cognitive Level l IComprehension I [Fa~ltity: ! j Salem 1 & 2 I i~x?n1oate: i I 12/21/20151 fl{A;j I007000K101 i .K1.01 .iROValu~::j 2.9j!SROValue:!j 3.1jisectioll:ij~IRoGr6up:!I 1j:SROGroup:lj 1j l~l D

~

'systerilJEvoli.i~idn Title I IPressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System I joo7

[KAStaternent:,, Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System

. and the following:

Containment system

[E)(pl~.~atiori 6ti I 55.41.b(9)The failure of a RCP #1 seal will not be seen in containment outside of closed systems. The excess seal leakoff flow past

I the #2 seal will be seen as a rise in RCDT level. The PZR safety failing open will cause the PRT to pressurize and the rupture disk I

.:.rs:<*.

I

! to rupture, causing the saturated steam in the PRT to continuously be vented to containment. The SGBD piping failure would not

~:~~-~,.,a:ise i~~~_,~'.~-t~o_n levels. The Spray valve failing open would cause the lowering PZR pressure, bit would not cause changing I

v  :::**/::,;'(, '.Reference Title . <>>),:.,' .

-: :'.'.-,~.-:, *, "'l !(**.* Facility 13,eference Number ' lReference Section I ~*Page Nci.l fRevisi6ni J

INo. 2 Unit Reactor Coolant II 205301-1 I ii I 159 I I II I ii ii I I !I I 11 ii I

[L()'..[\illrnber . *.. >j Objectives I PZRPRTE008 fqll~s.ti;er}.~f'.lirde:,. \ IFacility Exam Bank Iiaue~ti4,rl,;J\1'1:9difipatior\'M.'etho.Ci: .~Direct From Source i lus~d Dllring J:ralnir\g Program I D I

~~}:les'tlc)i:iSd:urp~goi-Ilw~:n~sj Salem May 2010 RO NRC exam, created from Point Beach 112012006 NRC exam j I I l I l

RO Skyscraper ...

I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I lOuestiori JC:lpie I IRO 37 I Gi"~'l the following conditions:

- .t 2 is operating normally at 100% power.

- Excess Letdown is in service due to a problem with an orifice isolation valve.

- The 2CC215, EXCESS LETDOWN HX CC INLET Vair supply line breaks, and all air is vented from valve.

Which of the following describes the effect this failure will have on Excess Letdown temperature, and how will operators respond?

Excess Letdown temperature will. ..

1 I

~ rise and the 2CC215 bypass will be throttled open to restore normal letdown temperature.

I I

~ lower and the 2CC215 bypass will be throttled open to restore normal letdown temperature.

I I

c.

rise and Excess Letdown flow will be secured to prevent lifting 2CV115 eve RCP SEAL WTR INJECTION RETURN RELIEF VLV.

1, i

d. I lower and Excess Letdown flow will be secured to prevent VCT temperature from lowering to the point where 23 charging pump must be

'-----' I secured. I

'Answer I jc I [Exam Level l IR I !Cognitive Level 11 Application I jFaCiiity: ! j Salem 1 & 2 I IExamDate: j j 12/21/20151

KA: i 008000A205 I A2.05 I !!Z()Value:l!3.3*i [sROValue:lj 3.51 tsecUori: tl=-.J [Ro Group:ll 11 *sRb Group:!! 1J ~~}~ D

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YsteJ"ri/Eve>lutionTitle j I Component Cooling Water System I ~oos IKA.Statement:: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

Effect of loss of instrument and control air on the position of the CCW valves that are air operated l

JE)(plan~tfonof 55.41.b(?) The Excess Letdown HX CC isolation valves 2CC113 (outlet) and 2CC215 (inlet) are fail close (air and power) isolation

~- <rs:'; t'*I valves. With excess letdown in service and no cooling flow, temperature and pressure will both rise. Excess letdown flows into the I

seal return header and rising pressure causes seal return line relief valve to open. Knowledge of both the effect (valve failure position) and operator action (isolate excess letdown) required. SO.CVC-3 P&L 3.3 states to maintain excess letdown pressure I

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. ReferenceTitle,., * . Facility Reference t-Jumbeir *I [Reference,Section' ! Page No.

f J !Revision:

IExcess Letdown II S2.0P-SO.CVC-0003 I Ij I !6 I Ieves drawing l j 205228-2 I I :.=I==:::.1184 I l_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.11 1

_____ ___.l _ _ _ ___.q l l_~I

• t;o~ Nuriib'er. ..** **

• 1 Objectives I CCWOOOE012 1--~

!que~tio)l .Si)um~: *. 1 l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.I c...;Q'--"u"--'-,~"-.s_ti~o~n'-M-",0£*d'--",**.i'- "_fi:. . c. :.~t;:. .io_*n'--"*******:..c.M_e-"t'-ho"-"'**""1""'.:'--">.J*,l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.I !Used .1?.11ri1"19 :rr~iningProgr<lm *I D latie.~~i§~'s~urc~Comrij~.nfol I

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R~ SkyScraper  ! SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List .. I SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

!Ouestfon Topic I 1,_R_0_3_8_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,

Gi..-~ the following conditions:

.cm Unit 2 is operating normally at 100% power.

- The controlling PZR level channel fails low.

- As the operators respond IAW S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging, and before an operable channel is selected for control, the RO reports that PZR backup heaters in auto are energized with the controlling PZR level channel indicating 0%.

Which of the following describes the operation of the PZR B/U heaters?

PZR heaters in auto 1) be energized because 2)

.;_;~~a~;~1~1~)~s~h~ou~l~d.::.=.:c=....;-'=~~=":..:;...;:;;..;..:;~==.::....::..::.=.:::.=.=.=...::~~~...:....------------------------------'ll I

1I 1

~ 2) PZR level has risen 5% above program.

[bl 11) should I

'-----' 2) PZR pressure has lowered to the auto on setpoint of 221 O psig. 1 le. i 11) should NOT

'----' 2) PZR low level cutoff at 17% should be keeping heaters OFF.

rd.111) should NOT L_.J 2) PZR pressure has remained above the auto on setpoint of 2218 psig.

jAnswer! ~ jE~am Level j ~ lcognitiveLevel  ! IApplication I 1f~cmty:1 ISalem 1 & 2 1 IEx~tl"lo,ate<! I 1212112015!

~I o10000A402 I A4. 02 i [Ro Value: IfJ] ;sROVaiue: ![))" !SectiOri: I!~ !Ro Group:! LJ !SR() (;rolip:: LJ ~N;~l D

[systelTI/Evolution Title! IPressurizer Pressure Control System I ~10_1_0_ _

KA Statement: I Abili to manuall operate and/or monitor in the control room:

PZR heaters

[f:~planati8,t:J ot Il 55.41.b(7,5) The low level on the contra! channel will cause an automatic letdown isolation. Char~ing flow ~II continue. and rais.e 1Answers: ** * 'I PZR level. The backup heaters are designed to energize at 5% above program to ensure staurat1on cond1t1ons are maintained 1n the PZR. However, either an alarm or control channel failing low deenergizes all PZR heaters. Nothing has occurred which would I cause a PZR pressure change except for the rise in PZR level. Pressure will not lower. PZR B/U heaters are designed to energize at 2210 nsia dpcreasin . . .

• • . * *~e~,~r$nCe: Titie. _:*. * , :

• FacilifyReference Nm11ber <.d tRefer,enc~ Section >i I Page No, lgevisiop'.

1 j Loss of Charging I 1 S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 I1 ~'====-  :.::19=~

IOverhead Annunciator Window E II S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0005 ii OHA E-20 1129 I 2=0 1.::l ==

,______________.I _________..., _______,, j_ ___,

.I l PZRP&LE006 Objectives ic:JuesU<?nsolirce: J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _~I [9~~sti()n M,odificaticml\hethod: ' il ________~I jus~d burir'lg Trairii'!jg'Progral111 DI foqe,~,uon ~qurc;~ cf)rnmer:ts1, I 1 I I

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RO Skyscraper I SRO Skyscraper I .-------.......- -

RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List .. ( Outline Changes I lquestionJqpi~ I l_R_0_3_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,I l,.YJf-'~11 of the following describes how the PZR Spray Nozzle is prevented from being thermally shocked during normal operation? I I

~ Initiating spray flow when the Spray Nozzle delta T exceeds 320°F. I I

I

~ PZR Backup heater groups operating in auto forces continuous spray flow.

fSystern(E;vo!Uticm lHle I j Pressurizer Pressure Control System

'KA Statement: i I Knowledge of Pressurizer Pressure Control System design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following: I I Sprav valve warm-up I

¢cBlanati()~ of I! 55.41.b(5,7) PZR spray bypass flow is set during unit startup while@ NOT/NOP to ensure spray line temp is >500°F with both

'Answers: T: :C:;j I spray valves shut. Salem runs with one PZR B/U heater group in MANUAL which forces the spray valves open a small amount to provide continuous spray for boron mixing also, but that is not a choice. Spray flow is NOT initiated if spray line delta T exceeds I

I 320°F. Control groups are SCR controlled and normally fire to maintain pressure ON program, and do not force spray flow.

I

,: *.* ...* ,' . *.. '"" i

,, <ReferenceTitle *. *  :[* ' FacilitYReference.Nufl1ber

• I[ReferencE! ~ection * ! i Page No. J !Revision; I

• f""

ISetting Pressurizer Spray Bypass Flow 11 S2.0P-SO.PZR-0008 I ii 114 I I II I ii 11 I I II I ii II I I Objectives I PZRP&LE012 fQuestiq'n.,soµ,r.c~*:, ':.11_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___,l '--IQ~u""'e""..; .:.: ~i" p" ,~"'*.M.:.: *IA'(). :.~*"'rt" \~" *~" tlc.]:9.:.: *~.:.: Ji.G*"e"'t'""}i""o~d_:*.:.::>*'""J, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I iUsed During J[airjing f'fogf~'11 i 0 l'C}uestiqp~§ufce c<:>:ti'i!il~.~t~j 1, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.l i fcomment i

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I I

RO Skyscraper .. ~ROSkyscraper 1... RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List .. I. Outline Changes I louestio'h 'ropi9! IRO 40 Gi**-., the following conditions:

- ,( 2 was operating at 90% power with 21 charging pump in service when the controlling PZR Level Channel I failed low.

- The Charging Master Flow Controller was placed in Manual when directed by S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001, Loss of Charging.

- The alternate PZR level channel has been selected as the controlling channel.

- Letdown has been restored.

Which of the following identifies a consequence of returning the Master Flow Controller to auto PRIOR to returning PZR level to program as directed in S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 ?

~ l Charging flow will. ..

rise, and VCT auto makeup may initiate.

I

[bl I lower, and flashing in the Letdown line could occur.

Ii

!t.l j rise, and RCP seal injection flow could exceed Tech Spec limit total seal injection flow.

11

~J lower, and 2CC71 LTOWN HX CC CONT VALVE will not respond quickly enough to prevent Mixed Bed Dem in isolation on high inlet temperature.

llulswer I I~ JExarri Levell 1£__J :cognitive Level i IAppli~tion 'j ,Fac,lfitY: , ISalem 1 & 2 I [Ex~mDat~.:fl _ _ _1_2_12_1_12_0_1s_,I

~I 011 OOOA404 j /A4.04 *:Ro Value: I § ;sRO Value: If.}]" (Section: 1 I~ iRO Gfoup:;j~ 'sRb Group:! LJ !i':t~i D

'System/E\lolution Title j IPressurizer Level Control System I 011

'KA Statemen.t:i Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

Transfer of PZR LCS from automatic to manual control

[E*. x~'"natio..n. o. f. i 55.41.b(7)With a CCP in service, the failure LOW of the controlling PZR level ch~nnel .will cause charging .flow to RIS~.

1* The stem

~ I stated that MFC was taken to manual when directed IAW AB, so there was sufficient time for actual charging flow to nse I

s:: .* * * ,

substantially. With actual level higher than programmed level, if the MFC were placed in auto it would force charging flow to lower.

I 11:~ha~L;i~;;1~:s1~:~r'~~,;~d ::~~,;p;h~n~g;~~~t~a~~o~il~; ~~1~~:d100';'~ :~:ow~~~d hoa~c~~;:htrh~/r~~:~~a~~:nh~~~t~:~~~~;:~ ~,~~re to ii Il rise downstream o(the letdown HX, and temps would n~t reach demin isolation levels. The 2 rises ar~ incorrect because charging flow wouldn't rise, but the actions associated with higher flow are correct. I ReferE!ncE! Title

.=================

.;====

:::::=======:::!' ~ *** * ,*

• • • • f"adlity RefE!rE!nce. Number i iRE!ferE!nC:e Section 11 P,a9e No.1 :Re\llsionl I I Loss of Charging lj S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 c""

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LO.Number.*

Obj I PZRP&LE015

RO SkyScraper J. SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes I

I louesticmTopic ! RO 41 I I

\N"' -'1 of the following describes the interface between the Reactor Trip Handles on 2CC2 and the Reactor Protection System?

ii 1 c.. .. 1g either Reactor Trip Handle to the trip position is designed to operate I I

la;j the UV trip ONLY for Reactor Trip AND Reactor Trip Bypass breakers.

I ib.1 Ithe shunt trip ONLY for Reactor Trip AND Reactor Trip Bypass breakers.

L-c l I 121 lBOTH the shunt trip and UV trip for Reactor Trip AND Reactor Trip Bypass breakers.

l I

d. j , BOTH the shunt trip and UV trip for Reactor Trip breakers, and the shunt trip ONLY for the Reactor Trip Bypass breakers ..

11 Answer! c I I !Exani Level ; IR I !cognitive Leyel l 1 Memory I IFagHity: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I :ExamDate: i I 12/21/2015jl

• t-, "<:W<'<(: ~

l<A=il 012000A401 I A4.01 J@[sROValue: i@Jsection:1 I~ ;Ro,Group:\LJ !SRO Group:'LJ ~i!i, LJ

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SystemfEvolutiO'n Title, I l_R_e_a_ct_o_r_P_ro_te_c_r_io_n_s....y_st_e_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...I io12

'KA Statement: i IAbility to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: I I Manual trip button I

[Expla'iiation ofll Salem has 2 Reactor Trip Handles/Switches. Either switch operates BOTH the UV and shunt trips for BOTH the reactor trip

~wers: t I breakers and bypass breakers. The distracters are plausibler because: 1) an automatic reactor trip ONLY actuates the UV trip; 2) j manually tripping the reactor trip breakers from the control console ONLY actuates the shunt trip.

I I

Reference Title .*** :L *Facility Reference Number , j 'Reference Section **. I i Page No. 1 jRevision 1 I

IReactor Protection System Reactor Trip Signals 11221051 Ii ii ljE__J I II II ii 11 I I II !I ii ii I I

• -*: j I RXPROTE010 I RXPROTE007

!Ouesti,?l'l ~ource;. I l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _____,! tQuestiBn ri,1oditiC~tion Met~od: i':' 1 I iused Durlryg trairing program i D fquestion Source co111ri}~nt~j 1 j 1-------------'1 icC>mmenL 11~==============================::::::1

! I I

s~yscrap~r I FS::R:::O::S:::k::ys::c::ra::p::er:=c..:::::::::RO=S:::ys::te::m::l:::Ev::o::lu::ti::o::n::Li::st;:;;:::.::::SR::O:;::Sy::s::te::m::/E::v::o::lu::ti::on::L::i::st::*::l~o=ut::li::n::e::C::h::a::n::g::e::s::**~I_.;__.;__.;.;,_.;____.;__---:-

I RO oue~tion TC>pic I ~o ~2 m . * .

• m u m

• m .. * ** * *** * * * . . . * * * * ** * * * ** '!

i_V1 1'- -+would be the effect on the Reactor Protection System if the 2B Vital Instrument Bus were to become deenergized with the unit at 100% power? 1 1 ra:J j SSPS Train B slave relays would not actuate on a Safety Injection signal. I I

I

~ OHA A-34 SSPS TRN A TRBL in alarm due to loss of 1 of 2 45VDC power supplies to Train A logic cabinet. 1,

c;i Logic coincidence for Containment Spray actuation would go from 2/4 to 1/3 due to channel 11 bistable tripped.

~,

II fd.l,~2=R=P=4=b=i=st=a=bl=e=li=g=ht=s=fi=a=sh=i=ng==fo=r=a=11=c=ha=n=n=e=1=11=in=d=ica==ti=on=s=d=u=e=t=o=t=ra=in=d=i=sa=g=r=ee=m=e=n=t=b=e=tw=e=e=n=s=s=P=S=T==ra=in=s=A==an=d==B=.================~,!

Answer I ~!Exam Level! ~ iC9gnitive Level j IApplication I !Facility

i j Salem 1 & 2 I [Exa111Date: 11 12/21/20151  !

~I 012000K201 i IK2.01 iROVatue::[IfilsR0Va1ue:1[Titsection: II~ [ROGrpup:jLJlsRO Group:![] ~~~~! D Systein!Evolution Title I 1_R_e_a_ct_o_r_P_ro_te_c_ti_o_n_S~y_st_e_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~l 1012

.KA Statement:! I Knowled~e of bus power supplies to the following:

I RPS channels, components, and interconnections Explariati9r\of !155.41.b(?) Bis incorrect because Train A 45 VDC power comes from A and D vital power. C is incorrect because CS bistables are I

Answers:*:*

• i energize to actuate. Dis incorrec because there is no disagreement since none of the slave relays have energized with the other I Itrain ot having energized.

I I I***** . i:: .* I:Page No. I IRevision' 1** Reference Title IOverhead Annunciators Window A FacHityReferenC:e Nufober ii S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0001

' i '.Reference Section

_J

,, Ii 56 I I l

J Solid State Reactor Prot Train A AC Power Distr !I Drawing 240136 I 11 114 I I II I ii 11 I Objectives l RXPROTE011 IRXPROTE020 I

I ,Questiori.Modific~tion N\eth(Jd: .*I Direct From Source I[Used ouririg';rrafri(hg Progr~Jrij DI I

I I I

.*RO Skyscraper ( SRO Skyscraper J__ R_o_s_y_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_ti_on_Li_st_, __

sR_o_sy_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_tio_n_L_is_t.....,_o_u_t_Ii_n_e_c_h_a_n_g_e_s_...

c;iuestton fopic I _R_o_43_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,I Gi* *-.,the following conditions

.. c 2 is operating at 100% power when a turbine trip event and subsequent switchyard disturbance result in an undervoltage condition (<70%) on the 2A & 2C 4160 V vital buses.

- 2 minutes later, a Safety Injection signal is generated.

Which of the following describes the plant response when the SI occurs?

~ I EOG output breakers remain shut and safeguards loads sequence on each vital bus.

I I

~ EDG output breakers remain shut, blackout loads are stripped, then safeguards loads are sequenced on each vital bus.

l

c. j EOG output breakers open,

. !bus.

blackout loads are stripped, EOG output breaker shuts, then only safeguards loads are sequenced on each vital I, td. !EOG output breakers open, blackout loads are stripped, EOG output breaker shuts, then safeguards and blackout loads are sequenced on j!

- each vital bus. ij fAnswer 1 ~ 1Exam Levei '. ~ I

!cognitive Level * : Application I !Facirity: ! ISalem 1 & 2 I iExamDate: I l 12/21/20151 I 11<A:*l1013000K112 K1.12 'iROValue:!l 4.1!sRoya1u~:q 4.4l[Section::j~ ROGroui>:H 11:sROGroup::j 11 f~~ D

• syst~'m/Evolution Title'*; IEngineered Safety Features Actuation System 11013 J(A Statement:: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and the following:

! ED/G I

1.t.::o:.t:Jumber

• ESFOOOE005 Objectives . I lsECOOOE010 i

!tMaterial Requli'ect tor E:xarriinafio'r1 *** ** 1 I 11 1comn1ent I I I

I- I I~~.~~~~~~~~~~~~----"

RO SkyScrap:r J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List I. SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes

~::::::::~::'.::'.:::::::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::::~::::::::::::::::::~-'--'--'-'--'-"-'--'

[Question Topic 1 RO 44

, . ~ !~~-------------~-----~~-----~-~-----~---~----~

IYJ~* *'1 of the following describes why control and protection circuits are electrically isolated from each other?

.---------------:1

a;*: To prevent a single failure from actuating a protective action.

1

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~~=============================================================~111

,c. i To ensure there is no electrical feedback from control system to the protection system.

~ To maintain the minimum number of channels required for safe shutdown outside the control room. I 12/21/201511

~I 015000Kso1 I Ks.01  : IROVa1ue:J[3.2jisR0Vaiue:l§'secuo11: II~ :RoGfoup:)[}LsRoGrol.i?:'.LJ ~i1~j D lsystem/Evollltioii'ritle: INon-Nuclear Instrumentation System I 1016

'KA Statement:! Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System:

Separation of control and protection circuits

Exptanatforiotl 55.41.b(7) "Control" is designed to maintain steady-state operating conditions, ensure adequate margin to trip setting and suppress

'Answhs; i excursions imposed by operational transients before protective action is required. Maintained separate and distinct from the protection system by physical separation and electrical isolation. Electrical isolation provided by Isolation Amplifiers Ensures there is no electrical feedback from control system to the protection system Refere11ceJitle * . 1 * *.Facility Reference Number l '.Reference Section Ji Page NO.I [Revision!

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.LO.fllul11ber **

Objectives IRXPROTE006 1_ ____,

It!IJ\ateriat Requireci to~ §~aiuination\ *** ! I !I

[Ouest1?p Source: *j j_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _____,I [:._o_u_e_s_ii:...o_n:...M:...o:...je:-:1;i:._fic. .:C*:. .~te:cj,oe:c.n.: c:*:c:-~e:,ee:c-~:...ho._.

c. c t . _ .: ; . . . . ._ . _ , ]

1

________ __,I iusedDurlng Training Program I D fgpei;~!o,p Sc>U~c~ S9iTim~fa~l I I

!~-----------------------------------------'

I I I I

,l ________________________,I I_

RO Skyscraper .... I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I

Questi9nTopic 11RO45 A Jr-- of off-site power resulted in a reactor trip. The operating crew is attempting to confirm natural circulation flow but neither SPDS NOR the Plant c ter is operating. You are the 3rd NCO and have been assigned to monitor and log CET's at the GET Control Panel.

Which of the following describes the "ALL" Mode at the Train A GET Control Panel?

It displays ......

I

~ Train A GET temperatures in sequential order.

~I Train A GET temperatures from lowest to highest reading .

• • c./ I.any Train A GET >700°F, then remainder of Train A CETs from lowest to highest.

I I

'.d. ! the two highest reading Train A CET's in each quadrant then sequentially display all Train A CETs.

I

'Answerate:

f *.-I 1j 12/21/2015!

'l<f..:Ji 017000K402 IjK4.02  ! (RO va.1µ'e':q 3.1 !!$RO Value: ii 3.6psectihn;'lj~ fRO Gtdup::I 21 isRO Grbup:ll 2j I~~~~ D System/Evolution "fitle I Iin-Core Temperature Monitor System 11017 l

KAStatement:l Knowled e of In-Core Temperature Monitor System desi Sensin and determination of location core hot spots iExpt~natio~ of '1155.41.b(?) Table C of CFST-1 states that in ALL Mode the display will progress through the first and second highest GETS in each

!Answers: .* :-: Iquadrant, then sequentially display all cETs assigned to that channel. Ais incorrect because does not display in sequential order without first displaying the 2 highest in each quadrant. B is incorrect because it doesn't display lowest to highest. C is incorrect l because the 700°F noted in choice is criteria for purple path CFST for Core Cooling.

Rfe erence* 1e <::

F ac11y Tt Rf.e erence Num b er . ;1I jReference s*ec1on r i'p

~ i age No.* IRey1s1.on ICritical Safety Function Status Trees 112-EOP-CFST-1 I I j 15 1125 I I II I !I II I I Ii  ! !I 1I I I

!L.O.. NUmb'er '

IINCOREE016

!Mat~riC11 .Requir~~ f<?r,pcamination

• II

'Question Source: *J IFacility Exam Bank l IOuestion Modificatiq~M~tl:lod:, IEditorially Modified

~~~~...:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::=::~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I!us'ed . Durih9Ir~I11ih9 Program':)

• (;ly~s~i-~~-~~~~~~*F?N.rr,~piSi 143165

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I I I I 1-*

RO SkyScraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I. Outline (;hanges iOu,estio!1 Topic; IRO 46 I IG' I

the following conditions:

- v* 11t 2 is operating at 100% power.

- A Main Steamline break inside containment occurs.

- The Rx was tripped, but the MSLI failed to shut ANY MSIV.

Safety injection was initiated successfully.

Containment pressure has risen steadily and is currently 11 psig.

I

- RCS pressure is 1700 psig and lowering slowly.

- Safeguards reset actions have just been completed in 2-EOP-LOSC-2, Multiple Steam Generator Depressurization.

Which of the following describes how the Containment Cooling system will respond if containment pressure were to rise to >15 psig?

ia. !I Both Containment Spray pumps will start and Containment Spray valves will reposition.

I

'.b.*11 Neither Containment Spray pump will start, and Containment Spray valves will reposition.

l

'tl IBoth Containment Spray pumps will start, and Containment Spray valves will NOT resposition.

I I

eel I Neither Containment Spray pump will start, and Containment Spray valves will NOT resposition.

I.

Answe~l IE__] JEX.am Levelj j~ !Cognitive Level

jApplication I [Facility: I ISalem 1 & 2 I :E)('.ampat~;j !___12_12_1_12_0_15_,I

~I 022000A301 I'A3.01 I !R9\fa11Je:.!GJ}'sRo varue:l@tsect\on::j~ :.Rb§roup:f[J}sRo'droup:!LJ D

.*systeryj/E:volution Title J IContainment Cooling System I '.022

KAStater'nenbl l Ability to monitor automatic operations of the Containment Cooling System includin Initiation of safe uards mode of operation IEx,...* -.,ation of j 55.41.b(9,7) Containment Spray Pump Sequencing fA:

L.::_

s: 1 1)If the SSPS Containment HI-HI Pressure signal is not present when the SEC initially tries to start the Spray Pumps, the SEC contact will re-open I. 2)0n~: the SEC has completed the last step of its loading sequence, the CS Pump start contact is re-closed

' >* ' . '* . Reference tme . *....

• n  ; i ~\';'Faciiity'Reference Number. <I[Reference Sectioh<I jf Pag~;Np. j !Revision' 11 Safeguards Equipment Controller Lesson Plan 1INOS05SEC000-06 I II17 I l;.=6==::.

1

.==================ll~==========

=:::'.'l=========::'i 11 ~~~~~~~~~~~__,111~~~~~~~~-'1!~~~~~~!1~~~1~__, I I** . . ' . *'

tL,O. Number**

Objectives I CSP RAYE009

Mate[i<1,l;R,e9t,iire<:f .. t9J,~~mi'natT6iiJ'fi I

[.9.u~sti 8 n*~oqrce j:ornfllents: I

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

, .,** *~ .,,.,,.*.:'*;\*.*)<. '<\'.~A*<.,,..,

ico.minent ;;> ,,, :..:**,.{'>*:';.. ':;*;

I I 1- I

[~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'

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SRO System/Evolution List l Outline Changes I

QuestionJopic 11RO47 I G' the following conditions:

- ~,;erators are responding to a LBLOCA JAW 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

- RWST level is 8.9' and lowering as expected.

Which of the the following describes the effect if 21 CS2 Containment Spray pump discharge valve experienced a short and motored closed?

Containment Spray Header flow will. ..

~I lower to O gpm.

I

~I lower but remain> 0 gpm.

I SI be unaffected since 21CS36 RHR CS STOP VALVE is open supplying all spray flow I

~I be unaffected since 22CS36 RHR CS STOP VALVE is open supplying all spray flow.

I

!Answer! a I 1 li::xamtevel ! IR I (ccigr{l~ive Level 11 Application I !FaciUty: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !Exan;i,q(lte: j I 12/21/20151 iKA.:il 026000K302 IiK3.02 11:Ra Vallie:! j4.2*1 ;sRo. value~! I 4.3 I:section::! I~ !Ro Group:; I 11 'sR6Group:! I 11 ;~~ D

'system/Evo!ufipiiJitie I j_c_o_n_ta_in_m_e_n_t_S..;..p_ra-'y_S_,y,_s_te_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,11026 KASfaterrierit:! I Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Sprav Svstem will have on the followino:

l Recirculation sprav system J

I

ex~I;;ir\atf<?t'.t ?f 155.41.b(S, 1O~ When RWST level reaches. 15.2', operators will beging alig.nment ~o Cold Leg Recir_c. IAW LOCA-3. 22 Containment

Answe"' * * * . Spray pcmp" 'topped'"' tf both Coommm'ot Spray pcmp' am op,rabog. Wtfu fu' "'m ooodtboo of ounoot RWST '"* 21 CS pump will still be running. When RSWT level reaches lo-lo setpoint, the remaining CS pump (21) will be stopped, and 21 CS36 opened to supply recirculation spray flow. II i' ** \Reference Title .* ... :I Facilit}'Reference Numbef.. /!Reference Section*

• 11 Page No./ !Revision

\Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc !12-EOP-LOCA-3 I !I 1129 I I II I ii II I I II I 11 11 I I

I LCA3U1E006 Objectives

_J i~aterial R.eqo.ir~qf()rExamination 11 II

auestion~o';lrce: l l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ __,l !titi~~tionMO~if!4ation.M~tho~: :*;f _________,I [lls'e:ciDuringi,:rainih~1Progral11! O

[gu~~~;§.~~?~*~s~c?~fn,entsj I j

!------------------------~---------------------~

'=========================================

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper . RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List m I Outline Changes J fQuesUon Topic  ! IRO 48 G the following conditions:

- ~-.dm Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a LOCA occurred.

- A manual reactor trip and manual SI were initiated.

- When the Main Generator output breakers opened, a loss of off-site power occurred.

- 1A vital bus locked out on bus differential.

Which of the following identifies which Containment Iodine Removal Units (IRUs) can be started if required?

[a;i 111 IRU ONLY.

I rMI

& 12 IRU ONLY.

~ 111or12 IRUs.

I IAriJi~~ ;:~::::bl~ l<;o9rilt1vO LOv01 i IMemmy I ifaomfyo i ISolem 1& 2 1l"'~")P" i I 1212112015! I

~I 027000K201 I'K2.01 IRo'va1lle:![DjSROValue::J[IBjseCtidrl::j~ ;Ro Group:ILJlsR.qGrolJ!lELJ ~! D

~System/E;VoiutiOri 'Titre*:: IContainment Iodine Removal System 11027 I

'KA Statement:! Knowled e of bus power sup lies to the followin Fans

~E.~.p.la.11~.tion.*',otJ! 55.41.b(9) Containment IRUs are powered from G and Enon-vital 460VAC. With the loss of off-site power, none of the non vital

~w'efs: . ,* . *** 1Ibusses are energized. The distracters are based on the operator knowing that the loading of a vital bus in Mode IV doesn't have any bearing on !RU operation.

II

,

• Reference Title* ** 'E *.* Facility Reference Number;* I[Referef19e Sectic)n *,I *.page, No~ 1 !Revision!

I1E1 Aux Building 460-230V One line !1207916 I I ~I===-I j 26 j

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'! ___________,!l, _ _ _ _ _ _~l----~11 11-~'

!Lo. Number** Objectives I CONTMTE003 IMffe.forial Required for ES<ar!lin~tlor( ***.! I

_Ol.Ie~tlon ,Spurc~:i{1 IPrevious 2 NRC Exams Ii,(;tue~ti?~ M.9di!ic~~ior.:i rJ{e~npd:, JDirect From Source Iii.iseclpurih~i"rnining Pr()gram .j o i'ouesiion~ourc~ (;§,rrim~iit~1 1_1_1_-0_1_R_o_N_R_c_o_4_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,

'..:: ..:;::.: *1

',.* :,<:: ' ..::. /j I I I I l I 1-

RO SkyScraper I ~S:R:O:S:ky:s!c:ra:p:er:::'._:::::R:O:S:y:st!:e:m:/E:v:o:lu:tio:n::L::i::st:::~I::*:::S:RO:::S::ys:t:'.em:/::E::vo::l:ut::io::n:L:is:t:::'.l~o:::u:tl:in:e::C:h::a:n:g::e:s:::'.'.._~'-'--'-"-:....;..:.--~-~

\Question Tqpfo \ ,_R_0_4_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~

Given the following conditions:

I

- . 2 has experienced a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

- Containment H2 concentration has risen to 2%.

- 21 H2 Recombiner has been placed in service with containment pressure at 4.1 psig.

- 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> later, containment H2 concentration has remained at 2%, and containment pressure has risen to 5.1 psig.

Which of the following describes the effect the higher containment pressure has on H2 Recombiner operation, and how should the crew proceed?

H2 Recombiners are _ _ effective as containment pressure rises with a constant power setting. The power setting must be ___ IAW S2.0P-SO.CAN-0001, Hydrogen Recombiner Operation.

r:-111 ess, raise

~ . d.

ib:i Imore, raised.

~1

[] I more, lowered I

'Ariswer I

~I 02soooA201 System/EvolUUon Title I IA2.01 J

1

=

ra-1 !exam Level rR! 'coa!litive Level ! IApplication iRO Value: I~[SRO

~gen Recombiner and Purge Control System I :Facilit : I Salem 1 & 2

'{.al~e:J[§j,sectiori: 1j~ fRO Group:! [JI \SRO Grol!pi! [JI iE:XamDate: I 1212112015!

D KAStatemen1::! Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

Hydroqen recombiner power settinq, determined by usinq plant data book

~Explanati~n .* oq The 55.41.b(?,8, 10) H2 recombiners are placed in service when directed in the EOPs with containment H2 concentration between 2-4%.

hydrogen recombiners use electric heating elements to elevate the temperature of the containment atmosphere. As shown in

Ar *s: *** * .1 Attachment 2, RE COMBINER POWER CORRECTION FACTOR CURVE, a higher containment pressure would result in a higher power correction factor, which would cause recombiner power setpoint to rise. So initially the higher pressure would cause the

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,_,re...c.woJ..!.mJ.J..bJ.Ujn_,,p"'-r-"toc.w.Jb=..Jecame..lass effcient_ and the po\A/pr setpoint \l!/Ol dd he raised as directed at Step 5 1 g c \Mhjch sya'"" ;+ W'1 t - - - -=--. . . .

I or remained constant and Containemnt pressure has changed, perform attachment 1 and adjust power.

Referen2,eTHle  ::'i*>.>: :t . .*_**facility R,eference: Number" I iRefereMe;section J [g~ge No:.:! !Revisiori*

r=;;;:::=:::=::::::::::::=:::=:::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::::=~======:::::::=========:::=::':::::==c.'"=:::::::::::::::::::::==:::==

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J I CONTMTE012 Objectives iM~terial Requir~~f()~aj?~'rriinatic)ri'. rl IS2.0P-SO.CAN-0001 (because KJA says so!)

icomn}eht I

l- I

[_ I

RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I. Outline Changes loue.~tionToplc.l I RO 50 Gi"-.., the following conditions:

- _,m Unit 2 is 7 days into a refueling outage.

- The core is partially offloaded with 7 bundles remaining in the Rx.

- Fuel movement is in progress, and S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0010 SPENT FUEL POOL MANIPULATIONS is in effect.

- SFP temperature is 120 deg. F.

- 21 SFP becomes air bound, trips on motor OL, and can NOT be restarted.

- 22 SFP pump will NOT start.

- SFP hi level alarm is in alarm.

I

- SFP heatup rate is 12 deg F/ hr.

If SFP cooling can NOT be restored, which of the following choices describes an adverse consequence of this loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling?

I

~ Rx cavity overflow due to rising SFP level if the Gate Valve remains open.

ti.! I Increased production of radioactive waste liquid as the tell-tale drains flow rises to the FHB sump.

I

~ Increased radiation levels at the FHB charcoal filter due to Spent Fuel off-gassing at temps> 150 deg. F. I I

[d,-: Inability to place a raised Spent Fuel bundle into any location in the pool due to rising radiation level on 2R32 Fuel Handling Crane Area l

l I

I An,swer,!

Monitor.

I~ JExam Levell I~

I

!Cognitive Leve! , Memory I !faciHty; : ISalem 1 & 2 I iE.x.arn.Date: 1' !___12_12_1_12_0_15_.I J

~1033000K303 I K3.03 iROVafue:![I§J~:~oyarue:i@r~ec~iob:ij~:RoGroup:(LJlsROGrolip:iLJ D Syste'rij/Efolutiori Title 'i [Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System

'.KA Statement:: IKnowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System will have on the following:

ISpent fuel temperature

!ExP'"n~yqn of JI 55.41.b(13, 10) Distractor b is incorrect because the pool would overflow into the ventilation system, not come over the physical wall I

'AI s:>

• I

'I of the pool. C is correct because rising radiation will be seen as fuel off-gassing and is expected to occur as temp increase to 150

, deg. Distractor a is incorrect because any overflow will go out the ventilation openings in the SFP. Distractor d is incorrect I because it is always possible to lower a SF bundle.

i.'"

1.: Reference Title.*. ii

• I Facility)~~fe~enee Number** >I* IL

• Reference Section '

. . .  ! I* ~age No . ! l.Revisicml I Loss of Spent Fuel Cooling !I S2.0P-AB.SF-0001 I 11 q12 I I I II I lj II I I II I 11 iI I I SFPOOOE007 Objectives J

[gi1~spM~§~rc~!;1 IFacility Exam Bank 11(.llle;;p,on Modms~tr9.~Met_hod: A Editorially Modified I:Used ou'rlng'rfaiqing ~rogram I D

[ouesti?n§C>orce Comm~nt.s IUsed on Salem June 2004 NRC RO exam (6 exams ago) I

• ----------~-~~-~~~~~~-~~~~-~~~~~~~~~-~~

ltonimt:mt* *

• I I I I 1- I

RO Sky Scraper ..  ! .SR~ Skyscraper. I __R_o_s_y_s_te_rn_IE_v_o_iu_ti_on__u_st..- _._s_R_o_s_y_st_ern_._iE_v_oi_ut_io_n_L_is_t....:i Outline Changes . I

~Question tcipic: RO 51 I Gi""l the following conditions:

- , 1 is operating at 95% power performing a 1% per minute load reduction due to high radio frequency in the Main Generator.

- 11 SG Narrow Range Level channel II is undergoing a channel calibration IAW S1 .IC-CC.RCP-0035, 1LT519 #11 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL PROTECTION CHANNEL 11, and all associated bistables are tripped.

Which of the following identifies the consequence if a second channel of Narrow Range level on 11 SG were to fail to 30% with NO operator action?

11 SG level will become ...

I

~ higher than program because 11BF19 and 11 BF40 ONLY swapped to manual and will be over feeding 11 SG.

j6,; I lower than program because 11BF19 and 11 BF40 ONLY swapped to manual and will be under feeding 11 SG.

I I

ic: ! higher than program because both SGFPs and 11BF19 and 11 BF40 swapped to manual and will be over feeding 11 SG.

I @]I lower than program because both SGFPs and 11BF19 and 11 BF40 swapped to manual and will be under feeding 11 SG.

J !Answer i Ia I IExam Level I ~ :cognitive Level i IApplication I !Facility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I 'Examoate:I

' ***. ... . II 12/21/2015!

KA::! 035000K603 !IK6.o3 '!RO Value: :j 2.6ltSRO Value: i 3.ol ;section: q~_j(Ro Grotrp:; I 2j [SRO Group:i I 21 ~~ D tSysterT11E:V:91Ation Jit!eJ j Steam Generator System _o_3_5_ _

iKA Statement:! I Knowledge of the of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Steam Generator System:

SIG level detector EXplanatiorl pf.I 55.41.b(7) SG NR level is programmed from 33-44% up to 100% power. As the downpower continues, the BF19 will be closing in 11,I Answers:* **** ., response to the lower steam flow requiring less feed. The 11 BF19 and 11 BF40 (expected to be shut at this power level) swap to I manual upon the second NR level channel failure. The SGFPs do not. When the 11 BF19 swaps to manual, it will have a certain I demand on it. As power (and steam flow) continues to lower, the demand will be higher than required, and SG NR level will b@r-f"'lmc h: .... h ....... .i.h..,n n ....... ,.. .............. 1,...., ,,,.,1 Ii J -

Reference Title**

.""le Fac!lity Refere11ce Number * ! [Reference Section *... l ! Page NCi'. J IRevisicml I*

IOverhead Annunciators Window G I 1 S1 .OP-AR.ZZ-0007 I lj 17 1142 I Il I I 11 11 I I I I 11 11 I

l,;io. Number ..**. I I CN&FDWE004 Objectives i.Mater.ial Requiredfor ~xa.gir~;:itiori * .: I 11

!9~e~!!e11~ourc;~;. j j_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.l l9u~5n0n M0Clificbtio6'r1~~h9q: j 1IOsedburirig TratnfhgProgram I oI i~~~~~i'9n'$,~~r~e.con1~eptsi 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.ll 1

tcomrrient .*. **

I I I I

RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper I __R_o_s_y_s1_em_1_E_vo_1_ut_io_n_L_is_t..... __s_Ro_s_ys_t_em_1_E_vo_1_ut_io...n_L_is_t..... Outline Changes iouestion Topic I IRO 52 I s~ 10 m Unit 2 is operating at 95% when the PO reports steam flow is rising on all SGs with no readily apparent reason.

Al of the following describes how the steam flow will affect the plant, and how operators should proceed if steam flow continues to rise significantly IAW S2.0P-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow?

Reactor power will rise at 1) rate as the increased steam flow. The crew will 2)

§] 11) a higher

2) initiate a MSLI to determine if a safety injection is required. I

~ 11) the same

2) Trip the reactor and confirm the trip, then initiate a MSLI to determine if a Safety Injection is required. I

~ 11) a higher

2) Initiate a power reduction to ensure reactor power remains <100% while attempting to identify and isolate the leak. I

a.i 11) the same c::::_i 2) Initiate a power reduction to ensure reactor power remains <100% while attempting to identify and isolate the leak.

!Answer 11 b I !Exam Level 11 R I !Cognitive Level 1 I Comprehension I !Facility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I JExamDate: ; I 12/21/20151

~1039000A2os j,A2.05 I I

,RO Value.*l,@,SRO Value.1 I! !J]" ,Section. ,I~ 1RO Group.. *!1LJ 1SRO Group.1LJ '"MD I i 0 , **xcA~

Jtl. , ,

system/Evolution Title I I Main and Reheat Steam System I [039-1

'KA Statement:' Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Main and Reheat Steam System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

lncreasina steam demand, its relationship to increases in reactor power 1Expla:nation of i 55.41.b(1,5, 10) AB.STM does direct a power reduction at Step 3.8 if the EHC system is not causing the turbine to be the source of

Ar *qrs: i the rising steam flow. The stem states that there is no readily apparent reason for the rising steam flow, and EHC malfunction would be apparent. Also, the Continuous Action Summary is in effect at Step 1. CAS Step 1.1 states that at any time if reactor power is rising uncontrollable, trip, confirm, initiate MSLI. If sauce of steam leak is isolated, then go to TRIP-1. If not, initiate SI and

~~ +~ TDID_1 I

I Reference Title If, Facility Reference Nu'mber I !Reference Section II Page No.: !Revision'

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,1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~1,1 _ _ _ _ _~1, _ _ _ _.Jj 11~==='

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LO.Number Objectives MSTEAME008 IABSTM1E001 iMaterial Required for Examinatfon ,, J I iouestion Source:* J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ ___.l jouestion Modification Method: I I !used During Training Program I D 1

ouestionSource Comments; I I

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Icomment I I I I L I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I

RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I IQµesUoh Topic: IRO 53 G;. .., the following conditions:

- . ,,t 2 has experienced a loss of all feedwater flow initiated by a Feedwater Isolation signal (P-14) condition on 23 SG.

I

- To mitigate the event after the P-14 has cleared an NCO has been directed to start 21 SGFP in accordance with S2.0P-SO.CN-0007, Rapid SGFP Recovery.

II

- The NCO successfully relatches the 21 SGFP but the speed of the pump does not rise automatically to minimum speed as he anticipated.

Which of the following is the cause of this response?

~I The P-14 signal "seal-in" feature.

L:.........:J I

\b.J, 21 SGFP PUMP SPEED CONTROL is in AUTO.

I c. 121 SGFP ENABLE/DISABLE switch is in the DISABLE position.

@iJ 121 SGFP speed was >160 rpm when the latch push button was depressed.

!'Answer l Id I IExam l..evei .i IR I iC?gnitive'l..evel i IMemory I iF~i;ility.:'J ISalem 1 & 2 I lexarl1 oate: I I

• • • ,' ,*, l 12/21/20151

.l<A::I osgoooA107 I1A1.07 , lRPYalue:ll2.5*l'skovaltleSlj2.6*i 'Section:!I~ !ROGroup:il 11 's1m Group:ll 1j ~i:i D System/Evoll.itiOn'Thle I l_M_a_in_F_ee_d_w_a_t_e_r_s.._ys_t_e_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I !059 l<AstatemenEi Ability to predict and/or monitor chanqes in parameters associated with operatinq the Main Feedwater System controls includinq:

Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICS I Explanation of .i 55.41.b(4, 10). A is incorrect because the P-14 signal automatically clears when the SG level lowers <setpoint, there is no seal in 1:ArisVv'ifrs*:: :"' t j circuit. B is incorrect because auto speed control prevents latching of the SGFP. C is incorrect because the Enable/Disable switch in the disable position only removes the ADFWCS from controlling SGFP speed, the switch is placed in Disable when starting the SGFP. Dis correct because the SGFP may be latched with speed <160 rpm, but it will not automatcally raise speed to minimum 1~ 1 nn --~ ;ri1~ -----n

. -Referente Title . : ~* FatH[ty Reference Number

• j iRefereflcesection I!* page No. j !R,evision*

ISGFP Prompt Recovery iIS2.0P-SO.CN-0007 I 116 11 4 I

'I II I ii 11 I 11 i! I !I 11 I Objectives ISGFPLOE006 Illlse1:fouri@Trc_;inif19"F>rograrri] o 191f~~t[()fj:~o).l'.~~,'coll,l!henf?! 144112. Removed second part of question which asked what you had to do to get speed to raise. Replaced I

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• 1 _i_m~p_la_u_s_ib_le~d_is_tr_ac_t_e_r*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-J

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RO Skyscraper. I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

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fduestibllTopic 11 Ro 54 1 1.r;*'- f-ioth 11 and 12 AFW pumps in service providing 6E4 lbm/hr flow to each SG, what would be the response if both 13AF21 and 14AF21 were shutl

~ 111 AFW pump automatic recirc valve would open. I

~I The single automatic recirc valve for the MDAFW pumps would open. I

..=J I The Pressure Override Circuit would actuate to prevent dead heading 11 AFW pump. J

[J I Normal MDAFW pump recirc flow would rise through the orificed continuous recirculation line. I Answ:r: ~ !Exam Level j ~ jcognitiye Level  ! j Application I !Faci,lity:,l iSalem 1 & 2 I :E)(a[T'Jp~tef.l j 12/21/20151 1

~I 061000K503 j 'K5.03 i *RO Value:if))'fsRo Vaiue:l[IB"!s~ctie>n(il~ 1~0 Gre>up::LJ!SRCfGroup:iLJ ~]I~ D SysteffiJEvolution Title j IAuxiliary I Emergency Feedwater System  ! '-jo_6_1~

KA Statement: I ! Knowledge of the operational implications of the followinq concepts as they apply to the Auxiliary I Emergency Feedwater Svstem: I

! Pump head effects when control valve is shut I iE~p.laoa,tron :otd 55.41.b(?,8) The MDAFW pumps each has its own dedicated recirc line and associated automatic recirc valve, which opens to iAnswe'l-s:* '>  !:' qmaintain aFW pump flow >180 gpm. With the 6E4 lbm/hr in stem for each of the 2 SGs being supplied from 11 AFW pump that=

240 gpm, the valve would initially be closed and open when flow lowers <180 to prevent the increased pump head from causing 1

1. fhU.,mgr~:~ ~;~;~~:d~v~~~~~ ti~2ts 1 ?0 i~ 1 ~n5~o~~~c~~~\~lf~~~\~/:'.;~ 0t~~~;:1t1 ;:~~~ 1~r: 1~of~r~~~;:,~:~1 1~n1 ~~ 1 ~ ~~ ~~~:ecA ~;cause Iincorerect but plausible because that is how the recirc line for 'the TDAFW pump is setup for continuous recirc.. .

• • • . . :* * .. Reference Title'* * ***.* . *** *' l** facility Reference Number..*  %*! 'Reference Section .* * .j f.Pagef'.19.i !R.evislpri'

=;;===============

;========~~==================~;::===========~

j Auxiliary Feedwater System Lesson Plan I 1 NOS05AFW000-14 I 1119-20 1 I I lj 1l=====11 i l=I==

L 11 I 11 11 _ __.

1 Lo>Numl:lei'.:" ' *

• Objectives

! AFWOOOE008

[

1_ _ _ ____.

'Matel"iaLf{equfredfoi- Ex~mii'tati<?n :**; I i9.l1esH?~ ~g~rC,~: *,I l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ __,I ~9,U,~;>fi<>n M9.ciifiC:atiC>l1 Method: *: :I I ius~d otiriil9 Training ProgramJ o fol1e~tiC>n s~~\S~ pornm~lltsi I J

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[O.uestloriJ6pi~\ ,_R_0_5_5_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I Given the following conditions:

, 2 is performing a normal shutdown at 20% per hour IAW the IOP's.

LL SGFP is shutdown.

Current Rx power is 24%.

21 SGFP trips.

With NO operator action, what will be the status of the Auxiliary Feed Pumps?

~I ONLY the MDAFW pumps start immediately upon the trip of 21 SGFP.

I

~I ONLY the MDAFW pumps start when SG NR level in 1/4 S/G's lowers to 14%.

I I

• c. i The MDAFW pumps AND the TDAFW pump start immediately upon the trip of 21 SGFP.

t!:..J IThe MDAFW pumps AND the TDAFW pump start when NR level in 1/4 S/G's lowers to 14%. I

• Answer.! ~!Exam Level i ~!Cognitive ~evel '"I j Application l IFacmty:l lSalem 1 & 2 I 1.E~~rnD~.t~:.:j j 12/21/201511

~I 061000K602 IIK6.02  ;!Ro IJ"afoe:l[2BtsRova.1lle:![TI":section:jl~ [Ro'Grollp:iLJisR6Group:1LJ !~~ D i,SystemtEv,'olutiOri:Titfe J f Auxiliary I Emergency Feedwater System I :061 KA s tatement:* . j I K nowi ed1qe of th eo f t heeffect o a loss or ma Ifunction on t he f0 II OWJnQWI*11 have on the AUXIT1arv IE merqencv Fee dwa er system:

Pumps

Expf#°natlo n of\ 55.41.b (4) MDAFW pumps auto start when both SGFPs are tripped as shoen on logic drawing 221064. The TDAFW pump does l

.ArisWets: r~ 'i'.'<f not. The MDAFW pumps also auto start on 2/3 NR level channels in one SG lowers to 14%, but in this case they will already be running. The TDAFW pump starts on 2/3 NR level channels on 2/4 SGs.

,....__ ' I I :2.L:"Reference rn1e .*

1**

,;:,*"' Fadlity" ReferehceNumber **I [Reference Secti~rf !kPageNo.f [~evision; I RPS AFW pumps startup 11221064 II 11 1 Is I I I II I

AFW System LP II NOS05AFW000-14 II ll 1133

!I 1114 11 I

I lI

Lo/NiJmbifr:Xi! .. Objectives I AFWOOOE006 1.9ue~!l6fi.§?.P.tce:,.l'J IFacility Exam Bank i \q~es~iofi Mo<;Jificati~!i.r,<t~tflo~;:. 11Editorially Modified Ifu~edbl!rin9 ;rrarnii1g Prograrnl o j'ot1~5t!9tisC>D[c:~*¢,9rti!J1e~ts.i I;:======-::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~===========-===============:::__,

41751

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R__o s_ k_yS_ c_ r_ap_er_ - '~ SRO Skyscraper --~~' I I RO SysternlEvolution List_ L

• SR? System/Evolution List _ " _ _ Outline Changes loue~tion Toplcj _R_0_5_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,

Giv"'n the following conditions:

emergency Diesel Generator (EOG) is operating in parallel with the 500KV grid for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> endurance run IAW 82.0P-ST.DG-0014, 2C DIESEL GENERATOR ENDURANCE RUN, following a complete overhaul.

- Cumulative run times for all individual EOG load limits are less than 10% of rated.

- While operating at 2525 KW three hours into the test, the operator mistakenly adjusts 2C EOG speed control resulting in MW loading rising to 261 O KW.

What are the consequences, if any, of continued EOG operation at this KW load?

Operation for the remaining 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> of the test. ..

~'will not have any adverse effect on 2C EOG.

I L.~ will result in exceeding the 30 minute load limitation for 2C EOG.

6 jwill result in exceeding the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> load limitation for 2C EOG. l

~ !will result in 1

exceeding the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> load limitation for 2C EOG. 1 fAnswer i~ IExam Level I !B::J !Cognitive Level I! Application  ! ;Facility:W Salem 1& 2 j_ExamD~te: w___12_1_21_12_0_1~51J

~!062000A101 1:A1.01 1 jRo'lalue:l~.:sR6Va1ue:l[I~Jisectiori:Jl~:ROGroup:{.J]lsR()~Group:il~ D

'System/Evollltion Title J j_A_.c_._E_l_ec_t_ric_a_l_D_is_tr_ib_u_ti_on_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ ~--~

'KA statement:' Ability to predict and/or monitor chanqes in parameters associated with operatinq the A.C. Electrical Distribution controls including:

Significance of DIG load limits

~p1ara!ion ~ti 55.41.b(S) The EOG load limitations are maximum of: 2600KW continuous, 2600-2750KW for 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />, 2750-2860KW for 2 Answers:---.- >i hours, and 2860-3100KW for 30 minutes. With the EOG operating at 2610KW for 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />, the EOG will not exceed any limits, operation between 2600 (cont) and 2750(2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />) KW, since the stem stated that the cumulative run time for ALL EOG load I limits was <10%, which would be 210 hours0.00243 days <br />0.0583 hours <br />3.472222e-4 weeks <br />7.9905e-5 months <br /> for this limit.

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• Reference Title--_

I FaCinty"Referehce Numbef-. \ IReferEH1ce Section I\' Page J'lo. j !Revlsio~n:

I2c DIESEL GENERATOR SURVEILLANCE TE 1IS2.0P-ST.DG-0003 llP&L 3.5 II !152 I

! II ll 11 11 I I II II 11 11 I

~~9~:-N\i'ffibet;/'. <.:*

I EDGOOOE012 Objectives l9ti~~~[o~ ~?:U,rce:}*;j j Facility Exam Bank I[use~'burillg Tfaining Program ] D

[olJ~~~ionSo~~C:e Ccir"J!'gt~~~~l 163989 replaced 2000 hr distracter (implausible) with 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> distracter I

!comment >

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.R? SkyScra~er I SRO Skyscraper. . ROSystem/Ev?lution List j SRO System/Evolution List I .Outline Changes J louestibn Topic j l , . . . R _ 0 _ 5 _ 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , 11 I-IAW Salem FSAR Section 8.3.3.2, Station Batteries, on a total loss of all AC power the station vital 125 VDC batteries are designed to s* loads for a minimum of . hours. I

!.a:.111

!~~--------~----------------------~---------------'

!Answer] ["O" :Ex<1m Levefj ~ lcbgnitiveLevel d IMemory I jFcidt\ty: I j Salem 1 & 2 I J,ExariiDat~:j j 12/21/20151

~I 062000K303 i ,K3.03 I[RO.Value:/[DJ [sR.oVaiu~:lr.2] isecti6ri: Jl..=_j ['ROGroup:ILJ iSRO Group:/ LJ D Sy~teaj/Evd!O(i9ri Titre"j j_A_.c_._E_l_ec_t_ric_a_l_D_is_tr_ib_u_ti_on_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ ~--~

iKA Statem"ent";"J Know!edqe of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the A.C. Electrical Distribution will have on the followinq:

DC system

'Expl~natiori C>fi 55.41.b(?,8) IAW Salem FSAR Section 8.3.3.2, Station Batteries, states ... "The batteries are sized for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of operation after a

A1\sWefs'; **' I loss of ac power, based upon the required operation of the de emergency equipment."

"'<' .*.,Reference

Title:

• .; \'

• Facility Reference Number I[Reference Sedr9n ~ l i Page No. I i.Revis\9n(

!salemFSAR ll 118.3.2.2 118.3-18 1114 I

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• .:* .. ::,;.J lL_o.Number * """<i Objectives I DCELECE002

(,pu~stkJnSoµrce: !IFacility Exam Bank I J r9uestid~;~c)~ifii::~tionM,~~hod: .* Direct From Source I !Used outing 'Tr~infrigfrogram l D

9qMtfon.sour<:~.som~~h!s,l j.-L_o_9_1_0_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___, 1 I I I

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes I

[Question Topic i !RO 58 Given the following conditions:

- control room receives Auxiliary Typewriter alarm point 0676. 2G 4KV

~~OUPBUSLOSS125VDCCONTROLPWR.

- An operator investigates and reports 125 VDC breaker 2BDC1AX12, 2G 4KV Bus Control Power Supply (Reg) tripped.

Which of the following identifies the effect, if any, this will have on 24 RCP 4KV breaker?

If 24 RCP is running it will ...

fal Itrip immediately.

lb; 11 continue to run but will not trip if required. I II I

c,i trip if a RPS trip signal is subsequently developed, but would not be able to be re-started if directed.

I' I

,d. l continue to run and be unaffected as emergency control power from the alternate control power supply will automatically be provided.

I

[Answer 11 b I !Exam Level 11 R I i~ogllitlve Level

• I Application I !Facility: !ISalem 1 & 2 I i.Examoate: I j

,_,. . '.** _- l 12/21/20151 iKA=,I 053000K401 1IK4.01 1 IROVahJe:q 2.71 tsROValue::j3.0*I Section: II SYS IiRo Group:l I 1 j ist,m Group:' j 11 ~~~1 D

!Systein/Evolution Title.I 1_0_.c_.E_le_c_tr_ic_a_ID_is_tr_ib_u_ti_on_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~l j063

'KAStatement: i Knowledge of D.C. Electrical Distribution design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Manual/automatic transfers of control  !

[§plaf1~tloh, of! 55.41. b(8) 4KV Group bus control power is supplied from the DC electrical system. Thr alternate supply must be manually provided 1Answers: ** * ** * 'I when the normal supply is lost. 4 KV breakers cannot be tripped remotely without 125VDC available to energize trip coil. A is incorrect because there is no power to energize the trip coil. plus no trip signal would be present. B is correct. C is incorrect because it would not trip if required (different from A is "immediate" vs. "subsequent"). Dis incorrect because the control power s~Ota!J is perfoc:rop.4 n-1..:in1 ,,..,n~

. ..... Re~eren&Title',/: .

• li FadlitY Reference. Number  : tRefererice,3'ectio~.* ij.Page No~ J [R.evisfon:

INo. 24 Reactor Coolant Pump 11211538-2 I 11 1122 I I II I 11 11 I

'I II I II II I

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' ~ *)

Objecti I DCELECE007

[au'estion SolJr~e,:(j I Facility Exam Bank J i0ll~~ti9~ Jl4?c!Jfi9~~iori~eth6d: :j Editorially Modified

~~~~-'.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::==::::::::__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I Irus~~ During Trafni(lg ,Program I D

!Question Source Comrtien~#! 129217 j

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comrrie'nt Oi *. *'. . ** *'[

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List. I Outline Changes

\duestionTopic I IRO 59 I GivAn the following conditions:

- .Jiesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank indicated level is 96.0".

- 22 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank indicated level is 96.1 ".

- 21 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump is selected to REGULAR.

- 22 Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump is selected to BACKUP.

- The Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank area C02 Tank fails, and a projectile opens a hole in the bottom of 21 DFOST which completely empties.

Assuming no other damage from the C02 Tank failure has occurred, which of the following identifies how makeup flow to the EOG Day Tanks will be provided, if at all, if the 2C EOG starts automatically to provide power to 2C Vital bus on a single bus UV condition?

Makeup flow to the EOG Day tanks will be provided by ......

~I BOTH DFO Transfer pumps because DFOSTs are normally cross connected but check valves will prevent 22 DFOST from draining out the rupture. I

~ 121 DFO Transfer pump ONLY because the REGULAR pump is aligned to the highest storage tank level during normal surveillance testing.

I ftl INEITHER DFO Transfer pump because DFOSTs are normally cross connected and both will be empty.

I

~I 22 DFO Transfer pump ONLY because 21

~d. ! DFO Transfer pump is aligned to an empty tank.

I i

Answer !~ !Exam Level 11~ !Cognitive. Level** ; j Application I ifacility:j ISalem 1 & 2 I j~X~f!1Date: IJ_ _ _12_12_1_12_0_15_,j

~I 064000K608 I K6.08 1 IRO\/alue: !~'SRO\tal1,1~:!02j;s~'ctfop: II~ rRO Group:1[::]'sRO,Grnup:!LJ 0

s~tern/Ey'olution:Jitle ! I Em erg ency Diesel Generators 11064 tKAStafement; II Knowledge of the of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Emergency Diesel Generators:

l Fuel oil storaoe tanks I.E.

• .. fCplan~.t.i*o**.n* o.tji 55.41.b(S) DFOSTs are normal isolated from each other on the outlet side by the closed 2DF35, 21/22 DFO STOR TANK X-CONN

~ 's: .;, I

• j VAL VE. Each tank is supplied by its respective transfer pump. Return (overflow from DFO Day tanks) is directed to the tank which

• • ~-~!has its DFO transfer pump selected to lead, so that overflow won't be directed to the storage tank from which suction is not being I taken. With an empty 21 DFOST, 21 transfer pump will still receive a start signal (at 33"), but has no fuel to pump. As Day Tank l I level conii!JllAS to l

tov.tpr 22 fRack110) 011mo 'OliU s+,....+ f'.:lt ?7"\ ......... .-4

......,...,,;,-l,,., ~,.....

,,,, - * - * - - +........ r,..

/ .** Reference Title Il* F#cJHty R,efere~cE! Nul!lber l;Reference Section <:j l Page No. i iR,evision 1

~'F=ue=I=O=il==========!i.~l2=05=2=49=-3======='*!lf:= = = = = : : : : : ; ! !.=j=====-1130 I

~IE=D=G=L=es=s=on=P=la=n================~!l*~N=O=S0=5=E=DG=0=0=0-=11=========1~1~============-lj~4=4===='-ll!.=1=1==='

11, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,\l _ _ _ _ ____..lj _ _ ____,lj _ __.l l_ __.I Objectives J I FUEOILE004

!Matefi~I ~E!ci1Jireci for p,~mii:iation ::' I I 11

[S~~~ji~~:;~p~i;c~:.'. Il_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _-11 [9y~stiori'.M§dffi~ati9~*r.it~th2,c1:*..* --------~I [(fs@ plifi,ng Training Program l oI

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes

\ouesti6n*ToP!1£tl I RO 60 I I Gi,,~.-, the following conditions:

- , 1 is operating at 100% power.

- Control room operators are preparing to perform a Containment Pressure Relief !AW S1.0P-SO.CBV-0002, CONTAINMENT PRESSURE-VACUUM RELIEF SYSTEM OPERATION.

I- Containment radiation levels are NORMAL for 100% power operation with no failed fuel.

After opening the 1VC5 and 1VC6 CONT PRESSNAC RELIEF !SOL valves to initiate the pressure relief, which choice describes how the respective radiation monitors indication will respond?

• 1R12A- Containment Gas Effluent

• 1 R41 B - Plant Vent Noble Gas Intermediate Range

• 1 R41 D - Plant Vent Noble Gas Release Rate

[al 11 R12A rises; 1R41 B rises; 1R41 D rises.

I

.b. \ 11R12A rises; 1R41 B constant; 1 R41 D constant.

I, ls] 11R12A constant; 1R41 B constant; 1R41 D rises.  !

t.a. j I1R12A constant; 1R41 B rises; 1R41 D constant.

'.Answer I ~ !Exam Level j rE=J tccignitive Level i IApplication I lf'<!9ifi~.:,:J ISalem 1 & 2 I !E~1u11P<ite: J !___12_12_1_12_0_1s_.!

KA:! I073000A 101 I A 1. 01 1 IROValue: IO] r~RO Value;:] G] :section: 11 SYS I[RO Group:J LJ ;sRO Gtoup:! [ ] D Radiation levels 55.41.b(11)1R12A is sampling containment atmosphere, so it will NOT rise when the pressure relief is started. 1 R41 B is an intermediate range monitor that normally does not have sample flow through it. It's sample flow will start when the lo range 1R41A monitor nears its high end of monitoring range. It's indication will not change during a pressure relief with NORMAL containment radiation levels. The R41 D provides the gaseous effluent release rate (uCi/sec) by combining (product of) the on-range R41A r . . . . .

t.i'/i: . R,eferenceffjtle. * < I ~":yi=acil)tyRe~etf)fice Num.ber : *. ;Re;ff)~f)nce Sectigni t';J 1 Page.~o'..j [Reyision:

=

=:::::::::::::::::::::=:::::.::::::::::;::::::=.:::::::==.::::::::::::::::::==:.

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~!A=b=n=or=m=a=IR=a=d=ia=ti=on================:=:.l~ls=1=.0=P=-A=B=*=R=A=D-=0=00=1========~':~==========::::::::1j:======'l~3=2==:::::.I II 111 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,l, _ _ _ ____.!l _ ___.l j_~I Objecltives ~

I RMSOOOEOOS

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List i SRO System/Evolution List j Outline Changes I

l~ue~Hohtop.ic! IRo 61 Giv 0 ri the following conditions:

- i 1 is operating at 25% power.

- 1B EOG is running in parallel with station power on 1B 4KV Vital Bus.

- 13 and 16 SW pumps are in service, 11 SW pump is in AUTO.

- 1A 4KV Vital bus becomes deenergized due to a Bus Differential signal.

1 minute after the 1A 4KV Vital bus deenergizes, with NO operator action, which of the following contains ALL the SW pumps which will be running?

bll

~

[b.T1. 15.

~

I

[]113,16.

,d.j 115, 16.

[Ariswe.r !Ia  ! IEJ{al11 L,evel i IR I i<:;ogn'itlve Level !IApplication I jFa'cility: i ISalem 1 & 2 I I**.*.

iExamDate:. **.* .*** f I 12/21/2015!

I iKA:f 076000K201 I K2.01 iR-OValue::l2.7*1

SROValu~

1I

• i 2.7! \Sectioh:il~_j:RO,Group:tl

-.=:====:.::=======::..:::::=====.:::==-==================-======:.:=:=-

11 iSRO Group:!! 1] em D tK'*~

.:r

Sys t~m/EvolutiorjTitle I l_s_e_rv_i_ce_w_a_t_er_S_y~s_t_em_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~l 076

'KA Staterne.llt:! I Knowledge of bus power supplies to the followinq:

I Service water I

e

x:plahatloil'*otl 155.41 (7) A bus powers 15, and 16 SW pumps. On a single bus UV as described in the stem, only that bus would load in blackout tAftSWefS>~ce >;i lo.dlog. A b"' ;, looked oct oo ""' Dlffocooti*I {doooe'l)l"d), '"' ~e lo" of 16 SW pc mp wocld "'"'e he*dec pee""" to lowee to where the auto pump (11) would start. Only one SW pump is aligned for AUTO which is the normal at power configuration for the SW pumps, one in auto, and the rest in manual. 12 SW pump would never start unless 11 pump did not on a SEC initiation, that is 1-- 1 b~l it is oat listed io ao~£ of tbe cboices j 4. S~l::il 011r:oo lMCll !Id cot stact sincP B bi is CP ...... ,,. 1............... ..............,,. .h: ....h i~ ..h, it: ....... '+ r~ ............ ,.J in l - - . . . -

II any of the choices. There can be confusion about the running EOG and the loss of A vital bus causing a MODE II (Blackout), which would strip busses and load the primary SW pump on each bus. The unit 1 SW pump power supplies are reversed from unit 2 (21/22 pumps A bus, 25,26 pumps C bus)

• , -'./\:;; -><*'.' ;,'<:;:  ::k I;Reference section" , , ....... ,, ... *. *I , . * * ,

IService Water Pump Operation

• R.eterencerme ,;- Facility Reference Number II S1 .OP-SO.SW-0001 I l ::Page No.':j \Rev1s1,on; 11 1127  !

I IUnit 1 4KV Vital Buses One line II 203002 I ii 1134 I

! I! I ii II i

!Lo. tjug16er I SWBAYSE005 Objectives J faµesti~(isC>ur~~: 11 Facility Exam Bank I[9~~~~tio,nM8ctlff~~tiori!'Aettfo~~2 JDirect From Source I!Used buring'.trai'ni'ng Prograrri l o

~qM~~lorf,~. ~~r,~'e,£~fu!Tlen~~j 1152970, used on Sept 2011 NRG RO exam (3 exams ago)

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper J RO System/Evolution List .* f SRO System/Evolution Ust *. Outline Changes I

ouesti9nJppi6! I Ro 62 I Giw.., the following conditions:

- , 2 is in MODE 3, NOT, NOP.

- # 2 ECAC was manually placed in operation to collect bearing vibration readings IAW S2.0P-SO.CA-0001, Control Air System Operation.

- PRIOR to starting the# 2 ECAC, BOTH Control Air headers were at 96 psig.

- 2C 4KV vital bus senses an UV condition, and the bus loads in MODE II*.

- 2A and 2B 4KV vital buses remain powered from SPT's.

- 5 minutes after the UV signal, Unit 2 ECAC oil pressure indicates O psig and has been O psig for> 1 minute.

With NO operator action, which of the following describes the effect this will have on the Control Air System?

Assume the ECAC Motor Overload has not actuated at any time.

1. 2 ECAC is and Control Air header(s) is/are a~ 11 NOT running, "A", lower than "B" header.

• ~

I

~ running, "A", higher than "B" header.

~I NOT running, BOTH, 96 psig. II

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'

~I running, BOTH, 96 psig.

Answer I @=] \Exam lever! ~ l~o'gllitive Le'{el ! IApplication 1 Faqility: l ISalem 1 & 2 .Ex~Mpate:l I 12121120151

~I o7aoooA301 I'.A3.01 r;7; r;-::;J ~

il~OVa!ue:l 1 .2.:_l 'S~oY~!lle:i 1 EJ (section:'.11~ '~oGroup:! 1 _2] isR'O'c3.roup:] 1_2]

~ Jt"*"'Hf-1;1

~~

D lSysterfl/Evc)lution Titie i IInstrument Air System 11~0-7-8-~

K,  !

ernent:<i Abilit to monitor automatic operations of the Instrument Air S stem includin Air pressure

[Ei<plariatlon o~ J 55.41.b(7) The ONLY trip which remains active for the ECAC after ANY SEC start is motor overload. The ECAC operating

[Answers:

• i characteristics are such that at 95 psig and above header pressure, the ECAC will NOT be supplying the CA header. With the stem

. conditions of 96 psig prior to and after the ECAC was originally started, the subsequent (SEC) stop and restart of the ECAC will I~~~e ~2e ~~=~t ~;a~~ ~~~~~~a~~nrc:c;~oen s!~tit~~ :a~~:ed;:~~~ip~~:;a;:~s ~:t~~~~:r ;~~~n~~~~:~;~~ftb!r bhse ~~cl~:~~n~f ~~\2C.vital

!pressure per PT.CA-001 (Rev. 17) P&L 3.4 bullet 3' could not be ~sed as justification for selecting a~ incorrect distracter.

)ReferenceJitJ,e1;;, *;*", *** FacilitY:.F{~f~reoceNu01bef

• It~efefer\c~.sectfori j ~P~~e"'NC?.\ jf{evisi611/

1;=::============================~~======================-.~============~

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!l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,ll 11---~!I Ii I Objectives ICONAIRE008

RO SkyScraper J SRO Skyscraper. I RO System/Evolution List .. I . SROSystem/EvolutionUst *.. 1. . Outline Changes . I faue~tlon Topic I RO 63

!-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--'

II in :>rlrJition to providing a source of water for Fire Protection, Fresh Water and Fire Protection Storage Tank water can be aligned to which one of the I

!5 g systems?

I la. I Service Water.

I

~I Main Condensate. I l

~ Auxiliary Feedwater. l

~ I Spent Fuel Pool Cooling. I1

>Ans\Ner1~iExamlevel1 ~;cognitive L~\/er. *i IMemory I j,FaciH!y:.11Salem1 & 2 I 'Examo~1:e: 11 121211201511

~loseoooK103 1:K1.03 . llRO'Va1ue:.J§[S,Rb\fa1ue!1§ise~t10n;1j~tR0Grour):f=JJ1sR().GroU?:!LJ ~!r~J D tsystetOIEyoiutionTiffe I j Fire Protection System I ~10_86_ _

IKA Statement:: IKnowledoe of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between Fire Protection System and the following:

AFW Svstem

Explanation of/ 55.41.b(4) Fire protection water can be aligned to theh AFW system through a normally disconnected spool piece.

Ailsw~fs: '"'*I

'-"--- ~~~_l::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::J.

Refer~nc;e rme INo. 1 & 2 Units Fire Protection 1l205222-4 Il Ij 1163 j I II !l~===::::;q:.=~1 ==! l=I I

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,lll _ _ _ _ ______.ll ii 11_~1 I

rL.C>. ('.lymber ;/; ; Objectives I FIRPROEOO?

1_ ___.

~Quei;ti~l} s(iy~~e:~ 11 Facility Exam Bank

[p@~i,idn S:p.ur9e: C()rrf@~~1#1 I

• -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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!Ollestion Topic, RO 64

!------------~~-----------------------~---------'

1Wr'-" of the following describes the effect if BOTH Containment Phase A and Phase B isolations occur during a LBLOCA, and when will they be rE 'len operating in the EOP network?

I containment penetrations not supporting ECCS functions will be isolated.

Phase A and Phase B will be reset in

~I ONL y NON-ESSENTIAL. EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

I l§J IONLy NON-ESSENTIAL. EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant.

I I

/c. ! ALL. EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. I I

I

~1ALL. EOP-LOCA-1 Loss of Reactor Coolant.

I (Answer 1 @=] !Ex<im Leyetl lR I !Cogn!tive'Level 1 IApplication  ! j.Facmty: i ISalem 1 & 2 I 1ExarJ1oate: 11 12/21/2015!

I ~IA_2._03_~! :RO V;:ilu~; if 3.5*1 ts Ro Valu~:J j3.8*1 [Section: JI~ fRO Grpup:J I 1j [SR() Group:: j

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il<A: 11103000A203 1j

system/Evolution Title J l_c_o_n_ta_i_nm_e_n_ts_y'-s_te_m_______________________________ __,I J103 l!V\'Stat&ment: i Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Containment System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitiqate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

Phase A and B isolation I!AriE~pla~~tlo.ne>f I rs: * ,

! 55.41.b(9,7) ~uring LBLO~A.

a defined as RCS pressure below the shutoff head of the RHR pumps,

expected to nse above 15 ps1g. The stem states that both Phase A and Phase B actuate. Phase A 2 isolates all non-essential c~ntainment pressure is_

I- --- line's penetrating containment, and Phase B isolates remaining containment penetrations not supporting ECCS functions. TRIP-1 I 1 verifies automatic actions and identifies the optimal recovery procedure. The SI, Phase A, and Phase B would be reset as directed iln I rV'll_1 -"'-- *--*"'*'-- 1 nf"/\ ;~th=------*-----"'"=

i . ,

I IH( F:\ ** . * * . * ,* .*. R~f~rerice Tille , . '.

• 1):: .; !V '*:'Fa¢ilityRef~reni:e N!Jml{~r****.* i:~eference seC'.tion:> *****I [P,age,No. / !Re\/isiotj 11 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection j j 2-EOP-TRIP-1 I ii I j2s I I! Loss of Reactor Coolant 112-EOP-LOCA-1 I ii lj2s I II I 11 11 I 11 I CONTMTE008 Objectives I lPU7stion ..1ollfoe.:J l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _ __.I i9H~~ti()r:Mc>'~,ifi~a,ti0~,i'v1~tho~: 1__________,I rµsecl puringTfafnirig Pfr)gi'ainJ D

9llestl()~ sc,iurce. cofrim~rt~i I I

!~-----------------------------------~-----~

l'Comrrient **** - .

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RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I [Questidil Topic I I RO 65 I I

l.".'.V"'~h of the following identifies a condition in which the Unit 2 LCO for Containment Integrity, 3.6.1.1 Modes 1-4, would NOT be met?  !

~I A manual valve or Blind Flange outside containment required to be to be closed during accident conditions cannot be visually verified in

~ correct position due to its location in a High Radiation Area. I t!fJ  ! The containment 100' elevation airlock doors are operated by procedure to allow entry into containment for Rad Pro to take radiation surveys.

I I

~ A eves Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve fails to fully close on a failure of the controlling PZR level channel LOW.

I fa.11 A SW Accumulator nitrogen cover gas pressure falls below the minimum required.

I 1Ar1swer 11 d I :Exam Level 1IR I !c:osnitive Level  ! j Application I !f.ac\Hty: i ISalem 1 & 2 I [Ex11mDate: 11 12/21/20151

KA

11103000G240 112.2.40 :IROYalue::Jj 3.41'sROValue:il4.7 I iSection:.:il~ 'Ro'(;follp:JI 11 :SRO Groi.ip:i! 1j E~i D

system/Eyolution Title'.! l_c_o_n_ta_in_m_e_nt_S_y~s_t_em _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~I j103 KAStatement:~----------------------------------------------

Abili to ap ly Technical S ecifications for a system.

explanation of i 55.421.b(9, 10). A is incorrect because 4.6.1.1.a specifically states that a manual valve or blind fiange in a high radiation area may

,Ahswers:

• i be verified using Admin controls. B is incorrect because while containment airlocks are required to be operable IAW 4.6.1.1.b (per I spec 3.6.1.3 airlock), the doors are allowed to be opened for normal transit entry and exit. C is incorrect because CIV have their Iown TS 3_.~.3 which is less r~strictive that containm.ent integrity and is ~ot included in surv requirements. for 3.6.1. '.. ~ is correct Ii> '* Reference TJtle *  : *

• Facility Reterefic.e NuinBe6 .*1 ;Reference section l' Page Nii I !Revision!

jsalemTechSpecs 11 113.6.1.1 II II

,~==================~11*~============~1~13=.6.=2.3======::=,11~===1~1==~,

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____.ll, _ _ _ _ _ _~,,3.6.1.3 ii II I Objectives ICONTMTE010

[atiest.ie~ Spuf(:~:".l l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ____,I iQuestfory Mhdifickti~p:Method:*i **1--------~I [lJsetfbllfi~gJrainin9 Pi-ografu j o

[°"i.i;s~jc)fi !:)oLirc~ q¢r}irne~~s:l I I

• ~---------------------------------------~

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes

\ouesti9nTopic\ ..----------------------------------------------,1

!_R_0_6_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.I I

1 When an on-coming operator recieves turnover in the field for a task in progress. who is responsible IAW OP-AA-112-101, Shift Turnover and Relief, I!(' 'uring the oncoming operator receives a follow-up shift turnover briefing?

~ IShift Manager. J

~ Iwee Supervisor. I f2] IAffected unit CRS. j

((! IAffected Unit NCO. I IJ\ns~eri ~ IExarnleyei1 ~ l<;ognitiveLevel i j Memory 1 !~~§i\iiy~i ISalem 1 & 2 I ~~ii.?~[)ate: ! I 12121120151

!l<A:Ji 194001G103 1;2.1.3 [\RoVa!Ue:\[TIJ~sR.bva1ue:\Uij!sedioh:H~'ROGroup:j[]rsR.o;Gr()'iJp:ILJ \9~ D s.Y~~e'tji{EvolutionTitle I iGENERI I

!~------------------------------------~

KA sfateirieiit

!

. ~IK_n_o_wl_e_d_lg_e_o_f-sh_i_ft_o_r_s_ho-rt---te-rm-r-el-ie_f_tu-r-no_v_e_r-pr_a_c-tic_e_s-.--------------------------,

!,.,;s;.:,e;:.ut 'rill

'EX:pr~riatiOn'otJ! 55.41.b(10) OP-AA-112-101, Step 4.1.5.2 states ..."If a turnover occurs in the field during performance of a task, the Shift Manager eo'"rn the ;odi'id"'I(') ce~;,e' follo~op 'hlft \OmO'eC briefiog."

i>* , . ****

• Refer~nce.Tit1e* * * ,:' * ! l* Fa~mt.Y ReferenceNuillher),*.:,j [Refe~en~es~~tion*  :-! t~age;f.fo-! !Revision!

1

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li===========================ll~===================~~=============,11~~'~'

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.ll l!, _ _ _ ___.ll _ ___.ij

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jdp~faiPll.~:§g~c~:. J j_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.I :auestiot\ Modificafio~:~~!;h§~:' '*'!

~()U'~~t~?.ffS.~ufce'.~orn~e~t~.11 l

!~---------------------------------------'

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Outline Changes I ... . .

jd.l.le!;tio'riTopic 11RO67 I I GivPn the following conditions for Unit 2:

- .sin Mode 3, NOT, NOP.

- RWST concentration - 2450 ppm

- 21 BAT concentration - 6650 ppm

- 22 BAT concentration - 6650 ppm

- 22 BAT level - 43%

Which of the following describes the LOWEST level for 21 BAT that meets or exceeds the operability requirements for the BAT?

~,43%.

I

[§B 154%.

I ic.i 192%.

I

@] 196%.

I

[Ariswer 1 ~ IE:~am Lev~r 1 IR I 1<:;ognitive Level. ! j Application I !Facility:! ISalem 1 & 2 I** .... **' I IEJ(arnoaw: 11 12/21/2015!

KA:ll 194001G125 112.1.25 *lrfo Value:!! 3.9j [SRO \Fahie: !j 4.2 I\sectidn::/I PWG I 'RO Grdup:,I 11 /sRo:Group:q 11 ~~li~ ~

~s~teITltE:'i~ruuon T.itle I ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. IGENERI I

KA staterri'ent: I

~IA-b-il-izy-to_i_n-te-rp_r_e-tr-e-fe-r-en_c_e_m-at-e-ria-1-s,-s-u_c_h_a_s_g-ra_p_h_s-.c-u-~-e-s-.-ta-b-le-s-,e-t-c-.---------------------:-

E****.~P.*.l~~.'~!.Jo.,J.*!.*,,*o.f. ii 55.41.b(6, 7) TS 3.1.2.6 requir~s a ce~ain an

ount of borated water a_vaila~le. The BASTs are normal!Y cross connected so the

'Answers:** * *;* dTOTAL volume of the 2 tanks 1s what 1s required to be above the l1m1t. With RWST boron concentration of 2450, and both BAT

• *

• 1tanks at 6650, the intersection is - 93.5%. If 1 tank is at 43 % the other tank must be at 50.5%. To preclude picking the wrong answer because of interpolation, the correct answer of 54% is 3.5% higher than required.

- I

• • ;, .* Reference Title . *

,;;;;;;;;==~~;;;;::;:;;~==;;;:;;;:;~;;;::;;;;:;;;;;::;:::=:::=~:;;;;:;;;=

i' >'Fadlity ~ef~rence Nl.lrribef *"I !Ref.erenee SectloriL :j : PagfNo. I !R~visiont I:.=S=aq=le=m=T=e=ch=S=p=ec=s======::::::::::.! I Ij 1I I I I I ii II I j_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,! I !I !j I II IJJ;o. NutTlqe( ; ** .*.

ICVCSOOE010 1

Objecti~es

• I illiriite~ia!Requjr~d fgr EX:arril11ati0n.:' 11 TS Figure 3.1-2 Boric Acid Tank Contents

[9y;~sftor's§\Jf(::f ~ IFacilizy Exam Bank I lC19:s~i(>ri MBd,ifi~~t!gfi'f,vi~t~§~[ ,A Editorially Modified 1qHe~ti?n S();lr~e s~tfoll~rit.sl 1135342 replaced a distracted and slightly modified correct answer.

_J 1co1niTient *

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes J

[Question:ropiC.i I RO 68 I I£'

At what point will the NCO record in the Narrative log that MODE 6 - Refueling is entered when refueling the Rx JAW S1 .OP-10.ZZ-0009, Defueled to

• ng?

I I

~ When the Refueling SRO in containment, has established command and control in containment with communications with the Control Room.

I I

b. j When all "Requirements and Reviews for Core Alterations and Mode 6 Entry" have been completed and the SM has signed as completed.

I

6,! IWhen the first fuel assembly is lowered into the Rx vessel.

I fd.11 When the first fuel assembly arrives in containment.

I lt..11~~er 11 c I !Excl.01 Lever! IR 11.<;:~gnitly~ L.e.\fe1 l IMemory I jFacHit)': 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !e,~afl}~~t~H I 12/21/20151

~j 194001G136 I:2.1.36 i IRO Valµe:

I[Ifil :SRO Value: i @I] ~Sei::t101:1:1!~ r.RO

~ ., <-=.:. l ~: .- ..; .,

' Group:; LJ .**c . . *:

!SRO Group:i i~ : .. <- I LJ !!1'~

nWt'>l D

sy~Ni+liE:volution Titre .I 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' IGENERI I K:Astaiement:l . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . , .

... . IKnowledge of procedures and limitations involved in core alterations.

I iExp!ar\atiorfotl 55.41.b(10) Refueling is the act of placing fuel assemblies into the Rx. Merely having a fuel assembly in containment doesn't

!P.nsv*ie~s: : ' ' j constitute refueling. The Requirements and Reviews is the Attachment 1 of the IOP, and while it is true that the SM signs it to authorize moving fuel, it is not the entry into Mode 6. While station of required personnel and verification of communication is L

It' required, it is not what defines the Mode change.

• .Ref.ererii:'etit1e' **

l~lo=e=fu=el=ed=t=o=R=ef=u=el=ing==============:::::::.lji~s=1.=o=P=-10=.=zz=-=00=0=9========~ll==l==========~l~l4=====lj19 I r~1=_=_=_=_=~~~~~~~~::===:::~:._=_=_=~~~~~~~::::~~:._=_=_=_=_=_=_=_==-~::=1_=_=~=: il-=_=~~:

Lo,Nu.mber'** .,v****

I I JOP009E004 1_ ____,

iQ~~~;pg~,~,*'~fC:~j*;j IFacility Exam Bank 119'.~*~S,~J;g:~;~<?'?.i.ficaii~h Method:

..----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-:-!

ij Editorially Modified I[9§~~ gliring'rraining ProgramJ D i,9u~~tlo~*s9y~~!f,,!J8lffe~e.~tS,:l j 11 s9so I

!-~~~~~---~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~-'

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l

RO. Sk.y.. sc. ra. pe***r* *.~~... SRO Skyscraper ~~ RO System/Evolution List i' SRO System/Evolution List !d Outline Changes ... I iOuestion.Topic'l ,_R_0_6_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,,

jWhich of the following describes how the control room(s) would be alerted to a problem with the Salem Fresh Water System? I

[] I An Auxiliary Typewriter alarm on BOTH units.

I

[lLl I An Auxiliary Typewriter alarm on Unit 1 ONLY.

I j

jc. I An OHA specific to Fresh Water system on BOTH units.

I fd.! I An OHA specific to Fresh Water system on Unit 1 ONLY.

I

, f.AiiS'wel'1 ~ [Ex~m t.E!vel j ~ ICogriitiv~TeV,e1 I !Memory I !f'..acjlfty: / j Salem 1 & 2 I 1Exampate:j j 121211201 s/

\KA:Jl 194001 G203 I 2.2.3  ! l~o va1UEEJI 3.s11sRpyalue:Jl3 g l tsectio5*:11 PWG ltFH:> Gfoup:/I 1 j lsRb Grfop:lj 1j I~~ D

[system/f:yoh.Jtion tltte I ll<A statement::

r---------------------------------------------,.

(multi-unit license) Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between units.

fE~planatiori ofi 55.41.b(4) OHA B-1 is present on BOTH units OHA system, although the equipment is located outside Unit 2, and the Unit 2

'Ah$1!Vefa: ' .;~* *: Secondary Operator is responsible for that equipment (fresh water, fire pumps, Salem Unit 3, House Heating Boiler)

r.

:;.*===*: ; .::;;..:;;;. ::;;. R::::e::;;f::;;;e::;;re:;;;n:;;;c::;;e:::;'T:.::it=Je:::;**:;;;:':::;"-:::;**:;;;'==***::;;*****:;;;**.:;:;j ;:f::;;.*:::;**=F:;;;ac::;;'i:; ;Ht;: ;y;: ;J: :;.e~: :;f: ; er:; ;e: :;'r:i: ; c:; ;e.:; ;N: :;u;: ;m: ; b:; ;e:; ;r': :;.='~I ;:::fR;;;:e::;;fe;::;j:::;e:::;ric:;;;e:::":;;;s:::;ec:::;t:;;;.lo:::;n:;;;:;;;:::::::;! l Page No. j IReyision!

IOverhead Annunciator Window B 1IS1 .OP-AR.ZZ-0002 I lj~5==~11~2=9=:::::!1 IOverhead Annunciator Window B II S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0002 I !j s I j 36 I l, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___,ll 11_ _ _ _--'lj I :.==~

j_ __.I Objectives

[oqestfofi~ol!rc~: . 1 l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _......I i8Ye!;.ti9~/~oq~tt~,~Y6ri'.rJl~t~6?!ll !I 11 l.Jse~Ilur,ing trainiljg Pr()gra111. ! oI f9ue~tipn'~o~sc~p9~.in~.rts! I*~~~~~~~~~--~-~~~~~~~~~-~~~-~~~~--~~~~~-~

I I

I I

I_

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes I

....-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--,

!UuestionTopic i RO 70  !~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'

An Independent Verification (IV) of valve position is required in an area with a 75 mrem/hr dose rate .

.:; job, which of the following is the longest time allowed for the IV before "hands-on" verification may be waived?

nl5 .

a,, minu tes.

.*j*1 7 minutes.

ir-b .

lEJ 19 minutes.

I

[ } 111 minutes 11 tAnswerj IU !Exarnl..evell ~ JC::oglliti;;el.evel i jApplication I IF~#ilfty:! jsalem 1 &2 I IExamDate:l I 12121120151

§1194001G214 I12.2.14 ilROvatlle:1G2}tsR9va1ue:i[illlsedion:ll~ fROGroup:JLJisROGroup:ILJ iltl ~

[System/EvolutionTitle:.I  ! IGENERI

• Knowledqe of the process for controllino equipment configuration or status.

!EXplariatioii of!' 55.41.b(10) 10 mrem is the dose above which an IV is not required to be performed. A= 6.25 mrem. B=S.75 c=11.25 mrem

[Ailswers: '< .;* * !

- I Refererice'iitre \ *** /'I 1L , Fcicil ity Refer,ente f'/uinber ., * .* J jReferefic~ $f;!~tion * '

• 1!*PaM Nd.  : IRevi.sial1:

~IC=o=m=p=o=n=en=t=C=o=n=fig=u=r=ati=*o=n=C=o=n=tr=o=I=====lj;=O=P=-AA=-=1=08=-=10=1=-=10=0=2=====-l!Att 11Step1.5.1 1165 117 I l~==========:::::,11~

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____.!I =========::::.'I IIII Ii1l I I

IL.a. Nd~b~r ...*.*.*.. I Objectives IMJSCAP007

'--~ 11 D

i?uestJ,~ri S,:o~rc~~grn?TI~~t~J j 60955 changed dose rate which changes correct naswer to a previous distracter.

I I

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper J RO System/Evolution List ..

SRO System/Evolution List *.~ Outline Changes I----------~-------""

~Question Topic I 1,_R_0_7_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,

Given the following conditions:

~m Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

- L 1 SW pump is C!T.

- 22, 25, and 26 SW pump are in service.

- Subsequently, 22 SW pump discharge strainer clogs, 22 SW pump is stopped, and 22 SW pump is declared inoperable.

- 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after being secured, maintenance discovers a crack in the strainer drum which will take 1 day to repair.

Of the following, which is the only method of tracking SW pump status which is NOT performed JAW OP-SA-108-115-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program?

Updating the is NOT required.

[a; i I Operational Status Board.

~ I Control Room Narrative Log.

Tech Spec Action Statement Status Board.

fd1 IT~ificgtiqn s+~+/-Aw:I01lJ;;QjQO.<..tluo:><O:l----------------------------------i-'

Lei l . Actjon

~

[A,n~werJ ~ iExainp~\feU fCJ !cognitive Level I j Memory I lfa4ilityt! j Salem 1 & 2 I lExampNe:j ,_ _ _1_2_12_1_12_0_15~1

~ 1194001 G223 112.2.23 1 IRO Value:'. f}JJ ~SROV(llu~: fifJ [S~! I~ [~bgroup:j LJ :SRO c;roup:i LJ 1 D isystem/Ev()lt!tiorj. 11tre i

---1 KA statement:!

~A-b-i-lit-y-to-tra_c_k_T_e_c_h_n-ic-al_S_p_e_c-ifi-ca-ti-.o-n-l-im-it-in_g_c_o_n_d-iti-o-ns_fo_r_o-pe_r_a-tio_n_s-.-------------------~

[E. . . .. Vo.

.a. ri.**o. f. . .*155.41.b(10) Initially, actions wil be attempted to clear the strainer clog, so it won't be readily apparent that the repair would take iAn'-' ** <:!rs: : * : longer than one shift. (Sect 5.2.4) When it becomes apparent that it will take longer than one shift, Section 5.2.5 will be

• * * * * * * , performed also. The Operational Staus Board is used during emergencies and is located in the control room area.

I

!);'"'* *r; / ' . . * *<* Ref~rence 'fitre -:,i*i , . :;c *.; * : *.

• FacllitY ~eferenc:eNumber. *** I!Referenc~ ~ectiori :j** :, I~~?] IRevisfanl I Operability Assessment and Equipment Control !l:.::o=P=-=S=A=-1=0=8=-1=1=5-=1=0=01====='i= = = = = = = = I :.:I==:::::::117 I I

'l 11;=======;1~====:!,11=1==11=1 ij ___________.1 1_ _ _ _ ___.l l__~l j_ ___,I

=='

Objectives I TECHSPE015 j_ ____,

[,8q~~M,nsou~C:k;;j l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___.l la~~~it<:)~"M§~fti4~!iory ~~thOd; *. . 11 Ilused puring Tra@.n'ggrogr'am I D

[ot1e~tior.~cillrc~:sc:i~m,~§~S,l I I

!~--------------------------------------~

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I

RO SkyScraper f SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List J Outline Changes

• 1

[oiiestioriTopicl l.-R-0_7_2-----------------------------------------~!1

• -------------------------------------------~

Given the following conditions:

.1it 2 shutdown is in progress.

- A containment entry is required to inspect an INOPERABLE component on elevation 78' outside the bioshield.

- The Unit is being shutdown at 10% per hour.

Which of the following additional approvals is required to authorize a containment entry other than the SM/CRS under these conditions?

!a.j I Operations Director - Salem.

[b,J I Station Vice President - Salem.

I

[c.j Work Control Center (WCC) Supervisor.

systeffi!Ev61utfon *Titre 1 IGENERI I

• -------------------------------------~

KAStatemel1t:I Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handlinq responsibilities, access to locked hiqh-radiation areas, aliqninq filters, etc.

'~~rn~;J~~g?t I ~:::~dc~;~~i~~~~~~iri~o~!~~~~ a~~c~~~e~~~~a~m:~i8!;: p~~~~~s b~i~;~~~~~~~- ~0~~~~~~~~:~i~~i~~s~~~~~~ii~~ent is 1

Supervisor's approval is required. (Pre-req 2.4)

I

[ *; ,.. : , *

• Rerereqce Tit]e,::* .;;r * ** ' i :. u. Facim:Y'R.etererice Number,, Yi \Reference $e,ctioli ',,.;*I f'PageNd. j !Revision, ISALEM CONTAINMENT ENTRIES IN MODES ii SC.SA-ST.ZZ-0001 I 1 l 11 s

.====

I II I II iI I I II I lj 1 l I Objectives I RADCONE004 ra@~~1,<'fi~9~~c~:*.::j IFacility Exam Bank ,;J I lau~~t.i,9U.l'flcl,cJiflCationMethod,: Editorially Modified I llJ.~e:qptil"ipg)'rairifng'Prograrrr,j D

=======..'.:=::'.'.=::'.'.=::'.'.:::::===:'.::::::::'.:::::::=::'.'.~==========================~1

/O,l.le,si~<?h~:O:~rc~<t,§.~m"~:~~§i 178014 added abbreviation to each title because its found that way in the procedure. I I

I I

. RO Skyscraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I Outline Changes tuuestipriTopic I IRo 73 I Which of the following Area Radiation Monitors (ARM) will cause a ventilation system alignment change when it reaches its High Radiation Alarm I I f 'lt?

~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~ I 2R44A, Containment High Range.

I ib.'i 2R32A. Fuel Handling Crane.

~ l 2R9, New Fuel Storage.

~I 2R52, Liquid PASS Room.

!'Answer.!~ !Exam Le\jeI i ~ !coghi~i"'.eLevel  ! j Memory l I !Facmty: 1 Salem 1 & 2 I JE:~aj'Hp~te: j I 12/21/20151

~11940018315 Ij2.3.15 jiROValue::[IB S~OValue~![Dlsectidn:lj~ ,RO G.r6up:l0iSRO_Groyp:'LJ ~5~ l_~g~~~;{-~d D

<systemtEy'c}1Jifon Jitfe I *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----

!GENER! I

• KA statelTlent: : .--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-..,

Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitorin!'.l equipment. etc.

lEx:planatlori'.of I 55.41.b(11) C is correct because it realigns FHB ventilation through the charcoal filters and starts both FHB Exhaust fans. Bis

'I fA.ri),;;',~'f'~':;: * *

• incorrect but plausible because its auto function is to prevent Fuel Crane motion except in downward direction. D is incorrect since it only has alarm light outside the PASS room which activates, but plausible because of the high radiation levels which would be 1 :~c~c~~~~~ ~~:~ ~~~~~~~h:,:r~sb~~~~nc1af~~o:~~; h~~aadc~~~1:~:*i: ;~~~~i~:e~~ 1s~~:~~~'~°a,~~i~~!i~0:u~c;~o~~~~~t.~s~f,:~~=~ble i Isystems (VCS and VC6 auto closure)

• I

f,

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I I I l I I

RO SkyScraper I

SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List j SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I LouestionTop!dl IRO 74 I I Given the following conditions:

- Jm Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

- '--' EOG is CIT for maintenance.

- A 500KV switchyard malfunction causes a loss of offsite power, and 1B and 1C EDGs do not load due to 1B and 1C 4KV vital buses locking out on Bus Differential.

Of the following, which one states a procedure entry and its correct flowpath allowed by the rules of procedure IAW OP-AA-101-111-1003 Use of Procedures?

ra:'j IEnter EOP-LOPA-1 directly and perform immediate actions, which states to trip the Rx then trip the Turbine.

I

!b:I L_j IEnter EOP-LOPA-1 directly and perform immediate actions, which states to trip the Rx and confirm the Rx trip, then trip the Turbine.

11 I

~ Enter EOP-TRIP-1 and perform immediate actions, which states to trip the Rx and confirm the Rx trip, trip the Turbine, initiate SI, then transition to EOP-LOPA-1 based on no vital buses energized. I

@JI Enter EOP-TRIP-1 and perform immediate actions, which states to trip the Rx and confirm the Rx trip, trip the Turbine, initiate SI ONLY if conditions warrant, then transition to EOP-LOPA-1 based on no vital buses energized. I fAns,,..,erl I~ [Exam Level 11 R I lcog~itive'i.:eve1* 11 Application  ! !Fa!=!'\!~/:. IISalem 1 & 2 I !Exam(!ate:; 11 12/21/20151

!KA,:j, 194001G401 112.4.1  !RO Vallie~ il 4.6j!sR.o yalue:ll 4.S I Secti()H:jj PWG HRo Gr6up;ij 1 j *sR6(3rdi.ip:ll 11 ~~~ D

,system/Evotution')*itre I iGENERI I

~-------------------------------------'

'KA statement:!

Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.

!EXpicinatJohof 55.41.b(10) Either TRIP-1 ot LOPA-1 can be entered upon a total loss of all AC power. If entered, the flowpath for TRIP-1 does not

[Ari.sWers: * * *

• reach the Si evalution step before the kickout to LOPA-1 on no 4kv vital buses energized, so both TRIP-1 distracters are incorrect.

LOPA-1 does not confirm the Rx trip (since there is no power to do anything about it anyways).

1

> ' *><:1:v Reference Jitle **!Hi! Facility Reference Number >I !R.eterence Section HP.age: No.*l [Re:vJ~fonl

~,R~x=T=r=ip=o=r=s=a=fe=t=y=ln=je=c=ti=on==============;;;;;;;.11~1=-E=O==P-=T=R=IP=-=1============~i==============~l~j====:=:!.1127

~IL:o:ss:o:f:Al:IA:c::Po=w~e~r~~~===~~=:::::111-EOP-LOPA-1 lj I j 2s l_u_s_e_o_f_P_ro_c_e_d_u_re_s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____.H_o_P_-_AA_-1_0_1_-1_1_1-_1_0_03_ _ _ _~ *-------~111 O 11_6_ __.

ILOPAOOE009 Objectives J I

1--~

lpue~tl?11*~g.~,~~~::-:11_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ __.I rr.lqT~,ti9~'M~:~iflfati()n~e~h8:~}::.,J I [Us~dJ}ij~lrig'Ti-ainlrig'Prbgra~:l DI

at10st.r<>~*s9~f~~*~?T~~rtfo[ I I I~---------------------------------------------------------'

lcolllm ent *..*.* /*(>' *...

• I l I I I

RO Skyscraper J SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes fQuesUohtopicl IRO 75 I Given the following conditions:

- ..\lert has been declared at Salem, and all required notifications have been made by me Primary Communicator.

- Conditions degrade to the point where a Site Area Emergency is declared.

Which of the following identifies the PRIMARY method which the Primary Communicator will use to make notifications to the States of Delaware and New Jersey, and how long from the SAE declaration do they have to make those notifications IAW Attachment 6, Primary Communicator Log of the Salem ECG?

~I NETS phones within 15 minutes.

I

~I NETS phones within 60 minutes.

11

c;i / ESSX phones within 15 minutes.

I

~ I ESSX phones within 60 minutes.

I 12/21/20151

~I 194001 G429 !12.4.29 I IRo Value:*J [DJ is Ro Value: i8 'secti(>il;l I~ [Rb Grclup:; LJ is go <:;~()up:! LJ

~syst~Wi::votutiori Title I , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____, IGENERI .

KJ>. staternent: !

.. . .. . . ~,K_n_o_wl_e_d_g_e_o_f_th_e_e_m_e_r_g-en_c_y_p_la-n-.-----------------------------------------------------------------,.1 IE)<plan~tfon ()f I 55.41(10) Salem ECG, lists the communications systems in order of preference. The NETS (Nuclear Emergency

'Ji:n5;;.Je'i5:' \'ii Telecommunications System) is the primary closed circuit communication system for off-site notifications. The ESSX is also a I

1 closed circuit system, which is used as a backup for NETS. The notifications to the States must be made within 15 minutes of the I~=~~~aat:~~h~~:~ 1~~~~=~~~~::~:~:,~;i~,:~~~~s:~~~i~:;,::;_~r;~~~~'i1s8~li~~~dy in progress. The 60 minutes is plausible if the 1 ~ ~

I1

..:I =*.=:.=Fa=c=i=lit=y=.R=e=f=e=re=n=c=e=N=u=m="=b=e=r=**=* * *~! ;::fR=e=fe=r=e=n=c=e=S=e=c=ti=o=n==;;;:;:l I Page No.:J fR'eyision'

!=* * *=""=.. ;;

;;*=*=**='"*=*="*"=**=**=R=e=fe=i-=e=n=c=e=.T=it=le=*=*=*====**=:=:.::::;;; ;::t

!Primary Communicator Log 1

I~'E=P=-S=A=-=1=11=-=F6======~1~=======~lj!.::==:::::! !.::11=2===

, ~IE=m==er=g=e=n=cy==P=re=p=a=re=d=n=es=s=T=r=a=in=in=g=C=o=m==m=u=n=ic=at=l.~l=N=E=P=C=O=M=M=D=T=Y=S=C============:.l~============::::::::.l~l======~los

I 11, _ _ _ _ _ _~1 1 ______ !1_~ ==::::::::.\=I lt.:te>,'Nu!Jlbef ** ,.

• 1 Objectives I GENISSE013 i :lvlater'latR.equiredtor. Ex:amir:iatiorl .*. 1 I

! l~l1~;~lC>!J~~,o~r~~;::,,;,J I. F~~ility ~~~: Ba~k I 19~~~#e>~friodificati()A;fyi'~thp~2*H: Direct From Source I!Oue7ti9~Sourc;e,,<::om!fie,,nt5! Used on Salem Sept 2011 NRC exam (3 exams ago)

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RO SkyScraper I .SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List

. .. r" I Outline Changes I

• oueslicihtopis:l sRo 1 I Given the following conditions:

iit 1 is performing a Rx startup lAW S1.0P-10.ZZ-0003, Hot Standby to Minimum Load.

- Power is stable at 1x10-8 Amps for Low Power Physics Testing.

- A Shutdown Bank "A" rod drops fully into the core.

- The Rx does not trip.

Which of the following identifies:

1) How the CRS should proceed

2) Why rod withdraw! is not allowed?

I Direct the RO to ...

[]. 1) trip the Rx . I

2) A dropped rod recovery would constitute an approach to criticality.

fb.l 1) fully insert all Control Bank and Shutdown Bank rods.

2) A dropped rod recovery would constitute an approach to criticality.

'c;* 1) trip the Rx.

- 2) The depressed power distibution profile in the area around the dropped rod may cause power production in other parts of the core to rl exceed Tech Spec limits.

'd1 1) fully insert all Control Bank and Shutdown Bank rods. 'I

~

2) The d!pressed pow.er distibution profile in the area around the dropped rod may cause power production in other parts of the core to lt:;AVC:CU I C\....11 Vf-JC:\..o lllllll;'.::I.

I

'Answer j ~ :Exam Level! ~ ;cog11itive Level 11 Application J IFacHlty: i J Salem 1 & 2 I ,ExamD~te: j j 12/21/2015!

~I 0000038409 I 2.4.9 RO Value:: [Ifil iSR,O YalueL~:3J ;section: II~ !RO Group:: LJ !SRO Group:! LJ ~

System/Evolution Title I j_D_r_op'""'p_e_d_C_o_n_t_ro_l_R_o_d_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.. '---~

KA Statement::,,

j Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

r=-l .* .

. iation of l j 55.43.b(6,5) This question is. SRO leve! based on the knowledge of in'.ernal effects on core reactivity of a. drop~ed.rod while exa~tly

,An:::>wers: ,. ' cnt1cal, and the procedural d1rect1on to insert all rods based on becoming subcnt1cal. The bases for that insertion 1s that performing a dropped rod recovery when th eproblem has been fixed, which would normally be done at power, would NOT be done if the Rx I I

1:;',:'~~-su.~:~t~~~~ ~,:'~~u~e ~wi,t~drawing that rod would constitute an approach to criticality and is required to be performed lAW the

,1 I' Page No. I RevisiOn' I Referen,ce Title I< ** FaellitYFMerence Numbe,r *; ;geference Section j Dropped Rod II S1.0P-AB.ROD-0001 I ii 119 I

I  ! !I lj I I II I 11 I ll I LO. Nurnber . .  :*1 Objectives IABROD2E002

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List L SRO System/Evolution List J . O~Ui~e Cha~ges I

[Que~tior1Topfol ISRO 2 j Given the following conditions:

.1it 2 is operating at 100% power.

- 21 charging pump is in service.

- 22 and 23 charging pumps are operable.

- Subsequently, 21 charging pump trips due to a breaker malfunction.

- The CRS enters S2.0P-AB.CVC-0001 and places 23 charging pump in service.

Which of the following:

1) Identifies ALL the Tech Spec LCO(s) which will be entered

2) What the required action(s) is/are if 21 charging pump remains inoperable for the next 4 days?

The CRS will enter .....

~

1a *. 1 1) LCO 3.1.2.2.b for not having required boration flowpaths, LCO 3.1.2.4 for not having required charging pumps, and LCO 3.5.2.a for not having required ECCS subsystems available.

, 2) Be in Mode 3 and borated to a SOM equivalent to at least 1 % delta k/k within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> of pump trip.

'fJ 11) LCO 3.1 2.2.b foe oat h";og eeqo;rnd bocotioo flowp'th', LCO 3.124 foe oat h"'1og rnqo;rnd oh,cg;og pomp,, " ' LCO 3.5.2 ' foe oat having required ECCS subsystems available.

2) Be in Mode 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of pump trip.

[SJ 1) LCO 3.5.2.a ONLY for not having required ECCS subsystems available.

2) Be in Mode 3 and borated to a SOM equivalent to at least 1 % delta k/k within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> of pump trip;..,,

II

ct:j 1) LCO 3.5.2.a ONLY for not having required ECCS subsystems available.

2) Be in Mode 4 within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> of pump trip .

Answer, l.:!_J fa:am Leve.1 J ~ I

!Cognitive Level i Memory l \Facility: i J ISalem 1 & 2 I iExamDate: i ,___1_2_12_1_12_0_1_,51

~I 000022G222 1122.22 i iRO Value: i ~'SRO VallleL~z.J iSection: :I~ ,R() Group:I LJ ;SR() Group:j LJ 55'.431 !vl i 0,;&,L*i ~

[Syst~m/EvolutionTitle  ! ILoss of Reactor Coolant Makeup I :022

[!</' 8tatement: I . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. I Expfa.*-n-a-tio-. n-.-o~(.il 55.42.b(2) This question is SRO level based on NUREG-1021, ES401, Attachment 2, page 17, 11.B, 1st bullet for application of 1 rAnswers:

• i .* .

'I required actions.

Reference Title lnoperability of a single charging pump in Modes 1-3 only results in entry into the ECCS LCO. The 2 other LCOs

. would be entered upon inoperability of the second charging pump. The required action is to restore within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in Hot 1 Shutdown within next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The incorrect action in the distracters is for when 2 charging pumps are inoperable.

.,. * 'i Facility Reference Number IiReferen1ce ~ecF<),~' .. ' H Pag~ No.I iRevisionl 1

1 1

1

!s:a:le:m:T:e:ch::sp:e:cs:::::::::::::::::! I lj 3.5.2, 3.1.2.2, 3.1.2.4 11 Ij I ll II II Ij I

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____.q II lj Ii l ILCl~ Num.ber Objectives I CVCSOOE010

I 1<9~~~!t~~-~S l_N_e_w__________.I ~~~f~J&i,~~~JJ~~!iiiit~~~;Jli----------__,! W~~~~m!Q'9'~[~1,5f~Q(Bf.9~Ki~l

[9a~1!9rr~i2it~~im~~~i~J I I I I I I I

RO S~yScraper .. I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List J Outline Changes I 1ouesti611Jopic I ,-.-----------------------------------------------,.

l_s_R_o_3_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.

!r* <n the following conditions:

1

-_ _,nit 2 is in Mode 5.

Rx vessel level is 97.4'.

1* - 22 RHR loop is in service.

- RHR HX inlet temperature is 125°F.

- 21 RHR loop is available.

- 21,24, and 26 SW pumps are in service.

- 21 charging pump is in service.

- Subsequently, a complete loss of Service Water occurs.

Which of the following identifies a procedure the CRS will enter, and the FIRST action operators will perform in that procedure?

I

a,! S2.0P-AB.SW-0005, Loss of All Service Water. Start 23 charging pump. I b.: I S2.0P-AB.SW-0005, Loss of All Service Water. Stop 21 charging pump. .'.I

c. , S2.0P-AB.RHR-0002, Loss of RHR at Reduced Inventory. Start 21 RHR pump.

@,] IS2 .OP-AB .RHR-0002, LP% of RH R Red"oe<l I"°"'- Stop 22 RH R P"m p. 1 I Answer! I~ 1Exam Level I ~n iCognitive Level i IApplication i I iFacility: ! s:1em 1 & 2 I iExamDate: ; ,_ _ _1_2_12_1_12_0_1~51

~I 000025G120 \ 12.1.20 I iRO Value: II~ :SRO Valuej~ Section: 1 I~ iRO Group:\ LJ )SRQGroup:j LJ ~

System/EvolutionTitl~ j ILoss of Residual Heat Removal System KA Statement:!

'Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

1 F *,natrori of iI 55.43.b(S) This question is SRO level based on having to assess facility conditions, select the correct operating procedure, and 1i c'._ ers: dknow specific actions taken in that procedure. BOTH procedures may be entered, however, AB.SW-5 has a CAS that states if RHR

! is in service GO TO AB.RHR-1 or RHR-2 depending on RPV level. AB.SW-5 distracters are plausible because procedure states I______ _,l~'.~!i:~;c~~:~tni~ ~~:,fc~~~~~l:i~!;~ t!:~~~~*1 ~oe~i~~a~e ;~~;~=~~~ b~~~~~:~~1~1~~ 1!~~~~:di~~~,:iae;t~~~a\he 11 I condition; that ALL SI and charging pumps EX.CEPT one are required to be cleared and tagged with RCS temp< 312°F, and that Ithere will not be another charging pump to go to. 21 charging pump WILL be stopped, but not before letdown is isolated. AB.RHR

! checks a RHR pump in service, so starting a second RHR pump will not be performed. The in service RHR pump will be stopped to Ipreclude damage to the pump with RPV level <97.5' Ii.. r: . ' . : *.

• Referetu:e Title Facility Reference Number i; ,Reference Section * *.* l i Page No.* \Revision 0

~IL:::*=o=s*::::s=;:::.=o;:::.f=A:1:::1=s:e:rv:ic:e:*~::at:e:r:*:*: : :*=*:::::::::::

• 1~1,:; : : s;:::.2=.:o:P:-A:s:.s:w::-o:o:o:::s=

= . ;:::.=::::=::::=: : =~: : ;.!

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=;: :.;: :;:::.=  ::.=:= = = = = = = = ' ':.=::===-114

~IL=o=s=s=o=fR=H=R=at=R=e=d=u=ce=d=l=nv=e=n=to=ry=====::::.l~l=S=2.=0=P=-A=B=*=R=H=R-=0=00=2=======11:.=::========":.=::==~l!14 I

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,11-----~ll, _ _ _~ll  ! j_ __,I 1.::0. Number Objectives IABRHR1E004 i

I I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List ~ SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I ioueS:u~n Topic'.] IsRo 4 I l-" *-.n the following conditions:

- tlerators are responding to a 650 gpm tube rupture on 22 SG which occurred while operating at 100% power, lAW EOP-SGTR-1, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

- All off-site power was lost when the Main Generator breakers opened.

- The RCS was cooled down to Target Temperature, and then depressurized to stop primary-to-secondary leakage.

- Subsequently, off-site power is restored, and all 4KV Group Buses are now energized from off-site power.

- The crew is evaluating RCP re-start.

- RVLIS Upper Range indication is 98%.

Which of the following contains:

1) ONLY the criteria in addition to RCS Subcooling which are checked to determine if RCP re-start will be performed

2) How the re-start of the RCP be accomplished if allowed The crew will check ....  !

a,: 11) PZR level and the PZR saturated.

- 2) Start a RCP directly at SGTR-1 Step 49 based on RCP support conditions being desired but not required to start the RCP.

-b;.11) RVLIS Full Range indication and SG NR level.

I

~ 2) Start a RCP directly at SGTR-1 Step 49 based on RCP support conditions being desired but not required to start the RCP. I

• c;: 11) PZR level and the PZR saturated.

-~ 2) Start a RCP using S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation to ensure all support systems and P&Ls for starting a RCP are met.

@] I1) RVLIS Full Range indication and SG NR level.

2) Start a RCP using S2.0P-SO.RC-0001, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation to ensure all support systems and P&Ls for starting a RCP are 1met.

!1Answerl ~ j'ExamL~ve1l@=J !Cognitive Level I !Memory  ! [Facmty:l !salem 1 &2 I :E:xarnDa~e~l I 12121120151

~ 'l00038A217 J 1 EA2.17 ',RO Value:  :[I.~JlsRo Value~ 4.41 :section: j~ RO Group: !_~~SRO GrC>u1f LJ ~

S)--~m/Evolution Tltle j ISteam Generator Tube Rupture KA sfatement: ! Abilit to determine and interpret the followin as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Rupture:

RCP restart criteria Explanatlon or:i 55.43.b(5) This question meets SRO only criteria listed in NUREG-1021, ES-401, Attachment 2, 11.E. Figure 2, 1st bullet for 5th

,'Answers: 'II Block for assessment and implementation of a procedure or section of procedure, namely SO.RC-0001 vs direction strictly in the IiI I EOP. SGTR-1 does not contain a step which directly starts a RCP, rather it directs RCP start lAW SO.RCP-0001, which will require 1 I support conditions satisfied to start the RCP. There are other places in EOP network where RCPs are started without regard to i s11oort caodjtionsfl=RCC) \Nith R\/1 IS 1mner r:anae <10000 PZR le"el and sah 1rated capdjtjons jn PZR are re *

• 1 Isubcooling to start the RCP. ** - . * - I I* *.Reference Title*** ' I.

• Facility .Reference Number

• J [Reference Section .*.*< : [ pagE! NC>. I \Revision1 I'. Steam Generator Tube Rupture 112-EOP-SGTR-1 I 1 Flowchart 117  ! l\:::7===-

II11;.=:===================~==============!==========ilI

!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'

'I~

i.=::==

LO.,f,Jumber *

• Objectives ISGTR01E009 I

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!~----------------------------------------~

I I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution list I Outline Changes I

Question Topic I j SRO 5 I I

- unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

- 21, 24 and 26 SW pumps are in service.

- 21 and 22 SW header pressures are 108 psig.

- The following OHAs annunciate sequentially in this order:

- B-13, 21 SW HOR PRESS LO

- B-14, 22 SW HOR PRESS LO

- B-15, TURB AREA SW HOR PRESS LO.

- B-48, SW VLV RM FLOODED.

The standby SW pump starts automatically, and OHAs B-13, B-14, and B-15 clear.

l Which of the following describes where a SW leak could be located which would produce these alarms, and the procedurally directed actions which would mitiqate the event?

'a.j I On a CFCU supply piping in the 78' Mechanical Penetration Area. S2.0P-AB.SW-0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure, will direct isolating multiple CFCUs IAW Attachment 5 CFCU leaks, until header pressure stabilizes and sump pump runs stop. I I

,b.: Upstream of the 2ST901, TURB LO CLR ST RET VLV. S2.0P-AB.SW-0002, Loss of Service Water-Turbine Header, will direct operators to

- adjust 2ST901 TURB LO CLR ST RET V, and 2ST1 TG AREA SW PRESS CONT VLV, to compensate for the SW leak. l

c.

• 1On a CFCU supply piping in the 78' Mechanical Penetration Area. S2.0P-AB.SW-0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure, will direct 1

isolating a single CFCU which would be readily identifiable from the control room. I tJ IUpstream of the 2ST901, TURB LO CLR ST RET VLV. S2.0P-AB.SW-0002, Loss of Service Water-Turbine Header, will direct removing the 11vrarr1 1ururr1e 11urr1::;erv11.;e111 µreaf.>ri:iuur1 rur 1::;u1au11~ ure 11.:iA r1eauer.

iAnswer I ~ Exam Level j ~ I

!Cognitive Level ! Application I :Facility:! ISalem 1 & 2 J 'Exam Date: i j___1_2_12_1_12_0_1~5I gj 000062G445 1.2.4.45 RO Value: {IifisRO Value~~ Section: II~ RO Group:]LJ SROGroup:iLJ I~~ ~

iSystemfEvolution Title 1 ILoss of Nuclear Service Water I 062 r :KA'statement: '

Answers:

lrA-b-i-lit-y-to-p-rio-r-it-iz_e_a_n_d_i_n-te-rp_r_e_t-th_e_s-ig-n-ifi-1c_a_n_c_e_o_f_e_a_ch_a_n-nu_n_c-ia_t_o_ro_r_a_l-ar-m-.--------------------,

nation of 1155.43.b(S)Thi' q"ootioo 1

moo~ SRO ooly crtteci' li'ted io NUREG-1021, ES-401, Afu>chmeot 2, 11.E. Fig"rn 2, 1 'tb"llet foe 5th Block for assessment and implementation of a procedure or section of procedure in knowing where the leak could be (assessment), then correct procedure implementation and steps taken in the peocedure. The leak location could be in the TGA with I I the conditions in the stem except for the SW valve room flooding. Knowledge of where the SW valve room and what piping is there is oeeded ta anS\Mpr q11as.tion The 2£TQ01 lOlO!J(d r.o.c~ ....... "" nn ".:! Tr-ti. 1.......... i ".'In~ ,..4 ...... :-- ........ '""'in: nn l.o.".:11.r e:- .... l"n1 ii~ ,...~ re.o. ".:! * .i........... . r header pressures. If it did not operators would be directed to ake manual control of 2ST901 and 2ST1. If it is thought that the TGA header must be isolated to stop the leak, then removing the MT from service would have to occur. The multiple cFCU isolations directed in attachment 5 is for leaks of undetermined CFCUs in containment, and refers to containment sump pump runs and trying to isolate the leak by stopping a bunch of CFCUs. Step 3.11 states if a single component can be isolated, and it can, to isolate it.

1Additionally, the SW indication in control room would identify that a single CFCU is affected. The sump pump runs referred to are I containment sump pump runs, and are if the SW leak is in containment.

Reference Title :1 Facility Reference Number , 1 iReference Section  : i Page No. : !Revision:

I Loss of Service Water Header Pressure II S2.0P-AB.SW-0001 ll II 1116 I IOverhead Annunciators Window B I! S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0002 11 !181 1136 I I II II 11 II I LO. Number:

Objectives I ABSW01 E004 c'===:::::::.

!Matef,i?I ~equired tor EXamina\i(in;;J JI I 11 ia~est\~9::sg~[se;' j IFacility E;:::xa=m=B=a=n=k==:...'.l!=O=u=e=st=io=*n=**=M=o=d=ifi=1c=a:::::ti=o=n=M=e=t=ho=d=:=*: :.:~=S=ig=n=ifi=ca=n=tl=y=M=o=d=ifi=1e=d==l..::lu=s=e=d=D=u=r='in=g=T=.=ra=in=i=n=g='f>=r=o=g=ra=m=*:..i_D_ ,

iOw=:~I,iC!~;~~-Y[ceCS'Tffi~~~s! 1153928 used on Salem SRO NRC exam more than 2 exams ago. Modified to add actions required. 1 I I I I I I

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List J. SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I fOuestion tC>piC:; l l_s_R_0_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.

1 G'"'"'n the following condition:

I L . Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms have been evacuated due to a toxic gas release on site.

When performing local actions to stabilize the plant:

1) Where will PZR level be determined

2) How will PZR level be controlled rCl

~ 11) At the Hot Shutdown Panel 213.

2) By ensuring the Charging System Master Flow Controller is controlling PZR level on program.  !

~ *11) At the Charging Pumps Flow and Pressure Panel 216-2.

2) By ensuring the Charging System Master Flow Controller is controlling PZR level on program.

I

,c.!,~1=)=A=t=th=e=H=o=t=S=h=ut=d=own===P=an=e=l=2=13=.=====================================================================::. ;1

~ 2) By establishing local control of the CV55 CHARGING FLOW CONTROL VLV to maintain PZR level 22%-77%.

d. l 11) At the Charging Pumps Flow and Pressure Panel 216-2.

-*~ 2) By establishing local control of the CV55 CHARGING FLOW CONTROL VLV to maintain PZR level 22%-77%.

1 I

Answer I ~ !Exam Level I~ 'cognitive Level

• iMemory I !Facility: 1lSalem1 & 2 I !Ex~111[)afe* !I 12/21/2015j,

~I 000068A207 I AA2.07  ! :RO ValuE::i@'sRo Valuej~ ;section: 1!~: ~o Group:! LJ SRO Group:][]

System/Evo!Utlon Title j !_c_o_n_tr_o_IR_oo_m_E_v_a_c_u_at_io_n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____,l i068 I

1KA Statement:' Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Control Room Evacuation:

!PZR level IE~P,f;3riat[o~ of' I55.43.b(5) This question meets SRO only criteria listed in NURE~-1021 I ES-401 Attachm.ent 2, .11.E. Figure 2, 1st bullet for 5th I ij Answers:  : I Block for assessment and implementation of a procedure or section of procedure 1n knowing which procedure will be used to II..

I evacuate the control room, and how the RO will maintain PZR level, and where it will be indicated. AB.CR-1 contains field actions j which will be directed by the CRS. AB.CR-3 for toxic gas directs the control room evacuation to occur using AB.CR-1, but does not I t contain field actions foe estahlishina a/ant coatml

!level, manual field control is establlshed for positive plant control.

\A/bile th.p ~!l.as.i~allv he majntainina arleor 1ate PZR Reference Title  : ~. d Fadlity Reference Number : j !ReferenceSection

• i I Page NC>.' !Revision

E:v:a:c=u=a:t:io:n:::::::::::::::~I,~!=s=2:.:o:P:-A:;;;;B==.=C:R:-=0=0:0:1::::::::::~! ::::::::::::::~;::. i.:====- li.:2=2=

ji-=c

o:n:tr:o:I:R:o=o==m= :1

1. Control Room Habitability SC OP AB CR 0003 Ij 16 1

i==========================::::.I . - . - 11

!=============~====~~====

11 1-~

!------~-----------~---~---~---~---~---~-------~-------'

LO.*~ur'nber I ABCR01 E003 Objectives

!'Mat~da[R~quired for Examination *: i I 1

• Ql!e~tiori S()ur:c~; ) j_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ ___,l LlO-"u-""e--'sLtiLoL . 11c.:.ML*****L*~_dLlfLi~L'a""!'i"'-o-"n_MLeLJ,;;c*~"'-o"'-dc::.*:. -"-*.,cJl*1! _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'! 'Used Dudn'g' Trainiri9 Prograrri .I LJ

,Oue~Uim sollr¢~:c;;orrimentsl I I

!~------------------------------------------'

rCe>rrfrnent ** * *. ;.. re**

I I I L I

RO S~yS~raper I SRO Skyscraper .f __R_o_s_y_st_em_1_E_vo_1u_t_io_n_L_is_t..... __sR_o__sy_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_tio_n_L_i_st.-;i Outline Changes fQuesti()f1ToplC: i ISRO 7

!~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~-~~~--'

I1 I~'- "n the following conditions:

. .SBLOCA has occurred on Unit 2 outside containment.

- Actions of EOP-LOCA-6, LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT, have failed to isolate the break.

- RCS pressure is 1440 psig and continues to lower.

Which of the following identifies the procedure that will be used upon transition from EOP-LOCA-6 and the actions that will be directed in that procedure after the transition?

(a'.J IEOP-LOCA-1. Add makeup to RWST, initiate a cooldown, and minimize injection flow.

I

~I EOP-LOCA-5. Add makeup to RWST, initiate a cooldown, and minimize injection flow.

11

c."! IEOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant. Check for subsequent failure and conserve makeup inventory.

11

[]I EOP-LOCA-5, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation. Check for subsequent failure and conserve makeup inventory. I

_Answer I ~ [Exam Level I @=]" !cognitive Leyel ! j Application I ~ ISalem 1 & 2 I !E:xamDate:j I 12121 /20151.

~I OOWE04A201 _ 'EA2.1 J :Ro Value: l[I+/-i !SRClValuej~ [Section: : I~ 'Rd Gn:mp:: LJ !SRO Group:i LJ ~ii:~ ~

System/Evolution Tjtle j j LOCA Outside Containment  ! '-IE_0_4_~

KA Statement: I Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to LOCA Outside Containment:

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures durinq abnormal and emergencv operations. I Explanation of! 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on having to assess facility conditions, select the correct operating procedure, and

1

'Ariswers: ,* know specific actions taken in that procedure. B is correct, because an unisolable break will transition out to LOCA-5. LOCA-1 is incorrect because it would be the appropriate transition if the break were isolated. 43.5 because the SRO is required to understand the actions of the LOCA-6 procedure to identify the appropriate procedure to transition to when it is complete, and actions I

,.oeriar:med 1a tbat orocedru:e I

' Reference Title Fadiity Reference Nurnber I,Reference Section I[.Page No. : !Revision[

ILOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCU 112-EOP-LOCA-5 II !I 1125 I I l

~!IL=O=C=A=O=u=t=s1=de==C=on=t=a1=nm==en=t=============!l2EOPLOCA6 ii I I 1~2=1==~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~___,11~~~~~~~~~~~--'1~~~~~~~--' ~~~. . . !~~--'

.,LO. Number I LOCA06E008 Objectives I M<t~erlal Requiredfor.~~aminatio'n,) 11 I

[Question Source: 1IPrevious2 NRC Exams I.Question Modification Method:**' Direct From Source I I\used ouring'Training Program 'l o j

aue~tron s<?urc~c9ajme'nts/ 113-01 NRC SRO exam (Dec. 2014) l icommerlt

• I I I i I

RO Skyscraper I ...

SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List* i Outline Changes I..

i<luestlon Topic I ISRO 8

(" 'ri the following conditions:

- _,nit 1 has experienced a Main Steam line Break (MSLB) inside containment from 100% power.

- Main Steam Line Isolation has failed to close any MS167.

- Safety Injection was manually initiated, with all components operating as expected.

- 11 AFP is CIT.

- 12 and 13 AF P's tripped after starting.

- Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1100 psig.

- All Reactor Coolant Pumps have been tripped.

- Containment pressure is 16 psig and rising.

- All Wide Range (WR) Steam Generator (SG) levels are 35% and dropping. I

- All Steam Generator pressures are 465 psig and dropping.

- Reactor Coolant System Tc's have dropped from 540 to 438°F in 40 minutes.

If these condition were present when transitioning out of 1-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip Response, which procedure must be entered and what action lI must be taken upon that transition? I

a. j 11-EOP-FRTS-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions. Reset Safeguards Actuation and restore normal charging and I letdown.

~ 11-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Initiate feed and bleed ONLY when 3/4 SG WR levels have dropped <32%.

I

~

[c.,; I 1-EOP-FRTS-1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Cond1t1ons. Shut all MS10's and steam dump valves. ,,

ct.I 1-EOP-FRHS-1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Initiate feed and bleed immediately.

Answdr 1 @=] !Exam Level I @=]" 'Cognitive Level** 1 j Application I !Facility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !ExamD~te: j j___1_2_12_1_12_0_1_.5I

~I OOWE05A202 I!EA2.2 1 IRO '\/ah.ie:l[Jli SRO Vall1e1~ !Section: 1j~ tRO Group:jLJ!SRO Gro'up:[LJ ~

isystem/Evoluti6t1Title'I ILoss of Secondary Heat Sink if j

'atement:I Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink:

IAdherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

bas~d II *AilsWers: I

[.Exp.la***n.ation . o. . f.!155.43(5) 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level on having to asses_ the conditions given in sten: _and determine both what I procedure will be entered and the act1on(s) required in that procedure. D 1s correct because the cond1t1ons given 1n stem would transition to FRHS-1 due to a RED path of no AFW flow and <9% NR level The Bleed and Feed initiation criteria are when S/G 11 WR levels are <36%(adverse), NOT 32% (normal) as in distracter B. Distracters A & C are incorrect because it is a lower priority

• RFD path tho119h ifs action is correct for the proced11rp II

' Reference Title" I

. Facility Reference Number*.*  ! 'keterence:sectrdrl .*

• I[,Page No., 'Revision* I I Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink ii 1-EOP-FRHS-1 l 11 1121 I I Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Sh 111-EOP-FRTS-1 I II !122 I I I' Critical Safety Function Status Trees II 1 1-EOP-CFST-1 I ii 1122 I

!Lo-:Norriber Objectives I FRHSOOE005 I FRHSOOE013

i,~~~),\~,!;!~~9~,~i~~~l l_F_a_c_il_ity"-E_x_a_m_B_a_n_k___.l ~~j;~1(e~~~gW!!£J!iei~~~~g~[fi{~I Direct From Source i~~~iilI~!q~;[i:fil~~rt'~sl 143189, Used on Salem SRO NRG exam more than 2 exams ago.

I I

I

ROSkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper J __ u...st-..;i R_o_s_y_s_te_m_1E_v_o_1u_ti_on__ SRO System/Evolution List J Outline Changes jauestioh Topic i SRO 9

• ~-------------------------------------~~--------'

Gi" 0 n the following conditions:

- dt 2 is responding to a degraded core cooling condition in accordance with 2-EOP-FRCC-2, "Response to Degraded Core Cooling."

I

- After depressurizing to inject the accumulators, the STA reports a RED priority on the Thermal Shock Status Tree, and recommends transitioning to 2-EOP-FRTS-1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock."

I Which actions describe the operator response?

[) I Do NOT implement 2-EOP-FRTS-1 until 2-EOP-FRCC-2 is completed because thermal shock is a lower priority CFST.

[b:J I Implement 2~EOP-FRTS-1 immediately because the potential damage done to the RPV by delaying entry into FRTS after entry conditions are met may be irreparable.

[c. I Do NOT implement 2-EOP-FRTS-1 until 2-EOP-FRCC-2 is completed because while in FRTS the core will continue to boil away injected accumulator water, and could lead to a RED path for CC.

I id. I I Implement 2-EOP-FRTS-1 immediately because it is a higher priority CFST and rules of usage stipulate the transition to a higher priority I!Answer I

, procedure always takes precedence over notes and cautions.

l.::_j !Exam Level! IS i ;cognitive Level i j Memory I 1Facility:

' f ISalem 1 & 2 ! IExamDa.te: ! [ 12/21/2015!1 l

• ~~=====:::::::====~==~~====~==~~:::::::::====~~~::::=~~~~-

~I OOWE06G423 112.4.23 I'Ro Value: iO]" rSRO Value}~ ,SeCtion: 11~ RO Group: LJ 'SRO Group:l !-3.l ~§:~; ~

isysternlEvolution Title : l_D_e..;:;g_ra_d_e_d_C_o_r_e_C_o_o_li_n;;;:.g_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,._E_0_6_ _

!KA statement: i Knowled e of the bases for prioritizing emergenc procedure implementation durin emergency operations.

'!EXpfanatfon of: 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in EOP that involve transition

'Answers: *; points to event specific emergency contingency procedures. Knowledge of the bases for when NOT to implement a RED priority CFST even when indications are present is just as importanct as knowing when to implement, in this case to preserve and inventory 1in the reactor pressure vessel. Stopping the depressurization to go to FRTS would cause the cooldown to be stopped, and a i thermal soak to he neriormed The care \Atil! contin11e to bojl a\i\!f!\l joiected acc11m.J..J.La+/-.a.r:.ater and heoin to  ! IOCQ)l8C once aoain

!Eventually, CETs and/or RVLIS level values could exist which would require transition to FRCC-1 via -a RED path CFST. The I stop ing of the cooldown could lead to a de raded core cooling condition to deteriorate to an inadequate core cooling condition.

Reference Title*.* I'

• Facility Reference Number *I Reference Section l

• * *Page No. i !Revisioni r==========================~==================

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~I_ ==================i==============~======:::=::ll

_ _ _ _ _ _ ___,q I 1 I~I_=== ___.

!Lo. Nurnber I FRCCOOE006

Matel-ial Required for Exfilnination<i II 1j Queistl-0.1"1 Sourc~.; I

\ Facility Exam Bank I \Oue~tlo~;~odiflcation Meth,()cr: ***.***~Direct From Source I .used During Training Prc)'gfaJTi\I DI

auestion source Comments 159315 II

• ~-----------------------------------------------------------~,

I I l I t I

. RO System/Evolution List . I SRO System/Evolution List _ .. ?.utiine Changes . j I

!~~~~~~~-~~~.~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~*

II 1-j- .:;alem Unit 2 tripped from 100% when a loss of off-site power occurred.

All systems respond as expected, and operators progress normally through the EOP's .

. _ It has been determined a rapid natural circulation cooldown will be performed.

Which of the following describes procedures/actions which are REQUIRED to be performed PRIOR to transitioning to either 2-EOP-TRIP-5, Natural I1Circulation Rapid Cooldown Without RVLIS, or 2-EOP-TRIP-6, Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown With RVLIS, and the bases for them?

• a;! 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Rx Trip Response, must be performed to ensure adequate SOM and natural circulation have been established, containment

~ I cooling remains in service, and equipment not needed for the cooldown has been secured.

,b.' 2-EOP-TRIP-4, Natural Circulation Cooldown, must be performed to ensure adequate SOM and upper head cooling have been established,

~**~ SI signals have been blocked, and initial cooldown/depressurization have been performed.

c. ! j 2-EOP-TRIP-4, SI Initiation Criteria step must be performed to ensure SI will not be required prior to blocking SI before a cooldown can be

- Iinitiated.

ill 2-_EOP-TRIP-2, SI Initiation Criteria step must be performed to ensure SI will not be required prior to blocking SI before a cooldown can be  !

rnitrated. j i !Answer [ ~ Exam Level: ~ !Cognitive Level i j Memory I iFacility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I IExamDate: !I 12/21/2015! !

!KA:I !OOWE10A202 I 'EA2.2 1 RO Value: I~ SRO Value[J]" Section: 11~ .RO Group:![]lsgo Group:ILJ ~~1~~ YI KA Statement: l IAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS: I Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facili 's license and amendments. I ii E}(plcinationof 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on having to asses the conditions given in stem and determine both what procedure  !

Answers:. ii must have been performed and the bases behind that performance. Both TRIP-5 and TRIP-6 contain a caution at Step 1 which says 1 I- I that TRIP-4 must be completed steps 3-17 prior to entering TRIP-5 or 6. Also, the reson is correct in the bases. TRIP-2 must be I I Ii~~g~~~~_:~~:~c~/~~1 ~1a~~~~~~~ndm:~~ c~gli~~~e~a (other than CAS), other reasons are correct. !I

!l Natura!Circulati:ne:~::c::~~::wn with. RVLI S : I* 2 -~~ap~~~::ference Number *,.*_* 1i=:R=e=fe=r=e=n=c=e=S=e=c=ti=o=n==', Page No. I ::vision i I II Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown without RVLI! 2-EOP-TRIP-5 Ii 1 Ji===== ,~2=3===-

11 11 _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.l======:!,11 ,_ ____,

I jL.o. Number TRP004E005

_Objec~ives_ I I;:~:i:nR::::~,:~;:::n::: ;:~;  :======'..::IO=.*=u=e.s::'.:t=fo=n=****=M=o=d=if=ic=a='t=io=n=M=et=h=o=d=;='*=*.* D:..:i:..:re:..:c:..:t:..:F:..:ro:..:m=S:..:o:..:u:..:rc:..:e==::..I='U=s=e=d=D=u=r=in:g=*:T:ra=i:n:in=g=P=r=o=g=ra=m=*

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l_D__,.I Qllest10!1soLu'c:ecommentsj j 153335 *I I!

1~1========================================

1*-

1- - - -

• RO Skyscraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List . I. Outline Changes ictuEistion"fopic  ! ISRO 11 I

('" ~n the following conditions:

~11it 2 is operating at 75% power.

21 Waste Holdup Tank (WHUT) is being processed via the Portable Liquid Radwaste I

Processing System.

- Console alarm SURGE TANK LEVEL HI-LO for the CC system alarms.

- Surge tank levels are 59.3% and 59.2% on Channels A and B, and rising slowly.

- No other alarms are present.

Which of the following describes the effect if Surge Tank Level were to continue to rise, and what action the control room will take in response to the rising level?

[] I 2CC149 CC SURGE TANK VENT VLV will auto close to prevent overflow. Stop processing 21 WHUT as directed in the S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0011, Control Console 2CC1. 11 I

~ Overflow of the Surge Tank will contaminate the Waste Holdup System with chromates. Close 2CC149 CC SURGE TANK VENT VLV from 2CC2 as directed in the S2.0P-AR.ZZ-0011, Control Console 2CC1. I ic. ! I 2CC149 CC SURGE TANK VENT VLV will auto close to prevent overflow. Open the CC Surge Tank Drain Valve from 2CC1 as necessary to maintain Surge Tank Level <100% as directed in S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality.

11 rdl I Overflow of the Surge Tank will contaminate the Waste Holdup System with chromates. Direct a NEO to locally drain the Surge Tank to 55 gallon drum as necessary to maintain Surge Tank Level <100% as directed in S2.0P-AB.CC-0001, Component Cooling Abnormality. I!

!Ansi,\fer i Id  ! 1 Exam Level I js I !Cognitive Level* .! IApplication I ;Facility,:'! ISalem 1 & 2 I i'E~amDate: l I 12/21/2015J

KA:!!l 008000A202

~-~*

I iA2.02 I:Ro \Ja;h.ie: il 3.21:sRO\/aluel~ 1 Secti61l: II~ [RO Group:J! 11-S.RQGroup:il 1I ~~~l~ lY'J

[System/Evoll.ltiOn Titre  ! IComponent Cooling Water System I _o_0_8_ _

iKAStatement: 11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Component Cooling Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use l procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

High/low surge tank level

.Expf~t_1*_,atfo_._"_n_*_of j 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on having _to asses t~e conditions given in stem and determine which action i~ which I'! *ers: ... I i procedure will be taken. The 2CC149 auto closes on h1 rad1at1on 1n the CCW systen, nnot high pressure, to prevent rad1at1on release from the CCW system. The Surge Tank will be locally drained. The overflow from the tank will go to the Waste Holdup j ~:!t!~kai~da~~n~~:~:~ehthe WHUT. WHUT processing will be stopped in both the AB.CC and ARP procedures. Locally draining I

<' Reference Title  : ! F,acility Reference Number

• i fReferehce Section *.*

• ii Page NO.j IJ~evis!Onl r==========================~~====~===========:;;;.

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I:.:C=o=n::tr::o::IC=o=n=s=o=le=2=C=C=1=========::::,1 IS2.0P-AR.ZZ-0011 li.=6=0====

\ !_2_05_3_3_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,lj 205331 Sheet 1 !_54_~

i).~::9~'.~_N.uhl.t?ef *, '. * ".:=l I CCWOOOE008 Objectives il\'lateriar R.ecfuifed,~orf:#minauoh *** 'l l 1a~~stion S?urc~:>1 I Facility Exam Bank I r*q~~st~o,n.M'.2~,ificati9n rw1,ethod:.i :1 Concept Used j jusedb~ring Tr?i~(iig'Program  ! DI lOlie~tio,n ~,o,yice c~inmenlsi 182785 modified to make SRO level and fit KA.

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cofririlent z< ,

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, .Question Topic l _S_R_0_1_2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ll 11 'n the following conditions: 11

- unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

11 - 2PR1 fails open and remains open.

II Which of the following identifies how this affects the PZR Master Pressure Controller (MPC) response, and what consequences, if any, are Iassociated with the actions performed by the crew IAW S2.0P-AB.PZR-0001. Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction?

a.: j MPC output will RISE. A unit shutdown will be required if 2PR1 cannot be restored to operable status.

l

~I MPC output will LOWER. A unit shutdown will be required if 2PR1 cannot be restored to operable status.

-1 I

'c, 1 MPC output will RISE. The unit may continue to operate indefinitely after the initial mitigative actions are completed.

I

d. i IMPC output will LOWER. The unit may continue to operate indefinitely after the initial mitigative actions are completed.

I 12/21120151 I

KA Statement:! Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Pressurizer Pressure Control System and (b) based on those predictions.

~*u_s_e~p_r_o_c_ed_u_r_e_s_to~co_r_re_c_t.~c_o_n_tr_o~l._o_r_m_it-'i~a_te~th_e_c_o_n_s_e~qu_e_n_c_e_s_o_f_th_o_s_e_a_b_n_o_rm_a_l_o~p_e_ra_t_io_n_:_ _ _~--------~*

l PORV failures I II Explanation of vers:

1! 55.43(2)

Imalfunctions.

This question is SRO level because of the Tech Spec knowledge required, and what actions TS directs for different PORV Add1t1onally, while the question doesn't specifically ask what procedure to use (too easy for AB.PZR). 1t does require

• knowledge of the actions IN that procedure The MPC raises output when actual pressure rises. and lowers as actual pressure I lowers. As pressure lowers due to the open PORV, the output will lower to turn on heaters and close spray valves. When the PORV

_ _ _ _ _ __.l"""B"'lo_..c_,,k""""1a.,_h.,..1e._.,,is_,,sb1 it to isolate the..E.QRlLi..o...A..ELR Iech SneC-3.....4 5 action b if tbe POR\/ is oat n::istoreruMitbin 72 ba1 irs shl~L1 l is required. A PORV isolation that DOESN'T require shutdown if not fixed is a leaking PORV. which is isolated by its Block Valve I l

. with power maintained to the Block valve. I Reference Title Facility Reference Number.

• i .Reference Section

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!;Page No.! \Revision' I

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!:.::' l.:11=8==~

j PZR Pressure and Level Control LP 11 NOS05PZRP&L j 1O t~1 s=a::::le::::m:::::::T=e=ch==S=p=ecs::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::==::::::.ll~~~~~~~~~~~--' ~~~~~~~~ ~~~_. ~j======-

I I

L.O.Number ABPZR1 E002 Objectives J

I PZRP&LE010 I I I 'Material. Required.tor Exarnination *... \ I I!Qw~stio~ I Source:... J Facility Exam Bank j *ouestionModificatio,n Method.: j Direct From Source I'Used During Training Program I CI louestfon SourceCommellts! 1125725 used on Salem SRO NRC exam more than 2 exams ago i I

l ;*comment ****

1 _ 1_ _

RO System/Evolution List .* I __ SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I ~n the following conditions:

- ~11it 2 is conducting a rapid plant shutdown due to a loss of condenser vacuum.

I

- Two IRPls in control bank D go dark, and their P-250 readings are 0 steps.

- Maintenance Controls Dept. will be unable to repair the IRP ls until after shutdown.

- Rx Engineering has made no specific recommendations outside of procedural direction regarding boration.

Which action is required when the plant is placed in Hot Standby?

!a:) I Borate to Cold Shutdown SOM to prevent a Yellow Path on FRSM from occurring during the shutdown.

,b'. JI Borate an additional 540 ppm to prevent a Yellow Path on FRSM from occurring during the shutdown.

!c.; IBorate an additional 540 ppm since it is assumed that the reactivity associated with the affected rods is unavailable for shutdown. ,

~I:.========================================================::::::::.

~I Borate to Cold Shutdown SDM since it is assumed that the reactivity associated with the affected rods is unavailable for shutdown. Ii1 I :Answer I ~ !Exam Level j ~ !Cognitive Level i j Application I I fFacility: 1 Salem 1 & 2 I ;Exam Date: j j 12/21/2015! I

~I 014000A202 i IA2.02 I iRO,Value: !122.J !SRCJValueL~~ isectioll: 1I~ [~Cl-Group:! LJ *sRo. Group:' [JJ 1>>r:.i.f!i

Ell ~

~

iSystern!Evolution Title : I Rod Position Indication System I 014 KA Statement:' Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Rod Position Indication System and (b) based on those predictions, use 1 procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

, Loss of power to the RPIS

• _*Expla_tf~--.*t. lo_ n o_*_f_} 55.43.b(6,5) This question is _SRO lev_el based _on having to detemiine_ the effect on core reactivity based on the 2 control rods which  !

J> *ers: ._  : : have to be assumed to remain fully withdrawn 1n the absence of IRPI 1nd1cat1on. Add1t1onally, the sRO must select the portion of II,

• .1AB.ROD-4 (CAS action 2.0) which requires an additional 270 ppm boration for each failed IRPI if a shutdown is performed before I

I!

the !RPI is declared op_erable. Bo ration to col_d shutdown _conditions is not requi_red for a shutdown to_ h_ot standby. It assumes the

' , ..... . ~

Ii:- < >". c --,.-.* . ** Reference Title I ; *... Facility Refere11ce Number_ *. :i Reference s~ction Ii*-R=o=d=P=**=os=it=i~=n=l=n=di=ca=t=io=-~=F=a=i=lu=re=*======lj S2.0P-AB. ROD-0004 r 'li==================~===========-

l1

~=========================11~*===================~==============-!.=:====

-~-~~-~~---------~! ~~-~

}'.'.,o: Number * ** *,!

Objectives i ABROD4E002 l(l~7~ti9n So1.(rce: J jFacility Exam Bank I i(luestion,Mo~m¢ation¥ethod:* >il __________;I :used During Training Progralll 'I D lauest,i~ ,....1_4_o_s_2_9_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _....,.l 1 11

• sourc~.c()fri{l:t~n~sl rcomment l * *.

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List ( SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

auestiol"l;ropicJ !SRO 14 I Ir *11 the following conditions:

- unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

- Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument (IRNI) Channel I (2N35) failed yesterday.

- The CRS entered TSAS 3.3.1.1, action 3, and the crew removed the channel from service IAW S2.0P-SO.RPS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Channel Trip I Restoration.

- Subsequently, the RO reports IRNI Channel II (2N36) just started indicating erratically, oscillating between 1x10-11 amps and 1x10-5 amps.

- The reactor remains at power.

The CRS shall. ..

Q

a*i Enter S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction. Remove IRNI Channel 2N36 from service. Power operation may continue with no restrictions. I

~

~

Enter S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction. Remove IRNI Channel 2N36 from service. Initiate actions within one hour to I place the unit in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. J

,c.: Direct the RO to trip the reactor based on an ATWT. BOTH Source Range Nuclear Instrument Channels must be manually energized in EOP-

~

TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response. if the Rx trip is successful, or 2-EOP-FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation, if the reactor does not trip.

I

d. ! Direct. the RO to trip the reactor based on an ATWT. ONLY Source Range Nuclear lnstr~mentation Channel II (2N.32.) will automatically ___

1"""1'"-"'* '-'"'"-a'"'" \"-'""'I '"u;ocuc "'aoouauy """1'"-"'U "' L..vr-"r-.:., ""'ac,cv* I 1 ltJ * ,V.'.:>tJVI l.'.:>C::, II LI IC n.A ll q...1 I;:) ;:>UVVCJ;:).'.:>lUI, VI £.-1-vr -

FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation, if the reactor does not trip.

Answer I ~ !Exam Level i' ~ [Cognitive Level. 11 Application I ;Facility: 11 Salem 1&2 I IExamDate: j !___1_2_12_1_12_0_1_.51

~1015000G107 1!2.1.7 llROValue:l~;SROValueL.~:IJSection:!I~ ROGroup:'[}j:sROGroup:(LJ !f'j~j ~

'system/Evolution Title! INuclear Instrumentation System l !015 Statement*..i

'KA I Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

rxplanation of 55.43.b(5) Thi' qo,,boo SRO l"el b"ed oo h3'iog lo '"e' ti" oonditiooo gi° in olem ond dete,mine bolh wh*I prnoodo~

II I 1

Answers:  ! will be entered and the action(s) required in that procedure, as well as the TSAS which is applicable and actions required. Loss of a

---

~ single !RN! channel is specifically excluded from entry into LCO 3.0.3 even though the minimum operable channel requiremnt is 2.

Loss of the second channel would require entry into TS 3.0.3, which requires actions initiated within one hour to place unit in Hot lC'+,.. .......a.._, ii-i n'"'""" ~ hn ire: n .......... :10.r! ,..., ,1,......-lrt.o ic: ' tn +h,...+

other channel going below 7x10-11 Amps would automatically energize Source Range Ni's if not for the fact that *the P-1 O interlock prevent Source Range instruments from enerqizinq >10% power.

' LL "r">'"'- IDt-..11 .-.h  : .... .Lt- +ri- ...1 ' ' - .LL..

I: * *: * * ** ** . Reference Titl.e .* **. I'11 Facility Reference Number  ! [Reference Section i I Page No. 1 .Revision1 11 Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction 11 S2.0P-AB.NIS-0001 ii !I 117 I I Nuclear Instrumentation Lesson Plan 11 NOS05EXCORE-09 II 11 119 I I Salem Tech Specs II 113.3.1.1 I! 11 I iL.O. Number Objectives IABNIS1E003 I EXCOREEOO?

j_ ___,

!llllaterial Required for Examination 1 I lj jou~~;tio~Sj)i:frcii:'ij l_N_e_w_______,I [Q~estion ~()c:li.fis.;a,tic.>r1.~et~od: A, ________~l lOsecfouringTrai11ing p~ogram I 0 1 1uuesiio~:'.~0W{ce¢?\TIP1~~i~[ I

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RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

!Question Topic j SRO 15 I I I -"" ---

c;urruruur,., .

- ...init 2 is operating at 100% power.

- At 1200 on December 5th, 21 CFCU was CIT for an emergent electrical repair window.

- A very small SW leak is noticed by a NEO on his rounds on the 21 SW52, 23 CFCU SW INLET Vandis isolated by closing the 21SW52 at 1200 on December 7th.

After the 21SW52 is shut and the leak isolated, which of the following describes 21 -23 CFCU operability, and the required actions if 21-23 CFCUs remain in their current status?

ia.: 121 and 23 CFCUs ONLY are inoperable. Restore BOTH inoperable CFCUs to operable status by 1200 on December 12th or be in Hot

'---' Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I

'b'.* 121 and 23 CFCUs ONLY are inoperable. Restore EITHER inoperable CFCU to operable status by 1200 on December 14th or be in Hot

~ Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I

[SJ 121, 22, and 23 CFCUs are inoperable. Restore at least ONE of the inoperable CFCUs to operable status by 1300 on December 7th or be in Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I

'd.121, 22, and 23 CFCUs are inoperable. Restore at least TWO of the inoperable CFCUs to operable status by 1300 on December 7th or be in I*  ! Hot Standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and Cold Shutdown within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. I Answer* a I I iExam Level IS I !cognitive Level : j Application I !Facility;

• 1Salem 1 & 2 I iExamDate: 11 12/21/20151

• KA:JI 022000G242 I 2.2.42 l:ROValue:Jj 3.9j SROValueL+/-~JSection:ll~ ROGroup:fl 11,SROGroup:ll 1j ~~;~~; D System/Evolution Title I IContainment Cooling System ,022

'KA Statement*'

I Abilitv to recognize indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.

!Explanation of I This is not considered solely RO Tech Spec knowledge based on the ability to determine CFCU status based on SW header

~nswers:

• availability. SO.SW-5, Attachment 2, page 34 of 35 states "Enter the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 if during Modes 1, 2, or 3, Containment Fan Coil Unit #23 is isolated from either SW supply header, i.e. if the manual header cross-connect supply valve 21 SW52 OR 22SW52 for one SW header is CLOSED. Additionally, knowledge of where the SW isolation valve is cbi1s.ical!i1 loca!ed in !be s.1100!11 In tbe CECI Is. lMill be 11S?d In de!e1:mioe if 22 CECI I is. al-- ;_ ..h;-h ;t k __ , " - * +h;_ - - - - I I;,.,,ith one .ot two CFCU's ino*p-erable, BOTH CFCUs must be restored to operable within 7 days.of the FIRST CFCU being declared -

I inoperable, not from when the 2nd CFCU becomes inoperable. The 3 CFCU distracters are plausible if it is thought 22 CFCU loses

_its SW supply.

I I Reference Title Facility Reference Number .

I:Reference Section L

, :' Page No. I . Revision' IService Water System Operation I 1 S2.0P-SO.SW-0005 II 11130 1141 I ISalem Tech Specs Ii lj 3.6.3 ll 11 I Ii No. 2 Unit Service Water Nuclear Area 11205342 II Sheet 6 11 l I7o I

'LO. Number Objectives I CONTMTE009

'Material Required for Examination I ISRO 15 205342 Sheet 6 JI Question Source: : New

~

I I'Question Modification Method: II I iUsed During Training Program II D

,Question Source Comments I I

!Corr .. ""< I I I

~

I I

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er.. *d******* SRO Skyscrape..r.....1.

_ RO System/Evolution List

• 1;_ SRO System/Evolution List

• 1 Outline. Changes ..I lauestionJ9pif*i 1_s_R_o_1_6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.

I' 1 the following conditions:

- unit 1 was operating at 100% power when a catastrophic failure of 12 SG steam piping occurred inside containment.

- The Rx tripped and SI was initiated.

- 12 SG rapidly blew down to containment pressure, and containment pressure peaked at 16 psig prior to transition out of EOP-TRIP-1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to EOP-LOSC-1, Loss of Secondary Coolant.

- Operators have just transitioned out of LOSC-1 to EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant, with the following conditions:

- RCS pressure is 1780 psig and rising slowly.

- RCS subcooling is 100°F.

- PZR level is 22% and stable.

- 11, 13, and 14 SG levels are 17% and rising slowly.

Which of the following describes containment spray operation during subsequent EOP performance?

Containment Spray will be secured in ......

~ lin LOCA-2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, when containment pressure is< 4 psig. Containment Spray Additive Tank will be isolated based on normal radiation levels in containment.

'b. j ,in EOP-TRIP-3, SI Termination, when containment pressure is< 4 psig. Containment Spray Additive Tank will be isolated based on normal

- radiation levels in containment.

I c.; EOP-TRIP-3, SI Termination if ccntainment pressure is less than 13 psig. CFCUs will continue to operate in Low Speed.

rctJ I LOCA-2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. CFCUs will continue to operate in Low Speed.

At1s~er ~ J jExam Level I@=] [Cognitive Level  ; j Application l IFadnfY: 11 Salem 1 & 2 I !E~~~[)ate: I j___12_12_1_12_0_1~5j IKA:il 026000A208 IiA2.08 . !RO Valu~:[!J]isROValuej_EJ ,.sedion: II~ [RO Group:1[]is~OGroup:1 LJ ~

m/Evoh.ition Title I IContainment Spray System KA Statement:: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Containment Spray System and (b) based on those predictions, use 1*

procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

Safe securing of containment spray when it can be done) I i'ExpJanafion of! 55.43.b(5) This question is SRO level based on having to asses the conditions given in stem and determine both what procedure I

'Answers:  !

.* 1 will be entered and how containment cooling/spray equipment will be operated. With conditions in stem, the transition out of LOCA-11 to TRIP-3 will be made at step 9 based on adequate subcooling, SG NR level status, and PZR level, otherwise the transition

':~~~~s~~;~~hee~ els°~;~~' a;d~i~;,; ~a:t~s~l;;o~r~~~~: ;:~~~1 ~~~t ~~;~ ~~~~~~~r;,~e~~~: :;t~~: ::~~e~~ ~le~~~ p~~~~~~~

0

, operation, which would. be. goverened by the System operati.ng Procedure when EOP network weas exited to the Integrated I operatin Procedure (IOP)

1) * * * *FatilityReference Number

• IfReference Section*.*. Il Page No. j 1Revlsion

'I SI Termination !IEOP-TRIP-3 II lj q25 I P=o=s=t=LO=C=A=C=oo=l=do=w=n=a=n=d=D=e=p=re=ss=u=ri=za=t=io=n==l~l~===========li ii I! 25 I

!l

I l, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____,11._ _ _ _ _~ll ll I Objectives jcsPRAYE012 I TRP003E005

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[au'estionJ9'Pi<:q _s_R_o_17_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

1

_,I

!r* '1 the following conditions:

- -* iit 2 is in Mode 5.

- 2C EOG was err yesterday for scheduled outage window.

- The normal 31 day surveillance test of 2A EOG was completed SAT 2 days ago while in Mode 4.

- Subsequently, the Unit 2 CRS notices that the 18 month Hot Restart surveillance for 2A EOG, was NOT performed as scheduled after the normal 2A EOG 31 day run surveillance, and is now outside its required periodicity including any allowable grace time.

Which of the following describes:

1) The status of 2A EOG

2) When the associated Hot Restart test must be performed

~I Operable. The Hot Restart test must be performed prior to entering Mode 4. I 1

b; i I Operable. The Hot Restart test must be performed prior to entering Mode 6. 1 I 8  ! Inoperable. The Hot Restart test must be performed prior to entering Mode 4. 1 I lct.:j !Inoperable. The Hot Restart test must be performed prior to entering Mode 6. I I I I

.Answer 1 ~ :Exam Level I ~ :cognitive Level*. i IApplication I ;Facility: I lSalem 1 & 2 I :Exar11Date: j j___12_12_1_12_0_15~!

KA

ll 064000G120 I12.1.20 . ;Ro Value:ij 4.altsROValueL~ 1Section:i1 SYS IEW.Group:'j 11 l~Ro Group:q 11 ~

iSJ'stem/EvolutionTitle l IEmergency Diesel Generators KA Statement:!

~IA_b_i-lify~to-in-te_r_p-re_t_a_n_d_e_x_e-cu_t_e_p-ro_c_e_d_u-re-st_e_p-s.-~~~~-~~--~~-~~~--~~~~~~~~-~~~I t

-1at-fo_n_o_.f_,J 55.43.b(2) This question is SRO level based on being able to apply TSAS 3.8.1.2 for electrical power in Modes 5 and 6, and the .,1

• -ders: * *

• I action required based on the conditions in the stem. RO knowledge would be "above the LCO line", and SRO level for actions below the line. LCO 3.8.1.2 requires 2 operable EDGs, and the stem states 2C is already tagged out. The surveillance l I~~~ui~~~a~~!~e 0Ja~~*,;1~~~~:~:~c~l~~t~~ea!:~11~~~~J~h ~~~~~~~t~e!a~:rNn~~,;o~~u~~e~1~~:1~~:t:~:x~~~ ~~:~:~~1~% d'.r~i~~ases for 1 Icircuit

'I performance of the surveillance requirement, and to preclude de:energizing a required ESF bus or disconnecting a req~ired offsite during performance of surveillance requirements ...... It is the intent that these surveillance requirements must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and the offsite circuit are required to be operable.

I1 During startup, prior to entering Mode 4, the surveillance requirements are required to be completed if the surveillance frequency has been exceeded .... " The provided reference does not give answer, but allows the operator to interpret the surveillance 1requirement, and in any case does not contain the action required which is located in the bases.

• • • Reference Titie **. ' r <. i [ FacilityR~ference Number H:Reference,S~ctic:>n **. j ! Page No. I 1.~evisior1

================================

:::.~=======::::::::===::::::::::::::;;::::::::::::;:::::::::=:.;:===:::::::::::'.::'.:::==::=:::::.::::::::::.

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\.=I j1Salem Tech Specs 11 1 Bases 1183/4 8-3 I 1!=2=82=:::::.

11 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _11 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.ll, _ _ _ _ ___,q 11 _ ___,

LQ.. Ntlmber ,

• l EDGOOOE011

I lM~1~fl~r,B~g~~1i~~j'9!;.,!2,i~IUlil,~tj§!),JIJ SRO Q17 Tech Spec 3/4.8.1 Electrical Power Systems, A.C Sources ISi!~l\l!llt~~~tii~~;j j_N_e_w__________,l ~g~#tf:g,~tM~(1Jfi~~t~~ll~$:~~~~1 rs&~~!ia~IE:~~r:~1rg;2mw1:~1~11

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Outline Changes I

fatiestiohJopiCI lsRo 1a I

' 'l the following conditions:

- ,.mit 2 is operating at 60% power, steady state.

- 21 A Circulator is CIT.

- The Condensate Polisher is O/S and in standby.

- Subsequently, the 13 KV South ringbus breaker D-E opens causing a loss of 23 SPT.

Which of the following describes the plant status 15 minutes after the loss of 23 SPT as operators respond to this event?

~!The reactor remains at power. Operators will be performing S2.0P-AB.CW-0001, Circulating Water System Malfunction, and establishing Low Pressure Turbine Hood Spray.

I 1 fb.11 The reactor was manually tripped. Operators will be utilizing S2.0P-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, in conjunction with the L"--' ITRIP series of EOP's, to break condenser vacuum.

'cl The reactor remains at power. Operators will be performing S2.0P-AB.CHEM-0001, Abnormal Secondary Chemistry, and placing the

'---' Condensate Polisher in service for the expected rise in Dissolved 02.

[5!J IThe reactor was manually tripped. Operators will be utilizing S2.0P-AB.CN-0001, Main Feedwater I Condensate System Abnormality in

!conjunction with the TRIP series of EOP's to respond to the loss of condenser hotwell levels and possible Condensate pump cavitation.

/Answer1 ~ :ExamLevet! rI=J jCognitiveL~velJ jApplication I :Facility:J jsalem 1 &2 I :ExamDate: j 12/21/20151 mI 075000A202 I 1A2.02 I /RO Vallie: '@:sRO.Valuej--2Z] ,Section: iI~ /ROGroup:J LJ lsRo Group:: LI ~

1Systeh1IEvolution Title i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ ---~

j_c_ir_c_u_la_ti_ng...._W_a_t_e_r_s.._ys_t_em

!KA Statement: I Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Circulating Water System and (b) based on those predictions, use j procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the conse uences of those abnormal operation:

Loss of circulatin water pumps

[Exp Ian. atio. n. . o.f. j 155.43. b(5) This question is SRO level based on knowing the appropriate procedure or section of procedure used in applying the 11

I

• * 'I ers: . ' conditions which will occur based on the initial conditions in the stem. 23 SPT powers 23 CW bus, and 24 SPT powers 24 CW bus.

• 23 CW bus powers the "A" circulatros and 24 SPT powers the "B" circulators. The loss of 23 SPT will cause a loss of 2 additional l circulators in addition to ~1A which is CIT. The op~rator must know how many circulators a.re now not runni~g, 3 or 4. If it i~ .

0 Ithought condense~ vacuum would degr~de or DO increased based on losing h;twell levels and its effect on condensate pump 1

I seals. Manually bypassing the Turbine Hood Spray is allowed (and directed) in AB.CW-1, even though normally it remains secured I> 15% power. (AB.CW-1page5) l'{eference Title

=

::::::::::::::=:::=:::::::::::::::=:::::::::~

11

• Facility Reference Number I iReference Section !i Page No. J jRevisionJ

!~C=i=rc=u=la=t=in=g=W=a=t=e=r=S=ys=t=em==M=a=lf=u=n=ct=io=n======:::::.i~!S=2=.0==P=-A=B=.=C=W=-=0=00=1==========~1::::::==============qs I 1~3=5=====

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ABCW01 E004

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I. The Rx shall be subcritical for at least 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br />.

II. Direct, continuous communication between the control room and refuel floor is established.

Ill. The RCS is drained to < 104' elevation.

IV. Unit CRS AND SM approval.

[J,1. II.

I

~1111, IV.

I 11,

!C** Ill.

l

@;]Ill, IV.

II

!Answer 11 b I 1Exam Level J lS j iCognitive Level :IMemory I tFacility: 11 Salem 1 & 2 1 IExamDate: 11 12/21/201511

!KA:!f 194001 G141 I 2.1.41 I :RO Value:; [Ifil" ,SRO Valuej.22.J ,Section: :I~

I RO Group:j LJ 1SRO Group: LJ ,S~~l D

v'-"""'*,,~,, :",~

Isystem/Evolution Title 1 IGENERI  !

---

~--~---~----------------~---------'

'KA Statement: I . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!Knowledge of the refueling process.

I!Explanation of! 55.43(6,2) This question is SRO level based on knowing the requirements which must be met before alterations affecting core

!Answers: I configuration will be started entering a refueling outage. The reactor does not have to be subcritical for 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> (Oct 15-May 15th) prior to moving fuel in the reactor (TSAS 3.9.3) Direct communications is required during CORE AL TS, and detensioning the head is NOT core alts.

! Reference Title Facility Reference Number i Reference Section  !: Page No. j !Revision!

iCold Shutdown to Refueling II S2.0P-IO.ZZ-0007 I ii 1117 I

! !I I 11 11 I l II I 11 11 I

.LO. Number Objectives IIOP007E002 l

!Material Required for Examination* :I II

!.Question Source:

• IFacility Exam Bank I jOuestion Modification Method: .! Editorially Modified l IUsed During Training Program j D iOuesticm .Source Comments I I iComment

! I I I ii I I_

RO SkyScraper  ! SRO Skyscraper

• I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List ....

I Outline Changes I

[Cluestron Topic i ISRO 20 11 r

, the following conditions:

- unit 2 is in MODE 6 with core reload in progress.

- 10 fuel assemblies have been moved into the Rx.

- Rx cavity level is 26' above the RPV flange. l 21 RHR loop is in service in Shutdown Cooling.

22 RHR loop is 0/S and available. I Which one of the followinq would prevent continuation of fuel movement into the reactor?

lfJ lLoss of Control Air to containment.

I

bl I.Racking down the 22 RHR pump 4KV breaker.

I

~ Both 100' elevation containment airlock doors are opened. I l

~ With both SRNls operable, only ONE is capable of providing audible indication in the control room.

II I ' "

I!

12/21/201511 1

~I 194001 G201 I 2.2.1 lRo Value:  !@lsRo ValueL~:.:.U section: H~ 'Ro Group:;f:=::IJ SRO Group:\ LJ System/Evolution Title / .GENER! i

!~-----~-----~----------~-----------~~--~

KA Statement: I

~IA-b-i-lity_t_o_p_e_rf_o_rm-p-re---st_a_rt_u_p_p_ro_c_e_d_u-re_s_f_o_r-th_e_f_a-ci-lity-,-in-c-lu-d-in_g_o_p_e-ra-t-in_g_t_h_os-e-co_n_t_ro_ls-as_s_o_c-ia-te_d_wi_.t_h_p_la_n_t_e-qu-i-pm-e-nt_t_h_a_t- -

i could affect reactivit .

1

,Eiolanation of I 55.43(7, 6) This question is SRO level because of the knowledge require for fuel handling procedures, and the ability to 11

~rs:

• i 1

~

/

'I continuously apply that knowledge when operating the fuel handling equipment. The requirement for SRNl's is BOTH operable and providing VISUAL indication in the Control room, with ONE providing AUDIBLE indication in the control room. The manipulator I

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I

• . ); * ***Reference Title

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!Reac Pene Area & Cont Control Air n205347-1,3 II " l j 42,36 I

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-'*-~~~~~~~~~~~~!~~~~~~~~~

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Ccnninent I I I I I

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auestiontopic 1 lsRo 21 11 l.v '1 of the following Salem events requires a 15 minute notification? I

~I A unit shutdown is initiated to comply with Technical Specifications.

I

[§] I An oil discharge directly into the Delaware River with a visible sheen.

I

c.'i I An endangered species of sturgeon is found deceased during circ water trash rack cleaning.

I

ct.! I Rx power is determined to be greater than 3459 MWth after removing a Feedwater Heater from service.

I

' I ,c;,..*,.

' .: 12/21/2015jl

!B' .5£4!1 0 l:>::::-li$t.'f~

!--------------------------------------'* \GE NERI '1 i [.EX.'pl~.nat*i*o* n. of:i* 155.43.b(1) This q.ue~ti~n is SRO level based on the knowledge required of Conditions and Limitation required in the facility 1.icense,

!Answers:','

• and meets the cntena 1n ES-401, Attachment 2, page 17, II.A, 4th bullet. Knowledge of events which require 15 minute not1ficat1ons

'---- * . is critical for SRO to know from memory to faciliate timely and correct notifications. RAL 11.5.2.b contains conditions for which an I .~~0~~1; ~s0~e6oi~a.,~l~~ns;; ~~~u:~~'~ :~~~is~~~:~!:~~ ~~l~~c~~a~~~h 1! . .

2  :~~ti:~~~~~t;( :~a~~~~p~0r!J ~ i~:~ *~~2~~ ~~~.r-~~ hour

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ii Salem ECG I! RAL 11.5.2.b 11 I !::14===

Il,!_ _ _ _

Salem ECG I Attachment 16 Ij 4-5 l j4

_ _ _ . l _ _ _ ___., _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _____.:.=I====.

'L.o'.f:tumber,<,

Objectives J IEL0_11.d I :M?teriaJ,Required for Ex:aminatiorf. II II 1

ques(i_on ~PP~c:e: , j l_N_e_w_ _ _ _ _ _~l ><l<lesiio~ Mo~ltfcatioll J111eff1od( . -*~--------~' :used During rrain\rig Progran(I D tou~§;tion~<:i~fce CorliliJents.! I I

• comment.-. y:.

I I 11- I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

RO SkyScraper I SRO Skyscraper I RO System/Evolution List I SRO System/Evolution List I Outline Changes I .

louestionJopic*l 1SRO22 r 1 the following conditions:

- unit 1 is in Mode 2, with all Shutdown Banks withdrawn.

- Unit 2 is at 100% power.

- All Unit 1 & 2 Circulating Pumps are in service.

- 21, 23 & 26 Service Water Pumps are running.

- 21 CVCS Monitor Tank is being released via 22 CCW Hx to the Circulating Water System.

Choose the condition that would require termination of the liquid release?

§JI IUnit 1 Rx trips.

l

'b. l 21 CCW Pump trips.

I ic,; The 11 A & 11 B Circulators trip.

I An:J, 1 ~',:::;::;I ~ ~::::~~.,~::.:';~::::,::0 23 1 10 1 I OS ' ;:aojt!o/ i ISolem 1 & 2 1 iEx!TD*' j I 12/21/20151

~ j 194001 G311 I:2.3.11  !RO Value: IQ] ~SRO Vatuej_~ ~Seeti()n: I!~ !Ro Group: LJ fSRO Group:; LJ 1

1 System/Evolution Title I KA S t a t e m e n t : : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!Ability to control radiation releases.

EJ(!Jlanatfon ofi 55.43.b(4) This question is SRO level based on the knowledge required that loss of required dilution flow may result in a release

• 1*

~swers: * . *i1 above limits, and could happen during this normal evolution. SO.WL-001 states at step 5.5.9 that the released is to be terminated upon loss of dilution water flow. 22 SW header discharges into the outlet of 11A and 11 B circulators. A unit 1 trip does not I  !\

co~;~~u~~ a~,~~~~:~~~r?;;',Rs~;:~:~~~~~~a~~t~ of OP-SA-106-101-2001 Operating with an Emergency on the Opposite Unit is not l* * *. * *. . ' Reference Title * *. ***.< * * * * ' 'I ' *Facility Reference Number *'.:I ,Reference ~~(;ti on " I! Page fllo. ! jRevision jRELEAS~ ~F RADIOACTl~E uo~1~ ~~STE II s2.0P-SO.WL-0001 II I I25 I I l=I==  !=i::==:::::.

I I !______.

Lo. Number

• IWASLIQE012 Objecti~== . I

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!aiiestiol1 sol.ire~ Cofri[Uentsl  :::======-=::::=::::=::::=::::=:=::==:=::~==============-================--!

11913s I:Commeob , . . .. .* *. /}C ' *

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RO SkyScraper SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List .(,_ I SRO System/Evolution List . . Outline Changes . I iouestion Topic;: I SRO 23 I 1' r* '1 the following conditions:

- _,nit 2 is operating at 100% power.

- The operating crew entered S2.0P-AB.RC-0002, High Activity in Reactor Coolant System, when RMS channel 2R31, Letdown Line Monitor, went into WARNING.

Which of the following is required to be performed JAW S2.0P-AB.RC-0002, and why?

The CRS will. ..

~I direct Radiation Protection Technician to take surveys to determine if radiation levels may have changed access requirements.

I

~I direct Radiation Protection Technician to survey the letdown line in the vicinity of 2R31 to confirm the suspected rise in RCS activity. II

• c. ! I direct Chemistry Technician to sample hourly for isotopic analysis to determine predominant radiation hazard (gamma, neutron, beta, alpha).

I

, ~ direct Chemistry Technician to initiate confirmatory sample analysis because the 2R31 reads in CPM and therefore has no correlation to dose level changes.

II I:Answer! ~ (Exam Level \ [CJ 1Cognitive Level I 1

1 Memory I !Facility~ j j Salem 1 & 2 I lExamDate: J I 12/21/20151 I

~I 194001G314 j ;2.3.14 1 IROValue:1[Ei SROValuej~ Section: II~ tRO Group:'LJ[SR() Group::[] ~~;1~1 ~

.System/Evolution Title i iGENERI

• KAStatement:! - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ , .

! Knowledqe of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emerqency conditions or activities. I

• e***.xpl<;ln.ati.on***ofl!55.43(4) This question is SRO level based on the "why" the action will have to be taken, as knowledge of radiation hazards which is iJ..nswers: I occurring during an abnormal situation. A is correct as described in S2.0P-AB.RC-002 basis, so that prompt identification and

~ I subsequent notification of plant personnel is ensured. B is incorrect because chemistry sampling ccnfirms 2R31 readings, not I survey results. D is incorrect because rising counts does indicate dose level changes. C is incorrect because the hourly isotopic I ...,--1 ..... :,... --~----...J ic- L-- ,........,,...,..,.-n.., f,-.. ~.- .,... _ __...;....,.,..., nC:/ &_,,.,. '-.---..J:-- /C::to.I""! ') 1Q\

I I ~1------R~e-fe_r_e~n-c_e_T~it-le_ _ _ _ _ _i ' Facility Reference Number * . j Reference Section I; Page Noj ;Revision:

I High Activity in Reactor Coolant System II S2.0P-AB.RC-0002 l I 1-==~  :..=Is==

I ~==::::; =::::::;

I II I i II I 1=1 I _ _ _ _ 1_ __.

'LO. Number\ , i Objectives I ABRC02E003

[ou,~stion scwrc;e:: 11 Facility Exam Bank Irguestion Modificati9p Meth~d: ** ;,I Direct From Source I'Use~ Di,Iring Training Program I DI lpu$~tion ~?un;.a s?rr,Jiiientsj I=======-==========::::::==::::::==:::.============-================--1I Used on Salem SRO NRC exam more than 2 exams ago.

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RO SkyScraper . I SRO Skyscraper RO System/Evolution List SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

!Ques~onTopic\ ,_s_R_0_2_4_ _ _ _ _ ~-------~------~---~-------~-------~-~~

' ' '1 the following conditions:

1t time T-0, while operating at 100% power, the Auxilary Typewriter prints an alarm without OHA A-41, AUX ALM SYS PR! NT annunciating.

- Operators enter S2.0P-AB.ANN-0001, Loss of Overhead Annunciator System and begin assessing the OHA system functionality.

- AT +5 minutes, and prior to verifying if either SER is in command, the Rx trips.

- At T +14 minutes, the PO reports that neither SER is in command.

Which of the following identifies the correct ECG classification, and time at which it should have been made?

'a.I I

~!Alert at T+14 minutes. II

~ IUnusual Event at T +5 minutes.

@] l Unusual Event at T +14 minutes. 11 Answer I ~ Exam Level* 11=J !Cognitive Level I I Application I [Faci!ity: ! ISalem 1 & 2 I :ExamDate: ! I 12/21/20151 KA::l 194001G432 I 2.4.32 . 'RC>valUelf]}J[sRO Valuei~ Section: II~ RO Group:ILJISRO Group: LJ ~

System/Evolution Title !

IKA Statement: I ,Know1ed ..------------------------------------------------

e of o erator response to loss of all annunciators.

i.Explanation of:. 55.43.b(1) This question is SRO level based on the requirement to declare an emergency. The requirement to declare an

'Answers:  : emergency under any of the loss of annunciators (S5) EALs is the loss for greater than or equal to 15 minutes. Declaring at T +5 minutes with 10 minutes of assessment time left is not indicated even though the significant transient (Rx trip) has occurred, I

1_ _ _ _ _ _....LJlbn.;e31 caJ.1.u.u:s12eW.ll.th el<l;AraBo..DJfa:nNo.N=.ta.rrkJEeus 5

B:1J~u.~.:.t~>.1:~:..t~"-i.u:i~w~l:l~lr!l.!.tr.r::i.a;;nnpa)..J.@f~k~e5s;o~~' f~:~~~!I~~ ~~ 01~~:~~1t~;1r~~~~~~i~hna~t0~:~bne~ ~r:~~ out procedure.

IT +14, the even't *should be declared. *

• i Reference Title j' Facility Reference Number * !Reference Section  : I Page No~ j jRevision

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S::a::le:::m=EC=G============l,\:1===========11 S5 - Instrumentation i-:::1 I :.:I====! '!.: I===I

'i-::====================ll,~=============11~========1~1

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __Jl, _ _ _ _ _~11---~ll_~l l_~I

===~===l iLO. Number I ABANN1 E002 Objectives

!Material Required for Examination I j SRO 024 ECG Section S5 II iOuestionSource: . I INew IIOuestion Modification Method:

i . - ,:.. ____J

~ I iUsed During Training Program i D I

!Question Source _comments!

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'Comment I I

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RO SkyScraper j SRO Skyscraper J RO System/Evolution List f SRO System/Evolution List Outline Changes

~-PG*i:t:~,::~::~w,_i:-:-O-id-:-:-tifi-1e_s_a_c_on-d-it-io_n_d_u_r-in_g_a-de-c-la_r_e_d_E_m_e-rg_e_n-cy_w_h-ic_h_R_E_Q_U_I R_E_S_a_P_r_o-te-c-ti-ve_A_c-tio_n_R_e-co_m_m_e_n_d-at-io_n_, -e-it-he_r_i-ni-tia_l_o_r-~ll I l~ .de, when the TSC/EOF have NOT been activated yet?

[a;*j 1ANY General Emergency initial declaration.

I I

~ ANY event which results in a radiological release to the environment.

I fcl I I

ANY time the wind shifts after the initial 15 minute notifications have been made during a General Emergency.

'd. II ANY event which in the judgement of the Emergency Coordinator could result in exceeding 10CFR Part 100 limits.

'Answer!!~ !Exam Level I@=]" :cognitive Level,; j Memory I :f'acility: /I Salem 1 & 2 I :E:xamp~te: I J 12/21/2015\j

~1194001 G444 I 2.4.44 I:RO Value:  :[TI" ~sR.o ValueJ~ !section: n~ ;Ro Group:ILJ/SRO Grdl1p;I [ ] mxai %1::.;Aii o

• systein/Evolt.ifion Title.1

!----------------------------------- )GENERI kA statement:,

I Knowledge of emer'1ency plan protective action recommendations.

Iit;/'P)?n*tton of 11 "

t!'"~lers: .*. * ** i 43.b( 5' 1) Thto '""'"°' ;, SRO ' ' " ' ' ' " ' 00 " ' koowt e<lg* of. how to im pl*mcot " ' " " " " ' '

111-F4, Attachment 4, General Emergency, and the cond1t1ons which require making a PAR or PAR upgrade. The ICMF for a GE

"°" o1 " ' ECG, EP-SA-I requires a PAR; see Appendix 1. There is a PAR for a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident, a PAR for Hostile Action, and a I ,

1defualt PAR, one of which must be made. Bis incorrect because a radiological release is defined as "Any release above normal, It,..,.i,..;. .. ;h11t"::!hlot,...,.i.1.-. .................... .i. 11c-o.if'::l~ ............:.i... ,....".l 1C"o.r(*u--~c ,..,r1,.....:.--- - "*---_.

11 f"'iC"' i... .............. r:: ...... ..,fic- .i.... ..... .i.l----::ir"'l"O * - - i ..

for a wind shift (see Appendix 1). D is incorrect because there is no "judgement" directed in the PAR based- on exceeding radiation limits, the PAR is determined based on the the GE that directed its implementation.

• Reference Title ***

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Facility Reference ~umber *. ! Reference Section j i Page No. i !Revision! I l General Emergency II EP-SA-111-F4 II II 1102 I I I  ! n ll ii I I I II ii ll I I

LO/Number Objective jEL0_24.a

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