ML20004C648

Control Room Habitability Study.

ML20004C648
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	03/31/1981
From:	BECHTEL GROUP, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20004C647	List: ML20004C646 ML20004C648
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8106040386
Download: ML20004C648 (52)

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CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY STUDY FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION Prepared for:

Toledo Edison Company i

Bechtel Power Corporation Gaithersburg, Maryland March 1981 i

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CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY STUDY FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION :

-1.0' INTRODUCTION-

'The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is located in Ottawa County in north-western Ohio and borders the southwestern shore of Lake Erie.

Lake Erie, which borders the site for approximately 3,000 ft, is important for commerce, commercial and sport fishing, recreation, and water supply to Ohio, other states which border the lake, and Canada (Ref. 1). <

Agriculture is a.p.ajor source of income in Ottawa County; the major crops of the county include peaches, grapes, apples, corn, wheat, soy beans, oats, hay, tomatoes, pumpkins, and sugar beets. The raising of livestock is not a major a tivity in this area (Ref. 1).

The site consists of 954 acres of which approximately 600 acres are marshland.

The major station structures are located approximately in the center of the site area, 3,000 ft from the shoreline, and the containment building is located 2,400 ft from the neraest site boundary, which is to the. north (Ref. 1).

Figure #1 shows the site arrangement.

This report provides information regarding the potential effects on the safe operation of the nuclear facility of all industrial, transportation, mining, t

and military installations in the site area. A survey was carried out to  !

_ determine the amount of hazardous material being transported, manu actured, f oc i stored within 5 miles of the site and at greater distances if significant quantities -;

exist. Potential accidents involving these hazardous materials were evaluated as to

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tcheir effect on the control room personnel.- i 2.0 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL HAZARDS IN IEE SITE VICINITY l'

2.1 Mining There are no mining operations within 5 miles of.the Davis-Besse site. The nearest operation is in Limestone, Ohio, 7 miles southwest of the site (Ref. 2).

2.1 Military Facilities The Camp Perry Military Reservation is the only military installation in the vicinity of the. Davis-Besse site. The Camp Perry Military Reservation is an Ohio National Guard training ce6ter located 4.5 miles southeast of the station site immediately adjacent to the east of the Erie Industrial Park as shown on Figure #2. This installation is used extensively by the Ohio National Guard for training including small arms firing and limited firing of 40 mm anti-aircraf t ordinance (Ref. 1).

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This facility is also the site of the annual National Rifle Matcnes during Ju2) and August of each year (Ref. 1).

2.3 Airports There are no airports within 5 miles of the Davis-Besse site.

The closest cIrport serving commercial airlines is Toledo Express Airport located 38 miles vest of the station site. The nearest airport with a paved runway is at Port Clinton located east-southeast, 13 miles frc= tha site. i Table 1 gives the annual operations for the airports within 50 miles of the Davis-Besse site and Figure 3 shows the airport locations.

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s-D e two nearest VHF Omni-Directional Radio Range Airways are' designated

-'!232 which runs WNW and ESE approximately seven milas south' of the _ site and E V-45 which runs east and west the same distance' south of - the site (Ref.1).

~ Statistics on aircraft' accidents have not been provided since the airports do not' mest _the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70' criteria such that the effe'et of aircraft accidents due to the station safe operation need to be analyzed:

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" airports with projected operations greater than.500'd movements per year

~ within 10 miles and airports with projected operations greater than 1000 d nevements per year outside 10 miles, where d is the distance from the site in miles" (Ref. 3).

2.4 Transportation Routes 2.4.1 Highways State Highway Route 2 is the maior transportation route within 5 miles of the station site; Figure #2 shows its location. This two lane, medium to heavily traveled highway is located immediately adjacent to the westerly site boundary, but is a distance of 2,600 ft from the nearest station structure.

This highway is used by commercial truck carriers (Ref. 1). Table 2 provides the size and frequency of the transports of hazardous material on State Highway 2.

2.4.2 Waterways The two potential water routes within 5 miles of the site are Lake Erie and the Toussaint River.

Lake Eric is used for commercial shipping, both domestic and overseas. The shallowness of the western lake basin, particularly near shore, prevents

-any closer approach then eight miles for ships ot any size. The

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5 major shipping lanes are approximately 20 miles from the site. Since the-navigable-channel is not-within 5 miles of the site, information on transported.

materials has not been provided (Ref. 1).

A narrow strip of marshland on-the southern boundary of the site separates the sitt trom the Toussaint River except for a small segment of the site which extends to the river. This river, which becomes a stream six miles upstream.

~ from the mouth, empties-into Lake Erie 700 feet from the lake ~ shoreline site '

boundary (Ref. 1). The river depth at the mouth is 10 ft and decreases to 2 ft ,

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inland. There is no commercial traffic or hazardous material' transports on the river (Ref. 2). l 2.4.3 Railroads There are two railroads which run near the vicinity of the Davis-Besse sice, the Penn Central and thc Norfolk & Western Railroads (refer to Figure #2).

The Penn Central Railroad runs in a east-west direction 5 miles south of-the site. A rail spur runs from the Penn Central line to the Erie Industrial Park, but this spur is not used (Ref. 4).

The Norfolk & Western Railroad runs in a NW-SE direction from Oak Harbor about 6 miles southwest of the site. A rail spur which serves the Davis-Besse station  ;

runs from the Norfolk & Western main line from a point 7 miles southwest of the site (Ref. 1). This entire spur line is owned and operated by Toledo l Edison and has been built solely for service- to the Dsvis-Besse station. The rail spur is used primarily for chlorine deliveries. One tank car of chlorine is delivered every two months on this rail spur (Ref. 2). ,

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2.5 -Erie Industrial Park

!The only industrial facilities in the vicinity of the Davis-Besse site are at the Erie Industrial Park located 3 to 5 miles' southeast of the site as  !

- shown in Figure #2.. The park is used mainly as a warehouse area with'some  !

i light industry (Ref. 2).

Uniroyal Corporation has .the largest manufacturing facility at the. park. The

- chemicals used by Uniroyal are discussed in Section 2.8.

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Ares Incorporated, also located at the park, stores some potentially hazardous materials: 500 - 75 mm and 8000 - 35 mm ordinance ammunition, stored in ,

accordance with Department of Defense requirements (Ref. 2),

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2.6 Pipeline

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The only pipeline in the site vicinity is a 4 inch natural g'as pipeline in the

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. Erie Industrial Park. The pipeline runs underground, along the lake shore, l l

1 from Port Clinton to the east side of the Erie Industrial Park. At the park,

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the pipeline runs to two Uniroyal Buildings about 3/4 of a mile from the l

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eastern park boundary. There are valves in the line at the edge of the park  :

i and outside cach of the Uniroyal Buildings (Ref. 5).

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l 2.7 Restricted Lake and Airspace Areas A portion of Lake Erie including the shoreline of the Erie Industrial Park and Camp. Perry has been established as a restricted area by the.U.S. Army, _j

. Corps of Engineers. The Restricted Lake Areas (Area I and II), with their  !

[ closest boundary offshore from the station site and 1.5 miles from the station i structures, are limited to use as impact areas for small arms, artillery, and i

anti-aircraft artillery (Ref. 1). The Restricted Lake Areas are shown on j Figure #6.

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The Restricted Lake' Areas are used by Camp Perry and Ares Incorporated. l Camp Perry uses the area as an_ impact area for the anti-aircraft training firing. Ares Incorporated, located in the Erie Industrial Park,.through- I a joint use agreement with the Ohio National Guard uses the lake area as an impact are's for ordinance test firing (Ref. 1).

The Federal Aviation Agency has established restricted air space R-5502 over this area to prohibit the use of the airspace to low-flying aircraft during ordinance and small arms firing (Ref. 1).

For a detailed study of the use of the restricted lake and airspace areas, see Appendix 2A of the Final Safety Analysis Report for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

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2.8 Off-site Chemical Chemicals are stored at two locations in the vicinity of the Davis-Besse site, at a local campground and at the Erie Industrial Park (refer to Figure #4).

The campground, located approximately lh miles SSE of the site, stores 2 - 1000 gallon tanks of propane (Ref. 2).

The Erie Industrial Park, located 3 to 5 miles southeast of the site, stores a wide range of chemicals. Table 3 provides a list of the types and quantities of chemicals stored at the park.

The chemicals identified as' potentially hazardous to the control room personnel are:

Ammonia Naphtha Carbon Dioxide Propane Chlorine Tetrahydrofuran 6'

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Formaldehyde Trichloroethylene Hydrogen Peroxide. Toluene i Methyl-Ethyl Ketone Xylene The chemicals are stored both inside and outside of buildings. When the chemicals are stored inside, they are stored in storage rooms with sprinklers'  !

u- j and blowout walls (Ref. 2). l r

2.9- Onsite chemical Storage There is a wide range of chemicals stored at the Davis-Besse site. Tables 4 and 'i provide a complete list of the types and quantities of chemicals stored  ;

at the site and Figure #6 shows the criemical storage locations. .

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. 4 The chemicals identified as having the potential to affect the control room l personnel are: l Ammonia Sodium Hypochlorite i Chlorine Sulfuric Acid Hydrogen Nitrogen  ;

No. 2 Fuel Oil / Diesel 3 3.0 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS  !

I i On_the basis of the information provided in Section 2.0, the potential affects >

on the plant from accidental release of the hazardous materials were considered )

in terms of design parameters (e.g., overpressure and missile energies) or [

physical phenomena (e.g., concentration of flammable or toxic cloud outside the control room intake).

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~ 3.1 Explosions .

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3.1.1 Offsite ,

As described in Sections 2.4, 2.6, and 2.8, the chemicals transported or stored offsite identified as having the potential to explode are:

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, Gasoline ' Propane Naphtha = Natural. gas

'As indicated'in Table 2, the largest explosive' transports on State Highway 2 would be an 8,000 gallon gasoline, 7,000' gallon naphtha, and 3,200 gallon .

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. propane; trucks. Accidents involving these chemicals were postulated, assumi.ng:

only one ch'emical is involved in each. accident, the total chemical volume explodes instantaneously:(worst. case),.and the'secident occurs at the closest ,

1 point of. State Highway 2 to the Davis-Besse site structures (at a distance of approximately;820 meters). ,

As described in Section 2.6, the 4 inch diameter natural gas pipeline at the .

Erie Industrial' Park also has the potential to explode. An accident causing.

"t he 1 mile section of pipe to explode was analyzed assuming: the breaking > point of the pipeline is at a distance of 3 miles from the control room. the natural  !

gas is in a gaseous state, and the gas is under a pressure of 1250 psig.

.Results of the analysis of accidents involving these chemicals is summarized in '

Table 6. It was concluded that the explosive chemicals transported or stored 1

in the vicinity of the Davis-Besse site pose no hazard to safe' plant operation.

i 3.1.2 Onsite ,

The only chemical stored onsite identified as having the potential to explode  ;

is hydrogen. Hydrogen, H at STP, is stored in a 50,000 f t3 tank 128 meters 2

north of the control room. Since H has a very low boiling point, if the 2

storage tank fails, the whole amount of H is assumed to form an instantaneous j 2

vapor puff.- The explosion would create 1 psi overpressure at a distance of 118 meters from the storage site. Since this distance is less than the distance between the hydrogen storage site and the control room, no damage will occur to

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control room structures. The hydrogen explosion analysis is summarized in 8

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Table 6, also see page 12 of discussion of delayed ignition-of hydrogen.

3.2 Flammable Vapor' Clouds (Delayed Ignition)

- Flammable gases in the liquid or gaseous state'can form a vapor cloud which can-drift toward the plant before ignition occurs. The possibility of the cloud then exploding depends upon its concentration being within the flammability limits for the particular gas released.

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The most hazardous chemical transported near the site in terms of a delayed ignition is propane gas. As indicated in Table 2, the largest expected propane

. transport on State Highway 2 would be a 3.200 gallon truck. In the event of a propane truck crash and conservatively assuming 47% of the propane instanta-1 neously flashes to vapor, the propane vapor cloud can drift 720 meters away

.from the accident site and still be within the flammable limits. The effective distance that the cloud could travel and still be within flammable limit was estimated to be 757 meters. This radius, 757 meters, is less than the distance between the plant site and the closest point of State Highway 2, 820 meters.

The propane vapor cloud explosion at that distance vould produce an overpressure.

less than 1 psi at the Davis-Besse site structures. Therefore, a propane truck crash poses no hazard to the control room personnel. .

r 3.3 Fire -1 3.3.1 Offaite Chemicals The chemicals transported or stored offsite that were identified as potentially hazardous due to fire are:

Gasoline Methyl-Ethyl Ketone Naphtha 9 <

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-j As indicated in Table 2, the largest. transports of these chemicals on State j Highway 2 are: 8600 gallons of gasoline, 6500 gallons of methyl-ethyl ketone, 'l and 7000 gallons of naphtha. Table 3 shows the largest volumes of the chemicals stored at Erie Industrial Park are: 5000 gallons of methyl-ethyl ketone and 150 gallons of naphtha.

In each case, an accident causing the ignition of a chemical spill was postu-

. lated and the wind speed required to bend the hot plume of the burning chemical to the control room air intake such that the fresh air to control room will be contaminated was calculated. The fire hazard chemical accident analysis is presented in Tahle 7. i t

The fastest wind speeds recorded at the Davis-Besse site are: 77 mph (33 m/s) at Cleveland, Ohio (25-year) and 72 mph (32 m/s) at Toledo, Ohio (11-year) (Ref. 1).

For each chemical accident postulated, the wind speed required to bend the hot plume of the burning chemical to the control room air intake was much faster than any wind speeds recorded at the Davis-Besse site area. It was concluded that, offsite chemical fires pose no hazard to the control room t

personnel.

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3.3.2 Onsite Chemicals .

The only chemical stored onsite identified as potentially hazardous due to fire is No. 2 fuel oil. No. 2 fuel oil is stored in a 100,000 gallon tank l

137 meters NNW of the control room air intake. Two oil fire accident cases [

were analyzed: Case 1, the oil fire is restricted to the oil tank and l

Case 2, the oil spills into the dike that surrounds the tank and is then ignited. The oil fire accident analysis is presented in Table 8. It was j l  !

concluded that an oil fire at the onsite storage tank poses no hazard to the 10

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3 . 4' Toxic Chemicals 3.4.1 Onsite' Chemicals Section 2.9 discussed the hazardous chemicals stored onsite. The toxic I

chemicals identified as potentially hazardous to the safety of the control room personnel are:

9 Ammonia Nitrogen ,

Chlorine Sodium Hypochlorite Hydrogen Sulfuric Acid

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Liquid ammonia , NH 3 at 35% concentration, is stored onsite in 5 gallon plastic containers in the water treatment building 168 meters east of the control room air intake. In the event of storage container failure, assuming an amVient temperature of 25 C and a continuous ground level release is assumed.

3 The maximum NH concentration in the control room would be 31.5 mg/m . This 3

is less than the NH toxicity limit of 35 mg/m3 (Ref. 6), therefore, the ammonia 3

storage container failure poses no hazard to the control room personnel.

Chlorine gas, Cl2 , f r use as an algacide f r the cooling water and cooling tower systems is transported to the site and stored on the site in a 30 ton i- railroad tank car. The effect of an accidental chlorine release was discussed in Section 15.4.8 of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Final Safety

, Analysis Report. As a result of this analysis, chlorine detectors were installed ,

at the chlorine storage site and at the control room air intake to initiate automatic isolation of the control room and provide an audible alarm to the operators in the event of a chlorine release. (See the Response to Question 15.4.4 of the FSAR). Gas masks are also located in the control room and other critical areas of the station to provide personnel protection in coping with any chlorine release accident. Station personnel are trained in the proper procedures to deal with and secure equipment involving a chlorine release accident. (Ref. 1)

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, Hydrogen gas,2 H at STP, is stored.in a 50,000 ft tank 128 meccra north cf the control room air intake. Studies (Ref. 7 ) show that hydrogen-air mixtures do not go through a transition from ordinary flame to detonation wave if they exist in the open air (without any. accumulation), unless the ignition source impacts with considerable extra energy in the form of a shock wave. Hence, an unconfined hydrogen-air mixture will burn rather than explode. If the hydrogen gas is not ignited upon impact, but a vapor cloud drifts from the ruptured tank toward the control room, the hydrogen concentration inside 'the control 3

room would be 1.0 g/m which would be 1.2% by volume in the control room air mixture. This amount of increase of H2 (1.2% by volume) will result in reducing the oxygen concentration from 20.9% to 19.7% by volume. Since 18% oxygen concentration in the air.is the minimum recommended for working without special

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breathing equipment (Ref. 8), no hazard is exnected to th'e control tJom personnel.'

Nitrogen, N2 at 250 Psi and 77 K, is stored in a 140,000 ft3 capacity tank, 73 meters west of the control room air intake. In the event of storage tank failure, assuming a continuous release under the worst meteorological condition, che N2 concentration reaching the control room air intake would be 20.1 g/m3 . The maximum N concentration in the control room would be 1.0 g/m3. This N2 con-2 centration (0.09% by volume) would result in reducing the amount of 02 in the control room from 20.9% to 20.8% by volume. Since 18% oxygen concentration in the air is the minir;um recommended for working without special breathing equipment (Ref. 8), no hazard is expected to the centrol room personnel, i

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i Sodium hypochlorite, Na0Cl at 15% concentration, is stored in 13 gallon plastic containers in the water treatment building 168 meters from the control room  !

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air intake. Sodium hypochlorite is considerably safer than liquid chlorine l because it is not under pressure and not as violently reactive as liquified  !

emental chlorine. However, Na0Cl may be hazardous due to the release of i l

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hypochlorous acid vapor when it reacts with water. .In the event of a storage container-faAlure, assuming the vapor pressure of hypochlorcus acid, HOC 1, is l

similar to t!.e vapor pressure of hcl and an ambient _ temperature of 25 C, the

~9 l con 7entration reaching the control room air intake would be 7.9 x 10 mg/m3 .

The toxicity limit of HOC 1 is not available, so it is, assumed to be similar to the toxicity limit of chlorine which is 45 mg/m3 (Ref. 9).- Therefore, a sodium hypochlorite storage container failure poses no hazard to the control room personnel.

Sulfuric acid, h SOf 2 at 100% concentration, is stored onsite in a 2^.000 gallon capacity tank in the water treatment building 168 meters east of the control room air intake. In the event of tank failure, assuming a continuous release under worst meteorological condition, the H SO4 2 concentration reaching the control room air intake would be 0.034 mg/m3 This is much less than the H SO4 2

toxicity limit of 2.0 mg/m3 (Ref. 9). Therefore, failure of the sulfuric acid storage tank poses no hazard to the control room personnel.

A summary of the onsite toxic chemical analysis is provided in Table 9.

3.4.2 Offsite Chemicals -

As shown in Table 2 and 3, large quantities of chemicals are transported on State Highway 2 and stored in the Erie Induatrial Park. The chemicals identified as potentially hazardous to the control room personnel are: '

Ammonia Naphtha l Carbon Dioxide Propane l Chlorine Tetrahydrofuron Formaldehyde Trichloroethylene Hydrogen Peroxide Toluene Methy-Ethyl Ketone Xylene spills involving these chemicals were analyzed as to there effect on the con-trol room personnel. For spills of chemicals stored at the Erie Industrial l

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A Park, the distance between the location of the spill and the control room  :

air intake was conservatively assumed to be 3 miles.

Chemical spills on State Highway 2 were assumed to occur at the closest point of the highway to the site structures, a distance of 870 meters. Table 10 i presents the analysis of the offsite chemical spills; each spill involves only one chemical.

For all the offsite chemical accidents, except formaldehyde,.the chemical con-centration reaching the control room air intake is less than the chemical toxicity limit, therefore would pose no hazard to the control room personnel.

t' In the event.of a formaldehyde accident on State Highway 2, the formaldehyde concentration was estimated to reach 25.0 mg/m3 at the control room air intake which would exceed of formaldehyde toxicity limit of 12.0 mg/m3 (Ref. 9).

Appendix A discusses the postulated formaldehyde accident and presents procedures that would enable the control room to remain habitable during the accident.

3.5 Restricted Lake Areas The use of the Restricted Lake Areas in the vicinity of the Davis-Be;se station,

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as discussed in Section 2.7, was analyzed for its potential to effect the safe l operation of the power station.

The small arms ff"ing from Camp Perry is at a distance of five miles from the i Davis-Besse station and the nearest boundary of the impact area (Area I, shown on Figure 6) is 1.8 miles. There is no possibility of small arms fire i

reaching the station.

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The 40 mm antiaircraf t firing area at Camp Perry is 4.5 miles from the Davis-Besse station and the nearest boundary of the rapact area is 1.5 miles.

The firing fans used at Camp Perry further limit the possible impact area and increases the distance of possible impact frem the station. (Ref.1) .

The projectiles used carry destruct charges and fuses to prevent surface impact of intact projectiles. These destruct charges limit the maximum. range of an intact projectile to approximately two-thirde of the minimum distance from the ,

firing area to the station location. (Ref. 1)

The outside firing area at the Erie Industrial Park that is used by Ares  :

Incorporated is four miles fra the Davis-Besse station and the nearest boundary of the impact area (Areas II) is 1.5 miles. The firing fan for firing of all ,

ordinance is limited to a 10 azimuthal sector, 5 east and west of north.

(Ref. 1) ,

The limited amount of firing, type of ordinance used, type of firing, and the administrative controls associated with this firing makes the probability of a projectile impact in the immediate area of the station negligibly small.

It was cor.cluded that the use of the Restricted Lake Areas pose no hazard to the safe operation of the plant or to the personnel in the control room. g e

3.6 Intake Structure 3.6.1 Collision The statiqn cooling water intake structura and errangement is shown on Figure 7.

The depth of unter where this structure is located and low projection above lake bottom precludes any significant damage to the structure from the type I

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of boating using the water areas in the vicinity. (Ref. 1) ,

The distance of the normal shipping lanes from the station site and the dis-tance to deep water available for ships of any size precludes any effect on the station or the. station cooling water intake structure from accidents ,

involving ships or barges (Ref. 1).

3.6.2 Liquid Spills Accidental spills of oil or other materials incident with the boating activities  ;

can'have no effect on the structure or the water drawn into 'the station through the structure (Ref. 1).  ;

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3.7.~ Equations Used in the Analysis

1. The diffusion equation for u instantaneous (puff) ground level release is:

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• 4=i.,9ar..g,(...,I,x-,9'.i.v.s<().

. .p where:

= unit concentration at coordinates x, y, z from

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the center of the puff, m ex '#y: = standard deviations of the gas concentration in the horizontal alongwind, horizontal crosswind, and vertical crosswind directions, respectively (assume ox " 'y)' "

7.87 = 2 1/2 w3 /2 3

o = initial standard deviation of the puff, m f

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- 1/3

= where Q is the puff release quantity, 7

7.87Xo ,

g and Xo is the density of the gas at standard conditions, g/m .

x.y,z = distance from the puff center in the horizontal alongvind, horizontal crosswind, and vertical cross- ,

wind directions, respectively, m.

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2. For liquified gases and low boiling point liquids, the heat ba?.nce in the instantaneous puff formation assuming an adiabatic change is given by:

My = Mg C p (T,-Tb) (Ref. 10) where:

M = t tal initial mass the liquid (g) t C = heat capacity of the liquid (cal /g C)

, T, = ambient temperature ( C)

T = n rmal boiling point of the liquid ( C) <T, b

My = mass of the instantaneously vaporized liquid (g)

Hy = heat of vaporization of the liquid (cal /g)

3. The equation for the TNT energy equivalent, Q, of a fuel tank ,

explosion is.

UNW Q = "2000 (Ref.11 )

where:

Q = TNT equivalent yield (1b)

AH = heat of combustion (Btu /lb) r W = weight of fuel oil to be evaluated (1b) a = empirical factor The U.S. Bureau of Mines advises using a=0.1 as a safe upper limit for an explosion whenever the characteristics are not known. '

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4. For explosive chemicals, the radius to peak incident pressure l of 1 psi is:

R = 45 W 1/3 (Ref. 12) 18.. ..

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s where:

, R = distance which can generate a reak incident over-pressure of 1 psi (ft)

' W = equivalent mas's of TNT (Ib)

5. The equation for the buoyancy flux, F, of a hot source is:

F= ~~1 *

• O (Ref.13 )

, wC H al se p . .

where:

QH =

eat em ssion (cal /sec)

. C = specified he t of air at constant pressure p

0 = ambient density T = source temperature

6. The equation for the height of the plume centerline, ah, of a buoyant plume before final rise is:

Ah = 1.6F x /u (Ref.13 )

where:

. F = buoyancy flux x = distance u = wind speed

7. The equation for the distance of the final plume rise is:

Xf = 3.5 (34 F 2/5) (Ref. 13)

F = buoyancy flux of a hot source, for i

4 F > 55 m /53 ,.

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8. The equation for estimating the surface area, A(t), of a spill is:

- 1/2'l A(t) = w I1 ) I r, +2t (Ref.10 )

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where: '

r, = initial radius of spil1 (m) 3 V, = volume of the spill (cm ) = w(r,)3 f 3

o g = density of the liquid or gas (g/cm )

a = density of air (g/cm )

t = time (sec)

9. The diffusion equation for the concentration, x, of a continuous ground level release is:

O (Ref.14 )

x. "8 y z" Exp 1 (f)z _

where: ,

Q = release rate (g/s) f a ,o = standard deviations in horizontal and vertical directions (m) u = wind speed (m/s) i H = effective height (m) t

10. The rate of total heat transfer, in cal /sec, of the remaining  ;

i' liquid after instantaneous flashing is given by the following equation: ,

h=A(t) gr+hc (T,-Tb)+1M(TE b)/t (Ref.10 )

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e * .

i where: ,

qr = solar and atmospheric radiation fluxes (cal /m2-sec) l he= heat transfer coefficient (cal /m -sec 'C)

T,= ambient temperature ( C) i

, Tb = boiling point ( C)

T = gr und temperature ( C) ,

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t = time (sec) l

11. The equation for calculated atmospheric radiation flux, qg , is:

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.- gg =o SB (C1 + 0~0263 VpH2O)

(T,+ 273) (Ref. 10) where:  !

qg = atmospheric radiation flux (cal /m sec) i e

SB

= Stefan-Boltzmann constant = 1.355 x 10 -8 2

cal /m sec O4 K i t

T,= ambient temperature ( C)

C = 0.735 for Ta > 34# ;  !

y pH2 O = vapor pressure of water (mber) I

12. The heat flux, q , due to forced convection of air ovir the spill:

c qc =he (T,-Tb) (Ref. 10) where:

he is the heat transfer coefficient (cal /m sec - 'C)

I r

The ? transfer coefficient of air blowing over a flat surface ,

i has been computed for a mean air temperature of 210C. The com- l l

21

l putation was based on the following heat transfer equation:

l i

0.3 k C h = (constant) g (L u o)0.6 (k a u) where:

k = thermal conductivity of air at T, (cal /cm see C)

L = characteristic length (m) u = wind velocity (m/sec) u = viscosity of air (g/cm sec)

C, = heat capacity of air (cal /g C) o = density of air (g/cm ) '

The computed values of h are tabulated for several assumed wind velocities (Ref. 9 ) . The value extrapolated for the wind velocity of 1 m/sec is 1.6 cal /m2 see C.

13. The evaporation of a liquid in an open space with wind or in a confined area with good ventilation can be described as a mars transfer process by forced convection.

The evaporation rate may be calculated by the following formulas:

(dm y /dt) = hd M A(t) (P,-P,)/R (T,+273) (Ref. 10) where, for a laminar flow h

d = 0.664 f (Re) ! (Sc)[

i l

[

t and for a turbulent flow h (Sc) d = 0.037 f (Re)

{

i l

i Re = Reynold number = L u p/u '

Sc = Schmidt number = p/Do i l

, hd = mass trans er c efficient (cm/sec)

o.

• R = universal gas constant g

D = diffusion coefficient (cm /sec) u = wind speed (cm/sec) o = density of air (g/cm )

L = characteristic length (cm) l u = viscosity of air (g/cm see)

M = molecular weight of the liquid (g/ mole)

P, = saturation vapor pressure of the liquid at temperature T, (mm H3)

.P, = actual vapor pressure of the liquid in air (mm Hg)

For water, P, way be computed from the relative humidity L i

For other liquids, P, would normally be zero. ,

14 The equation for calculating the diffusivities in gases is: ,

D = p/o (cm /s) (Ref. 15)  ;

where:

p = viscosity of gas (g/cm-s)  ;

o = density of gas (g/cm3) i

15. The equation for calculating the viscosity of a gas is:

2.7 M1/2 T3/2 (Ref. 16)

V

! (T+1.47 Tb ) '

b where: j M = molecular weight (g/ mole) l l T = ambient temperature ( K)  !

l Tb = boiling temperature ( K)  !

2 Vb = m lar volume (cm fg ,og )

Yb

• M/D1b i

l 23 . - l

L ,

where:

olb = liquid density at the boiling point.

I s

16. The equation for the dilution fattor T, of air taken into the control room air intake is:

~#

F = 1-exp (Ref.10 )

. r.

where:

W = air flow rate into control room (m3/sec)

Vr = control volume (m3)

~

r = cime durat' ion (sec)

4.0 CONCLUSION

It is concluded that the industrial, transportation, and military facilities in the site area vill not adversely effect safe operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Chanicals stored on the power plant site pose no hazard to the control room personnel. Chemicals stored and trensported in the site vicinity (within 5 miles of the power plant) also pose no hazard to the control room personnel.

e r

i l

I

, l 24 .

~ - .. ,- . , , - _ , - - , - - - , , , , - , . , , - - - - - - - , .- a-- . , -

REFERENCES

'l. Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Final Safety Analysis Report, Toledo Edison- Company,1973.

2. Bradley, G.A., Intra-company memorandum to T. Meyers, Toledo Edison Company,

Subject:

Additional Information Required from TECo for TMI Action  ;

Plan Item III, D.3.4 Control Room Habitability Requirements. January 16, 1981.

3. Regulatory Guide 1.70, Section 2.2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 1978.

4. Bradley, G.A., Intra-company memorandum to T. Meyers, Toledo Edison Company, February 25, 1981, Subj ect: Information Required from TECo for TMI Action Plan Item III, D.3.4 Control Room Habitability Requirements,  ;

February 26, 1981.  :

5. Perri, Joyce (GPD), personal communication to George Bradley, Toledo Edison i Company, March 3, 1981.

6. Danielson, J.A., Air Pollution Engineering Manual, U.S. Department of HEW,

. 1967.

7. " Handling Hazardous Materials," Technology Survey, Technology Utilization Division, NASA, Washington, DC.

8. Safety Gram, Air Products and Chemical Inc., Gaseous Nitrogen, Septriber 1963, Na 33-C.

9. Regulatory Guide 1.78, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1974 F

10. Wing, J., Toxic Vapor Concentrations in the Control Room Following a (

Postulated Accidental Release, U.S. N;: clear Regulatory Commission,  !

NUREG-0570, 1979. [

11. Brasie, W.C., and D.W. Simpson, " Guidelines for Estimating Damage Explosion,"  :

American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Chemical Engineering Process, 1968.

I

12. Regulator: Guide 1.91, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1978.

13. Briggs, G.A., Plume Rise, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, July 1968.

14. Stade, U.H., Meteorology and Atomic Energy, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,1968. ,

15. Treygal, R.E., Mass-Transfer Operatings, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968.

16. Perry, R.H., and C. H. Chilton, Chemical Engineers Handbook, 5th edition, i 1973. l I

17. Perri, Joyce (GPD) personal communication to Gene Mercer, Office of l Aviation Policy and Plans, Federal Aviation Administration, 202-426-3103, l February 27, 1981.

l

~_ ,

-__-as--_..mmua.um._ -

_ - %y -, , .. e%.g,._.w.._, , . ..y,, *, __, y p., ._,, . pew. -. 9,w,

18. Perri, Joyce (GFD) personal communicatioc to Thomas Henry, Offico of Aviation Policy and Plans, Federal Aviation Administration 202-426-3103, i March 2, 1981.

19. Perri, Joyce (GPD) personal communication to Robert Duclos,~ Office of Statistics and Forecasting, Department of Policy, Planning and Programming, Air Administration, Transport Cananda, 513-996-0836, March 4, 1981.

20. Bradley, G.A. Intra-company memorandum to T. Meyers, Toledo Edison Company,

Subject:

Toxic Chemicals, December 5, 1980.

21. Hazardous Chemical Data, CHRIS, Department of Transportation, Coast Guard, October 1978.

22. Steam /Its Generation and Use, Babcock & Wilcox, 1975.

23. Official Transportation Map of Ohio, Ohio Department of Transportation, 1979.

24. Official Transportation Map of Michigan, Michigan Department of Transportation, 1980-1931.

., , n- ,,, ,--. - -, -e n - -

TABLE 1 AIRPORTS WITHIN 50 MILES Approximate Operations Distance From

. Airport City in 1979 Site (miles)

Put-In-Bay South Bass Island, 5,230 15 OH Carl R. Keller Field Port Clinton, OH 44,432 13 Griffing-Sandusky Sandusky, OH 56,000 '26 ,

Huron' County Norwalk, OH 13,332 37 Lorain County S. Amherst, OH 81,400 45 i Flyria City Elyria, OH. 4,880 53 i Wyandot County Upper Sandusky, OH 12,780 48 Se'neca County Tiffin, OH 30,4'40 33 Progress Fremont, OH 32,300 18 Fosteria Metropolitan Fostoria, OH 1,884 32 Wood County Bowling Green, OH 14,920 30 -

Toledo Express Toledo, OH 110,822 38  :

Metcalf Field Toledo, OH 75,986 20 Wagan Wheel Lambertville, MI 34,650 25  ;

Custer- Monroe, MI 60,750 28 Lenawee County Adrian, MI 42,137 50 ,

Al Myers Tecumseh, MI 20,000 50 Ann Arbor Municiple Ann Arbor, MI 131,100 53 Willow Run Ypsilanti, MI 203,000 45 Detroit Metropolitan Detroit, MI 285,445 40 ,

Crosse Ile Municiple Grosse Ile, MI 56,760 35  !

Detroit. City Detroit, MI 204,855 55 ,

Windsor Windsor, Ontario 79,325 45 Sources: References 17, 18, 19, 23 and 24 i

f L

i  !

j s -

i

TABLE 2 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTED ON ROUTE 2 h

Hazardous Material Volume (gallons) Frequence of Transports Gasoline 8600 1-2 per day

" 2 per day 8500 i

" 4 per week 8400

" 3 per week 8500

" 6 per month 8400 Fuel oil or gasoline 8500 5-6 per day Fuel oil 7200 1-2 per day ,

7200 2 per day

" 1-6 per day

• 8000  ;

" 3 per month 8000 Propane 3200 1 per day  :

25-100# cylinders 1 per day I w/23.6# of propane  ;

Chemicals:

Sulfur 3000 1 per day Resin glue 4500 1 per day Foundry core oil 4500 1 per day Sulfuric acid 3000 1 per day Naptha 7000 2 per day Methyl ethyl ketone 6500 2 per week Xylene 65,000 2 per week Formaldehyde 6500 2 per week  ;

" 48,000 lb 2 per week  :

i when Davis-Besse is shut down Source: Reference 2 l i

i

4 0

. TABLE 3 CHEMICALS STORED AT THE ERIE IND?fGTRIAL PARK Chemical User Chemical Storage Volume Park Management Chlorine 6-150#.cylinderal Hydrogen peroxide 24,000 gallons 2 Uniroyal Industrial Products Naphtha 150 gallons

" " " Toluene 150 gallons

" " " 111 Trichlorinethylene 150 gallons

" " " Ammonia 2500 pounds 3 Formaldehyde 2500 pounds3-Uniroyal Industrial Plastics Methyl Ethyl Ketone 5000 gallons

" " " Toluene 1800 gallons

" " " Xylene 1800 gallons Tetrahydrofuran 1200 gallans Carbon Dioxide -

12,000 gallons

! I for park water treatment

, located in 6 underground, explosion proof, bunkers (the bunker dimensions are 42' 8" x 27' 2" 4

with a surface area of 1005 ft2 and a bunker volume of 9875 ft3) 3

! stored in 55 gallon drums Source: References 4 and 20 I

J .

l i- . . . . . _ . _ - - - . . . . . _ - . - . . .-. , . , . , - , _ , , - - - , . . - - . -. - -

. \ '..

e .

AIRPORTS WITHIN 50 MILES (Key for Figure' f 3 )

1. Put-In-Bay

2. Carl R. Keller Field

3. Griffing-Sandusky 4 Huron County

5. Lorain County

6. Elyria City 6

7. Wyandot County

8. Seneca County

9. Progress

10. Fostoria Metropolitan

11. Wood County i i

12. Toledo Express  !

13. Metcalf Field

, 14. Wagan Wheel

15. Custer

16. Lenawee County  :

17. Al Myers  ;

18. Ann Arbor Municiple

19. Willow Run

20. Detroit Metropolitan

21. Grosse Ile Municiple

22. Detroit City -

23. Windsor  !

i Source: Referencen 23 and 24 '

i i

l f

e I

i

o TABLE 4 .

CHEMICALS STORED ONSITE Chemical Quantity Containers Location -Concentration Ammonia 12 5 gal plastic Uater Treatment 35%

, 12 5 pt glass Chlorine 12 150 IL. cylinder Water Treatment Gaseous C12 1 30 ton cank car 300 yd north of Caseous C12-turbine b1dg.

CO 152 20 lb Various* 100%

2 100 Various* 100%

2 150 Various* 100%

Dry Resins 300 ft 3 5 ft 3 Warehouse - -

(not flammable)

Hydrogen 30 100 cu ft bottle West of turbine -

building 1 50,000 cu ft North of turbine -

building Hypochlorire Solution 12 13 gal plastic Sewage and Water 15I Treatment Lube Oil 10 55 gal drums Turbine building -

storage roon Nitrogen 6 75,000 cu ft West of turbine ' -

bottle building 1 140,000 cu ft By borated water tank -

tank No. 2 Fuel Oil / Diesel 1 100,000 gal tank NNW of control room -

2 20,000 gal tank Underground NW of cont rol room

4 TABLE 4 (Contd.) .

CHEMICALS STORED ONSITE Chemical Quantity Containers Location- Concentration Propane 6 1 pt metal Water Treatment flam -

locker Sodium Hydroxide 50 50 lb bags Water Treatment 100% (Flake) 16,000 gal Storage tank 20%

Sulfuric Acid 20,000 gal Storage took Water Treatment 100%

• Fire extinguishers throughout the plant Source: Reference 2 4

i.

l b .

,-,e,,w, --- - ,,m- w -ww +-v ,,--e v e .,-,-e- ---, , w ~-,,,-,--r s v- ,-- ,y - - - - - , - , , - -

,,w,,, w - --n. ---

TABLE 5 CHDf1CALS STORED ONSITE IN DIE DAVIS-BESSE MCM WAREHOUSE

• l QTY UNIT SIZE DESCRIPTION 30 Tube - 2.8 fl. Rubber Compound 30 -

Tube 12 oz. Rubber Compound 30 Tube 12 oz. Rubber Compount 24 QT 1-st. Glue L-41-A 15 GL. Jackson Grey 6 E.cb Tourch Kit 6 Each Tank for Tourch Kit 12 CN Cleaner 12 EA 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 'EA 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite -

12 '

BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Lo'cktite 12 BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 BT 1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 12 BT-1-FL. oz. Adhesive Locktite 4 QT P.V.C. Cement 2 CAN Copalite Cement 24 BT-4-FL. oz. Contact Cement 12 Tube 12-oz. RTV-106 i 4 CN-1-gy PVC Solvent 4 PT 1-Pint PVC Thinner 12 CN 12-oz. Belt Dressing Spray 6 TB-12 oz. Permatex No. 2 12 CN 12-oz. Metal Protector 12 CN 12-oz. Preservative  ;

5 EA 6-oz. Sealent Locktite 5 EA 6-oz. Sealant Locktite 5 EA 6-oz. Sealant Locktite l 10 CN-12-oz. Sealant Adhesive 10 CN-12-oz. Sealant Adhesive 10 -

CN - 5 Gallon Lapping Vehicle No. 317 -

l 4 GL Clearner/ Wax 12 CN 12-oz. Cleaner Dylek i l

12 CN 12-oz. Cleaner 24 CN 12-oz. Cleaner Electric Motor 24 CN 12-oz.

~

Cleaner Radeon Hand 10 QT Cleaner Vitro Sheen 1 ' Gallon Cleaner Swish 36 CN-12-oz. Cleaner Window 2 . Gallon Cleaner Window l Cleaner Spraytex 6 CN 12-oz.

1 DR. 55-gal. Compound Electro Quick 12 CN-12-oz. Spray Deodorant

-. _- - . _ . - - , ,--___-,-..,.%,_,,,.,m_.,-_ _

,m,, *..,...,wm,m.. , .-,

TABLE 5 (Contd.)

CHEMICAI.S STORED ONSITE IN THE DAVIS-BESSE HCM WAREHOUSE

• i

?

UNIT SIZE DESCRIPTION QTY t 4 CN-12-oz. Metal Polish  ;

12 -

CN-12-oz. CRC-226 12 CN-12-oz. Ticks off 12 CN-12-oz. Raid Insect 12 CN-12-oz. Wasp Stopper .

4 DR. 55 gal. Stop Check cleaner 24 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint l 48 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 48 .CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 48 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 48 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 48 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 48 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 48 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint

. 48 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 48 , CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 48 CN-12 oz. Spray Paint 12 CN-20 oz. Rust Proofing Flex ,

10 GL Amercote ,

10 GL Amercote 2 CN 5 gal. Plastic Carbo 2 CN 5-gal Plastomeric Carbo 4 GL Primer l 4 GL Reducer 48 GL Thinner 10 GL Thinner 12 TB 12 oz. Grease Med.

6 EA Exon EP1 8 EA Mobile #28 ,

6 TB Grease DC 41 2 EA Grease Yearway 2 TB Grease D50H47 2 PL-5 gal. Grease Beacon 325 ,

5 PL-5-gal. Grease Crown #1 . l PL-5-gal. Grease Lubcote #3 l 5 PL-5 gal. Grease Gulf 2  !

5 -

5 PL-5 sal. Grease Gulf EP-2 24 TB Grease Crown SPEC I '

5 PL 5 gal. Grease Crown EP-1 Grease Supreme 2 l 5 PL 5 gal.  !

5 PL 5 gal. Grease Precision 1 PL 5 gal. Grease High Temp  !

5 i 5 'PL 5 gal. Grease Chevron 5 PL.5 as1. Grease Preceision 2 l

10 .TN-1-qt. Grease Silicone 12 GL 011 4 GL 011 ,

4 DR 55 gal. Oil l

l I

i

TABLE 5 scontd.)

CHDfICALS STORED ONSITE IN DIE DAVIS-BESSE MCM WAREHOUSE

• QTY UNIT SIZE DESCRIPTION 1

4 CN 011 4 --

GL 011 4 GL Oil 1 PL 5 gal. Oil 30 011 10 DR 55 gal. Oil 1 DR 55 gal. Oil 1 DR - 55 gal. Oil 48 QT 011 48 'QT' 011 4 CN 5 gal. Oil 4 4 CN 5 gal. Oil 4 CN 5 gal. Oil 4 CN 5 gal. Oil 4 CN 5 gal. Oil 5 -

CN 5 gal. Oil 5 CN 5 gal. Oil 2 DR 55 gal. Oil 20 DR 55 gal. Oil 30 CN 5 gal. Oil 2 DR 55 gal. Oil 2 DR 55 gal. Oil 2 DR 55 gal. Oil 2 DR 55 gal. Oil 2 DR 55 gal. Oil 2 DR 55 sal. Oil 2 CN 5-gal. Oil 10 DR 55 gal. Oil 2 GL Oil 2 GL Alcohol 2 DR 55 gal. Solvent 55 GL Solvent 5 GL Solvent 4 02 Compound Electrical 24 CH 12-oz. Fluid Spray Starting 50 -

EA 12-oz. Ether 30 CN 12-oz. Moly Cote 12 TB 12-os. Moly Cote 48 CH-12 oz. LPS #2 48 CH-12 oz. LPS #3 24 73 8-oz. DC55M 12 TB 8-oz. Silicone 12 'CN-12 oz. UCON Spray 24 CN-12 oz. Moly Cote GN Nuclear 24 .CF-12 oz. Silicone Spray i 24 CN-12 oz. Hyperlube 12 FT Neolube #2 l l

50 LB DC-200 i

l I

l 3

-, --s - ,--,--..,-+-.----,--.--,e-, , --

l

. 1 TABLE 5 (Centd.)

l CHEMICALS STORED ONSITE IN THE DAVIS-BESSE M"M WAREHOUSE

• 1 UNIT SIZE DESCRIPTION QTY 6 TB-10-oz. Lubricant 50 LB Lubricant 5 PL 5 gal. Lubricant 2 CN 5 gal. Lubricant 2 CN 5 gal. Lubricant i 12 TB 8 oz. Lubricant 12 CN.12-oz. Lubricant 12 CN 12-0s. Penetrating 011 5 DR 20 gal. Bisulfate 10 DR 20 gal. Nalco Liquid 250 PL 6 as1. Resin 120 PL 6 sal. Resin 250 PL 6 gal. Resin 24 CN 12 oz. Cleaner 24 . .Q( 12 oz. Developer ,

24 CN 12 oz. Chroatec 10 CN Fluid Silicone 15 GL Anti Foam 12 CN-12 oz. Penetrant SKL.

The Davis-Besse MCM Warehouse is located approximately mile east of a reactor building. ,

Souce: Reference 4 5

J 4

. 4

TABLE 6 CHEMICAL EXPLOSIONS

• Equivalent Weight Distance From the Accident Site Distance From of TNT et which a Peak Overpressure of Chemical Quantity Control Room (pounds) I psi would occur (meters)

Onsite:

.' Hydrogen 50,000 ft 128 meters 6.32 x 10 2

ggg offsite:

Casoline 8600 gal 870 meters 4.92 x 10 503 4

Naphtha 7000 gal 870 meters 4.57 x 10 490 Propane 3200 gal 870 meters 6.75 x 10 3 259 Natu g1 1926 lbs 3 miles 2.17 x 103 178 The natural gas pipeline (approximately 1 mile of 4 inch diameter pipe at a pressure of 1250 psig) at the Erie Industrial Park,

~

i .

i l

J ._ _ .._ . . . _ . . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . , . . - . . _ _ _ , , _ _ _ . - . - , . - -.. .- - . . _ _ _ , _ . . _ .

TABLE 7

• OFFSITE CHEMICAL FIRES Distance from Burning

• Heating

• Wind Speed required Quantity Control Room Air Rate Value to bend the hot plume .

Chemical (gallons) Intake (in/hr) (Btu /lb) to the control room (m/s)

Casoline 8600 870 meters 9.0 18,720 77.7 Methyl-ethyl Ketone 6500 870 meters 9.7 13,490 71.7 5000 3 miles 9.7 13,480 123.4 Naphtha 7000 870 meters 9.4 18,200 82.4 150 3 miles 9.4 18,200 86.0 a

from: Hazardous Chemical Data, CHRIS, Department of Transportar ion, Coast Guard, October 1978.

Ase.mpt>ns used in Analysis:

! - spill radius of 5 meters

- height of control room air intake equal to 21 meters 1

j o

1

TABLE 8 ONSITE CHEMICAL FIRE

~

Cas Concentration TL:fcity

' at the Control Lint:

011 Fire

• Cas Generated Room Air Intake (Reg. Cuide 1.78)

Case 1: oil fire CO 1.4 mg/m 57.0 mg/m 3 restricted to oil SO 2

2.06 mg/m3 13.0 mg/m3 tank NO 5.0 mg/m3 asphyxiant 2

Case 2: oil spills CO 2.3 mg/m3 57.0 mg/m 3 into dike surrounding 502 3.4 mg/m3 13.0 ng/m 4

the tank and is NO 2

8.4 mg/m3 asphyxiant i ignited -

Assumptions used in the analysis:

j - 011 burning rate of 9.4 in/hr (Ref.21)

- Oil heating value of 19,430 Btu /lb (Ref;22)

I - 011 tank diameter of 27 feet 3 inches 4

- Tank dike diameter of 40 feet 1

- Distance between oil tank and control room air intake equal to 137 maters -

l

- Stability D meteorology 1 .

i 5

i i

i

TABLE 9 Ort!TE soIIC OtDIICALS MAIDOi CAS CONCENTRATION AT THE CONTROL RotM AIR INTAKE Distance from Control Toxicity Maximien Concentration Assumptione used I Chemical Quantity Room Air Intabe Limit at Control Room Air intake in flee Analyste 4 Asmonia 5 gal 168 meters 35 mg/m 3'

31.5 mg/m 3* a, e, f 188 3 (35I concentration)

Nydrogee 50,000 ft 128 meters MA 1.0 m/s a, c, e 18 2 (9 STF) j Nitrogen 14,000 ft 73 meters NA 1.0 g/m b, c, f N (0 -320 F. 250 poi) 2

~

Sodium Nypochlorite 13 sal 168 meters 45 as/n 7.9 x 10 ' an/a e, c f Na0C1 (151 concentration) 3 3 Sulfuric Acid 20,000 gal 168 meters 2 mg/m .G34 as/m b, d, f . ,

t N SO (100% concentration) 2 4 ,

Asemptions j a) Meteorology - Stability F, wind speed = 1.5 m/s b) Meteorology - Stability A, wind speed = 1.5 m/s

! c) Ambient temperature 25*C l d) Ambient Emperature 408C i

e) instantaneous puff release f) Continuous ground level release MA - Defined as sopbyxistes in Regulatory Guide 1.78 j

• Af ter dilution in the control room air intake system i

4 s

l 4

a .-,

,-- ., . , - ,.,_ , . - - . - ,g-,- _ , _ _ . ,a_,,_,_y , .-.. , y y- , y - - . , , ,, ,_ .,- ,,_, --. ,. , , , _ . _ . _ . _ _. .

t e

TAgt2 10 OFFSITE T0XIC OIDlICA1.3 MAXIM 91 CAS CONCENTRATION AT liiE CDMTROL ROOH AIR INTAgE Distance From Control Maximum Concentration Assumptions used Chemical Quantity Room Air intake Toxicity Limit 2 at Control Room Air Intake in the analysisI Asumonta 55 gal. drum 3 elles 35 mg/m 3 2.1 m3/m 3

a, c e, f lat) (351 concentration)

Carbon Dioulde '

12,000 lbe 3 miles 18.4 g/m3

• 4.75 g/m 3 a, d. e, f Cn 3 (9 0 F, 306 psi)

Chlorine 110 lb cyclinder 3 miles 45 mg/m3 ' 17.91 mg/m a. d,'e. f C1 IO 05 P*I) 2 Formaldehyde 6500 gal 870 meters 12 mg/m3 ' 25.0 mg/m 3 a, c e, f, a HCHO (371 concentration) 55 gal drum 3 miles 0.22 mg/m3 a, c. e, f i

(500 lba)

Hydrogen Peroxide 4000 gal 3 miles l'4. mg/m 3 0.09 og/m H0 a, c e, f 22 (90% concentration)

, Methyl-sthyl Ketone 5000 gal 3 miles 590 mg/m 3 19.2 mg/m 3 a, c e, f CHo4g 6500 gal 870 meters 100.0 mg/s.3 a, c. e, f itsythe 150 gal 3 miles 2000 mg/m 3

1.5 mg/m a, c. e, f 7000 gal 870 meters 180.0 mg/m3 a, c. e. f Propane 3200 gal 870 meters 1.8 g/m 1.5 g/m 3 CH (9 124.3 psi) b,d.e,f 3g Tetrahydrofuron 1200 gal 3 miles 590 mg/m 3 2.65 mg/m 3

CH O a, c, e, f i G2 (CH I22 2 Trichloroethylene 150 gal 3 elles 535 mg/m 3 1.0 mg/m 3 C HC1 a, c, e, f 2 3 Toluene 1800 gal 3 miles 750 mg/m 3 14.4 mg/m 3 a, c, e, f C6 "5 C"3 Xylene 1800 gal 3 miles 435 mg/m 3.8 mg/m 3 a, e, e, f C6 "4 IEI 3 65.000 gal 870 meter,s 241.9 ag/m 3 a, c, e, f I

Aasiseptions used in analysis

a. Ambient temperature of 25'C e.

b. Ambient temperature of 600F When the chemical spills on the ground, all the chemical

c. Continuous ground level release involves in war.rization

d. The combination of the instantaneous puff release and

f. Meteorology - htah111ty F. wind speed = 1.5 m/s 3 Horizontal plume meander

{

the continuous release of the remaining liquid .

Toxicity Limits from: Danielson, J. A., Air Pollution Engineering Manual. U.S. Dept. of HEW. 1967 or I

• Regulatory Guide 1.78. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission. June 1974.

i S.__.____. ., _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . , _ , - __ _ _ .- _ _ _ _ _ __. _

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l APPENDIX A j l

FORMALDEHYDE ACCIDENT'

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Formaldehyde, HOCH at 37% concentration, is transported on State Highway 2 in 6500 gallon capacity trucks. A formaldehyde truck accident is assumed to take place at the closest point of State High ay 2 to the Davis-Besse site structures, a ' distance of 870 meters from the control room air intake. The accident is assumed to take place under stable atmospheric conditions (Stability F, vind speed o.f 1.5 m/s).

During the postulated accident, the entire contents of the truck spills out onto the ground (maximum spill radius of 27.98 meters) and is vaporized at a rate of 721.3 g/s. At this emission rate, it would take 9 minutes 40 seconds for the first formaldehyde vapor to reach the control room air intake and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 25 minutes to vaporize all the liquid formaldehyde. The maximum formaldehyde concentration outside the centrol room air intake during the formaldehyde accident would be 25 mg/m3 J The toxicity limit of HOCH is 12 mg/m (Ref. A-1). This is reached inside the a r*.rol room approximately 8.5 minutes af ter the forn<;dehyde vapor reaches the control room air Intake (assuming 4560 cfm of outside air entering the

, control room). Sxnce release from the spill can last 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> 25 minutes, the HOCH concentration will continu? to build up over the toxicity level uniass it is reduced by some method.

Formaldehyde has an odor threshold value of 1 ppm (Ref. A-2) which is much lower 4

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3 than '.the HOCH toxicity limit of 9.8 ppm (12 mg/m ) . . Therefore, either through human (operators) or mechanical detectors, if a high concentration of formalde-

' hyde is detected, then the control room intake o'f outside air can be stoppc4 completely using the existing isolation dampers. A 25 cfm inleakage of con -

taminated air is assumed after the dampers are closed (Ref. A-3). Assuming all 3

outside air is'at a maximu= HOCH concentration of 35 mg/m , it would take 25.8

-3 hours'to reach the HOCH toxicity limit of 12 =g/m in the control roo: under an inleakage rate of 25 cfm. Since the HOCH concentration in the outside air will be'25 mg/m3for a maximum of only.10.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, the control room would remain-habitable during the accident.

Since non-toxic concentrations of' formaldehyde are easily detected, the control room can remain habitable during a formaldehyde accident by closing the isola-tion dampers and isolating the control room for the duration of the accidental release. During the postulated accident, the first formaldehyde vapors will reach the control room in approximately 9 minutes and 40 seconds. Conservative r

analysis shows that the toxic limit will be reached in 18 minutes and 10 seconds. The time difference, 8 minutes and 30 seconds, between first vapors and toxic limits allow for operator action to close isolation dampers. Station procedures are being modified to direct operators'to isolate the control room ,

ventilation system in the event chemical contaminant is detected in the control i

room atmosphere.

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' REFERENCES A-1 Regulator Guide 1.78, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission, June 1974. l A-2 Cross, Frank L. , Jr. , Air-Pollution Odor Control Primer, Technomic Publithing Company, Inc...Westport, Conn. 1973, p.-73.

.A-3 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit l' Final Safety Analysis Report, Toledo. Edison Company, 1973, Section 15.4.8.

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