ML120690589

Initial Exam 2012-301 Draft SRO Written Exam

ML120690589
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	03/08/2012
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
Gerald Laska
Shared Package
ML120550268	List: ML120690513 ML120690589 ML120690593
References
50-327/12-301, 50-328/12-301
Download: ML120690589 (76)

Text

76. 008 G2.4.18 076 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit I has just experienced a Rx Trip and SI due to a failed open PORV.

- The crew has entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

- The operating crew is unable to close the PORV block valve.

- Pressurizer level indicates off-scale high.

- CCPIT Flow indicates 100 gpm.

- Containment pressure is 0.3 psig

- RCS pressure is 1150 psig and lowering.

- The SRO directs a transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?

The initiation of an Appendix to establish Hydrogen Mitigation Actions will first be implemented (1) and the RCPs will be tripped to (2) w Av by a step in E-0 prevent excessive depletion of RCS inventory through the break B. by a step in E-0 prevent damage to RCPs operating in a highly voided system C. by a step in E-1 prevent excessive depletion of RCS inventory through the break D. by a step in E-1 prevent damage to RCPs operating in a highly voided system Wednesday, November 23, 201111:40:48 AM 76

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRD Exam DISTRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Correct, In accordance with EPM-3, at step 10 of E-0, contingency actions, the crew is directed to perform ES-0. 5, Appendix D for the conditions as stated in the stem. This is done prior to checking the Hydrogen concentration in containment.

This is acceptable since the igniters will be turned on early in the event to preclude hydrogen buildup in containment due to the ongoing steam space LOCA. (stuck open PORV). This action is to preclude a Hydrogen burn in containment that may challenge containment integrity, due to Hydrogen being released from the RCS.

Also for conditions of a LOCA with no subcooling present, the RCPs are tripped to conserve inventory in the RCS.

B. Incorrect, Plausible since the first part is correct. Also plausible since candidate could confuse the reason for tripping the RCPs with the action done for LOCAs during conditions when the RCS is in a highly voided condition, such as FR-C. 2, however as indicated in EPM-3-E-0, for small break LOCAs the RCPs are tripped to conserve inventory.

C. Incorrect, Plausible since this action was previously performed in E-1 after a LOCA had been confirmed and a transition to E-1 had been made, however it has been determined that an ice condenser plant could be susceptable to CNMT integrity challenges due to the hydrogen from the RCS being released into CNMT, thus the hydrogen igniters are to be turned on immediately upon recognizing a stuck open PZR PORV or Safety. Also the second portion is correct.

D. Incorrect, Plausible since this action was previously performed in E-1 after a LOCA had been confirmed and a transition to E-1 had been made. Also plausible since candidate could confuse the reason for tripping the RCPs with the action done for LOCAs during conditions when the RCS is in a highly voided condition, such as FR-C2, however as indicated in EPM-3-E-0, for small break LOCAs the RCPs are tripped to conserve inventory.

Wednesday, November 23, 201111:40:48 AM 77

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 76 Tier: 1 Group 1 KIA: 008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident G2.4.18 Knowledge of specific bases for EOPs.

Importance Rating: 3.3 / 4.0 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 /43.1 /45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 1 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates knowlege of the basis in EOPs for the use of Hydrogen igniters during Steam Space LOCAs (stuck open PORV). It also tests the candidates knowledge of the basis for tripping the RCPs in this condition. SRO due to testing specific basis of EOPs. The EOPs and basis are part of the operating licensing documents for the plant.

Technical

Reference:

EPM-3-E-0, Basis Document for E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 16 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271E-0, obj. 5 OPL271E-1, obj 9 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN Bank question used on the 2008 NRC exam.

Changes have been made to question and distractors to increase plausibility.

Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Wednesday, November 23, 201111:40:48 AM 78

77. 011 EA2.01 377 Given the following plant conditions:

- A Reactor Trip and Safety Injection have occurred on Unit 1.

- All RCPs have been secured.

- While performing actions of E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, a transition to FR-C.1, Inadequate Core Cooling, has been made.

- The crew has just completed depressurizing the SGs to 100 psig and have isolated the Cold Leg Accumulators.

- Current conditions are:

- RVLIS Lower Range 38% and slowly lowering.

- Core Exit T/Cs are 820°F and slowly rising.

- All SG5 levels are between 25% and 39%.

Which ONE of the following describes the NEXT evolution to be performed to mitigate the cooling challenge?

A Depressurize all SGs to atmospheric pressure to allow the RHR pumps to refill the RCS.

B. Open all available PZR PORVs to depressurize the RCS to allow RHR pumps to refill the RCS.

C. Immediately start one RCP in an available loop to force two-phase flow through the SG without first establishing support conditions.

D. Establish support conditions and then start one RCP in an available loop to force two-phase flow through the SG to support RCS depressurization.

Wednesday, November 23, 201111:47:36 AM 77

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Correct, In accordance with FR-C. 1, after the SGs are depressurized to 100 psi to allow the CLAs to inject and with the CETCs still above 700°F the direction is to ensure the RCPs are off and then depressurize the SGs to atmospheric pressure to further reduce RCS pressure to allow the ECCS flow into the RCS and reflood the core.

B. Incorrect, Plausible since this is the action given to depressurize the RCS when you are performing the actions of FR-P. 1 to minimize the effect of PTS. The candidate could get this direction confused with the continued use of the SGs to depressurize the RCS and re-establish core cooling.

C. Incorrect, Plausible if candidate determines that since the action of injecting the CLAs were not successful then immediate action to start RCPs would be needed and followed the direction given if the CETCs are at 1200°F following the action of depressurization of the intact SGs to atmospheric pressure.

D. Incorrect, Plausible if candidate determines that since that they would need to verify the normal support conditions are needed to be established prior to starting the RCP and that RCP start would be appropriate action following isolating the CLAs.

Wednesday, November 23, 201111:47:36 AM 78

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 77 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 011 Large Break LOCA EA 2.01 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:

Actions to be taken based on RCS Temperature and pressure saturated and superheated.

Importance Rating: 4.2 I 4.7 10 CFR Part 55: N/A IOCFR55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: The question matches the K/A by testing the candidates ability to analyze plant conditions, RCS temperature and pressure, and determine the correct actions to take that will mitigate large break LOCA event. SRO level by testing the candidates ability to assess plant conditions and select appropriate procedures to mitigate the event.

Technical

Reference:

CSFSTs Core Cooling F.02 E-1, FR-C.1 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271E-1, obj 12 0PL271 FR-0, obj 5, 6 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: WBN 2009 SRO question that has had the stem reworded to clarify the plant conditions and answers restructured for clarity, and to make plant specific.

Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: WATTS BAR Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Wednesday, November 23, 201111:47:36 AM 79

78. 025 AA2.04 078 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 2 is in MODE 4 cooling down on RHR.

- RCS Temperature is 225° F and stable.

- RCS pressure is 320 psig and lowering.

- Pressurizer level is 22% and lowering.

- Containment pressure 0.1 psig and stable.

- 0-RM-90-l 01 B, AUX BLDG VENT RADMON TOTAL GAS, is trending higher.

- SG NR levels are stable at:- SG#1 - 32%

SG#2 - 30%

SG#3 - 33%

SG#4 - 34%

Which ONE of the following identifies..

(1) a leak location resulting in the conditions and (2) the lowest leakage rate that when exceeded would meet the requirements for an declaration in accordance with EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classifcation Matrix for the above leakage?

A (1) a flange leak on the suction of an RHR pump (2) logpm B. (1) a Charging pump suction relief is stuck OPEN (2) logpm C. (1) a flange leak on the suction of an RHR pump (2) 25 gpm D. (1) a Charging pump suction relief is stuck OPEN (2) 25 gpm Wednesday, November 23, 2011 11:55:36 AM 78

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct, For the conditions listed, RHR would be in service and rising indications on RM-90-IOIB would indicate that a flange leak has developed which is outside of containment. This leak is also considered unidentified since it is not being contained and collected in a tank. Also, the RCS leakrate that first meets the criteria of EPIP-1 criteria 2.5 for an NOUE is 10 gpm of unidentified leakage.

B. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that a leaking charging pump suction relief will show up as increasing counts on Aux Bldg Vent Rad monitor, however the suction reliefs discharge to the PRT which is inside CNMT. This leakage would be considered identified leakage. Also the second part is correct.

C. Incorrect, Plausible since the first part is correct. Also the second part is plausible since 25 gpm for identified leakage is the minimum EPIP-1 criteria for an NOUE; however this is the threshold value Identified leakage not unidentified.

D. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that a leaking charging pump suction relief will show up as increasing counts on Aux Bldg Vent Rad monitor, however the suction reliefs discharge to the PRT which is inside CNMT. This leakage is considered identified leakage. Also the second part is plausible since 25 gpm indentified leakage is the minImum EPIP-1 criteria for an NOUE.

Wednesday, November 23, 201111:55:36 AM 79

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 78 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHR)

AA2.04 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss Residual Heat Removal System:

Location and isolability of leaks.

Importance Rating: 3.3 / 3.6 10 CFR Part 55: N/A IOCFR55.43.b: 5 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates knowledge of the indications of and/or locations of RHR system leaks. And SRO level by testing the candidates knowledge of the criteria for EPIP declarations.

Technical

Reference:

AOP-R.02, Shutdown LOCA, Revision 12 AOP-R.05, RCS Leak and Leak Source Identification, Revision 14 EPIP-1 rev 43 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.02, obj 6 OPL271AOP-R.05, obj 0PL271 REP, obj 3 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Bank question modified from a Cook 2008 NRC Exam Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: DC COOK Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Wednesday, November 23, 201111:55:36 AM 80

79. 056 AG2.4.18 079 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit I is at 99% power.

- Diesel Generator 1 B-B is out of service for a scheduled component outage.

- The reactor trips, and subsequently, a loss of offsite power occurs.

- The crew transitions to FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, due to a RED path, and is performing the first step.

- A fault on Shutdown Board lA-A results in the emergency supply breaker from Diesel Generator lA-A tripping.

Which of the following identifies (I) the required action(s) and (2) the basis for the action(s)?

A. (1) Transition to ECA-0 .0, Loss of All AC Power, (2) because the ECA will direct actions to establish a heat sink with the TDAFW pump.

B. (1) Remain in FR-H.1, to recover and establish a heat sink with the TDAFW pump, (2) because restoring heat sink is the highest priority evolution in progress.

C (1) Transition to ECA-0 .0, Loss of All AC Power.

(2) because all other procedures in the EOP network assume a minimum of at least one 6.9kv Shutdown Board is available.

D. (1) Remain in FR-H.1 and initiate EA-202-4, Emergency Use of 6900 v Shutdown Utility Bus, to energize Shutdown Board I B-B (2) because restoring heat sink is the highest priority evolution in progress.

Wednesday, November 23, 2011 12:20:21 PM 79

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DIS TRA CTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, The transition to ECA-O.O is the correct action and the ECA will direct actions ensuring the TD AFW pump is in service but the reason is not because the ECA establishes the heat sink. Plausible because the transition is correct and ECA will direct actions to place the TD AFW pump in service and establish a heat sink.

B. Incorrect, Remaining is FR-H. I is not correct; a transition to ECA-O.O is required.

Plausible because other ECAs do not take precedence over the FRGs and with a RED path there is a severe challenge to the Heat Sink function that would be addressed if the required heat sink could be established with the TD AFW pump.

C. Correct, The transition to ECA-O. 0 is the correct action and the reason is because all other procedures, including FR-H. I, assume a minimum of at least one train of shutdown power is available.

D. Incorrect, Remaining is FR-H. I is not correct; a transition to ECA-0.0 is required.

Plausible because power could be restored to the lB-B board using the maintenance breaker as directed by EA-202-4 and restoring Heat Sink is critical safety function being challenged.

Wednesday, November 23, 2011 12:20:21 PM 80

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 79 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: 056 Loss of Offsite Power AG2.4.18 Knowledge of specific bases for EOPs.

Importance Rating: 3.3 I 4.0 10 CFR Part 55: N/A IOCFR55.43.b: 1 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates knowledge of specific bases for EOP ECA-0.0. SRO level by having the candidate select the appropriate procedure to implement and the reason for selecting that procedure.

Technical

Reference:

EPM-4 User Guide EPM-3-ECA-0.0, Basis Document for Loss of All AC Power, Rev 10 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: 0PL271 ECA-0.0 obj. 5 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Bank question that has been modified from the 2007 VC Summer NRC exam.

Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SQN Date: 1201 Last2NRC?:

Wednesday, November23, 2011 12:20:21 PM 81

80. 065 AA2.08 080 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is in MODE 4 following a Refuel Outage.

- ABGTS Train B is tagged for heater bank inspection.

- Fuel movement is in progress in the Spent Fuel Pool.

- Annunciator PS-32-104 TRAIN A AUX CONTROL AIR PRESSURE LOW (1-M-15) alarms.

- AUO reports the Train A Aux air is isolated from control air, Train A Aux Air Compressor is running and the Train A header is 67 psig and slowly lowering.

Which ONE of the following identifies the action required per Unit I Technical Specifications regarding the status of ABGTS?

A. ABGTS Train A remains OPERABLE until the Train A Containment Air Isolation valve automatically closes, at which time LCO 3.0.3 entry would NOT be required.

B. ABGTS Train A remains OPERABLE until the Train A Containment Air Isolation valve automatically closes, at which time LCO 3.0.3 entry would be required.

C. Both ABGTS Trains would be INOPERABLE with the current conditions.

LCO 3.0.3 entry would NOT be required.

D Both ABGTS Trains would be INOPERABLE with the current conditions.

LCO 3.0.3 entry would be required.

Wednesday, November23, 2011 12:59:03 PM 80

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, per the AR! for the alarm identified in the stem (and AOP-M.2, Loss of Control Air) if the air pressure is less than 70 psig then control air is inoperable (and it is not covered by a T/S of its own.) The ABGTS is one the systems affected by the loss of air. Thus, the Train A ABG TS must be declared Inoperable. The Train A Containment Air Isolation valve automatically closing is plausible due to it occurring at a pressure setting air on decreasing air pressure. The suspension of fuel movement is a required action in LCO -3.9.12 if no ABGTS train is operable making the distractor more plausible.

B. Incorrect, per the AR! for the alarm identified in the stem (and AOP-M.2, Loss of Control Air) if the air pressure is less than 70 psig then control air is inoperable (and it is not covered by a T/S of its own.) The ABGTS is one the systems affected by the loss of air. Thus, the Train A ABGTS must be declared Inoperable. The Train A Containment Air Isolation valve automatically closing is plausible due to it occurring at a pressure setting air on decreasing air pressure. The suspension of fuel movement is a required action in LCO -3.9.12 if no ABGTS train is operable making the distractor more plausible and the distractor also has the correct application of LCO 3.0.3 as required by LCO -3.7.8 due to being in Mode 4.

C. Incorrect, Both trains of ABGTS are Inoperable (B- tagged and A-due to low air pressure as identified in the AR! and in AOP-M.2, Loss of Control Air). Plausible if the candidate remembers that LCO-3.0.3 is identified as not being applicable in LCO 3.9.12 which is applicable due to the movement of irradiated fuel in the storage pool, but does not remember LCO 3.7.8 is also applicable due to the plant being in Mode 4. LCO 3.0.3 is applicable for not meeting 3.7.8 and not having an identified action statement that can be applied.

D. Correct, Both trains of ABGTS are Inoperable (B- tagged and A-due to low air pressure, <7Opsig, as identified in the ARI and in AOP-M.2, Loss of Control Air)

LCO 3.9.12 is applicable due to having irradiated fuel in the pit and requires the movement of irradiated fuel in the storage pool to be stopped. While not applicable for LCO 3.9.12, LCO 3.0.3 is applicable for not meeting 3.7.8 due to not having an identified action statement that can be applied.

Wednesday, November 23, 2011 12:59:03 PM 81

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 80 Tier: 1 Group 1 KIA: 065 Loss of Instrument Air AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:

Cause and effect of low-pressure instrument air alarm Importance Rating: 2.9 / 3.2 10 CFR Part 55: 43.5 / 45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 K/A Match: KA is matched because the question requires ability to understand the effect of a loss of air on the ABGTS system operability status and required Tech Spec actions. Question requires the knowledge of when the air system can not support the systems that require air and the application of 2 Technical Specifications for ABGTS. Plant Systems LCO 3.7.8 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System and Refueling Operations LCO 3.9.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System.

Technical

Reference:

1-AR-Mi 5-B (A-4)

AOP-M.2, Loss of Control AirPlant Systems T/S 3.7.8, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment T/S 3.9.12, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPT200.ABGTS obj. ii OPL271AOP-M.02 obj 6 & 8 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN bank question from SQN NRC EXAM 1/2008 Comments:

Wednesday, November 23, 201112:59:03 PM 82

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Source: BANK Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1/2008 Last 2 NRC?: NO Wednesday, November 23, 2011 12:59:03 PM 83

81. W/E04 G2.4.6 081 Given the following plant conditions:

- The Unit 1 crew enters ECA-1 .2, LOCA Outside Containment.

- When ECA-1 .2 is complete the following conditions exist:

- CNMT pressure is 0.1 psig and stable.

- RWST level is 70% and dropping.

- RCS subcooling is 0°F.

- RCS pressure is 800 psig and dropping.

- RVLIS is 42% and slowly rising.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

Upon completion of ECA-1 .2, the crew will transition to (1)

The Emergency Plan Classification for this event is a(n) (2)

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. (1) E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (2) Site Area Emergency B. (1) ECA-1 .1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation (2) Alert C. (1) E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (2) Alert D (1) ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation (2) Site Area Emergency Wednesday, November 23, 2011 1:1 5:08 PM 81

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible because ensuring RHR is isolated first is correct and if the RCS pressure had been rising instead of lowering, the correct transition would be to E1.

Also the second part is correct.

B. Incorrect, Plausible since EPM-3-ECA-1.2 identifies a rupture or break outside containment is most probable to occur in the Low pressure RHR System piping.

With the RCS pressure dropping, the break has not been isolated and the procedure will direct a transition to ECA-1. 1. Also plausible if the candidate misses the Loss of Containment 1.3.2 due to missing the criteria of no changing CNMT parameters then they would choose an Alert based on Loss of RCS barrier.

C. Incorrect, Plausible because sequentially isolating the RHR cold leg injection paths is performed in the procedure but after the RHR suction is isolated and if the RCS pressure had been rising, the correct transition would be to E-1. Also plausible if the candidate misses the Loss of Containment 1.3.2 due to missing the criteria of no changing CNMT parameters then they would choose an Alert based on Loss of RCS barrier.

D. Correct, EPM-3-ECA-1.2 identifies a rupture or break outside containment is most probable to occur in the Low pressure RHR System piping. With the RCS pressure dropping, the break has not been isolated and the correct procedure transition would be to ECA-1. 1. Also with a LOCA is progress and no change in CNMT pressure or sump level it is a Loss of Containment Barrier 1.3.2 and with a RCS leak which results < 40°F subcooling, that would be a Loss of RCS Barrier 1.2.2.

With the Loss of 2 Barriers a Site Area Emergency would be declared.

Wednesday, November 23, 20111:15:08 PM 82

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 81 Tier: 1 Group 1 K/A: W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment G 2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

Importance Rating: 3.7 / 4.7 IOCFRPart55: 41.10/43.5/45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 5 KIA Match: KA is matched because the question requires knowledge of the mitigation strategies of the procedure for responding to a LOCA outside containment and the ability to assess conditions and make the correct transition from the procedure. Also SRO due to assessing plant conditions and selection of appropriate procedure to miitgate the event and the EPIP classification of this event.

Technical

Reference:

ECA-1 .2, LOCA Outside Containment, Revision 10 EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Matrix, rev 43 Proposed references EPIP-1 Classification Matrix pg 9 & 10 to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271ECA-2.1 obj 5 & 7 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN bank exam question which has been rewritten to include EPIP classificaiton of the event.

Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Wednesday, November 23, 2011 1:1 5:08 PM 83

82. 028 AG2.4.11 082 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit I is operating at 25% power.

- I-XS-68-339E, LEVEL CONTROL CHANNEL SELECTOR, is in the LI-68-339 & 335 position.

- AOP-l.1 1, Eagle 21 Malfunction, was implemented due to a failure of an LCP in Eagle Rack 5.

- The crew is performing actions using AOP-l.04, Pressurizer Instrument Control Malfunctions, due to the resulting failure of pressurizer level transmitter 1 -LT-68-335.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

Actions to hard trip the 1-LT-68-335 bistable should be (1) an Eagle system reset is attempted.

The maximum time allowed to hard trip the bistable is (2) hours.

A. (1) completed before (2) 6 B. (1) completed before (2)4 C (1) delayed until after (2)6 D. (1) delayed until after (2) 4 Wednesday, November 23, 20111:20:51 PM 82

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRA CTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible because hard tripping the bistables and attempting an Eagle reset are actions in the AOl but in this distractor, the order is reversed and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is a time in Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 that instrument bistables can be placed to bypass for suiveillance testing.

B. Incorrect, Plausible because hard tripping the bistables and attempting an Eagle reset are actions in the AOl but in this distractor, the order is reversed and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is the time required by in Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 to have the instrument bistables tripped.

C. Correct, AOP-l.04 has a note stating If performing AOP in conjunction with A OP-I. 11 for an Eagle LCP failure, then actions to hard trip bistables should be delayed until Eagle system reset is attempted. Also the action to hard trip bistables must be completed within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> in accordance with Tech Spec 3.3.1.1.

D. Incorrect, Plausible because delaying the action to hard trip bistables until an Eagle reset is attempted is correct and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is a time in Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 that instrument bistables can be placed to bypass for surveillance testing.

Wednesday, November 23, 20111:20:51 PM 83

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 82 Tier: 1 Group 2 KIA: 028 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction AG2.4.1 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

Importance Rating: 4.0 I 4.2 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10/43.5/45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 KIA Match: KA is matched because the question requires knowledge of an abnormal operating procedure that is used in response to a pressurizer level control malfunction and is SRO because it requires knowledge of how Tech Spec actions would be implemented in conjuction with other steps in the procedure as well as the time requiremetns for the Tech Spec actions.

Technical

Reference:

AOP-l.11, Eagle 21 Malfunction, Revision 10 AOP-l.04, Pressurizer Instrument and Control Malfunctions, Revision 9 Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Amendment 304 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-I.04 obj. 3 & 8 Question Source:

New Modified Bank X Bank Question History:

Comments:

Source: BANK MOD Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Wednesday, November 23, 20111:20:51 PM 84

83. 068 AG2.4.7 183 Given the following:

0500 - Conditions required the Unit 2 Main Control Room (MCR) to be abandoned.

0501 - The reactor is TRIPPED.

0505 - All MCR actions of AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary Control Room, were completed and the crew has established control in the Auxiliary Control Room.

0515 - Tech Spec 3.0.3 is entered.

0730 - The crew initiates a natural circulation cooldown and the following SG pressure trends are observed:

Time SG Pressures 0730 - 1040 psig 0750 - 825 psig 0810 - 565 psig 0830 - 385 psig 0850 - 365 psig Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

The RCS Tech Spec limit (1) been violated.

The latest time allowed by Tech Specs to place the unit in Mode 5 is at (2) the next day.

A(1) has (2) 1215 B. (1) has (2) 1815 C. (1) has NOT (2) 1215 D. (1) has NOT (2) 1815 Wednesday, November 23, 20111 :43:01 PM 83

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DIS TRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Correct, The reactor coolant pumps are shutdown leaving the RCS cooldown to be trended by the SG pressure instruments. The data indicates the 100°F! hour cooldown rate was violated at 0830 as Tcold dropped from 55 1°F to 444°F and since the plant is afready in Mode 3, the plant must be in Mode 5 within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

B. Incorrect, Plausible because a violation of the cooldown rate did occur at 0830 and 1815 would have been the correct time if the plant had been in Mode I when 3.0.3 was entered because there would be 6 additional hours to get to Mode 3.

C. Incorrect, Plausible because the cooldown rate not being violated could be concluded if an error was made in determining the temperatures and!or time periods and also because 1215 is the correct time the plant is required to be in Mode 5 due to 3.0.3 being entered.

D. Incorrect, Plausible because the cooldown rate not being violated could be concluded if an error was made in determining the temperatures and!or time periods and also 1815 would have been the correct time required for Mode 5 if the plant had been in Mode I when 3.0.3 was entered because there would be 6 additional hours to get to Mode 3.

Wednesday, November 23, 20111:43:01 PM 84

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 83 Tier: 1 Group 2 KIA: 068 Control Room Evacuation AG2.4.7 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

Importance Rating: 4.2 / 4.2 IOCFRPart55: 41.10/43.5/45.12 IOCFR55.43.b: 5 KIA Match: KA is matched because the question requires knowledge of how an RCS cooldown is trended using Auxiliary Contol Room indications when the RCP are not available and is SRO because it requires knowledge of Tech spec action time requirements after LCO 3.0.3 is entered.

Technical

Reference:

AOP-C.04, Shutdown From Auxiliary Control Room, Revision 18 Proposed references Steam Tables to be provided:

Learning Objective: 0PL271-C.04 obj. 5,9, 11 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN question for 068 AG2.4.7 used on the SQN 1/2009 exam.

Comments:

Source: BANK MOD Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Wednesday, November 23, 2011 1:43:01 PM 85

84. 076 AG2.2.40 084 Given the following:

- Unit 1 is in Mode 3 with the RCS at normal operating pressure and temperature.

- 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> ago, RCS Activity was determined to be 0.38 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

- Chemistry now reports that the RCS Activity has been on a continuous slow increase and is now 0.43 microcuries/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

- The crew begins reducing RCS Tavg in accordance with a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Tech Spec Action statement.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

RCS Tavg will first be less than the required temperature when it is reduced to below (1)

The basis for the RCS Tavg reduction is to limit doses at the site boundary in the event of a (2)

A. (1) 500°F (2) LOCA in conjunction with 0.25La leakage from containment B(1) 500°F (2) SGTR in conjunction with steady state SG tube leakage of 1 gpm C. (1) 350°F (2) LOCA in conjunction with 0.25La leakage from containment D. (1) 350°F (2) SGTR in conjunction with steady state SG tube leakage of 1 gpm Wednesday, November 23, 20111:54:23 PM 84

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect, reducing Tavg below 500°F is correct but the basis is not due to a LOCA with assumed containment leakage. Plausible because the action stated js correct and a LOCA with leakage from containment could cause elevated doses at the site boundary.

B. Correct, with the activity above the 0.35 microcuries/gram limit in the Tech Spec 3.4.8 for 48 continuous hours, Tavg is required to be reduced to less than 500°F within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> in accordance with the Tech Spec. The T/S bases states that reducing Tavg below 500°F prevents the release of activity should a steam generator tube rupture since the saturation pressure of the primary coolant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves. The limit on activity is based on the resulting 2-hour doses at the site boundary not exceeding a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 limits following a SGTR in conjunction with an assumed steady state SG tube leak of I gpm.

C. Incorrect, reducing Tavg below 350°F is not correct and the basis is not due to a LOCA with assumed containment leakage. Plausible because lowering Tavg to 350°F would mean changing to Mode 4 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (which is a directed action in many T/S) and a LOCA with leakage from containment could cause elevated doses at the site boundary.

D. Incorrect, reducing Tavg below 350°F is not correct but the basis is being to limit doses in the event of a SG TR is correct. Plausible because lowering Tavg to 350°F would mean changing to Mode 4 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (which is a directed action in many T/S) and the bases is to limit doses at the site boundary during SGTR accident.

Wednesday, November 23, 20111:54:23 PM 85

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 84 Tier: 1 Group 2 KIA: 076 High Reactor Coolant Activity AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity:

Corrective actions required for high fission product activity in RCS Importance Rating: 2.8 / 3.4 IOCFRPart55: 43.5/45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 KIA Match: KA is matched because the question requires knowledge of the requried action when Tech Spec limits for Reactor Coolant activity are exceeded and is SRO because of the knowledge of the bases for the required action as well as the required action.

Technical

Reference:

Technical Specifications 3.4.8 and Bases, Amendments 301 and 305.

Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.06 obj. 7 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN 1/2009 exam question with formatting changed.

Comments:

Source: BANK MOD Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1/2009 Last 2 NRC?: NO Wednesday, November 23, 20111 :54:23 PM 86

85. W/E10 EA2.2 085 Given the following plant conditions;

- Unit 2 tripped, with a subsequent loss of the RCPs.

- ES-O.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, is in progress.

- The Shift Manager has determined the cooldown should proceed as quickly as possible due to low CST inventory.

Which ONE of the following completes the statement below?

The crew will (1) and the maximum allowed RCS cooldown rate is (2)

Note:

ES-O.3 Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in the Vessel (with RVLIS)

A. continue with ES-O.2 50°F B. continue with ES-0.2 100°F C transition to ES-0.3 100°F D. transition to ES-0.3 200°F Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:24:28 AM 85

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DIS TRA CTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible if the applicant does not remember a transition point to ES-0.3 due to need for cooldown due to low CST inventory and cooldown rate limits for the procedures. Cooldown limit of 50°F/hr is the maximum cooldown limit on natural circulation however, ES-0.3 allows up to 100°F/hr B. Incorrect, Plausible if the applicant does not remember a transition point to ES-0.3 due to need for coo/down due to low CST inventory and coo/down rate limits for the procedures. Coo/down limit of 50 °F/hr is the maximum coo/down limit on natural circulation while implementing ES-0.2, however ES-0.3 allows up to 100 °F/hr.

C. Correct. The SM decision to proceed as quickly as possible due to a condition such as CST inventory requires a decisison to made about which procedure to transition to, ES-0. 3 or ES-0. 4. Given the conditions in the stem there is no reason to believe that RVLIS is not available thus a transition to ES-0.3 would be the correct transition. Also ES-0.3 limits coo/down to 100°F/hr while monitoring the for a possible steam bubble in the Reactor Vessel head that may develop while cooling down.

D. Incorrect, Plausible if the applicant does remember a transition point to ES-0. 3 due to SM decision to proceed as quickly as possible due to a condition such as CST inventory. Also the candidate may get the maximum coo/down rate of the RCS confused with the maximum coo/down rate of the PZR (200°F/hr) thus may think that the maximum allowed coo/down rate of the RCS during ES-0. 3 is limited to 200°F/hr instead of 100°F/hr.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:24:28 AM 86

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 85 Tier: 1 Group 2 KIA: W/E10 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in vessel with/without RVLIS):

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

Importance Rating: 3.4 / 3/9 10 CFR Part 55: N/A IOCFR55.43.b: 5 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by having the candidate determine the correct procedure to be implemented based on conditions in the stem and applying restrictions in the procedure that would prevent the plant from violating the cooldown limits in Tech Specs thus preventing a PTS failure of the reactor vessel.

Technical

Reference:

ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel (With RVLIS), Rev 13 ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, Rev 15 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271ESO.3 obj 5 & 6 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN bank Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1210 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:24:28 AM 87

86. 005 G2.2,25 186 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 2 is shutdown with RCS at 225°F.

- RCPs #2 and #4 are is service.

- RCPs #1 and #3 are unavailable and tagged.

- SIG Wide Range levels are: #1 #3 22% 8% 6% 17%

- Operators have aligned RHR pumps for decay heat removal.

Which ONE of the following identifies (1) the minimum number of RHR pumps LCO 3.4.1.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SHUTDOWN, currently requires to be operable and (2) the bases of the requirement?

w A. 1 to ensure sufficient circulation of the reactor coolant system to minimize the effects of a boron dilution accident.

B. 2 to ensure sufficient cirulation of the reactor coolant system to minimize the effects of a boron dilution accident.

C I to ensure sufficient heat removal is provided including single failure criteria.

D. 2 to ensure sufficient heat removal is provided including single failure criteria.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:38:30 AM 86

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible because only I RHR ioop being required to be operable is correct. Also plausible if the candidate confuses the basis for RHR loops OPERABLE and in operation during Modes 5 & 6 with the requirement for Mode 4 which for the purpose of the loops is to provide decay heat removal.

B. Incorrect, Plausible because a total of two loops are required to be OPERABLE and the condition could be misinterpreted as no RCS loops operable due to RCP and SG status (Mode 3 requires minimum level in the SG to be 25%). Also the candidate could confuse the basis for RHR loops OPERABLE and in operation during Modes 5 & 6 with the requirement for Mode 4 which for the purpose of the loops is to provide decay heat removal.

C. Correct, for current conditions LCO 3.4.1.3 requires at least two of the reactor coolant and/or residual heat removal (RHR) loops to be OPERABLE. An RCS loop consists of the loop, its associated steam generator (with WR level greater than or equal to 10%), and its reactor coolant pump. Only RCS loop 4 meets the requirement. So a minimum of one RHR loop is required to be operable. With the plant In MODE 4, a single reactor coolant loop or residual heat removal (RHR) loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE.

D. Incorrect, Plausible because a total of two loop are required to be operable and the condition could be misinterpreted as no RCS loop operable due to RCP and SG status (Mode 3 requires minimum level in the SG to be 25%). Also, because requiring an RHR Train to be operable because only one RCS operable loop exists is to meet single failure criteria.

43/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers. Single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODE 4, a single reactor coolant loop or residual heat removal (RHR) loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:38:30 AM 87

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 86 Tier: 2 Group 1 KIA: 005 Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

G2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Importance Rating: 3.2 I 4.2 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5/41.7 /43.2 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 K/A Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates knowledge of the Tech Spec bases for the required number of RHR loops while the unit is in Mode 4.

Technical

Reference:

Tech Spec 3/4.4.1.3 5/23/03 Tech Spec Bases 3/4.4.1 3/09/05 page 3/4 4-1 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPT200.RHR obj. 13 b Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:38:30 AM 88

87. 008 A2.01 087 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 and 2 are in MODE 1.

Tuesday 2200

- lA-A CCS pump is made inoperable after being removed from service in accordance with 1-SO-70-1 to be tagged for motor replacement.

Wednesday at 1000

- C-S CCS pump motor trips due to a bearing failure.

- AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water, is implemented.

- Unit 1 enters LCO 3.0.3 due to both Trains of CCS being INOPERABLE.

Wednesday at 1130

- The 2B-B pump is realigned to supply Train B CCS as directed by AOP-M.03.

Wednesday at 1330

- lA-A CCS pump is restored to operable status in accordance with 1-SO-70-1.

Which ONE of the following identifies...

(1) why the Train B ECCS pumps are required to be called inoperable on both units from 1000 to 1130 on Wednesday due to the trip of the C-S CCS pump and (2) the earliest time on Wednesday that Unit 1 can exit LCO 3.0.3?

A. (1) Because the pumps cannot fulfill the design function for sump recirculation.

(2) 1130 B (1) Because the pumps cannot fulfill the design function for sump recirculation.

(2) 1330 C. (1) Because the pumps cannot be operated with no CCS cooling water to their mechanical seal HXs.

(2) 1130 D. (1) Because the pumps cannot be operated with no CCS cooling water to their mechanical seal HXs.

(2) 1330 Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:55:00 AM 87

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible because the ECCS pumps being declared inoperable because they are not being able to fulfill the design function for sump recirculation is correct and because 1130 is when CCS cooling was restored Train B ECCS pumps on Unit

1. Restoring flow does not make Train B operable on Unit 1 because a Unit I SI signal will not start 28-B CCS pump.

B. Correct, the ECCS pumps being declared inoperable because they are not being able to fulfill the design function for sump recirculation is stated in AOP-M.03 and 1330 is correct because it is when one train of CCS became operable on Unit 1.

C. Incorrect, Plausible because the ECCS pumps have lost cooling to their mechanical sea/s (but AOP-M.03 states this cooling is not required) and because 1130 is when CCS cooling was restored Train B ECCS pumps on Unit 1. Restoring flow does not make Train B operable on Unit I because a Unit 1 SI signal will not start 2B-B CCS pump.

D. Incorrect, Plausible because the ECCS pumps have lost cooling to their mechanical seals (but AOP-M.03 states this coo/hg is not required) and because 1330 is correct for the LCO 3.0.3 exit.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:55:00 AM 88

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 87 Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: 008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Loss of CCW pump Importance Rating: 3.3 / 3.6 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 /43.5 / 45.3 /45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 2, 5 K/A Match: KA is matched because the question requires the ability to predict the impact of how component cooling water pump problems affect systems cooled by the component cooling water system and using procedures to realign the system affect the Tech Spec required actions associated with the failure. SRO by testing the candidates knowledge of Tech Spec basis for CCS system and application of the conditions and the requirements for application of LCO times.

Technical

Reference:

AOP-M.03, Loss of Component Cooling Water, Revision 14 Tech Spec 3/4.7.3, Component Cooling Water System, March 25,1982, Amendment 12 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-M.03, Obj. 8.

OPT200.TS-APP obj 1 Question Source:

New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: SQN bank question with the stem data rearranged and d istractors rearranged for psychometric flaws Comments:

Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:55:00 AM 89

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 8:55:00 AM 90

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam

88. 010 G2.1.7 088 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is performing a shutdown required by Tech Specs.

- Currently the plant is in Mode 3 with a cooldown in progress to Mode 5.

- The operators note RCS wide range pressure 1-PT-68-66 indicating 140 psig and slowly drifting downscale.

- RCS temperature trend as the cooldown continues:

Time Tcold 0900 - 358°F 0930 - 349°F 1000 - 345°F 1030 - 341°F 1100 - 339°F 1130 - 337°F 1200 - 335°F 1230 - 331°F 1300 - 329°F 1330 - 327°F 1400 - 326°F 1430 - 321°F Which ONE of the following correctly identifies...

(1) the latest of the listed times when the CCPs had to be aligned where only one was capable of injecting and (2) how the status of an inoperable PORV would affect the entry in to Mode 4?

Latest Time Mode 4 Entry A. 1330 PORV status required implementing 3.0.4.b B. 1430 PORV status required implementing 3.0.4.b Cv 1330 Mode 4 entry was NOT restricted by PORV status D. 1430 Mode 4 entry was NOT restricted by PORV status Sunday, November 27, 2011 4:31:47 PM 88

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DIS TRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible because 1330 is the latest listed time where only one CCP can be aligned to inject due to 4 hrs after going below 350°F and normally a mode cannot be entered unless the required actions provisions of 3.0.4 a., b., or c. are not met.

B. Incorrect, Plausible because 1430 would be the correct time if the RCS temperature had been maintained above 325°F during the time period and normally a mode cannot be entered unless the required actions provisions of 3.0.4 a., b., or

c. are not met.

C. Correct, The CCPs are required to be aligned where only one pump is capable of injecting within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of entering Mode 4 or before the RCS Tcold drops to less than 325°F, whichever occurs first and the Mode 4 entry is not restricted by the PORV being inoperable and stated in LCO 3.0.4.

D. Incorrect, Plausible because 1430 would be the correct time if the RCS temperature had been maintained above 325°F during the time period and the mode entry not being restricted is correct.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 4:31:47 PM 89

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 88 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control System G2.1 .7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

Importance Rating: 4.4 / 4.7 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5/43.5/45.12/45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 K/A Match: KA is matched because the question requires the ability to determine required time allowed to make plant alignments to meet Tech spec limitations on the pressurizet pressure control systems based on response of instrumentation to tjhen apply Tech Specs (3.0.4) related to entered a mode when required components inoperable.

Technical

Reference:

Tech Spec LCO 3/4.0, APPLICABILITY, October 4, 2006 Amendment 312 Tech Spec 3/4 4.12.LOW TEMPERATURE OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP) SYSTEM, November 9, 2004 Amendment 297 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective:

Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last2NRC?:

Sunday, November 27, 2011 4:31:47 PM 90

89. 026 A2.09 089 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit2isinModel.

- The SRO is preparing to Recirculate the RWST in accordance with 0-SO-72-1, Containment Spray Systems, Section 8.4 Recirculating RWST Via Containment Spray Pump B-B.

- The estimated general area dose rate in the El. 690 pipe chase during recirculation is 52 mr/hr.

- An AUO, in continuous communication with the control room, has gone to El. 690 Pipe chase and opened the Containment Spray pump recirculation line valves (72-502 & 72-504) to the RWST.

- The AUO is standing by to close the valves in case of a LOCA.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

LCO 3.6.2.1, Containment Spray Pump, action (1) required to be entered when the recirculation valves are opened.

The SRO will direct the AUO to (2) to ensure the isolation of the recirculation line valves if conditions require.

A. (1) is NOT (2) remain in the Pipe Chase B. (1) is NOT (2) leave the Pipe Chase but remain dressed out and in the area C. (1) is (2) remain in the Pipe Chase D(1) is (2) leave the Pipe Chase but remain dressed out and in the area Sunday, November 27, 2011 9:21:53 AM 89

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRA CTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible because a dedicated operator to close the valves has been designated and there are provisions in Tech spec where the use of a dedicated operator is allowed when manual actions are required to put equipment in its required state during an accident. Also, because when using a dedicated operator the operator is normally assigned to be at the location of the component.

B. Incorrect, Plausible because a dedicated operator to close the valves has been designated and there are provisions in Tech spec where the use of a dedicated operator is allowed when manual actions make be required to put equipment in its required state during an accident. Also, because leaving the pipe chase but remaining in the area, dressed out, and ready to operate the valves is allowed in the SO to reduce dose to the operator.

C. Incorrect, Plausible because the Tech spec being required to be entered while the recirculation line valves are open is correct and because when using a dedicated operator the operator is normally assigned to be at the location of the component.

D. Correct, The Tech spec is required to be entered while the recirculation line valves are open and to reduce the dose received by the operator, the AUO is allowed to leave the pipe chase but required to remain in the area, dressed out and ready to close the valves if directed.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 9:21:53AM 90

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 89 Tier: 2 Group 1 K/A: 026 Containment Spray System (CCS)

A2.09 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Radiation hazard potential of BWST (RWST)

Importance Rating: 2.5 I 2.9 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5, 43.5 10CFR5543.b: 4 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates knowledge of the effects of using the CCS pumps to recirc the RWST and how those increased rad levels would applied to site specific ALARA. SRO by having the candidate assess radiation hazards that may arise during abnormal situations (recircing the RWST with Cont Spray Pump)

Technical

Reference:

U2 Tech Specs, 0-SO-72-1, CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPT200.TS-APP obj 3 OPT200. CS obj 10 & 11 Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History:

Comments: SRO Sunday, November 27, 2011 9:21 :53 AM 91

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 9:21:53 AM 92

90. 062 G2.2.25 090 Concerning Tech Spec 3.8.1.2, A.C. SOURCES SHUTDOWN, which ONE of the following identifies both:

(1) a basis in Tech Specs for electrical distribution during shutdown and refueling conditions, and (2) the MINIMUM electrical power source combination that will satisfy Tech Spec?

A. (1) Ensures the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods of time.

(2) 1 A-A and 1 B-B diesel generator sets and one offsite transmission network to a shutdown board.

B. (1) Ensures sufficient power is available to safety related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the facility.

(2) lA-A and 2A-A diesel generator sets and one offsite transmission network to a shutdown board.

C. (1) Ensures sufficient power is available to safety related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the facility.

(2) lA-A and lB-B diesel generator sets and one offsite transmission network to a shutdown board.

D (1) Ensures the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods of time.

(2) lA-A and 2A-A diesel generator sets and one offsite transmission network to a shutdown board.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 9:33:51 AM 90

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DIS TRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible since 2 diesel sets listed, and both for Unit 1, however the two sets must be from the same train and at least one source of offsite power to a shutdown board is required. Also the basis listed is correct for shutdown power sources.

B. Incorrect, Plausible since 2 diesel sets from the same train are listed, however there must also be at least source of offsite power to a shutdown board. Also the basis is for AC power sources during normal operation not shutdown.

C. Incorrect, Plausible since there are 2 diesel sets listed and a source of power site power to a shutdown board, however the diesels must be of the same train not opposite trains. Also the basis is for AC systems operating not shutdown.

D. Correct, As listed in T.S 3.8.1.2, AC systems Shutdown, at least two emergency diesel sets must be operable from the same train and at least one source of offsite power to a shutdown board must be operable. Also a basis for the Tech Spec requirement for AC sources Shutdown, states that sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available monitoring and maintaining unit status.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 9:33:51 AM 91

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 90 Tier: 2 Group 1 KIA: 062 AC Electrical Distribution G 2.2.25 Knowledge of the basis in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Importance Rating: 3.2 I 4.2 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5/41.7/43.2 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for the AC Electrical Distribution system during Mode 5 conditions.

SRO by testing the candidates knowledge of Tech Spec basis for AC electrical system.

Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8.1.2 Electrical Power Systems Shutdown Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPT200.AC6.9KV obj. 13 b Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question written for 1201 NRC exam Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SQN Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 9:33:51 AM 92

91. 028 G2.2.40 191 Given the following:

- Unit I is at 100% power.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

The maximum number of igniters that can be inoperable without an action being required in accordance with LCO 3.6.4.3, Hydrogen Mitigation System, is (1)

In accordance with LCO 3.6.4.3, the minimum temperature the igniters must attain to be declared OPERABLE is (2)

L)

A. 1 1700°F B. 1 1400°F 0 2 1700°F D. 2 1400°F DISTRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate confuses the minimum requirement for the surveillance with the minimum for Tech Specs. The maximum number is I inoperable per Train for the surveillance and also the second part is correct the minimum temperature for the Hydrogen Igniter which is 1700°F to be considered operable.

B. Incorrect, Plausible because the maximum number is I inoperable per Train. Also plausible if the candidate gets confused with the minimum temperature for the Hydrogen Recombiner which is 1400°F as compared to the minimum required temperature for the Hydrogen Igniters which is 1700°F in containment Tech specs (example 3.6.5.3)

C. Correct, LCO 3.6.4.3 surveillance a. states that 66 of the 68 igniters are required to be operable, which would mean that 2 would be the maximum required number to enter the LCO. Also per the surveillance for an igniter to be considered operable it must attain a minumum temperature of 1700°F.

D. Incorrect, Plausible because 2 being the maximum number is correct, and also plausible if the candidate gets confused with the minimum temperature for the Hydrogen Recombiner which is 1400°F as compared to the minimum required temperature for the Hydrogen Igniters which is 1700°F in containment Tech specs (example 3.6.5.3)

Sunday, November27, 2011 9:57:15AM 91

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 91 Tier: 2 Group 2 KIA: 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System 2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

Importance Rating: 3.4 / 4.7 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.5 /45.3 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by having the applicant recall the required number of hydrogen igniters required by Tech Spec surveillance and the per the surveillnance the minimum temperature conditions required for the Igniters to be considered OPERABLE.

SRO by requiring knowledge of Tech Spec surveillances associated with Hydrogen Mitigation System.

Technical

Reference:

Technical Specifications, 3.6.4.3, Amendment 213 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPT 200.CGCS Obj 11 b Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAR Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 9:57:15 AM 92

92. 055 G2.1.19 092 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is at 100% power

- The Unit Supervisor enters AOP-R.01, Steam Generator Tube Leak, due to an identified primary to secondary leakage of 5 gpd.

- Appendix A, Radiation Monitor Trending Data, is being implemented with a trend established on lOS and values recorded every 15 minutes.

- Chemistry has provided the following data for correlation of cpm to gpd:

75 gpd = 354 cpm 50 gpd = 250 cpm 30 gpd = 166 cpm 5 gpd = 61 cpm

- The OATC reports that the data taken for rad monitor trending has increased to 300 cpm and appears to be stable.

Which ONE of the following identifies:

(1) the maximum amount of time allowed to shutdown the unit per AOP-R.01 and (2) the preferred radiation monitor used for leak rate monitoring.

Note:

1-RM-90-1 19 Condenser Vacuum Pump Exhaust Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-255 Unit I Condenser Vacuum Exhaust 0-GO-5, Normal Power Operation 0-GO-6, Power Reduction From 30% Reactor Power To Hot Standby AOP-C.03, Emergency Shutdown w

A. within 24 hrs. using 0-GO-5 1-RM-90-255 and 0-GO-6.

B. within 3 hrs. using AOP-C.03 1-RM-90-119 C within 24 hrs. using 0-GO-5 1 -RM-90-1 19 and 0-GO-6 D. within 3 hrs. using AOP-C.03 1-RM-90-255 Sunday, November27, 2011 10:29:19AM 92

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect. Plausible since in accordance with AOP-R.01, if the corrolated cpm/gpd is between 50 and 75 gpd then the unit is to be shutdown wihtin 24 hrs using the normal shutdown procedures. Also plausible if the candidate gets confused about which rad monitor would be used. However due to the detector sensitivity 1-RM-90-1 191s the monitor to use for leak rate monitoring during steam generator tube leak rate determinations. 1-RM-90-255A!B is a post-accident radiation monitor, and is specified in EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart as the radiation monitor used for determining potential radiation releases during an event.

B. Incorrect. Plausible if the candidate gets the guidance for Ieakrates> 75 gpd confused with guidance for leaks between 50 gpd and 75 gpd. If leakrate is >75 gpd then the unit is to be less than 50% power in 1 hr. and shutdown in 2 more hours (total of 3), and also plausible since the second part is correct.

C. Correct. Per AOP-R. 01, If the corrolated cpm/gpd is between 50 and 75 gpd then the unit is to be shutdown wthtin 24 hrs using the normal shutdown procedures.

Due to the detector sensitivity 1-RM-90-1 19 is the monitor to use for leak rate monitoring during steam generator tube leak rate determinations. 1-RM-90-255A/B is a post-accident radiation monitor, and is specified in EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart as the radiation monitor used for determining potential radiation releases during an event.

Plausible since the first part is correct. Also it is plausible to believe that the data provided by the trended radiation monitor, would also be qualified to use for classifying the event.

D. Incorrect. Plausible if the candidate gets the guidance for leakrates> 75 gpd confused with guidance for leaks between 50 gpd and 75 gpd. If leakrate is >75 gpd then the unit is to be less than 50% power in 1 hr. and shutdown in 2 more hours (total of 3). Also plausible if the candidate gets confused with the rad monitor used for Ieakrate determination since 1-RM-90-255A/B is a post-accident radiation monitor, and is specified in EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart as the radiation monitor used for determining potential radiation releases during an event.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 10:29:19AM 93

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 92 Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 055 Condenser Air Removal G2.1.19 Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.

Importance Rating: 3.9 I 3.8 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 / 45.12 IOCFR55.43.b: 4 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the applicants ability to monitor trends and evaluate data to determine correct guidance based on data input to plant computers and the applicants knowledge of the rad monitor used to determine the procedures to select. SRO level due to assessing plant conditions and selecting appropriate procedures to mitigate the event.

Technical

Reference:

EPIP-1, Table 7-1, Effluent Radiation Monitor EALs AOP-R.01, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK, Revision 28 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-R.01 obj 10 & 21 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: WBN bank question with equipment names changed for plant specific information and format changed.

Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 10:29:19AM 94

93. 079 A2.01 093 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 in Mode 3 with the RCS at normal operating temperature and pressure preparing for reactor startup.

- Alarm PS-32-104 TRAIN A AUX CONTROL AIR PRESS LOW (M15-B) is actuated.

- Control Air pressure indications are:

- P1-32-200 Control Air Header pressure is 65 psig and lowering.

- P1-32-104 Aux Bldg Control air header A pressure is 65 psig and lowering.

- P1-32-i 05 Aux Bldg Control air header B pressure is 82 psig and rising.

Which ONE of the following identifies both...

1) the direction given the AUO and

2) When reviewing Tech Specs in accordance with direction in AOP-M.02, Loss of Control Air, which train(s) of AFW will be INOPERABLE on Unit 1?

Note:

O-FCV-32-82, Aux. Compsr. A-A Aux. Bldg Iso!.

O-FCV-32-85, Aux. Compsr. B-B Aux. Bldg Iso!.

1-FCV-32-80, Unit I Train A Rx Bldg Iso!.

I-FCV-32-102, Unit I Train B Rx Bldg Iso!.

Direction U-I AFW Trains Inoperable Av Ensure 0-FCV-32-82, Motor Driven Train A only and 0-FCV-32-85 are closed.

B. Ensure 1-FCV-32-80 Motor Driven Train A and Turbine Driven Train and 1-FCV-32-102 are closed.

C. Ensure 0-FCV-32-82, Motor Driven Train A and Turbine Driven Train and 0-FCV-32-85 are closed.

D. Ensure 1-FCV-32-80 Motor Driven Train A only and 1-FCV-32-102 are closed.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 10:38:47 AM 93

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct, The isolation valves should automatically close at 69 psig. With the control header pressure and Aux Bldg control header A at the same pressure with Aux Bldg B header rising it would indicate that at least one of the isolation valves did not go closed. AOP-M02 would have the operators ensure that the 0-FCV-32-82 & 85 are closed to isolate the leak. The Aux Bldg A header pressure is less than 70 psig according to the notes in alarm response procedure the A header would be considered Inoperable. In accordance with the TIS Bases, the loss of a train of essential air is no more severe than the loss of one of the motor driven trains because the TD Pump can still supply to steam generators.

B. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that 1-FCV-32-102 is also isolated by the AOP-M.02 for leak isolation. This valve would automatically isolate at 50 psig. Also Only the Train A is inoperable due to loss of air to the A MD driven LCVs. The T-D AFW pump can still supply 2 steam generators due to B train of air available.

C. Incorrect, Plausible since the first part of is correct. Also the candidate may get confused on whether the TD AFW train is also inoperable, however in accordance with the T/S Bases, the loss of a sincle train of essential air is no more severe than the loss of one of the motor driven trains because the TD Pump can still supply to steam generators.

D. Incorrect, Plausible if the candidate thinks that 1-FCV-32-102 is also isolated by the AOP-M.02 for leak isolation. This valve would automatically isolate at 50 psig. Also the second part is correct.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 10:38:47 AM 94

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 93 Tier: 2 Group 2 K/A: 079 Station Air A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Cross-connection with lAS Importance Rating: 2.9 I 3.2 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5/43.5 / 45.3/45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 KIA Match: KA is matched because the question requires the ability to predict the impact a loss of air has on the operability of the AFW system and requires using the information in the bases of the Tech Spec in determining the impact.

Technical

Reference:

Technical Specification Bases AOP-M.02, Loss of Control Air, Rev.

Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-M.02 obj 7 & 8 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN bank question with the stem and choices modified Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1210 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 201110:38:47 AM 95

94. G 2.2.14 094 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit I is operating at 100% power.

- I & C going to perform 1 -Sl-ICC-063-051 .2, Channel Calibration of RWST Level Channel II Rack 7 Loop L-63-51.

- As part of the surveillance the following 1 -M-6E annunciator window inputs from 1-LT-63-51 will be disabled.

LS-63-50A RWST LVL LO LS-63-50B RWST LVL LO-LO

- All other inputs to these annunciators will remain in service.

- The surveillance is expected to be completed by the end of shift.

Which ONE of the following completes the statement below as related to the SROs responsibility for a 50.59 review and a Technical Evaluation?

Prior to disabling the annunciator input is required.

A. only a 50.59 review B. only a Technical Evaluation C. both a 50.59 review and a Technical Evaluation D neither a 50.59 review nor a Technical Evaluation Sunday, November 27, 201111:02:26 AM 94

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRA CTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible because a 50.59 review would be required if the disablement were to exceed 90 days. See OPDP-4 excerpt below.

B. Incorrect, Plausible because a Technical Evaluation would be required if the disablement caused the Inputs to the alarm to also be disabled. See OPDP-4 excerpt below.

C. Incorrect, Plausible because a 50.59 review and a Technical Evaluation would be required if the annunciator input were to be disabled with the equipment remaining in service. See OPDP-4 excerpt below.

D. Correct, In accordance with OPDP-4, Annunciator Disablement, the annunciator input can be disabled without either 50.59 or a Technical Evaluation being performed. See OPDP-4 excerpt below.

OPDP-4 Appendix A B. If an annunciator window/input is disabled in support of maintenance or surveillance activities, a 50.59 review is not required UNLESS the annunciator will remain disabled for more than 90 days. If 90 days will be exceeded, a 50.59 review shall be completed prior to exceeding 90 days. A Technical Evaluation is required prior to disablement if alarm functions will be disabled for equipment remaining in service (not removed from service/inoperable for the maintenance activity).

1. The following example would be considered necessary to support maintenance activities and requires a Technical Evaluation:

A pump is tagged with a clearance for maintenance. Its suction pressure switch will be depressurized and disabling the associated low pressure alarm will disable the alarm function for other equipment that must remain in service.

2. The following examples would be considered necessary to support maintenance activities and do not require a Technical Evaluation provided the parameter is the only input to the alarm:

A pump is tagged with a clearance for maintenance. Its suction pressure switch will be depressurized and the associated low pressure alarm disabled.

An instrument is declared inoperable, and any required LCO action(s) are entered for calibration in accordance with an approved maintenance instruction. The alarm from this instrument is disabled.

Sunday, November 27, 201111:02:26 AM 95

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 94 Tier: 3 Group n/a K/A: G 2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status.

Importance Rating: 3.9 I 4.3 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 / 43.3 /45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 3 KIA Match: The KA is matched because the question requires knowledge of the an SRO administrative function associated with the process to control the disablement of annunciators in the Main Control Room.

Technical

Reference:

OPDP-4, Annunciator Disablement, Revision 4 0-SO-55-1, Annunciator System, Revision 0042 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL27IOPDP-4 obj. 7 & 8 Question Source:

New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: SQN bank question modified Comments:

Source: BANK MOD Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1/2009 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 201111:02:26 AM 96

95. 02.1.8095 Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is being shutdown for a refueling outage.

- Operating crew is performing 0-GO-7, Unit Shutdown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown.

Which ONE of the following identifies....

(1) when 0-GO-I 5, Containment Closure Control, is required to be implemented in accordance with 0-GO-7 and (2) if an evaluation in accordance with 0-GO-I 5 Appendix F, Containment Closure Evaluation Process, indicates the ACT/ECT margin is 12 minutes, what is required?

Note:

ACT/ECT - Allowable Closure Time/Estimated Closure Time Li)

A. When Unit enters Approval granted to open the Mode 5 penetration without restrictions B When Unit enters Require person to close penetration Mode 5 to be stationed at the penetration C. When RHR is placed Approval granted to open the in service penetration without restrictions D. When RHR is placed Require person to close penetration in service to be stationed at the penetration Sunday, November 27, 201111:08:59 AM 95

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRA CTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect, 0-GO-7 states that 0-GO-15, Containment Closure Control, is to be implemented to track containment configuration changes when the unit enters Mode 5. 0-GO-15 identifies that if the margin is less than 15 minutes, the persons having responsibility for closure are required to be stationed at the penetration.

Denying approval is plausible because the denial is required if the ACT/ECT is negative unless the opening is approved by the Operation Manager.

B. Correct, 0-GO-7 states that 0-GO-15, Containment Closure Control, is to be implemented to track containment configuration changes when the unit enters Mode 5. 0-GO-iS identifies that if the margin is less than 15 minutes, the persons having responsibility for closure are required to be stationed at the penetration.

C. Incorrect, 0-GO-15 purpose statement says the GO provides the requirements for Containment Closure Control in the event of a loss of RHR shutdown cooling, making the implementation of the GO when RHR is placed in service plausible because the purpose of the procedure is to provide the requirements for Containment Closure Control in the event of loss of RHR shutdown cooling, however, the correct implementation is when the Unit enters Mode 5. 0-GO-iS identifies that if the margin is less than 15 minutes, the persons having responsibility for closure are required to be stationed at the penetration. Denying approval is plausible because the denial is required if the ACT/ECT is negative unless the opening is approved by the Operation Manager.

D. Incorrect, 0-GO-15 purpose statement says the GO provides the requirements for Containment Closure Control in the event of a loss of RHR shutdown cooling, making the implementation of the GO when RHR is placed in service plausible, because the purpose of the procedure is to provide the requirements for Containment Closure Control in the event of loss of RHR shutdown cooling.

However, the correct implementation is when the Unit enters Mode 5. 0-GO-IS identifies that if the margin is less than 15 minutes, the persons having responsibility for closure are required to be stationed at the penetration.

Sunday, November 27, 201111:08:59 AM 96

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 95 Tier: 3 Group n/a KIA: G 2.1.8 Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room.

Importance Rating: 3.4 / 4.1 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10/45.5 /45.12 /45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 5, 7 K/A Match: KA is matched because the question requires the ability to implement the requirements of a GO as related to control of maintenance personnel outside the control room as it relates to prevention of a release if RHR cooling were lost.

Technical

Reference:

0-GO-7, Plant Shutdown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, Rev 0059 0-GO-i 5, Containment Closure, Rev 0026 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271GO-15 B.i, B.4, B.13 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Used on SQN 1/2009 audit exam, originally modified from SQN question GO-i 5-B.4 003 Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1/2009 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 201111:08:59 AM 97

96. G 2.2.42 296 Given the following plant conditions:

- An RCS heatup is in progress on Unit I in preparation for a Mode change following refueling.

- Tavgisl95°F.

- Lower containment average air temperature is 59°F.

Which ONE of the following identifies...

(1) the actions relative to the upcoming Mode change and (2) the bases for the required minimum containment air temperature?

A. (1) Mode change is allowed without requiring the provisions of LCO 3.O.4.b being met.

(2) To limit the air mass to prevent exceeding the maximum allowable internal containment pressure during LOCA conditions.

B. (1) Mode change is allowed without requiring the provisions of LCO 3.O.4.b being met.

(2) To limit the air mass to prevent exceeding the maximum allowable internal containment pressure during a design basis steam line break.

C (1) Mode change requires implementing of the provisions of LCO 3.O.4.b.

(2) To limit the air mass to prevent exceeding the maximum allowable internal containment pressure during LOCA conditions.

D. (1) Mode change requires implementing the provisions of LCO 3.O.4.b.

(2) To limit the air mass to prevent exceeding the maximum allowable internal containment pressure during a design basis steam line break.

Sunday, November 27, 201111:37:03 AM 96

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible, if the candidate thinks that the tech spec for minimum temperature is allowed and therefore no restrictions would apply to enter Mode 4.

Also plausible since the second part is correct.

B. Incorrect, Plausible, Plausible, if the candidate thinks that the tech spec for minimum temperature is allowed and therefore no restrictions would apply to enter Mode 4. Also plausible if the candidate thought that the design base accident for this condtion of containment temperature was steam line break.

C. Correct, Per LCO 3.6. 1.5 the minimum required lower containment air temperature for operability is 60°F. LCO 3.6.1.5 is not one of the Tech Specs which are restricted from applying LCO 3.0.4.b, and therefore if these provisions are met, the mode change can be made. Also the basis for minimum lower containment air temperature is to limit the total air mass in lower containment such that if a LOCA were to occur during modes 1, 2, 3 or 4, the internal pressure of Containment would not exceed design maximum for the accident.

D. Incorrect, Plausible, since the first part is correct, and also plausible if the candidate thought that the design base accident for this condtion of containment temperature was steam line break Sunday, November 27, 201111:37:03 AM 97

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 96 Tier: 3 Group: n/a KIA: G2.2.42 Equipment Control Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

Importance Rating:

10 CFR Part 55: 41.7/41.10/43.2/43.3/45.3 IOCFR55.43.b: 2 KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates ability to recognize conditons that are Tech Spec entry conditions and SRO by testing the candidates knowledge of Tech Spec rules of useage (T.S 3.0.4) and the basis in Tech Spec for minimum internal temperature of containment.

Technical

Reference:

LCO 3.6.1.5, Air Temperature and basis Tech Spec 3.0.4 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL200.CNTMTSTRUCTURE obj 10 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: New question written for 1201 NRC exam Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 201111:37:03 AM 98

97. G 2.3.4 097 Given the following plant conditions:

- A LOCA occurred on Unit 1.

- A Site Area Emergency has been declared.

- The Containment Barrier is intact (i.e. no loss or potential loss of containment).

- The Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree (FR-Z) is Yellow due to high radiation in containment.

- Containment pressure is 2.1 psig and decreasing.

- There is no release to the environment in progress.

- The A train of containment spray is operating normally for plant conditions.

- The B containment spray pump tripped, 25 minutes ago, after pump amps were observed to be oscillating.

- Authorization has been given for an emergency responder to receive an emergency exposure of 11 Rem TEDE in order to restore B train containment spray.

Which one of the following completes the statement below?

The decision (1) the requirements of EPIP-1 5, Emergency Exposure Guidelines, because (2)

A. met emergency exposure is necessary to maintain critical safety functions B violated emergency exposure is NOT necessary to maintain critical safety functions C. met emergency exposure limits apply during any REP classification D. violated emergency exposure limits only apply during a General Emergency Sunday, November27, 2011 12:04:17 PM 97

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRA CTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible if applicant believes that B train Cs is necessary to prevent a release or to maintain FR-Z yellow or restore to green. However B train CS is not necessary to maintaining critical safety functions or to protect the public since A train is reducing CNMT pressure without it. Per EPM-4 Yellow paths are OPTIONAL to the operator therefore not required to maintain critical safety functions. The REP does not recognize yellow paths for REP criteria to protect public health.

B. Correct, B train CS is not necessary to maintaining critical safety functions or to protect the public. Per EPM-4 Yellow paths are OPTIONAL to the operator therefore not required to maintain critical safety functions. The REP does not recognize yellow paths for REP criteria to protect public health, thus does not meet requirement for emergency exposures to maintain critical safety functions per EPIP- 15.

C. Incorrect, Plausible if applicant believes that B train CS is necessary to prevent a release and emergency exposure limits always apply during REP to correct any situation. However per EPM-4 Yellow paths are OPTIONAL to the operator therefore not required to maintain critical safety functions. The REP does not recognize yellow paths for REP criteria to protect publlc health.

D. Incorrect. Plausible since the action is correct, however the reason is incorrect.

Also plausible because there are different restrictions depending on REP classifications and in this case there is no direct threat to public heath.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 12:04:17 PM 98

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 97 Tier: 3 Group n/a KIA: G 2.3.1 Radiation Control Knowledge of 10 CFR:20 and related facility radiation control requirements.

Importance Rating: 2.6 / 3.0 10 CFR Part55: 41.12/43.4/45.9/45.10 IOCFR55.43.b: 4 K/A Match: KA is matched because the question tests the knowledge of radiation contol limits and how to apply them during implimentation of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

Technical

Reference:

EPIP-15, Emergency Exposure Guidelines, Revision 9 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: 0PL271 REP, Obj 1 .f Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Question on SQN NRC Exam 1/2008, originally SQN Bank REP-8.1.F 015 Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 12:04:17 PM 99

98. G23.7 498 Given the following plant conditions:

- Both Units are operating at 100% RTP.

- A diving operation in the Spent Fuel Pit is planned to commence later in the shift.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

The dive (1) the requirements of NPG-SPP-07.3, Work Activity Risk Management Process, to be classified as a HIGH risk activity If the rad level in the area of the dive is estimated at 62 Rad/hr, in accordance with RCI-14, Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Program, the RWP would be required to be approved by (2)

A. meets Radiation Protection Manager only meets Radiation Protection Manager and Plant Manager C. does NOT meet Radiation Protection Manager only D. does NOT meet Radiation Protection Manager and Plant Manager Sunday, November27, 2011 12:24:25 PM 98

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DIS TRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible, because the diving operation being a HIGH risk activity is correct and for values of < 50 rad/hr the Radiation Protection manager would be the only approval that is required.

B. Correct, NPG -SPP-07.3, Work Activity Risk Management Process, Attachment 2 Initial Risk Characterization identifies that All activities associated with Diving Operations, due to industry operating experience are to be characterized as HIGH and RCI-14, RADIATION WORK PERMIT (RWP) PROGRAM identifies The Plant Manager and Radiation Protection Manager must approve in writing entries into areas where whole body dose rates are = 50 Rad/hour.

C. Incorrect, Plausible, because the applicant may recall the criteria on the Site High Focus Risk and Attachment 5 PWR Operational Risk Review sheet (RED SHEET) and identify that diving is not on the sheet and for values of < 50 rad/hr the Radiation Protection manager would be the only approval that is required.

0. Incorrect, Plausible, because the applicant may recall the criteria on the Site High Focus Risk and Attachment 5 PWR Operational Risk Review sheet (RED SHEET) and identify that diving is not on the sheet. Also plausible because the Plant Manager and Radiation Protection manager being required to approve in writing entries into areas where whole body dose rates are = 50 Rad/hour is correct.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 12:24:25 PM 99

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 98 Tier: 3 Group n/a KIA: G2.3.7 Radiation Control Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions.

Importance Rating: 3.5 I 3.6 IOCFRPart55: 41.12/45.10 IOCFR55.43.b: Related to item 7.

KIA Match: This question matches the K/A by testing the candidates knowledge of the RWP requirements for entry into high radiation areas and SRO level by testing the candidates knowledge of the risk factor associated with diving operations.

Technical

Reference:

NPG-SPP-07.3, Work Activity Risk Management Process, Rev. 0005 RCI-14, Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Program, Revision 0052 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271SPP-7.1 obj. 4 & 9 Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New question Comments:

Source: NEW Source If Bank:

Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1201 Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November27, 2011 12:24:25 PM 100

99. G 2.4.35 099 Given the following plant conditions:

0200 - Unit 2 is operating at 100% power when implementation of AOP-C.04, Shutdown from Auxiliary Control Room, was required.

0204 - All main control room actions have been completed and the main control room is evacuated.

0212 - All transfer switches are placed in the required position in accordance with AOP-C.04, Checklist 2, Unit 2 Auxiliary Control Room.

0218 - AUO reports 6.9Kv Shutdown Board equipment is configured in accordance with Checklist 4.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements below?

The conditions require the declaration of a/an (1) in accordance with the Radiological Emergency Plan.

(2) control is available for Pressurizer Backup Heaters 2A-A.

A. (1) Alert (2) ONLY manual B (1) Alert (2) BOTH manual and automatic C. (1) Site Area Emergency (2) ONLY manual D. (1) Site Area Emergency (2) BOTH manual and automatic Sunday, November27, 2011 12:42:57 PM 99

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam DISTRA CTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, Plausible because the declaration of an ALERT is correct. Also plausible since most automatic functions are disabled when the components transfer switch is in the AUX position however the PZR B/U heaters can be operated either manually or in automatic.

B. Correct, Because control was established within the 15 minutes, the required declaration is an ALERT and after 6.9kV Shutdown Board equipment has been configured per Attach 4, the Pressurizer Backup Heaters IA-A can be operated in either automatic or manual from the control on the breaker door.

C. Incorrect, Plausible because the declaration of an SAE would be correct if candidate thought that control had not been established within the 15 minute allowance and needed to wait for the report from the AUO that Attach 4 had been completed. Also plausibe since most automatic functions are disabled when the components transfer switch is in the AUX position.

D. Plausible because the declaration of an SAE would be correct if candidate thought that control had not been established within the 15 minute allowance and needed to wait for the report from the AUO that Attach 4 had been completed. Also the heaters having both manual and automatic control after the transfer switch is in the AUX position is correct.

Sunday, November 27, 2011 12:42:57 PM 100

QUESTIONS REPORT forSQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 99 Tier: 3 Group n/a KIA: G 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

Importance Rating: 3.8 / 4.0 IOCFRPart55: 41.10/43.5/45.13 IOCFR55.43.b: 5 KIA Match: This question matches K/A by requiring candidate to know the operational effect of placing 6.9Kv breakers to the aux position. SRO by determining the EPIP Classification associated with abondoning the Main Control Room.

Technical

Reference:

AOP-C.04, Shutdown from the Auxiliary Control Room, Revision 18 EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Matrix, Revision 44 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: OPL271AOP-C.04 obj. 3 & 12 Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: SQN bank question (originally DC Cook question) Also WBN question 034 K6.02 stem modified Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: DC COOK Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: AUDIT 02/20 10 Last 2 NRC?:

Sunday, November 27, 2011 12:42:57 PM 101

100. G 2.4.38 100 In accordance with the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs),

which ONE of the following identifies a function of the Site Emergency Director (SED) that can be delegated and who the SED can delegate to perform this function?

Function to be delegated Can be delegated to...

A. Emergency Doses that exceed CECC Director occupational dose limits B. Emergency Doses that exceed Site Vice President occupational dose limits C Protective Action CECC Director Recommendations D. Protective Action Site Vice President Recommendations DIS TRACTOR ANAL YSIS:

A. Incorrect, the SED can delegate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to the CECC Director but not the authorization of emergency dose limits. Plausible because the authorization of emergency dose limits is an SED function and because Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) can be delegated to the CECC director.

B. Incorrect, the SED can delegate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to the CECC Director but not the authorization of emergency dose limits. Plausible because the authorization of emergency dose limits is an SED function and because the Site VP is a position in the Technical support Center (TSC) and normally is the highest ranking person on the site.

C. Correct, In accordance with EPIP-6, the SED makes Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to the state and the responsibility cannot be delegated except to the CECC director.

D. Incorrect, the SED can delegate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) but not to anyone except the CECC director. Plausible because the Site VP is a position in the Technical support Center (TSC) and normally is the highest ranking person on the site.

Sunday, November27, 2011 12:49:08 PM 100

QUESTIONS REPORT for SQN JAN 2012 NRC SRO Exam Question Number: 100 Tier: 3 Group n/a K/A: G 2.4.38 Emergency Procedures /Plan Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.

Importance Rating: 2.4 / 4.4 IOCFRPart55: 41.10/43.5/45.11 IOCFR55A3.b: 4 K/A Match: KA is matched and the question is SRO because it requires the knowldege to perofrm correctly when filling the position of the Site Emergency Director.

Technical

Reference:

EPlP6, Activation and Support of the Technical Support Center, Rev 47 Proposed references None to be provided:

Learning Objective: 0PL271 .REP obj. 5.a Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: Question on Sept 2009 Retake exam Comments:

Source: BANK Source If Bank: SQN Cognitive Level: LOWER Difficulty:

Job Position: SRO Plant: SEQUOYAH Date: 1/2009 RETAKE Last 2 NRC?: NO Sunday, November 27, 2011 12:49:08 PM 101