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| number = ML14114A305 | | number = ML14114A305 | ||
| issue date = 05/08/2014 | | issue date = 05/08/2014 | ||
| title = | | title = Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident | ||
| author name = Miller G | | author name = Miller G | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLII-1 | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLII-1 | ||
| addressee name = Capps S | | addressee name = Capps S | ||
| addressee affiliation = Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | | addressee affiliation = Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC | ||
| docket = 05000369 | | docket = 05000369 | ||
| license number = NPF-009 | | license number = NPF-009 | ||
| contact person = Miller G | | contact person = Miller G | ||
| case reference number = TAC MF0140 | | case reference number = TAC MF0140 | ||
| document type = Letter, Report, Miscellaneous | | document type = Letter, Report, Miscellaneous | ||
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=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. Steven D. Capps Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-8985 | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 May 8, 2014 Mr. Steven D. Capps Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-8985 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1-STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0140) | MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1- STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0140) | ||
==Dear:== | ==Dear:== | ||
Mr. Capps: On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures. | Mr. Capps: | ||
On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the metho~s and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures. | |||
By letter dated November 26, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated June 20, 2013, Duke Energy submitted its Seismic Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1. By letter dated November 26, 2013, Duke Energy provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the NRC staff to complete its assessments. | By letter dated November 26, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated June 20, 2013, Duke Energy submitted its Seismic Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1. By letter dated November 26, 2013, Duke Energy provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the NRC staff to complete its assessments. | ||
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter. | The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter. | ||
S. Capps If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-2481 or by e-mail at Ed.Miller@nrc.gov. | |||
Docket No. 50-369 | S. Capps If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-2481 or by e-mail at Ed.Miller@nrc.gov. | ||
?f~Ac<~ | |||
G. Edward Miller, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-369 | |||
==Enclosure:== | ==Enclosure:== | ||
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv | Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv | ||
STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT DUKE ENERGY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-369 | |||
==1.0 INTRODUCTION== | |||
On March 12, 2012, 1 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter) to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," 2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP), verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC. | |||
Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to provide the following: | |||
: a. Information concerning the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation. | |||
: b. Information related to the implementation of the walkdown process. | |||
: c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them. | |||
: d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. | |||
: e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features. | |||
: f. Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review. | |||
In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the seismic walkdown process. By letter dated May 29, 2012, 3 the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff 1 | |||
ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340 2 | |||
ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A049 3 | |||
ADAMS Package Accession No. ML121640872 Enclosure | |||
submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) document 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima* Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," | |||
(walkdown guidance) to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement. By letter dated May 31, 2012, 4 the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance. . | |||
* By letter dated November 26, 2012, 5 Duke Energy (the licensee) provided a response to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (MNS-1 ). In addition to the aforementioned letter, the licensee, by letter dated June 20, 20136 , | |||
provided an updated submittal to the initial seismic walkdown report. The purpose of the latter submittal was to update and provide information on inaccessible components not completed in the first submittal. | |||
The NRC staff reviewed the walkdown report and determined that additional supplemental information would assist the NRC staff in completing its review. In letter dated November 1, 20137 , the NRC staff requested additional information to gain a better understanding of the processes and procedures used by the licensee in conducting the walkdowns and walk-bys. The licensee responded to the NRC staff request by letter dated November 26, 2013. 8 The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter. | |||
==2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION== | |||
The structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 2: "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena;" and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria." GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena* such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. | |||
For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions that an sse of a facility must perform; and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design. | |||
The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated. | |||
4 ADAMS Accession No. ML12145A529 5 | |||
ADAMS Package Accession No. ML130030480 6 | |||
ADAMS Package Accession No. ML13190A272 7 | |||
ADAMS Accession No. ML133048418 8 | |||
ADAMS Accession No. ML13338A171 | |||
The current licensing basis is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, including the licensee's docketed commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis, including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the facility operating license. | |||
==3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION== | |||
3.1 Seismic Licensing Basis Information The licensee provided information on the plant-specific licensing basis for the Seismic Category I SSCs for MNS-1 in Section 1.0 of the walkdown report. Consistent with the walkdown guidance, the NRC staff noted that the report includes a summary of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and a description of the codes, standards, and methods that were used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements. | |||
Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has provided information on the plant-specific seismic licensing basis and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing bases evaluation consistent with Section 8, Submittal Report, of the walkdown guidance. | Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has provided information on the plant-specific seismic licensing basis and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing bases evaluation consistent with Section 8, Submittal Report, of the walkdown guidance. | ||
* 3.2 Seismic Walkdown Methodology Implementation Section 2, Personnel Qualifications; Section 3, Selection of SSCs; Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; and Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provide information to licensees regarding the implementation of an appropriate seismic , walkdown methodology. | * 3.2 Seismic Walkdown Methodology Implementation Section 2, Personnel Qualifications; Section 3, Selection of SSCs; Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; and Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provide information to licensees regarding the implementation of an appropriate seismic , | ||
walkdown methodology. | |||
The walkdown report dated November 26, 2012, and supplemented on June 20, 2013, did not identify deviations from the walkdown guidance. | The walkdown report dated November 26, 2012, and supplemented on June 20, 2013, did not identify deviations from the walkdown guidance. | ||
The NRC staff reviewed the following sections of the walkdown methodology implementation provided in the walkdown report: | The NRC staff reviewed the following sections of the walkdown methodology implementation provided in the walkdown report: | ||
Line 60: | Line 84: | ||
* Development of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWELs) | * Development of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWELs) | ||
* Implementation of the Walkdown Process | * Implementation of the Walkdown Process | ||
* Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results 3.2.1 Personnel Qualifications Section 2, Personnel Qualifications, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with qualification information for personnel involved in the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. | * Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results 3.2.1 Personnel Qualifications Section 2, Personnel Qualifications, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with qualification information for personnel involved in the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. | ||
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 2 and Appendix 5 of the walkdown report, which includes information on the walkdown personnel and their qualifications. | The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 2 and Appendix 5 of the walkdown report, which includes information on the walkdown personnel and their qualifications. | ||
Specifically, the NRC staff reviewed the table summary of the background, experience, and level of involvement for the personnel involved in the seismic walkdown activities: | Specifically, the NRC staff reviewed the table summary of the background, experience, and level of involvement for the personnel involved in the seismic walkdown activities: equipment selection | ||
equipment selection | |||
3.2.2 Development of the SWELs Section 3, Selection ofSSCs, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees for selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the SWELs, so that they can be walked down by qualified personnel. | personnel, seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs), licensing basis reviewers, IPEEE reviewers, peer review team, and operations staff. | ||
The NRC staff reviewed the overall process used by the licensee to develop the MNS-1 base list, SWEL 1 (sample list of designated safety functions equipment), and SWEL 2 (sample list of spent fuel pool related equipment). | Based on the review of the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that those involved in the seismic walkdown activities have the appropriate knowledge, as specified in Section 2 of the walkdown guidance. | ||
The overall equipment selection process followed the screening process shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the walkdown guidance. | 3.2.2 Development of the SWELs Section 3, Selection ofSSCs, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees for selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the SWELs, so that they can be walked down by qualified personnel. | ||
*Based on Attachments 2, 3 and 4 of the walkdown report, MNS-1 SWEL 1 and 2 meet the inclusion requirements of the walkdown guidance. | The NRC staff reviewed the overall process used by the licensee to develop the MNS-1 base list, SWEL 1 (sample list of designated safety functions equipment), and SWEL 2 (sample list of spent fuel pool related equipment). The overall equipment selection process followed the screening process shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the walkdown guidance. *Based on Attachments 2, 3 and 4 of the walkdown report, MNS-1 SWEL 1 and 2 meet the inclusion requirements of the walkdown guidance. Specifically, the following attributes were considered in the sample selection: | ||
Specifically, the following attributes were considered in the sample selection: | |||
* A variety of systems, equipment and environments | * A variety of systems, equipment and environments | ||
* IPEEE equipment | * IPEEE equipment | ||
* Major new or replacement equipment | * Major new or replacement equipment | ||
* Risk considerations Due to individual plant configurations and the walkdown guidance screening process followed to select the final SWEL equipment, it is possible that some classes of equipment will not be represented on the SWEL. The walkdown guidance recognizes this is due to the equipment not being present in the plant (e.g., some plants generate DC power using inverters and therefore do not have motor generators) or the equipment being screened out during the screening process (the screening process is described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance. | * Risk considerations Due to individual plant configurations and the walkdown guidance screening process followed to select the final SWEL equipment, it is possible that some classes of equipment will not be represented on the SWEL. The walkdown guidance recognizes this is due to the equipment not being present in the plant (e.g., some plants generate DC power using inverters and therefore do not have motor generators) or the equipment being screened out during the screening process (the screening process is described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance. After a review the NRC staff deemed the licensee adequately followed the screening process during the development of the equipment walkdown lists and the lists were appropriate. | ||
After a review the NRC staff deemed the licensee adequately followed the screening process during the development of the equipment walkdown lists and the lists were appropriate. | The NRC staff also noted that a rapid drain-down list was included as part of the SWEL 2, as described in Section 3 of the guidance. The equipment review process is described in the walkdown report Section 3.0. After reviewing the information provided in this section, and , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified rapid drain down items to be included in the SWEL 2 as described in screen #4 of the walkdown guidance. | ||
The NRC staff also noted that a rapid drain-down list was included as part of the SWEL 2, as described in Section 3 of the guidance. | After reviewing the SWEL 1 and 2, the NRC staff concludes that the sample of SSCs represents a diversity of component types and assures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions, thereby meeting the intent of the walkdown guidance. In addition, the NRC staff notes that it appears that the equipment selection personnel were appropriately supported by plant operations staff as intended in the walkdown guidance. | ||
The equipment review process is described in the walkdown report Section 3.0. After reviewing the information provided in this section, and | |||
After reviewing the SWEL 1 and 2, the NRC staff concludes that the sample of SSCs represents a diversity of component types and assures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions, thereby meeting the intent of the walkdown guidance. | 3.2.3 Implementation of the Walkdown Process Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for each site. | ||
In addition, the NRC staff notes that it appears that the equipment selection personnel were appropriately supported by plant operations staff as intended in the walkdown guidance. 3.2.3 Implementation of the Walkdown Process Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for each site. | * The NRC staff reviewed Section 4 of the walkdown report, which summarizes the process and results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys, including an overview of the number of items walked down and the number of areas walked-by. The walkdown report states that teams, consisting of two qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) accompanied by a Duke staff engineer, conducted the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. According to the signed seismic walkdown checklists (SWCs) and area walkdown checklists (AWCs), these activities were conducted during the period of August 10, 2012, through September 13, 2012. In addition, a I subsequent set of walkdowns were performed March 16, 2013- April 23, 2013, as stated in the June 20, 2013, letter. The purpose of the last activity was to complete a number of items that were inaccessible during the initial walkdowns. | ||
* The NRC staff reviewed Section 4 of the walkdown report, which summarizes the process and results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys, including an overview of the number of items walked down and the number of areas walked-by. | The walkdown report also states that the SWEs discussed their observations and judgments with each other during the walkdowns. Additionally, the SWEs agreed on the results of their seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys before reporting the results of their review. Attachments 5 and 7 of the final, June 20, 2013, walkdown report provide the completed SWCs and AWCs, documenting the results for each item of equipment on SWEL 1 and 2 and each area containing SWEL equipment. | ||
The walkdown report states that teams, consisting of two qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) accompanied by a Duke staff engineer, conducted the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. | The licensee documented cases of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs) in the checklists for further evaluation. Table 4-1 of the walkdown report list the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and the area walk-bys. The table describes how each condition was addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP) and their resolution. Based on the review of the checklists, the NRC staff was unable to confirm that all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns were included in this table. As such, by letter dated November 1, 2013, the NRC staff issued two questions in a request for additional information (RAI) in order to obtain additional clarification regarding the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions identified in the field during the walkdowns and walk-bys. Specifically, in RAI 1, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide further explanation regarding how a field observation wa~ determined to be PASC, and to ensure that the basis for determination was addressed using normal plant processes and documented in the walkdown report. In response to RAI 1, the licensee confirmed that observations which could not be readily judged to be acceptable with respect to its current licensing basis during the walkdown were identified as PASCs and documented as condition reports in the CAP. The licensee referred to Table 4-1 of the walkdown report which includes all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns and area walk-bys for MNS-1. | ||
According to the signed seismic walkdown checklists (SWCs) and area walkdown checklists (AWCs), these activities were conducted during the period of August 10, 2012, through September 13, 2012. In addition, a I subsequent set of walkdowns were performed March 16, 2013-April 23, 2013, as stated in the June 20, 2013, letter. The purpose of the last activity was to complete a number of items that were inaccessible during the initial walkdowns. | After evaluating the licensee's response and reviewing Table 4-1 , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to RAI 1, PASCs were properly identified and documented, and summary Table 4-1 is considered complete. | ||
The walkdown report also states that the SWEs discussed their observations and judgments with each other during the walkdowns. | In addition to the information provided above, the NRC staff notes that anchorage configurations were verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50-percent of the SWEL items, in accordance with Section 4 of the walkdown guidance. | ||
Additionally, the SWEs agreed on the results of their seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys before reporting the results of their review. Attachments 5 and 7 of the final, June 20, 2013, walkdown report provide the completed SWCs and AWCs, documenting the results for each item of equipment on SWEL 1 and 2 and each area containing SWEL equipment. | |||
The licensee documented cases of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs) in the checklists for further evaluation. | The walkdown report states that where possible, cabinets were opened to ensure that visibly accessible internal components mountings are adequate. Additional walkdowns were conducted, as described in the supplemental report, to perform internal inspections of selected cabinets that were not completely inspected or were not opened during the initial walkdowns. | ||
Table 4-1 of the walkdown report list the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and the area walk-bys. | |||
The table describes how each condition was addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP) and their resolution. | |||
Based on the review of the checklists, the NRC staff was unable to confirm that all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns were included in this table. As such, by letter dated November 1, 2013, the NRC staff issued two questions in a request for additional information (RAI) in order to obtain additional clarification regarding the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions identified in the field during the walkdowns and walk-bys. | |||
Specifically, in RAI 1, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide further explanation regarding how a field observation determined to be PASC, and to ensure that the basis for determination was addressed using normal plant processes and documented in the walkdown report. In response to RAI 1, the licensee confirmed that observations which could not be readily judged to be acceptable with respect to its current licensing basis during the walkdown were identified as PASCs and documented as condition reports in the CAP. The licensee referred to Table 4-1 of the walkdown report which includes all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns and area walk-bys for MNS-1. After evaluating the licensee's response and reviewing Table 4-1 , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to RAI 1, PASCs were properly identified and documented, and summary Table 4-1 is considered complete. | |||
In addition to the information provided above, the NRC staff notes that anchorage configurations were verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50-percent of the SWEL items, in accordance with Section 4 of the walkdown guidance. The walkdown report states that where possible, cabinets were opened to ensure that visibly accessible internal components mountings are adequate. | |||
Additional walkdowns were conducted, as described in the supplemental report, to perform internal inspections of selected cabinets that were not completely inspected or were not opened during the initial walkdowns. | |||
Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. | Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. | ||
3.2.4 Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of licensing basis evaluations for items identified during the seismic walkdowns as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed that might have potential seismic significance. | 3.2.4 Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of licensing basis evaluations for items identified during the seismic walkdowns as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed that might have potential seismic significance. | ||
The NRC staff reviewed Section 5 of the MNS-1 Walkdown Report, which discusses the process for conducting the seismic licensing basis evaluations of the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. | The NRC staff reviewed Section 5 of the MNS-1 Walkdown Report, which discusses the process for conducting the seismic licensing basis evaluations of the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. The licensee stated that 32 items were identified by the SWEs during the walkdowns as a PASC. These items were entered into the CAP, were reviewed, and were concluded to be in compliance with the MNS-1 seismic licensing basis. In a few cases, minor records corrections or repairs (loose/missing fasteners) were conducted. The response to RAI 1 provided additional description and clarification on the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions with respect to the CLB. Table 4-1 of the walkdown report lists the key | ||
The licensee stated that 32 items were identified by the SWEs during the walkdowns as a PASC. These items were entered into the CAP, were reviewed, and were concluded to be in compliance with the MNS-1 seismic licensing basis. In a few cases, minor records corrections or repairs (loose/missing fasteners) were conducted. | *licensee findings, and provides a complete list of the potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. This table also describes the actions taken or planned to address these conditions. | ||
The response to RAI 1 provided additional description and clarification on the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions with respect to the CLB. Table 4-1 of the walkdown report lists the key *licensee findings, and provides a complete list of the potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. | The NRC staff reviewed the CAP entries and the description of the actions taken to address potential deficiencies. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and entered them into the CAP, which meets the intent of the walkdown guidance, and appropriately dispositioned them. | ||
This table also describes the actions taken or planned to address these conditions. | 3.2.5 Conclusion Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance for personnel qualifications, development of SWELs, implementation of the walkdown process, and seismic licensing basis evaluations. | ||
The NRC staff reviewed the CAP entries and the description of the actions taken to address potential deficiencies. | 3.3 Peer Review Section 6, Peer Review, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with information regarding the conduct of peer reviews for the activities performed during the seismic walkdowns. Page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance identifies the following activities to be conducted during the peer review process: | ||
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and entered them into the CAP, which meets the intent of the walkdown guidance, and appropriately dispositioned them. 3.2.5 Conclusion Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance for personnel qualifications, development of SWELs, implementation of the walkdown process, and seismic licensing basis evaluations. | |||
3.3 Peer Review Section 6, Peer Review, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with information regarding the conduct of peer reviews for the activities performed during the seismic walkdowns. | |||
Page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance identifies the following activities to be conducted during the peer review process: | |||
* Review the selection of the SSCs included on the SWELs | * Review the selection of the SSCs included on the SWELs | ||
* Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys | * Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys | ||
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* Review the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP | * Review the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP | ||
* Review the walkdown report | * Review the walkdown report | ||
* Summarize the results of the peer review process in the walkdown report The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 7 and Attachments 6 and 8 of the MNS-1 Walkdown Report which describes the conduct of the peer review. In addition, the NRC staff reviewed the response to RAI 2. In RAI 2, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide additional information on the overall peer review process that was followed as part of the walkdown activities. | * Summarize the results of the peer review process in the walkdown report The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 7 and Attachments 6 and 8 of the MNS-1 Walkdown Report which describes the conduct of the peer review. In addition, the NRC staff reviewed the response to RAI 2. In RAI 2, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide additional information on the overall peer review process that was followed as part of the walkdown activities. Specifically, the NRC staff requested the licensee to confirm that the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were assessed and documented in the report. The licensee was also requested to confirm that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a peer reviewer for that same activity. In response to RAI 2, the licensee confirmed that all the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were included as part of the peer review process and referred to the summary of the peer review activities provided in Section 7 and Attachments 6 and 8 of the walkdown report. | ||
Specifically, the NRC staff requested the licensee to confirm that the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were assessed and documented in the report. The licensee was also requested to confirm that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a peer reviewer for that same activity. | The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's summary of each of these activities, which included the peer review team members' level of involvement, the peer review findings, and resolution of peer review comments. After reviewing the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee sufficiently documented the results of the peer review activities and how these reviews affected the work described in the walkdown report. | ||
In response to RAI 2, the licensee confirmed that all the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were included as part of the peer review process and referred to the summary of the peer review activities provided in Section 7 and Attachments 6 and 8 of the walkdown report. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's summary of each of these activities, which included the peer review team members' level of involvement, the peer review findings, and resolution of peer review comments. | Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's results of the peer review and subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review meets the intent of Section 6 of the walkdown guidance. | ||
After reviewing the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee sufficiently documented the results of the peer review activities and how these reviews affected the work described in the walkdown report. Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's results of the peer review and subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review meets the intent of Section 6 of the walkdown guidance. | 3.4 IPEEE Information Section 7, IPEEE Vulnerabilities, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the reporting of the evaluations conducted and actions taken in response to seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program. Through the IPEEE program and Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities- 10 CFR 50.54(f)," dated November 23, 19889 , licensees had performed a systematic examination to identify any plant-specific vulnerability to severe accidents. | ||
3.4 IPEEE Information Section 7, IPEEE Vulnerabilities, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the reporting of the evaluations conducted and actions taken in response to seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program. Through the IPEEE program and Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-10 CFR 50.54(f)," dated November 23, | MNS-1 had concluded from the IPEEE that there were no vulnerabilities from external threats. | ||
MNS-1 had concluded from the IPEEE that there were no vulnerabilities from external threats. There were, however, nine enhancements that were recommended. | There were, however, nine enhancements that were recommended. A list of those enhancements and the completion dates were included in Table 6-1 of the walkdown report. | ||
A list of those enhancements and the completion dates were included in Table 6-1 of the walkdown report. Based on the NRC staff's review of Section 6 of the walkdown report, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's identification of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including anomalies, outliers and other findings) identified by the IPEEE program, as well as actions taken to eliminate or reduce them, meets the intent of Section 7 of the walkdown guidance. | Based on the NRC staff's review of Section 6 of the walkdown report, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's identification of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including anomalies, outliers and other findings) identified by the IPEEE program, as well as actions taken to eliminate or reduce them, meets the intent of Section 7 of the walkdown guidance. | ||
9 ADAMS Accession No. ML031150465 | 9 ADAMS Accession No. ML031150465 | ||
Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of seismic protection features. | |||
The inspection report dated January 25, 2013, 11 documents the results of this inspection and states that no findings were identified. | 3.5 Planned Upgrades The licensee did not identify any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features in the walkdown report. | ||
3.6 NRC Oversight 3.6.1 Independent Verification by Resident Inspectors On July 6, 2012, 10 the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/188 "Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns." In accordance with the Tl, NRC inspectors independently verified that the MNS-1 licensee implemented the seismic walkdowns in accordance with the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of seismic protection features. The inspection report dated January 25, 2013, 11 documents the results of this inspection and states that no findings were identified. | |||
==4.0 CONCLUSION== | |||
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The NRC staff concludes that, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities and, in accordance with plant processes and procedures, the licensee verified the plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis; addressed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed seismic conditions; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features. Furthermore, the NRC staff notes that no immediate safety concerns were identified. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter, dated March 12, 2012. | |||
10 ADAMS Accession No. ML12156A052 11 ADAMS Accession No. ML13028A143 | |||
S. Capps If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415:..2481 or by e-mail at Ed. Miller@nrc.gov. | |||
Sincerely, IRA/ | |||
G. Edward Miller, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-369 | |||
Docket No. 50-369 | |||
==Enclosure:== | ==Enclosure:== | ||
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION: | |||
PUBLIC LPL2-1 R/F RidsNroDsea Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource LRegner, NRR | PUBLIC RidsOpaMail Resource RidsRgn2MaiiCenter Resource LPL2-1 R/F RidsNrrLASFigueroa Resource BRini, EDO Rl, Rll, Rill, RIV RidsNroDsea Resource RidsNrrPMMcGuire Resource RidsAcrsAcnw MaiiCTR Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource FVega, NRO RidsNrrDorllpl2-1 Resource LRegner, NRR NChokshi, NRO SFianders, NRO DJackson, NRO RKaras, NRO MJardaneh, NRO THerrity, RES ADAMS Accession Number: ML14114A305 | ||
/LA NAME GEMiller SFigueroa DATE 05/07/14 04/28/14 OFFICE DORLILPL2-1 | * concurrence by e-mail OFFICE DORLJLPL2-1/PM DORL/LPL2-1 /LA JLD/PMB/PM DSEA/RGS2 NAME GEMiller SFigueroa NDiFrancesco DJackson* | ||
/BC DORLILPL2-1 | DATE 05/07/14 04/28/14 04/28/14 01/31/14 OFFICE DORLILPL2-1 /BC DORLILPL2-1 /PM NAME RPascarelli GEM iller DATE 05/08/14 05/08/14 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}} | ||
/PM NAME RPascarelli GEM iller DATE 05/08/14 05/08 | |||
Latest revision as of 21:47, 5 February 2020
ML14114A305 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | McGuire ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/08/2014 |
From: | Geoffrey Miller Plant Licensing Branch II |
To: | Capps S Duke Energy Carolinas |
Miller G | |
References | |
TAC MF0140 | |
Download: ML14114A305 (11) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 May 8, 2014 Mr. Steven D. Capps Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-8985
SUBJECT:
MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1- STAFF ASSESSMENT OF THE SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT (TAC NO. MF0140)
Dear:
Mr. Capps:
On March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information letter per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter). The 50.54(f) letter was issued to power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits requesting addressees to provide further information to support the NRC staff's evaluation of regulatory actions to be taken in response to lessons learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The request addressed the metho~s and procedures for nuclear power plant licensees to conduct seismic and flooding hazard walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions through the corrective action program, and to verify the adequacy of the monitoring and maintenance procedures.
By letter dated November 26, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated June 20, 2013, Duke Energy submitted its Seismic Walkdown Report as requested in Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1. By letter dated November 26, 2013, Duke Energy provided a response to the NRC request for additional information for the NRC staff to complete its assessments.
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided and, as documented in the enclosed staff assessment, determined that sufficient information was provided to be responsive to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
S. Capps If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-2481 or by e-mail at Ed.Miller@nrc.gov.
?f~Ac<~
G. Edward Miller, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-369
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
STAFF ASSESSMENT OF SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3 RELATED TO THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT DUKE ENERGY MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-369
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 2012, 1 the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information per Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subpart 50.54(f) (50.54(f) letter) to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. The request was part of the implementation of lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Enclosure 3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," 2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to conduct seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions using the corrective action program (CAP), verify the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance procedures, and report the results to the NRC.
Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to provide the following:
- a. Information concerning the plant-specific hazard licensing bases and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing basis evaluation.
- b. Information related to the implementation of the walkdown process.
- c. A list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) program and a description of the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them.
- d. Results of the walkdown including key findings and identified degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions.
- e. Any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features.
- f. Results and any subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review.
In accordance with the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Required Response Item 2, licensees were required to submit a response within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the seismic walkdown process. By letter dated May 29, 2012, 3 the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) staff 1
ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340 2
ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A049 3
ADAMS Package Accession No. ML121640872 Enclosure
submitted Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) document 1025286, "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima* Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic,"
(walkdown guidance) to the NRC staff to consider for endorsement. By letter dated May 31, 2012, 4 the NRC staff endorsed the walkdown guidance. .
- By letter dated November 26, 2012, 5 Duke Energy (the licensee) provided a response to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter Required Response Item 2, for McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (MNS-1 ). In addition to the aforementioned letter, the licensee, by letter dated June 20, 20136 ,
provided an updated submittal to the initial seismic walkdown report. The purpose of the latter submittal was to update and provide information on inaccessible components not completed in the first submittal.
The NRC staff reviewed the walkdown report and determined that additional supplemental information would assist the NRC staff in completing its review. In letter dated November 1, 20137 , the NRC staff requested additional information to gain a better understanding of the processes and procedures used by the licensee in conducting the walkdowns and walk-bys. The licensee responded to the NRC staff request by letter dated November 26, 2013. 8 The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's submittals to determine if the information provided in the walkdown report met the intent of the walkdown guidance and if the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The structures, systems and components (SSCs) important to safety in operating nuclear power plants are designed either in accordance with, or meet the intent of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, General Design Criteria (GDC) 2: "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena;" and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria." GDC 2 states that SSCs important to safety at nuclear power plants shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena* such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
For initial licensing, each licensee was required to develop and maintain design bases that, as defined by 10 CFR 50.2, identify the specific functions that an sse of a facility must perform; and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for the design.
The design bases for the SSCs reflect appropriate consideration of the most severe natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area. The design bases also reflect sufficient margin to account for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated.
4 ADAMS Accession No. ML12145A529 5
ADAMS Package Accession No. ML130030480 6
ADAMS Package Accession No. ML13190A272 7
ADAMS Accession No. ML133048418 8
ADAMS Accession No. ML13338A171
The current licensing basis is the set of NRC requirements applicable to a specific plant, including the licensee's docketed commitments for ensuring compliance with, and operation within, applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis, including all modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the facility operating license.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Seismic Licensing Basis Information The licensee provided information on the plant-specific licensing basis for the Seismic Category I SSCs for MNS-1 in Section 1.0 of the walkdown report. Consistent with the walkdown guidance, the NRC staff noted that the report includes a summary of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and a description of the codes, standards, and methods that were used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.
Based on its review, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has provided information on the plant-specific seismic licensing basis and a description of the protection and mitigation features considered in the licensing bases evaluation consistent with Section 8, Submittal Report, of the walkdown guidance.
- 3.2 Seismic Walkdown Methodology Implementation Section 2, Personnel Qualifications; Section 3, Selection of SSCs; Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys; and Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provide information to licensees regarding the implementation of an appropriate seismic ,
walkdown methodology.
The walkdown report dated November 26, 2012, and supplemented on June 20, 2013, did not identify deviations from the walkdown guidance.
The NRC staff reviewed the following sections of the walkdown methodology implementation provided in the walkdown report:
- Personnel Qualifications
- Development of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWELs)
- Implementation of the Walkdown Process
- Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results 3.2.1 Personnel Qualifications Section 2, Personnel Qualifications, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with qualification information for personnel involved in the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys.
The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 2 and Appendix 5 of the walkdown report, which includes information on the walkdown personnel and their qualifications.
Specifically, the NRC staff reviewed the table summary of the background, experience, and level of involvement for the personnel involved in the seismic walkdown activities: equipment selection
personnel, seismic walkdown engineers (SWEs), licensing basis reviewers, IPEEE reviewers, peer review team, and operations staff.
Based on the review of the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that those involved in the seismic walkdown activities have the appropriate knowledge, as specified in Section 2 of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.2 Development of the SWELs Section 3, Selection ofSSCs, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees for selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the SWELs, so that they can be walked down by qualified personnel.
The NRC staff reviewed the overall process used by the licensee to develop the MNS-1 base list, SWEL 1 (sample list of designated safety functions equipment), and SWEL 2 (sample list of spent fuel pool related equipment). The overall equipment selection process followed the screening process shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 of the walkdown guidance. *Based on Attachments 2, 3 and 4 of the walkdown report, MNS-1 SWEL 1 and 2 meet the inclusion requirements of the walkdown guidance. Specifically, the following attributes were considered in the sample selection:
- A variety of systems, equipment and environments
- IPEEE equipment
- Major new or replacement equipment
- Risk considerations Due to individual plant configurations and the walkdown guidance screening process followed to select the final SWEL equipment, it is possible that some classes of equipment will not be represented on the SWEL. The walkdown guidance recognizes this is due to the equipment not being present in the plant (e.g., some plants generate DC power using inverters and therefore do not have motor generators) or the equipment being screened out during the screening process (the screening process is described in Section 3 of the walkdown guidance. After a review the NRC staff deemed the licensee adequately followed the screening process during the development of the equipment walkdown lists and the lists were appropriate.
The NRC staff also noted that a rapid drain-down list was included as part of the SWEL 2, as described in Section 3 of the guidance. The equipment review process is described in the walkdown report Section 3.0. After reviewing the information provided in this section, and , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified rapid drain down items to be included in the SWEL 2 as described in screen #4 of the walkdown guidance.
After reviewing the SWEL 1 and 2, the NRC staff concludes that the sample of SSCs represents a diversity of component types and assures inclusion of components from critical systems and functions, thereby meeting the intent of the walkdown guidance. In addition, the NRC staff notes that it appears that the equipment selection personnel were appropriately supported by plant operations staff as intended in the walkdown guidance.
3.2.3 Implementation of the Walkdown Process Section 4, Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys for each site.
- The NRC staff reviewed Section 4 of the walkdown report, which summarizes the process and results of the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys, including an overview of the number of items walked down and the number of areas walked-by. The walkdown report states that teams, consisting of two qualified Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) accompanied by a Duke staff engineer, conducted the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. According to the signed seismic walkdown checklists (SWCs) and area walkdown checklists (AWCs), these activities were conducted during the period of August 10, 2012, through September 13, 2012. In addition, a I subsequent set of walkdowns were performed March 16, 2013- April 23, 2013, as stated in the June 20, 2013, letter. The purpose of the last activity was to complete a number of items that were inaccessible during the initial walkdowns.
The walkdown report also states that the SWEs discussed their observations and judgments with each other during the walkdowns. Additionally, the SWEs agreed on the results of their seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys before reporting the results of their review. Attachments 5 and 7 of the final, June 20, 2013, walkdown report provide the completed SWCs and AWCs, documenting the results for each item of equipment on SWEL 1 and 2 and each area containing SWEL equipment.
The licensee documented cases of potentially adverse seismic conditions (PASCs) in the checklists for further evaluation. Table 4-1 of the walkdown report list the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and the area walk-bys. The table describes how each condition was addressed (e.g., placement in the CAP) and their resolution. Based on the review of the checklists, the NRC staff was unable to confirm that all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns were included in this table. As such, by letter dated November 1, 2013, the NRC staff issued two questions in a request for additional information (RAI) in order to obtain additional clarification regarding the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions identified in the field during the walkdowns and walk-bys. Specifically, in RAI 1, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide further explanation regarding how a field observation wa~ determined to be PASC, and to ensure that the basis for determination was addressed using normal plant processes and documented in the walkdown report. In response to RAI 1, the licensee confirmed that observations which could not be readily judged to be acceptable with respect to its current licensing basis during the walkdown were identified as PASCs and documented as condition reports in the CAP. The licensee referred to Table 4-1 of the walkdown report which includes all the PASCs identified during the walkdowns and area walk-bys for MNS-1.
After evaluating the licensee's response and reviewing Table 4-1 , the NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to RAI 1, PASCs were properly identified and documented, and summary Table 4-1 is considered complete.
In addition to the information provided above, the NRC staff notes that anchorage configurations were verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50-percent of the SWEL items, in accordance with Section 4 of the walkdown guidance.
The walkdown report states that where possible, cabinets were opened to ensure that visibly accessible internal components mountings are adequate. Additional walkdowns were conducted, as described in the supplemental report, to perform internal inspections of selected cabinets that were not completely inspected or were not opened during the initial walkdowns.
Based on the information provided in the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of the walkdown process meets the intent of the walkdown guidance.
3.2.4 Licensing Basis Evaluations and Results Section 5, Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the conduct of licensing basis evaluations for items identified during the seismic walkdowns as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed that might have potential seismic significance.
The NRC staff reviewed Section 5 of the MNS-1 Walkdown Report, which discusses the process for conducting the seismic licensing basis evaluations of the PASCs identified during the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys. The licensee stated that 32 items were identified by the SWEs during the walkdowns as a PASC. These items were entered into the CAP, were reviewed, and were concluded to be in compliance with the MNS-1 seismic licensing basis. In a few cases, minor records corrections or repairs (loose/missing fasteners) were conducted. The response to RAI 1 provided additional description and clarification on the process followed by the licensee when evaluating conditions with respect to the CLB. Table 4-1 of the walkdown report lists the key
- licensee findings, and provides a complete list of the potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions. This table also describes the actions taken or planned to address these conditions.
The NRC staff reviewed the CAP entries and the description of the actions taken to address potential deficiencies. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee appropriately identified potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions and entered them into the CAP, which meets the intent of the walkdown guidance, and appropriately dispositioned them.
3.2.5 Conclusion Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance for personnel qualifications, development of SWELs, implementation of the walkdown process, and seismic licensing basis evaluations.
3.3 Peer Review Section 6, Peer Review, of the walkdown guidance provides licensees with information regarding the conduct of peer reviews for the activities performed during the seismic walkdowns. Page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance identifies the following activities to be conducted during the peer review process:
- Review a sample of the checklists prepared for the seismic walkdowns and area walk-bys
- Review the licensing basis evaluations
- Review the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP
- Review the walkdown report
- Summarize the results of the peer review process in the walkdown report The NRC staff reviewed the information provided in Section 7 and Attachments 6 and 8 of the MNS-1 Walkdown Report which describes the conduct of the peer review. In addition, the NRC staff reviewed the response to RAI 2. In RAI 2, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide additional information on the overall peer review process that was followed as part of the walkdown activities. Specifically, the NRC staff requested the licensee to confirm that the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were assessed and documented in the report. The licensee was also requested to confirm that any individual involved in performing any given walkdown activity was not a peer reviewer for that same activity. In response to RAI 2, the licensee confirmed that all the activities identified on page 6-1 of the walkdown guidance were included as part of the peer review process and referred to the summary of the peer review activities provided in Section 7 and Attachments 6 and 8 of the walkdown report.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's summary of each of these activities, which included the peer review team members' level of involvement, the peer review findings, and resolution of peer review comments. After reviewing the licensee's submittals, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee sufficiently documented the results of the peer review activities and how these reviews affected the work described in the walkdown report.
Based on the discussion above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's results of the peer review and subsequent actions taken in response to the peer review meets the intent of Section 6 of the walkdown guidance.
3.4 IPEEE Information Section 7, IPEEE Vulnerabilities, of the walkdown guidance provides information to licensees regarding the reporting of the evaluations conducted and actions taken in response to seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program. Through the IPEEE program and Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities- 10 CFR 50.54(f)," dated November 23, 19889 , licensees had performed a systematic examination to identify any plant-specific vulnerability to severe accidents.
MNS-1 had concluded from the IPEEE that there were no vulnerabilities from external threats.
There were, however, nine enhancements that were recommended. A list of those enhancements and the completion dates were included in Table 6-1 of the walkdown report.
Based on the NRC staff's review of Section 6 of the walkdown report, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's identification of plant-specific vulnerabilities (including anomalies, outliers and other findings) identified by the IPEEE program, as well as actions taken to eliminate or reduce them, meets the intent of Section 7 of the walkdown guidance.
9 ADAMS Accession No. ML031150465
3.5 Planned Upgrades The licensee did not identify any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features in the walkdown report.
3.6 NRC Oversight 3.6.1 Independent Verification by Resident Inspectors On July 6, 2012, 10 the NRC issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/188 "Inspection of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns." In accordance with the Tl, NRC inspectors independently verified that the MNS-1 licensee implemented the seismic walkdowns in accordance with the walkdown guidance. Additionally, the inspectors independently performed walkdowns of a sample of seismic protection features. The inspection report dated January 25, 2013, 11 documents the results of this inspection and states that no findings were identified.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's implementation of seismic walkdown methodology meets the intent of the walkdown guidance. The NRC staff concludes that, through the implementation of the walkdown guidance activities and, in accordance with plant processes and procedures, the licensee verified the plant configuration with the current seismic licensing basis; addressed degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed seismic conditions; and verified the adequacy of monitoring and maintenance programs for protective features. Furthermore, the NRC staff notes that no immediate safety concerns were identified. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee responded appropriately to Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter, dated March 12, 2012.
10 ADAMS Accession No. ML12156A052 11 ADAMS Accession No. ML13028A143
S. Capps If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415:..2481 or by e-mail at Ed. Miller@nrc.gov.
Sincerely, IRA/
G. Edward Miller, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-369
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment of Seismic Walkdown Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC RidsOpaMail Resource RidsRgn2MaiiCenter Resource LPL2-1 R/F RidsNrrLASFigueroa Resource BRini, EDO Rl, Rll, Rill, RIV RidsNroDsea Resource RidsNrrPMMcGuire Resource RidsAcrsAcnw MaiiCTR Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource FVega, NRO RidsNrrDorllpl2-1 Resource LRegner, NRR NChokshi, NRO SFianders, NRO DJackson, NRO RKaras, NRO MJardaneh, NRO THerrity, RES ADAMS Accession Number: ML14114A305
- concurrence by e-mail OFFICE DORLJLPL2-1/PM DORL/LPL2-1 /LA JLD/PMB/PM DSEA/RGS2 NAME GEMiller SFigueroa NDiFrancesco DJackson*
DATE 05/07/14 04/28/14 04/28/14 01/31/14 OFFICE DORLILPL2-1 /BC DORLILPL2-1 /PM NAME RPascarelli GEM iller DATE 05/08/14 05/08/14 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY