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5-11-81 QTED CORRESPONDENCE 91                      UNITED STATES OF AMERCIA NUCLEAP REGULATORY COMMISSION g
5-11-81
vsnRG 3 gggj p    Q 2
                                                                                                !
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD            omte ot tde sec.
QTED CORRESPONDENCE
  .
91                      UNITED STATES OF AMERCIA NUCLEAP REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                                                    -
g vsnRG 3 gggj p    Q
                                                                                                  -
2 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD            omte ot tde sec.
3                                                        6      %;;3 '''-          3 4 In the Matter of                    )                      4                &
3                                                        6      %;;3 '''-          3 4 In the Matter of                    )                      4                &
                                                     )
                                                     )
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26 A. The purpose of this overall testimony is to address 27 Doherty Contention No. 47 which asserts that turbine missiles 28 may damage critical components of the ACNGS plant.      Intervenor 8203390    g3;
26 A. The purpose of this overall testimony is to address 27 Doherty Contention No. 47 which asserts that turbine missiles 28 may damage critical components of the ACNGS plant.      Intervenor 8203390    g3;


  .
   ,  1                                2 contends that the Allens Creek turbine generator is not 3 designed to prevent turbine missiles, that these missiles, 4 when generated, will damage critical cocponents of the system, 5 and that missile generation will cause stoppage or vibration 6 of the turbine resulting in halting and damage to the turbine 7 and main steam system. My testimony will address the evalua-8 tion of overall damage probabilities due to turbine missiles.
   ,  1                                2 contends that the Allens Creek turbine generator is not 3 designed to prevent turbine missiles, that these missiles, 4 when generated, will damage critical cocponents of the system, 5 and that missile generation will cause stoppage or vibration 6 of the turbine resulting in halting and damage to the turbine 7 and main steam system. My testimony will address the evalua-8 tion of overall damage probabilities due to turbine missiles.
9 nr. carnes will address the assertion that turbine missiles 10 will cause halting and damage to the main steam system.
9 nr. carnes will address the assertion that turbine missiles 10 will cause halting and damage to the main steam system.
11 Q. What is the basis for Intervenor's assertions?
11 Q. What is the basis for Intervenor's assertions?
12 A. Intervenor relies upon incidents of cracking in turbine 13 wheels that occurred at the Yankee Rowe and Zion Unit 1 14 plants. Mr. David Tees of flouston Lighting & Power Company 15 will address the Yankee Rowe and Zion incidents in his testimony.
12 A. Intervenor relies upon incidents of cracking in turbine 13 wheels that occurred at the Yankee Rowe and Zion Unit 1 14 plants. Mr. David Tees of flouston Lighting & Power Company 15 will address the Yankee Rowe and Zion incidents in his testimony.
.
16 Q. What criteria are used to assure that damage does not i
16 Q. What criteria are used to assure that damage does not i
17 occur due to a possible turbine missile?
17 occur due to a possible turbine missile?
18 A. The probability of damage was calculated for each 19 category I structure by evaluating the product of the prob-20 ability for missile generation and the probability of impact 21 on a structure. Structures and components are adequately 1
18 A. The probability of damage was calculated for each 19 category I structure by evaluating the product of the prob-20 ability for missile generation and the probability of impact 21 on a structure. Structures and components are adequately 1
'
22 protected if the risk of damage from turbine missiles does
22 protected if the risk of damage from turbine missiles does
                     -7 23 not exceed 10    per year. The risk presented by a postulated 24 turbine failure is determined by evaluating and combining i  25 three conditional probabilities:    the probability of a turbine 26 failure with missile ejection, Py; the probability of a 27 damaging strike on a structure, P2; and the probability of 28 damage to the structure or components housed there, P
                     -7 23 not exceed 10    per year. The risk presented by a postulated 24 turbine failure is determined by evaluating and combining i  25 three conditional probabilities:    the probability of a turbine 26 failure with missile ejection, Py; the probability of a 27 damaging strike on a structure, P2; and the probability of 28 damage to the structure or components housed there, P
* 3 l
* 3 l
                                                                    . . . . . . . .


   )
   )
    .
    ,
1                                                                    ~
1                                                                    ~
2                              or less per year, the event need not If P y xP2*    3 is 10 3  be considered in the design (see Standard Review Plan 4  S 2.2.3).
2                              or less per year, the event need not If P y xP2*    3 is 10 3  be considered in the design (see Standard Review Plan 4  S 2.2.3).
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wheels and 0 to 25' for last stage wheels (last stage g          wheels are of most concern since they have the highest energy).
wheels and 0 to 25' for last stage wheels (last stage g          wheels are of most concern since they have the highest energy).
: 2. There is equal probability of ejection in the 360  around the axis.
: 2. There is equal probability of ejection in the 360  around the axis.
27
27 28          Dep3nding upon the ejection angle, missiles can be
!
'
28          Dep3nding upon the ejection angle, missiles can be
                                          .---.


    .
.
.
1    ,
1    ,
J 2'    of two types, either direct, low trajectory missiles or high 3' trajectory, so called lob-shot missiles.            Due to plaat 4-    arrangement, orientation of the turbine generators, and 5      elevation of the turbine deck, only the Radwaste Building structure could be exposed to low trajectory missiles.        How-6l 7      ever, in order to impact on the Radwaste Building, a low 8      trajectory missile would have to penetrate the three foot l
J 2'    of two types, either direct, low trajectory missiles or high 3' trajectory, so called lob-shot missiles.            Due to plaat 4-    arrangement, orientation of the turbine generators, and 5      elevation of the turbine deck, only the Radwaste Building structure could be exposed to low trajectory missiles.        How-6l 7      ever, in order to impact on the Radwaste Building, a low 8      trajectory missile would have to penetrate the three foot l
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27      A. Should a turbine wheel fail during operation, it would 28      create a very large rotating imbalance in the turbine.
27      A. Should a turbine wheel fail during operation, it would 28      create a very large rotating imbalance in the turbine.


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
0-1                                                        2  Turbine protective instrumentation would signal the stop 3  and intercept valves to close.
0-
                    ,
1                                                        2  Turbine protective instrumentation would signal the stop 3  and intercept valves to close.
4        The plant is designed to accept the rapid closure of these 5  valves without adverse consequences, because closure is a 6  normal occurrence whenever the turbine or generator is 7  tripped. The transient on the steam system resulting from 8  the closure of these valves is more severe than would result 9' from sudden halting of the turbine, because valve closure 10  completely cuts off steam flow while a flow path would 11  exist through the halted turbine to the condenser.
4        The plant is designed to accept the rapid closure of these 5  valves without adverse consequences, because closure is a 6  normal occurrence whenever the turbine or generator is 7  tripped. The transient on the steam system resulting from 8  the closure of these valves is more severe than would result 9' from sudden halting of the turbine, because valve closure 10  completely cuts off steam flow while a flow path would 11  exist through the halted turbine to the condenser.
12        A rapid halting of the turbine due to missile ejection 13  could cause damage to the turbine.      However, the turbine and 14  the main steam system downsteam of the containment building 15  (after the main steam isolation valves [MSIV]) are not safety 16  related systems and are not required to remain operational 17  or even maintain integrity through transients.      Damage to 18  these systems will not imperil the health and safety of 19  the public.
12        A rapid halting of the turbine due to missile ejection 13  could cause damage to the turbine.      However, the turbine and 14  the main steam system downsteam of the containment building 15  (after the main steam isolation valves [MSIV]) are not safety 16  related systems and are not required to remain operational 17  or even maintain integrity through transients.      Damage to 18  these systems will not imperil the health and safety of 19  the public.
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23        Generation of a turbine missile will cause stopping of 24  the turbine generator through several methods including l
23        Generation of a turbine missile will cause stopping of 24  the turbine generator through several methods including l
25  closure of the valves which control steam flow to the turbine.
25  closure of the valves which control steam flow to the turbine.
i
i 20  Stopping of the turbine due to missile ceneration is not as E  severe a transient on 'he main steam system as the closure of 28  the valves shutting off steam flow and therefore will not damage the main steam system.
'
20  Stopping of the turbine due to missile ceneration is not as E  severe a transient on 'he main steam system as the closure of 28  the valves shutting off steam flow and therefore will not damage the main steam system.
I
I


                                                                  .
O
O
. 1l                              Exhibit RCI-l b;
. 1l                              Exhibit RCI-l b;
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23 Responsible for planning and directing all 24 engineering efforts toward shielding and 25 radiation monitoring of nuclear installa-26 tions; responsible for the planning, 27 direction, and performance of studies of 28                          transient effects in containments and
23 Responsible for planning and directing all 24 engineering efforts toward shielding and 25 radiation monitoring of nuclear installa-26 tions; responsible for the planning, 27 direction, and performance of studies of 28                          transient effects in containments and


O
O 2-1    Experience (Cont'as enclosures resulting from high energy pipe 2
                                    -
2-
* 1    Experience (Cont'as enclosures resulting from high energy pipe 2
I                      breaks, wind loadings, detonations; studies 3
I                      breaks, wind loadings, detonations; studies 3
     !                      of transient fluid flow phenomena; and heat 4
     !                      of transient fluid flow phenomena; and heat 4
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24 formed by consultants for a group of 25 utilities owning CE reactors and another 26                          group owning B&W reactors to assess 27 probability of pipe ruptures. In this 28 capacity, acted as consultant to SAI in
24 formed by consultants for a group of 25 utilities owning CE reactors and another 26                          group owning B&W reactors to assess 27 probability of pipe ruptures. In this 28 capacity, acted as consultant to SAI in


                                        - -
1  Experience (cont'd)
1  Experience (cont'd)
     ,    2                      the required probabilistic and fracture 3                      mechanics studies.
     ,    2                      the required probabilistic and fracture 3                      mechanics studies.
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loads inside the reactor vessel and the 8l'                    reactor cavity. Developed methodology for 9l'                    design against hydrogen detonations.
loads inside the reactor vessel and the 8l'                    reactor cavity. Developed methodology for 9l'                    design against hydrogen detonations.
10 l-11                      Directed design modifications of main steam 12-                      lines isolation and check valves to enable 13                        them to withstand rupture transients.
10 l-11                      Directed design modifications of main steam 12-                      lines isolation and check valves to enable 13                        them to withstand rupture transients.
14                        Engineered and designed novel neutron
14                        Engineered and designed novel neutron 15                        streaming shields for application in 16                        ex; sting PWR plants.
-
      '
15                        streaming shields for application in 16                        ex; sting PWR plants.
l 17    1971 - 1974        Engineer / Senior Engineer / Principal Engineer /
l 17    1971 - 1974        Engineer / Senior Engineer / Principal Engineer /
18                        supervisor, Applied Physics
18                        supervisor, Applied Physics
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l
l


6 1      Experience (Cont'd)
6 1      Experience (Cont'd) 2,l, wind loadings from detonaticut or tornadoes 3
  .
2,l, wind loadings from detonaticut or tornadoes 3
and/or hurricanes at critical structures; 4
and/or hurricanes at critical structures; 4
studies on potential hazards to nuclear 5
studies on potential hazards to nuclear 5
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12      1970 - 1971        Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 13 Assistant Professor, Department of Nuclesr 14                          Engineering 15                          Teaching Mathematical and Nuclear Physics, 16 Basic Nuclear Engineering, Applied 17                          Mathematics, Radiation Shielding.
12      1970 - 1971        Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 13 Assistant Professor, Department of Nuclesr 14                          Engineering 15                          Teaching Mathematical and Nuclear Physics, 16 Basic Nuclear Engineering, Applied 17                          Mathematics, Radiation Shielding.
18      1967 - 1970          Instructor, Department of Nuclear 19                          Engineering i
18      1967 - 1970          Instructor, Department of Nuclear 19                          Engineering i
'
20                          Teaching Nuclear Physics, Radiation Effects 21                          on Materials, Heat Transfer, Basic Nuclear i      22                          Engineering, research in Theoretical 23                          Nuclear Physics (neutron-proton cross-24                          sections) and radiation shielding (roof 25                          scattered radiation from infinite fallout 26                          fields); Assistant Director Professional 27                          Advisory Service Center for Fallout 28                          Shelter Development in Kansas.
20                          Teaching Nuclear Physics, Radiation Effects 21                          on Materials, Heat Transfer, Basic Nuclear i      22                          Engineering, research in Theoretical 23                          Nuclear Physics (neutron-proton cross-24                          sections) and radiation shielding (roof 25                          scattered radiation from infinite fallout 26                          fields); Assistant Director Professional 27                          Advisory Service Center for Fallout
    .
28                          Shelter Development in Kansas.


  .
1      Experience (Cont'd) 1965                Coordinator and Participant 2,
1      Experience (Cont'd) 1965                Coordinator and Participant 2,
Kansas State University-OCD International 3
Kansas State University-OCD International 3
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10:-
10:-
Proceedings of Salt Lake City, ANS Meeting 11 on Light Water Reactor Safety, CONF-730304 12 USAEC, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1973.
Proceedings of Salt Lake City, ANS Meeting 11 on Light Water Reactor Safety, CONF-730304 12 USAEC, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1973.
13 14 Iotti, R.C., et al., " Scattering of Fallout 15 Radiation from Ceilings of Protective 16 i                                Structures", Final Report under Department
13 14 Iotti, R.C., et al., " Scattering of Fallout 15 Radiation from Ceilings of Protective 16 i                                Structures", Final Report under Department 17 of Defense Contract No. OCK-OS-63-74, 18 19 Kansas Engineering Experiment Station, 20 Special Report No. 72, July 1966.
,
17 of Defense Contract No. OCK-OS-63-74, 18 19 Kansas Engineering Experiment Station, 20 Special Report No. 72, July 1966.
21 Iotti, R.C., et al., " Design of Structures 22 for Protection from Window-Collimated, 23 24 Ceilings - Scattered Fallout Radiation",
21 Iotti, R.C., et al., " Design of Structures 22 for Protection from Window-Collimated, 23 24 Ceilings - Scattered Fallout Radiation",
Presented at the Denver Meeting of the 25 American Nuclear Society, Trans-American 26 27 Nuclear Society, 9, 1, pp. 150-151, 1966.
Presented at the Denver Meeting of the 25 American Nuclear Society, Trans-American 26 27 Nuclear Society, 9, 1, pp. 150-151, 1966.
l 28
l 28


.
                                     . 1  Publications (Cont'd) 2l'                      Iotti, R.C., et al., " Solution of the 3                      Ceiling Shine Problem in Structure Shielding 4                        Design and Analysis", presented at the 5:                      Pittsburgh Meeting of the American Nuclear b
                                     . 1  Publications (Cont'd) 2l'                      Iotti, R.C., et al., " Solution of the 3                      Ceiling Shine Problem in Structure Shielding 4                        Design and Analysis", presented at the 5:                      Pittsburgh Meeting of the American Nuclear b
6:                      Society, Trans-American Nuclear Society, b
6:                      Society, Trans-American Nuclear Society, b
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l 28
l 28


  .
                                        -
1    Publications (Cont'd) 2:
1    Publications (Cont'd) 2:
Advanced Code for Dynamic Pipe Whip l
Advanced Code for Dynamic Pipe Whip l
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28 Particular Loads, Their Magnitude, Combina-i
28 Particular Loads, Their Magnitude, Combina-i


      .
  -
                                          -
8-
8-
   ,      }    Publications (Cont'd) tion and Time History, and Economics of 2
   ,      }    Publications (Cont'd) tion and Time History, and Economics of 2
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Knowledge and Implications for Man, pp.
Knowledge and Implications for Man, pp.
10l 585-599, June 1976.
10l 585-599, June 1976.
11
11 12' Iotti, R.C.,  " Neutron Streaming - The 13 Problem and Engineered Solution", Best 14 Paper Award, ANS M&C and RP&S Divisions -
                                                              ,
12' Iotti, R.C.,  " Neutron Streaming - The 13 Problem and Engineered Solution", Best 14 Paper Award, ANS M&C and RP&S Divisions -
15 ORNL/RSIC-43, 1978.
15 ORNL/RSIC-43, 1978.
16 17
16 17
         }g Iotti, R.C.,    " Regulatory Guides and Their
         }g Iotti, R.C.,    " Regulatory Guides and Their
         }g Impact on Engineering Analyses", ASME/PVP Conference, San Francisco, California, 20 I
         }g Impact on Engineering Analyses", ASME/PVP Conference, San Francisco, California, 20 I
'
21 August 1980.
21 August 1980.
22 Iotti, R.C.,  "The TMI Accident - The Impact 23 24 on Design'', ASME Winter Meeting, Chicago, l
22 Iotti, R.C.,  "The TMI Accident - The Impact 23 24 on Design'', ASME Winter Meeting, Chicago, l
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,  t 28 Piping Systems", SMIRT-6, M 10/4, Paris,
,  t 28 Piping Systems", SMIRT-6, M 10/4, Paris,


  .
.
                                      -
9-
9-
. 1  Publications (Cont'd) 2                        France, August 1981 31
. 1  Publications (Cont'd) 2                        France, August 1981 31
Line 257: Line 204:
26 27                          Iotti, R.C.,  " Velocities of Tornado Gener-28                          ated Missiles", Ebasco Topical Report,
26 27                          Iotti, R.C.,  " Velocities of Tornado Gener-28                          ated Missiles", Ebasco Topical Report,


I
I I!        B. Reports _ (Cont'd)
.
I!        B. Reports _ (Cont'd)
ETR-1003, 1975.
ETR-1003, 1975.
2['l 3l 4l:I 5"l l
2['l 3l 4l:I 5"l l
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9.
9.
l' 10' 11 12l<
l' 10' 11 12l<
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 i
        ,
24 25 26 i
28
28
_


t
t t
  -
h 1                              Exhibit WSC-1 l              EDUCATION  AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION 2
t h
        !
.
1                              Exhibit WSC-1 l              EDUCATION  AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION 2
3                              WILLIAM S. CARNES 4;      Born:      Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 11, 1950 5l Education: Mt. Lebanon High School, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania-1969 61                  General Motors Institute, Flint, Michigan, BSME-1974 h
3                              WILLIAM S. CARNES 4;      Born:      Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 11, 1950 5l Education: Mt. Lebanon High School, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania-1969 61                  General Motors Institute, Flint, Michigan, BSME-1974 h
7l                  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, BSEE-1976
7l                  University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, BSEE-1976 University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, BSCE-1976 8li 9        Licensed:  Engineer-In-Training in the State of Michigan 10l Memberships:          Construction Specifications Inst.itute TAU BETA PI 11    '; Experience:
          '
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, BSCE-1976 8li 9        Licensed:  Engineer-In-Training in the State of Michigan 10l Memberships:          Construction Specifications Inst.itute TAU BETA PI 11    '; Experience:
12        1981:      Lead BOP systems engineer for Al. lens Creek NGS Un h 'l.
12        1981:      Lead BOP systems engineer for Al. lens Creek NGS Un h 'l.
ll 13]                  Responsible for all BOP systems including SDD's, flow 14 b                diagrams, updating PSAR, design calculations, and 15                    systems input to equipment specifications.
ll 13]                  Responsible for all BOP systems including SDD's, flow 14 b                diagrams, updating PSAR, design calculations, and 15                    systems input to equipment specifications.
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E                    on th.. construction of the Waterford 3 Nuclear Genera-N                    ting Station,    Taft, Louisiana. As Cable Pulling
E                    on th.. construction of the Waterford 3 Nuclear Genera-N                    ting Station,    Taft, Louisiana. As Cable Pulling


  .
Engineer, I was responsible for the control of the 1
Engineer, I was responsible for the control of the 1
issuance of Cable Pull Forms to the Electrical Con-
issuance of Cable Pull Forms to the Electrical Con-
     !                  tracter Resolving Nonconformances on cable and race-3            ways,  resolving cable routing and pulling discrepancies, 4'            and to ensure that applicable codes and standards were 5            adhered to. As Electrical Engineer for the Reactor 6              Ausiliary Building, I tas responsible for Raceway and h            Electrical Equipment Installation, including resolu-7 tion of nonconformances and discrepancies.      Duties in-8' 9              cluded interfacing with Mechanical and Civil Depart-10              ments for design of Scismic Supports, Equipment Inter-11              facing and resolution of interferences. Also included 12'            was interfacing with vendors to assure that necessary 13
     !                  tracter Resolving Nonconformances on cable and race-3            ways,  resolving cable routing and pulling discrepancies, 4'            and to ensure that applicable codes and standards were 5            adhered to. As Electrical Engineer for the Reactor 6              Ausiliary Building, I tas responsible for Raceway and h            Electrical Equipment Installation, including resolu-7 tion of nonconformances and discrepancies.      Duties in-8' 9              cluded interfacing with Mechanical and Civil Depart-10              ments for design of Scismic Supports, Equipment Inter-11              facing and resolution of interferences. Also included 12'            was interfacing with vendors to assure that necessary 13 equipment modification would not jeopardize Class IE 14              or Seismic oualifications.
              '
15 16  1977-1978  WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION. Naval Reactors Facilities, Idaho Falls, Idaho. Nuclear Plant Engin-
equipment modification would not jeopardize Class IE 14              or Seismic oualifications.
                                          * ****
15
!
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19              Naval Nuclear Prototype. Responsibilities as Nuclear l
19              Naval Nuclear Prototype. Responsibilities as Nuclear l
l      20              Plant Engineer included monitoring and scheduling 21              Crew Training Program: Chemistry and Radiological Con-22              trol Prograr Administration and Auditing; co-ordina-23              tion of maintenance work packages and material during 24              both plant shutdown and routine maintenance; standing l
l      20              Plant Engineer included monitoring and scheduling 21              Crew Training Program: Chemistry and Radiological Con-22              trol Prograr Administration and Auditing; co-ordina-23              tion of maintenance work packages and material during 24              both plant shutdown and routine maintenance; standing l
25              watches as EOOW; and direct training of naval person-26              nel on the design and operating principles of all 27              Plant Systeras. Responsibilities as EOOW were to
25              watches as EOOW; and direct training of naval person-26              nel on the design and operating principles of all 27              Plant Systeras. Responsibilities as EOOW were to 28              assure .Hafe operation of the Prototype during all
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28              assure .Hafe operation of the Prototype during all


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I conditions, through direct supervision of crew.
2 Responsibility for entire plant required an in-depth knowledae of Design Principles Systems-Interfaces, 3
2 Responsibility for entire plant required an in-depth knowledae of Design Principles Systems-Interfaces, 3
Line 322: Line 249:
Chevrolet Motor Division, 23    1959-1973  GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
Chevrolet Motor Division, 23    1959-1973  GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.
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                        . _ . ..          .    -      -


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Latest revision as of 00:42, 31 January 2020

Testimony of Rc Iotti & Ws Carnes Re Doherty Contention 47, Turbine Missiles.Prof Qualifications Encl.Related Correspondence
ML19347F527
Person / Time
Site: Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date: 05/11/1981
From: Carnes W, Iotti R
EBASCO SERVICES, INC.
To:
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ML19347F516 List:
References
NUDOCS 8105190531
Download: ML19347F527 (19)


Text

^

5-11-81 QTED CORRESPONDENCE 91 UNITED STATES OF AMERCIA NUCLEAP REGULATORY COMMISSION g

vsnRG 3 gggj p Q 2

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD omte ot tde sec.

3 6  %;;3 - 3 4 In the Matter of ) 4 &

)

5 HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-466

)

6 (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

7 )

8 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF DR. ROBERT C. IOTTI AND WILLIAM S. CARNES ON BEHALF OF HOUSTON 9 LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY ON DOHERTY CONTENTION NO. 47/ TURBINE MISSILES 11 0 Dr. Iotti, please state your name, business affiliation, 12 and professional qualifications.

13 A. My name is Robert C. Iotti. I am employed by Ebasco as 14 the Chief Engineer for Applied Physics. My business address 15 is 2 World Trade Center, New York, NY. A statment of my pro-16 fessional qualifications is attached to this testimony as 17 Exhibit RCI-1.

18 o. Mr. carnes, please state your name, business affiliation, 19 and professional qualifications.

l 20 A. My name is William S. Carnes. I am employed by Ebasco 21 as Lead Balance of Plant Systems Engineer for ACNGS. My 1

22 business address is 160 Chubb Avenue, Lyndhurst, New Jersey.

23 A statement of my professional qualifications is attached to 24 this testinony as Exhibit WSC-1.

25 Q. Dr. Iotti, what is the purpose of this testimony?

26 A. The purpose of this overall testimony is to address 27 Doherty Contention No. 47 which asserts that turbine missiles 28 may damage critical components of the ACNGS plant. Intervenor 8203390 g3;

, 1 2 contends that the Allens Creek turbine generator is not 3 designed to prevent turbine missiles, that these missiles, 4 when generated, will damage critical cocponents of the system, 5 and that missile generation will cause stoppage or vibration 6 of the turbine resulting in halting and damage to the turbine 7 and main steam system. My testimony will address the evalua-8 tion of overall damage probabilities due to turbine missiles.

9 nr. carnes will address the assertion that turbine missiles 10 will cause halting and damage to the main steam system.

11 Q. What is the basis for Intervenor's assertions?

12 A. Intervenor relies upon incidents of cracking in turbine 13 wheels that occurred at the Yankee Rowe and Zion Unit 1 14 plants. Mr. David Tees of flouston Lighting & Power Company 15 will address the Yankee Rowe and Zion incidents in his testimony.

16 Q. What criteria are used to assure that damage does not i

17 occur due to a possible turbine missile?

18 A. The probability of damage was calculated for each 19 category I structure by evaluating the product of the prob-20 ability for missile generation and the probability of impact 21 on a structure. Structures and components are adequately 1

22 protected if the risk of damage from turbine missiles does

-7 23 not exceed 10 per year. The risk presented by a postulated 24 turbine failure is determined by evaluating and combining i 25 three conditional probabilities: the probability of a turbine 26 failure with missile ejection, Py; the probability of a 27 damaging strike on a structure, P2; and the probability of 28 damage to the structure or components housed there, P

  • 3 l

)

1 ~

2 or less per year, the event need not If P y xP2* 3 is 10 3 be considered in the design (see Standard Review Plan 4 S 2.2.3).

5 0 Has an evaluation of damage probabilities due to turbine 6 ! missiles been done for Allens Creek?

7 A. Such an evaluation has been performed for Allens Creek.

8 The probability of missile generation assumed is based upon O' historical data on turbine failures compiled by S.H. Bush 10 of Battelle Laboratory and referenced in Standard Review Plan 11 3.5.1.3. For a destructive overspeed failure, the ACNGS 12 -5 analysis used 4.0 x 10 / turbine year as the probability of 13 missible generation.

14 The ACNGS evaluation addresses the probability, 15 p f a turbine missile impacting on any Allens Creek 2,

16 safety related structures assuming that one had been 17 generated. This analysis shows that probability of impact 18 is strictly a function of the location and size of a particular l 19 structure.

E Q. Please describe the evaluation done for probability of 21 missile impact, P 2 and subsequent damage, P 3' 22 A. The ACNGS evaluation utilizes two basic assumptions:

E 1. Based upon test data, deflection angles of failed turbine wheels are constrained to +5' for interior N -

wheels and 0 to 25' for last stage wheels (last stage g wheels are of most concern since they have the highest energy).

2. There is equal probability of ejection in the 360 around the axis.

27 28 Dep3nding upon the ejection angle, missiles can be

1 ,

J 2' of two types, either direct, low trajectory missiles or high 3' trajectory, so called lob-shot missiles. Due to plaat 4- arrangement, orientation of the turbine generators, and 5 elevation of the turbine deck, only the Radwaste Building structure could be exposed to low trajectory missiles. How-6l 7 ever, in order to impact on the Radwaste Building, a low 8 trajectory missile would have to penetrate the three foot l

9lthickreinforcedconcreteturbinedeckatanimpactangleof 10' 5 to 14 degrees from horizontal. Under these conditions the 11 missile cannot penetrate the turbine deck; that is, P3 is

12. equal to 0.

13 The probability of impact (P2) n plant structures from 14 lob-shot missiles is directly related to the horizontal area 15 of the structures. The probability of subsequent damage (P3) 16 is assumed to be either 0 or 1 depending on whether the 17 missile has sufficient energy to penetrate the structure.

38 Q. What is the probability of damage from turbine missiles?

19 A. The evaluation has shown the total probability of damaging

~7 per year, based upon the probabilities 20 impact to be :es than 10 21 cf missile generation previously discussed.

22 Q. Mr. Carnes, Inte.rvenor has also alleged that turbine 23 missiles will cause dangerous halting and damage to the 24 main steam system. What are the potential safety consequences 25 to the turbine itself and the main steam system from generation 26 of turbine missiles?

27 A. Should a turbine wheel fail during operation, it would 28 create a very large rotating imbalance in the turbine.

0-1 2 Turbine protective instrumentation would signal the stop 3 and intercept valves to close.

4 The plant is designed to accept the rapid closure of these 5 valves without adverse consequences, because closure is a 6 normal occurrence whenever the turbine or generator is 7 tripped. The transient on the steam system resulting from 8 the closure of these valves is more severe than would result 9' from sudden halting of the turbine, because valve closure 10 completely cuts off steam flow while a flow path would 11 exist through the halted turbine to the condenser.

12 A rapid halting of the turbine due to missile ejection 13 could cause damage to the turbine. However, the turbine and 14 the main steam system downsteam of the containment building 15 (after the main steam isolation valves [MSIV]) are not safety 16 related systems and are not required to remain operational 17 or even maintain integrity through transients. Damage to 18 these systems will not imperil the health and safety of 19 the public.

20 Q. What are your conclusions?

l 21 A. The probability of unacceptable consequences from postu-E lated turbine missiles is well below NRC criteria of 10~ /yr. -

23 Generation of a turbine missile will cause stopping of 24 the turbine generator through several methods including l

25 closure of the valves which control steam flow to the turbine.

i 20 Stopping of the turbine due to missile ceneration is not as E severe a transient on 'he main steam system as the closure of 28 the valves shutting off steam flow and therefore will not damage the main steam system.

I

O

. 1l Exhibit RCI-l b;

2! EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS Robert c. Iotti 3lh' 4 Born Karisruhe', Germany 5; Member American Nuclear Society Subcommittee 6'

b ANS 55.2 on Protection Againnt the Effects I of Pipe Whip; 7I b

81 Member Atomic Industrial Forum Ad-Hoc

!! Committee on Pipe Whip 9

b 10: Professional 11 Licenses Professional Engineer, New York State, 12 No. 053262 13 Education Kansas State University - Ph. D. in 14 Nuclear Engineering (Physics and Applied Mathematics);

15 M. S. in Nuclear Engineering (Applied 16 Mechanics);

17 B. S. in Nuclear Engineering (Mechanical 18 19 Engineering) 20 Experience Ebasco Services, Incorporated, New York 21 Office 22 1974 - Chief Engineer, Applied Physics:

23 Responsible for planning and directing all 24 engineering efforts toward shielding and 25 radiation monitoring of nuclear installa-26 tions; responsible for the planning, 27 direction, and performance of studies of 28 transient effects in containments and

O 2-1 Experience (Cont'as enclosures resulting from high energy pipe 2

I breaks, wind loadings, detonations; studies 3

! of transient fluid flow phenomena; and heat 4

5l, transfer studies. Developed and directed li work in establishing a methodology for 6l' evaluation of piping vibrations during 7,

steady state and transient loading condi-8' b tions. Developed a methodology for sim-9 b ulation of transients in power plants and 10l 11 a computer program to describe the boiler implosion phenomenon. Managed the effort 12 of a special group of engineers dedicated 13 to an in-house research and development 14 15 program on solar energy use which ranged from the basic physics of the insolation, 16 to the design of thermal, thermo-electric 17 and photovoltaic systems. Responsible for 18 19 technical review and direction of radiation 20 transport activation and damage studies, 21 thermal hydraulic studies, and fluid heating and cooling design of the Tokamak 22 Directed work per-23 Fusion Test Reactor.

24 formed by consultants for a group of 25 utilities owning CE reactors and another 26 group owning B&W reactors to assess 27 probability of pipe ruptures. In this 28 capacity, acted as consultant to SAI in

1 Experience (cont'd)

, 2 the required probabilistic and fracture 3 mechanics studies.

4. Directed and performed work required for the complete analyses of the reactor vessel 5ll 6 supports of a PWR plant under LOCA condi-7 tions resulting in asymmetric pressure t

loads inside the reactor vessel and the 8l' reactor cavity. Developed methodology for 9l' design against hydrogen detonations.

10 l-11 Directed design modifications of main steam 12- lines isolation and check valves to enable 13 them to withstand rupture transients.

14 Engineered and designed novel neutron 15 streaming shields for application in 16 ex; sting PWR plants.

l 17 1971 - 1974 Engineer / Senior Engineer / Principal Engineer /

18 supervisor, Applied Physics

(

i 19 Responsible for shielding design of nuclear 20 electric generating plants; engineering of 21 state-of -the-art radiation monitoring 22 systems for nuclear plants; development and 23 implementation of theory and computerized l 24 models describing the tranrient effects in 25 systems and enclosures resulting from high 1

26 energy pipe breaks; studies on turbine, 27 detonation and tornado driven missiles; 28 development of models predicting blast or i

(

l

6 1 Experience (Cont'd) 2,l, wind loadings from detonaticut or tornadoes 3

and/or hurricanes at critical structures; 4

studies on potential hazards to nuclear 5

islands resulting from breaks in nearby 61 pipelines; development of models and codes 7;

h describing transient fluid effects such as i

steaa hammer effects on main steam and dump 8, ,

h 9" lines, pressurizer relief lines; studies on 11 fin temperature distribution for a molten 10-11 salt reactor plant heat exchanges.

12 1970 - 1971 Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas 13 Assistant Professor, Department of Nuclesr 14 Engineering 15 Teaching Mathematical and Nuclear Physics, 16 Basic Nuclear Engineering, Applied 17 Mathematics, Radiation Shielding.

18 1967 - 1970 Instructor, Department of Nuclear 19 Engineering i

20 Teaching Nuclear Physics, Radiation Effects 21 on Materials, Heat Transfer, Basic Nuclear i 22 Engineering, research in Theoretical 23 Nuclear Physics (neutron-proton cross-24 sections) and radiation shielding (roof 25 scattered radiation from infinite fallout 26 fields); Assistant Director Professional 27 Advisory Service Center for Fallout 28 Shelter Development in Kansas.

1 Experience (Cont'd) 1965 Coordinator and Participant 2,

Kansas State University-OCD International 3

Summer Institute of Fundamental Radiation 4l, Shielding Problems as Applied to Nuclear 5l-l Defense Planning.

6l: Publications 7

Iotti, R.C., W. J. Krotiuk, and D. R.

i A. Papers -

gfl, l deBoisblanc, " Hazards to Nuclear Plants 9/

N From, On (or Near) Site Gaseous Explosions",

10:-

Proceedings of Salt Lake City, ANS Meeting 11 on Light Water Reactor Safety, CONF-730304 12 USAEC, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1973.

13 14 Iotti, R.C., et al., " Scattering of Fallout 15 Radiation from Ceilings of Protective 16 i Structures", Final Report under Department 17 of Defense Contract No. OCK-OS-63-74, 18 19 Kansas Engineering Experiment Station, 20 Special Report No. 72, July 1966.

21 Iotti, R.C., et al., " Design of Structures 22 for Protection from Window-Collimated, 23 24 Ceilings - Scattered Fallout Radiation",

Presented at the Denver Meeting of the 25 American Nuclear Society, Trans-American 26 27 Nuclear Society, 9, 1, pp. 150-151, 1966.

l 28

. 1 Publications (Cont'd) 2l' Iotti, R.C., et al., " Solution of the 3 Ceiling Shine Problem in Structure Shielding 4 Design and Analysis", presented at the 5: Pittsburgh Meeting of the American Nuclear b

6: Society, Trans-American Nuclear Society, b

7g 9, 2, pp. 346-347, 1966.

l 8l.

0 9' Iotti, R.C. and H.J. Donnett, " Interaction 10 of Neutrons with Helium 3", Acta Physics 11 Austriaca, 44, pp. 7-26, 1976.

12 13 Iotti, R.C., and H.J. Donnert, " Finite 14 Differences Method of Solution for the 15 Two-Channel Reaction Problem", Acta Physica 16 Austriaca, 44, pp. 27-32, 1976.

17 18 Iotti, R.C., " Design Basis Velocities of 19 Tornado-Generated Missiles", Trans-American 20 Nuclear Society, 21. pp. 202-203, 1975.

21 l

22 Iotti, R.C., " Impact of Pipe Break on the 23 A/E", presented in a Panel Discussion at

(

24 the Second National Conference on Piping 25 and Pressure Vessels, San Francisco, l l

26 California, June 1975.

27 1

Heifetz, J. and R.C. Iotti, " PLAST -

l 28

1 Publications (Cont'd) 2:

Advanced Code for Dynamic Pipe Whip l

3 1 Analysis", Trans-American Nuclear Society, 21, pp . 202-207, 1975.

4 5

6: Yang, T.L. and R.C. Iotti, " Reactor Cavity f! Fast Neutron Streaming Calculation and 7-8; Shielding Design by Monte Carolo Techniques" b

9:

Trans-American Nuclear Society, 22, pp. 806-103 807, 1975.

11 Iotti, R.C. et al., " Analysis and Upgrading 12 13 of Swing-Type Steam valves", Trans-American 14 Nuclear Society, 22, pp. 561-562, 1975.

15 16 Iotti, R.C., R. Hensler, and R. Scully, 17

" Thermal Analysis of Reactor Support 18 Systems", Trans-American Nuclear Society, 19 23, p. 415, 1975.

20 16 21 Iotti, R.C. et al., " Determination of N 22 levels for an Operating Boiling Water 23 Reactor", Trans-American Nuclear Society, 24 23, pp. 598-599, 1976.

25 26 Iotti, R.C., " Establishing Loadings for 27 Cor.tainment Design, Including Choice of l

28 Particular Loads, Their Magnitude, Combina-i

8-

, } Publications (Cont'd) tion and Time History, and Economics of 2

g Containments", Winter Annual Meeting of the Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, 4

1976.

5:

6 7,

I Iotti, R.C., " Velocities of Tornado l Generated Missiles", Proceedings of the gl;' Symposium on Tornadoes, Assessment of 9

Knowledge and Implications for Man, pp.

10l 585-599, June 1976.

11 12' Iotti, R.C., " Neutron Streaming - The 13 Problem and Engineered Solution", Best 14 Paper Award, ANS M&C and RP&S Divisions -

15 ORNL/RSIC-43, 1978.

16 17

}g Iotti, R.C., " Regulatory Guides and Their

}g Impact on Engineering Analyses", ASME/PVP Conference, San Francisco, California, 20 I

21 August 1980.

22 Iotti, R.C., "The TMI Accident - The Impact 23 24 on Design, ASME Winter Meeting, Chicago, l

i Illinois, November 1980.

25 26 l Iotti, R.C. et al., " Dynamic Design of l 27

, t 28 Piping Systems", SMIRT-6, M 10/4, Paris,

9-

. 1 Publications (Cont'd) 2 France, August 1981 31

4. Iotti, R.C. and M. badrian, "Non-Linear 5l Analysis of a Biological Shield Wall Under 6: LOCA Loads in a PWR Plant", SMIRT-6, J 5/3, b

7 August 1981.

8 0

9 B. Reports - Iotti, R.C. et al., " Potential Hazards to 10 the Allens Creek Nuclear Station for 11 Hypothetical Breaks in Proximate Natural 12' and Liquified Petroleum Gas Lines",

13 Ebasco Report, APTR-1, 1974.

14 15 Iotti, R.C. et al., " Steam Hammer Analysis",

16 Ebasco Report, APTR-4, 1974.

17 18 Iotti, R.C. et al., "St. Lucie 1 Dynamic 19 Fluid and Stress Analysis of Main Steam 20 Isolation / Check Valves", Ebasco Report, 21 APTR-7.

22 23 Iotti, R.C. et al., " Measurements of N Effluent Activity at Steam Jet Air Ejector 25 of Millstone Unit 1", Ebasco Report, APTR-9.

26 27 Iotti, R.C., " Velocities of Tornado Gener-28 ated Missiles", Ebasco Topical Report,

I I! B. Reports _ (Cont'd)

ETR-1003, 1975.

2['l 3l 4l:I 5"l l

6i l'i 7:

h 8l ,

9.

l' 10' 11 12l<

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 i

28

t t

h 1 Exhibit WSC-1 l EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION 2

3 WILLIAM S. CARNES 4; Born: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 11, 1950 5l Education: Mt. Lebanon High School, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania-1969 61 General Motors Institute, Flint, Michigan, BSME-1974 h

7l University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, BSEE-1976 University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, BSCE-1976 8li 9 Licensed: Engineer-In-Training in the State of Michigan 10l Memberships: Construction Specifications Inst.itute TAU BETA PI 11 '; Experience:

12 1981: Lead BOP systems engineer for Al. lens Creek NGS Un h 'l.

ll 13] Responsible for all BOP systems including SDD's, flow 14 b diagrams, updating PSAR, design calculations, and 15 systems input to equipment specifications.

16 1980-1981 EBASCO SERVICES, INCORPORATED. Mechanical Engineer -

17 on the design of the Allens Creek Nuclear Generatlng 18- Station. Systems Engineer for the following: Conden-19 sate and Feedwater, Heater Drains and Vents, Extrac-20 tion Steam, Main Condenser Air Evacuation, and Diesel 21 Fuel Oil. Responsibilities for the above Systems in-22 clude Flow Diagram and Design Description Preparatier 23 and revision to assure that the System Configuration 24 will result in proper response for all modes of opera-25 tion.

26 1978-1980 EBASCO SERVICES, INCORPORATED. Electrical Engineer t

E on th.. construction of the Waterford 3 Nuclear Genera-N ting Station, Taft, Louisiana. As Cable Pulling

Engineer, I was responsible for the control of the 1

issuance of Cable Pull Forms to the Electrical Con-

! tracter Resolving Nonconformances on cable and race-3 ways, resolving cable routing and pulling discrepancies, 4' and to ensure that applicable codes and standards were 5 adhered to. As Electrical Engineer for the Reactor 6 Ausiliary Building, I tas responsible for Raceway and h Electrical Equipment Installation, including resolu-7 tion of nonconformances and discrepancies. Duties in-8' 9 cluded interfacing with Mechanical and Civil Depart-10 ments for design of Scismic Supports, Equipment Inter-11 facing and resolution of interferences. Also included 12' was interfacing with vendors to assure that necessary 13 equipment modification would not jeopardize Class IE 14 or Seismic oualifications.

15 16 1977-1978 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION. Naval Reactors Facilities, Idaho Falls, Idaho. Nuclear Plant Engin-

17 l

l l

18 eer/ Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) on a i

19 Naval Nuclear Prototype. Responsibilities as Nuclear l

l 20 Plant Engineer included monitoring and scheduling 21 Crew Training Program: Chemistry and Radiological Con-22 trol Prograr Administration and Auditing; co-ordina-23 tion of maintenance work packages and material during 24 both plant shutdown and routine maintenance; standing l

25 watches as EOOW; and direct training of naval person-26 nel on the design and operating principles of all 27 Plant Systeras. Responsibilities as EOOW were to 28 assure .Hafe operation of the Prototype during all

I conditions, through direct supervision of crew.

2 Responsibility for entire plant required an in-depth knowledae of Design Principles Systems-Interfaces, 3

4 and operating procedures.

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATlCN.

Chevrolet Motor Division; 5 1975-1976 6 On educational leave of absence to obtain BSCE and 7

l BSEE degrees at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

8 Chevrolet Motor Division; g 1974-1975 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.

Chevrolet - Saginaw Grey Iron Casting Plant; 1629 10l' Nortn Washington Ave., Saginaw, Michigan; Production 11' 12, Supervisor. Duties included the supervision of d

11 26 men on 18 Osborn Hot Box core machines, pro-13:j 14 ducing sand cores for automotive grey iron casting.

197.-1974 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. Chevrolet Motor 15 16 Division, Chevrolet-Saginaw Grey Iron Casting Plant, 17 1629 North Washington Ave., Saginaw, Michigan; 18 Fifth-Year Student Duties included time and method?

19 studies in the industrial Engineering Department 20 while compiling the plant specific thesis "An 21 Analysis of Cupola Material Handling and Yard 22 Layout to Improve Charging Efficiency."

Chevrolet Motor Division, 23 1959-1973 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION.

Chevrolet-Saginaw Grey Iron Casting Plant, 1629 24 25 North Washington Ave., Saginaw, Michifin; Co-Operative 26 Student. Assignments during the work sections (work 27 sections and school sections alternated every six-28 we3ks), included Production Supervision, Quality Con-

. . ... -- - . . =. - - . _ _ . . _ . . . .

i .- _4_

1 trol Engineer, Industrial Engineer, and Labor' Rela-2 tions Investigator.

I~

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15 l 16

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