Information Notice 1985-74, Station Battery Problems

Station Battery Problems

ML031180629
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	08/29/1985
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-074, NUDOCS 8508270031
Download: ML031180629 (4)

SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-74 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 August 29, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-74: STATION BATTERY PROBLEMS

Addressees

a

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This notice describes problems that have occurred with lead-acid station as a

batteries at several nuclear power plants. These problems were discovered

result of inspections by the NRC Performance Appraisal Team (PAT). It is

their

expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to

facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem

occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

All four recent inspections by the PAT identified problems with lead-acid

station batteries. Although all of the problems are not listed here, a summarythat

of a few of the more significant problems with lead-acid station batteries

were identified as a result of these inspections is provided below:

Cooper PAT Inspection (November 1984):

The battery rated-load discharge test was performed at a discharge rate

significantly less than the manufacturer's recommended rated-load discharge

rate for the 8-hour period of the test. The licensee had no records of battery

charging following the completion of battery discharge test and consequently

the time and date the batteries were returned to service could not be determined.

The licensee failed to correct specific gravity measurements for electrolyte

temperature and level. The licensee had no written procedures for conducting

charges of the station batteries.

McGuire PAT Inspection (February 1985):

Three cells were placed on single-cell chargers for about 2 years, thus raising

questions regarding the operability of the battery and electrical independence

and separation of the Class 1E dc power systems. The cells on single cell

8508270031

J

IN 85-74 August 29, 1985 charge were at voltages higher than specified in the vendor manual. Although

one cell in the battery was jumpered out, the float voltage for the entire

battery was not reduced; consequently each cell was floated at a voltage higher

than specified in the battery vendor manual. The battery performance discharge

test was performed improperly because the test was stopped before reaching the

minimum specified voltage.

Susquehanna PAT Inspection (February 1985):

There were no station procedures for maintaining station batteries in accordance

with the battery vendor's manual or IEEE Std 450-1975, "IEEE Recommended

Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries

for Generating Stations and Substations" (which is endorsed by Regulatory Guide

1.129, "Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries

for Nuclear Power Plants"). Intercell resistance values were not compared with

previous values to determine when corrective action was required. The licensee

did not always conduct equalizing charges when required; nor did the licensee

have procedures for monitoring the progress of an equalizing charge or determining

when the charge should be terminated. Surveillance procedures for the 60-month

rated-capacity discharge test did not conform to IEEE Std 450-1975 because the

test was terminated at the end of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, instead of when the terminal voltage

fell to the minimum specified value (usually 1.75 volts per cell). The licensee's

procedures did not require that the average specific gravity be calculated and

compared to the technical-specification acceptance criteria.

San Onofre PAT Inspection (March 1985):

During the first 2 years of operation, the battery capacity tests required by

the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and IEEE Std 450-1980 were not performed

on Units 2 and 3. The total battery float voltage was not adjusted to account

for two jumpered out cells. The two jumpered out cells did not receive the

manufacturer's specified surveillances, maintenance, or charges. The pilot

cells were not being changed on a yearly basis, as recommended by the vendor's

technical instructions. The station engineer responsible for the technical

aspects of battery operation, maintenance, and surveillance did not receive

surveillance results and data sheets on a routine basis.

Discussion:

Recent IE inspections of operating facilities indicate that several widespread

deficiencies may exist in the operation and maintenance of station batteries.

These deficiencies are attributable to a variety of causes, including licensee

error, inadequate knowledge of batteries by maintenance technicians and

supervisors, and inadequate procedural guidance. The results of these

inspections suggest a general lack of appreciation amongst licensee personnel

for proper maintenance and surveillance of station batteries. Although batteries

contain no moving parts, considerable care and attention to detail is required

to maintain them operable. Too often, licensees may be treating these vital

engineered safety features (ESF) power supplies as "passive" components and not

providing them the necessary management and technical attention.

IN 85-74 August 29, 1985 The following reference materials provide guidance as to the individual

requirements for a facility's station batteries.

1. IEEE 450-1975, and 1980

2. Regulatory Guide 1.129, Rev. 1, "Maintenance, Testing and Replacement

of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants" (This

regulatory guide endorses IEEE Std 450-1975 with certain exceptions.)

3. Facility Technical Specifications

4. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

5. Station Battery Vendor Technical Manual (The vendors of station

batteries periodically update their manuals to include revised

guidance.)

Other recent problems with station batteries were described in IE Information

Notice 84-83: VARIOUS BATTERY PROBLEMS, November 14, 1984.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis- trator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.

war Joran, Director

Divisi of Emergency Preparedness

and Engineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

CONTACT

S: E. W. Weiss, IE

(301) 492-9005 L. J. Callan, IE

(301) 492-9497 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 85-74 August 29, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

84-70 Reliance On Water Level 8/26/85 All power reactor

Sup. 1 Instrumentation With A facilities holding

Common Reference Leg an OL or CP

85-73 Emergency Diesel Generator 8/23/85 All power reactor

Control Circuit Logic Design facilities holding

Error an OL or CP

85-72 Uncontrolled Leakage Of 8/22/85 All power reactor

Reactor Coolant Outside facilities holding

Containment an OL or CP

85-71 Containment Integrated Leak 8/22/85 All power reactor

Rate Tests facilities holding

an OL or CP

85-70 Teletherapy Unit Full 8/15/85 All material

Calibration And Qualified licensees

Expert Requirements (10 CFR

35.23 And 10 CFR 35.24)

85-69 Recent Felony Conviction For 8/15/85 All power reactor

Cheating On Reactor Operator facilities holding

Requalification Tests an OL or CP

85-68 Diesel Generator Failure At 8/14/85 All power reactor

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear facilities holding

Station Unit 1 an OL or CP

85-42 Loose Phosphor In Panasonic 8/12/85 Materials and fuel

Rev. 1 800 Series Badge Thermo- cycle licensees

luminescent Dosimeter (TLD)

Elements

85-67 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator Key 8/8/85 All power reactor

May Fall Out Of Place When facilities holding

Mounted Below Horizontal Axis an OL or CP

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit