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| | number = ML17003A033 | | | number = ML17003A033 |
| | issue date = 12/29/2016 | | | issue date = 12/29/2016 |
| | title = Palo Verde, Enclosure 2 - APS Meeting Slides | | | title = Enclosure 2 - APS Meeting Slides |
| | author name = | | | author name = |
| | author affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co | | | author affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:Second License Amendment Request for the Unit 3 Train B Diesel GeneratorPalo Verde Nuclear Generating Station December 29, 2016 Agenda*Background | | {{#Wiki_filter:Second License Amendment Request for the Unit 3 Train B Diesel Generator Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station December 29, 2016 |
| *Regulatory Commitments | | |
| *Event Investigation | | Agenda |
| *Risk Assessment | | * Background |
| *Second License Amendment Request | | * Regulatory Commitments |
| *Conclusions 2 | | * Event Investigation |
| | * Risk Assessment |
| | * Second License Amendment Request |
| | * Conclusions 2 |
| | |
| First License Amendment Request (LAR) | | First License Amendment Request (LAR) |
| *One-time Technical Specification (TS) Change to Allow a 21 day Completion Time In Response to Failure of Unit 3 B Train DG on December 15, 2016-Extension of 11 days needed to collect/analyze data and continue repair | | * One-time Technical Specification (TS) Change to Allow a 21 day Completion Time In Response to Failure of Unit 3 B Train DG on December 15, 2016 |
| -Deterministic justification based upon BTP 8-8 | | - Extension of 11 days needed to collect/analyze data and continue repair |
| -Risk insights provided to support change | | - Deterministic justification based upon BTP 8-8 |
| -NRC commitments made in LAR | | - Risk insights provided to support change |
| -NRC Amendment 199 issued on December 23, 2016 3 | | - NRC commitments made in LAR |
| | - NRC Amendment 199 issued on December 23, 2016 3 |
| | |
| Regulatory Commitments | | Regulatory Commitments |
| *Commitments documented in NRC Amendment #199 include but are not limited | | * Commitments documented in NRC Amendment #199 include but are not limited to: |
| | - Three, 2 MW portable DGs staged, tested and hooked-up to Unit 3 FLEX 4.16KV connections |
| | - Diesel driven FLEX Steam Generator make-up pump staged in Unit 3 |
| | - Suspension of discretionary maintenance on SBOGs, Switchyard, Safety Systems |
| | - Establish protected equipment controls for Train A equipment, SBOGs, portable equipment |
| | - Commitments monitored and tracked by OPS |
| | - Dedicated personnel 4 |
|
| |
|
| to:-Three, 2 MW portable DGs staged, tested and hooked-up to Unit 3 FLEX 4.16KV connections
| |
| -Diesel driven FLEX Steam Generator make-up pump staged in Unit 3
| |
| -Suspension of discretionary maintenance on SBOGs, Switchyard, Safety Systems
| |
| -Establish protected equipment controls for Train A equipment, SBOGs, portable equipment
| |
| -Commitments monitored and tracked by OPS
| |
| -Dedicated personnel 4
| |
| Palo Verde AC Power System 5 | | Palo Verde AC Power System 5 |
| | |
| Palo Verde AC Power System 6 | | Palo Verde AC Power System 6 |
| | |
| Event Investigation | | Event Investigation |
| *Partnerships established with MPR, Goltens, Structural Integrity, EPRI, and the Cooper- | | * Partnerships established with MPR, Goltens, Structural Integrity, EPRI, and the Cooper-Bessemer Owners Group |
| | * Evidence of high cycle fatigue on master connecting rod |
| | * Second major failure of 3B DG (9R) |
| | * 1986 event created localized misalignment 7 |
|
| |
|
| Bessemer Owners Group
| |
| *Evidence of high cycle fatigue on master connecting rod
| |
| *Second major failure of 3B DG (9R)
| |
| *1986 event created localized misalignment 7
| |
| Operating Experience (OE) | | Operating Experience (OE) |
| *Cooper-Bessemer KSV-20 OE | | * Cooper-Bessemer KSV-20 OE |
| -1986 -Palo Verde 3B DG connecting rod (9R) failure during unit startup testing program | | - 1986 - Palo Verde 3B DG connecting rod (9R) failure during unit startup testing program |
| -1989 -South Texas Project DG 22 connecting rod failure during a surveillance test | | - 1989 - South Texas Project DG 22 connecting rod failure during a surveillance test |
| -2003 -South Texas Project DG 22 connecting rod failure during a surveillance test (one-time LAR using a two-phased approach to extend allowable outage time to 113 days) | | - 2003 - South Texas Project DG 22 connecting rod failure during a surveillance test (one-time LAR using a two-phased approach to extend allowable outage time to 113 days) |
| -2016 -Palo Verde 3B DG connecting rod (9R) failure during a surveillance test 8 | | - 2016 - Palo Verde 3B DG connecting rod (9R) failure during a surveillance test 8 |
| | |
| DIRECT CAUSE OF FAILURE | | DIRECT CAUSE OF FAILURE |
| *High cycle fatigue failure of the master | | * High cycle fatigue failure of the master connecting rod ligament which surrounds the lower part of the articulating rod pin. |
| | 9 |
| | |
| | Event Investigation Master Rod Fracture Surface 10 |
| | |
| | ROOT CAUSE OF FAILURE FLAW + STRESS = FATIGUE POTENTIAL FLAWS STRESS |
| | : 1. Residual tensile within master connecting rod bore due to machining process change Mis-Alignment |
| | : 2. Fretting |
| | : 3. Undersized Oversized Bearing following 1987 repair. |
| | 11 |
| | |
| | 12 3A/3B COMPARITIVE EVALUATION |
| | * Evaluating Wide Array of Data |
| | * Relevant Data |
| | - Vibration |
| | - Engine Analysis |
| | - Line Bore Data |
| | - Work History |
| | - Event History 13 |
| | |
| | 3A/3B COMPARITIVE EVALUATION |
| | * Unit 3 B Emergency Diesel Generator experienced a catastrophic failure that induced crankshaft mis-alignment which increased the stress profile within the engine |
| | * Unit 3 A engine has not had a catastrophic failure |
| | * Unit 3 A engine vibration displacement data is consistently less and has significantly less variability |
| | * Unit 3 A Master connecting rods are original equipment (i.e. Pre machining change) 14 |
| | |
| | Engineering Conclusion There is no common cause mode of failure to Unit 3 A Emergency Diesel Generator due to the unique aspects of the Unit 3 B Diesel Generator root cause. |
| | 15 |
| | |
| | Risk Assessment |
| | * PRA models for |
| | - Internal Events |
| | - Internal Flood |
| | - Internal Fire |
| | - Seismic |
| | * Other hazards screened out 16 |
| | |
| | PRA Model and Risk-Informed Application Model History Internal Events CEOG peer review & numerous risk-informed TS changes Internal Flood peer review Risk-informed 7-day inverter TS approved Internal Events self-assessment per RG 1.200 App B TSTF-425 Surveillance Frequency Control Program approved External Hazards Screening peer review 1st fire PRA peer review Seismic PRA peer review 2nd fire PRA peer review TSTF-505 submitted All Unit 3 Mods Comp |
| | & all ASME PRA Std SRs Met to CC II Pre-2010 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 17 |
|
| |
|
| connecting rod
| | Risk Assessment |
| | * Palo Verde PRA Aspects |
| | - Six 100% capacity SG makeup pumps all supplied by onsite power sources |
| | - Only one of these powered by B DG if loss of offsite power |
| | - RCP seal LOCAs negligible - ECCS significance minimal in loss of offsite power events |
| | - No Pressurizer power-operated relief valves |
| | - Very low internal events CDF and LERF - consistent with STP and Millstone 3 |
| | - Only shared systems in PRA are SBOGs and firewater |
| | - Dedicated fire department staff and equipment |
| | - Risk significant FLEX connections outside of unit |
| | - Did not need to implement NFPA-805 to address multiple spurious operations 18 |
|
| |
|
| ligament which
| | PRA Model Credited Changes |
| | * Revised emergency operating procedures and night order to direct timely use of firewater to auxiliary feedwater cross-tie in total loss of feedwater event - validated in simulator |
| | - Additional dedicated auxiliary operator added to each shift to implement cross-tie |
| | * Post continuous fire watch in fire zone FCCOR2 (120 Corridor Building) |
| | * Establish new transient combustible and hot work exclusion zones and conduct shiftly inspections |
| | - Fire zones FCCOR2 (120 Corridor Building) and FCCOR2A (120 Corridor Riser Shaft) |
| | - Fire zones FCTB04 (upper level only, non-class DC Equipment, |
| | [FCTB04-TRAN1]) |
| | - Fire zone FC86A (train A Seismic Gap, make part of train A Electrical Protected Equipment) |
| | - Fire zone FCTB100 zone ZT1G (SW corner, south half of 100 Turbine between columns TA and TC) 19 |
|
| |
|
| surrounds the lower part of
| | Risk Assessment |
| | * Defense-in-Depth Evaluation |
| | - Unavailability does not reduce the amount of available equipment to a level below that necessary to mitigate a design basis accident |
| | * Safety Margin Evaluation |
| | - No significant reduction in margin of safety |
| | * Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2 compliant |
| | * Regulatory Guide 1.177, Revision 1 compliant |
| | * Regulatory Guide 1.174, Revision 2 compliant 20 |
|
| |
|
| the articulating | | Second License Amendment Request |
| | * Requesting a extension of TS 3.8.1 Condition B.4 Completion Time to complete the DG Repairs |
| | * Request on Emergency Basis |
| | * Risk-informed LAR |
| | * Carrying forward the Commitments made in Deterministic LAR |
| | * To be submitted Friday, December 30 |
| | * Request approval by early Thursday morning 21 |
|
| |
|
| rod pin. 9 Event Investigation 10 Master Rod Fracture Surface ROOT CAUSE OF FAILUREFLAW + STRESS = FATIGUE POTENTIAL FLAWSSTRESS1. Residualtensile within master connecting rod bore due to machining process changeMis-Alignment2. Fretting 3. "Undersized" OversizedBearing following 1987 repair.
| | Conclusions |
| 11 12 3A/3B COMPARITIVE EVALUATION
| | * Direct cause of the 3B DG failure has been determined |
| *Evaluating Wide Array of Data | | * No common mode failure applicability to 3A DG |
| *Relevant Data
| | * Continue to have diverse and redundant sources of AC power and steam generator makeup |
| -Vibration
| | * PRA risk acceptable in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177 |
| -Engine Analysis
| | * No significant hazards consideration criteria satisfied 22 |
| -Line Bore Data
| |
| -Work History
| |
| -Event History 13 3A/3B COMPARITIVE EVALUATION
| |
| *Unit 3 "B" Emergency Diesel Generator experienced a catastrophic failure that induced crankshaft mis-alignment which increased the stress profile within the engine
| |
| *Unit 3 "A" engine has not had a catastrophic failure*Unit 3 "A" engine vibration displacement data is consistently less and has significantly less variability
| |
| *Unit 3 "A" Master connecting rods are original equipment (i.e. Pre machining change) 14 Engineering Conclusion There is no common cause mode of failure to Unit 3 "A" Emergency Diesel Generator due to the unique aspects of the Unit 3 "B" Diesel Generator root cause. | |
| 15 Risk Assessment
| |
| *PRA models for | |
| -Internal Events
| |
| -Internal Flood
| |
| -Internal Fire
| |
| -Seismic*Other hazards screened out 16 PRA Model and Risk-Informed Application Model History Pre-2010 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 17Internal Events CEOG peer review & numerous risk-informed TS changesTSTF-425 Surveillance Frequency Control Program approved 2 ndfire PRA peer reviewTSTF-505 submittedInternal Flood peer reviewRisk-informed 7-day inverter TS approvedSeismic PRA peer review 1 stfire PRA peer reviewInternal Events self-assessment per RG 1.200 App B All Unit 3 Mods Comp
| |
| & all ASME PRA Std SRs Met to CC IIExternal Hazards Screening peer review Risk Assessment
| |
| *Palo Verde PRA Aspects | |
| -Six 100% capacity SG makeup pumps all supplied by onsite power sources
| |
| -Only one of these powered by B DG if loss of offsite power
| |
| -RCP seal LOCAs negligible -ECCS significance minimal in loss of offsite power events
| |
| -No Pressurizer power-operated relief valves
| |
| -Very low internal events CDF and LERF -consistent with STP and Millstone 3
| |
| -Only shared systems in PRA are SBOGs and firewater
| |
| -Dedicated fire department staff and equipment
| |
| -Risk significant FLEX connections outside of unit
| |
| -Did not need to implement NFPA-805 to address multiple spurious operations 18 PRA Model Credited Changes
| |
| *Revised emergency operating procedures and night order to direct timely use of firewater to auxiliary feedwatercross-tie in total loss of feedwaterevent -validated in
| |
|
| |
|
| simulator-Additional dedicated auxiliary operator added to each shift to implement cross-tie
| | Questions?}} |
| *Post continuous fire watch in fire zone FCCOR2 (120' Corridor Building)
| |
| *Establish new transient combustible and hot work exclusion zones and conduct shiftlyinspections
| |
| -Fire zones FCCOR2 (120' Corridor Building) and FCCOR2A (120' Corridor Riser Shaft)
| |
| -Fire zones FCTB04 (upper level only, non-class DC Equipment, [FCTB04-TRAN1])
| |
| -Fire zone FC86A (train A Seismic Gap, make part of train A Electrical Protected Equipment)
| |
| -Fire zone FCTB100 zone ZT1G (SW corner, south half of 100' Turbine between columns TA and TC) 19 Risk Assessment
| |
| *Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
| |
| -Unavailability does not reduce the amount of available equipment to a level below that necessary to mitigate a design basis accident
| |
| *Safety Margin Evaluation
| |
| -No significant reduction in margin of safety
| |
| *Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2 compliant
| |
| *Regulatory Guide 1.177, Revision 1 compliant
| |
| *Regulatory Guide 1.174, Revision 2 compliant 20 Second License Amendment Request
| |
| *Requesting a extension of TS 3.8.1 Condition B.4 Completion Time to complete the DG Repairs*Request on Emergency Basis
| |
| *Risk-informed LAR
| |
| *Carrying forward the Commitments made in Deterministic LAR
| |
| *To be submitted Friday, December 30
| |
| *Request approval by early Thursday morning 21 Conclusions
| |
| *Direct cause of the 3B DG failure has been determined
| |
| *No common mode failure applicability to 3A DG*Continue to have diverse and redundant sources of AC power and steam generator makeup*PRA risk acceptable in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177
| |
| *No significant hazards consideration criteria satisfied 22 Questions?}}
| |
Letter Sequence Meeting |
|---|
CAC:MF9019, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - RITSTF Initiative 5B (Approved, Closed) |
|
MONTHYEARML16356A6892016-12-21021 December 2016
Emergency License Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of Diesel Generator Completion Time
Project stage: Request
ML17003A0332016-12-29029 December 2016
Enclosure 2 - APS Meeting Slides
Project stage: Meeting
ML16365A2402016-12-30030 December 2016
Emergency License Amendment Request to Extend Diesel Generator 3B Completion Time
Project stage: Request
ML17003A0182017-01-0202 January 2017
NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Draft RAIs for the Second Emergency LAR Associated with EDG 3B Failure
Project stage: Draft RAI
ML17002A0012017-01-0202 January 2017
Response to NRC Requests for Additional Information (Rais) Regarding Emergency License Amendment Request (LAR) to Extend Diesel Generator 3B Completion Time
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML17004A2092017-01-0303 January 2017
Safety Evaluation Input for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3, Llcense Amendment Request for a One-Time Extension of the 3B Emergency Diesel Generator Completion Time
Project stage: Approval
ML17003A3892017-01-0303 January 2017
Safety Evaluation Input Regarding the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 Emergency Request to Extend Diesel Generator 3B Completion Time
Project stage: Approval
ML17004A0202017-01-0404 January 2017
Issuance of Amendment No. 200, Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, for One-Time Extension of the Diesel Generator Completion Time, Risk-Informed (Emergency Circumstances)
Project stage: Approval
ML17004A2382017-01-0404 January 2017
License Conditions Re Emergency License Amendment Request to Extend Diesel Generator 3B Completion Time
Project stage: Request
ML17004A0222017-01-0404 January 2017
Biweekly Notice of Issuance of Amendment No. 200, Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, for One-Time Extension of the Diesel Generator Completion Time, Risk-Informed (Emergency Circumstances)
Project stage: Approval
ML17003A0352017-01-0404 January 2017
Summary of Pre-Application Meeting with Arizona Public Service to Discuss a Proposed Second Emergency License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC (Alternating Current) Sources - Operating, for Palo Verde Nuclear
Project stage: Meeting
2016-12-30
[Table View] |
|
|---|
Category:Meeting Briefing Package/Handouts
MONTHYEARML24262A1052024-09-20020 September 2024
Pre-Submittal Presentation Slides - 1R25 Pzr Nozzle Life of Repair - Relief Request 73 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML24236A7032024-08-22022 August 2024
Pre-Submittal Meeting Slides to Support August 29, 2024 Aps/Westinghouse Thermal Design Procedure (Wtdp) Meeting
ML24212A3392024-08-0101 August 2024
August 1, 2024, Public Meeting on Potential Palisades Nuclear Plant Restart Presentation
ML24192A3262024-07-12012 July 2024
Licensee Slides to Support Pre-Submittal Meeting – Relief Request 71 Slides
ML24192A3402024-07-12012 July 2024
Licensee to Support Pre-Submittal Meeting - Relief Request 72 Slides
ML24275A2332024-06-28028 June 2024
APS Slides Supporting Preapplication Meeting Regarding Safety Injection Tank Pressure Band
ML24155A2112024-06-0707 June 2024
VRR-02: Exercise Test Frequency Reduction (Slides)
ML24155A2122024-06-0707 June 2024
VRR-03: SOV Test Criteria (Slides)
ML24038A1742024-02-0707 February 2024
Pre-submittal Meeting Slides
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Slides - Modification of Browns Ferry Technical Specifications to Eliminate LCO 3.3.2.1 Actions C.2.1.1 and C.2.1.2 for Rod Worth
ML24003A8532024-01-0303 January 2024
January 4, 2024 Presubmittal Meeting Presentation-Risk Informed Process for Evaluations (RIPE) License Amendment Request for Safety Injection Tank (SIT) LCO (EPID: L?2023?LRM-0108)
ML23240A3232023-08-31031 August 2023
APS Presentation Slides for Pre-Submittal Meeting on 8/31/23, Alloy-600 Management Program Plan
ML23192A0102023-07-11011 July 2023
NRC RIPE 7-11-23 Public Meeting Presentation Slides
ML23144A0252023-05-25025 May 2023
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April 5, 2023, Presubmittal Meeting Presentation - Containment Temperature and Safety Injection Tank Volume Requirements LAR
ML23090A1392023-04-0404 April 2023
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March 1, 2023 Presubmittal Meeting Presentation - Request for Use of Mururoa V4F1 and MTH2 Supplied Air Suits (EPID: L?2023?LRM-0012)
ML22096A0052022-04-0606 April 2022
TSTF-487 LAR Pre-submittal Public Meeting Presentation Slides
ML22025A0012022-01-25025 January 2022
1/25/22 Pre-submittal Meeting Presentation Slides for RR-69 to Extend Containment Tendon Inspection by Three Months Beyond 2/8/22
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TSTF-567 LAR Pre-submittal Public Meeting Presentation Slides
ML21320A1032021-11-17017 November 2021
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ML21194A2502021-08-10010 August 2021
RIC 2021 - Ai EPRI-Artificial Intelligence and Development at EPRI
ML21131A0132021-05-13013 May 2021
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ML21025A0032021-01-26026 January 2021
Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations (RIPE) - NEI Public Meeting Presentation Slides
ML21025A0042021-01-25025 January 2021
Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations (RIPE) - NRC Public Meeting Presentation Slides
ML20171A2352020-06-24024 June 2020
Inservice Testing - Supplemental Position Indication Relief Request - NRC Pre-Application Meeting - June 24, 2020
ML19192A0972019-07-11011 July 2019
License Amendment Request for Emergency Plan, July 11, 2019
ML18299A0722018-09-26026 September 2018
Ionizing Radiation Factsheet-Veterans - Information for Veterans and Their Families
ML17320A1932017-11-15015 November 2017
NRC Public Meeting, Treatment of Mitigating Strategies in Risk Informed Decision Making
ML17003A0332016-12-29029 December 2016
Enclosure 2 - APS Meeting Slides
ML16357A6872016-12-20020 December 2016
One-Time License Amendment Request Unit 3 Train B Diesel Generator
ML17003A0862016-11-0303 November 2016
Enclosure 2 Slides Regulatory Audit Report for November 2-3, 2016
ML16253A4112016-09-0707 September 2016
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Generic Letter 2004-02 - September 7, 2016
ML16083A4722016-03-24024 March 2016
NRC Subsequent Pre-Submittal Meeting Next Generation Fuel - Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML16014A1102016-01-20020 January 2016
Draft APS Slides for January 20, 2015, Public Meeting with APS Regarding Upcoming Next Generation Fuel License Amendment Request for Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML15244B2632015-08-27027 August 2015
Slides for Public Meeting with Arizona Public Service Company to Discuss License Amendment Request for Palo Verde Regarding Revised Methodology for Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis
ML15236A1342015-08-26026 August 2015
Presentation Slides for Public Meeting with Arizona Public Service Generic Letter 2004-02 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML15159B2972015-06-0909 June 2015
Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 (R2.1) Seismic Hazard Evaluation - Arizona Public Service, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Public Meeting - June 9, 2015
ML15156B3312015-06-0909 June 2015
Public Meeting Slides on R2.1 Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluation
ML15156B3522015-06-0404 June 2015
Draft Slides for Public Meeting with Arizona Public Service Company Ongoing Resolution of Generic Letter 2004-02 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML15126A2072015-05-11011 May 2015
Presentation Slides for Prelicensing Meeting with Arizon Public Service Company to Discuss License Amendment Request for Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3,
ML15134A3592015-05-11011 May 2015
5/11/2015, Meeting Slide Regarding Pre-Submittal Meeting for Palo Verde Unit 1, 2, and 3 Updated Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis
ML15103A2882015-04-0909 April 2015
Presentation on Potential Relief Request About Pressure Boundary Leakage on Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Pipe Nozzle
ML15070A2522015-02-18018 February 2015
Pre-Submittal Public Meeting Final Slides on Risk-Informed Completion Times.
ML15042A4152015-02-11011 February 2015
Pre-Submittal Public Meeting Draft Slides on Risk- Informed Completion Times
ML14184B4112014-06-11011 June 2014
Nrc/Nei/Utility MTG 6/11/14
ML14149A5092014-04-23023 April 2014
4/23/14 Meeting Slide for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Re. Sig Tube Inspection
ML14098A1832014-04-0202 April 2014
4/2/2014 Meeting Slide for Bottom-Mounted Instrument (Bmi) Relief Request 52 Pre-Submittal Meeting
ML13309A7202013-11-0505 November 2013
Meeting Presentation for November 5, 2013 Public Meeting Regarding Incorporation of NEI 11-04 Into the QA Program at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
ML13308C3402013-11-0404 November 2013
SG Unit 3 Telephone Call
2024-09-20
[Table view]
Category:Slides and Viewgraphs
MONTHYEARML24262A1052024-09-20020 September 2024
Pre-Submittal Presentation Slides - 1R25 Pzr Nozzle Life of Repair - Relief Request 73 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
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ML24212A3392024-08-0101 August 2024
August 1, 2024, Public Meeting on Potential Palisades Nuclear Plant Restart Presentation
ML24192A3262024-07-12012 July 2024
Licensee Slides to Support Pre-Submittal Meeting – Relief Request 71 Slides
ML24192A3402024-07-12012 July 2024
Licensee to Support Pre-Submittal Meeting - Relief Request 72 Slides
ML24275A2332024-06-28028 June 2024
APS Slides Supporting Preapplication Meeting Regarding Safety Injection Tank Pressure Band
ML24155A2112024-06-0707 June 2024
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ML24155A2122024-06-0707 June 2024
VRR-03: SOV Test Criteria (Slides)
ML24038A1742024-02-0707 February 2024
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ML24003A8532024-01-0303 January 2024
January 4, 2024 Presubmittal Meeting Presentation-Risk Informed Process for Evaluations (RIPE) License Amendment Request for Safety Injection Tank (SIT) LCO (EPID: L?2023?LRM-0108)
ML23296A0162023-10-20020 October 2023
– October 20, 2023 Presubmittal Meeting Presentation - 1R24 Pressurizer Nozzle Repair - RR-70 (EPID: L?2023?LLR-0057)
ML23240A3232023-08-31031 August 2023
APS Presentation Slides for Pre-Submittal Meeting on 8/31/23, Alloy-600 Management Program Plan
ML23192A0102023-07-11011 July 2023
NRC RIPE 7-11-23 Public Meeting Presentation Slides
ML23144A0252023-05-25025 May 2023
APS Presentation Slides for Pre-Submittal Meeting on 5/25/23, Przr Surge Line
ML23093A0252023-04-30030 April 2023
April 5, 2023, Presubmittal Meeting Presentation - Containment Temperature and Safety Injection Tank Volume Requirements LAR
ML23055B0572023-03-0101 March 2023
March 1, 2023 Presubmittal Meeting Presentation - Request for Use of Mururoa V4F1 and MTH2 Supplied Air Suits (EPID: L?2023?LRM-0012)
ML22312A5952022-11-0808 November 2022
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Submittal of Annual Financial Reports 2021
ML22299A1812022-10-26026 October 2022
– Presubmittal Meeting Presentation - License Amendment Request - Adoption of TSTF-107-A Separate Control Rods That Are Untrippable Versus Inoperable and Change to TS 3.1.5 Condition B (EPID: L?2021?LRM-0081)
ML22096A0052022-04-0606 April 2022
TSTF-487 LAR Pre-submittal Public Meeting Presentation Slides
ML22025A0012022-01-25025 January 2022
1/25/22 Pre-submittal Meeting Presentation Slides for RR-69 to Extend Containment Tendon Inspection by Three Months Beyond 2/8/22
ML21342A0502021-12-0808 December 2021
TSTF-567 LAR Pre-submittal Public Meeting Presentation Slides
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2024-09-20
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Text
Second License Amendment Request for the Unit 3 Train B Diesel Generator Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station December 29, 2016
Agenda
- Second License Amendment Request
First License Amendment Request (LAR)
- One-time Technical Specification (TS) Change to Allow a 21 day Completion Time In Response to Failure of Unit 3 B Train DG on December 15, 2016
- Extension of 11 days needed to collect/analyze data and continue repair
- Deterministic justification based upon BTP 8-8
- Risk insights provided to support change
- NRC commitments made in LAR
- NRC Amendment 199 issued on December 23, 2016 3
Regulatory Commitments
- Commitments documented in NRC Amendment #199 include but are not limited to:
- Three, 2 MW portable DGs staged, tested and hooked-up to Unit 3 FLEX 4.16KV connections
- Diesel driven FLEX Steam Generator make-up pump staged in Unit 3
- Suspension of discretionary maintenance on SBOGs, Switchyard, Safety Systems
- Establish protected equipment controls for Train A equipment, SBOGs, portable equipment
- Commitments monitored and tracked by OPS
- Dedicated personnel 4
Palo Verde AC Power System 5
Palo Verde AC Power System 6
Event Investigation
- Partnerships established with MPR, Goltens, Structural Integrity, EPRI, and the Cooper-Bessemer Owners Group
- Evidence of high cycle fatigue on master connecting rod
- Second major failure of 3B DG (9R)
- 1986 event created localized misalignment 7
Operating Experience (OE)
- Cooper-Bessemer KSV-20 OE
- 1986 - Palo Verde 3B DG connecting rod (9R) failure during unit startup testing program
- 1989 - South Texas Project DG 22 connecting rod failure during a surveillance test
- 2003 - South Texas Project DG 22 connecting rod failure during a surveillance test (one-time LAR using a two-phased approach to extend allowable outage time to 113 days)
- 2016 - Palo Verde 3B DG connecting rod (9R) failure during a surveillance test 8
DIRECT CAUSE OF FAILURE
- High cycle fatigue failure of the master connecting rod ligament which surrounds the lower part of the articulating rod pin.
9
Event Investigation Master Rod Fracture Surface 10
ROOT CAUSE OF FAILURE FLAW + STRESS = FATIGUE POTENTIAL FLAWS STRESS
- 1. Residual tensile within master connecting rod bore due to machining process change Mis-Alignment
- 2. Fretting
- 3. Undersized Oversized Bearing following 1987 repair.
11
12 3A/3B COMPARITIVE EVALUATION
- Evaluating Wide Array of Data
- Vibration
- Engine Analysis
- Line Bore Data
- Work History
- Event History 13
3A/3B COMPARITIVE EVALUATION
- Unit 3 B Emergency Diesel Generator experienced a catastrophic failure that induced crankshaft mis-alignment which increased the stress profile within the engine
- Unit 3 A engine has not had a catastrophic failure
- Unit 3 A engine vibration displacement data is consistently less and has significantly less variability
- Unit 3 A Master connecting rods are original equipment (i.e. Pre machining change) 14
Engineering Conclusion There is no common cause mode of failure to Unit 3 A Emergency Diesel Generator due to the unique aspects of the Unit 3 B Diesel Generator root cause.
15
Risk Assessment
- Internal Events
- Internal Flood
- Internal Fire
- Seismic
- Other hazards screened out 16
PRA Model and Risk-Informed Application Model History Internal Events CEOG peer review & numerous risk-informed TS changes Internal Flood peer review Risk-informed 7-day inverter TS approved Internal Events self-assessment per RG 1.200 App B TSTF-425 Surveillance Frequency Control Program approved External Hazards Screening peer review 1st fire PRA peer review Seismic PRA peer review 2nd fire PRA peer review TSTF-505 submitted All Unit 3 Mods Comp
& all ASME PRA Std SRs Met to CC II Pre-2010 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 17
Risk Assessment
- Six 100% capacity SG makeup pumps all supplied by onsite power sources
- Only one of these powered by B DG if loss of offsite power
- RCP seal LOCAs negligible - ECCS significance minimal in loss of offsite power events
- No Pressurizer power-operated relief valves
- Very low internal events CDF and LERF - consistent with STP and Millstone 3
- Only shared systems in PRA are SBOGs and firewater
- Dedicated fire department staff and equipment
- Risk significant FLEX connections outside of unit
- Did not need to implement NFPA-805 to address multiple spurious operations 18
PRA Model Credited Changes
- Revised emergency operating procedures and night order to direct timely use of firewater to auxiliary feedwater cross-tie in total loss of feedwater event - validated in simulator
- Additional dedicated auxiliary operator added to each shift to implement cross-tie
- Establish new transient combustible and hot work exclusion zones and conduct shiftly inspections
- Fire zones FCCOR2 (120 Corridor Building) and FCCOR2A (120 Corridor Riser Shaft)
- Fire zones FCTB04 (upper level only, non-class DC Equipment,
[FCTB04-TRAN1])
- Fire zone FC86A (train A Seismic Gap, make part of train A Electrical Protected Equipment)
- Fire zone FCTB100 zone ZT1G (SW corner, south half of 100 Turbine between columns TA and TC) 19
Risk Assessment
- Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
- Unavailability does not reduce the amount of available equipment to a level below that necessary to mitigate a design basis accident
- No significant reduction in margin of safety
Second License Amendment Request
- Requesting a extension of TS 3.8.1 Condition B.4 Completion Time to complete the DG Repairs
- Request on Emergency Basis
- Carrying forward the Commitments made in Deterministic LAR
- To be submitted Friday, December 30
- Request approval by early Thursday morning 21
Conclusions
- Direct cause of the 3B DG failure has been determined
- No common mode failure applicability to 3A DG
- Continue to have diverse and redundant sources of AC power and steam generator makeup
- PRA risk acceptable in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177
- No significant hazards consideration criteria satisfied 22
Questions?
