Information Notice 1985-74, Station Battery Problems

Station Battery Problems

ML031180629
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	08/29/1985
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-074, NUDOCS 8508270031
Download: ML031180629 (4)

SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-74 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION

AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 August 29, 1985 IE INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 85-74: STATION BATTERY PROBLEMS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities

holding an operating

license (OL) or a construction

permit (CP).

Purpose

This notice describes

problems that have occurred with lead-acid

station batteries

at several nuclear power plants. These problems were discovered

as a result of inspections

by the NRC Performance

Appraisal

Team (PAT). It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring

at their facilities.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances:

All four recent inspections

by the PAT identified

problems with lead-acid station batteries.

Although all of the problems are not listed here, a summary of a few of the more significant

problems with lead-acid

station batteries

that were identified

as a result of these inspections

is provided below: Cooper PAT Inspection (November

1984): The battery rated-load

discharge

test was performed

at a discharge

rate significantly

less than the manufacturer's

recommended

rated-load

discharge rate for the 8-hour period of the test. The licensee had no records of battery charging following

the completion

of battery discharge

test and consequently

the time and date the batteries

were returned to service could not be determined.

The licensee failed to correct specific gravity measurements

for electrolyte

temperature

and level. The licensee had no written procedures

for conducting

charges of the station batteries.

McGuire PAT Inspection (February

1985): Three cells were placed on single-cell

chargers for about 2 years, thus raising questions

regarding

the operability

of the battery and electrical

independence

and separation

of the Class 1E dc power systems. The cells on single cell 8508270031 J IN 85-74 August 29, 1985 charge were at voltages higher than specified

in the vendor manual. Although one cell in the battery was jumpered out, the float voltage for the entire battery was not reduced; consequently

each cell was floated at a voltage higher than specified

in the battery vendor manual. The battery performance

discharge test was performed

improperly

because the test was stopped before reaching the minimum specified

voltage.Susquehanna

PAT Inspection (February

1985): There were no station procedures

for maintaining

station batteries

in accordance

with the battery vendor's manual or IEEE Std 450-1975, "IEEE Recommended

Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement

of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating

Stations and Substations" (which is endorsed by Regulatory

Guide 1.129, "Maintenance, Testing and Replacement

of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants").

Intercell

resistance

values were not compared with previous values to determine

when corrective

action was required.

The licensee did not always conduct equalizing

charges when required;

nor did the licensee have procedures

for monitoring

the progress of an equalizing

charge or determining

when the charge should be terminated.

Surveillance

procedures

for the 60-month rated-capacity

discharge

test did not conform to IEEE Std 450-1975 because the test was terminated

at the end of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, instead of when the terminal voltage fell to the minimum specified

value (usually 1.75 volts per cell). The licensee's

procedures

did not require that the average specific gravity be calculated

and compared to the technical-specification

acceptance

criteria.San Onofre PAT Inspection (March 1985): During the first 2 years of operation, the battery capacity tests required by the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and IEEE Std 450-1980 were not performed on Units 2 and 3. The total battery float voltage was not adjusted to account for two jumpered out cells. The two jumpered out cells did not receive the manufacturer's

specified

surveillances, maintenance, or charges. The pilot cells were not being changed on a yearly basis, as recommended

by the vendor's technical

instructions.

The station engineer responsible

for the technical aspects of battery operation, maintenance, and surveillance

did not receive surveillance

results and data sheets on a routine basis.Discussion:

Recent IE inspections

of operating

facilities

indicate that several widespread

deficiencies

may exist in the operation

and maintenance

of station batteries.

These deficiencies

are attributable

to a variety of causes, including

licensee error, inadequate

knowledge

of batteries

by maintenance

technicians

and supervisors, and inadequate

procedural

guidance.

The results of these inspections

suggest a general lack of appreciation

amongst licensee personnel for proper maintenance

and surveillance

of station batteries.

Although batteries contain no moving parts, considerable

care and attention

to detail is required to maintain them operable.

Too often, licensees

may be treating these vital engineered

safety features (ESF) power supplies as "passive" components

and not providing

them the necessary

management

and technical

attention.

IN 85-74 August 29, 1985 The following

reference

materials

provide guidance as to the individual

requirements

for a facility's

station batteries.

1. IEEE 450-1975, and 1980 2. Regulatory

Guide 1.129, Rev. 1, "Maintenance, Testing and Replacement

of Large Lead Storage Batteries

for Nuclear Power Plants" (This regulatory

guide endorses IEEE Std 450-1975 with certain exceptions.)

3. Facility Technical

Specifications

4. Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)5. Station Battery Vendor Technical

Manual (The vendors of station batteries

periodically

update their manuals to include revised guidance.)

Other recent problems with station batteries

were described

in IE Information

Notice 84-83: VARIOUS BATTERY PROBLEMS, November 14, 1984.No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.If you have questions

about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis-trator of the appropriate

NRC regional office or this office.war Joran, Director Divisi of Emergency

Preparedness

and Engineering

Response Office of Inspection

and Enforcement

CONTACT

S:

E. W. Weiss, IE (301) 492-9005 L. J. Callan, IE (301) 492-9497 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information

Notices

Attachment

1 IN 85-74 August 29, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 84-70 Sup. 1 85-73 85-72 85-71 85-70 Reliance On Water Level 8/26/85 Instrumentation

With A Common Reference

Leg Emergency

Diesel Generator

8/23/85 Control Circuit Logic Design Error Uncontrolled

Leakage Of 8/22/85 Reactor Coolant Outside Containment

Containment

Integrated

Leak 8/22/85 Rate Tests Teletherapy

Unit Full 8/15/85 Calibration

And Qualified Expert Requirements

(10 CFR 35.23 And 10 CFR 35.24)Recent Felony Conviction

For 8/15/85 Cheating On Reactor Operator Requalification

Tests Diesel Generator

Failure At 8/14/85 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Station Unit 1 Loose Phosphor In Panasonic

8/12/85 800 Series Badge Thermo-luminescent

Dosimeter (TLD)Elements Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator

Key 8/8/85 May Fall Out Of Place When Mounted Below Horizontal

Axis All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP All material licensees All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP Materials

and fuel cycle licensees All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP 85-69 85-68 85-42 Rev. 1 85-67 OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit