ML11362A379

Response to an Apparent Violation in Inspections Report 05000259-11-011, 05000260-11-011, 05000296-11-011; EA-11-252

ML11362A379
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	12/19/2011
From:	James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC/RGN-II
References
EA-11-252 IR-11-011
Download: ML11362A379 (6)

See also: IR 05000259/2011011

Text

Tennessee

Valley Authority, 1101 Market Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee

37402 December 19, 2011 10 CFR 2.201 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Facility Operating

License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 NRC Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 Subject: Response to an Apparent Violation

in Inspection

Report 05000259/2011011, 0500026012011011, 0500029612011011;

EA-1 1-252 Reference:

Letter from NRC to TVA, "Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant -NRC Inspection

Procedure

95003 Supplemental

Inspection

Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, and 05000296/2011011 (Part 1)," dated November 17, 2011 In accordance

with the reference

letter, the Tennessee

Valley Authority (TVA) is required to submit a response to the Notice of Violation

EA-1 1-252 within 30 days of the date of the letter which transmitted

the notice of violation, i.e., by December 17, 2011. Because December 17, 2011 fell on a Saturday, TVA's response is being submitted

on December 19, 2011. The TVA response to this notice of violation

is provided in the enclosure

in accordance

with 10 CFR 2.201.There are no new regulatory

commitments

contained

in this response.

Should you have any questions

concerning

this submittal, please contact Tom Hess at (423) 751-3487.R e s u l l y , L n aeCorporate

Nuclear Licensing

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Page 2 December 19, 2011 Enclosure:

Response to an Apparent Violation

in Inspection

Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 05000296/2011011;

EA- 11-252 cc (Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator

-Region II NRC Director, Office of Enforcement

NRC Senior Resident Inspector

-Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Project Manager -Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

ENCLOSURE Tennessee

Valley Authority Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Response to an Apparent Violation

in Inspection

Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 05000296/2011011;

EA-11-252

Response to an Apparent Violation

in Inspection

Report 0500025912011011, 0500026012011011, 05000296/2011011;

EA-1 1-252 Restatement

of Violation Title 10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information

provided to the Commission

by an applicant

for a license or by a licensee or information

required by statute or by the Commission's

regulations, orders, or license conditions

to be maintained

by the applicant

or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.Contrary to the above, on January 6, 1997, TVA provided information

to the Commission

that was not complete and accurate in all material respects.

Specifically, in a letter dated October 7, 1996, the NRC asked TVA to further consider and respond to questions

about whether valves FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66

had a redundant

safety function to close to allow operation

of the suppression

pool cooling mode of the RHR System. In a letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA responded

that "Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66

is not required by plant procedures

to operate the RHR system in the suppression

pool cooling mode. Therefore, these valves have no 'redundant'

safety function and will not be included in the GL-89-10 program." This information

was inaccurate

because the FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66

valves do have a safety function to shut to operate the RHR system in the suppression

pool cooling mode as described

in EOI Appendix-17A, "RHR System Operation

Suppression

Pool Cooling," and should therefore

have been included in Browns Ferry's GL 89-10 MOV monitoring

program.Additionally, The NRC identified

that incomplete

and inaccurate

information

was also provided in a letter dated May 5, 2004. This letter stated that "TVA's review and documentation

of the design basis for the operation

of each Unit 1 MOV within the scope of the GL 89-10 program, the methods for determining

and adjusting

its switch settings, testing, surveillance

and maintenance

are the same as with the Units 2 and 3 program." This information

was material to the NRC because it was used, in part, as the basis for determining

that valves FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66

did not meet the conditions

necessary

that would require them to be in Browns Ferry's GL 89-10 MOV monitoring

program. The issue was preliminarily

determined

to be an apparent violation

of 10 CFR 50.9 (AV 05000259, 260, 296/2011011-02;

Inaccurate

Information

Provided Regarding Scoping of Motor Operated Valves in the Generic Letter 89-10 Program).

This issue was entered into BFN's CAP as SR 435463, "95003 -PER 430439 documented

that Units 1, 2, and 3 RHR Outboard Injection

Valves, FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66, Should have been Included in the Scope of the GL 89-10 Program. The Purpose of this SR is to Assess the Technical

Basis and Adequacy of the NRC Correspondence

for the GL 89-10 Scope removal of These Valves in the mid 1990's." Background

Tennesse Valley Authority (TVA) incorrectly

determined

that flow control valves FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66

were "passive" based on operating

in their safety position during normal alignment.

Additionally, TVA failed to identify that FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66

are required to be closed to enable Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to operate to the suppression

pool cooling mode, per Emergency

Operating

Instruction (EOI) Appendix-1

7A.E- 1 of 3

Response to an Apparent Violation

in Inspection

Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 0500029612011011;

EA-1 1-252 By letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA responded

to NRC inspector

follow-up

item 50-260, 296/95-19-01

regarding

the reduced scope of motor-operated

valves (MOVs) in the NRC Generic Letter 89-10, "Safety-Related

Motor-Operated

Valve Testing and Surveillance," program for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Units 2 and 3. This letter stated in part that"Closure of valves FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66

is not required by plant procedures

to operate the RHR system in the suppression

pool cooling mode.. ." As a result, FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66 were removed from the GL 89-10 program in 1997, in accordance

with Supplement

1 to GL 89-10.As identified

during the root cause analysis being conducted

to address the issues associated

with the failure of FCV-74-66

in BFN Unit 1, TVA discovered

that the statement "Closure of valves FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66

is not required by plant procedures

to operate the RHR system in the suppression

pool cooling mode. .." was inaccurate.

Specifically, the revision of the EOI, Appendix 17A, that was in place in January 1997 included a step to verify that the FCV-74-52

or FCV-74-66

valve was closed as part of performing

the steps to place the RHR system in the suppression

pool cooling mode. As required by 10 CFR 50.9(b), TVA provided written notification

to the NRC by letter dated October 20, 2011, acknowledging

the inaccuracy

of its January 6, 1997 letter. Additionally, TVA provided written notification

to the NRC by letter dated December 19, 2011, acknowledging

the inaccuracy

of its May 5, 2004 letter.With respect to FCV-74-52

and FCV-74-66

and the GL 89-10 program, TVA will implement

the following

actions: " Add 1, 2, 3 -FCV-74-52

and 1, 2, 3 -FCV-74-66

to the GL 89-10 program.* Develop or revise an existing procedure

to specifically

provide the criteria for determining

GL 89-10 program scope, including

active/passive

classification.

Reason for the Violation The reasons for this violation

of 10 CFR 50.9 are: STVA failed to apply adequate technical

rigor to the review process for regulatory

submittals.

The responsible

licensing

engineer was requested

by a reviewer of the January 1997 submittal

to verify the statement

regarding

closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66.

Verification

was done through verbal confirmation

from Engineering

without documentation

supporting

the conclusion.

F VA procedures

did not contain sufficient

details governing

the verification

process for regulatory

submittals.

TVA procedures

in place at the time of the 1997 letter only provided guidance on acceptable

methods of verification.

In addition, the procedure stated that method of verification

remained at the discretion

of the technical

lead; not the responsible

licensing

engineer.E- 2 of 3

Response to an Apparent Violation

in Inspection

Report 05000259/2011011, 05000260/2011011, 0500029612011011;

EA-1 1-252 TVA personnel

assigned to the BFN Unit 1 restart licensing

failed to follow procedures

governing

the verification

process for regulatory

submittals.

The information

provided in the May 5, 2004 letter related to BFN Unit 1 was verified to the extent required to ensure the BFN Unit 1 valves were described

in a manner equivalent

to the BFN Units 2 and 3 valves. As stated in the 2004 letter, the basis for excluding

the BFN Unit 1 valves from the GL 89-10 program was the same as the BFN Units 2 and 3 valves.Corrective

Steps That Have Been Taken and Results Achieved As stated above, TVA provided written notification

to the NRC by letter dated October 20, 2011, acknowledging

the inaccuracy

of its January 6, 1997 letter, in accordance

with 10 CFR 50.9(b).Additionally, TVA provided written notification

to the NRC by letter dated December 19, 2011, acknowledging

the inaccuracy

of its May 5, 2004 letter Procedural

requirements

in TVA procedure

BP-213, "Managing

TVA's Interface

with NRC," governing

the verification

of information

contained

in NRC submittals

were enhanced in 2002.These enhancements, included the following, are contained

in the current revision of BP-213:* Designating

oversight

responsibility

for the submittal

verification

process to Licensing." Specifying

which NRC submittals

require verification.

• Describing

which types of statements

in NRC submittals

require verification.

• Providing

detailed requirements

for verification

packages.With respect to the failure of BFN Unit 1 restart licensing

personnel

to follow the procedure governing

the verification

process for regulatory

submittals (i.e. BP-213), procedure

use and adherence

has since been reinforced

as one of TVA's fundamental

human performance

tools.Management

expectations

regarding

procedure

use and adherence

are communicated

regularly through TVA Nuclear corporate

and site communications

and are further reinforced

through TVA's Nuclear Fleet Focus Handbook.Corrective

Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Future Violations

All identified

corrective

actions to avoid future violations

have been implemented.

Date When Full Compliance

Will Be Achieved For the 10 CFR 50.9 violation

described

in EA-1 1-252, TVA achieved full compliance

with the October 20, 2011 and December 19, 2011 NRC notification

letters.E-3 of 3