ML17284A435

LER 88-022-00:on 880616,violation of Fire Zone in Radwaste Bldg Cable Spreading Room.Caused by Missing thermo-lag Insulation Due to Personnel Error.Outline of 20 Ft non- Combustible Zone Will Be Taped on floor.W/880715 Ltr

ML17284A435
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	07/15/1988
From:	Powers C, Washington S WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-022, LER-88-22, NUDOCS 8807210003
Download: ML17284A435 (7)

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svrrzx 0~REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8807210003 DOC.DATE: 88/07/15 NOTARIZED-NO FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WASHINGTON,S.L.

Washington Public Power Supply System POWERS,C.M.

Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILXATION

SUBJECT:

LER 88-022-00:on 880616,Tech Spec violation of cable spreading room fire barrier.DOCKET g 05000397 8 z W/8 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR (ENCL/SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPXENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA SAMWORTH,R INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 0 NRR/DRIS/SIB 9A EG FI~02 ES~SZR DEPY'GN5 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD'ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,J RES/DSIR/EIB FORD BLDG HOY,A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 45 ENCL 44~~

J II N C form 358)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)V.S.NUCLEAR AEOULATOAY COMMISSION'PPROVEO OMB NO.31504)104 EXPIRES: BI31I88 FACILITY NAME lll Washin ton Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2)PACE 3)0 5 00 03 971OF 4 Technical Specification Violation o a e Sprea>ng oom>re arriver Caused b Missin Thermo-Lag Insulation Due to Personnel Error EV EN T OAT E (5)LE R N VMS F R (8)REPORT DATE l7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUM8EA 4'rl REYEIN MONTH NUMBER OAY YEAR FACILI'TY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)0 5 0 0 0 8 8 8 022 0 007 1 5 8 8 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINQ MODE (OI'4 POWER LEYEL 0 0 0~4%,4~gj<N:

NAME 20.402(8)20.405(~l(l l(B 20.405(~l(1 l(8)20A05(e)0)(ill) 20.405 (e I (I I (HI 20.405(el(1 l(v)20.40S(c)50.35(el(i) 50.35 (el l2)50.73(e)l2)(I)50.73(el l2)IEI 50.73(sl(2)(IIII LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA (12)50,73(el(2) livl 50.73(el(2)

HI 50.73(s)(2)(vSI 50.73(s)(2)(vIIB(A) 50,73(e)l2)(vs 4)(BI 50,73(e)l2)(xl THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 7 0 THE REOUIAEMENTS OF 10 CFR g: IChech one or more Ol the rerlovtrlnPI (11 73.71(8)73.71(c)DTHER Ispecily In Aostrect Oelow end In Texr, IIIIC Form 366AI TELEPHONE NUMBER Steven L.Washin ton"Com liance En ineer AREA CODE 50 937 7-2 080 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT l13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANVFAC TURER REPORTABLE

>-TO NPROS QNC~a.'.~.'.CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER AEPOATABLE y~1.TO HEADS r.r'i.+Ã'~AN~RCA@Ã+4.r)~Br CO~SUPPLEMFNTAL RFPOAT EXPFCTED (14)X NO YES III yes, complete EXPECTED SUS4IISSIDH DA TEI ABSTRACT ILlmlr to 14IX)spsces, I e., epproxlmetely lilteen slnple.spete tyoewritren linesl (18)EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAA On June 16, 1988 it was determined that a problem documented on June 10, 1988 was a violation of a WNP-2 Plant Technical Specification and is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

On'une 10, 1988 an NRC Inspector, while on a Plant inspection tour, determined that the required 20 foot non-combustible zone (Fire Zone RC-IIC)in the Radwaste Building Cable Spreading Room was in some cases only 18 1/2 feet.Three cable trays'were identified which jog into and out of the 20 ft.non-combustible zone, and two cable trays that parallel Fire Zone RC-IIC have approximately one and a half feet of the two foot wide tray in the Fire Zone RC-IIC.Cables in the trays within Fire Zone RC-IIC were not insulated with thermo-lag.

One problem found outside the 1-1/2 foot corridor was a dedicated Division 2 cable tray which was missing thermo-lag insulation on the side rail of the cable tray.One small spot and a two foot strip of insulation was missing.Immediate corrective actions included verifying operability of the fire detection and suppression systems in Fire Zone RC-IIC and placing the cable spreading, room on the hourly fire tour.The root cause of this.event is personnel error.in that the Plant Fire Protection Engineer knew the non-combustible zone was not 20 feet wide in all places and he failed to take appropriate corrective action.A contributing cause was inappropriate corrective action when a similar problem was identified by an NRC Inspector during a Plant inspection in March, 1986.The cable tray side rail thermo-lag problem was due to poor workmanship in that the two locations were missed when the insulation was sprayed on.Corrective actions to be taken include: an outline of the twenty foot non-combustible zone will be taped on the floor of the cable spreading room, cable trays and conduits that intrude into the Fire Zone RC-IIC will be inspected'to insure proper fire PDR7210003 330715 ADoCIc,.PDC'RC Form 385 (94)3)".r~:.'Ivr--r:

NRC Form 385A (1HQl LICENSEE EVENT REPORT{LERI TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO.3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85 FACI(.ITY NAME (1l DOCKET NUMSER (2I LER NUMSER (51~AOE (31 Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT//amore oeoce lr roeooe4 eoo aR/4/ono////IC

%%de 3SLID/(ITI Abstract (Continued)

YEAR oW 3 9788 SEQUENTIAL NVMOEII 0 2 2 II EV IE IO N NVMBEII 0 0 02'0 4 barriers or coatings are installed, and any deficiencies found will be corrected.

Fire Zone RC-IIC was inspected to identify any other combustibles in the area.Combustibles found in Fire Zone RC-IIC will be justified or removed from the zone, trays with metal covers that require thermo-lag will be labeled, and a sign that describes the requirements of Fire Zo'ne RC-IIC will be posted near the non-combustible area.There are no adverse safety significant consequences associated with this event.'lant Conditions.

a)Power Level-OX')Plant Mode-4 (Cold Shutdown)Event On June 16, 1988 it was determined that a problem documented on June 10, 1988 was a violation of a WNP-2 Plant Technical Specification and is therefore..reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i);

On June 10, 1988 an NRC Inspector while on a Plant inspection tour determined that the required 20 foot non-combustible zone (Fire Zone RC-IIC)in the Radwaste Building Cable Spreading Room was in some cases only 18 1/2 feet.The Radwaste Building Cable Spreading Room (Fire Area RC-II)is divided into three Fire Zones RC-IIA, RC-IIB, and RC-IIC.Fire Zone RC-IIA contains Appendix R Division 1 Safe Shutdown components and Fire Zone RC-IIB contains Appendix R Division 2 Safe Shutdown'omponents.

Fire Zone RC-IIC is a 20 foot wide area separating Fire Zones RC-IIA and.RC-, IIB.Within Fire Zone RC-IIC there should be no intervening combustible fire loading, cable in trays are coated with a one-hour thermo-lag covering, and the area is protected by an automatic sprinkler and detection system.All but one of the problems identified are located in a 1 1/2'oot corridor where cable.trays associated with Division 2 Safe Shutdown System intrude into Fire Zone RC-IIC and the cables within Fire Zone RC-IIC are not covered with thermo-lag.

Three cable trays were identified which joginto and out of the 20 foot non-combustible zone.The cables in these cable trays were not thermo-lagged in the areas that protruded into Fire Zone RC-IIC.Two cable trays that parallel Fire Zone RC-IIC have approximately one and one-half feet of the two foot wide tray in the Fire Zone RC-IIC.Cables in the trays'ithin zone IIC were not thermo-lagged.

The only problem found outside the 1 1/2 foot corridor was a dedicated Division 2 cable tray which was missing thermo-lag on the side rail of the cable tray.Thermo-lag is applied to exposed metal surfaces such as cable tray side rails to eliminate a potential heat path to the thermo-lagged cables with'in the tray.One small spot and a two foot strip of insulation was missing.Immediate Corrective Action The fire detection and suppression systems in the cable spreading room fire areas were verified operable and the cable spreading.

room was.placed on the hourly fire tour.NRC SORM 34OA (842(*U.S.OPO:18884 524 538/455 NRC Fans 3$SA (B4)3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S, NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3150&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/Bd FACILITY NAME 11)COCKET NUMBER 12)YEAR LER NUMBER (Sl sEQUKNTIAL a~a(NUMSEII.('r.g A Eve)loN NUMaes PACE (3)Washington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 3 9 7 0 5 0 0 0 8 8 0 2 2 0 0 0 3 o F 0 4 TEXT//I'more)Pace R Io)U/Ieg we F/I/ase/A'RC form 3OLA3/(IT)Further Evaluation and Corrective Action A.Further Evaluation This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) a condition prohibited by Plant Technical Specification.

Other than the missing thermo-lag in the 20 foot non-combustible zone there were no structures,.

systems or components that were inoperable prior to this event that affected this event.B.The root cause of this event is personnel error.The Plant Fire Protection Engineer knew, from prior to Plant Startup, that Fire Zone RC-IIC was less than 20 feet wide in some places;however, he believed that this configuration was acceptable.

The engineer failed to take appropriate corrective action by either initiating a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)change, which would have justified and documented the actual configuration, or initiating work orders to bring the Plant configuration into agreement with the FSAR description.

A contributing cause was ineffective corrective action.In March 1986 an NRC Inspector identified cable trays in Fire Zone RC-IIC which traversed the zone and were not thermo-lagged for the entire 20 feet, the worst case identified was one cable tray with only 17 feet of thermo-lag.

The identified deficiencies were corrected within thirty days of the finding.The problems identified by the.June, 1988 NRC'inspection were not addressed apparently because the Supply System Fire Protection Engineer and a Plant Engineer thought the parallel trays intruding into the zone were acceptable.

The cause of the missing cable tray side rail insulation is poor workmanship in that two small areas were missed when the sprayed on insulation was applied.Corrective Actions To Be Taken I An outline of the twenty foot non-combustible zone will be taped on the floor of the cable spreading room.Cable trays and conduits that intrude into the area will be inspected to insure proper fire barriers or coatings are installed, and any deficiencies found will be corrected, including the missing cable tray side rail insulation.

Fire Zone RC-IIC was inspected to identify any other combustibles in the area.The inspection found two telephones, two light controlling clocks, an emergency battery-operated light, and a barometric pressure transmitter in the area.The location of this equipment in the Fire Zone RC-IIC will either be justified or be removed from the area.Trays with metal covers that require thermo-lag will be labeled as such.A.sign that describes the requirements of Fire Zone RG-IIC will.be posted near the non-combustible'area.

NRC FORM 388A (B43)aU.S.OPO:(085442A 838/Add NRC form SCCA ($82 l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.1ISOMI04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 PACILITY NAME Ill DOCKET NUMSER I1l LER NUMSER ISI YCAII rrlp SCQVCNTIAI.

I@i'rlCVICION NVMCCN~: NVM CA PACE IS)Ilashington Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 TEXT IN'oro rrrror b oCI4lor4 rror IICCCmor HIIC form 8$$4'rl I ITI Safety Si nificance, o s o o o 8 8 02 2 00 0 4 Qf 0 4 There are no adverse safety significant consequences associated with this event.No actual fire occurred in the cable spreading room during this event period.The increase in safety provided by a 20 foot non-combustible zone compared to-an 18 1/2 foot zone is minimal, and Fire Zone RC-IIC is protected by an automatic fire detection and sprinkler.

system.The safety significance of the missing side rail thermo-lag is also minimal.The pu'rpose of the side rail insulation is to eliminate a heat path to the thermo-lagged cables within the cable tray.In this case since only two small segments were missing it is estimated that at least a half-hour fire barrier existed and, depending on the location of the thermo-lag covered cables in the cable tray, the full one hour barrier may have existed.The health and safety of the public and plant personnel were not affected by this event.Similar Events/LERs84-031 Revisions 0, 1, 2 and 5, and 85-043 EIIS Information Text Reference EIIS Reference Radwaste Building Automatic Sprinkler System Automatic Detection Dedicated Division 2 Cable Tray Cable System NE KP KP ME Component SRNK 28 TY CBL NIIC SDIIM SCCA I042l o U.S.OPO;10884I4I24.838I4dd WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~3000 George Washington Way~Richland, Washington 99352 Docket No.50-397 July 15, 1988 Document Control Desk U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

Subject:

NUCLEAR PLANT NO.2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO.88-022

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No.88-022 for the WNP-2 Plant.This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the items of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

Very truly yours, Z.L.rq~g~a C.M.Powers (M/D 927M)WNP-2 Plant Manager CMP:lg

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No.88-022 cc: Mr.John B.Martin, NRC-Region V Mr.C.J.Bosted, NRC Site (M/D 901A)INPO Records Center-Atlanta, GA Ms.Dottie Sherman, ANI Mr.D.L.Williams, BPA (M/D 399)