IR 05000280/1986042

Requests Responses to Questions Re Insp Repts 50-280/86-42 & 50-281/86-42 Concerning Feedwater Line Failure,Including Identification of Codes,Stds,Specs & Regulatory Requirements Applied to Failed Feedwater Line & Associated Equipment

ML18150A041
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	03/16/1987
From:	SHARP P R HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE
To:	ZECH L W NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML18150A040	List: ML18150A041 ML18150A044
References
NUDOCS 8704270024
Preceding documents:	ML20213F877 (13 May 1987)
Download: ML18150A041 (6)

Text

• .\ -, * !)NE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS * PHILIP R. SHARP, INDIANA. CHAIRMAN * ROOM H2-331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX NO. 2 PHONE 12021 226-2600 DOUG'WALGREN, PENNSYLVANIA AL SWIFT, WASHINGTON CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, CALIFORNIA WILLIAM E, DANNEMEYER, CALIFORNIA JACK FIELDS, TEXAS 11.~. 11,oust of l'\epresentatibts MIKE SYNAR, OKLAHOMA W.J. "BILLY"' TAUZIN, LOUISIANA BILL RICHARDSON, NEW MEXICO JOHN BRYANT, TEXAS MICHAEL G. OXLEY, OHIO MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, FLORIDA DAN SCHAEFER, COLORADO Committee on Qenergp anl:I Commerce TERRY BRUCE, ILLINOIS JOE BARTON, TEXAS EDWARD J, MARKEY, SONNY CALLAHAN, ALABAMA NORMAN F. LENT, NEW YORK MASSACHUSETTS MICKEY LELAND, TEXAS RON WYDEN, OREGON RALPH M. HALL, TEXAS IEX OFFICIO) SUBCOMMITIEE ON ENERGY AND POWER WAYNE DOWDY, MISSISSIPPI llasbington, D~ 20515 JOHN D. DINGELL, MICHIGAN (EX OFFICIO) The Honorable Lando Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street Washington, DC 20555

Dear Chairman Zech:

March 16, 1987 The Subcommittee on Energy and Power is investigating the implications for the safety of nuclear power plants of the recent Surry accident.

In lar, we are concerned that (1) despite the designation of the failed feedwater line as "a nonsafety related system," a similar failure in a Boiling Water Reactor could result in the release of radioactive steam outside the ment structure; and (2) standards established for new nuclear power plants and inspection procedures for operational plants may not adequately take into account the possibility of deterioration of materials.

We are requesting your response to the following questions:

1. The NRC Augmented Inspection Team Reports Nos. 50-280/86-42 and 50-281/86-42 (NRC team reports) indicate that the failure at the Surry Station was caused by service induced deterioration of the feedwater suction line between the condenser and the feedwater pump. (a) What codes, standards, specifications and regulatory requirements are applied to the failed feedwater line and associated equipment (condenser, feedwater pumps, steam turbine, pipelines and components)?

Are these systems classified as nuclear or non-nuclear?

Are they classified as safety or nonsafety related systems? (b) Are these requirements different than those applicable to other tions of the feedwater and steam lines that are closer to the steam erators and reactor vessel? If so, why are they, and do you think this distinction is appropriate in view of what occurred in the Surry Plant accident?

What is the safety. justification for the differences?

8704270024 870417 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

• J * * The Honorable Lando March 16, 1987 (c) If a failure in the feedwater piping occurred at a similar location, e.g., between the condenser and feedwater piping in a Boiling Water Reactor nuclear power plant, could radioactive material be released outside the containment? (i) If so, how much could be released and what would be the consequences to the surrounding area? (ii) How are these areas of the feedwater and steam lines classified in Boiling Water Reactors? (iii) In view of the Surry accident, do you think that the tions of these areas of the power plant (including the steam turbine~ condenser and feedwater pumps) are appropriate? (d) What additional requirements could be applied to the feedwater lines, steam lines, steam turbine, feedwater pumps, condenser and related ment to improve the safety of nuclear plant operation? (e) Does the Commission plan to make any changes in its regulatory .ments for Surry or other nuclear power plants in order to implement lessons learned from the Surry accident?

2. The NRC team report cited erosion/corrosion induced thinning of the pipe metal as the cause of the failure at the Surry Station. Do the design, construction, maintenance and integrity monitoring codes, standards, or ,other regulations applied to nuclear power plants adequately provide for finding or make allowances for deterioration of plant components and piping in service? If not, does the Commission plan any regulatory changes to incorporate these factors in plant design, inspection and maintenance requirements? . 3. The two Surry Station nuclear units are very similar in design, nuclear reactor system and age. The units also "share" some support and auxiliary functions. (a) In view of this dependency, can you explain why Unit 1 was /not shut down immediately when the failure occurred in Unit 2? Whose responsibility was it to decide whether or not to shut it down immediately?

In your view, should Unit 1 have been shut down immediately? (b) Should the NRC issue any new regulatory guidance for such situations?

4. Changes in the control room ventilation system were being implemented while the plant was running and at the time of the accident.

The NRC inspection team reports conclude that the modification work resulted in the control room being flooded with potentially lethal carbon dioxide gas.

. . , . .... -1 * * * The Honorable Lando March 16, 1987 (a) Are NRC regulations adequate for modifications being performed while plants are operating?

Were these rules being observed at the time of the accident?* (b) Do you feel that different procedures should have been used? Is the Commission considering any regulatory changes to prevent ongoing tion work from compromising operational safety? 5. The NRC inspection team reports indicate the accident was initiated by an improperly maintained valve. (a) Does it seem appropriate that the plant was allowed to operate with this valve not functioning properly?

Are there adequate inspection requirements for such valves? (b) Does the Commission plan any regulatory changes as a result of the maintenance deficiencies discovered during the investigation of this accident?

Thank you for your assistance with this investigation.

We would appreciate having your response no later than April 10.

Sincerely,

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DC 2.05SS Dear Ch$irm.an Zech:: March 16 .11 * 1987 The Subcommittee on Energy*and Power is investigating the unplicatione for the safety of nuclear power plants of the recent Surry accident.

In lars we are conce~ned that {l) despite the designation of the failed feedwater line as 11 a nonu.fety related system, 11 a .ahnilar failure in a Boiling Water * Reactor could result in the. release of :radioactive steam outside tbe ment structure; ao.d (2) itandards e$tiblished for new*nuclear power plant& and inspection procedures for oper.e.t:ic:;an-al plants may not adequately take into account the potsibility of deterioration of materials

• . We are requesting yo~r response to the foltoving questions:

l. The NRC Augmented Inspection Te.!ln Reports Hos. 50-280/86-42.

and 50-281/86-42 (NRC :team i:eports)

indicnte that tbe failure at the Surry Station was caused by service induced deterioration of the feedw8ter auction lia.e between the coudenser

.' and the feedvater p\lmp., ,, (a) What. code*$, st:andarda,:

specificatioua and regulatory requiremeuU a.re applied to the failed feedwater*

line and associated equipment

{condenser~

feedwate~.pumps, ate,irin turbine, pipelines and com.ponenta)?

Are tbeee systems <:lassified as nuclear or non-nuclear?.

Are they classified as. ~afety or nonsafety related systems? (b) Are theae requirements different than those applicable to other tions of the feedw~ter and ste~ lines that a~e closer to the erators and re.$.Ct.or vesi&et'l If so, why are they, and do you think this distinction is approptiate in view of what occurred in the.Surry Plant accident?

What is Che safecy justification for the diff~rencea? ( EDO ---002635

... r .~**i. / /. ,. Sr, f ,, r ' . ' " *,* e e The*Honor~ble Lando Mar~h 16, 1987* {c) 1f a failure. in the feedwater piping occurced at a* similar .location, e.g ** between the condeuse~*

and feedwater piping in a Boiling Water Reactor* nuclear .power, plants could .i:'adioactive material be released outside the * COD t ai:maent?

(i) 1f so*' how mueh could 'be released *and 11bat would be tbe cO\\se.quences to the surrounding area.'?, (ii) Bov are .these areas of the feedwater and :ate*am lines. claaaif ied. lo. Boiling Water Reactots? (iii) In view of the Su..:ry accident, do you think that -the tion£ of these areas of .the power plant (including the steam turbine.*

conde11sec .apd feedvate;r pumps) are appi-opriate? (d) What additional requirement$

could be applied to the feedwater lines, steam lines, $team turbine, feedwater pumps,*eondens~r and related equip~ ment to iJll'Pt'OVe the safety of nuclear plant, ope~at'iou?.*

' * (e) Does the Commiasion plau to make. any changea in it* regulatory . ments for Sucry or ot:her nu.clear power plants in order ,to' implement leHoue l~arned f com the Surry a_cddent 1: 2. The NRC: team: report cited erosion/corrosion induced thinning of the pipe * me~al aa t.he ca.us~. of the failure at. tb.e * Surry Statiod. * Do tba design *. construction, maintenance and integrity monitoriug codea~ standard&, or -other regulations applied to nucl~:ai po..rer plaut.e adequately ptovide for findfog or make allowances for ~et.erioration of plant components and piping in service? If not, does the .. CommiHioll plan* any regulatory ehanges to incorporate these factora in plant designt inspection and maintenance requirement 81 3.. 'the two Surry Station nuclea.J:>

units a.re "f/ery similar in design, nuclear. * reaetoi: system and age. 'l'he u11it:a also .,share" some su.ppot't and auxili$ry f unc.t ions. (a) In view of ~his dependency.

can you explai~ .why Unit l ~as not &but* down immediately when the failure occurred in. Unit 2? * Whose responsibility was it to decide whether or not to shut it down immediately?

In your viewt should .Unit l have been shut down immediately? (b} Should the NRC issue any new regul$tory guidance for &ucb situationa7 4 .. Changes in the control room ventilation system were being iwplemented while the plan~ was running and at the tl.llle of the accid~nt *. The NRC inspection team rep~rts conclude that the modifi~ation work resulted in.the control rOO'lll being flooded with potentially lethal ea.t-bon dio~ide sas .* ; I;.* ---_____ ,_ --*--*-**. , ______ _c_ ---*. -------------

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,. -( , : > ~---* ,* ... , I\ The Uonos:-al:J 1(! Lando 'W. Zet'.:h March :16. 1987 '* (;i.) Are mic regulations adequ~~f~r-~.f'~i~ft'ious being perfo.r-t.aed while plents are operating1 Were these rules beittg obseTved at tne time of .the accident 'l (b) Do you feel that different procedures should hnve been uaedl ts the Com:nis~ian considering any regulato~y changes to prevent ongoing tion work from compromising operational

&afety? 5. The NB.C 1 inspectioa team reporta indicate the accident was initiated by an impropet-,ly t11ainta ined valve. (a) Does it aee111 appropciate that, the plant 111as aUowed to operate *vitb ttiia valve not functioning properly?

/..re, the-re adequate inspection requirements for au.ch .valves? * (b) Does the Comm.ission plan any :regulato.ry changes as a result of the . ~aintenance deficiencies discovered duting_ the investigation of thia, accident?

' Thauk. you for, your assistance

'111ith tbis investigatio\'l.

• 'fe wot.tld. a.ppi:-eciate having your.response no later than Ap~il 10. PRS:bb -------*-**-*---

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8/A?s/ :,.:' P~ .. 1 Sharp '7~ . Chairman --------------------------