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 Entered dateSiteRegionStateReactor typeEvent descriptionTopic
ENS 580779 December 2025 16:35:00Cozzi RecyclingNRC Region 3Illinois

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email: The Division of Radioactive Materials was notified on December 9, 2025, that an Alnor Instruments dew point measurement device, containing a radium-226 source, was located at a metal recycling facility in Bellwood, IL. The instrument was recovered by Agency staff. There was no indication of removable contamination. The device contains a 7 microcurie radium-226 foil that was manufactured and distributed under an Illinois-specific license that has since been terminated. An authorized service provider (DewPointer) was previously licensed and maintained the sealed source and device registry sheet but has since terminated operations. Labeling and serial numbers were damaged to the point that the prior owner will be unable to be determined. No public exposures in excess of regulatory limits are anticipated as a result of this incident. This device will be incorporated in the Agency's orphan source recovery program and properly disposed of as low level radioactive waste. This matter is considered closed. Illinois item number: IL250050

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/12/2025 AT 15:18 EST FROM GARY FORSEE TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: Upon investigation, three additional Alnor dew point measurement devices were identified and surrendered to the Agency for disposal as low level radioactive waste. Device serial numbers will be researched to identify the owners and appropriate enforcement/cost recovery (actions will be) initiated where possible. Notified (email) R3DO (Nguyen), NMSS Events Notification. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Moisture Density Gauge
ENS 580769 December 2025 16:35:00Ge HealthcareNRC Region 1Tennessee
Florida

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (Agency) via phone and email: The Agency was contacted by GE Healthcare to report a CardioGen Rb-82 generator had been lost in transit. Tracking information shows the 65-pound Yellow-II package arrived at the (common carrier) hub in Memphis, TN on December 4, 2025, but shows no movement thereafter. The intended destination was Cardiology Partners in Lake Worth, FL. The carrier's hazardous goods team has been contacted and reports they are unable to locate the package. The Florida recipient has confirmed that the package did not arrive. There is no indication the generator was intentionally diverted or has been separated from its packaging. At the time of reporting, the generator is estimated to contain 89.43 mCi of Sr-82 and 76.55 mCi of Sr-85. IL Event #: IL250049

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/11/2025 AT 1503 EST FROM GARY FORSEE TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The Agency was notified December 10, 2025, that the package was located and is being returned to the manufacturer. This matter is considered closed. Notified R1DO (Warnek), NMSS Events Notifications (email), ILTAB (email), and R3DO (Nguyen) THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Moisture Density Gauge
ENS 580759 December 2025 15:42:00Hope CreekNRC Region 1New JerseyGE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: This sixty-day telephone notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) under the provision 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), as an invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. On October 11, 2025, while in mode 5 for a refueling outage, an invalid actuation signal occurred while performing preventative maintenance on a 120V AC inverter. At the time of the event, one channel of the refuel floor exhaust (RFE) high radiation monitor was tripped due to a scheduled electrical bus outage. This electrical bus outage, in combination with the unexpected loss of power from the 120V AC inverter on another channel, caused the actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. The actuation was not the result of an actual plant condition and, therefore, is invalid. The containment isolation valves functioned as designed for the actuation signal received. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 580749 December 2025 14:40:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3OhioB&W-R-LPThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0818 EST on December 9, 2025, it was determined that a contract supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.Fitness for Duty
ENS 580739 December 2025 12:00:00Southern Nuclear Operating CompanyNRC Region 2GeorgiaCERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE VIOLATION The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On December 8, 2025, at 1424 EST, it was confirmed that a primary neutron source assembly (NSA) was loaded into a multi-purpose canister contrary to the requirements stated in the Certificate of Compliance (CoC, Renewed Amendment 11). Specifically, one primary NSA was loaded in the incorrect fuel storage location. Table 2.1-1 of the CoC requires fuel assemblies containing NSAs to be loaded in fuel storage locations 13, 14, 19, and/or 20. The primary NSA, however, was loaded into fuel storage location 32 in April, 2024. This condition is reportable in accordance with section 2.2 of the CoC. It has been verified that the total heat load of the fuel cask remains bound by the requirements of the CoC. There are also no adverse impacts to criticality since the primary NSA is in the outer region of the fuel cask, which is more conservative than the inner region. All other NSAs were verified to be in their approved fuel storage locations. All offsite and occupational dose remain within regulatory limits. This condition poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 580728 December 2025 09:28:00Building And Earth Sciences, Inc.NRC Region 1Alabama
Florida
The following is a summary of information provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via phone and email: On December 5, 2025, at 2100 EST, an individual was involved in a minor traffic accident in Haines City, Florida, and was subsequently arrested for driving under the influence, possession of firearms, possession of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and marijuana, and terroristic threats. The individual's vehicle contained a moisture density gauge, which was seized by the police. The BRC is investigating to determine if the individual was lawfully in possession of the gauge. The moisture density gauge was secured and undamaged. The gauge is licensed in Alabama with reciprocity in Florida. Florida incident number: FL25-112Moisture Density Gauge
ENS 580714 December 2025 20:07:00Anbessaw Consultants, IncNRC Region 4CaliforniaThe following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health via email: On December 4, 2025, the radiation safety officer (RSO) for Anbessaw Consulting, Inc., contacted the California Department of Public Health about a stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge was a CPN MC-3 Elite (S/N M30500858, 10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am-241/Be). The gauge was located on the floor of the rear seat of a locked pickup. The gauge was not secured to the vehicle frame, was not inside the gauge transportation box, and the trigger lock was not secured. The truck was located in the parking lot of the (gauge user's hotel) in Alameda, CA. The gauge was left in the vehicle around 1700-1745 PST on December 3, 2025, and was discovered missing around 0650 PST on December 4, 2025. After discovery of the missing gauge, the gauge user contacted their office to report the missing gauge (to the RSO around 0725 PST). The gauge user went to the hotel front desk to see if they had any security cameras and was told they did not. The gauge user contacted the Alameda Police Department and filed a police report. The licensee's investigation into this event is ongoing and will be reviewed further by the California Department of Public Health. California 5010 number: 120425 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfMoisture Density Gauge
Stolen
ENS 580704 December 2025 12:10:00University of Missouri-ColumbiaNRC Region 3MissouriThe following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email: On 8/26/25, waste was collected from the Central Missouri Cardiology clinic (CMC) and sent to a landfill. Later that day, the Missouri Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS) was notified that a radiological alarm was triggered at the landfill. DHSS agents responded to the incident on 8/28/25. Surveys were taken of the truck, resulting in a maximum reading of 3.8 mR/hr on contact. The truck was opened, and the radioactive trash bag was identified. The trash bag contained common waste items like napkins, food wrappers, nitrile gloves, and some medical packaging. The radioactive items were segregated from the rest of the waste. On 9/3/25, the waste was collected and transferred to the CMC. The DHSS team placed the contaminated items into a bucket with a lid and secured the waste at their facility. The bucket was then placed in a large plastic trash bag and stored in the lead cave in the locked hot lab. The radiation safety staff investigation confirmed that no individual member of the public exceeded the annual dose limit of 100 mrem per 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(1). However, it may be possible that individuals could have received 2 mrem in any one hour per 10 CFR 20.1301(a)(2), if they were standing next to the dumpster prior to the pickup of the waste. The waste was identified as Rb-82, most likely in equilibrium with Sr-82, and possibly containing Sr-85. Based on all collected evidence, the most likely source of the radioactive waste was a routine exchange of a Sr-82/Rb-82 generator that was externally contaminated. The nuclear medicine technologist performing the exchange assumed their gloves were not contaminated and disposed of them in the non-radioactive trash. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfMoisture Density Gauge
ENS 580693 December 2025 12:26:00SummerNRC Region 2South CarolinaWestinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), VC Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) is making a 60-day notification of an invalid actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). At 0948 EDT, on October 3, 2025, VCSNS commenced a shutdown to repair a steam line leak. On October 4 at 2116 EDT, VCSNS was in mode 3, with the 'A' motor-driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump providing decay heat removal. Main feedwater (MFW) had been secured per standard operating procedures. The deaerator storage tank (DAST) experienced a level decrease due to secondary-side valve leak-by. When the DAST level reached low-low level, an automatic signal was generated to secure the already secured MFW Pumps, which automatically sent an actuation signal to EFW. The low-low DAST signal is intended to secure MFW pumps to prevent damage due to a potential loss of net positive suction head at lower DAST levels. This sequence resulted in the invalid actuation of the previously secured 'B' EFW pump. This actuation was not in response to an actual engineered safety feature (ESF) condition and does not meet the criteria for a valid ESF actuation. This event is being reported as a 60-day report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for an invalid actuation of the EFW System. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 580682 December 2025 16:55:00CooperNRC Region 4NebraskaGE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0913 CDT, on October 6, 2025, a partial actuation of the division 1 emergency diesel generator (DG1) occurred during the performance of the 4160-volt bus 1F undervoltage relay channel functional test. The DG1 automatic start in the emergency mode was the result of the inadvertent contact between a jumper and another component. However, due to the test configuration, the output breaker for DG 1 did not close and pick up the load of the 4160-volt bus 1F since no actual undervoltage condition was present. DG1 components functioned as expected in response. Following the actuation, DG1 was restored to a standby lineup in accordance with plant procedures. This event is considered an invalid system actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters and was not a manual initiation. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this telephone notification is provided within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written licensee event report. The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified.
ENS 580672 December 2025 13:06:00Waters Corp.NRC Region 4ColoradoThe following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the Department) via email: The licensee prepared a shipment of samples in petri dishes containing Pu-239 (0.0869 uCi) and Sr-90 (0.0865 uCi) evenly distributed on 32 planchets with TDS (technical data sheet(s)) on November 3, 2025. The samples were sealed in a box which was vacuum sealed and labeled with a label detailing the package contained radioisotopes. On November 4, 2025, a shipping tracking number could not be located. The shipping department lead contacted the radiation safety officer. Efforts were made following this communication to find the missing package by contacting customers who had received other dangerous goods shipments from that day. No samples were found before the incident was reported by phone and in writing to the Department on December 1, 2025. Corrective actions have not been determined by the licensee at this time and further investigation by the unit is ongoing. Colorado Event Number: CO250045 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfMoisture Density Gauge
ENS 580661 December 2025 18:58:00Geotrack Technologies, Inc.NRC Region 1South CarolinaThe following information was provided by the South Carolina Department of Environmental Services (The Department) via email: GeoTrack Technologies, Inc. informed the Department via phone on December 1, 2025, that an authorized user and portable gauging device were hit by a truck while in use. The licensee reported that a 10 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241:Be Humboldt Scientific Model 5001 (gauge) was involved in the event. A portion of the index rod was broken and separated from the portable gauging device. The licensee was able to secure the source back into the portable gauging device. The licensee secured the area and waited for the Department's arrival. The licensee did not report any health or safety concerns and does not believe there to be any over exposures associated with the event. The Department went onsite to the construction site on December 1, 2025. Removable contamination and ambient dose surveys were performed. Ambient dose surveys were consistent with the Sealed Source and Device Registry certificate. The removable contamination surveys were background or below. The device is secured and being stored at the licensee's facility. This event is still under investigation by the Department. South Carolina event number: To be determined.
ENS 580651 December 2025 16:48:00University Of Maryland Baltimore)NRC Region 1MarylandThe following information was provided by the Maryland Department of the Environment via email: On December 1, 2025, at about 1100 EST, the Maryland Department of the Environment's Radiological Health Program (MDE/RHP) was notified via phone and email from the radiation safety officer (RSO) of MD-07-014-01 (University of Maryland Baltimore) that 13.78 mCi of F-18 fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) was used to a patient being evaluated for metastatic prostate cancer instead of F-18 prostate-specific membrane antigen (PSMA). The incident occurred on November 28, 2025, and the licensee is investigating the case and will provide a written report. MDE/RHP will finalize a reactive investigation. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5806426 November 2025 15:22:00Aultman HospitalNRC Region 3OhioThe following information was provided by the Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection via email: A patient was scheduled to receive 30 mCi Y-90 to the right lobe of the liver in segments 5/6, but only 11.2 mCi was delivered. This is an underdose of 63 percent. The authorized user (AU) and interventional radiologist physician verified catheter placement by contrast injection and fluoroscopy prior to the procedure and continued to monitor the catheter position during the treatment. During the procedure, the AU noted that saline was leaking from the top of the acrylic vial holder inside the delivery box and that there was insufficient pressure to mix/suspend the microspheres in the dose vial. It was also noted the catheter had moved from the original target. The AU determined the dose could not be delivered as prescribed and abandoned the procedure. The patient and referring physician were notified. Investigation is pending. Ohio item number: OH250004 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.Underdose
ENS 5806326 November 2025 14:27:00University of Missouri-ColumbiaNRC Region 0MissouriThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 26, 2025, during a review of past flux trap loadings, it was identified that during the period from July 22, 2024, through August 4, 2024, the University of Missouri Research Reactor (MURR) exceeded the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8, 'Experiments.' Specifically, TS 3.8.b requires that 'The absolute value of the reactivity worth of all experiments in the center test hole shall be limited to 0.006 delta-k/k.' A review of the center test hole flux trap loading for those two weeks determined that the reactivity worth of experiments exceeded the 0.006 delta-k/k and has been re-estimated to have been approximately between 0.0061 and 0.0063 delta-k/k (from initial estimates of 0.0046 and 0.0048 delta-k/k). This underestimation of flux trap worth occurred due to inadequate programmatic controls applied to TS 4.8, 'Experiments,' specification b, which requires that 'The reactivity worth of an experiment shall be estimated or measured, as appropriate, before reactor operation with said experiment.' Specifically, multiple center test hole flux trap irradiation samples were run in the reactor without adequate prior reactivity worth estimation or measurement. As corrective actions to this issue, MURR is performing additional sample measurements and revising the process used for measuring and determining flux trap irradiation samples to prevent this issue from recurring. While the TS 3.8.b limitation is 0.006 delta-k/k, the analytical limit of the supporting safety analysis is 0.007 delta-k/k. This limitation is based upon the step insertion limits evaluated within the MURR Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13. As a result, exceeding the 0.006 delta-k/k TS limitation by less than 0.001 delta-k/k does not result in an impact to reactor safety. This error does not impact any current operation or flux trap loading. This issue is being reported under TS 6.6.c(1) as it meets the TS 1.1.b and TS 1.1.f definitions for an abnormal occurrence. Specifically, TS 1.1.b defines an abnormal occurrence as an 'Operation in violation of limiting conditions for operations established in Section 3.0,' and TS 1.1.f defines abnormal occurrence as 'An observed inadequacy in the implementation of an administrative or procedural controls such that the inadequacy causes or could have caused the existence or development of an unsafe condition involving operation of the reactor.' The NRC Project Manager has been informed.
ENS 5806226 November 2025 12:58:00Martinez Refining CompanyNRC Region 3Illinois

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email: The Agency was contacted the morning of November 26, 2025, by Mistras Group, Inc., to report a radiography overexposure that occurred on 11/24/25. Reportedly, a trainee stood over a collimated, exposed 37 Ci Ir-192 source for an unreported period of time, before also grabbing the collimator (containing the exposed source) in his right hand and positioning it for the next shot. After checking the camera and recognizing the incident, he continued to work for ten additional shots, and the following day, before reporting the incident. Based on the report, the lead radiographer also failed to properly supervise and/or report the matter. The trainee was not wearing his dosimetry/alarming rate meter or referring to his survey meter throughout the incident. The radiographer reports symptoms consistent with an acute exposure to his right hand (sunburn, skin erythema, and tingling in the hand) and is being directed to medical treatment this morning. Oak Ridge Associated Universities (REAC-TS) was contacted by the licensee the evening of November 25, 2025, for direction on appropriate medical treatment. The trainee has been removed from all work for, at a minimum, exceeding his occupational exposure limits. The Agency has requested updates on medical assessment and is coordinating a full re-enactment with involved personnel for an accurate dose assessment at the beginning of next week. Agency staff, using the limited data available at this time, estimate an exposure in excess of 50 R but likely less than 250 R to the right hand. The source was in a 4 half-value layers tungsten collimator which the trainee states was pointed down. Based on the licensee's description, exposures to the groin and feet are estimated to be less than 50 R. Time/motion studies will allow refinement of these estimates. Based on the description of the exposure, this incident likely has a 24-hour reporting requirement, which the licensee failed to meet. Results of the time/motion study and refined dose estimates will be used to determine if the incident meets the criteria for an abnormal occurrence. Updates will be provided as they become available. Illinois item number: IL250048

  • * * UPDATE FROM GARY FORSEE TO BRIAN P. SMITH AT 1644 EST ON DECEMBER 2, 2025 * * *

The following is an update received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email: Agency inspectors completed a reactive inspection on Dec. 2, 2025. Based on a re-enactment of the incident, statements collected and time-motion studies, Agency staff do not believe the radiographer received a dose in excess of regulatory limits (50 rem). Inspector observations and inspection findings indicate a likely dose of 30 rem to the radiographer's right hand and an additional 1 rem to other portions of the skin. After repeated observations of the trainee's handling and securing of the collimated source, it was determined the guide tube was being held rather than the collimated (shielded) source. As a result, the exposure rate used for dose calculations was changed (increased) to that of an unshielded 37 Ci source at a distance of 1.25 inches. After ten recorded re-enactments, the act of picking up and securing the collimator to the pipe consistently resulted in an exposure to his right hand with a duration of 5-7 seconds. It would take an exposure of approximately twice this duration to result in a 50 rem dose to his extremity (11.7 seconds). Exposures to feet, groin, whole body and eyes were also calculated. In aggregate, the skin dose from this incident is estimated to be equal to or less than 31 rem. Total annual extremity exposure is also estimated to be less than the annual limit. Whole body dose for this incident is estimated to be less than one hundred millirem (15 second exposure, 14 inches away from shielded source at 0.31 R/hour). Prior to this incident, the individual's annual whole-body dose was 131 millirem; however, the trainee admitted to not wearing dosimetry. While lab results are pending, there was no appearance of deterministic effects (skin reddening/erythema). This incident will remain open pending the licensee's written report. If their investigation supports inspector findings, this incident may be retracted. Agency address of noncompliance with administrative rules will proceed concurrently. Notified R3DO (Hills), NMSS (Fisher), IRMOC (Grant) and NMSS _Events via email.

Overexposure
Reactive Inspection
ENS 5806126 November 2025 11:09:00G.E. Healthcare Dba/ Medi+PhysicsNRC Region 3IllinoisThe following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email: The Agency was notified on November 25, 2025, by G.E. Healthcare that a shipment containing one shielded, 10 mL vial of an indium-111 radiopharmaceutical has been reported as lost after arriving at the (common carrier's) Memphis, TN hub. This package was shipped from the licensee's Arlington Heights facility on Friday, November 7, 2025, for delivery to Leesar, Inc. of Fort Myers, FL. The package contained 3.201 mCi at time of shipment, which has now decayed to 0.03 mCi. The package is likely lost within the sorting facility and there is little likelihood of public exposures exceeding regulatory limits. The customer has acknowledged that the package was not received. There has been no indication that the package was damaged or that the contents were separated from its packaging. The loss has a 30-day reporting requirement, which was met by the licensee. Absent any new information, this matter is considered closed pending the licensee's written report. Illinois item number: IL250047 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfMoisture Density Gauge
ENS 5806025 November 2025 15:01:00Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc.NRC Region 3Texas
Minnesota
The following is a summary of information provided by the vendor via phone and email: Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. reported that certain Rosemount model 3154 pressure transmitters have exhibited a higher field return rate as a result of electronics assembly failure caused by an open circuit condition in certain precision wire wound resistors. This notification pertains to certain transmitters or spare electronics assemblies manufactured between November 2015 and November 2022. Specific parts affected are being identified to customers. Rosemount does not have complete information relating to specific plant applications and therefore cannot determine the potential effects of this condition on plant operation. Failure analysis determined the open circuit condition is a result of corrosion of the resistive wire element, which leads to an annunciated off-scale low failure of the 4-20 mA analog output signal. In some cases, the off-scale low failure may be preceded by observable erratic behavior of the analog output and/or analog output drift outside of published specifications. If the analog output is erratic or drifting outside of published specifications, the transmitter output should be considered unreliable. Rosemount investigation has determined the higher failure rate is associated with certain lots of wire wound resistors. As of this notice, 70 percent of model 3154 wire wound resistor failures occurred at two reactor sites, suggesting higher failure rates may be experienced at individual locations. Rosemount has revised the design of all Rosemount 3150-series nuclear qualified pressure transmitters to utilize higher reliability precision resistor technologies. This revision is fully qualified and implemented for all Rosemount 3150 series models including, but not limited to, Rosemount model 3154. Rosemount recommends that users review the application where any of the model 3154 pressure transmitters affected are used to determine any safety consideration in the operation of the plant and report any observed failures. Rosemount model 3154 pressure transmitters within the scope of this notification are considered fully functional unless failure symptoms consistent with the description are identified. Responsible company officer: Gerard Hanson Vice President and General Manager 8200 Market Blvd Chanhassen, MN Affected plants: Region I: Beaver Valley, Calvert Cliffs, Ginna, Hope Creek, Indian Point, Millstone, North Anna, Salem, Seabrook, Surry, VC Summer Region II: Browns Ferry, Catawba, Farley, Harris, Hatch, McGuire, Oconee, Robinson, Sequoyah, St. Lucie, Turkey Point, Vogtle, Watts Bar Region III: Braidwood, Byron, Davis Besse, DC Cook, Dresden, LaSalle, Monticello, Point Beach, Prairie Island, Quad Cities Region IV: ANO, Callaway, Columbia, Commanche Peak, Diablo Canyon, River Bend, South Texas Project, Waterford, Wolf Creek
ENS 5805925 November 2025 10:50:00St. Luke'S Univ. Health NetworkNRC Region 1PennsylvaniaThe following information was provided by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, Bureau of Radiation Protection (the Department), via email: On November 21, 2025, the licensee was performing a routine sealed source leak test and discovered that a Cs-137 vial reference standard (model RV-137-200U, S/N 1710-68-8) was leaking. The licensee used a Capintec CRC 55tW well counter to determine if the source was leaking or contaminated. The source container was wipe-tested on the inside and found to also be contaminated. The dose calibrator dipper was very slightly contaminated and also removed from service. All other equipment associated with the source was wipe tested and found to be free of contamination. The source was immediately removed from service. The sealed source was replaced in the original lead container and placed into gloves and a plastic bag along with all associated wipes and the dose calibrator dipper. The licensee will package the material and send it for disposal. The estimated activity of the source was 170 microcuries, and the leak test results were 0.0139 microcuries. The Department will perform a reactive inspection. More information will be provided as it is received. Event report number: PA250016Reactive Inspection
ENS 5805824 November 2025 14:42:00Phillips 66 CompanyNRC Region 1New JerseyThe following information was provided by the New Jersey Bureau of Environmental Radiation Radiological & Environmental Assessment Section via phone and email: During a site-wide inventory reconciliation, the licensee determined that 26 (of the) licensee's tritium exit signs could not be located. While a comprehensive search was conducted, it was ultimately determined that the signs may have been misplaced or removed during prior renovation or decommissioning activities. The signs were declared missing on November 20, 2025. The site is actively engaged in removing all tritium exit signs that remain on-site through a licensed waste broker. They will be replaced with non-radioactive signs. Manufacturer: Various Model number: Various Total estimated activity: 272 Ci Isotope: H-3 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfTritium Exit Sign
Moisture Density Gauge
Exit Sign
ENS 5805724 November 2025 11:49:00Town Center Ambulatory Surgery Ctr.NRC Region 3MichiganThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 19, 2025, Pd-103 seeds were retrieved from secure storage and brought directly to the operating room in accordance with established protocol. Pre-procedure planning; including review of the treatment plan, seed mapping, and completion of the written directive; was completed prior to patient arrival. The patient was brought to the operating room at 1145 (EST). A standardized time-out was performed to confirm correct patient, procedure, antibiotic administration, fire safety considerations, and seed verification. The patient was anesthetized and positioned, and the procedure began at 1151 and ended at 1207. An active, collaborative seed count was maintained throughout the case. During the debriefing phase, the radiation oncologist authorized user, surgical technologist, and nursing staff verbally confirmed the number of seeds implanted, the number of needles used, and the remaining seeds to be returned to storage. The patient was then transferred to recovery. During post-procedure room turnover, the surgical technologist reported difficulty removing the final seed cartridge from the applicator. She attempted to remove it by unscrewing the cartridge holder but was unsuccessful. After reassembling the device, she handed it to the radiation oncologist, who was able to partially remove the cartridge. The portion of the cartridge that remained connected to the applicator is presumed to have contained the unused seeds. The applicator was then sent to the central processing department (CPD) for sterilization with part of the cartridge still lodged inside. It was processed through CPD as routine. Based on the investigation, it is presumed that during the sterilization process the (eight) remaining Pd-103 seeds became dislodged from the cartridge assembly. Once separated, the seeds would have entered the wastewater stream and been carried into the sanitary sewer system, resulting in their unintentional disposal. Below are the calculations documenting the classification of reporting requirements. Sealed source certificate Pd-103 certified the following: Activity range: 2.59 - 2.80 mCi Maximum activity: 2.80 mCi x 8 seeds = 22.4 mCi Regulations for immediate reporting - Pd-103 100 (Part 20 Appendix C) x1000=100000 = 100 mCi Total activity lost - 22.4 mCi - not reportable under 20.2201(a)(i) Regulations for report within 30 days - Pd-103 100 (Part 20 Appendix C) x10=1000 = 1 mCi Total activity lost - 22.4 mCi - reportable under 20.2201(a)(ii) THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfBrachytherapy
Moisture Density Gauge
ENS 5805622 November 2025 15:45:00Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.NRC Region 1Vermont

The following is a summary of information that was provided by the licensee via phone: On 11/22/2025 at approximately 1340 EST, a plant worker sustained a leg injury on site at Vermont Yankee and was transported to a local hospital. The injured worker was verified to not be contaminated. Vermont Yankee notified the Department of Homeland Security and local law enforcement to inform them of the situation due to emergency medical response personnel responding on site. Vermont Yankee is making this report to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for offsite notification to other government agencies. The NRC Regional Inspector was notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/24/2025 AT 1037 FROM TOM SILKO TO JOSUE RAMIREZ * * *

The following is a summary of information that was provided by the licensee via phone and email: After further review, Vermont Yankee (VY) has determined that the event was not reportable. Therefore, VY is retracting the report. The basis for the retraction is: Notification to the NRC was made based on reporting to another government agency (The Vermont Department of Homeland Security), however, the reporting to the Vermont Department of Homeland security was not required per VY implementing procedures. Notified R1DO (Bickett) and NMSS Events Notifications (Email).

ENS 5805521 November 2025 22:12:00River BendNRC Region 4LouisianaGE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 21, 2025, at 0835 CST, River Bend Station (RBS) was operating at 78 percent reactor power when the (radioactive waste) shipping department received a cask from the Waste Control Specialists disposal facility in Andrews County, TX via (a common carrier). A smear sample was collected and exhibited surface contamination above the Department of Transportation (DOT) limits, specified in 49 CFR 173. The carrier was notified at 1713 CST. The surface contamination exceeded 24,000 (disintegrations per minute per centimeter squared) for beta gamma (activity). Supervision was immediately contacted and placed the shipment into a radiological controlled area. An investigation was performed to the extent of the condition of the loose surface contamination of the cask to determine if it was isolated to the immediately accessible areas of the cask due to an installed rain cover. The investigation concluded that the condition was extended to the surface of the cask where the average surface area exceeded DOT limits. This condition is immediately reportable to the NRC headquarters operations center per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1).
ENS 5805421 November 2025 16:53:00South TexasNRC Region 4TexasWestinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1208 CST on 11/21/2025, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, (the) Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped due to a main transformer lockout. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. One of three essential chillers (chiller 22C) was inoperable at the time of (the) trip due to planned maintenance activities. All other engineered safety feature (ESF) equipment was operable at the time of the event. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steam generator pressure operated relief valves (PORV). There was no impact to Unit 1. All control rods fully inserted. Primary pressurizer PORV '655A' opened twice to relieve pressure in response to (the) pressure transient. (South Texas Project Unit 2) entered Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.e due to a loss of two off-site power sources, `A' and `C' ESF busses. Upon main turbine trip, throttle valves closed as expected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to valid actuation of two of the three emergency diesel generators. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel, and Unit 2 remains at normal operating temperature and normal operating pressure. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Emergency diesel generators '21' and '23' automatically started upon loss of power as expected. Auxiliary feedwater actuated post-trip as expected. Offsite power to ESF busses has been restored.
ENS 5805321 November 2025 13:38:00The Regents Of University Of CaNRC Region 4CaliforniaThe following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) via email: On 10/30/25, the licensee was treating a patient with Y-90 microspheres to a liver lobe in 3 dosages. The first two dosages were successfully administered, but the third dosage did not deliver successfully, with essentially none of the dosage reaching the target. Instead, the majority of the dosage was retained in the administration apparatus with some having leaked out, resulting in contamination of the treatment room and treating personnel. While the licensee reported this event to RHB on 11/1/25, it was reported by email and not directed to the correct RHB sub-organization, nor was the email clear regarding the event. This resulted in the significant delay in reporting this event to the NRC. RHB is still investigating this event. California 5010 Number: 110125 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5805220 November 2025 11:13:00Veterans AdministrationNRC Region 3PennsylvaniaThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: A medical event occurred on November 17, 2025, at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. A patient was to be administered Lu-177 (Lutathera) by intravenous infusion for a neuroendocrine tumor. The written directive prescribed a dose of 200 mCi. During the administration, there was a leak from the administration apparatus onto absorbent material. It is estimated that only about half of the prescribed activity was delivered to the patient. The medical event was discovered on November 19, 2025, after reviewing post-treatment imaging. The referring physician and patient were notified of the medical event on November 19, 2025. No short-term harm to the patient is expected. The NRC Region 3 project manager will be notified. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5805119 November 2025 14:55:00Alabama River CelluloseNRC Region 1AlabamaThe following is a summary of the information provided by the Alabama Office of Radiation Control via email: During routine bi-annual shutter checks, the licensee noted that their device had a malfunctioning shutter. The device's shutter failed in its normal open position. The licensee attempted to address the malfunction by spraying the shutter with lubricant, but the shutter's mechanism still presented a high resistance. The area has been barricaded off and procedures are in place to ensure that no one approaches the device or pipe until the malfunctioning device is replaced. The licensee plans to replace the source holder. Once the replacement is installed, the malfunctioning device will be put into safe state, removed from service, and securely stored until disposal. The estimated date for repair is January 31, 2026. Model: Ohmart/Vega SH-F2 S/N: 8829GK Source: 500 mCi Cs-137 Alabama incident: 25-06Stuck Open Shutter
ENS 5805019 November 2025 14:10:00Fred Hutchinson Cancer CenterNRC Region 4WashingtonThe following is a summary of the information provided by the Washington State Department of Health Office of Radiation Protection (Department) via email: At 1651 PST, the Department was notified of the misadministration of a 200 mCi Lu-177 prostate membrane specific antigen dose for a patient on a research protocol. The dose was administered using an infusion pump. The principal investigator (PI) of the study was present for the administration and verified the dose. The PI is an authorized user on the license. The pump began malfunctioning shortly after the infusion began. There were attempts to reset the pump and change the pump and patient catheter lines, but the situation did not improve. The decision was made to abort the procedure due to the ongoing difficulties. It is believed that the infusion lines failed due to blockage or pressure buildup, which caused the pump to alarm. A small amount of contamination was noted on the infusion pump stand, on a side table that held the infusion lines, as well as near the sink in the room, likely due to initial decontamination efforts. The room was easily decontaminated and reopened. Residuals measured from the remaining vial and tubing totaled approximately 145 mCi. The patient had imaging immediately after the aborted infusion that confirmed some administration of the drug was successful, which was estimated at 55 mCi. This represents 27.5 percent of the prescribed dose injected. The research protocol includes an additional dose. Patient protocols are being reviewed for possible changes. A detailed report will follow within 15 days. WA incident number: WA-25-015 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5804919 November 2025 11:19:00LimerickNRC Region 1PennsylvaniaGE-4The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 18, 2025, at 0328 CST, as the licensee was initiating the standby gas treatment system in support of planned maintenance on normal reactor building ventilation, the '2A' reactor enclosure recirculation system (RERS) fan failed to establish flow upon the system initiation signal. The '2B' RERS fan was previously inoperable due to a planned maintenance window. Technical specification action statement 3.6.5.4.B was entered with both Unit 2 RERS fans inoperable. The '2B' RERS fan was restored to operable at 0523 EST. The licensee returned normal reactor building ventilation to service to restore secondary containment differential pressure. Due to inoperability of both RERS trains, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(3)(v)(C). The licensee reported there was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5804818 November 2025 18:06:00Highlands Camp And Retreat CenterNRC Region 4ColoradoThe following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email: The licensee reported two exit signs, each containing 11.5 Ci of tritium, were lost in Allenspark, Colorado. Manufacturer: Safety Light Corporation Model number: 2040 Colorado event number: CO250044 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfMoisture Density Gauge
Exit Sign
ENS 5804718 November 2025 18:03:00St. John Babtist ChurchNRC Region 4ColoradoThe following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email: The licensee reported three exit signs, each containing 17.51 Ci of tritium, were lost in Longmont, Colorado. Manufacturer: SRB Technologies Model number: BXU20GS Colorado event number: CO250043 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfMoisture Density Gauge
Exit Sign
ENS 5804618 November 2025 16:33:00PalisadesNRC Region 3MichiganCEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 18, 2025, (non-licensed) supervisor violated the station's fitness for duty (FFD) policy. The employee's unescorted access to Palisades Nuclear Plant has been terminated. The event was determined to be reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.Fitness for Duty
ENS 5804518 November 2025 15:28:00Deibel Labs Of Illinois IncNRC Region 3Illinois

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST CHROMATOGRAPH The following is a summary of information provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via phone and email: The licensee reported to the Agency that a generally licensed gas chromatograph could not be located. The device was listed as in use at the licensee's site in Lincolnwood, IL. No record could be found of the device's disposal, and search efforts have been unproductive. An investigation by the Agency is underway. Device: Shimadzu Scientific Instrument ECD-17 S/N: 1721 Source: 10 mCi Ni-63 Source S/N: 618587 Illinois incident number: IL250046

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/12/25 AT 1151 EST FROM GARY FORSEE TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: Email correspondence was located which indicated that the device was returned to the manufacturer in 2019. Recognizing further documentation of the transfer is unlikely to be available, and that information available to the Agency indicates it was returned, this matter is being closed. Notified (email) R3DO (Nguyen), NMSS Events Notification, ILTAB. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Moisture Density Gauge
ENS 5804418 November 2025 12:12:00Bard BrachytherapyNRC Region 3Georgia
Illinois

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (Agency) via phone and email: The Agency was contacted on November 17, 2025, to advise of four missing I-125 brachytherapy seeds with an activity of approximately 0.23 millicuries each. Three seeds remain missing with the most likely disposition being lost in transit from the Georgia shipper to the Illinois (common carrier) hub. The root cause appears to be poor packaging by the shipping licensee. On November 17, 2025, Bard Brachytherapy, Inc. received a package from Northside Hospital - Gwinnett (Lawrenceville, GA) with return shipping information indicating that there were twenty-four seeds being returned. Upon examination, ten were sealed inside their original packaging, nine were found loose inside the box, and one was found in the parking lot outside of the delivery door. Four sources remained unaccounted for when the Agency was contacted. (The common carrier) was called to return to the Bard facility, but surveys failed to identify any additional seeds within the delivery vehicle. Additional surveys were conducted at the local (common carrier) hub and on the truck that transported the package from O'Hare airport. The licensee was able to locate one additional seed at the (common carrier) hub, underneath a receiving conveyor belt, leaving three (3) seeds unaccounted for. The package is reported as having left Lawrenceville, GA on November 12, 2025. The package had no indication of damage from transit. The Georgia program will be notified. A similar incident was reported on May 13, 2024, as a result of inadequate packaging of seeds for transport by the same Georgia licensee. Agency outreach to O'Hare is still pending for additional surveys. A detailed listing of stops prior to delivery is also being sought. The brachytherapy seeds are classified as a Category 5 source, described by the IAEA as the least likely to be dangerous to a person. At the estimated activity, the exposure rate at one foot would be just under 0.5 mR/hour. Due to the small size as well as the proximity and duration of exposure required; it is highly unlikely any public exposures would exceed regulatory limits. The Illinois licensee followed reporting timelines, package receipt procedures, and performed all reasonable search efforts. Agency staff are pursuing additional avenues to attempt recovery of the sources. This report will be updated with any information available. IL incident number: IL250045

  • * * UPDATE ON NOVEMBER 19, 2025, AT 1653 EST FROM GARY FORSEE TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The following information was provided by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (Agency) via email: Agency inspectors performed a reactive inspection at O'Hare airport on November 19, 2025. Search efforts located one of the three missing seeds, which will be returned to the Illinois licensee for disposal. Two I-125 brachytherapy seeds, containing approximately 0.23 mCi each, remain missing. A detailed listing of stops was obtained from the carrier but proved logistically impractical to fully survey (approximately 63 locations). Given the very low likelihood of public exposures exceeding any regulatory limit, the Category 5 classification of the sources, and high likelihood the remaining sources are out of state; the Agency is considering this matter closed. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski) (email), NMSS Events Notification (email), and ILTAB (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

Brachytherapy
Moisture Density Gauge
Reactive Inspection
ENS 5804318 November 2025 00:28:00DresdenNRC Region 3IllinoisGE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1613 CST on November 17, 2025, it was discovered that the single train of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The isolation condenser was operable during this time period. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: A fuse in the turbine stop valve circuit blew during initial system testing for unit startup.
ENS 5804217 November 2025 16:05:00SequoyahNRC Region 2TennesseeWestinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0911 EST, on 11/17/2025, it was discovered that both trains of the control room emergency ventilation system were simultaneously inoperable due to an unauthorized door breach of a door in the control room envelope; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). At 0913 EST, the door was closed, and both trains of the control room emergency ventilation system were restored to operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5804115 November 2025 05:32:00OconeeNRC Region 2South CarolinaB&W-L-LPThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 2254 EST, on November 14, 2025, with Unit 2 in no mode at zero percent power, an actuation of the emergency AC power system occurred during verification of electrical system alignment. The reason for the Keowee Hydro units actuating was due to loss of power to the Unit 2 main feeder busses when a potential transformer drawer for the Unit 2 main feeder busses was opened, resulting in breakers supplying power to the Unit 2 main feeder busses opening. The Keowee Hydro Units 1 and 2 automatically started as designed when a main feeder bus undervoltage signal was received. There was no impact to Unit 1 or Unit 3. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the emergency AC power system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5804014 November 2025 21:47:00ClintonNRC Region 3IllinoisGE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1351 CST on 11/14/25, with the unit in mode 1 at 99 percent power, an actuation of the division 1, 2, and 3 emergency diesel generators (EDGs) occurred when a fault occurred on the emergency reserve auxiliary transformer (ERAT). The reserve auxiliary transformer `B' was de-energized and isolated for maintenance. The cause of the division 1, 2, and 3 EDGs auto-start was an actuation of the loss of voltage function undervoltage relays for each respective bus. The division 1, 2, and 3 EDGs automatically started as designed when the applicable loss of voltage signals were received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the division 1, 2, and 3 EDGs. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5803914 November 2025 16:41:00University Of California - Los AngelesNRC Region 4CaliforniaThe following information was provided by the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch via email: The University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) health (center) reported that a patient being treated for liver cancer underwent a Y-90 Sirtex SirSpheres brachytherapy treatment on November 12, 2025. This is a preliminary report of a medical event, per 10 CFR 35.3045. The authorized user's (AU) written directive called for two vials of Y-90 activity to treat two different segments of the right lobe via two different arterial branches of the lobe. The first prescription was for 108.11 mCi and 114 mCi (105.73 percent) was successfully delivered. The second prescription was for the right lobe, segment 4A using 13.51 mCi but only 10.04 mCi (74.32 percent) was able to be delivered. The authorized user believes his patient reached stasis, so he halted the procedure per the Sirtex IFU (instructions for use). Arterial flow is intermittently checked throughout the infusion process. The undelivered activity was determined by measuring the exposure rate at a known distance from the post-treatment waste after the administration. UCLA health (center) will submit a 15-day report to the Department. California 5010 Number: 111225 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.Brachytherapy
ENS 5803814 November 2025 16:00:00ClintonNRC Region 3IllinoisGE-6

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: On November 14, 2025, at 1351 CST, while in a system outage window, for the reserve auxiliary transformer 'B' bus work inspections, the emergency reserve auxiliary transformer tripped. This resulted in the loss of offsite power to all vital busses. At 1402 CST, a notice of unusual event was declared (MU.1) due to the loss of all offsite power to vital busses. All three emergency diesel generators actuated and energized the vital busses. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Operations Center, FEMA NWC, CWMD Watch Desk, HHS Ops Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email), and FERC Reliability Monitoring Center (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/16/2025 AT 0647 EST FROM JASON VINCENT TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following update is a summary of information provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 16, 2025, at 0500 CST, the Unusual Event was terminated. All offsite electrical power has been restored, and the plant is in a normal electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified R3RA (Geissner), NRR (Groom), NSIR (Williams), R3DO (Ziolkowski), NRR EO (Mckenna), IR MOC (Grant), R3PAO (Mitlyng), R3DRSS (Heck). Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Operations Center, FEMA NWC, CWMD Watch Desk, HHS Ops Center, CISA Central Watch Officer, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email), and FERC Reliability Monitoring Center (email).

Loss of Offsite Power
ENS 5803714 November 2025 12:19:00Big Rivers Electric Corporation, Db Wilson StationNRC Region 1KentuckyThe following information was provided by the Radiation Health Branch of the Kentucky Department for Public Health and Safety (The Department) via email: The Department was notified on 11/12/2025, by the radiation safety officer (RSO) from Big Rivers Electric Corporation, that during a routine six-month inventory/shutter checks, two sources were identified to have problems with the shutters closing. Both (gauges) measure density in the scrubber material and are mounted on piping. No exposure is possible unless the piping or gauge is removed. Primary action is to notify personnel and modify the red tag system to indicate that until this is resolved, no maintenance can be allowed on the piping because the shutters on the gauges cannot be safely closed. Until further notice, the piping where these gauges are mounted cannot have any maintenance activities performed on them. Red tag authorities should make note that the gauges cannot be red tagged because the shutters do not close. Maintenance will be performed on the gauges by an authorized contractor. Gauge 1 information: Manufacturer: Kay Ray Model number: 20493 Serial number: 7062BP Activity: 10 mCi Cs-137 Gauge 2 information: Manufacturer: Ronan Model number: SA8-C5 Serial number: 2104CP Activity: 20 mCi Cs-137
ENS 5803612 November 2025 19:14:00FermiNRC Region 3MichiganGE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 12, 2025, at approximately 1250 EST, during surveillance testing of the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system the HPCI minimum flow valve (E4150F012) would not open during stroke testing. HPCI had been removed from service for quarterly surveillance testing at 0957, November 12, 2025. The unplanned inoperability condition began at 1250 when a stroke time test was attempted, and the valve did not reposition. Since HPCI is a single-train safety system, this meets the criterion for event notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, based on loss of a single train safety system. Reactor core isolation cooling was and has remained operable. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The failure is currently under investigation. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Limiting conditions for operation 3.5.1 and 3.6.1.3 were entered to address HPCI inoperable. The site remains on normal offsite power, and all emergency diesel generators remain available.Time of Discovery
Stroke time
ENS 5803512 November 2025 16:02:00CallawayNRC Region 4MissouriWestinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0748 CST, on November 12, 2025, Callaway Plant experienced an automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system in response to auxiliary feedwater actuation signals (AFAS). A low suction pressure signal was also received which aligned the AFW pumps to essential service water (ESW). An unknown amount of water from the ultimate heat sink (UHS) entered the steam generators, necessitating a plant shutdown due to exceeding secondary water chemistry program action levels. During the shutdown, with the plant at approximately 28 percent power, high vibration was received on the main turbine, requiring a manual turbine trip. The cause of the AFAS is not yet known. The plant is currently stable in mode 3. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Decay heat is being removed via steam dump valves to the main condenser.

  • * * RETRACTION ON NOVEMBER 20, 2025, AT 1409 EST FROM ZACH MILLIGAN TO JORDAN WINGATE * * *

The following is a summary of the retraction provided by the licensee via phone and email. Event Notification 58035, made on November 12, 2025, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), is being retracted following a review of the cause of the auxiliary feedwater system's automatic actuation. The AFW system actuation was traced to a power supply malfunction, which also caused the auxiliary feedwater pumps to align with essential service water. Because the actuation resulted from a spurious power supply failure, rather than signals triggered by plant conditions or parameters meeting system initiation criteria, it is considered invalid and not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R4DO (Drake)

Ultimate heat sink
ENS 5803410 November 2025 17:47:00Deck SuperstoreNRC Region 4ColoradoThe following is a summary of information provided by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment via email: The licensee reported two exit signs, each containing 6.0 Ci of tritium, were lost in Commerce City, Colorado. Manufacturer: Isolite Corporation Model Number: SLX60 Colorado Event Number: CO250042 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfMoisture Density Gauge
Exit Sign
ENS 580327 November 2025 17:03:00Kumar And Associates, Inc.NRC Region 4ColoradoThe following information was provided by the Colorado Department of Health (the Department) via email: A gauge service provider reported that a member of the public had contacted them after finding an uncontrolled portable nuclear gauge. The individual observed the gauge fall from the back of a truck and called the service provider's number displayed on the gauge transportation case. The member of the public indicated that the transport case appeared to be intact. By the time the member of the public was contacted (by the Department), the licensee had already recovered the gauge. The Department contacted the licensee who confirmed that the gauge involved was a Troxler model 3440, serial number 24768, containing approximately 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241/Be. An investigation is ongoing, and the Department is awaiting additional information from the licensee. Colorado event report ID number: CO250041
ENS 580317 November 2025 14:25:00Graphic Packaging InternationalNRC Region 4TexasThe following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via phone and email: On November 7, 2025, the Department was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer that while removing a Berthold model LB7440 gauge for disposal, the shutter was found in the stuck open position. Open is the normal position for the shutter. The gauge contains a 10 millicurie (original activity) cesium-137 source. A shield was attached to the front of the gauge, and it was placed in a shipping drum full of shielding materials. The gauge was transferred to a storage area. The gauge will be shipped for disposal. No individual received any significant exposure due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas incident number: 10243 Texas NMED number: TX250059Stuck Open Shutter
ENS 580307 November 2025 11:22:00Atcs, PlcNRC Region 1Maryland
Virginia
The following is a summary of information provided by the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) via email: The VRMP was notified by phone of an incident at a soil compaction project site in Wytheville, VA. At approximately 1120 EST, on November 6, 2025, a Troxler 3440 portable nuclear gauge (S/N 71116, 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241) was struck by a motor grader while the rod was locked in the safe position within the gauge. The authorized user (AU) was approximately 100 yards from the unattended gauge when the incident occurred. The AU secured the area and contacted their radiation safety officer (RSO) to report the incident. The impact damaged the plastic housing, bent the source rod handle, and broke the depth rod off the device. The licensee and Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) RSOs verified the source rod was still locked within the gauge shielding and there was no apparent damage to either source capsules. Surveys indicated the radiation levels were within acceptable ranges. The licensee RSO reported that there were no exposures or injuries. Surveys of the surrounding area and grader tires showed only background radioactivity. The gauge was placed into its transport case and returned to the licensed storage location. A leak test will be performed, and the gauge will be transported to North East Technical Services, Inc., a licensed nuclear gauge service company in Maryland, for further evaluation. VRMP will investigate the licensee. Virginia event report ID number: VA250005Troxler
ENS 580296 November 2025 16:30:00MillstoneNRC Region 1ConnecticutWestinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 6, 2025, at 1014 (EST), it was determined that a licensed supervisory operator was in violation of the licensee's fitness for duty (FFD) policy. The test result was negative but determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii) due to violation of the licensee's FFD policy. The employee's unescorted access has been placed on hold in accordance with the licensee's FFD policy. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.Fitness for Duty
ENS 580286 November 2025 16:25:00University Of TexasNRC Region 4TexasThe following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email: On November 6, 2025, the Department received a report from the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) stating that they had discovered three under exposure events had occurred using Y-90 TheraSphere beads. The events were discovered during a review of these procedures conducted by a new manager. The events occurred on September 11, (September) 18, and (September) 22, 2025. In the September 11 event, the patient was prescribed to receive 34.3 millicuries (mCi) but only received 20.0 mCi. In the September 18 event, the patient was prescribed two separate procedures of 34.3 and 48.9 mCi, but received 23.6 and 31.8 mCi (respectively). In the September 22 event, the patient was prescribed 35.7 mCi but received 26.4 mCi. The final dose calculations were based on the recorded radiation readings taken on the delivery devices after the procedures. The RSO stated they have reviewed the records for the events and interviewed the individual who had taken the after-procedure radiation readings and was not able to determine the cause of the underexposures. The prescribing physicians in each case have been notified of the error. The patients will be notified by their physician of the events. The RSO stated they are continuing to investigate the cause of the under exposures. The RSO stated they do not expect any adverse effects on the patients. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident #: 10242 Texas NMED # TX250058 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.TheraSphere
ENS 580275 November 2025 16:58:00Southern California Edison CompanyNRC Region 4CaliforniaThe following information was provided by San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) via phone and email: At 1109 PST, SONGS made (an) official notification to the (California) Department of Toxic Substance Control (DTSC) relating to one violation/citation non-minor, requiring corrective action related to the hazardous waste facility, permit CAD000630921. Specifically, SONGS violated 22 California Code of Regulations (CCR) 66270.30(a) and California Health and Safety Code 25202(a), in that SONGS failed to comply with the conditions of the permit, specifically Part V `Special Conditions,' #5. To wit, DTSC inspectors observed the secondary containment which failed to be free of cracks or gaps in a waste management unit located in the (Hazardous Materials) Area - South Yard Facility (SYF), Section A. During the physical inspection, the inspector noted holes were drilled into the slab (the containment system) of mixed waste/hazmat storage pad areas. Because the identified holes only partially penetrate the secondary containment (i.e., the concrete pad), the secondary containment remains functional and intact and is sufficiently impervious to contain leaks, spills and accumulated precipitation. SONGS is in discussions with DTSC to determine if the holes partially penetrating the pad exceed the permit requirement. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: SONGS will notify NRC Region IV of this event.Spill