Semantic search
Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ENS 57284 | 23 August 2024 09:02:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0500 CDT on 8/23/24, Wolf Creek entered technical specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.5 required action D.1 which requires shutdown to mode 3 within 6 hours. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump discharge valve to the 'B' steam generator was not successfully restored to operable prior to expiration of the 72 hour completion time. At 0800 CDT, the shutdown to mode 3 was initiated, which is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56983 | 21 February 2024 10:33:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following is a synopsis of information that was provided by the licensee via email and phone call: A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive during a fitness for duty test. The supervisor's access to the plant has been terminated. |
ENS 56520 | 16 May 2023 17:20:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1127 CDT on 5/16/2023, during the reperformance of test procedure 'STS PE-006, Charcoal Adsorber In-Place Leak Test' due to a failure from the previous day, both trains of emergency exhaust were rendered inoperable due to incorrect performance of the procedure. Performers incorrectly de-energized the humidity control heating coil for the unit not under test, rendering it inoperable. This issue was identified and rectified at 1138 CDT on 5/16/2023, exiting the LCO (limiting condition of operation) for both trains inoperable at that time. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public.
The initial failure of the STS PE-006 test was caused by a malfunction of the test equipment which initially injected excessive amounts of tracer gas and caused saturation of the charcoal. Using test equipment sourced from Callaway, and following guidance from the vendor, STS PE-006 test was successfully passed on 5/17/2023. No maintenance or intrusive testing was performed on the unit between initial test failure and satisfactory completion of the test. Because this train of emergency exhaust was not actually inoperable at the time the second train was rendered inoperable due to incorrect procedure performance, there was no loss of safety function. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford). |
ENS 56269 | 12 December 2022 11:05:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On October 13, 2022, during Refueling Outage 25, 2 bolts and 2 washers were discovered in the strainer basket upstream of the main steam stop valve in the steam line from the 'A' steam generator. It was determined that these bolts and washers were from the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) upstream of the stop valve. One bolt and one washer were also determined to be missing from the MSIV on the line from the 'B' steam generator. The MSIVs are a similar design as the Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs). It appears that the torque values for these backseat bolts provided by the vendor weren't sufficient to prevent the bolts from coming loose. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation personnel evaluated the condition and determined that the inadequate torque values provided by the vendor could have constituted a substantial safety hazard if left uncorrected. In particular, if bolts had come loose from the MFIVs, they could have traveled downstream to the steam generators and then challenged the integrity of steam generator tubes. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification will be provided within 30 days. |
ENS 56047 | 16 August 2022 14:09:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day telephone notification is being made under the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. At 1949 Central Daylight Time (CDT), on 7/22/22, an invalid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred due to human error. At the time of the event, Wolf Creek Generating Station was coming out of a forced outage. Plant conditions were 47 percent power with operators increasing power approximately 10 percent per hour. At this power level there was one main feedwater pump in service and Operations was performing the procedure to place the second main feedwater pump into service. A control room operator was verifying that the control oil switches were not tripped for the main feedwater pumps by verifying the bulbs for both the 'A' and 'B' trains were not lit. To verify the unlit bulbs were not burnt out, the operator was pushing the lamp test buttons. The operator successfully verified the 'A' train, but on the 'B' train the operator mistakenly pushed the bi-stable which is located directly above the bulb rather than the lamp test button. This bi-stable is the low oil pressure switch for the 'A' main feedwater pump. Because the second feedwater pump was not running yet, this caused a 'two out of two' signal for low oil pressure and caused an auxiliary feedwater system actuation. The auxiliary feedwater system responded correctly and was returned to standby condition. The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56013 | 23 July 2022 02:52:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1949 CDT, while operating in Mode 1 at 46 percent power, an Auxiliary Feedwater actuation signal resulted from a human performance error while performing SYS AE-121 to place a second main feedwater pump in service. All systems responded correctly and were restored to standby condition. The Unit remained in Mode 1, at 47 percent power following the actuation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Wolf Creek is retracting the original notification (EN# 56013) of a valid actuation and has recategorized this as a 60-day optional (see EN #56047). Notified R4DO (Werner) |
ENS 56005 | 18 July 2022 21:17:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: While operating at 100 percent reactor power, the Control Room received indications of a feedwater transient, and indications of decreasing level on Steam Generator `B.' Reactor Trip occurred approximately 30 seconds after initial indications of transient at 1803 CDT on 7/18/22. All Safety Related Equipment responded as expected, including actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater. Control Room responded properly and progressed through Emergency Operating Procedures. The Unit is Stable in Mode 3. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up. Wolf Creek intends to make a press release.
The original event notification inadvertently indicated that a media / press release would be provided. However, no media / press release is planned. Notified R4DO (Gaddy). |
ENS 55539 | 21 October 2021 19:01:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Plant cafeteria workers discovered that four gallons of cooking wine were included in a delivery to their inventory within the plant protected area. Security took possession of the sealed unopened containers and removed the alcohol from the protected area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. |
ENS 55416 | 18 August 2021 13:51:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1036 CDT on 8/18/2021, Wolf Creek experienced a reactor trip due to low level in B Steam Generator. Auxiliary feedwater system actuated as designed. All systems actuated as expected. Decay heat is currently being removed by the auxiliary feedwater system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. All control rods fully inserted, and offsite power remained available. |
ENS 55252 | 12 May 2021 15:41:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | With Reactor power at approximately 8 percent following a refueling outage, Steam Generator levels began to oscillate while in automatic control. Manual control of Main Feedwater Regulating Valves was unable to stabilize steam generator levels prior to reaching the "C" Steam Generator Low Level Reactor Trip setpoint. Reactor Trip, Main Feedwater Isolation and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation automatically actuated. The plant is stable in Mode 3 at Hot Standby. All equipment has responded as expected. The Resident has been contacted. |
ENS 54968 | 27 October 2020 21:43:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1608 CDT on 10/27/2020, Wolf Creek Unit 1, operating at 100 percent rated thermal power in Mode-1, experienced a loss of the on-site wired corporate network. During actions to restore, it was discovered the ability to access the dose assessment software was compromised due to a security program. Access to the program was established after some time using Wi-Fi connectivity, but was not able to be accessed without network access. Actions are being taken to rectify. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee believes this was not a cyber-event and that the Emergency Response Data System was available, but couldn't verify. Should the Wi-Fi network access be lost, there's no capability to perform a dose assessment. Standalone laptops are being provided but have not been placed onsite yet. That should restore the ability to have dose assessment capability at all times.
The licensee notified the NRC that the network has been restored to the Technical Support Center building and the emergency plan dose assessment group was capable of performing dose assessment. The licensee also noted that the group is able to perform dose assessment without the network, if needed. The network is still unavailable in the control room. The licensee confirmed that ERDS is available. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick). |
ENS 54508 | 1 February 2020 23:06:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | At 1845 CST on 2/1/2020, during surveillance testing (STS PE-015, Containment Purge Valve Leakage Test) containment leakage in excess of Technical Specification requirements was observed. A Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at 2030 CST and Mode 3 was achieved at 2154 CST. All systems functioned as required during and following shutdown. The unit is proceeding to Mode 5. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 54109 | 11 June 2019 17:03:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | At 1324 CDT, on 6/11/19, Coffey County Emergency Management issued the following alert: The Civil Authorities have issued a Nuclear Power Plant Warning for Coffey, KS beginning at 1323 CDT and ending at 1423 CDT (WIBW radio AM/FM). Coffey County Emergency Management Required Weekly Test. A press release is planned to notify residents that the warning was only a test. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional. The site is operating with no emergency conditions present. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as an inadvertent notification of the IPAWS (Integrated Public Alert Warning System) system. A press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 54087 | 24 May 2019 17:12:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | At 1310 CDT on 5/24/2019, Wolf Creek experienced a loss of offsite power to the safety-related NB02 bus, due to an external fire on a bushing on the startup transformer. The NB02 bus was reenergized when the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator started and the output breaker automatically closed. The shutdown sequencer automatically started equipment as expected. Due to the undervoltage condition on the NB02 bus, an AFAS-T (Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal) signal was generated which started the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Turbine load was reduced to maintain reactor power less than 100% in response to the start of turbine driven and 'B' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. The fire was extinguished using a fire extinguisher at 1320 CDT. The unit is stable at 97% power. The NB02 bus remains on the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The other EDG is operable in standby. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | |
ENS 53842 | 22 January 2019 14:40:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | On January 22, 2019, 0723 CST, the Contracts group called and reported to FFD (fitness for duty), that a box of candy was received from a supplier vendor that may contain alcohol. Upon investigation of the candy with the manufacturer, pieces of the candy contain 20-30mg of Alcohol after the chocolate is cooked. The Contract offices are located in the Protected Area and this incident is being reported under 10 CFR 26.719. No for-cause testing was performed based on the consumption of the candy. No safety related work was performed by the individuals who may have consumed the candy. The box of candy was removed from the site. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
ENS 53647 | 5 October 2018 09:59:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | EN Revision Text: UNPLANNED LOSS OF THE ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY DUE TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT DIESEL At 05:52 CDT on 10/5/2018, the (Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation) (WCNOC) Technical Support Center (TSC) Diesel fuel oil transfer pump would not run. There was ongoing modification to the facility Halon system at the time. The modification process had included a jumper to the fuel oil transfer pump to allow it to continue to be available. This issue was discovered during testing as the modification was progressing. The pump was verified to function on 10/4/2018 by normal operations rounds. If an emergency is declared requiring the TSC activation during the time the TSC diesel is non-functional, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedure. If offsite power is lost, the TSC will relocate to the Alternate TSC using existing emergency planning procedures. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Event Notification (EN) 53647, made on October 8, 2018, is being retracted because during the time that the TSC Diesel fuel oil transfer pump was not available, normal power was continuously available. The Alternative TSC was also available. Consequently, the condition did not meet the criteria for a 8-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the Event Notification retraction. Notified R4DO (Pick). | |
ENS 53095 | 28 November 2017 10:01:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | (On) Monday, 11/20/17, (the licensee) received a call from the MRO (Medical Review Officer) staff that the Opiate blind submitted on 11/14/17 did not test as expected. The confirmatory test was positive for codeine and morphine but negative for 6-acetylmorphine. (The licensee) requested a retest by the MRO to the laboratory. The MRO staff contacted the provider of the blind specimens for documentation of the blind analysis. The lab was requested on 11/21/17 to perform the retest by the MRO. (On) 11/27/17, the results from the lab on the retest were virtually the same as the original test result. The lab's Certifying Scientist provided a letter documenting their findings. The MRO staff informed us (Wolf Creek) and we requested copies of all documentation from the provider of the blinds, the lab and any notes from the MRO staff. Informed Superintendent Access Screening of the test results. (The licensee) contacted two plants to verify reportability under 10 CFR 26.719. (The licensee) initiated CR 00117707 to document the occurrence. Superintendent contacted licensing and management. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector and R4 NRC Security Inspector.
This event was reported under 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). Further review shows that this event should have been reported under 10 CFR 26.719(c)(1), which only required a Licensee Event Report, not an Event Notification. This notification is retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hipschman) and FFD Group via email. |
ENS 52666 | 5 April 2017 16:32:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) have truck connections connected to transfer lines that are potentially not compliant with general design criteria. A potentially unanalyzed condition exists due to threat of tornado generated missiles. While in Mode 1 at 100% power, the Control Room was notified that the outdoor portion of the line upstream of JEV0001, EMERG FUEL OIL STORAGE TK A TRUCK CONN ISO, and the outdoor portion of the line upstream of JEV0002, EMERG FUEL OIL STORAGE TK B TRUCK CONN ISO, potentially have not been reviewed to meet general design criteria. No major equipment was out of service. No systems were required to respond to this event. The unit remains in Mode 1 at 100% power. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Compensatory measures have been established IAW (in accordance with) EGM 15-002. The Unit entered Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B and D for approximately 45 minutes until compensatory measures were put into effect. The licensee identified this condition during a design review and is currently identifying long-term corrective actions.
The Unit entered Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B and F, not Tech Spec 3.8.1 Condition B and D mentioned earlier. Notified R4DO (Vasquez). |
ENS 52399 | 29 November 2016 06:19:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | While operating in mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power an approximately 150 gallon oil spill occurred in the switchyard. Westar Energy personnel were performing corrective maintenance on the station's #6 transformer that required cleaning the oil. The #6 transformer was out of service at the time. The oil was being transferred to a group of hold up tanks. One of the tanks overflowed before the next tank could be placed in service. This resulted in the spill of approximately 150 gallons of UNIVOLT N 61 B, electrical insulating oil onto gravel and soil. The spill has been stopped. The oil had recently been sampled and there were no detectable polychlorinated biphenyls, PCBs. A clean up plan is being developed. Condition Report 00109759 has been generated. The acting NRC Senior Resident has been informed. The reportable quantity for the oil is 5 gallons. The licensee has notified the State of Kansas Department of Health and Environment and the National Response Center. |
ENS 52371 | 16 November 2016 23:39:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | While in Mode 5, power from the switchyard east bus was lost. AC Emergency Bus NB01 is fed from east or west buses through (breakers) 345-80 or 345-90. Both breakers tripped. The 'A' train emergency diesel generator started on the undervoltage signal and powered NB01. All other systems functioned normally including the Shutdown Sequencer. Shutdown cooling was being provided by train 'B' RHR (residual heat removal) and was uninterrupted. Initial reports are that the #6 transformer brought in an air/gas trouble alarm. The plant is still in Mode 5. The 'A' emergency diesel generator is supplying power to NB01. The switchyard west bus and NB02 remain stable. Transmission reports that the grid is stable. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52299 | 18 October 2016 06:11:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b). At 0305 (CDT) today an unknown substance was identified inside the protected area (inside an emergency light fixture in the emergency escape hatch for containment). At 0456, local law enforcement determined (the substance) was likely a prohibited substance (marijuana). The substance was obviously very old, so is surmised to be from a preoperational period and unable to be positively tested. The item (a bag of leafy material, round metal tube, rope with washer, light bulb) was under the control of the site security department upon discovery and was turned over to local law enforcement for disposal. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52218 | 2 September 2016 11:29:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | While operating in MODE 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power and placing Excess Letdown in service for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak detection, RCS operational leakage exceeded 1 gpm (gallon per minute) unidentified leakage as identified by performing RCS Water Inventory Balance using the Nuclear Plant Information System Computer. This required the entry into Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.4.13 Condition B at 0808 (CDT) on 9/2/16. The associated action is to place the unit into Mode 3 in 6 hours. Trending of containment sump level indicates the leakage is inside containment with the exact location within containment unknown. Containment inspection is being performed to try and identify the source of Reactor Coolant System leakage. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Re-alignment of the Letdown System back to its normal arrangement has subsequently reduced RCS leak rate to 0.521 gpm at 0652 CDT on 9/2/16. Unusual or Not Understood - Leak Location is not known at this time. Maximum leak rate recorded was 1.358 gpm. The leak was first discovered at 08/31/16 at 1519 CDT. Safety Related Equipment not operational - Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System (TS 3.3.3).
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) notification based on subsequent review of the event. The calculation of unidentified leak rate which triggered entry into the Mode 3 Required Action Statement was performed immediately after placing RCS Excess Letdown in service. An evaluation of the leak rate calculation determined that the leak rate was invalid due to performance of the RCS water inventory balance during non-steady state operating conditions. This was contrary to the requirements of TS Surveillance Requirement 3.4.13.1, as this test was performed while charging and letdown flows were being stabilized following the alignment of excess letdown. A walk down of the Excess Letdown system while in-service determined no leakage. Subsequent RCS water inventory balances performed with Excess Letdown in service under steady state operating conditions while in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature determined the maximum calculated unidentified leak rate was 0.675 gpm. After the plant entered Mode 3 a non-RCS pressure boundary leak was identified during equipment walk downs on a seal weld from the reactor vessel head core exit thermocouple nozzle assembly 77. The leakage did not impact the ability to shut down the unit. No TS limits were exceeded during this event. Therefore, the plant shutdown to investigate and correct leakage past the seal weld of a threaded connection does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Kramer). |
ENS 52184 | 16 August 2016 15:43:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On 8/16/2016, while operating at 100% in Mode 1, routine testing of the off-site sirens for Wolf Creek was scheduled. The county dispatcher was unable to actuate any sirens. The dispatch supervisor was contacted to ensure there was not a personnel qualification issue. Both the dispatcher and the supervisor were unable to actuate any sirens, either manually or using the normal computer controls. Coffey county personnel, assisted by Wolf Creek personnel, determined that a battery had failed causing a fuse to blow and de-energizing the equipment needed to actuate the sirens. The battery has been replaced, the fuse has been replaced, and the system has been tested satisfactorily. The emergency sirens were restored to service at 12:20 CDT 8/16/2016. NRC resident has been notified. No plant systems were affected by this failure of notification equipment. The plant remained at 100% power Mode 1 throughout this event. |
ENS 51297 | 6 August 2015 20:53:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Technical Support Center (TSC) Air Conditioning (AC) unit is out of service. Due to expected high temperatures in the upcoming days, there exists the potential for the TSC to become nonfunctional. This could result in a reduction in Emergency Plan Response Capability. The Alternate TSC is available for use in the event of an emergency and would be staffed and activated using existing EP (Emergency Preparedness) procedures and checklists. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
As of 0700 (CDT), 8/17/15, the TSC is fully functional, the HVAC system has been restored to 100 percent capacity. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." R4DO (HAGAR) has been notified. |
ENS 51074 | 15 May 2015 23:48:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Class 1E A/C Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical train 'A' and was found tripped at 2148 (CDT). As a result, the following supported safety related electrical equipment were declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01, 480 Volt Buses NG01 and NG03, 120 volt Instrument AC Inverters and Buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03, 125 VDC Chargers and Buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. T/S 3.0.3 was entered from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC Inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. Plant shutdown to mode 5 commenced at 2244 (CDT). No major equipment is out-of-service. All systems have functioned normally. Plant is currently at 99% with power ramping down. Plant must be in mode 3 by 0448 CDT. No compensatory measures have been established. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See EN #51071 for an earlier T/S required shutdown required at 0436 CDT on 5/15/15, due to the same conditions.
For both EN 51071 and 51074, the low lube oil pressure switch tripped the SGK05A unit. Oil pressures were verified to be normal and the SGK05A unit was successfully started. The plant shutdown each time was terminated. A fault in the Electronic Oil Pressure control which monitors the low lube oil pressure switch was identified. A jumper has been installed that bypasses the oil switch while maintenance is being conducted. The unit was declared functional but degraded. Indication of low oil pressure is still provided. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Okeefe). |
ENS 51071 | 15 May 2015 07:22:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Class 1E A/C Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical train 'A' and was found tripped at 0436 (CDT). As a result, the following supported safety related electrical equipment were declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01, 480 volt Buses NG01 and NG03, 120 volt Instrument AC Inverters and Buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03, 125 VDC Chargers and Buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. T/S 3.0.3 was entered from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC Inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. Plant shutdown to mode 5 commenced at 0530 (CDT). No major equipment is out-of-service. All systems have functioned normally. Plant is currently at 95 % power ramping down. Plant must be in mode 3 by 1136 CDT. No compensatory measures have been established. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51036 | 3 May 2015 12:56:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On 5/3/2015 during power ascension following Refueling Outage 20, Steam Generator 'C' water level increased rapidly, causing a Feedwater isolation on high Steam Generator water level and an associated Turbine trip. The reactor was subsequently manually tripped. At the start of the event, reactor power was approximately 22%. Plant staff was in the process of transferring from Main Feedwater Bypass Feed Regulating Valve control, used for low power control, to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve control as part of power ascension. When the Main Feedwater Regulating Valve for 'C' Steam Generator (AEFCV-530) was opened, it went to about 80% open, causing an overfeed of the 'C' Steam Generator. High Steam Generator water level in 'C' Steam Generator initiated an automatic Feedwater Isolation Signal, automatic Turbine Trip and automatic trip of the operating main feed pump. The operating crew initiated a manual reactor trip. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically initiated as part of the plant response to the feedwater system transient. The plant is presently stable in Mode 3. All equipment functioned normally, except the 'C' Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (AEFCV0530) which did not function to properly control Steam Generator level. This valve did function as designed to close on the Feedwater Isolation Signal. NRC Resident Inspector has been contacted. |
ENS 50863 | 4 March 2015 14:11:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A non-licensed, non-supervisory supplemental worker was found with synthetic urine on their person during a search at the security entrance station. The individual's access was terminated on site and in PADS. The NRC Resident Inspector and NRC Regional Inspector was notified. |
ENS 50855 | 28 February 2015 05:24:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Wolf Creek Generating Station performed a planned shutdown for the start of a refueling outage. As part of the procedure GEN 00-005, Minimum Load to Hot Standby, a planned manual reactor trip was initiated from 25 percent power level with the plant in Mode 1. As part of this planned shut down sequence, an anticipated automatic Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) actuation signal was generated. This is a non-emergency event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to preplanned manual actuation of the reactor protection system and auto-initiation of auxiliary feed water system. All systems and components operated as designed with the exception of the main generator output breakers. They did not open as designed. They were manually opened using the main control room hand switches as directed by EMG ES-02, Reactor Trip Response. The plant is stable in Mode 3 with AFW secured, with plans to cool down and enter Mode 5 for the planned refueling outage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
WCNOC (Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation) is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) notification based on further review of the event. A valid AFAS (Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal) actuation occurred during the planned shutdown as a result of SG (Steam Generator) water level reaching the lo lo level setpoint. The AFAS actuation was an expected actuation that occurred due to preplanned activities covered by GEN 00-005. On-shift control room personnel were aware that an AFAS actuation would occur as a result of tripping the plant between 30% and 25% power. The AFAS actuated consistent with the planned shutdown with no anomalies. This is consistent with NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, Section 3.2.6 that states, in part: 'With regard to preplanned actuations, operation of a system as part of a planned test or operational evolution need not be reported. Preplanned actuations are those that are expected to actually occur due to preplanned activities covered by procedures. Such actuations are those for which a procedural step or other appropriate documentation indicates that the specific actuation is actually expected to occur. Control room personnel are aware of the specific signal generation before its occurrence or indication in the control room.' The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified R4DO(Okeefe). |
ENS 50772 | 28 January 2015 08:56:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 0535 CST on 1/28/15, control room staff identified that valve EJHV8716A, RHR A To SIS (Safety Injection System) Hot Leg Recirc Loops 2&3 (isolation valve), had been closed per clearance order C20-D-EJ-A-005 to support maintenance on the A RHR system. Closing valve EJHV8716A placed Wolf Creek in TS 3.0.3. At 0550 CST on 1/28/15, power was restored to valve EJHV8716A and the valve was opened, allowing the unit to exit from TS 3.0.3. Subsequent reviews of clearance order C20-D-EJ-A-005 identified that valve EJHV8809A had been energized and closed per direction of the clearance order. TS 3.0.3 was reentered at 0635 CST due to discovery of this condition. At 0650 CST, valve EJHV8809A was opened and deenergized allowing exit from TS 3.0.3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50744 | 19 January 2015 14:24:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The missile door (door 33012) protecting Class 1E Engineered Safety Features (ESF) buses NB01/NB02 switchgear rooms was discovered misaligned on its hinge and stuck partially open and not capable of being closed. The missile door has since been repaired and closed. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.9, 'Distribution Systems- Operating,' was declared not met and Condition F entered when the immediate operability determination identified that buses NB01 and NB02 were inoperable. Condition F of TS 3.8.9 requires immediate entry into Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. LCO 3.0.3 was entered at 1100 CST and subsequently exited when the missile door was repaired at 1118 CST. The unit was in and still is in MODE 1 at 100% power. No actions were initiated to commence a unit shut down. The NRC resident inspector was contacted regarding this event. All systems functioned as expected.
The licensee is retracting this event based on the following: An engineering evaluation concluded that the weather conditions during the period of the event did not result in the threat of a tornado. Given that the weather during the event would not have presented a valid threat of a tornado, the stuck open missile door would not have prevented the ESF busses and the DGs (Diesel Generators) from performing their specified safety function. The ESF busses and the DGs were considered OPERABLE but degraded. This is analogous to Example 4 in RIS 2001-09, 'Control of Hazard Barriers', with the exception that this event did not occur as a result of planned maintenance or a plant modification. As such, this event has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford). |
ENS 50628 | 19 November 2014 16:42:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On 11/19/2014, Wolf Creek determined that the alternative shutdown procedure for responding to a fire in the control room does not address all potential operating modes of the credited emergency diesel generator. During the 2014 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, it was postulated that a loss of offsite power following a fire in the control room would cause the Train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) to start and load to the bus. The fire is also postulated to cause damage to the Train B essential service water (ESW) pump control circuit and prevent the pump from automatically starting and cooling the EDG. Additionally, the fire is postulated to cause spurious operation of another large load that is not normally sequenced onto the bus following a loss of offsite power. This postulated scenario loads the EDG to approximately 53% of its rated load without cooling. This scenario was not considered when developing the control room fire response strategy. Preliminary calculations show that operators have 3.6 minutes to establish cooling prior to the EDG tripping on high jacket water temperature. Performance timing determined that operators would establish cooling in approximately 10 minutes. Based on this information, it was determined that this condition is unanalyzed and is potentially reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). An hourly fire watch compensatory measure is in place in the control room, consistent with procedural requirements for a Post Fire Safe Shutdown circuit analysis deficiency. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50510 | 6 October 2014 15:00:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1336 CDT, Wolf Creek declared an Alert due to a fire. The fire in the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator potential transformer was extinguished using a portable CO2 fire extinguisher. Plant personnel were exposed to the smoke and were evaluated with no injuries noted. The plant continued to operate at 100% power throughout the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Kansas Division of Emergency Management, and the Coffey County Sheriff Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.
The Alert was terminated at 1542 CDT because the fire had been terminated within fifteen minutes and a walkdown of the area was clear. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Allen), IRD (Grant), NRR (Lee), DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.. |
ENS 50468 | 18 September 2014 14:05:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | During a review of INPO Event Report 14-33, Direct Current Circuits Challenge Appendix R Fire Analysis, it was determined that portions of the control circuits for the Turbine Generator DC Emergency Lube Oil Pump and the Emergency DC Seal Oil Pump are not properly fused to prevent overload and possible secondary fires. The review found that a fire at the motor starter cabinet in the turbine building could cause specific smart hot shorts that could cause overheating of the control cable and result in secondary fires outside the turbine building. Based on this information, it was determined that this condition is unanalyzed and is potentially reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Hourly fire watch compensatory measures are in place in the affected areas of the Turbine Building. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection and suppression in these fire areas ensures protection of the equipment. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50407 | 27 August 2014 12:24:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of communications capability. On August 27, 2014 at 0805 hours CDT the internal phone system, Emergency Notification System (ENS), and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) became nonfunctional because of a power supply failure. The ERDS has been restored to service and work is currently in progress to restore the internal phone system and ENS. It has not been determined at the time of this notification as to when the internal phones system and ENS will be restored to a fully functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. |
ENS 50047 | 20 April 2014 19:58:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A leak was discovered in the area of EPV0109, COMBINED SI/RHR (Safety Injection/Residual Heat Removal) TO ACCUMULATOR D OUTLET LINE VENT. The leak rate was estimated at 2.5 gallons per hour. The plant is in Mode 5, RCS (Reactor Coolant System) depressurized. This leak is considered a material problem that causes abnormal degradation of or stress upon the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, reportable in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Efforts are underway to characterize the leak and plan for repairs. The leak has been secured after realigning RHR cooling from the B to the A train. The Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the leak is being investigated. |
ENS 49980 | 1 April 2014 10:06:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At approximately 0616 CDT on April 1, 2014, a supplemental employee at Wolf Creek developed a personal medical condition. Wolf Creek Emergency Medical Technicians on site responded and an ambulance transported the individual to an offsite hospital. The individual was located in one of the office areas inside the protected area. The offsite hospital declared the individual deceased upon arrival on April 1, 2014. The individual was outside the Radiological Controlled Area. No radioactive material or contamination was involved. This notification is being performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State and Coffey County. |
ENS 49692 | 6 January 2014 06:56:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | While operating in Mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power, the City of Burlington Kansas emergency dispatch center notified Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) Security that two emergency plan sirens in Burlington, Kansas and one emergency plan siren in New Strawn, Kansas failed to function when they were actuated to call out a local fire response . These three sirens also function as part of the Emergency Plan Alert and Notification System. WCNOC Emergency Plan personnel have been notified of the three siren failures and the cause is under investigation. Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) remains at 100% rated thermal power. The WCGS NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified and local government.
At 0922 CST, the three sirens were returned service. WCGS NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R4DO (Hagar). |
ENS 49627 | 13 December 2013 13:40:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1106 (CST), the control room was informed that a diesel fuel spill to the environment was a reportable event. Earlier in the day, a container tipped over in the bed of a truck eventually spilling diesel fuel onto the ground inside the owner controlled area. Approximately 2 and one half gallons spilled out. The lid of the container was apparently defective. No fuel oil made contact with any surface water. The area was cleaned up. The Kansas Department of Health and Environment and the National Response Center were notified. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 49533 | 13 November 2013 11:42:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Approximately 10 gallons of fuel oil was spilled from excavation equipment onto the ground inside the owner controlled area. Notifications will be made to the National Response Center and the Kansas Dept. of Health and Environment. Cleanup by on-site personnel is in progress. No fuel oil made contact with any surface water. NRC resident inspector has been notified (by the licensee). |
ENS 49448 | 18 October 2013 13:47:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Wolf Creek has commenced a plant shutdown in accordance with Technical Specifications. The A train class 1E electrical equipment air conditioning unit was declared non-functional due to a possible failed oil pressure sensor. This failure could prevent the (AC) unit from performing its required function over its required mission time, as required by Technical Specifications 3.8.4, 3.8.7, and 3.8.9. The following safety related electrical equipment was declared inoperable: 4.16KV bus NB01; 480 volt AC buses NG01 and NG03; 120 volt instrument AC inverters and buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03; 125 VDC chargers and buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 1141 CDT on 10/18/2013 from Technical Specification 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 VAC inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. Plant shutdown to Mode 5 commenced at 1211 CDT. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. No major equipment is out of service. No switchgear room temperature limits were challenged. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See event notifications; EN #49339, EN #49126, and EN #49008 for similar events. |
ENS 49423 | 9 October 2013 22:47:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A review of industry operating experience with respect to fire induced damage to unfused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the control room has determined that the condition described below is applicable to Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station. This condition results in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The original plant wiring design did not include overcurrent protection features to limit the fault current in these circuits. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each NK direct current (DC) battery or charger. Two leads run from the shunt to a current meter in the main control room (MCR). These leads are tied to the positive polarity of the NK battery system. The ammeter wiring attached to the shunt is not overcurrent protected. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of these ammeter wires to short to ground at the same time the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the unfused ammeter cable. This event could result in excessive current flow (heating) in the ammeter wiring to the point of causing a secondary fire in the raceway system. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment. Reference Palo Verde plant event #49411. A Breech Authorization with compensatory Control Room hourly fire watch for this issue is in place and will remain in effect until this deficiency is resolved. This condition has been discussed with the Resident Inspector. Similar Events #49422 and #49419 |
ENS 49339 | 11 September 2013 20:37:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Wolf Creek has commenced a plant shutdown in accordance with Technical Specifications. The A Train Class 1E Electrical Equipment Air Conditioning unit was declared non-functional due to a possible failed compressor cylinder, as indicated by increased vibration. This failure could prevent the unit from performing its required function over its required mission time, as required by Technical Specifications 3.8.4, 3.8.7, and 3.8.9. The following safety related electrical equipment was declared inoperable: 4.16KV Bus NB01; 480 Volt AC buses NG01 and NG03; 120 Volt Instrument AC inverters and buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03; 125 VDC chargers and buses NK11, NK13, NN01 and NN03. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 1645 CDT on 9/11/2013 from Technical Specification 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 VAC inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. Plant shutdown to Mode 5 commenced at 1731 CDT. The unit is currently at approximately 50% power. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. No major equipment is out of service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. No switchgear room temperature limits were challenged. See EN #49008 (May 6, 2013) and EN #49126 (June 17, 2013) for similar events.
At 00:36 CDT 9/12/13, Wolf Creek had an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation during a plant shutdown in accordance with Technical Specifications. The plant was in Mode 3, all control rods inserted, with reactor trip breakers closed when low steam generator levels prompted a manual reactor trip. A Valid Auxiliary Feed Actuation signal was received due to low steam generator levels. All Auxiliary Feedwater pumps started and operated as expected. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Hay) notified. |
ENS 49126 | 17 June 2013 14:37:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Class 1E A/C Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical train 'A' and was declared non-functional at 1111 hours. As a result, the following supported safety related electrical equipment was declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01, 480 volt Buses NG01 and NG03, 120 volt Instrument AC Inverters and Buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03, 125 VDC Chargers and Buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. T/S 3.0.3 was entered from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC Inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. All electrical systems listed above remain available but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. Plant shutdown to mode 5 commenced at 1125 hours. No major equipment is out-of-service. All systems have functioned normally. Plant is currently at 55% power ramping down. Plant must be in mode 3 by 1811 CDT. No compensatory measures have been established. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 49065 | 23 May 2013 18:25:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A non-licensed, supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49008 | 6 May 2013 20:16:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Class 1E Air Conditioning Unit SGK05A cools safety related electrical Train 'A' and was declared non-functional at 1733 hours. As a result, the following safety related electrical equipment was declared inoperable: 4.16 KV Bus NB01; 480 volt buses NG01 and NG03; 120 volt Instrument AC inverters and buses NN11, NN13, NN01 and NN03; 125 VDC chargers and buses NK11, NK13, NK01 and NK03. T/S 3.0.3 was entered at 1733 from T/S 3.8.7 due to two out of four 120 volt AC inverters (NN11 and NN13) being inoperable. Plant shutdown to Mode 5 commenced at 1801 hours. All electrical systems listed above remain functional but are declared inoperable due to inadequate room cooling capability. The licensee plans on performing a controlled plant shutdown using normal rod insertion following approved plant procedures. Per the licensee, Mode 3 conditions must be met by 0033 CDT 5/7/2013 and Mode 5 conditions must be met by 0033 CDT 5/8/2013. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 48914 | 11 April 2013 16:47:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The fire started at 1455 CDT in the turbine building southeast stairwell and on the auxiliary boiler room roof. Fire fighting efforts continue as fire exists inside the wall between the turbine building and the auxiliary boiler room. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local governments. Notified DHS, FEMA, and the NICC. * * * UPDATE FROM WARREN BRANDT TO PETE SNYDER AT 0100 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * * Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 (CDT) in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof. The fire was extinguished at 15:19 (CDT), and cool to the touch at 16:48 (CDT). No offsite fire response support was required. The fire did not impact any safety related equipment. The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13. The cause of the fire is under investigation. Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall), DHS, FEMA and NICC (via email).
Update to Termination of NOUE due to Fire on roof of Auxiliary Boiler. Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 (CDT) in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof. The fire was extinguished at 15:19 (CDT), and cool to the touch at 16:48 (CDT). The Offsite Fire Department was called and responded but their support in fire suppression was not required, they did assist in clean up and fire investigation efforts. The fire did not impact any safety related equipment. The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13. The cause of the fire is under investigation. Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall) via email. |
ENS 48820 | 13 March 2013 03:11:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 0149 CDT on 3/13/2013, Wolf Creek declared an Unusual Event due to inoperability of both on-site emergency diesel generators. While the A-EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) was out of service due to planned maintenance, the B-EDG experienced a loss of control power. The cause is currently under investigation. Offsite power is available and providing electrical power to the Unit. The licensee notified state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).
Repairs are complete on the 'B' EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator). The 'B' EDG has been tested and restored to operable status at 0221 (CDT) on 03/14/2013. The 'A' EDG remains out of service for scheduled maintenance. NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) terminated at 0239 CDT on 03/14/2013. The licensee notified state and local agencies and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Powers), IRD (Grant) and NRR (Lubinski). Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and Nuclear SSA (email). |
ENS 48802 | 2 March 2013 00:25:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On 3/1/2013 at 2242 CST, Wolf Creek Unit 1 declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) due to both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) being unavailable: With the 'A' EDG out of service for planned maintenance, the 'B' EDG was discovered to have high governor oil level and was declared inoperable at 2235 CST. The governor oil level was adjusted and the 'B' EDG was declared operable at 2307 CST. The NOUE was terminated on 3/21/2013 at 2321 CST. Normal offsite power was maintained to the plant and no offsite assistance was requested. The licensee notified state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).
Further evaluation by the Engineering department determined that the 'B' EDG was available with the high governor oil level. Testing was performed at an offsite facility, which confirmed that the 'B' EDG was capable of performing its specified safety function with the as-found oil level. As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake), NRR EO (Skeen) and IRD MOC (Grant). |
ENS 48755 | 14 February 2013 23:58:00 | Wolf Creek | NRC Region 4 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Approximately 15 gallons of hydraulic oil was spilled from excavation equipment onto the ground inside the protected area boundary. Notifications have been made to the National Response Center and the Kansas Department of Health and Environment. Cleanup by on-site personnel is in progress. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |