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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5717516 June 2024 16:41:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On June 16, 2024, at 1233 CDT, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 was operating at 93 percent power when an automatic reactor trip occurred. Immediately following the reactor trip, emergency feedwater (EFW) actuated automatically. The unit is currently in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat removal is via the main condenser. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally after the reactor trip, except steam generator (SG) feedwater pump 'A' tripped and SG '1' main feed regulatory controller went to manual. Steam generator water levels are being controlled with the SG feedwater pump 'B'. The cause of the trip is currently being investigated. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the EFW system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5714023 May 2024 11:24:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: During a security inspection, it was determined that some past events at Entergy sites that were not reported may have met the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). As a result, the following event at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 is now being conservatively reported: On May 15, 2023, a condition report was written to document that an individual who should have been placed in a follow-up fitness for duty program was not tested according to this program. The individual was no longer badged at Waterford 3 but is currently badged at another Entergy site. The resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5712211 May 2024 22:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1655 CDT, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 was in Mode 3 with all control rod element assemblies (CEA) fully inserted with reactor trip circuit breakers closed and individual CEA disconnects open for plant startup. During the performance of emergency feedwater surveillance testing, reactor protection system (RPS) trip set point and emergency feedwater actuation system (EFAS) initiation set point for steam generator level low was exceeded for steam generator 1. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods remain fully inserted. This event is being reported as a eight-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the RPS and emergency feedwater systems. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5704222 March 2024 01:17:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

The following information was provided by the licensee: A Notification of Unusual Event, HU4.4 (see note below) was declared based a fire in the protected area requiring off site assistance to extinguish. The fire was in the main transformer yard. The fire was detected at 2328 CDT on March 21, 2024, and the fire was declared out at 0009 CDT on at March 22, 2024. An automatic reactor trip was initiated due to a loss of offsite power to the "B" train and a failure to automatically transfer from unit auxiliary transformer "B" to startup transformer "B. The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC remained in Normal. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email). NOTE: Due to a typographical error initiating condition HU4.1 was initially recorded for the event. The correct initiating condition is HU4.4 as now shown.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0345 EDT ON 03/22/24 FROM LARRY GONSALES TO BILL GOTT * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 0221 CDT on 3/22/24. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford), IR-MOC (Grant), NRR-EO (Felts), DHS-SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0420EDT ON 03/22/24 FROM JOHN LEWIS TO BILL GOTT * * *

RPS ACTUATION The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On March 21, 2024, at 2328 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 was operating at 98 percent power when an automatic reactor trip was initiated due to a loss of offsite power to the B train and a failure to automatically transfer from unit auxiliary transformer B to startup transformer B. Emergency feedwater actuation signal 2 (EFAS), safety injection actuation signal (ECCS), containment isolation actuation signal and emergency diesel generators automatically actuated. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted and all other plant equipment functioned as expected. Forced circulation remains with one reactor coolant pump per loop running. Decay heat removal is via the main condenser. A train safety bus is being supplied by off-site power, and B train safety bus is being supplied by emergency diesel generator B. Following the loss of offsite power to the B train, it was reported that main transformer B and startup transformer B were both on fire. The Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at time 2337 CDT. The fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, and the Unusual Event was terminated at 0221 CDT on March 22, 2024. Offsite assistance was requested. The local fire department responded to the site but the fire was extinguished by the on-shift fire brigade. NRC Region IV management was contacted regarding the emergency plan entry at 0030 CDT on March 22, 2024. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system, ECCS, Containment Isolation and Emergency Diesel Generators. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Gepford)

  • * * RETRACTION OF NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT FROM ON 03/26/24 AT 1721 FROM L. BROWN TO K. COTTON * * *

The initial notification in event notice #57042 by Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, reported a Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE) emergency declaration due to a fire in the protected area requiring off site support to extinguish. The basis for retraction of the initial emergency notification is that this event did not meet the definition of a fire in the protected area that requires off site support to extinguish. Guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Rev. 6 and implemented in Waterfords Emergency Plan procedure, initiating Condition HU4.4 states, The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. (NOTE: The Initial Notification Form sent from the Control Room at 2341 CDT on March 21, 2024, requested by and provided to the NRC Headquarter Operations Center via e-mail at 0302 CDT on March 22, 2024, stated that the Emergency Classification had been made on Initiating Condition HU4.4 rather than HU4.1)" When the event occurred on March 21, 2024, the Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at 2337 CDT and requested offsite support based on the information available at that time including the initial assessment by the fire brigade leader and expected need for offsite support to extinguish the fire. As reported in the 0420 EDT update on March 22, 2024, the fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, by the Waterford Fire Brigade without the need of offsite support." Notified R4DO (Kellar).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1209 EDT ON 03/27/24 FROM JOHN LEWIS TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The initial notification in EN 57042 by Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, reported an emergency declaration of an Unusual Event due to a fire in the protected area requiring off site support to extinguish. The basis for the update to the initial notification is that this event did not meet the definition of a Fire in the Protected Area that requires offsite support to extinguish. As provided in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 and implemented in Waterfords emergency plan procedure, initiating condition HU4.4 states, The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Additionally, EAL 4.1 for a fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection in any Table H-1 fire area was not applicable because the fire did not occur in a Table H-1 fire area. When the event occurred on March 21, 2024, the Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at 2337 CDT and requested offsite support based on the information available at that time including the initial assessment by the fire brigade leader and expected need for offsite support to extinguish the fire. As reported in the 0420 EDT update on March 22, 2024, the fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, by the Waterford Fire Brigade without the need of offsite support. (NOTE: The Initial Notification Form sent from the Control Room at 2341 CDT on March 21, 2024, requested by and provided to the Headquarters Operation Center via e-mail at 0302 CDT on March 22, 2024, stated that the emergency classification had been made on initiating condition HU4.4 rather than HU4.1) In accordance with NRC Approved guidance in FAQ 21-02 (ML21117A104), Waterford 3 is retracting the initial event notification made at 0117 EDT on March 22, 2024. The remaining events that were reported in EN 57042 as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW (emergency feedwater) system, ECCS (emergency core cooling system), containment isolation and emergency diesel generators are still applicable and require no additional update at this time. The licensee also provided a site map. Notified R4DO (Kellar)

ENS 5703216 March 2024 18:36:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1449 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station was operating at 100 percent power when a manual reactor trip was initiated due to main feed isolation valve (FW-184B) and main steam isolation valve (MS-124B) going closed unexpectedly. Emergency feedwater (EFW) was automatically actuated. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally after the reactor trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted as expected. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour nonemergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Decay heat is being removed through the turbine bypass valves and the atmospheric dump valve on loop '2'. There is no primary to secondary system leakage. The cause of the isolations is still being investigated.
ENS 5684911 November 2023 00:23:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1545 CST on November 10, 2023, personnel at Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 determined that 19 conduits in the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) auxiliary relay cabinets A and B did not have the required fire seals for bay separation. This condition meets the criteria involving an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety. The plant is currently defueled. Decay heat is being removed by normal spent fuel cooling system operations. ESFAS is not required to be operable in the current plant mode. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Region 4 Branch Chief (Dixon) has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/8/2024 AT 1222 EST FROM PETER RAMON TO ERNEST WEST * * *

On November 10, 2023, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 reported in EN 56849 that 19 conduits in engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) auxiliary relay cabinets A and B did not have the required fire seals for bay separation. This condition met the criteria involving an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety. Waterford 3 has determined that the ESFAS auxiliary relay cabinets A and B jumper conduits do not require fire seals based on review of an engineering specification that specifies the size and length of conduits which require fire seals to be installed. None of the nineteen affected conduits meet the size and length criteria that would necessitate installation of a fire seal. Based on this, the condition described in EN 56849 is not considered to be an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and therefore is not reportable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy)

ENS 568345 November 2023 17:52:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1033 CST on November 5, 2023, while in a refueling outage, it was determined that Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, did not meet the performance criteria for steam generator structural integrity in accordance with Technical Specification 6.5.9.b.1, Steam Generator Program, due to two tube failures in the number 1 steam generator. The condition was identified during performance of in-situ pressure testing. The affected tubes will be plugged. The plant is currently stable with all fuel in the spent fuel pool. Decay heat is being removed by normal spent fuel cooling system operation. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a degraded condition. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 567226 September 2023 19:22:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: A supplemental contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
ENS 5664430 July 2023 17:25:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On July 30, 2023 at 1119 CDT, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with technical specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to the control room envelope doors failing a door seal smoke test creating a breach in the control room envelope. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 Action b. Mitigating actions were implemented and tested satisfactorily by 1215 CDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 09/12/23 AT 1357 EDT FROM MONICA PEAK TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The original operability determination of inoperable was made based on a conservative evaluation that with presence of smoke in-leakage through Door 261 and 262, the CRE boundary could not perform its safety function. A more detailed engineering evaluation was subsequently performed. No maintenance or intrusive testing was performed on the doors after initial test failure. As documented in version 2 operability determination for condition report WF3-2023-14604, the CRE boundary remained intact for the condition identified and was able to fulfill its safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Warnick).

ENS 5640310 March 2023 07:25:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 03/09/2023 at 2200 CST, Waterford (Unit) 3 entered OP-901-111, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, and OP-901-403, High Activity In Containment, due to elevated reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage in containment. On 03/10/2023, at 0030 Operations entered Technical Specification 3.4.5.2 action (c) due to unidentified leakage exceeding 1 gallon per minute (gpm). Technical Specification 3.4.5.2 action (c) requires reducing the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. On 03/10/2023 at 0237 the plant discovered an unisolable RCS leak in the reactor coolant pump 1B cubicle and initiated action to complete a plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications. This event is being reported as a 4-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as the initiation of plant shutdown required by technical specifications. Reactor was tripped at 0521 CST on 3/10/2023.
ENS 562149 November 2022 15:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 562023 November 2022 14:05:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day telephonic notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid engineered safety feature actuation signal. On September 6, 2022, at Waterford 3, while performing a plant protection system (PPS) power supply check, technicians observed an abnormally high voltage output. When the technicians opened the PPS bay cabinet door to adjust the voltage, they then observed low voltage indications. The direct cause of this issue is believed to be vibration induced relay chattering or an intermittent connection issue when opening the rear doors of PPS cabinets. This resulted in half the logic being met for the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal (ESFAS) signals to fully actuate. The ESFAS signal opened the following valves: EFW-228A (EFW to SG 1 Primary Isolation), EFW-229A (EFW to SG 1 Backup Isolation), EFW-228B (EFW to SG 2 Primary Isolation) and EFW-229B (EFW to SG 2 Backup Isolation). This was a partial actuation of ESFAS. Affected plant systems functioned successfully. The inadvertent actuation was caused by a spurious signal and was not a valid signal resulting from actual parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include spurious signals including jarring of a cabinet door. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written licensee event report. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. These events did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
ENS 5596325 June 2022 00:44:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2012 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 was operating at 100 percent power when an automatic reactor trip occurred due to Main Steam Isolation Valve MS-124B going closed unexpectedly. Subsequently, both main feedwater isolation valves shut. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) was automatically actuated. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally after the reactor trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted as expected and all other plant equipment functioned as expected. This was an uncomplicated scram. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5544331 August 2021 20:52:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 1340 CDT on August 31, 2021, Waterford 3 Nuclear Generating Station discovered a condition impacting functionality of the ENS and commercial telephone lines. This issue was evaluated and determined to be a major loss of communications capability because the condition affected the ability to directly communicate between the NRC and the Control Room. Satellite phone capability was established at 1410 CDT. Additional communication capability was restored at 1609 CDT. Communication capability via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) was reestablished at 1923 CDT. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5543630 August 2021 01:50:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

At 1804 CDT on 8/29/2021, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station (WF3) experienced a Loss of Off Site Power event due to Hurricane Ida (See EN #55435). This event caused an automatic actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators Trains A and B. Both Emergency Diesel Generators started as designed and both are currently operating normally supplying power to their respective Class 1E Safety Busses. This automatic actuation is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Prior to the loss of offsite power, WF3 was in progress of performing a plant cooldown in accordance with procedural guidance. As part of this cooldown and after entering Mode 4, all Safety Injection Tanks were isolated. As a result of losing offsite power, Reactor Coolant System Temperature increased above 350F which is above the temperature requirements for Mode 4. Safety Injection Tanks are required to be unisolated and OPERABLE in Mode 3. Therefore, with no Safety Injection Tanks OPERABLE, this constituted an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and the unit entered Technical Specification 3.0.3. The unit was in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 43 minutes from 1805 CDT until 1848 CDT when Mode 4 conditions were re-established. This event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a Safety Function is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). While continuing to perform the Reactor Coolant System Cooldown and prior to placing Shutdown Cooling Train in service, it became necessary to start one train of Emergency Feedwater. Emergency Feedwater Train A was manually started at 1847 CDT to feed the Steam Generators and was secured at 1947 CDT. Emergency Feedwater Train A started and operated normally during this period. This manual actuation is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1549 EDT ON OCTOBER 25, 2021 FROM CHANTEL HATTAWAY TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The purpose of this notification is to revise Event Notification Report (EN) 55436 to include a partial retraction. On August 29, 2021, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of offsite power (LOOP) event due to Hurricane Ida. Prior to the LOOP, WF3 had shutdown to Mode 3 (Hot Standby) in anticipation of the LOOP and was performing a plant cooldown in accordance with procedural guidance. When Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) was achieved, all Safety Injection Tanks (SITs) were isolated as part of the plant cooldown. After the LOOP, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature increased and the Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs) indicated that RCS temperature had exceeded 350 degrees F. Based on the CETs, this was above the temperature requirements for Mode 4 and, as such, WF3 declared entry into Mode 3. The SITs are required to be unisolated and Operable in Mode 3. Since no SITs were Operable at that time, it was determined that this constituted an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and included this as part of the EN 55436 report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). An engineering evaluation has subsequently been performed to validate whether the RCS temperature excursion following the LOOP actually reached 350 degrees F. As defined in WF3 Technical Specification (TS) Table 1.2, Operational Mode temperatures are a function of RCS average temperature (Tavg), not just the indicated temperature of the CETs. Based on the calculated Tavg using validated temperatures, it was concluded that 350 degrees F was not reached. Thus, WF3 remained in Mode 4 following the LOOP and there was no event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function that was reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The remainder of EN 55436 remains correct and unchanged. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick)

ENS 5543529 August 2021 19:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

Waterford 3 shut down the reactor in preparation for Hurricane Ida landfall prior to this event. At 1812 CDT, Waterford 3 declared a notification of unusual event under EAL S.U. 1.1 due to a loss of offsite power as a result of hurricane Ida. Plant power is being provided via emergency diesel generators. The NRC Activated at 2016 EDT with Region IV in the lead. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, CISA Central, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NWC (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/1/21 AT 0132 EDT FROM ALEX SANDOVAL TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

At 2345 CDT on 8/31/21, Waterford 3 terminated their notification of unusual event under EAL S.U. 1.1. Offsite power has been restored to both safety-related electrical buses. The NRC remains Activated with Region IV in the lead while reviewing additional criteria to exit Activation. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, CISA Central, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NWC (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email), R4DO (Josey), IR MOC (Kennedy), NRR EO (Miller), R4 (Lantz).

ENS 5528128 May 2021 09:04:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal. On April 1, 2021, at Waterford 3, while performing a replacement of power supplies on the Plant Protection System, a spurious signal caused a partial actuation of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal. A partial Emergency Feedwater (EFW) logic trip path was met causing the opening of valves EFW-228A (EFW to SG 1 Primary Isolation), EFW-229A (EFW to SG 1 backup isolation), EFW-228B (EFW to SG 2 Primary Isolation), and EFW-229B (EFW to SG2 Backup Isolation). This inadvertent actuation was spurious and was not a valid signal resulting from parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration (57 FR 41378) define an invalid signal to include spurious signals. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid. This event was entered into the Waterford 3 corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The plant responded as expected. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 549782 November 2020 08:10:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn November 2, 2020, at 0419 CST, Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to a Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System timer failure while attempting to synchronize a second motor generator set. All control rods fully inserted. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and stable with normal feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the failure is still under investigation.
ENS 5482710 August 2020 17:05:00WaterfordNRC Region 4The following was received from the licensee: On August 3, 2020, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) completed an evaluation of a deviation at Waterford 3 which concluded the condition constitutes a defect pursuant to 10 CFR 21. The Waterford 3 Site Vice President was notified of the result of this evaluation on August 10, 2020. The Masoneilan 8012N-3C electropneumatic positioner installed on Emergency Feedwater Valve EFW-223A locked during as-found diagnostic testing. Failure analysis concluded that the condition was due to an internal failure of the magnet-coil assembly due to the magnet base had poor solder joints. This has been attributed to a manufacturing defect. Entergy concluded that this condition could affect the ability to properly respond to an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal / Main Steam Isolation Signal if present on any of the four air operated Emergency Feedwater to Steam Generator flow control valves; therefore, it could have created a substantial safety hazard. Licensees affected: Waterford. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO and the Part 21 group via email.
ENS 5472421 May 2020 17:38:00WaterfordNRC Region 4A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a pre-access fitness-for-duty test. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated.
ENS 546321 April 2020 21:05:00WaterfordNRC Region 4On April 1, 2020, a licensed senior reactor operator, returning from a leave of absence, disclosed a Fitness-For-Duty policy violation, which occurred on July 29, 2019. The individual's site access has been removed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 542058 August 2019 13:26:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Engineered Safety Feature actuation signal. On June 25, 2019, at Waterford 3, while performing an emergent replacement of relays on the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Train A that affected Shield Building Ventilation Train A and HVAC Equipment Room Supply Fan AH-1 3A, unintentional contact was made between two contacts on the relay, resulting in an inadvertent initiation of other relays in the sequencer circuit. This caused the starting of Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump A, Switchgear Ventilation Fan A, and Boric Acid Makeup pumps. This was a partial actuation of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Train A. Affected plant systems started and functioned successfully. This inadvertent actuation was caused by human error and was not a valid signal resulting from parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include human error. Therefore, this actuation is considered invalid. This event was entered into the Waterford 3 corrective action program for resolution. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5419131 July 2019 16:20:00WaterfordNRC Region 4On July 31, 2019, at 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced initiation of a plant shutdown as required by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3. Prior to this, on July 31, 2019, at 1108 CDT, the boron injection flow paths were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.2, 'Flow Paths - Operating,' and the charging pumps were declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.1.2.4, 'Charging Pumps-Operating.' This was due to visual examination identifying that propagation had progressed on a previously identified flaw on piping upstream of the header supplying the charging pumps. TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered due to the action statements of LCOs 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.4 not being met. LCO 3.0.3 requires that action shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in a mode in which the specification does not apply by placing it in hot standby within the next 6 hours and cold shutdown within the next 30 hours. At 1206 CDT, Waterford 3 commenced direct boration to the reactor coolant system. This condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D) due to an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.
ENS 5413125 June 2019 11:09:00WaterfordNRC Region 4On June 25, 2019, at 0428 CDT, the Waterford 3 shift operating crew declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to both Broad Range Gas Monitors being inoperable. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 action b, which requires that with one or more control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable due to inoperable control room envelope boundary in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4, then: 1. Immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions; 2. Within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions ensure control room envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits; and 3. Within 90 days, restore the control room envelope boundary to operable status. Action b.1 was completed by placing the control room in isolate mode at time 0441 CDT. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident, due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5406816 May 2019 18:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On May 16, 2019, at 1348 CDT, Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Steam Generator number 1 high level, which was the result of a Main Turbine trip and subsequent reactor power cutback which had occurred at 1345 CDT. The cause of the Main Turbine trip is currently under investigation. Subsequent to the Reactor trip, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves number 1 and number 2 closed on high Steam Generator levels. Emergency Feedwater automatically actuated for Steam Generator number 2 at 1419 CDT and Steam Generator number 1 at 1425 CDT. Main Feedwater was restored to both Steam Generators by 1629 CDT. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for an uncomplicated reactor trip and is in the process of transitioning to the normal operating shutdown procedure. The plant is currently in Mode 3 and stable with Main Feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed through the main condenser. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.
ENS 5399111 April 2019 10:28:00WaterfordNRC Region 4

On April 11, 2019, at 0200 CDT the shift operating crew declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to the door handle for Door 86 (H&V Airlock Access Door) being detached. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 action b, which requires that with one or more control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable due to inoperable control room envelope boundary in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, then: 1. Immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions; 2. Within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions ensure control room envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits; and 3. Within 90 days, restore the control room envelope boundary to OPERABLE status. Action b.1 was completed by sealing the hole in Door 86 at 0232 CDT. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfilment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident,' due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 5/17/19 AT 1620 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

This is a Non-Emergency Notification from Waterford 3. This is a retraction of EN 53991. This event was evaluated in accordance with the corrective action process. The original operability determination of inoperable was made based on a conservative evaluation that with the door handle for Door 86 (Heating and Ventilation Airlock Access Door) being detached, the control room envelope boundary could not perform its safety function. A more detailed engineering evaluation was subsequently performed. This shows that the condition of the door handle being detached is bounded by the most recently performed non-pressurized radiological tracer gas test, as the control room envelope differential pressure was maintained more positive with the detached door handle as compared to that observed during the test. Additionally, the control room envelope differential pressure trends showed no discernable change between the two conditions of the door handle detached or with the opening taped over (resulting in an air tight seal). This information supports the conclusion that with the door handle for Door 86 being detached, the control room envelope boundary remained operable and did not constitute a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident; therefore, this event is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx).

ENS 5383718 January 2019 17:03:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On January 18, 2019, a relevant indication was detected in the performance of Phased Array Ultrasonic Examinations of A600 Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds during planned inspections. The indication was observed during the analysis of data recorded of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loop 2A Reactor Coolant Pump Suction Drain Nozzle to Safe-End Butt Weld (11-007). This indication does not meet applicable acceptance criteria under American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI. The plant was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0 percent power for a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50 .72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded,' because an indication was found that did not meet acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Section XI , IWB-3514-2 and Code Case N-770-2, 3132. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Reference: CR-WF3-2019-01041
ENS 5383417 January 2019 23:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On January 17, 2019, a relevant indication was detected in the performance of Phased Array Ultrasonic Examinations of A600 Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds during planned inspections. The indication was observed during the analysis of data recorded of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loop 1A Reactor Coolant Pump Suction Drain Nozzle to Safe-End Butt Weld (07-009). This indication does not meet applicable acceptance criteria under American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section Xl. The plant was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0 percent power for a planned refueling outage at the time of discovery. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded,' because an indication was found that did not meet acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Section Xl. IWB-3514-2 and Code Case N-770-2, 3132. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Reference: CR-WF3-2019-0967
ENS 5379620 December 2018 05:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4On December 19, 2018, at 2322 CST, the shift operating crew declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to valve HVC-102 exceeding its maximum allowed closed stroke time of 2.0 seconds during performing of surveillance procedure OP-903-119. Actual closed stroke time was 2.1 seconds. Valve HVC-102 is part of the control room envelope. TS 3.7.6.1 requires that two control room emergency air filtration trains shall be OPERABLE. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 action b, which requires that with one or more control room emergency air filtration trains inoperable due to inoperable control room envelope boundary in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, then: 1. immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions; 2. within 24 hours, verify mitigating actions ensure control room envelope occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits; and 3. within 90 days, restore the control room envelope boundary to OPERABLE status. Actions b.1 and b.2 were completed by placing the control room ventilation system in isolate mode at 2355. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident,' due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5355923 August 2018 12:11:00WaterfordNRC Region 4This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. 10 CFR Part 21 Notification - Defect of Westinghouse 7300 Process Analog Control System circuit cards On August 14, 2018, Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy) completed an evaluation of a deviation at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3) which concluded the condition constitutes a defect pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21. The Waterford 3 Site Vice President was notified of the result of this evaluation on August 21, 2018. An interim report stating that an evaluation of this deviation was in progress was submitted to the NRC on July 5, 2018 (Entergy letter W3F1-2018-0040, ADAMS Accession Number ML18186A694). Three Westinghouse 7300 Process Analog Control System (PAC) circuit cards were identified to be failed due to failed hex inverter chips. Some of these cards were installed in applications which support the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) at Waterford 3. These PAC cards use Texas Instruments Part Number SN74LS04N, W113 hex inverter chips. The circuit card types of concern are Analog Comparator model number 2838A32G01, Control Board model number 2838A30G011, and Prom Logic model number 2838A33G01. Entergy concluded that this condition could have prevented the UHS from performing its safety function and thus could have created a substantial safety hazard. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 533897 May 2018 17:40:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive result for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 530577 November 2017 10:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn November 7, 2017, at approximately 0337 (CST) hours, Waterford 3 (WF3) Control Room received a phone call from Entergy's Load Dispatcher to inform us that the NRC was unable to call Waterford 3 by ENS (emergency notification system) phone or by PABX (private automatic branch exchange) phone. The NRC was called by the Waterford 3 Control Room using the PABX at 0339 (CST) hours. However, the ENS phone could not call the NRC. Also, outside lines were not able to call in to Waterford 3. Offsite prompt Public Warning Sirens were available at all times. State and Local notification capability was available via PABX. WF3 Emergency Response Organization notification capability was available at all times. WF3 site Emergency Response Facility intercommunications were available at all times. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of offsite communications capability. ENS communication and full PABX functionality was reestablished at 0452 (CST) on November 7, 2017. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5286317 July 2017 17:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

During a rain and lightning storm, plant operators observed arcing from the main transformer bus duct and notified the control room. The decision was made to trip the main generator which resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The plant entered EAL SU.1 as a result of the loss of offsite power for greater than fifteen minutes. Plant safety busses are being supplied by both emergency diesel generators while the licensee inspects the electrical system to determine any damage prior to bringing offsite power back into the facility. Offsite power is available to the facility. No offsite assistance was requested by the licensee. During the trip, all rods inserted into the core. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric dump valves with emergency feedwater supplying the steam generators. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed to protect the main condenser. There were no safeties or relief valves that actuated during the plant transient. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Reactor cooling is via natural circulation. All safety equipment is available for the safe shutdown of the plant. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/17/17 AT 2007 EDT FROM MARIA ZAMBER TO DONG PARK * * *

This notification is also made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On July 17, 2017 at 1606 CDT, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Forced Circulation, which was the result of Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) to the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses. Both 'A' and 'B' trains of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started as designed to reenergize the 'A' and 'B' safety buses. The LOOP caused a loss of feedwater pumps, resulting in an automatic actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) system. Prior to the reactor trip, at 1600 CDT, personnel noticed the isophase bus duct to main transformer 'B' glowing orange due to an unknown reason. Due to this, the main turbine was manually tripped at 1606 CDT. Following the turbine trip, the electrical (safety and non-safety) buses did not transfer to the startup transformers as expected due to an unknown reason. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for LOOP/Loss of Forced Circulation Recovery. At 1617 CDT, an Unusual Event was declared due to Initiating Condition (IC) SU1 - Loss of all offsite AC power to safety buses (greater than) 15 minutes. All safety systems responded as expected. The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with the EDGs supplying both safety buses and with EFW feeding and maintaining both steam generators. Offsite power is in the process of being restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and the local Parish emergency management agencies.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ADAM TAMPLAIN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2203 EDT ON 7/17/17 * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 2056 CDT. The basis for terminating was that offsite power was restored to the safety busses. The licensee has notified Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, St. John and St. Charles Parishes, Louisiana Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness, and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Stapleton), NRR (King), R4DO (Hipschman), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, FEMA National Watch Center (email) and Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1724 EDT ON 7/19/17 * * *

This update is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). During the event discussed in EN# 52863, at 1642 CDT (on July 17, 2017), Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) level lowered to less than 92% resulting in entry to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.3. Level in the CSP was lowered due to feeding from both Steam Generators with EFW. Normal makeup to the CSP was temporarily unavailable due to the LOOP. Filling the CSP commenced at 1815 CDT (on July 17, 2017), and TS 3.7.1.3 was exited on July 18, 2017 at 0039 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hipschman).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1233 EDT ON 9/14/17 * * *

Waterford 3 is retracting a follow up notification made on July 19, 2017 for EN# 52863, concerning the loss of safety function associated with the Condensate Storage Pool (CSP) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The Condensate Storage Pool was performing its required safety function by providing inventory to the Emergency Feed Water pumps when the required Tech Spec level (T.S. 3.7.1.3) dropped below 92%. The Technical Specification was entered at 1624 (CDT) on July 17, 2017 and exited after filling at 0039 on July 18, 2017. The total allowed outage time allowed by Tech Spec 3.7.1.3 is 10 hours to be in Hot Shutdown if not restored. The Condensate Storage Pool level was restored to greater than 92% prior to exceeding the allowed outage time. Based on level being restored and the Condensate Storage Pool performing its required safety function, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) does not apply. Prior to the automatic reactor trip, Condensate Storage Pool level was greater than 92%. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified R4DO (Groom).

ENS 5275314 May 2017 21:27:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn May 14, 2017 at time 1823 (CDT), Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station notified St. Charles Parish Emergency Services via 911 of a fire in the Generation Support Building (GSB), the Hahnville, Luling and Killona Fire Departments were dispatched. The GSB is an Administrative and Engineering Building outside the Protected Area and on the Owner Controlled Area. The fire was reported out at 1841. No personnel were injured due to the fire. The fire appeared to be from an external building exhaust fan. There was no internal or structural damage to the building. There was no radiological release. No Safety Related Systems were required to function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 526008 March 2017 20:13:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On March 8, 2017 at 1627 (CST) Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 action 'c' was entered due to both trains of Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) being inoperable. This TS action requires one train of LPSI be restored within 1 hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours. It was identified that LPSI train B was inoperable due to SI-135B, Reactor Coolant Loop 1 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, being found open. At the time of discovery, LPSI train A was inoperable for pre planned maintenance, but available and awaiting operability retest. The station was in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. Maintenance workers were scheduled to work Sl-135A Reactor Coolant Loop 2 Shutdown Cooling Warmup Valve, and inadvertently began work on Sl-135B and manually opened the valve which resulted in the LPSI Train B being inoperable. Once identified by Operations Control Room staff, the valve (SI-135B) was placed in the closed position and stroke tested to ensure operability. TS 3.5.2 action 'c' was exited at time 1705. The station remained in compliance with TS 3.5.2 action 'a'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 523371 November 2016 12:00:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This 24 hour report is being made as per 10CFR72.75. On October 31, 2016, at 1100 (CDT), the Supplemental Cooling System was secured to the Dry Cask Storage Hi-Track Transfer cask, as allowed by Dry Fuel Storage T.S. 3.1.4, in preparation for moving the Hi-Track transfer cask. At approximately 1500, after moving the Hi-Track into position for downloading including securing the cleats to the mating device, the next step in the procedure was to lower the Hi-Track. When lowering the Hi-Track, a crane overload condition occurred. With the crane, attached the Supplemental Cooling System can not be operated and has remained secured. The Supplemental Cooling System is classified as 'Important to Safety Category B' and is required to be utilized, as necessary, to maintain the peak fuel cladding temperature below the allowed limits. T.S. 3.1.4 allows the Supplemental cooling system to be secured for up to 7 hours during the Hi-Track transfer process and then followed by a 7 day allowed outage time. This is being reported based on 10CFR72.75 which states in part that a 24 hour Non-emergency notification is required if; 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed'. The Hi-Track is presently in a safe condition with supplemental cooling still secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONG PARK AT 1111 EST ON 11/08/16 * * *

On November 1, 2016 at 1100 CDT Waterford 3 notified the NRC of a 24 hour reportable event per 10CFR72.75. The notification is documented under EN# 52337 based on the information known at that time. Follow up investigation determined that the conditions required per 10CFR72.75 were not met and should not have been reported. 10CFR72.75 states in part that a 24 hour non-emergency notification is required if, 'An event in which important to safety equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.' It also requires that, 'The equipment is required by regulation, license condition, or certificate of compliance to be available and operable to prevent releases that could exceed regulatory limits, to prevent exposures to radiation or radioactive materials that could exceed regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Based on a review of the bases for Certificate of Compliance, T.S. 3.1.4 thermal analysis shows that the fuel cladding temperature would not exceed the short term temperature limits applicable to an off normal condition. The bases further states that because the thermal analysis is a steady-state analysis, there is an indefinite period of time available to make repairs to the Supplemental Cooling System. The completion time of 7 days to restore the system per T.S. 3.1.4 is considered an appropriate and reasonable amount of time to plan the work and complete repairs. Based on this information there was no possibility of exceeding regulatory limits or the need to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Waterford 3 is retracting event notification EN 52337. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Campbell).

ENS 5233631 October 2016 18:07:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEOn October 31, 2016, an informal, voluntary communication was made to the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) and the Saint Charles Parish Emergency Operating Center concerning a spill of greater than 100 gallons (estimated 150 gallons total) of Tritium contaminated water to the storm drains located within the Protected Area. Tritium activity was 8.201E-06 micro Ci/ml and no detectable gamma activity. The spill lasted approximately 5 minutes before the pump moving the tritium contaminated water was secured. The contaminated water came from the Condensate Polisher Backwash Storage Tank and discharged from a (loose) hose connection going to a baker tank located within the protected area. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5232127 October 2016 08:26:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

At 0021 (CDT) on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of all three charging pumps. Charging Pump AB was restored and aligned to replace Charging Pump A and WF3 exited TS 3.0.3 at 0055 on 10/27/16. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB during electrical troubleshooting. The cause of CVC-507 not opening is being investigated. Power was restored to SUPS 014AB at 0022. WF3 is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the Steam Bypass Control System. Pressurizer Level was maintained throughout the event. WF3 was previously shut down for reasons unrelated to this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Valve CVC-183 closed when the power supply was lost. CVC-183 is the Volume Control Tank outlet isolation valve. Waterford 3 will remain in mode 3 until the issue has been corrected.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1005 EST ON 11/23/16 FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

This is a retraction of EN 52321 which was reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency on October 27th at 0826 EST. At 0021 (EST) on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems due to an electrical transient on a Static Uninterruptable Power Supply that was being worked under a maintenance work order. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB. Both operating charging pumps automatically secured due to low suction pressure trips as designed. Post event investigation determined that a relay that had failed affected only the normal suction path isolation valves to the charging pumps and did not impact the safety related flow path that is required during a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). Had an SIAS occurred during the period when no active suction path was aligned, the low pressure trip would have been blocked and the pumps selected to start on an SIAS would have auto started. The SIAS would have aligned the Boric Acid Make-up system for Emergency Boration. This would have resulted in the Charging Pumps being aligned to take suction from the Boric Acid Make-up pumps and/or Boric Acid Gravity Feed valves. A function of the charging systems is to inject concentrated boric acid into RCS upon an SIAS. As discussed in FSAR Section 6.3.3.3.1, the injection flow from the charging pumps is not credited in the small break LOCA analysis. Charging is however credited for natural circulation cooldown without letdown in order to meet the safe shutdown requirements of NRC Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-4. This analysis assumes that the charging source is initially Boric Acid Makeup Tanks followed by Refueling Water Storage Pool. Both sources were available. The charging system was fully capable of performing its safety function following the relay failure. The charging pumps remained capable of starting on an SIAS and the flow path from the Boric Acid Management system remained operable. In addition the flow path from the RWSP was not affected since the outlet isolation valve could be manually opened. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R4DO (Taylor).

ENS 5217915 August 2016 14:10:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 12, 2016, at 1704 CDT, the shift operating crew entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to both trains of Essential Services Chilled Water being inoperable. Essential Services Chilled Water Loop A had previously been declared inoperable for maintenance on August 11, 2016. On August 12, 2016, at 1704, the shift operating crew noted that Loop B Essential Services Chilled Water outlet temperature exceeded the allowed TS limit of 42 degrees Fahrenheit. Essential Chiller AB was subsequently aligned to Loop B and TS 3.0.3 was exited on August 12, 2016 at 1802 when outlet temperature was verified less than or equal to 42 degrees Fahrenheit. On August 15, 2016, subsequent review of this event determined that this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident' due to both Essential Services Chilled Water Loops being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5149223 October 2015 12:04:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following is excerpted from LER 2015-007 submitted by the licensee (see related EN #51348): On October 9, 2015, Waterford 3 received information from the external evaluation concerning the Generator Differential Current Transformer. The evaluation concluded that a manufacturing defect internal to the current transformer was the cause of the failure. On October 22, 2015, engineering evaluation determined the manufacturing defect could create a substantial safety hazard, as defined in 10 CFR 21, and provided the site vice president information of the defect the same day. Additional information identified in the report is as follows: Constructor - Westinghouse Type KIR-60 current transformer, style 7524A01G16, serial number 28218571; Defect and safety hazard - There were voids found in the insulation, and the thickness of the insulation material around the fault area appeared reduced when compared to the other areas of the current transformer. There is only one transformer of this type remaining installed in the plant. Scheduled replacement is no later than November 15, 2015.
ENS 514649 October 2015 21:59:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 1800 (CDT) on October 9, 2015 a polling test was initiated in Saint Johns Parish to test the circuitry of the installed sirens. During the polling test no sirens are expected to sound as it is only a circuitry test. Siren number SJ39 inadvertently sounded for 15 to 20 minutes, and no others. Saint Johns Parish notified the parish residents that the sounding of the siren was inadvertent via a Parish wide cable television channel and a press release. A contract vendor has disabled the siren and will troubleshoot and repair starting on October 12, 2015. All remaining sirens within Saint Johns Parish remain operational and capable of being activated when required. 0% of the population is affected by the loss of this siren due to siren overlap. Time to repair and restore siren SJ39 to service is still being investigated. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 514474 October 2015 03:51:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 2307 CDT Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip and all Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) inserted into the core. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is currently under investigation. The plant is currently in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) and stable with Main Feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. Main Feedwater Pump 'A' tripped subsequent to the reactor trip. Emergency Feedwater actuated following the plant trip as expected, but was not required to maintain Steam Generator level. The plant entered the Emergency Operating Procedure for an uncomplicated reactor trip and has now transitioned to the normal operating shutdown procedure. Unit 3 is in a normal post trip electrical lineup. The Main Condenser is in-service removing decay heat.. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5134826 August 2015 15:47:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. were entered. EDG 'A' was being routinely run in accordance with OP-903-115, 'Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test', Section 7.4, '24 hr EDG A Run with Subsequent Diesel Start' to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2 6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b. (1). At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1 f. was entered due to the exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started. Troubleshooting determined that the EDG B exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f. was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' exhaust fan. Waterford 3 is currently in TS 3.8.1.1 actions b. and d. Actions to verify a temporary EDG is available and restore EDG 'A' to operable status are in progress. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) (A) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v) (D), 'event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition' and (D) 'mitigate the consequences of an accident due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1328 EDT ON 8/31/2015 * * *

The following is a correction to a non-emergency event notification from Waterford 3 originally made on 8/26/2015: On August 26, 2015, at 0111 CDT, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 'A' was declared inoperable following a trip of EDG 'A' on Generator Differential. Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1 actions b and d were entered. EDG 'A' was being routinely run in accordance with OP-903-115, 'Train A Integrated Emergency Diesel Generator/Engineering Safety Features Test,' Section 7.4, '24 hr EDG A Run with Subsequent Diesel Start' to satisfy Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2(e)6. EDG 'B' was subsequently started per TS 3.8.1.1 action b.(1). At 0740 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared inoperable and TS 3.8.1.1 f was entered due to the room exhaust fan not starting when the diesel engine was started. Troubleshooting determined that the EDG B room exhaust fan did not start due to HVR-501B (EDG B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE DAMPER) not opening. Action was taken to isolate air and fail HVR-501B to its open safety position. At 1001 CDT, EDG 'B' was declared operable and TS 3.8.1.1.f was exited following verification of proper operation of the EDG 'B' room exhaust fan. Waterford 3 is currently in TS 3.8.1.1 actions b and d. Actions to verify a temporary EDG is available and restore EDG 'A' to operable status are in progress. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident due to both emergency diesel generators being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Warnick)

ENS 512956 August 2015 18:47:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 1200 CDT, on August 6th, 2015, during the monthly test of Emergency Plan sirens in Saint Charles Parish (county), all sirens failed to actuate when required. There are a total 73 sirens of which 37 sirens are in Saint Charles Parish, which covers approximately 49 percent of the total population within the Waterford 3 10-mile emergency planning zone. The siren vendor is currently investigating to repair the issue. Waterford 3 still maintains 100 percent backup notification capabilities. The Saint John the Baptist Parish Sirens remain fully operational. The Saint Charles Parish Emergency Manager has been notified. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. The Waterford 3 and Saint Charles Parish Emergency Response Plans include back-up processes to provide warning to affected areas, if required, in the event of the loss of sirens. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 511163 June 2015 21:36:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. At 1705 (CDT) the reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of an automatic trip due to loss of main feedwater pump 'A'. The plant is currently in mode 3 and stable with emergency feedwater feeding and maintaining both steam generators due to an automatic emergency feed actuation signal. During the trip, the 'B' electrical safety and non safety busses did not automatically transfer from the unit auxiliary transformer to the startup transformer causing a loss of off-site power to the 'B' electrical busses. This resulted in a loss of main feedwater pump 'B'. The 'B' emergency diesel generator started as designed and reenergized the 'B' safety related buses. The plant entered the emergency operating procedure for loss of main feedwater. Off-site power has been restored to the 'B' safety and non safety busses, and the emergency diesel generator 'B' is secured.

All control rods fully inserted into the core following the trip.  Decay heat is being removed by the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.  The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup.  

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5037818 August 2014 17:23:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEConditions were met that require immediate NRC notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to both trains of the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) system being inoperable for approximately 83 minutes. This condition resulted from a planned system outage of train B Component Cooling Water (CCW), as a subsystem of the Train B UHS, and an unexpected trip of a Train A Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) Wet Cooling Tower (WCT) fan, which is also a subsystem of the Train A UHS. CCW Train B was declared inoperable at 0820 CDT and removed from service for a planned relay replacement, resulting in entry of 72 hour shutdown Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.3, and associated cascading TS on Train B, including TS LCO 3.7.4 Action a. Subsequently, at approximately 0853 (CDT), the 6A ACCW WCT fan tripped, rendering the redundant Train A UHS inoperable, causing entry into 1 hour TS LCO 3.7.4 Action b, which states, 'With both UHS trains inoperable, restore at least one UHS train to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.' At approximately 0948 CDT the WCT Fan 6A electric motor thermal overload relays were reset, the fan restarted, and operated properly. At 1016 CDT, CCW train B had been restored from the planned maintenance and was declared operable, exiting TS LCO 3.7.3 and associated cascading TSs on Train B. Although a plant shutdown was not commenced following expiration of the one hour specified in TS LCO 3.7.4 ACTION b, Operations was preparing for a power reduction and TS required plant shutdown. During this reported condition, an outside air intake valve of the Control Room Emergency Filtration system was inoperable for planned maintenance, for which TS 3.7.6.1 mitigating actions were in place. This valve was restored to Operable at 1210 CDT. Other safety systems remained available. The plant remained stable at 100% during this time. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5019112 June 2014 09:31:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThis is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning the deviation of a basic component from manufacturing purchase specifications. On 04/18/2014, during pneumatic actuator replacement for Emergency Feedwater (EFW) valve EFW-224A (EFW to Steam Generator #1 Primary Flow Control Valve), it was identified that the fail action of the actuator was incorrect in that it was in a fail-closed instead of fail-open configuration. The actuator model, as identified in Waterford 3 site receipt/acceptance document and the actuator's name plate data, was a Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F, which is specified as a fail-open actuator. However, the actuator was discovered to have a fail closed action, which is indicative of a Masoneilan model 48 actuator. The fail-action of these Masoneilan Sigma-F actuators can be changed in accordance with its technical manual TDM120.0565 with no additional parts; therefore, Waterford 3 corrected the fail action of EFW-224A's replacement actuator (to fail-open) and ensured the handwheel indicator was corrected prior to entering mode 4. Two of these actuators were received and accepted as Masoneilan model 47 Sigma-F (fail-open) actuators in September of 2010, both of which were labeled as such, yet configured in the fail-closed action. One of these two actuators remains in the warehouse and has been placed on hold. The vendor, Dresser Masoneilan, has been notified in writing on May 12, 2014. On 6/9/2014 at approximately 1600 CDT, Entergy concluded that for those potential applications of this valve operator model in the EFW system, had they been installed without correcting the deviation, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard in that it could have prevented fulfillment of EFW safety function, and therefore reportable under 10CFR PART 21. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed on 06/11/2014. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5005824 April 2014 20:32:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed contract supervisor was confirmed positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness for duty test. The supervisor's access to the facility has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4997831 March 2014 20:30:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 15:58 hours (CDT) on March 31, 2014, Waterford 3 was informed that five emergency sirens were inoperable during the performance of a monthly siren inspection. Subsequent review during preparation of this notification has identified an additional one inoperable siren, which brings the total number of inoperable sirens to six. There are a total of seventy-three sirens distributed among two parishes (counties). The loss of these six sirens for more than one hour is considered a major loss of offsite response capability and is reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The affected parish Emergency Operations Center was notified of the condition and it was confirmed that they will use the preplanned alternative method of Route Alerting for the affected areas until notified that repairs to the sirens have been completed. Waterford 3 has initiated preparations to repair the sirens, with actual repairs expected to commence tomorrow. The performance of the monthly siren inspection will continue during daylight hours today and resume tomorrow. There is no effect on the plant. This issue has been entered into the Waterford 3 Corrective Action Program and appropriate corrective actions will be developed. The NRC Resident Inspector and local agencies were notified.
ENS 4992517 March 2014 15:53:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt approximately 0737 (CDT) on March 17, 2014, Waterford 3 was informed that four emergency sirens were inoperable. One other siren had previously been determined to be inoperable on March 12, 2014. Subsequent review during preparation of this notification has identified an additional eight inoperable sirens, which brings the total number of inoperable sirens to thirteen. There are a total of seventy-three sirens distributed among two parishes (counties). The loss of these thirteen sirens for more than one hour is considered a major loss of offsite response capability and is reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The two affected parish Emergency Operations Centers were notified of the condition and it was confirmed that they will use the preplanned alternative method of Route Alerting for the affected areas until notified that repairs to the sirens have been completed. Waterford 3 is working to repair the sirens. There is no effect on the plant. This issue has been entered into the Waterford 3 Corrective Action Program and appropriate corrective actions will be developed. The NRC Resident Inspectors, local agencies, and the State of Louisiana were notified.