Semantic search
Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ENS 51350 | 25 August 2015 05:00:00 | Agreement State | Agreement State Report - Contamination in an Uncontrolled Area | The State of Oklahoma reported that contamination from a leaking Ba-137 generator was discovered in a 'shed' at the University of Tulsa. It is estimated that approximately 1 milliCurie of Cs-137, used in the generator, was leaked. The licensee, Tracerco, licensed by the State of Texas, was using the generator for tracer studies on University of Tulsa equipment under a reciprocity agreement with the State of Oklahoma. The contamination occurred between October and November of 2014. Tracerco discovered the generator leakage at their Texas facility in May, 2015 but only recently informed the University of Tulsa. The Radiation Safety Officer at the University of Tulsa surveyed the area on 8/25/15 and obtained count rates as high as 100,000 cpm inside the shed. Contamination was also found outside of the shed's location. According to Tracerco, it is estimated that approximately 1 milliCurie of Cs-137 was leaked at the University of Tulsa. The University of Tulsa reported that approximately eight individuals work in the area at least some of the time, however, the University is working on obtaining occupancy information at the contaminated location. The shed has been quarantined. The Ba-137 generator, which contained 50 milliCuries of Cs-137, was manufactured by the China Institute of Atomic Energy. The State of Oklahoma will be investigating the event and will be determining the amount of exposure to the individuals. Tracerco is continuing evaluating the event. The State of Texas reported the leaking generator under NRC EN #51102
The following information was received via facsimile: On August 27, 2015 the Oklahoma Environmental Agency Radiation Management Section performed a reactive inspection of this facility. The facility consists of a closed flow-loop pipeline which water or petroleum was pumped through. A port was used to inject radioactive tracers into the material to study its behavior in the flow-loop. Normally the crew from Tracerco would set up the generator at the injection port which was located on a platform about 12 feet above grade. However for some reason, possibly bad weather, the crew that performed the work last year decided to set up in an enclosed pump house immediately adjacent to the pipeline. At some point during the procedure an estimated 0.1 mCi of Cs-137 (not 1 mCi as previously reported) was released in the interior of the structure. The material was in the form of small resin spheres, about the size of a poppy seed, with the Cesium coating the surface. Sometime around May of this year, after Tracerco discovered that the generator was leaking and their own facility was contaminated, they sent staff back to the University to survey for contamination. However, they were unaware that the previous crew had used the pump house, and only surveyed around the injection port where they found no contamination. No further action was taken until August 24 when Tracerco employees again visited the site and surveyed the pump house. After finding the contamination they decontaminated the area using adhesive tape to pick up the material. Two office chairs and a floor mat were also found to be contaminated and removed to an area the university uses for radioactive storage. None of the University employees who worked at the facility were badged. During our inspection we noted that the background radiation level was elevated in the vicinity of the pump house and flow-loop (approx. 100 microR/hr as measured with a Victoreen 450P, this was about 10 X background off the facility). It should be noted the University has it's own license and uses or stores about 25 fixed gauges, with a total possession limit of 15 Ci., either on or near the flow-loop. Surveys inside the pump house showed isolated areas of contamination with radiation levels as high as 500 micro-R/hr. Multiple areas (usually concrete joints or gravel at the edge of the concrete) around the exterior of the pump house were also found to be contaminated with dose rates around 200 microR/hr. One trailer adjacent to the pump house was found to have a small spot of contamination in the carpet just inside the door. This was surveyed at 260 micro-R/hr. This trailer was used for office space for two persons, one of whom is a member of the public. 14 samples were collected at various points and will be counted next week. The University has restricted access to the contaminated areas but has continued to allow essential radiation workers to enter when necessary to operate the flow-loop. They were instructed to require anyone entering to wear disposable gloves and shoe covers. Tracerco has arranged for Chase Environmental to characterize and remediate the facility. This will begin on August 31 and is expected to take 5 to 7 days. Tracerco has also arranged for any university staff who desire to be scanned at a full-body counter in Houston. Notified R4DO (Campbell) and via E-mail the NMSS Events Notification group. | ||
ENS 51102 | 27 May 2015 05:00:00 | Agreement State | Agreement State Report - Leaking Cs-137 Source | The following was received from the State of Texas via email: On May 27, 2015, the licensee reported to the Agency (Texas Department of State Health) that while performing a routine survey of its source storage area, it discovered that a Barium-137 generator, originally containing 50 millicuries of Cesium-137, had leaked. The licensee investigated and found small amounts of the Cesium had been tracked into its office area (floor only and it has been remediated) and some of the licensee's work vehicles. Employees' vehicles were surveyed and no contamination was detected. The licensee continues its surveys of tools, tool boxes, and other items in the trucks. The area where the generator was stored is a restricted area (security). Access has been further restricted for greater than 24 hours due to the contamination. The licensee is working to identify and remediate all contamination outside the storage room before beginning to remediate there. The licensee has placed the generator into a type A drum to contain the material. The licensee was unable to determine the source or cause of the leak prior to placing it in the drum. An investigation into this event is ongoing. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I-9316 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | ||
ENS 44075 | 17 March 2008 07:00:00 | Agreement State | Agreement State Report - Shipping Container Arrived Damaged with Source Outside of Pig and Container | The State of California Radiologic Health Branch provided the following information via email: The licensee shipped a nominal 123 mCi Co-60 source via FedEx in a Type A package from a temporary job site in the State of Washington to their office in Paramount, CA. Upon arrival at the Paramount office, the Type A shipping container was observed to have been damaged, and the Co-60 source was found out of its shielded pig, and outside of the Type A container. Calculation assuming a point source shows that the radiation levels would have been ~170 mr/hr at one meter, ~1.8 R/hr at one foot, and ~1700 R/hr at one centimeter from the source. The Type A container is constructed of steel, with an inner lead storage pig, and was secured to a wooden shipping pallet. The Type A container has a collar that extends above the lead pig. The cover for the lead pig is secured by a rod that fits through the steel collar. The rod is secured in place by a lock on the rod. Upon receipt of the Type A container at the Paramount, CA facility, the wooden pallet was missing, the lock on the securing rod was missing, the securing rod was not inserted in the holes in the steel collar (therefore it was not securing the cover to the lead pig), and although the inner lead pig cover was in place, the source was found lying on top of the lead pig within the steel collar portion of the Type A container. It is surmised that the Type A container was dropped on the lock during transportation, such that the lock broke, the securing rod was displaced, the cover came off the lead pig, and the source came out of the lead pig. Either the Co-60 source lodged in the steel collar at that time, or the source fell out and someone picked it up and placed it on top of the lead pig within the steel collar of the Type A container (the latter appears more likely). The source is located at one end of an ~3 inch long rod. The licensee notified FedEx of the event. FedEx's consultant is investigating to determine where and how the damage to the Type A container occurred, and to evaluate the exposures to FedEx personnel. Transportation occurred exclusively on FedEx conveyances, so no significant non-FedEx personnel exposure is expected to have resulted during transportation. A licensee employee reinserted the source in the lead pig before removing the Type A container from the FedEx delivery truck. In doing so he handled the non-source end of the source rod with his bare fingers, while wearing extremity dosimetry. Calculated extremity dose is 100 to 200 mrem based on a 5-10 second handling time. CA Report Number 031708 |