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Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
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ENS 57426 | 15 November 2024 16:29:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1305 CST, on November 15, 2024, it was determined that division 2 cables for the '12' emergency diesel generator start circuitry are routed through a division 1 area without adequate fire barrier separation. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. A fire impairment and hourly fire watch have been established for the affected fire zones. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 57412 | 4 November 2024 09:02:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0500 CST, on November 4, 2024, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant was notified by Wright County dispatch of a spurious actuation of one emergency response siren that lasted approximately ten minutes. The cause of the actuation has not been determined and the vendor is investigating. The siren is no longer actuating. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event and the offsite response capabilities remain functional. No press release by the licensee is planned at this time. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 57346 | 27 September 2024 12:10:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On September 17, 2024, the site identified that an individual assigned to perform fitness for duty (FFD) program duties, who should have been part of the fitness for duty program random testing pool, had been inadvertently removed during a recent computer system upgrade. The individual was reprocessed and placed back into the FFD program on September 18, 2024. This was determined to be an isolated incident as it was confirmed that no other individuals required to be in the program were removed. |
ENS 57199 | 28 June 2024 16:28:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. On 6/27/2024 at 2158 CDT, (technical specification) TS 3.5.1 condition 'D' (both divisions of (low pressure coolant injection) LPCI inoperable) was entered for surveillance testing. On 6/28/2024 at 0110 CDT, MO-2012 (residual heat removal) RHR Division 1 LPCI injection outboard valve was attempted to be cycled. It was discovered to be inoperable resulting in an inability to exit TS 3.5.1 'D'. Initial review of this condition for immediate reportability under 50.72(b)(3)(v) event or a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, concluded the condition was not reportable based on the operability of other emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). Specifically, core spray and high pressure coolant injection were both operable to perform the function of emergency core cooling. Subsequent reviews determined that the reportability decision under 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function should be based on the safety function at the LPCI system level, rather than at the ECCS system level. The decision to report the inoperability of LPCI under 50.72(b)(3)(v) was made at 1030 CDT on 6/28/2024. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 57002 | 1 March 2024 17:27:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1330 CST, on March 1, 2024, an equipment vendor was coordinating with Wright County performing maintenance on an emergency siren when the county operator mistakenly sent an alarm signal instead of cancel signal, activating all Wright County emergency sirens for approximately 17 seconds. At 1345 CST, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) emergency planning coordinator received a notification from the vendor and notified the duty shift manager (of the inadvertent activation). Wright County officials are planning to make a public notification via social media to local residents. No press release by the licensee is planned at this time. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), 'News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies.' This is a 4-hour Reporting requirement. The NRC Resident has been notified. |
ENS 56995 | 28 February 2024 13:25:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax and email: At approximately 0839 (CST) with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically scrammed due to the depressurization of the SCRAM air header caused by an invalid signal that (occurred) during system testing. The SCRAM was uncomplicated with all systems responding as expected. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Containment isolation valves actuated and closed on a valid Group 2 signal. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the Group 2 isolation signal. Operations responded using the emergency operating procedure and stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. State as well as Wright and Sherburne Counties will be notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) circuit was being tested when an invalid signal was sent to depressurize the SCRAM air header. |
ENS 56759 | 27 September 2023 15:28:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: (On 09/27/2023) at 1041 CDT, with the plant at 75 percent power and main turbine control valve testing in progress, a reactor pressure transient resulted in a reactor steam dome high pressure scram and subsequent group 1 primary containment isolation of the main steam lines (MSL). All main steam isolation valves closed as a result of the group 1 isolation signal. Additionally, a group 2 containment isolation signal was received due to reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level less than plus 9 inches during the transient. Operations personnel responded and stabilized the plant. The high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was placed in service to control RPV pressure. HPCI did not inject into the RPV and was not needed to control RPV water level. The cause of the initial pressure transient is under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The utility notified the State of Minnesota and Wright and Sherburne counties. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski) |
ENS 56707 | 1 September 2023 18:05:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 9/1/23 at 0900 hours, site personnel identified a 1 ounce bottle of vanilla extract in the protected area. Alcohol was identified as an ingredient on the ingredients label. It was determined that the alcohol by volume (ABV) for vanilla extract was 35 percent, above the 0.5 percent ABV considered low alcohol content. |
ENS 56584 | 22 June 2023 09:44:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee email: This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of Division 2 Primary Containment Isolation logic at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) that occurred while in a refueling outage. At approximately 0402 Central Daylight Time (CDT) on April 28, 2023 and at approximately 1611 and 2143 CDT on May 4, 2023, momentary losses of 'Y80 Division 2 Uninterruptible 120VAC Class 1E Distribution Panel', which provides power to Division 2 Primary Containment Isolation logic, resulted in a partial Primary Containment Group 2 Isolation (gas systems), initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment system, and the shift of Control Room ventilation to the high radiation mode. The momentary losses of 'Y80' were due to an intermittent, age-related degradation issue with the 'Uninterruptible Power Supply Y81, Division 2 120VAC Class 1E Inverter', which resulted in a temporary loss of output plus a lack of static switch transfer from the inverter supply to the alternate source as designed. The actuations were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, these were not intentional manual initiations, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation. Therefore, these events have been determined to be invalid actuations that were attributed to the same cause. All systems responded as designed to the actuation signal. Operations reset the partial Primary Containment Group 2 Isolation signal, shutdown the Standby Gas Treatment system, and restored Control Room ventilation per the procedure. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56535 | 23 May 2023 22:13:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax: On 5/22/23, Xcel Energy performed a notification to the state of Minnesota Duty Officer, in accordance with Minnesota Statute 115.061, regarding 300-600 gallons of pumped ground water that overflowed from a holding tank and returned to the ground area from which it was pumped. The groundwater being pumped is related to recovery activities associated with the event reported on November 22, 2022 (EN 56236). This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency report for notification to other government agency. An update is being provided to the Monticello community and published on Xcel Energy's website. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56236 | 22 November 2022 17:35:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/22/2022, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant initiated a voluntary communication to the State of Minnesota after receiving analysis results for an on-site monitoring well that indicated tritium activity above the (Offsite Dose Calculation Manual) ODCM and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) reporting levels. The source of the tritium is under investigation and the station will continue to monitor and sample accordingly. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency report for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55896 | 13 May 2022 17:47:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 5/13/22 at 1111 CDT the station entered LCO 3.7.4 Condition B for Control Room Envelope being inoperable. This was due to results from an inspection in the Steam Jet Air Ejector room that identified steam leakage exceeding the leakage rate assumptions made in the Alternate Source Term (AST) dose analysis calculation. Therefore, this is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. There is no impact to the health and safety of the public. NRC Resident has been notified. |
ENS 55708 | 21 January 2022 10:25:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation of secondary containment relays in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On November 29, 2021, the `B' Fuel Pool radiation monitor spiked high during restoration following the performance of the 0068 procedure `Spent Fuel Pool & Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Monitor Calibration' due to cable to radiation monitor connector degradation from handling. This resulted in a Partial Primary Containment Group II isolation (gas systems), initiation of Standby Gas Treatment system, and isolation of the Reactor Building Ventilation system. All systems responded as designed to the actuation signal. Operations reset the Partial Primary Containment Group II isolation signal, shutdown Standby Gas Treatment System, and restored Reactor Building Ventilation system per procedures. At the time of the occurrence, the `A' Fuel Pool radiation monitor was reading normal at approximately 1.5 mr/hr. The `B' Fuel Pool radiation monitor spiked above the 50 mr/hr setpoint and continued to read erratically. Work was performed to clean and reconnect the connector and testing per 0068 procedure verified the condition was corrected. The `B' Fuel Pool radiation monitor returned to service. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55244 | 7 May 2021 17:21:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The following is a summary of information received via email from Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP): On March 9, 2021, GE Hitachi (GEH) issued Safety Communication SC 21-02 for PRC 21-02, Transfer of Information, Revision 0, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b). Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was listed as a potentially affected plant. This is a deviation from the Power Range Nuclear Monitor (PRNM) Licensing Topical Report, NEDC 32410P-A. On May 5, 2021, MNGP completed an evaluation of this deviation and concluded this condition represents a substantial safety hazard in that the condition could result in an Average Power Range Monitoring (APRM) flux reading either below or above the Technical Specification (plus/minus) 2% band. The condition is a defect that is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4). The GEH NUMAC PRNMS was installed in 2009 with System Part No. 299X739NF. Name and Address of the Individual or Individuals Informing the Commission: Thomas A. Conboy, Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company - Minnesota 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 54938 | 8 October 2020 13:14:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1125 CDT on 10/8/20 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant declared a Notification of an Unusual Event (NOUE) due to a Security Condition that did not involve a hostile action, due to a helicopter that hovered over the site for approximately 10 minutes. The unit remained at 100 percent power during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Minnesota State Duty Officer and the Wright County and Sherburne County Sherriff departments of the event. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
At 1715 CDT Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant terminated the Notice of Unusual Event (HU1.1), upon confirmation through federal law enforcement and conversation with the aircraft owner that the aircraft in question was performing power line inspections for a different utility and was not a threat to the plant. Monticello determined that this condition did not meet the 1-hour reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73.71. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Gott). Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) is retracting this event notification based on subsequent information received that was not available at the time of the original notification. Following review of the additional information collected by the site through an investigation performed with input from local and federal law enforcement, Xcel Energy determined the helicopter did not constitute a credible threat or compromise site safety or security. There was no impact to public health or safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State and county. Notified R3DO (Peterson). |
ENS 54111 | 11 June 2019 17:55:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | At 1132 CDT on 6/11/2019, both manual primary containment isolation valves in a one-inch service air line were found open. This resulted in an open primary containment penetration. Both valves are required to be closed for Primary Containment Isolation Valve Operability. Both valves were closed and independently verified closed at 1149 CDT on 6/11/2019. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified the State of Minnesota State Duty Officer. | |
ENS 54000 | 15 April 2019 11:36:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | At 0511 CDT on 4/15/2019, transport of a potentially radiologically contaminated person from the Monticello Nuclear Plant to a local hospital was performed prior to conducting a radiological survey as a prudent measure to ensure timely medical support. At 0658 CDT a radiological survey determined that the individual and their clothing were not contaminated. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53997 | 13 April 2019 02:04:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | EN Revision Text: HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK DOOR FOUND IN INCORRECT POSITION RESULTING IN LPCI AND CORE SPRAY BEING INOPERABLE At approximately 1815 CDT on April 12, 2019, High Energy Line Break (HELB) Door-410A in the Reactor Building was discovered in the closed position. HELB Door-410B was previously closed for maintenance. Either Door-410A or Door-410B must be open to support the current HELB analyses. With both doors closed, this is considered an unanalyzed condition resulting in the loss of a post-HELB safe shutdown path. With Door-410A and Door-410B closed, LPCI (Low Pressure Coolant Injection) and Core Spray injection valves in both divisions are no longer considered available. This condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The condition was resolved at approximately 1845 CDT on April 12, 2019 when Door-410A was blocked open. The health and safety of the public was not affected by this condition. The NRC Resident has been notified.
Event Notification (EN) #53997, made on 4/13/2019, is being retracted. An engineering evaluation completed subsequent to this event analyzed the discovered condition with both Door-410A and Door-410B being closed. The engineering evaluation determined that the environmental conditions present with both Door-410A and Door-410B closed would not have impacted the availability of both divisions of the LPCI (Low Pressure Coolant Injection) and Core Spray injection valves nor would it have resulted in the loss of a post-HELB safe shutdown path. Therefore, this condition did not meet the criteria for an 8-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety or per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee also notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer. Notified R3DO (Cameron). | |
ENS 53597 | 11 September 2018 18:42:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | On 9/10/2018, the 11 Core Spray (CSP) loop was placed in service to support quarterly surveillance testing. With the 11 CSP pump in service it was identified that the check valves isolating the 11 CSP system from the keep fill supply were leaking by. At 1129 CDT on 9/11/2018, it was identified that this leakage may have exceeded the leakage rate assumptions made in the dose analysis calculation for emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Therefore, this is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. The potential ECCS leak pathway has been isolated. There is no impact to health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
ENS 53285 | 23 March 2018 21:07:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | This report is made for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability associated with Emergency Action Levels for Toxic and Flammable Gas and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). During an emergency equipment inventory, it was identified that methods were not available to detect levels of toxic or flammable gas at the IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) level for a number of substances due to the detector having an unsuitable range. The IDLH is used to assess the Emergency Action Level Alert Range. The ability of the Control Room Staff to detect and respond to the presence of toxic or flammable gas is unaffected. Because there have been no chemical spills or releases that would require sampling to be performed, the health and safety of the public was not affected. The resident NRC Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the state of Minnesota. |
ENS 52814 | 20 June 2017 08:18:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 2353 CDT on 6/19/2017, while performing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) quarterly surveillance following planned maintenance, the HPCI turbine did not start as expected due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failing to open. This issue is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. Investigation into the failure of the HPCI system to start is in progress. The unit remains at 100% power. The health and safety of the public was not affected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52781 | 1 June 2017 23:41:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | Planned maintenance to restore normal power to Plant Computer Systems resulted in an unexpected loss of all Meteorological (MET) Tower Data (at 1645 CDT). As a result, this represents a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and is reportable under 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). The isolation was restored and MET Tower Data was restored at 1845. The health and safety of the public was not affected as the plant is operating in a normal condition with no severe weather or storms in the area. Additionally meteorological data was available from the National Weather Service should this data had been necessary. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee will be notifying the State of Minnesota. |
ENS 52749 | 11 May 2017 18:11:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | A can of alcohol (16.9 ounce foreign beer) was discovered unopened in an administration building refrigerator. Site security took possession of the can of alcohol. The owner of the can of alcohol is unknown. This licensee is making this 24 hour notification in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(1). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52715 | 28 April 2017 21:21:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as an event where notification to other government agencies has been made. On April 28, 2017, notification to the Minnesota State Duty Office was made due to a non-compliance with release of wastewater requirements in the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit. There were no consequences to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52682 | 15 April 2017 13:03:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | During shutdown activities with the reactor subcritical, actions were being taken to remove 11 Reactor Feed Pump from service in support of a scheduled refueling outage. Reactor Water Level on Safeguards level instrumentation dropped below +9 inches, which resulted in a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) Scram signal and Partial Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) signal. All systems functioned as required. Reactor Water Level on Safeguards instrumentation was restored to greater than +9 inches immediately. RPS and PCIS logic was reset. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This actuation of these systems is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52454 | 21 December 2016 18:00:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 0935 (CST) on 12/21/2016, while performing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Comprehensive Pump and Valve Tests for post-maintenance testing following scheduled maintenance, the HPCI turbine did not start as expected due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failing to open. This issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. Investigation into the failure of the HPCI system to start is in progress. The plant remains at 100% power with no challenges to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The plant is in a 14-day action statement under LCO 3.5.1, 'ECCS - Operating' due to the HPCI turbine stop valve failure. The licensee notified the Minnesota State Duty Officer.
On December 21, 2016, the NRC Operations Center was notified of Event Number 52454 that described a failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine stop valve to open during post maintenance testing prior to being declared operable. The condition was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. At the time, it was not readily apparent that the failure was due to the maintenance activities. Subsequent return-to-service testing showed the oil system vent and fill had been inadequate following the maintenance. This event occurred as a result of the maintenance process and would not have occurred during normal operation of the system. NUREG-1022, Revision 3 states, 'reports are not required when systems are declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution for maintenance or surveillance testing when done in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's TS (unless a condition is discovered that would have resulted in the system being declared inoperable).' There was no discovered condition that would have resulted in the safety function of the system being declared inoperable under normal, non-maintenance conditions. Based on the above additional information, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant is retracting this report. The plant was in a planned evolution and did not discover a condition that could have prevented performing a safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (McCraw). |
ENS 52451 | 21 December 2016 16:38:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the 12 Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Service Water pump (12 ESW pump). At 1745 (CST) on October 24, 2016, an unexpected auto-start of the 12 ESW pump occurred. The 12 Emergency Diesel Generator (12 EDG), was previously properly removed from service and isolated for scheduled maintenance. Upon investigation, is was determined that no valid start signal was present and actuation occurred during relay replacement activities on the 12 EDG in C-92 (12 EDG (G-38) electrical control panel) cabinet when electricians inadvertently bumped a 12 EDG start relay. During this period, the Control Room received annunciators indicating the 12 EDG engine was running/cranking and the 12 ESW pump started. Due to being isolated, the 12 EDG did not actually start. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52396 | 27 November 2016 21:22:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1447 (CST) on 11/27/2016 while troubleshooting a minor leak on the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) turbine, it was discovered that the HPCI turbine exhaust drain pot high level bypass switch was not functioning per design to support removal of condensate from the HPCI turbine casing. This resulted in some water accumulation within the HPCI turbine casing. Subsequently, HPCI was declared INOPERABLE and this issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at the time of discovery. The plant remains at 100 percent power with no challenges to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Technical Specification limiting condition for operation requires HPCI to be Operable within 14 days. The licensee will be notifying the State of Minnesota regarding the event. |
ENS 52156 | 5 August 2016 13:58:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On 8/5/2016 at 1014 (CDT), the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was notified by the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) of a notice of violation for exceeding the drinking water limit for carbon tetrachloride in the drinking water well that supplies the Security Access Facility. Additionally the MDH will be notifying the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency regarding the violation. As a result, this issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notifications to other offsite government agencies. There was no impact to the health and safety of the general public as a result of this issue. The drinking fountains in the Security Access Facility have been isolated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52154 | 5 August 2016 06:26:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 2240 CDT on August 4, 2016, it was discovered that the floor between the cable spreading room and the plant administration building (PAB) basement is not a credited Appendix R fire barrier. Because the cable spreading room and the plant administration building are located in the same fire area, a fire in the PAB could spread to the cable spreading room requiring evacuation of the control room. The travel path used to access the Alternate Shutdown Panel following control room evacuation traverses the same fire area in the PAB. Therefore, this event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) for Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition as a fire in the PAB could have the potential to impact Division 1 equipment as well as impede the Operators ability to access Division 2 safe shutdown equipment. Fire watches have been established. There is no impact to the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of Minnesota. |
ENS 52153 | 4 August 2016 22:04:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1415 CDT on August 4, 2016, while performing a scheduled fire protection surveillance, it was discovered that a component within fire panel FZCP-7, BATTERY ROOM FIRE DETECTION had failed resulting in the inability of the installed fire detectors to detect a fire within the Division 1 and Division 2, 125 VDC battery rooms as well as the Division 2, 250 VDC battery room. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for a Loss Of Emergency Assessment Capability as the Control Room would not receive automatic notification of a fire in these areas for evaluation of HU2.1 and HA2.1 for fire within impacted battery rooms which are located within the Protected Area. There is no impact to the health and safety of the public. A 15 minute fire watch has been established for the affected fire zones. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Event Notification 52153 completed at 2204 EDT on 8/4/2016 shown above contains an error. The failure of FZCP-7, BATTERY ROOM FIRE DETECTION, resulted in the inability to detect a fire within the Division 1 and Division 2 125 VDC battery rooms as well as the Division 1 250 VDC battery room. The Division 2 250 VDC battery room was not affected by this issue. Additionally, the State of Minnesota was notified of this issue. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this update. Notified R3DO (Skokowski) |
ENS 52020 | 18 June 2016 06:25:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On 6/18/16 at approximately 0259 CDT, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant was notified by the Wright County Sheriffs Office of a spurious actuation of one emergency siren in the city of Monticello. As a result, this issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notifications to other off site government agencies as the licensee was notified by the Wright County Sheriff's Office. The source of the siren activation has not been determined. Wright County Sheriff's Office successfully deactivated the siren at 0322 CDT. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional with a single siren failure. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of Minnesota concerning this event. |
ENS 51812 | 22 March 2016 06:38:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On 3/22/2016 during performance of HPCI FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM DYNAMIC TEST PROCEDURE, an oil leak was discovered on the hydraulic control oil piping. HPCI had previously been declared INOPERABLE due to planned maintenance, however as a result of the oil leak HPCI remains INOPERABLE. This oil leak would have cause HPCI to be declared INOPERABLE had it been found outside of the planned maintenance. The plant remains at 100% power with no challenges to the health and safety of the public. HPCI is in a 14 day technical specification to repair the oil leak. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51566 | 24 November 2015 17:02:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1253 CST on 11/24/2015, XCEL Energy Environmental Services made a report to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) due to the recorded total fish loss (59) as a result of the Monticello Plant's discharge canal temperature change following the reactor scram on 11/23/2015. This notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on a notification to another government agency. This issue has no safety significance and no impact on the health and safety of the general public. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51564 | 24 November 2015 14:19:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On 11/24/2015 at 0534 hours (CST) the plant was in MODE 3 (hot standby) for a forced outage. While initially placing Shutdown Cooling (SDC) in service, the 12 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump tripped approximately 8-10 seconds after start due to the closure of the RHR SDC suction isolation valves. This was determined to be from an invalid signal on the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) suction interlock. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat. This event did not challenge the ability to maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident as other methods of decay heat removal were being utilized successfully to establish plant conditions. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This incident places the RHR system in a 24-hour technical specification limiting condition for operations. |
ENS 51560 | 23 November 2015 15:03:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1040 CST, with the plant at 100% power, a lockout of the 11 recirculation pump occurred. Following the 11 recirculation pump lockout, at 1041 CST, a reactor scram and a Group 1 isolation occurred. All Main Steam Isolation Valves closed as a result of the Group 1 isolation signal. HPCI (High Pressure Core Injection) has been placed in service to control RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) pressure. HPCI did not inject into the RPV and was not needed to control RPV level. At 1104 CST, a Group 2 containment isolation signal was received due to RPV level less than +9 inches. The Group 2 isolation signal has been reset. The cause(s) of the 11 recirculation pump lockout, the reactor scram, and the Group 1 isolation are currently not known and are under investigation. This event is being reported under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to the actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical. For the following reasons, this event is also being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A): 1) This event resulted in a valid Group 2 containment isolation signal, 2) Since the cause of the Reactor Protection System actuation is not known, the event is being reported as a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System, and 3) Since the cause of the Group 1 isolation is not known, the event is being reported as a valid primary containment isolation signal affecting multiple Main Steam Isolation Valves. All systems have responded as expected, all control rods fully inserted following the Reactor Protection System actuation. The plant is currently shutdown in mode 3, RPV pressure and RPV level are stable. This event did not result in any radiological release from the plant. This event did not challenge the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. HPCI is in pressure suppression mode with RHR cooling the suppression pool. |
ENS 51379 | 8 September 2015 18:15:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51306 | 10 August 2015 19:49:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On August 10, 2015, at approximately 1555 CDT, the licensee was notified that emergency siren S-07 in Sherburne County, MN had inadvertently activated from approximately 1525-1538 CDT. The cause of the activation is under investigation. The siren vendor (NELCOM) was also contacted and made the notification to the licensee. As a result, this issue is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notifications to other offsite government agencies as the licensee was notified by the Sherburne County Sherriff's Office. The source of the activation signal has not been determined. The vendor is investigating. The siren is no longer actuating. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional with a failure of only 1 out of 106 total sirens. The site is operating normally with no emergency present. (The) NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State. |
ENS 51241 | 20 July 2015 13:37:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On 7/20/2015 at approximately 0931 CDT, the Monticello nuclear generating plant was notified by Wright County Sheriffs Office of a spurious actuation of one emergency response siren in the city of Monticello that occurred at approximately 0855 CDT (lasted for approximately three minutes). This actuation was confirmed by vendor system monitoring. As a result, this issue is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notifications to other offsite government agencies as the licensee was notified by the Wright County Sheriffs Office. The source of the activation signal has not been determined. The vendor is investigating. The siren is no longer actuating. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event as the offsite response capabilities remain functional with a single siren failure. The site is operating normally with no emergency conditions present. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Minnesota will be notified. |
ENS 51034 | 2 May 2015 20:57:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | |
ENS 50978 | 12 April 2015 16:01:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On 4/12/2015 at approximately 1230 CDT, an Xcel Energy employee performing activities in the drywell (currently shut down for a planned refueling outage), experienced heat exhaustion. Upon discovery, the plant emergency medical team was dispatched to aid the individual. The individual was immediately transported, via ambulance, to a local hospital for treatment without verification that no contamination existed. Accompanying the individual were two (2) radiation protection individuals. The individual was transported out of the Protected Area at approximately 1250 CDT. Because the potentially contaminated individual could not be surveyed prior to being transported offsite, the individual was considered potentially contaminated. As such, this event is being reported as an 8-hour prompt report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). On 4/12/2015 at approximately 1340 CDT, the radiation protection personnel that accompanied the individual to the medical facility reported that the individual, ambulance, gurney, hospital travel path and exam room were determined not to be contaminated. As a result, no follow-up status report is planned. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will be notifying the State Duty Officer. |
ENS 50915 | 21 March 2015 13:55:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 0537 CDT on March 21, 2015, following the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system quarterly pump and valve surveillance, after HPCI was removed from service, an alarm for the HPCI Turbine Inlet High Drain Pot Level did not reset. This indicated that LS-23-90 (HPCI Steam Supply Drain High Level Bypass) did not reset, which could be an indication that condensate exists in the steam line. The system responded as designed but the alarm did not clear as expected. Without assurance that the condensate has been removed from the HPCI steam line, HPCI remains inoperable for reasons other than the planned surveillance. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery. The health and safety of the public was maintained as the plant was in a normal condition with no initiating event in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Minnesota will be notified.
On March 21, 2015, Northern States Power Minnesota reported a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable for a reason other than planned maintenance due to the failure of the HPCI Steam Supply Drain Hi Level Bypass Level Switch to clear the high level alarm subsequent to actuation. An engineering evaluation was performed and concluded that the function of the primary pathway to remove condensate remained unchallenged by the condition present on the level switch This conclusion was also validated via thermography with the HPCI steam supply pressurized and bypass valve open. The verification that the primary pathway was functional provides reasonable assurance that the HPCI steam supply was always clear of condensate supporting the ability of HPCI to perform its required safety function. Therefore, the condition present on the level switch did not render HPCI inoperable. The conclusions of the engineering evaluation provide the basis for retraction of the ENS report made on March 21. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also notify the State of Minnesota. Notified R3DO (Peterson). |
ENS 50899 | 17 March 2015 02:57:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1820 on March 16th, 2015, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system steam lines were re-pressurized following scheduled maintenance. Upon restoration, an alarm was received that indicated condensate may exist in the steam line. The system responded as designed but the alarm did not clear as expected. Without assurance that the condensate has been removed from the HPCI steam line, HPCI remains inoperable for reasons other than the planned maintenance. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery. The health and safety of the public was maintained as the plant was in a normal condition with no initiating event in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also notify the State of Minnesota.
On March 16, 2015, Northern States Power Minnesota reported a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable for a reason other than planned maintenance due to the failure of the HPCI Steam Supply Drain Hi Level Bypass Level Switch to clear the high level alarm subsequent to actuation. An engineering evaluation was performed and concluded that the function of the primary pathway to remove condensate remained unchallenged by the condition present on the level switch. This conclusion was also validated via thermography with the HPCI steam supply pressurized and bypass valve open. The verification that the primary pathway was functional provides reasonable assurance that the HPCI steam supply was always clear of condensate supporting the ability of HPCI to perform its required safety function. Therefore, the condition present on the level switch did not render HPCI inoperable. The conclusions of the engineering evaluation provide the basis for retraction of the ENS report made on March 17. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also notify the State of Minnesota. Notified R3DO (Peterson). |
ENS 50806 | 10 February 2015 20:39:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | On February 10, 2015, at 1240 EST, Northern States Power-Minnesota (NSPM) determined that the Station Blackout (SBO) implementation at Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was not consistent with the NRC Safety Evaluation (SE). Specifically, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was not being utilized in a manner consistent with the NRC SE for SBO. Current battery calculations do not reflect a full complement of HPCI system equipment running for the duration (coping requirements) of the SBO event. The calculation assumed a manual action to remove the HPCI auxiliary oil pump from operating during an SBO event in order to preserve the station battery. NSPM is reporting this as an Unanalyzed Condition pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The health and safety of the public was not affected since no SBO event occurred. All station batteries and the HPCI system remain operable in accordance with the plant Technical Specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the event.
An engineering analysis was performed updating the battery calculations for Station Blackout (SBO) implementation demonstrating the ability of the safety related station batteries to provide sufficient capacity and capability to ensure that the core is cooled and appropriate containment integrity is maintained in the event of the SBO for the specified four hours. Therefore, the battery calculation is analyzed and specifically the High Pressure Cooling Injection (HPCI) System is analyzed to run in automatic for the entire duration of the SBO event meeting the site licensing basis for SBO. The SBO procedure has been revised to incorporate HPCI running in automatic for the entire duration of the SBO event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Duncan) |
ENS 50705 | 29 December 2014 03:40:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | While the 12 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was inoperable for performance of the monthly surveillance, adjustments were inadvertently made to 11 EDG which made it inoperable. As a result, Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 Condition E, for both EDG's inoperable was entered. Monticello has subsequently restored 12 EDG to an operable status within the 2 hour TS LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) completion timer requirement. The station remained in a safe condition during this discovery with 12 EDG available at all times. The plant continues to operate in a normal condition with no initiating events present. The health and safety of the public was not impacted as a result of this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. EDG 12 was restored to operable status at 2214 CST and EDG 11 will remain inoperable until a surveillance test is performed to start the EDG and restore the local governor control idle speed to the correct setting. The licensee will be notifying the Minnesota State Duty Officer. |
ENS 50663 | 10 December 2014 00:31:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 1830 (CST) on December 9, 2014 Door 410B, a HELB (High Energy Line Break) door between the east and west sides of the ground floor of the reactor building, was found closed. This door is one half of a pair of double doors that are normally open to provide a HELB energy and flooding release path to mitigate postulated HELB events. The closed HELB door has the potential to impact safe shutdown by exposing both divisions of safe shutdown components to unanalyzed environmental conditions. With the potential loss of both divisions of safe shutdown equipment, no safe shutdown path would exist. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by (10 CFR) 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The HELB door was immediately opened and returned to normal configuration. Door 410A remained open during the time that Door 410B was closed and provided an available, but not yet analyzed, release path that could have mitigated the consequences of this event. The health and safety of the general public was not impacted as a result of this condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Further analysis has determined that the condition did not significantly degrade plant safety. Door 410B in the Reactor Building was found closed. This door is one half of a pair of double door (Doors 410A and 410B) that normally open to provide a High Energy Line Break (HELB) energy and flooding release path to mitigate postulated HELB events. The condition of one half of the double door closed was not previously analyzed. A subsequent completed engineering evaluation analyzed this condition, Door 410B being closed and Door 410A being open, for the following environmental conditions: peak compartment temperatures, block wall differential pressure, radiation dose, and flooding. The environmental conditions found the Reactor Building in response to Door 410B being closed with 410A being open does not affect the operability of safety related equipment housed within the Reactor Building or the ability to safely shut-down the plant and maintain the plant shutdown condition following a HELB event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Dickson). |
ENS 50496 | 26 September 2014 02:53:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 2200 CDT on September 25, 2014, the Duty Shift Manager was notified that Agastat relays associated with Primary Containment Isolation valves on the Hydrogen-Oxygen Analyzing System are beyond the analyzed shelf life for relays that are in the normally energized state and are considered INOPERABLE. This affected both primary containment isolation valves for a containment penetration on multiple flow paths. This issue was determined to be reportable under (10 CFR) 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) & (D) for an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Additionally, the required actions involved isolating six flow paths via manual isolation valves. This action rendered the Hydrogen-Oxygen Analyzers non-functional for both trains and constitutes a loss of Emergency Preparedness and Accident Assessment Capability. This is reportable under (10 CFR) 50. 72(b)(3)(xiii). The Primary Containment Isolation Valves have been, and remain, in their closed position to satisfy their Primary Containment Function and protect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of Minnesota. The relays of concern were manufactured 19 years ago and have been in operation for 11 years, versus a manufacturer assumption of a 10 year operational lifespan.
Partial retraction for EN 50496. This is an update of Emergency Notification System (ENS) report 50496 that was submitted at 0253 EDT on Friday, September 26, 2014. ENS notification was made due to four relays associated with the sampling valves on the Hydrogen-Oxygen Analyzing (HOA) system that perform Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) functions. These relays were discovered installed beyond their manufacturer qualified service life, which called operability into question. The portions 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) & (D) are being retracted after subsequent bench testing and investigation of system operability. Based on the past operability evaluation, all four relays associated with PCIV functions on the HOA system would have performed their specific safety function of primary containment isolation, as required by the facility's technical specifications. Therefore, this event does not meet the threshold of an event or condition that would prevent fulfilment of a safety function. The loss of emergency preparedness and accident assessment capability previously reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) remains unchanged. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Peterson). |
ENS 50456 | 14 September 2014 11:03:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | At 0226 CDT on September 14, 2014, MNGP (Monticello Nuclear Generating Station) experienced a trip of the 12 Reactor Recirc Pump. The subsequent power drop and lowering of recirculating water flow resulted in the plant being outside of the analyzed region of the Power to Flow Map. Operators promptly restored operation within the analyzed region per procedural guidance. This event has been determined to be a condition where the plant was in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii). The plant is in stable condition at 51% power and the health and safety of the public were not affected. The investigation of the cause of this event is in progress. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Further analysis has determined that the condition did not significantly degrade plant safety. General Electric Hitachi was requested to review the event and confirm the SIL653 guidance remains applicable for MELLLA+ (Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis) operation. This review was completed and the conclusions of SIL653 remain valid . The SIL states that: 'unplanned events that result in the plant exceeding the licensed upper boundary do not constitute a safety concern. The consequences of such unplanned events are bounded by the GE safety analysis of limiting events initiated from within the licensed operating domain. Stability monitoring and protection using Detection and Suppression Solution Confirmation Density remained available throughout the event (oscillating power range monitors). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Hills). |
ENS 50411 | 28 August 2014 10:09:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | 'Planned preventive maintenance will render both divisions of discharge canal radiation monitors non-functional. As a result, this represents a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The planned maintenance is expected to last two hours. During this time, alternate plant parameters will be monitored and sampling performed if needed. The health and safety of the public remains protected as the plant is operating in a normal condition. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified prior to removing the discharge canal radiation monitors from service. |
ENS 50364 | 14 August 2014 08:58:00 | Monticello | NRC Region 3 | GE-3 | The service water radiation monitor system will be rendered nonfunctional during planned preventive maintenance. As a result, this represents a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The planned maintenance is expected to last 4 hours. During this time, plant parameters will be monitored and sampling will be performed which will support sustaining the health and safety of the public during this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified prior to removing the service water radiation monitor from service. |