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EN Revision Imported Date : 3/30/2020 DEGRADED CONDITION On March 26, 2020, while McGuire Unit 2 was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage, the reactor vessel head penetrations were being examined in accordance with the in-service Inspection Program. Ultrasonic examinations identified a relevant indication in the Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle number 35 that did not meet the acceptance criteria under ASME, Section XI IWB-3600, 'Analytic Evaluation of Flaws.' Actions to address the relevant indication will be taken in accordance with the applicable codes, standards, and regulations. This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The relevant indication has no impact on the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION ON 3/29/2020 AT 1700 EDT FROM TOM BERNARD TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

McGuire is retracting the eight hour non-emergency notification made on March 26, 2020, at 10:45 ET (EN#54614). A subsequent evaluation determined that the suspect indication identified during ultrasonic examination of Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle number 35 is not service induced nor representative of primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). The indication has been classified as "non-relevant" and is not reportable as a degraded condition. The senior NRC Resident Inspection has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

At approximately 1900 EDT on March 28, 2016, an unplanned loss of retail power to the McGuire Meteorological tower occurred. This loss of power impacted communication between the Meteorological tower and the control room, which resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Compensatory measures existed within the site's emergency planning procedures to obtain meteorological data from the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC operations center. Power was restored at 2245 EDT on March 28, 2016. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to the public.

• * * RETRACTION AT 1423 EDT ON 4/19/2016 FROM SCOTT SLIETER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

This notification is being made to retract event EN 51828 that was reported March 29, 2016. Based on further investigation, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide acceptable alternative methods to perform emergency assessment that are in addition to the control room indications from the meteorological tower. Furthermore, it was determined that the meteorological tower data was valid and available in the control room during the applicable period. It was therefore determined that no actual or potential major loss of emergency assessment capability existed per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, rev 3, supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, rev 0. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

At approximately 0429 hours (EDT) on May 8, 2014, McGuire was informed that 34 emergency sirens were incapable of activation from the primary location. The loss of these 34 sirens for more than one hour is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Until repairs are complete, backup route alerting is in place. Troubleshooting is in progress. During troubleshooting, an inadvertent actuation of emergency sirens occurred at 1030 hours (EDT) on May 8, 2014. Mecklenburg County Emergency Management was notified of this inadvertent actuation which is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). Although these sirens were activated there was no incident at McGuire. This event does not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector and local agencies were notified.

• * * UPDATE FROM NICHOLAS BARTSCHER TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/08/2014 AT 1603 EDT * * *

The emergency sirens have been repaired and are functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

Notification is to be made to an offsite agency: North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR). Due to heavy rains on site, a holdup pond overflowed to the Catawba River. Holdup pond overflow included chemicals (Rotenone) used to treat macro fouling in the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond. Notification to NCDENR will be made by telephone Saturday morning 6/29/13. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE ON 7/2/13 AT 1139 EDT FROM BRENT BARE TO DONG PARK * * *

Due to continued rains on site, the holdup pond continues to overflow to the Catawba River. The overflow includes a new chemical, Potassium Permanganate, used to neutralize the Rotenone treatment of the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond. This new chemical has the potential to initially turn water purple, which is normal when applied. The North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (NCDENR) has been updated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Freeman).

The Unit-2 AMSAC (Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation Actuation Circuitry) actuation generated a Unit-2 turbine trip signal. The Unit-2 turbine was already tripped, but the 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater and 2B Nuclear Service Water pump started. AMSAC actuation occurred during calibration of AMSAC actuation pressure switches. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM TIM JOHNSON TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/11/12 AT 1550 EST * * *

This notification retracts an eight (8) hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) which was made December 2, 2012 and documented as NRC Event Notification (EN) # 48550. The December 2, 2012 actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System was initially reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system as listed in paragraph 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6). McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) has subsequently determined that the actuation signal, which was caused by a test signal during calibration of the AMSAC (Anticipated Transient Without Scram Mitigation Actuation Circuitry) actuation pressure switches, constitutes an invalid actuation as described in Revision 2 of NUREG-1022 (Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73). Specifically, valid actuations result from signals initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the system. A test signal is not representative of an actual plant condition and was therefore an invalid actuation signal and does not meet the NRC 8-hour reporting criteria under paragraph 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6). In addition to retracting the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6) notification, MNS is notifying the NRC Operations Center that the December 2, 2012 event met the reporting criteria specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). Specifically, an invalid actuation of the auxiliary feed water system occurred while the systems was in service. The event did not involve an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor was critical; therefore, MNS is opting to notify the NRC Operations Center within 60 days in lieu of a 60 day written licensee Event Report (LER), as allowed by 10CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). This notification satisfies 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) reporting requirements in lieu of a written LER. The 2A and 2B trains of the auxiliary feed water were actuated by an invalid signal. Each train's actuation was complete and systems operated as designed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sykes).