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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5734327 September 2024 07:02:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: At 0346 EDT on 9/27/24, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 54 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum secondary to environmental conditions. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post trip. Closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems occurred. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. The reactor protection system actuation while critical event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 52.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, it is reportable under 10 CFR 52.72(b)(3)(iv)(a) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the CIVs. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Decay heat removal is via steam bypass to the main condenser. Unit 2 was not affected.
ENS 5702111 March 2024 15:46:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On March 11, 2024, at 1337 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 35 percent power performing power ascension activities, the reactor was manually tripped due to the 'A' reactor feed pump (RFP) tripping on low suction pressure. Due to the power level at the time, the 'B' RFP had not been placed in service. Closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems and actuation of high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) occurred as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level as designed. The trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. The 'B' RFP was placed in service and is controlling reactor water level. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharging into the reactor, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A). Also, the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs, RCIC and HPCI. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the 'A' RFP is under investigation. The reactor electric plant remains in a normal lineup with both emergency diesel generators available. There were no temperature or pressure technical specification limits approached.
ENS 5697518 February 2024 16:02:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following is a synopsis of information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call: A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness for duty test. The supervisor's access to the plant has been terminated.
ENS 5695911 February 2024 11:38:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1011 EST on 02/11/2024, during a refueling outage at 0 percent power, while performing local leakage rate testing (LLRT) of the feedwater check valves (part of the containment boundary), it was determined that the Unit 1 primary containment leakage rate did not meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements specified in Technical Specification 5.5.12. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5689718 December 2023 13:34:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: At 2011 EDT on 11/01/23, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, Unit 2 received multiple spurious actuations. These actuations consisted of a partial group 1 and a partial group 5 primary containment isolation and a partial secondary containment isolation. The partial Group 1 isolation resulted in the closure of two main steam isolation valves (MSIVs); all other MSIVs were already closed. The partial group 5 isolation auto closed one of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) isolation valves. The partial secondary containment isolation resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs). Additionally, at 2238 EDT, Unit 2 again received multiple spurious actuations. These actuations consisted of a partial group 5 primary containment isolation and a partial secondary containment isolation. The partial group 5 isolation auto closed one of the RWCU isolation valves The partial secondary containment isolation resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building SCIVs. And again, at 2354 EDT, Unit 2 received spurious actuations which consisted of a partial secondary containment isolation which resulted in the closure of the inboard refueling floor and reactor building SCIVs. The spurious actuations seen on 11/1/23 are triggered at -35 inches reactor water level (RWL) for group 5 and secondary containment isolations and at -101 inches RWL for group 1 isolations. It was determined that a combination of the RWL fluctuating above and below the wide range instrument reference leg tap, the reactor vessel pressure being lowered, and reactor core isolation cooling introducing colder water conditions near the reference leg tap of the wide range instrument caused the spurious actuations. Using multiple RWL indications for each of the instances mentioned above, the actuations were confirmed to be spurious as RWL was being controlled in a band of +55 inches to +85 inches at the time of the actuations. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in an invalid actuation of a partial group 1, a partial group 5, and partial secondary containment logic. The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5689618 December 2023 07:40:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee email: At 0223 EST, on 12/18/2023, while Unit 2 was at 100 percent power in mode 1, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) outboard steam isolation valve closed resulting in the HPCI system being declared inoperable. The cause of the outboard steam isolation valve closing is under investigation. HPCI does not have a redundant system, therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The safety function was restored at 0512, on 12/18/23, and HPCI has been declared operable. Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) were operable during this time. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 568261 November 2023 09:38:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0648 EDT on 11/1/23, with Unit 2 in MODE 1 at 56 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a trip of the 'B' reactor feed pump (RFP). The 'A' RFP had been previously isolated due to a leak. Closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems and the actuation of high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) occurred as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level as designed. The trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained with RCIC. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 was not affected. Due to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharging into the reactor this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A). Also, the reactor protection system actuation while critical is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs, RCIC and HPCI. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5644631 March 2023 15:54:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1432 EDT on 03/31/23, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 97 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of both recirculation pumps. The cause of the recirculation pump trips is under investigation. Additionally, closure of CIVs in multiple systems occurred during the trip as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level as designed. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via condensate / feedwater. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). It is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 563427 February 2023 21:10:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1738 EST on 02/07/2023, while in mode 5 at 0 percent power, it was determined during local leak rate testing (LLRT) that the primary containment leakage rate exceeded the allowable limit defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, 'Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.' Both primary containment isolation valves in a penetration failed LLRT requirements which represents a failure to maintain primary containment integrity. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5611317 September 2022 13:06:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4The following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56112, 56114, and 56115.
ENS 5567929 December 2021 19:16:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4This following information was conveyed by the licensee via phone and email: At 1552 EST on 12/29/21, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 90 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to reactor pressure perturbations. The cause of the reactor pressure perturbations is under investigation. Additionally, closure of (containment isolation valves) CIVs in multiple systems occurred during the trip as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via condensate / feedwater. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). It is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 554488 September 2021 08:40:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4At 0159 EDT on 09/08/2021, the HPCI pump discharge valve failed to reopen during a valve surveillance, resulting in the HPCI system being declared INOPERABLE. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system and low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems were OPERABLE during this time. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5542020 August 2021 12:53:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4A licensed operator failed a pre-access authorization test specified by the FFD testing program test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 553943 August 2021 13:18:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4At 1026 EDT on 8/3/21, with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to low reactor water level. The low reactor water level condition was due to a loss of both reactor feed pumps. The cause of the loss of feed pumps is under investigation. Additionally, the low reactor water level resulted in the automatic actuation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems, and Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs) in multiple systems. All safety systems responded normally. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via RCIC system. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). It is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the HPCI and RCIC systems and CIVs. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Unit will proceed to Mode 4 while the cause of the loss of feed pumps is under investigation.
ENS 5530311 June 2021 18:06:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4

At 1710 EDT on June 11, 2021, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Plant Hatch Unit 1. Technical Specification Condition 3.4.4.B unidentified LEAKAGE increase not within limits, was entered due to a greater than 2 gpm increase in unidentified LEAKAGE within the previous 24 hour period in MODE 1. This specification was entered on June 11, 2021, at 1615 EDT with a REQUIRED ACTION to restore leakage increase within limits within 4 hours. This REQUIRED ACTION could not be completed within the COMPLETION TIME; therefore, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 6/17/2021 AT 1309 FROM JASON BUTLER TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

Upon further review of the leakage rates, it was determined that at 1900 EDT on 6/11/2021 the drywell floor drain unidentified leakage increased greater than 2 gpm within the previous 24 hours while in MODE 1. Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.4.B was entered to reduce leakage increase to within limits within 4 hours. At 2000 EDT on 6/11/2021 unidentified leakage was reduced below the 2 gpm increase within the previous 24 hours due to actions taken to lower reactor power and pressure. Therefore, the TS required shutdown per TS 3.4.4.C was not applicable. Thus Event Report 55303 is being retracted. The NRC resident has been notified of the retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5518712 April 2021 09:17:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4At 2323 EST on 02/12/2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at zero percent power, an actuation of the Group I containment isolation logic occurred during fluid flushing of turbine stop valves. The reason for the actuation was due to a maintenance activity resulting in turbine stop valve movement with no condenser vacuum which is a Group I isolation signal. Two Group I isolation valves, 2B31F019 and 2B31F020, reactor water sample valves, automatically isolated as designed when the system actuation signal was received. The other Group I valves had already been removed from service as part of the refueling outage schedule. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that results in an invalid actuation of the Group I containment isolation system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5518812 April 2021 09:17:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4At 2320 EST on 02/17/2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at zero percent power, an actuation of the Group 2 containment isolation logic occurred on the inboard valves. The reason for the actuation was most likely due to air entrapment in reactor water level sensing lines following maintenance. Group 2 inboard isolation valves in the drywell floor and equipment drain system and the fission product monitor system automatically isolated as designed. As a corrective action, the variable leg and reference leg of the instrumentation were backfilled with water to ensure all air was removed from the line. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that results in an invalid actuation of the Group 2 containment isolation system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5467722 April 2020 14:52:00HatchNRC Region 2At 1015 (EDT), on 04/22/2020, while Unit 2 was at approximately 0.4 percent power in MODE 2, reactor pressure was increased to 150 psig while HPCI was INOPERABLE due to not having been placed in standby. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). ADS (Automatic Depressurization System) and low pressure ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) systems were OPERABLE during this time. HPCI was returned to OPERABLE status at 1109 hrs. on 04/22/2020. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5449122 January 2020 17:50:00HatchNRC Region 2At 2005 EST on January 21, 2020, Hatch Security was informed that a contract worker covered by 10 CFR 26.719(b) had been involved in a legal action as defined in 10 CFR 26.5. The contract worker's plant access has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 544634 January 2020 15:00:00HatchNRC Region 2At 1109 (EST) on 01/04/2020, it was determined that the primary containment leakage rate did not meet value La, defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, 'Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors'. An additional, tested valve has been closed to maintain leakage below maximum allowable leakage, La. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5423723 August 2019 00:33:00HatchNRC Region 2At 2234 (EDT), on 08/22/2019, while Unit (2) was at approximately 100 percent power in MODE 1, it was discovered that Unit 2 HPCI was INOPERABLE. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Initial evaluation is that it is a power supply issue. The system had no indications, followed by smoke from behind the circuitry, and then indications returning. This is associated with a 14-day Limiting Condition for Operation.
ENS 5395324 March 2019 05:23:00HatchNRC Region 2At 0159 (EDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 25 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. After the turbine was tripped, the station service electrical buses did not transfer to alternate supply resulting in loss of the condensate feedwater system and level being controlled by the RCIC system. Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via the RCIC system. Pressure is being controlled and decay heat is being removed by the HPCI system in pressure control mode. Unit 1 is not affected. Additionally, an actuation of the primary containment isolation system occurred during the reactor scram. The reason for the actuation was a group II isolation signal was received on reactor water level and a group I isolation was received on decreasing vacuum. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non- emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the primary containment isolation system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5394419 March 2019 07:41:00HatchNRC Region 2At 0140 (EDT) on 03/19/2019, while the unit was at approximately 1% power and 154 psig pressure in MODE 2, it was discovered that Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was INOPERABLE. HPCI does not have a redundant system, therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 entered LCO 3.5.1.c for the HPCI being inoperable. There is no effect on Unit 1.
ENS 5389323 February 2019 09:13:00HatchNRC Region 2At 0212 EST on February 23, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, an actuation signal for the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was received during the Loss of Coolant Accident / Loss of Offsite Power logic system functional test. The 2C EDG was running and tied onto the 2G 4160 emergency bus when the alternate supply breaker was closed as required per the test procedure. Immediately upon closing the alternate supply breaker, both the alternate supply breaker and 2C EDG output breaker tripped open. The 2C EDG output breaker reclosed once the 2G 4160 bus undervoltage relays sensed a deenergized bus. When the 2C EDG tied to the 2G 4160 bus, the bus voltage was noted as being high, and the 2C EDG was secured. Investigation is ongoing to determine the cause of the initial bus undervoltage and the subsequent bus excessive voltage. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the emergency AC power system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event puts Unit 1 in a 72 hour Limiting Condition for Operation for the 1C Startup Transformer being out of service.
ENS 538178 January 2019 08:12:00HatchNRC Region 2On November 12, 2018, at 1331 EST, Unit 1 secondary containment isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) systems started on Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to a blown fuse. The blown fuse was caused by a degraded refuel floor radiation monitoring relay, causing the radiation monitor to trip and resulted in an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Group 10 and Group 11 primary containment isolation valves, all Unit 1 secondary containment isolation valves, and auto start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SBGT system. The Unit 1 Fission Product Monitor isolated and tripped and both Unit 1 H202 Analyzers isolated. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SBGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system. All primary and secondary containment isolation valves, with the exception of the 2T41F003A, Refueling Floor Inboard Vent Supply Isolation valve, functioned successfully. The refuel floor inboard vent supply isolation valve failed to travel fully closed on the secondary containment isolation signal and was therefore declared inoperable. The 2T41F003B refuel floor outboard vent supply isolation valve was verified to go fully closed and therefore isolation of that associated penetration line was successful. After assistance from maintenance, the valve was verified to be fully closed. All SBGT systems functioned successfully. The associated fuse and relay were replaced, and secondary containment was returned to normal service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5281822 June 2017 09:32:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4On April 27, 2017 at 0029 EDT, Unit 2 received an invalid partial Group 2 isolation due to a failed relay (2D11-K80) on the auxiliary trip unit. Both of the U1 and U2 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) trains started and the U2 Group II primary containment and all secondary containment inboard isolation valves closed. Also, the refuel floor isolation dampers closed, the reactor building supply and exhaust fans tripped, and the refueling floor supply and exhaust fans tripped. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system. All primary and secondary containment inboard isolation valves and SGT systems functioned successfully. The failed relay was replaced and the systems were restored to normal alignment. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5280314 June 2017 08:42:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4On April 17, 2017 at 1120 EDT, following scheduled maintenance, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 'A' bus was returned to its normal supply, the RPS 'A' motor generator (MG) set. The RPS MG set had been running loaded for 1 hour when the RPS 'A' bus tripped. Maintenance personnel had connected probes of a grounded oscilloscope to check for proper operation of the MG set, resulting in the RPS 'A' bus trip. The controlling procedure did not contain a caution about using only an ungrounded oscilloscope. The trip of the RPS 'A' MG set resulted in a half scram and an invalid isolation signal causing primary containment isolation valves in multiple systems to isolate. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system. Corrective actions include revising the governing procedure with the proper precaution and limitation to require the use of an ungrounded oscilloscope. A training needs analysis will also be performed to cover the lessons learned from this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5270021 April 2017 05:41:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4At 2345 (EDT) on 04/20/2017, the Unit 1 Reactor Mode Switch was taken to the Shutdown position to comply with Technical Specification 3.10.4 due to having no operable IRM's (Intermediate Range Monitors) in one quadrant of the reactor vessel as a result of maintenance activities. Placing the mode switch to Shutdown inserts a valid scram signal into the Reactor Protection System (RPS). All control rods had been previously inserted and no rod movement occurred when the mode switch was positioned to Shutdown. Due to this valid RPS scram, and not being a part of a preplanned evolution, this condition is reportable under criteria 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5269620 April 2017 05:57:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4On 04/20/2017 at 0302 EST during a reactor startup, a reactor scram resulted from upscale spike on two Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs), 1C51K601A and 1C51K601B. IRM A, 1C51K601A is in Reactor Protection System Channel A and IRM B, 1C51K601B is in Reactor Protection System Channel B. All control rods fully inserted. No PCIS (Primary Containment Isolation System) actuations occurred and none were expected to occur based upon plant condition following the reactor scram. Investigation is in progress. Condition was not due to a true flux event. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an event or condition that resulted in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. CR 10356172 The NRC Resident has been notified. The reactor was at 0.5% (percent) power at the time of the event and will remain in Hot Shutdown pending the results of the root cause investigation.
ENS 5268517 April 2017 13:35:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4On February 17, 2017 at 1021 EST, secondary containment isolated and Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) systems started on Unit 1 and Unit 2 during a maintenance activity to replace a relay in the Unit 2 primary containment isolation system. The work was being conducted as part of planned maintenance during the Unit 2 refueling outage. Poor work instruction led to a jumper not being installed as required, thus causing relays to de-energize, resulting in an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 outboard primary and secondary containment isolation valves and auto-start of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SBGT system. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since the containment isolation and auto-start of SBGT on both units was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of general containment isolation valves in more than one system. All primary and secondary containment isolation valves and SBGT systems functioned successfully. The associated wires were re-landed and secondary containment was returned to normal service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5265030 March 2017 12:58:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4During the evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and the potential impacts to safety-related plant equipment, it was concluded that the following structures are vulnerable to tornado generated missiles: All five of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tanks have ventilation pipe extending approximately 5 feet above grade. In the event that a tornado missile impact occurs on the aforementioned ventilation piping, there is a possibility that the vent lines could crimp. This could prevent the tanks from venting and inhibit the transfer of fuel oil from the main fuel oil storage tanks to the day tank. Ultimately, this causes the emergency diesels to be inoperable. These conditions are reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and also an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequence of an accident. This issue is being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002, Revision 1, Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance. The NRC Resident Inspector has also been notified.
ENS 5256720 February 2017 01:14:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4On 2/19/2017 at 2323 EST, during LLRT (local leak rate test) testing per 42SV-TET-001-2, 2T48F320 exceeded the maximum allowable leakage limit. The companion isolation valve in the same line (2T48F319) had previously failed LLRT. The failure of the 2T48F320 represents a failure of the 2T23X26 penetration to maintain primary containment integrity. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the failure of the 2T23X26 penetration caused primary containment leakage to exceed La (allowable leakage) and thus represents a degraded principle safety barrier. CR (condition report) 10333178. NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. 2T48F319 and 2T48F320 are 18 inch dampers. This event places the licensee in a Technical Specification limit that requires the dampers to be repaired and pass LLRT prior to the plant entering Mode 3.
ENS 5256317 February 2017 17:46:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4On 2/17/2017 at 1414 EST, secondary containment was declared inoperable due to the discovery of an 18-inch open pipe penetration in the secondary containment boundary. During walkdown activities, it was discovered that a blind flange installed to support removal of a Unit 2 secondary containment isolation valve had been installed on the wrong flange to provide isolation for secondary containment. At 1503 EST, the blind flange was moved to the correct side of the flange and secondary containment was declared operable. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material. In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystems, secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations. Therefore, the lack of a qualified isolation device to limit the release of radioactive material constitutes a loss of safety function due to a loss of secondary containment integrity. CR 10332592 The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5255816 February 2017 17:28:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4On February 16, 2017 at 1320 EST, the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started in response to a valid actuation signal due to the momentary loss of the 2C Startup Transformer (SAT). While performing maintenance activities on the 2D SAT, the alternate supply breaker tripped and reclosed, allowing the 4160 2E Emergency Bus to be momentarily de-energized. When the 4160 2E Emergency Bus de-energized, the 2A EDG received a valid autostart signal due to emergency bus low voltage. Although, the 2A EDG did autostart, it did not tie to the 4160 2E Emergency Bus as the 4160 2E Emergency Bus was re-energized from the 2C SAT. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) since the autostart of the 2A EDG was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the valid actuation of an emergency ac electrical power system. CR 10332134 The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 525438 February 2017 17:31:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4During a control room panel walk down by an on-shift Reactor Operator at approximately 1151 (EST) on 2/8/2017, Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) suction and discharge pressure indicators were noted to be downscale. I & C investigated and found the output of 1E41K603, DC to AC inverter, degraded. This inverter also powers the HPCI flow controller. Without the flow controller HPCI would not auto-start to mitigate the consequences of an accident, thus HPCI was declared inoperable. All other emergency core cooling systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. HPCI is a single train system with no redundant equipment in the same system, thus this failure is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Inverter 1E41K603 was replaced and functionally tested satisfactorily at 1630 on 2/8/2017, restoring HPCI to operable status. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 525313 February 2017 16:33:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10CFR50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), a weak-link and operator manual action (OMA) analysis for Information Notice (IN) 92-18 type hot shorts on motor-operated valves (MOVs) was performed to support the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. As a result of the analysis, it was identified that cable impacts can bypass valve limit and torque switches, resulting in physical damage to valves required for Safe Shutdown. This would prevent the valves from being operated locally or being operated from the remote shutdown panel. These cable failures could also cause the valve motors to fail. This updated analysis has identified circuit configuration deficiencies in Fire Areas 0024 A & C (Main Control Room & Cable Spread Room), 1203F (U1 Reactor Building SE), 1205F (U1 Reactor Building NE), and 2203F (U2 Reactor Building NE). Therefore, due to the identified deficient conditions, it was determined that in the event of a postulated fire in the affected fire areas, the paths of safe shutdown on the affected unit(s) could be compromised and impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be repaired. CRs 10326399, 10326401, 10326402, 10326404 and 10326405 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The unanalyzed condition is applicable to 10CFR50.48(b) Appendix R and not to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805).
ENS 525261 February 2017 16:46:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4

Plant Hatch declared a notification of unusual event. Subsequent investigation determined the paraphernalia was related to plant drills. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1727 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM KENNETH HUNTER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ AT 1829 EST ON 2/1/2017 * * *

The event was retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Shakur), NSIR (Holian), IRD MOC (Gott), DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).

ENS 5195023 May 2016 17:02:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4On May 23, 2016, at 1009 EDT, while personnel were performing turbine testing with Unit 2 offline for planned maintenance, an event resulted in the actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. In response to this unexpected signal, 2B21F016 (Steam Line Drain Line Inboard Isolation Valve), 2B21F019 (Steam Line Drain Line Outboard Isolation Valve), and 2B31F019 (Reactor Water Sample Inboard Isolation Valve) went closed, all of which are primary containment isolation valves actuated by Group 1 Isolation. The Group 1 Isolation signal initiated based on low condenser vacuum during the turbine testing procedure, a valid condition that was expected to have been bypassed in the logic during the performance of this procedure. Human performance is believed to be the cause of these systems having actuated in a way that was not part of the planned evolution. Although the Unit was shut down when this signal was received, and primary containment isolation was not required to mitigate the consequences of an event, this Isolation signal has been determined to have been valid due to the initiation in response to actual plant conditions or parameters which satisfy the requirements for initiation of the system. The event is reportable as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(2): (A) Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. (2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam Isolation valves (MSIVs). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5174218 February 2016 15:48:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4As part of the upgrade to the full structural weld overlays (FSWOL) per NRC-approved ISI (In-service Inspection) Alternative HNP-ISI-ALT-15-01, the surface of the existing weld overlay for the 1E Recirculation weld (1B31-1RC-12BR-E-5) was ground to prepare the surface for receipt of a new Alloy 52M overlay. Upon performance of the subsequent liquid penetrant testing examination, it was discovered that the as-found condition of the flaw did not meet acceptance criteria. It was determined that the flaw constituted a defect in the primary coolant system that could not be found acceptable per ASME Section XI. Therefore, this event notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Evaluation of the flaw found in the weld overlay suggests that the non-satisfactory liquid penetrant surface examination is a result of the propagation of the original flaw that was found on the 1E Recirculation Loop Piping. The flaw is axial in nature and therefore there is no impact on structure integrity degradation. No leakage is currently present or was seen during the previous operating cycle from this flaw. There is also reasonable assurance that there was not a breach in the credited RCS (Reactor Coolant System) boundary during the previous operating cycle. As part of the corrective action to fix the flaw, the 1E Recirculation weld will be upgraded to full structural weld overlay per the NRC-approved ISI Alternative. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5125623 July 2015 15:52:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4At 1120 EDT on 07/23/2015, while performing Chemistry rounds, a Chemistry Technician discovered an underground leak near the Plant Service Water bleach moat. The Plant Service Water bleach injection pumps were secured at 1130 EDT on 07/23/2015. The leak was later confirmed to be bleach. Approximately 200-300 gallons of 12.5% sodium hypochlorite are estimated to have leaked out of a broken underground pipe. This amount exceeded the reportable limit (100 lbs. or 80 gallons) as specified by the National Response Center. The bleach leaked into the surrounding soil and into a Plant Hatch storm drain where it pooled before reaching the Altamaha river. No bleach discharged into the river. Cleanup began immediately by neutralizing the bleach with sodium bisulfite and is still on-going. Plant Management authorized Southern Nuclear Company Environmental Affairs to report to the US Coast Guard National Response Center at 1305 EDT on 07/23/2015 in accordance with corporate procedures. The event was reported to the National Response Center at 1316 EDT. The Georgia Environmental Protection Division was also contacted. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event or situation related to the protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies have been made. NRC Resident Inspector was notified at 1530 at 07/23/2015. CR (Condition Report) 10099779
ENS 511204 June 2015 12:56:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in four Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, RCIC (1E51C001) (Path 1) components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1203. The postulated failure described above impacts HPCI (1E41C001) (Path 2) operation. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method for high pressure injection that remains free of fire damage for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203. In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 1E 4160 Kv (1R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205. In the Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 2 components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 2205. The postulated failure described above impacts the 2E 4160 Kv (2R22S005) emergency bus power to Path 1 components. Therefore, in the updated analysis there is no safe shutdown method that remains available for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2205. In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same three options for Torus Water Temperature indication (1T48R072, 1T47R611 or 1T47R612). Only one of these three components is required to succeed, however, all are impacted by the postulated fire. Thus, there is no Unit 1 Torus Water Temperature Indication available for a fire in Fire Area 1205. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario is only possible given a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1205. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10079009, 10079019, 10079022, 10079025 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1634 EDT ON 6/17/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in two Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) In the Unit 1 Safe Shutdown Analysis, Path 1 RCIC components are impacted by a fire in Fire Area 1105. The postulated failure would impact Path 2 (HPCI) operation. Therefore, in the current analysis for the credited safe shutdown method for high pressure injection may be affected for an Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105. 2) In the updated post-fire safe shutdown model, both safe shutdown paths include the same two options for Torus Water Level Indication: 2T48-R622A and 2T48-R622B. Only one of these two components is required to succeed, however both would be impacted by a postulated fire in Fire Area 2104. Consequently, both credited paths of Unit 2 Torus Water Level Indication could potentially be affected due to a fire in Fire Area 2104. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2104. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10084753, CR 10084757. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (HAAG).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/24/15 AT 2114 EDT * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Generator Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in five Fire Areas where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve A, 1E11-F015A, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop A in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1404. RHR Loop B is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1412 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 1E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 1 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 1412. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1412. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2404 is assessed to impact a cable required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. This cable was not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2404. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2404. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. 5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Inboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F015B, to open. These cables were not identified in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (SSAR) for this component. This valve is normally closed and is required to open to support the operation of RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited Low Pressure Injection system for Unit 2 in support of Inventory Control to the RPV for a fire in Fire Area 2408. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. RHR Loop A is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10088142 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (O'Donohue).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1739 EDT ON 08/13/15 FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Diesel Building MCC 1C, 1R24-S027, to remain energized. Further analysis has shown that an inter-cable hot short between two conductors could cause the feeder breaker to this MCC to trip. This MCC is required to support the operation of Diesel Generator 1C, which is a credited power source in the Safe Shutdown analysis for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. CR 10108999. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Nease).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1331 EDT ON 08/25/15 FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48c (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Diesel Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 1D, 1E, and 1F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 1B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 1 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1408. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2408 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Station Battery Chargers 2D, 2E, and 2F to remain energized. These chargers support 125V DC Switchgear 2B which is the credited DC Switchgear for Unit 2 Path 2 Safe Shutdown in the event of a fire in this area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2408. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report.

CR 10113740, CR 10113745 The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose).

  • * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1717 EDT ON 8/28/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Turbine Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1105 is assessed to impact cables which are required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of HPCI (SSD Path 2), which is the credited form of high pressure injection in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1105. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1104 is assessed to impact a cable required for the RCIC Vacuum Breaker Isolation MOV, 1E51-F105, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure operability of the RCIC turbine if RCIC is required to stop and restart. Failure of this valve to remain open could cause a siphon that would impact the operability of RCIC, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 1 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1104. In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10 CFR 50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in a Fire Area where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown conditions. This is a Category 1 barrier impairment. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 1203 is assessed to impact a cable required for HPCI Steam Supply Isolation MOV, 1E41-F002, to remain open. This valve is required open to ensure steam flow to the HPCI turbine. Failure of this valve to remain open would isolate steam to the HPCI turbine, which would disable HPCI, and thus disable Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 1203. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for RHR Outboard Injection Valve B, 2E11-F017B, to remain open. This valve is required open to support RHR Loop B in LPCI mode, which is the credited lineup for Path 2 Safe Shutdown Decay Heat Removal. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2203 is assessed to impact cables required for HPCI Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve, 2E41-F104, to remain open. This valve is required open in support of Safe Shutdown Path 2 High Pressure Injection. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2203. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10115432, CR10115473, CR10115436, CR10115446, CR10115444 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rose).

  • * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GUY GRIFFIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1815 EDT ON 09/04/2015 * * *

In preparation for transitioning the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from 10 CFR 50.48(b) (Appendix R) to 10CFR50.48(c) (NFPA 805), an update to the Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis has been performed for the Control Building and Reactor Building. This updated analysis has identified circuit configurations in Fire Area's where an Appendix R postulated fire could impact the ability to achieve safe shutdown (SSD) conditions. These are Category 1 barrier impairments. 1) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable that is required for Torus Suction Valve, 1E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 1 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024. 2) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0024 is assessed to impact a cable required for Torus Suction Valve, 2E11-F065B to remain open. This valve is required to remain open in support of LPCI train B which is credited for Unit 2 Safe Shutdown in the event that the RPV has spuriously depressurized and low pressure inventory control is performed from the remote shutdown panel. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0024. 3) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. The fire impacts a cable required for MCC 1C, 1R23-S003 to remain energized. This MCC supports the operation of Air Handling Unit B, 1Z41-B003B which is required in support of Main Control Room HVAC. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. 4) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0031 is assessed to impact all three Air Handling Units; 1Z41-B003A, 1Z41-B003B, and 1Z41-B003C. These AHUs are required in support of MCR HVAC. MCR HVAC was not required in the current Safe Shutdown Analysis Report, and thus these failures were not evaluated in this fire area. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0031. 5) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for Station Battery Chargers 2A (2R42-S026) 2B (2R42-S027) and 2C (2R42-S028) to remain energized. These chargers support 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016), which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014. 6) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 2014 is assessed to impact a cable required for 125 VDC Switchgear 2A (2R22-S016) to remain energized. This is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 1 Safe Shutdown. Path 2 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 2014. 7) An Appendix R postulated fire in Fire Area 0014 is assessed to impact cables required for Station Battery Chargers 1D (1R42-S029), 1E (1R42-S030), and 1F (1R42-S031) to remain energized. These chargers support 125VDC Switchgear 1B (1R22-S017) which is the credited DC Switchgear for Path 2 Safe Shutdown. Path 1 Safe Shutdown is not available in this fire area due to fire impacts. While this represents an unanalyzed condition for Appendix R, the described scenario presumes a fire has occurred in Fire Area 0014. Based on the updated Plant Hatch Appendix R Safe Shutdown analysis recommendations and the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), compensatory measures have been taken and will remain in place until the conditions are resolved. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment and installed fire protection and detection equipment, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions are resolved. The analysis associated with the transition of the Plant Hatch Fire Protection Licensing Basis from Appendix R to NFPA 805 is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar conditions that meet reporting requirements will be in included in an ENS Update Report. CR 10118312, CR 10118328, CR10118333, CR10118338, CR10118345 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour)

ENS 5109126 May 2015 17:45:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4
  • * * UPDATE ON 05/26/15 AT 1745 EDT FROM SCOTT BRITT TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147(foot) elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Gaps were identified around cables in the foam cable tray penetration seal for penetration 1Z43H006F in the floor of the Cable Spreading Room (separating Fire Areas 0024A and 1104). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10074859 The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2017 EDT ON 6/1/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL. - An issue was identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Station Battery Room 1B, FA 1005. - An issue was identified with the wall separating the Station Battery Room 2A, Fire Area (FA) 2004 from the Station Battery Room 2B, FA 2005, on el. 112 (foot). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10077573 & 10077574. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO(O'Donohue).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK AT 1704 EDT ON 6/2/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL: - Issues were identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building Working Floor, Fire Area (FA) 0001 from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, FA 1008. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10078011. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK AT 1501 EDT ON 6/3/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, using more intrusive tools and methods, fire barriers in the Control Building El. 112 (foot) were found not to meet acceptance criteria. The fire protection engineering staff has examined the situations and recommends that these conditions be considered NON-FUNCTIONAL: - Issues were identified with the wall separating the el. 112 (foot) Control Building U2 Water Analysis Room, Fire Area (FA) 2006 from the Control Building East Corridor, FA 0007 The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10078561. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Rose).

ENS 5107014 May 2015 23:02:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4

On May 14, 2015, it was determined that the number of 55 gallon drums of 2-Butoxyethanol analyzed to be transported and stored within the owner-controlled area (OCA) at any one time had been exceeded. It was discovered that contrary to the toxic gas analysis performed, fourteen 55-gallon drums of 2-Butoxyethanol were transported and stored in the OCA to support the construction of a dome being built to provide storage for FLEX equipment. The number of drums exceeded the limitation specified in the toxic gas analysis performed as part of the design project for transportation and storage could potentially impact Control Room habitability, emergency diesel generator air intake and have an adverse impact on security personnel. Upon determination that an unanalyzed condition existed, Operations placed the control room ventilation system in the 'isolation mode' until the number of drums on-site was reduced within the analyzed number. A substantial covering had been placed over the drums which also decreased the likelihood that any of the drums would fail and would also limit the potential dispersion of chemicals should a breach occur. The excess number of drums of 2-Butoxyethanol being transported and stored on-site is considered an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The allowed number of 55 gallon drums of 2-butoxyethanol allowed per the current toxic gas analysis is 4 drums. The number of drums has been reduced to 2 as of 2024 EDT. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/8/2015 AT 1657 EDT * * *

Further investigation into the chemicals transported on-site (F183M, of which 2-Butoxyethanol is a component) revealed that an on-site spill of all fourteen 55-gallon drums will not adversely affect Main Control Room Habitability, Security Personnel, or the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The Control Room Habitability Determination flowchart in Attachment 3 of NMP-CH-002-002 establishes a 10 mmHg vapor pressure threshold for determining if chemicals need to be evaluated for impact on the Main Control Room. Chemicals with a vapor pressure less than 10 mmHg do not need to be evaluated for control room habitability. The basis for the threshold is found in Reg Guide 1.78 Revision 0 section C.5.a, 'For chemicals that are not gases at 100F and normal atmospheric pressure but are liquids with vapor pressures in excess of 10 torr (10 mmHg), consideration should be given to the rate of flashing and boil off to determine the rate of release to the atmosphere and the appropriate time duration of the release.' The individual chemical component (including 2-Butoxyethanol) vapor pressures are less than 10 mmHg. As their vaporization rate is too low to adversely affect Control Room Habitability, it is also too low to create a hazard for Security personnel or to adversely affect the Emergency Diesel Generators. Based on this information, the transportation and storage of these chemical barrels did NOT represent a condition that significantly degraded plant safety. As such, this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and is therefore NOT reportable. Based on this information the previous notification for Event 51070 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

ENS 5099820 April 2015 21:26:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4
  • * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately 1/4" tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K) - Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately 1/4" tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. CR 10058276; CR 10058278 The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M) - A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M) - A gap 1/2" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A 1/4" x 1/2" defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired. CR 10058277 The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONG PARK ON 4/23/15 AT 1654 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). No seal material was seen between the sleeve and the cinderblock on the north side of penetration. - A void 1" tall, 1" wide, and 7" deep was found in the south upper corner under a concrete beam at column line T12 above penetration 1Z43H941D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). - At penetration 1Z43H1139D, it appears that combustible neoprene insulation is used around the pipe within the plane of the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). Combustible materials would not be part of a rated pen seal. - A gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was observed at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10060228 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

  • * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONG PARK ON 4/27/15 AT 2047 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: -An opening in the grout 1/4" wide, 1/2" tall and over 7" deep was found between the wall and the outside sleeve for penetration 2Z43H028D on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016). -A 1/4" diameter hole in the grout approximately 2.5" deep was found above conduit 2MI2128 on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10061830 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK ON 4/28/15 AT 1640 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers in the Unit 2 Control Building 130' elevation to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway - Fire Area 2014, from the U2 West 600 V Switchgear Room - Fire Area 2016. The following conditions were located on the south wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). 1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 2" long and probed to be at least 2 1/2" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016. 2. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016. The following conditions were located on the opposite side of the same wall. This is the north wall of the U2 West 600V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 2016): 3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. 4. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. 5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 2 1/2" wide, 2 1/2" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified around the 2" continuous run conduit located above cable tray penetration 2Z43H031D. 6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (first of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. 7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (second of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. 8. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 5" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (third of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10062254 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 4/29/15 AT 1804 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Unit 2 Control Building 130 foot elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018) and the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). The following conditions were located on the west wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). 1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D. 2. There is insufficient masonry material to fill the full depth of the wall above the ductwork that passes through penetration 2Z43H032D. This deficiency affects a small area on the south side of the ductwork and penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. 3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be 4 inch deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall (see Item 5 below). The following conditions were located on the east wall of the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018). 4. There are openings between the conduits and the wall 1/2 inch wide and 1 inch long for penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. These penetrations are affected in Item 2 above. 5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 6 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. 6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D. 7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 1/2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H676D. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10062955 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2137 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 130' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) and the Health Physics Hallway and Counting Room (Fire Areas 0014B and 0014G). - Penetration 2Z43H783D terminates open within a foot of the east wall of the Health Physics Counting Room (Fire Area 0014G) - Penetration 2Z43H603D contains no visible seal material and is located on the east wall of the Health Physics Hallway (Fire Area 0014B). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Deficiencies were also observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded condition of the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) from the common East Cableway Foyer (Fire Area 1105). - Gap near penetration 2Z43H170D between a conduit and the concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall located on the south wall of the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104).

The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas but were modified based on the nature of the degradations noted in the condition report and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10063642 Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1638 EDT ON 5/7/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Computer Room (Fire Areas 0024B) as well as a discrepancy in the affected wall.

   - In Fire Area 0024B, a small gap in the foam, approximately 6 (inch) deep was identified in Penetration 1Z43H592F.  The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
   - In Fire Area 0024B, penetration 1Z43H325F was identified with no sealant for the penetration sleeve.  The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
   - In Fire Area 0024B, foam sealant was missing in cable-tray, 1Z43H061F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025
   - In Fire Area 0024B, a gap was identified in a concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall joint, directly above 1Z43H062F.

The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10066678 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2151 EDT ON 05/07/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, a deficiency in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation was observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. This deficiency represented degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Cable Spreading Room (Fire Areas 0024A). - A 1/4 inch x 2 inch x approximately 4 inch deep gap in the east CMU wall of Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room above penetration 1Z43H046F. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10066844 The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2029 EDT ON 05/08/15 FROM SCOTT A. BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represent degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Cable Spreading Room (FA 0024A) and the CO2 Tank Room (FA 0025). - Multiple gaps in the caulk at the top of the ceiling of the west wall of the Cable Spreading Room (separating FA 0024A and FA 0025). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10067163 The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/11/15 AT 1711 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection activity, multiple fire penetrations on the Control Building El. 130' elevation were identified that resulted in the affected barriers being considered NON-FUNCTIONAL. An issue was identified with the wall separating the Vertical Cable Chase, Fire Area 0040, from the Unit 2 RPS MG Set Room, Fire Area 2013. - A 1/4" wide x 1/2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of a 2" continuous run conduit, 6" away from 2Z43H581D was identified. - A 1/4" wide x 3" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H581D was identified. - A 1/2" wide x 2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H580D was identified. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10068138 The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

  • * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/12/15 AT 2151 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection activity, a fire barrier on the Control Building El. 164' elevation was identified as being NON-FUNCTIONAL as follows; - A discrepancy was identified with the fire barrier separating the Unit 1 Turbine Building Main Floor Area, Fire Area 0101A from the Main Control Room, Fire Area 0024C. The condition consists of a small gap 1/4" wide, 3" long and probed to be greater than 6" deep between the wall and conduit at penetration 1Z43H605J on the Turbine Building side of the wall. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10068842 The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

  • * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/14/15 AT 2121 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 164' elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - A 1/4 inch x 1/2 inch x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1/4 inch wide x 8 inch long vertical crack, approximately 6 inch deep was identified in the CMU below penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - Three abandoned anchor holes, 1/2 inch in diameter and approximately 4 inch deep, were identified below penetration 1Z43H604J in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1 inch diameter abandoned anchor hole, approximately 6 inch deep, was identified directly above a 1/4 inch pipe penetration in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1/2 inch to 3/4 inch gap exists between the top of each of the 3 concrete block (CMU) walls enclosing the HVAC chase and the underside of the floor/ceiling assembly separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L). - A 1/2 inch diameter hole exists in the CMU at the upper right corner of penetration 1Z43H1184J separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10069898; CR 10069995 The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

  • * * UPDATE FROM R.S. STONE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/15/15 AT 1807 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, the following discrepancies were identified with the wall separating the Unit 1 Working Floor, Fire Area 0001, from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008 that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H553C.

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 1/8 inch wide x 1/2 inch tall x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the foam block out, below penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 3 inch x 3 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around a 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduit.

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around 1-1/2 inch continuous run and 1-1/4 inch continuous run conduits.

2 inch deep gaps in the grout around 1-1/2 inch and 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduits.

A 1/4 inch hole x 1 inch deep gap in the grout around penetration 1Z43H060C.

A 1/4 inch x 1/4 inch x 2 inch deep gap around the annulus of a 1-1/4 inch continuous run and 2 inch continuous run conduits. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10070439 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

  • * * UPDATE ON 1638 EDT ON 05/21/15 FROM GUY S. GRIFFIS TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, the following discrepancies were identified in the Unit 1 Control Building 130(foot) elevation that caused the affected fire barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Six 3(inch) x 3(inch) holes in the wall of the Men's Rest Room (separating Fire Areas 0014M and 1104). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Deficiencies were also observed in the Diesel Generator Building 130(foot) elevation that caused the affected fire barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Through-wall gap around the conduit that passes through penetration 2Y43H511D on the south wall of the U2 Diesel Generator Switchgear Room 2F (separating Fire Areas 2408 and 2409). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10073041; CR10073187 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ernestes).

ENS 506629 December 2014 20:02:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4

During an inspection of a fire penetration between Fire Area 1404, Switchgear Room 1G and Fire Area 1408, Switchgear Room 1F in the diesel generator building, the penetration was determined to be non-functional as a 3 hour fire barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in the fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be repaired. (Condition report No.) CR904013 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector

  • * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY KENNY HUNTER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0915 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * *

Further investigation revealed that after removing the outermost two inches of loose silicone foam material, and taking additional measurements there remained adequate silicone foam material to provide 10 inches of silicone foam sealing the penetration. Plant design shows that the wall in question is 18 inches thick and also that 9 inches of silicone foam is required in the penetration in order maintain a 3 hour fire rating for the wall/penetration. Since there is adequate foam in the penetration to maintain the 3 hour fire rating the penetration is fully functional. Based on this information, this penetration in its 'as found' state does NOT represent a condition that seriously degrades a principal safety barrier. As such this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and is therefore NOT reportable. Based on this information the previous notification for Event 50662 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Bartley)

ENS 5062919 November 2014 21:44:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire penetrations that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of a fire penetration was identified that was sufficient to prevent this penetration from meeting Appendix R requirements as a 3 hour fire barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were put in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) for the degraded penetration in the affected fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected. The degraded fire penetration is located between the turbine deck and the main control room. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 505882 November 2014 12:26:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4

On November 2, 2014 EST, the bus providing power to the Health Physics emergency HVAC system for climate control tripped unexpectedly and has been out of service for greater than 30 minutes. The Health Physics emergency HVAC system for climate control is required for functionality of the Operations Support Center (OSC), which is a required emergency response facility (ERF). Actions to determine the cause of loss of 1R24-S030 Load Center and to return ERF to functional status are in progress with high priority. In the interim, the backup OSC remains fully functional and capable of providing the required support as defined in the Hatch Emergency Plan and emergency implementing procedures. This notification is being made in accordance with the plant's Technical Requirements Manual Specifications to make the notification within 8 hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the unplanned loss of an emergency response facility. An update will be provided once the OSC has been restored to normal operation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2126 EST ON 11/2/14 * * *

Power was restored to the 1R24-S030 Load Center at 1955 EST. At 2038 EST, power to the Health Physics emergency HVAC system was restored. The OSC was returned to service at 2120 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1641 EST on 12/31/14 * * *

In accordance with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1, the NRC endorsed NEI 13-01, 'Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities,' such that 'if a licensee has a 'backup ERF' that is capable of performing the functions of the primary facility, the licensee's emergency assessment capability is not significantly impaired if the primary facility is not available.' Based on this information this condition is not reportable. Although NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Supplement 1 did not require an event notification report to be made, an initial notification was generated based on requirements within licensee control documents. These documents have been updated to reflect the guidance provided in the supplement to NUREG 1022. This report is therefore being retracted in accordance with NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Supplement 1 since a backup ERF remained fully functional and capable of providing the required support during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper).

ENS 5045513 September 2014 09:53:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4A fire penetration on the Unit 1 reactor building 158 foot elevation was discovered to be degraded such that the associated wall would not meet Appendix R requirements as a 3-hour barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in either of the affected fire areas, separated by the affected penetration, both Unit 1 safe shutdown paths could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be corrected. Condition Report: 865615 The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 503517 August 2014 20:00:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4

During a fire inspection activity involving inspection of fire walls that serve as Appendix R barriers, degradation of some fire walls was identified that was sufficient to prevent these walls from meeting Appendix R requirements as 3-hour fire barriers. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on the affected unit could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions can be corrected. Condition Reports: 850802, 850819 In addition to automatic fire protection features, the licensee has posted fire watches as a compensatory measure. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1814 EST ON 11/24/2014 * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1023 - RPS MG Set Room and Fire Area 1015 - Annunciator Room. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. Condition Report: 898908. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

  • * * UPDATE FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1758 EST ON 11/25/2014 * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1016 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1C and Fire Area 1017 - 600 Volt Switchgear Room 1D. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1706 EST ON 12/4/2014 * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls for conditions similar to those reported on 8/7/2014. During this inspection, additional conditions were identified involving multiple fire barriers in the control building that affected both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and Unit 2 based on the respective inspection results. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Freeman).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1842 EST ON 12/12/2014 FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the condition identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity is in progress to inspect the remaining fire walls and associated penetrations for conditions similar to those reported on 08/07/2014. During this inspection, nonconformances of multiple fire barriers were identified that bring into question the functionality of the affected fire barriers that can compromise safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 based on the respective inspection results. Since additional time is required to further evaluate each nonconformance to conclusively determine if the nonconformance is sufficient to consider the barrier nonfunctional, interim conservative fire actions were taken by considering these fire barriers as nonfunctional. Based on this conservative conclusion, in the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 and 2 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded penetrations and fire walls in most of these same fire areas and will remain in place until the barrier(s) are repaired. Additional fire actions were taken as required to address the additional fire areas identified. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. Unit 1 is entering a planned outage due to unrelated activities. Condition Report: 10000607 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Desai).

  • * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2315 EST ON 1/15/2015 * * *

As part of the 'extent of condition' corrective action for the conditions identified in EN# 50351, an inspection activity was performed of a fire wall for conditions similar to those reported on 12/12/2014. During this inspection, another condition was identified involving some degradation of the fire wall between Fire Area 1008 - Unit 1 AC Inverter Room and Fire Area 0001 to consider the barrier nonfunctional. In the event of a postulated fire in the affected areas both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in these same fire areas and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. The inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. Condition Report: 10013077 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Musser).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JEFF HERRERA AT 2025 EST ON 1/21/2015 * * *

During review and closeout of fire barrier and penetration seals work orders and surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity initially described in Event # 50351, the following conditions were identified that in the event of a postulated fire in the respective fire areas listed both safe shutdown paths could be compromised.

Unit 2 Control Bldg. el. 130', gap in the grout around conduit penetration between fire areas 2013 and 2015 Unit 1 Reactor Bldg. el. 130', open conduit between fire areas 1203C and 1105 Given this information the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded fire barriers in the Unit 2 fire area and will remain in place until the affected barrier areas are repaired. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 1 areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition is repaired. Subsequent similar condition(s) found when performing remaining inspections that meet the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity.

Condition Report 10015417 Condition Report 10015437 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (McCoy).

  • * * UPDATE FROM G.S. GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EST ON 2/4/15 * * *

During the review of fire barrier surveillance procedures performed as part of the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, some degradation was observed on the east wall of fire area 2006. These nonconforming issues observed on the affected fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 2 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures, in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas, ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10021623 Notified R2DO (HAAG).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1823 EST ON 2/18/15 * * *

During performance of work package closeouts to support the 'extent of condition' inspection activity for the event initially identified in EN# 50351, the following fire barriers were identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria: - Three penetrations separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1013 and 0040 - A fire wall deficiency in the wall separating Unit 1 Fire Areas 1015 and 1013 These nonconforming issues observed on the affected penetrations and fire wall were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Therefore, in the event of a postulated fire for the affected area, both safe shutdown paths on Unit 1 could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10028364 CR 10028366 The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2035 EST ON 02/25/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

During the review and closeout of a work package performed as part of the 'extent of condition' for the inspection activity initially described in EN #50351, a fire penetration seal was identified as failing to meet the procedure acceptance criteria. This penetration seal is located in the 2C Diesel Generator (DG) room and passes between Fire Area 2407 and 2408. The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were established for the Unit 2 Areas and will remain in place until the affected barriers areas are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10032202 The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2000 EST ON 3/4/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, two deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - Small imperfections and a hole through Penetration 1Z43-H116C that passes between Fire Area 1101G (Unit 1 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) Room) and Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room), and - Gaps in a civil/architectural joint at the top of the south wall leading from Fire Area 1006 (Unit 1 Water Analysis Room) to Fire Area 0007A (East Corridor in the Control Bldg.). These nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire area and will remain in place until the wall is repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS update report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10035730 The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sykes).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DANIEL MILLS AT 2047 EDT ON 3/16/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - Imperfections in three penetration seals (2Z43-H037C, 2Z43-H038C, and 2Z43-H177C) located in the 2A Battery Room separating Unit 2 Fire Areas 2004 and 2005 - Imperfections in fire penetration seal 2Z43-H644C located in the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Area 2006 and 0007A - Imperfections in the grout between two tiers of concrete masonry wall and at the intersection of the walls in the upper northeast corner of the U2 Water Analysis Room separating Fire Areas 2006 and 0007A The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10041392, CR 10041394, and CR 10041397 The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer)

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1619 EDT ON 3/17/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, a fire penetration seal was observed to contain imperfections that did not meet acceptance criteria. Penetration seal 1Z43H542C is located between the U1 Corridor, Fire Area 0001, and the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008, in the Unit 1 Control Building. The nonconforming issue observed on the affected penetration was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing and this, and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements, will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10041766 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

  • * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1648 EDT ON 3/18/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - Gap in the concrete masonry wall at penetration seal 1Z43-H547C located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001) - Gap in the annulus around the 2 inch continuous run penetration seal located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001) - Gap in penetration seal 1Z43-H059C located between the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room (Fire Area 1008) and the Unit 1 Corridor (Fire Area 0001) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10042532; CR 10042530; CR 10042526 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1814 EDT ON 3/31/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, a fire wall was observed to contain a gap behind a 3 inch square plate attached to the thru-bolt anchor that did not meet acceptance criteria and caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. The affected fire barrier is located between the U2 RPS MG Set Room (Fire Area 2013) and the U2 Annunciator Room (Fire Area 2015). The nonconforming issue observed on the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until all associated non-functional fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The extent of condition inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10048449 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Walker).

  • * * UPDATE FROM KEN HUNTER TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/13/15 AT 1722 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - Gap around penetration 1Z43H805D located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1D (Fire Area 1017) and the Unit 1 Transformer Room (Fire Area 1019). - Gaps in a fire barrier around a unistrut, below penetration 1Z43H012D, that are approximately 7 deep and into the CMU core located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (Fire Area 0014K) - Gap in the top corner of the wall, above 1Z43H842D that protrudes into the CMU approximately 7 deep located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (Fire Area 0014K) - Two anchor bolt holes east of penetration 1Z43H810D located between the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1B (Fire Area 1020) and the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room 1D (Fire Area 1017) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Heissierer).

  • * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO CHARLES TEAL ON 04/14/15 AT 1728 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A 1/16" wide x 4" long x 5" deep gap was identified at the top of the wall, above penetration 1Z43H646D, in the west wall in Unit 1 East 600V Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1017 and Fire Area 1016). - A 1/16" wide x 4" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of the wall, above penetration 1Z43H646D, in the east wall in the Unit 1 West 600V Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1016 and Fire Area 1017). - A �" wide x 2" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of penetration 1Z43H522D located between the Unit 1 West 600 V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1016) and U1 East 600 V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1017). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10055316; CR 10055377 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bartley).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2000 EDT ON 4/16/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A 1" wide x 2" long x 7" deep gap was identified at the top of penetration 1Z43H622D in the west wall of the Unit 1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0014K). - A 1/4" wide x 1/4" long x 7" deep gap was identified near a ground wire, above penetration 1Z43H595D, at the top of the east wall of the Unit 1 East DC Switchgear Room (separating Fire Area 1020 and Fire Area 1104). - A 3" wide x 1/4" tall x 7" deep gap was identified at penetration 1Z43H617D on the south wall of the Unit 1 Working Floor (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1013). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10056548; CR 10056555; CR 10056582 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bartley).

  • * * SEE EN #50998 FOR CONTINUATION OF UPDATES * * *
ENS 5016030 May 2014 20:16:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4Conditions were identified in which grouting in some fire penetrations through hollow block walls on Units 1 and 2 do not comply with design drawings. While some grouting is present in the penetration, the determination has been made that the qualification of the amount and configuration of the grouting present does not meet Appendix R requirements. Further evaluation by Engineering concluded that this condition could compromise both safe shutdown paths on each unit in the event of a postulated fire. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) to compensate for this condition to ensure that safe shutdown paths are preserved until the conditions can be corrected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.