Semantic search
Start date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
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ENS 57328 | 18 September 2024 00:05:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: At 2005 EDT on 9/17/2024, it was discovered that steam propagation door DRCB/501 would not latch properly; thus making the door inoperable. Door DRCB/501 is required as a steam propagation barrier to protect both trains of engineered safety feature equipment from effects of a postulated steam line break. Due to this inoperability, the plant was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Steam propagation door DRCB/501 was repaired and maintained in the closed and latched position at 2032 EDT on 9/17/2024. |
ENS 57278 | 21 August 2024 00:01:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: At 2001 EDT on 8/20/2024, it was discovered that both trains of the control room ventilation system were simultaneously inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. One train of control room ventilation was restored to operable status at 2107 EDT on 8/20/2024. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: While performing canister maintenance on train B, it was discovered that the dampener for train A failed to close. Train B was restored at the conclusion of maintenance.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: This event is also reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), loss of emergency assessment capability, as the technical support center facility is located inside the control room envelope. Notified R2DO (Masters) |
ENS 56978 | 19 February 2024 07:36:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On February 19, 2024, at 0236 EST, with VC Summer Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the `B emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred. The reason for the `B EDG auto-start was the trip of 1 `DB normal incoming breaker. The `B EDG automatically started as designed when the undervoltage signal was received. The `B emergency feedwater pump started due to the undervoltage signal and ran for approximately 1 minute and was secured by operations per procedure. Other plant equipment and systems also responded as expected. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the `B EDG and a valid actuation of the `B emergency feedwater pump. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The `A Emergency Diesel Generator was tagged out for maintenance earlier in the shift, but maintenance has not started. The plan is to restore the `A emergency diesel generator to an operable status and investigate the cause of the 1 `DB normal incoming breaker trip. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: This event resulted in the plant entering a 12 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) in accordance with technical specification (TS) 3.8.1.1.C. due to having one operable EDG and a loss of offsite power.
VC Summer is retracting event notification (EN) 56978 regarding the unexpected actuations of the B emergency diesel generator and B emergency feedwater pump on 02/19/2024. Both were previously reported as valid actuations under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Subsequent evaluation has determined that the actuations were the result of an invalid signal caused by equipment failure on the 1 DB bus undervoltage control circuit. The event, its cause, and corrective actions were reported in VC Summer licensee event report 2024-001-00 (ML24108A143) on 04/17/2024, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel as a result of the actuations. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Franke) |
ENS 56612 | 11 May 2023 16:50:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days. Steam generator emergency feedwater header discharge isolation check valves (XVC01009A-EF, XVC01009B-EF, and XVC01009C-EF) were designed specifically for and supplied to VC Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) by Flowserve under purchase order 4500653391 to replace the previous valves in the emergency feedwater system during refueling outage 27. On May 11, 2023, after valve installation, but prior to initial service, the socket head cap screws were identified as being shorter than the required design length. Valve drawings indicate a design length of 1.25" while the socket head cap screws received were 0.875". The correct length cap screws were installed prior to initial service. VCSNS completed a substantial safety hazard evaluation and determined that the improper length of the cap screws constituted a substantial safety hazard. This deviation in cap screw length resulted in a partial engagement of the cap screw to the cylinder rod extension and could potentially affect valve operation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56453 | 5 April 2023 10:51:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0651 EDT on April 5, 2023, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 85 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to loss of main feedwater pump 'C'. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Main feedwater pump 'B' had previously been removed from service in preparation for a planned shutdown as a part of refueling outage RF27. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the emergency feedwater system. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) resulting from valid actuation of the reactor protection and emergency feedwater systems. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee continues to investigate the loss of main feedwater pump 'C'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 55580 | 15 November 2021 22:28:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1728 EST on 11/15/2021, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 47 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main transformer fault. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the emergency feedwater system through the main condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, due to the valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system, this event is being reported as a non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
At approximately 0900 (EST) on 11/16/2021, it was identified that mineral oil from the faulted main transformer had surpassed the capability of the oil containment system and discharged into Lake Monticello. It is estimated that less than 50 gallons of mineral oil entered the Lake. The oil is contained with booms and cleanup is ongoing. The EPA National Response Center and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control have been notified. This is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies; therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller). |
ENS 56919 | 12 November 2021 05:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call: On January 9, 2024, VC Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) determined a manufacturing defect affecting a control power circuit monitor (CP1) relay on its 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) was reportable under Part 21. On November 12, 2021, the 'B' EDG was rendered inoperable when its CP1 relay de-energized due to mechanical binding of the magnet carrier assembly. The binding was caused by a manufacturing defect that allowed heat-induced shrinkage to reduce the clearance between the magnet carrier and adjacent coil housing and base, preventing it from moving freely. VCSNS replaced the affected relay and restored operability of its 'B' EDG. Manufacturer/Model: Eaton-Cutler Hammer D26MRD30A1 A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The plant has notified the manufacturer. It is not known if any other plants are affected by this defect. | |
ENS 55450 | 8 September 2021 17:37:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1337 (EDT) on 9/8/2021, V.C. Summer reported the overflow of the Nuclear Operations Building Lift Station (LS-3) to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The lift station overflow was due to a broken discharge pipe from Pump 1 to the common discharge header. The overflow was contained in the valve vault, basin gravel, and the nearby concrete surface. None of the overflow reached any storm drains or waters of the state. This release did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
At 1712 EDT on 9/8/2021, V.C. Summer made Event Notification 55450 notifying the NRC of an environmental report to another government agency, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). In the course of station response, it was determined that the lift station overflow did not exceed any federal, state or local reporting criteria or violate any permits. Following this investigation, the report to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control is considered a courtesy notification and the event does not meet reporting criteria under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller) |
ENS 55808 | 22 June 2021 05:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days. On June 22, 2021, VC Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) received information indicating that a poppet seal failure in the Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV) 'B' control block was due to laminations in the Viton material. The failure occurred on May 12, 2021 and was captured in the corrective action program as CR-21-01263. VCSNS completed a Substantial Safety Hazard Evaluation and determined that the laminations in VCSNS poppet seal lots 7064051 and 7081558 constituted a substantial safety hazard. The FWIV poppet seals are responsible for retaining and directing pressurized air to each side of the FWIV actuator for repositioning and maintaining FWIV position in both the open and closed positions. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 55297 | 7 June 2021 14:27:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 56920 | 5 May 2021 05:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call: On January 9, 2024, VC Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) determined a manufacturing defect affecting a field flash contactor (K2) relay on its 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) was reportable under Part 21. During testing on May 5, 2021, the 'B' EDG was rendered inoperable when its K2 relay coil switch exhibited intermittent binding due to insufficient clearances of the switch actuator from the protective case and plastic switch molding. The inadequate clearances resulted in accelerated loss of graphite lubrication at these locations, which led to mechanical binding. VCSNS replaced the affected relay and restored operability of its 'B' EDG. Manufacturer/Model: Gould F10NOCLD1 DC coil switch A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee did not notify the intellectual property owner because the manufacturer is no longer operating or in business. They are not aware of other plants that utilize this coil switch. | |
ENS 54742 | 8 June 2020 17:55:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | At 1725 EDT on 6/8/2020, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station reported a transmission fluid spill to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The spill was the result of a hydraulic hose leak during equipment testing. This spill did not violate any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The spill resulted in 1 - 2 ounces of transmission fluid being released into the Monticello Reservoir. | |
ENS 54688 | 1 May 2020 16:53:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | At approximately 1238 EDT on May 1, 2020, an alarm indicated smoke on a non-safety related electrical switchgear bus in the turbine building. Plant personnel were dispatched to investigate. Smoke and heat were found coming from the bus. At 1253 EDT, a Notification of Unusual Event was declared. At 1308 EDT the fire was declared out and fire watches posted. Offsite assistance was requested during the event and the Jenkinsville, SC fire department responded to the site. There were no plant personnel injuries or impact to the health and safety of the public. The cause of this event is unknown at the present time. The electrical bus has been de-energized. The unit is currently in a planned refueling outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 1737 EDT on May 1, 2020. The cause of the event is currently being investigated. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Miller). NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant). Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email). | |
ENS 54495 | 27 January 2020 04:54:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | At 2354 EST, on January 26, 2020, officials with the State Emergency Operations Center and Newberry County, SC were notified of an apparent inadvertent actuation of a single siren in the VC Summer Early Warning Siren System (EWSS). (VC Summer Nuclear Station) VCSNS received a report of siren actuation from a local resident at approximately 2340 EST. The EWSS indication at the Emergency Operations Facility showed siren #35 had actuated. A reset of the EWSS was performed. VCSNS is working to confirm actual siren activation and troubleshoot the issue. This event is still under investigation. This is a non-emergency notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The Licensee notified state and local agencies.
The investigation of this event has concluded that EWSS siren #35 did not actuate. This conclusion was reached after interviewing residents who reside directly across the street from EWSS Siren #35, who confirmed that this siren did not actuate. Also, maintenance personnel investigations concluded that the local activation indication was erroneous, due to observed battery readings being normal. Had the siren actuated, its batteries would have been depleted or nearly depleted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Baptist). | |
ENS 54075 | 20 May 2019 22:33:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | At approximately 1833 EDT on 5/20/2019, VC Summer Nuclear Station identified a potential missed surveillance of the Spent Fuel Storage Canister Heat Removal System Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.2. This is a surveillance requirement in the Holtec CoC No. 1032 Amendment 0, Revision 1 for the HI-STORM FW. It was identified that the station suspended verifying all overpack inlets and outlets were free of blockage from solid debris or floodwater every 24 hours and began utilizing the alternate surveillance method of installed temperature monitoring equipment. However, this monitoring equipment had not been declared operable from the completion of the Dry Cask Storage Campaign on April 11, 2019. This surveillance was last performed satisfactorily on May 15, 2019. The station has documented this missed surveillance in the Corrective Action Program under CR-19-01866. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. The licensee stated that the temperature monitoring equipment while not operable, was functional. The licensee successfully performed the surveillance requirement on 5/21/2019.
ENS Event Number 54075, made on May 21, 2019, is being retracted. NRC Notification 54075 was made to ensure the 24-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirement of 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1)(i) was met for a potential missed surveillance of the Spent Fuel Storage Canister Heat Removal System Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.2. On June 4, 2019, a Past Operability Evaluation determined the temperature monitoring equipment, utilized to complete the Technical Specification Surveillance 3.1.2, was operable during the time period of 5/16/2019-5/21/2019. The station performed satisfactory calibration checks on the temperature monitoring equipment and had not experienced any significant weather events capable of producing vent blockage (i.e. flood, tornado, snow storm, etc.). Therefore, utilizing the installed temperature monitoring equipment is not considered a missed surveillance of SR 3.1.2 and renders this event not reportable under 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1)(i). VCSNS's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program in Condition Report (CR-19-01866). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rose) and NMSS Events Notification (email). | |
ENS 53176 | 18 January 2018 17:02:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator. On January 18, 2018 at 1202 EST, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) lost one of its two redundant offsite power supplies. The loss of the 115kV power supply created an undervoltage condition on the normal incoming Engineered Safety Features power supply to safety related bus 1DA. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator started and loads sequenced as designed. The 'A' Residual Heat Removal pump started but did not inject any water into the Reactor Coolant System. The 'A' Emergency Feedwater Pump started and ran for approximately 2 minutes. Other plant equipment and systems also responded as expected. The loss of the 115kV power supply occurred due to an issue with a component in a switchyard, external to VCSNS. The cause of the event is still under investigation. All loads have been transferred back to the offsite 115kV power supply at 1318 EST. The diesel generator was secured at 1321 EST, reset and is ready to auto-start. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 53060 | 8 November 2017 00:57:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On 11/7/2017 at 1957 (EST), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip is under investigation at this time. All systems responded as expected. All Control Rods fully inserted and all Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Main Steam to the Main Condenser. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the South Carolina State Emergency Management Division, the Fairfield, Richland, Lexington and Newberry Counties.
All systems responded as expected, with the exception of 'B' Steam Generator Feedwater Isolation Valve XVG1611 B-FW. This valve did not appear to automatically close and was slow to indicate closed from the Main Control Board. All Control Rods fully inserted and all Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Notified the R2DO (Musser). |
ENS 53020 | 17 October 2017 15:34:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At approximately 0319 EDT on 10/14/17, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the protected area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 12. The estimated release volume was approximately 50 gallons. At 1134 EDT on 10/17/17 an initial notification was made to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The cause of the overflow is still under investigation. Functionality of the lift pump has been restored and cleanup is complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52962 | 11 September 2017 20:48:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator. On September 11, 2017 at 1648 (EDT) the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started on the low voltage signal from Bus 1DA as a result of a 115KV grid perturbation. All emergency buses remained energized from offsite power. The EDG did not tie to the 1DA bus because the offsite power voltage recovered within the designed recovery time limit. The diesel generator has been secured, reset and is ready to auto start. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52932 | 28 August 2017 12:37:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On 8/28/2017 at 0837 (EDT), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The turbine trip was caused by the Main Generator Differential Lockout due to a fault on the center phase lightning arrester on the Main Transformer (XTF-001). There were no complications with the trip. All control rods fully inserted. Balance of Plant (BOP) buses automatically transferred to their alternate power source XTF 31/32. All Emergency Feedwater pumps started as required. All systems responded as required. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Station personnel are investigating the cause of the fault on the main transformer lightning arrester. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat removal via the Main Steam to the Main Condenser. The licensee will inform both State and local authorities. |
ENS 52833 | 29 June 2017 12:57:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On 6/29/2017 at 0857 (EDT), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to a loss of normal feed water flow to the B Steam Generator. There were no complications with the trip. All control rods fully inserted. All emergency feedwater pumps automatically started and recovered steam generator levels. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Station personnel are investigating the cause of the loss of normal feedwater to the B Steam Generator. This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the State of South Carolina as well as Fairfield, Lexington, Richland and Newberry Counties regarding the event. |
ENS 52705 | 25 April 2017 13:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On April 25, 2017 at approximately 0900 (EDT), it was identified that power to RM-G8 Area Gamma Radiation Monitor for the Fuel Handling Building Bridge, had not been restored within 72 hours. RM-G8 was de-energized during the B train essential bus outage and was restored on April 25, 2017 at 1148. It was out of service for approximately 92 hours. Compensatory measures were in place per HPP-904 while RM-G8 was out of service. RM-G8 is identified in the emergency plan as an equipment important to emergency response. NUREG-1022, Rev. 3 Supplement 1 Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), allows a 72 hour planned outage time to restore equipment important to emergency response. Since RM-G8 was not restored in 72 hours, it is reportable as an 8 hour ENS. This event should have been reported when it was known that the 72 hour outage time was not going to be met. This issue has been entered in the station's corrective action program. Fuel inspections were occurring during this time with compensatory measures in place. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52668 | 6 April 2017 13:48:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor manager had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a pre-access test. The employee's access to the construction site has been revoked. The licensee notified the NRC Unit 2 & 3 Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52357 | 9 November 2016 18:39:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At approximately 1008 (EST) on 11/9/16, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the protected area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. The estimated release volume is approximately 10 gallons. The release has been stopped. At 1339 an initial notification was made to SCDHEC (South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control). The cause of the overflow is still under investigation. Functionality of the lift pump has been restored and cleanup is complete. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. |
ENS 52354 | 2 November 2016 05:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | In accordance with 10CFR52.99(c)(2), V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 Construction is making this notification to NRC for determining that Inspection, Test, Analysis, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.6.01.02.ii (Seismic Qualification of Reactor Coolant Pump Switchgear) for both units requires additional actions to restore its completed status. The Closure Notification for this ITAAC (NRC Index No. 580) was originally submitted on February 29, 2016 (reference ML16060A344 and ML16060A345). On November 2, 2016, it was determined that modifications to the RCP switchgear cabinet design were required to ensure compliance with the applicable portions of IEEE 384, Standard Criteria for Independence of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits. The modification involved an engineering change which adds different equipment to the RCP Switchgear cabinet which function to trip the RCP. The new components were not previously seismically qualified for use in the RCP switchgear cabinet assembly. The additional components have now undergone seismic qualification testing for use in the RCP switchgear. The Equipment Qualification Data Package and Equipment Qualification Summary Report for the RCP switchgear will be revised based on the results of the testing to confirm the switchgear withstands seismic design basis loads. The revised testing report has been completed on November 8 2016. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 52240 | 14 September 2016 00:30:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | During routine operator rounds at 2030 EDT, a steam propagation barrier door (SPBD) was discovered propped open for maintenance activities without appropriate station controls. This condition was in existence from approximately 1720 EDT to 2042 EDT when the SPBD was restored to its normal configuration. Throughout the approximate 3 hours and 22 minutes, when the SPBD was propped open, both trains of chill water were rendered non-functional due to a potential high energy line break. This subsequently rendered both trains of high-head safety injection inoperable, which placed the plant in Technical Specification 3.0.3. This condition was corrected prior to commencing a Technical Specification 3.0.3 plant shutdown. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 52086 | 14 July 2016 11:41:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On 7/14/16, at 0741 (EDT), it was determined that (a contract employee supervisor) violated its FFD policy. The individual's construction site access has been revoked. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The Units 2 and 3 (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 51954 | 24 May 2016 16:50:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At approximately 1250 (EDT), a contract employee was found unresponsive in (their) personal vehicle located in the parking lot outside of the owner controlled area. The Fairfield County Coroner arrived on-site and declared the individual deceased at 1345. The fatality was due to an apparent personal medical issue and not work related. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee has notified State of South Carolina Department of Labor - OSHA. |
ENS 51941 | 17 May 2016 16:49:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Construction Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51585 | 4 December 2015 19:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | Off-site Notification to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). At approximately 1400 (EST) on 12/4/15, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the owner controlled area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. The estimated release volume is between 10-15 gallons. The release has been stopped. At 1448, an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. The overflow appears to be the result of securing electrical power to the general area, including the lift station, to support construction activities. Power has been restored and clean-up is in progress. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. |
ENS 51485 | 20 October 2015 18:14:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51135 | 7 June 2015 09:25:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | An individual approached the protected area and grabbed the fence. Local law enforcement assistance has been requested. The Security Team leader does not consider this to be hostile. An emergency declaration was made based on HU4.1, for a security condition that does not involve a hostile action. The licensee notified state and local agencies and informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, and FEMA NWC and NuclearSSA via email.
The individual was taken into custody without incident. Notified R2DO (Rose), NRR EO (Morris), and IRD (GOTT). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA OPS Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, and Nuclear SSA via email.
Update to correct description of where the individual was apprehended. An individual approached the outside of the administrative fence near the circulating water intake structure. Local law enforcement assistance was requested. The Security Team Leader does not consider this to be hostile. This declaration was made based on HU 4.1, a security condition that does not involve Hostile Action. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Rose). |
ENS 51010 | 23 April 2015 19:32:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract employee supervisor tested positive for a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the site has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51005 | 22 April 2015 19:28:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contract employee supervisor willfully acted to avoid a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual left the construction site after the notification to report to the fitness-for-duty office. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 51158 | 17 February 2015 12:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B associated with AP1000 nuclear power plant construction by Chicago Bridge & Iron Company (CB&I) at the V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction site. This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) for V.C. Summer Units 2 & 3, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criteria V and XV. It is concluded that Quality Assurance programmatic issues, as identified by CB&I Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). Root Cause Analysis 2015-0539 investigated the causes that lead to impingement of safety related reinforcing steel and the steel containment vessel during concrete core drilling operations within the Unit 2 containment structure. No defect has been identified. This condition is associated with NRC special inspection report number 05200027/2015-009. This notification closes the Interim Part 21 report submitted on April 16th, 2015, by CB&I. This 50.55(e) Initial Notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 50796 | 7 February 2015 13:48:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At approximately 0848 (EST) on February 7, 2015, a contract employee was found unresponsive at a VC Summer Unit 1 facility outside the Owner Controlled Area. The VC Summer Medical Emergency Response Team responded to the scene and provided assistance until offsite medical personnel arrived. Emergency Medical Services arrived on the scene and transported the individual to a local area hospital. VC Summer has reported this to OSHA and is reporting this to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
At 0935 EST, on February 16, 2015 SCE&G notified OSHA that the contract employee had passed away. This update also corrects the second sentence of the initial notification that station personnel versus the Medical Emergency Response Team responded to the scene. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Nease). |
ENS 50815 | 25 August 2014 12:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55 initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I), an agent for the Licensee of the V. C. Summer 2 & 3 Construction Project. In August 2014, deviations were found in sub-modules CA03-06, -08, and -09 for the Vogtle 3 Construction Project, which initiated the discovery and evaluation processes for both Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55. The conditions were determined to be not reportable by CB&I under 10 CFR 21, but an evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.". |
ENS 50293 | 22 July 2014 08:14:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 0414 (EDT on 7/22/2014), VC Summer Nuclear Station automatically tripped due to decreasing water level in the 'C' Steam Generator. The trip occurred when valve XVB-09210 WI System Condensate Bypass Valve failed to open as required while the station was removing the Condensate Polishing System during startup. The Condensate Polishing System is used to purify and filter the condensate from the non-nuclear, secondary side of the plant. This valve failure caused low level in the Deaerator Storage Tank, which consequently tripped all feedwater pumps. This loss of feedwater led to Lo-Lo Steam Generator level in the 'C' Steam Generator. All Emergency Feedwater pumps automatically started on Lo-Lo Steam Generator level and all control rods inserted fully. The Steam Generator levels recovered quickly. Presently the plant is in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the condenser. A station response team is actively investigating the cause of the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee will notify the State and local governments. |
ENS 50229 | 19 June 2014 15:45:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification regarding a very small amount of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) which is unaccounted for. On May 30, 2014, a discrepancy was found in the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station SNM inventory. After extensive review, it was determined on June 19, 2014 that one nuclear instrumentation incore detector could not be located at V.C. Summer Nuclear Station. Detectors of this type are used to measure incore neutron flux (intensity of neutron radiation) inside the reactor vessel. This is being reported under 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii) Reports of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material. According to V.C. Summer documentation, there should be 42 such detectors in storage. Only 41 detectors could be physically located. There is no evidence of theft or diversion of the detector. Detectors of this type contain very small amounts of Uranium-235 (.0041 grams/detector), which qualifies them as SNM. The detector is believed to be located in a storage location in the Reactor Building (RB). The RB storage location will be inspected during the next refueling outage. This event had no effect on plant operations. No impact on public health and safety has been identified. A written report will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1)(i-vi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
ENS 50044 | 19 April 2014 00:39:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On April 18, 2014, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 identified 3 reactor vessel head penetrations (9, 43 and 51) that did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled. The reactor vessel head contains a total of 66 penetrations and the volumetric inspection efforts are complete. The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties.
On April 26, 2014, V. C. Summer Station (VCSNS) Unit 1 finalized the inspections of the reactor vessel head penetrations. Confirmatory dye penetrant inspections determined that penetrations 15 and 22 also did not meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1. The station is in a refueling outage (RF21) and the plant is currently shutdown and defueled. The indications are not through wall as indicated by volumetric and bare metal visual inspections. The penetrations will be repaired to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a prior to returning the vessel head to service. The inspection results are reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State of South Carolina and local counties. Notified R2DO (McCoy). |
ENS 50442 | 13 March 2014 12:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10CFR50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub modules for the Virgil C. Summer Units 2 and 3 construction project. In March, 2014, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for welding program deviations associated with the fabrication of sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10CFR50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49882 | 7 March 2014 18:58:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A construction supervisor failed a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Rose). |
ENS 49831 | 15 February 2014 03:45:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | An earthquake was felt in the control room at Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 (VCSNS) at approximately 2223. The earthquake was confirmed with USGS at 2240. An unusual event in accordance with the emergency plan was declared at 2245 and NRC was notified at (2308 EST) via ENS per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i). The plant is stable and continues to operate at 100% power. The licensee has completed preliminary building walkdown inspections with no damage noted. There were no injuries. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
(V.C. Summer Nuclear Station) VCSNS has terminated the (Unusual) Event after walkdowns of the plant were satisfactorily completed and no aftershocks were felt. An update to ENS has also been made. The event was terminated at 1045 (EST) on 2/15/2014. The plant continues to operate at 100% power and the licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2RA (McCree), R2DO (Guthrie), NRR EO (Monninger), NRR (Uhle), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA Ops, DHS NICC, and NuclearSSA via email. |
ENS 49722 | 14 January 2014 18:30:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | Offsite notification to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). At approximately 1330 EST on January 14, 2014, site personnel discovered a fork lift leaking hydraulic oil in the protected area. The estimated amount of hydraulic oil spilled is between 10-15 gallons. Approximately 3 gallons of hydraulic oil from the spill entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. At 1530 (EST) an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. The spill has been contained and clean up efforts are underway. The NRC Residents have been notified. |
ENS 49515 | 5 November 2013 13:26:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | On November 7, 2013, at 0826 EST, an investigation determined that a Fitness for Duty (FFD) policy violation as defined in 10 CFR 26.417(b)(1) had occurred in the Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) FFD Program at the South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 construction site. On November 5, 2013, a CB&I contractor vending machine service employee, in the presence of a CB&I contract security officer, used another contractor vending machine service employee's badge to gain access to the construction site after his badge did not allow access due to being inactivated in an effort to facilitate a random FFD test. The contractor vending machine service employee was escorted out of the construction site. Subsequent investigation uncovered that it was a practice within the contractor vending machine service company to maintain an employee's badge in the vehicle and periodically use it to ensure the badge was not deactivated. The contractor vending machine service company employee badges have been deactivated pending further investigation. The individuals involved in this event are under 10 CFR 26, Subpart K, and do not perform safety or security related work. This event has been entered in the CB&I and SCE&G Corrective Action Programs for resolution and development of appropriate corrective actions. SCE&G is providing this notification in accordance with 10 CFR 26.417(b)(1). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 49582 | 24 September 2013 13:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub modules for the Virgil C. Summer Units 2 & 3 construction project. In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49345 | 16 September 2013 11:00:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At approximately 0700 (EDT) on 9/16/13, site personnel discovered a sewer lift station, in the owner controlled area, overflowing. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. The estimated release volume is between 500-1000 gallons. The release has been stopped. At 1045 an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. A pump failure is suspected to be the cause of the back-up and subsequent overflow. Repair and clean-up is in process. The NRC Residents have been notified. |
ENS 49336 | 10 September 2013 12:52:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | A non-licensed, contract, supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
ENS 49253 | 8 August 2013 23:53:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | W-AP1000 | A contractor supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a follow-up fitness for duty screening. The individual's construction site access was revoked. The Unit 2/3 Resident Inspector has been notified. |
ENS 49213 | 23 July 2013 17:45:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | On July 23, 2013 at 1345 (EDT), the Fitness-for-Duty Snapshot Self-Assessment team identified an anomaly with the Employee Plant Access Control Tracking (EMPACT) program used to randomly select V.C. Summer employees for daily fitness for duty (FFD) screenings. More specifically, when an employee terminates employment at the station, Access Control personnel select 'Exclude from Random' feature in the EMPACT program to remove their name from the program code that randomly selects current employees for daily FFD screenings. When a former employee returns to the station for re-employment, Access Control personnel select 'New Request' within the EMPACT program. The 'New Request' feature is supposed to automatically deselect the 'Exclude from Random' feature, which adds the employee back to the randomly selected population. This feature of the EMPACT program was determined not to be functional. In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4), this program flaw constitutes: 'Any programmatic .... discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit the undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program.' This event has been entered into the station's corrective action program under CR-13-03066. The issue is limited to 53 employees (2.9% of the randomly selected population) that have returned to V.C. Summer for employment in the previous six years. Immediate corrective actions consist of contacting the program vendor, conducting an Access Control Program standdown, and contacting the 53 employees to report for fitness-for-duty screening. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Other utilities known to use the EMPACT software have been contacted. This issue does not affect units 2 or 3 since they use a different system. |