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 Start dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5743119 November 2024 18:50:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1350 (EST) on 11/19/2024, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to an automatic trip of the `B' main feedwater pump turbine. The reactor trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat removal is being accomplished by the steam dumps to the condenser. Emergency feedwater actuated due to low-low steam generator (water) level, as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the 'B' main feedwater pump trip is under investigation. There was maintenance involving the 'B' main feedwater pump at the time of the scram.
ENS 5743219 November 2024 18:50:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1350 (EST) on 11/19/2024, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to an automatic trip of the `B' main feedwater pump turbine. The reactor trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat removal is being accomplished by the steam dumps to the condenser. Emergency feedwater actuated due to low-low steam generator level, as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the 'B' main feedwater pump turbine trip is under investigation.
ENS 5742515 November 2024 15:01:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1001 EST, on November 15, 2024, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to three control element assemblies fully inserting into the core. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the steam bypass control system and main feedwater. Unit 2 was not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The insertion of the three control rods is suspected to be caused by an electrical failure; however, the cause is still being investigated.
ENS 5740830 October 2024 13:05:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone or email: At 0905 EDT, on October 30, 2024, a courtesy notification was made to OSHA for a contractor working at Turkey Point who was transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment of a personal medical condition. Upon arrival at that facility, medical personnel declared the individual was deceased. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 573667 October 2024 21:46:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On October 7, 2024 at 1444 EDT, a contract worker at Turkey Point was transported off-site for treatment at an off-site medical facility. On October 7, 2024 at 1746 EST, a courtesy notification was made to OSHA for an individual who was transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment of a personal medical condition. Upon arrival at that facility, medical personnel declared the individual was deceased. This event is being reported pursuant to accordance 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 574241 October 2024 12:38:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: NextEra Energy Seabrook LLC. makes the following notification under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) of a defect found in a GE - Hitachi Relay, CR120B (Model #DD945E118P0060) during pre-installation bench testing. During bench testing, the relay failed to energize and transfer all associated contacts. The relay was purchased from GE - Hitachi (GEH) as safety-related, GE CR-120B relays. All GE CR-120B relays that were purchased in the same batch as the failed relay were located and quarantined in order to be returned to GEH for forensic testing. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC has concluded that this defect constitutes a substantial safety hazard (SSH). A SSH exists because the nature of the defect was such that, if installed in certain safety-related applications and failed, it would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. On November 12, 2024, the Seabrook site Vice President was notified of the requirement to report this event under 10 CFR 21.21. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification will be provided in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii). Because the defect was discovered prior to installation, there was no impact to safety-related equipment. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5733017 September 2024 05:00:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe following information was provided by NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra) via phone and email: NextEra makes the following notification under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) of a defect found in a Westinghouse relay, model NBFD31S, during pre-installation bench testing. Specifically, the relay was found to not function as required due to its internal plunger not operating properly. This malfunctioning caused the plunger to not fully extend and cause the normally open contacts to remain closed. Investigations completed by Westinghouse determined that the plunger would not function properly because its kickout spring was misaligned due to human error. This relay was procured from Westinghouse for safety related nuclear applications. NextEra has concluded that this defect constitutes a substantial safety hazard (SSH). A SSH exists because of the nature of the defect was such that the relay would not be able to perform its safety function if installed, and would result in a loss of redundancy in a safety related system, in this case, the reactor protection system. On September 17, 2024, the Point Beach Site Vice President was notified of the requirement to report this event under 10 CFR 21.21. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3(ii) will be provided within 30 days. Since this defect was discovered prior to installation, in accordance with station requirements for bench testing, and the vendor has concluded that this event is an isolated case, there were no actual impacts on safety related equipment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Responsible corporate officer: Michael Durbin Site Vice President (920) 755-7854
ENS 5724928 July 2024 22:37:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1837 EDT on 7/28/24, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to inadvertent closure of a main steam isolation valve. During the trip, auxiliary feedwater actuated. All other systems responded normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves and auxiliary feedwater. Unit 2 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5717718 June 2024 07:17:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

The following information was provided by the licensee by email: On 06/18/2024 at 0317 EDT with Unit 2 at 18 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to elevated secondary chemistry levels (sodium and chlorides). The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by auxiliary feedwater and atmospheric dump valves. St. Lucie Unit 1 was unaffected and remains at 100 percent power. This event is being reported pursuant 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: All rods fully inserted. An investigation is underway to determine the root cause of the elevated chemistry levels.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 6/24/2024 AT 1315 FROM BOB MURRELL TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The following retraction was provided by the licensee via email: The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 06/18/2024 at 0652 (EDT) (EN# 57177). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made because of inserting a manual reactor trip due to elevated secondary chemistry levels (sodium and chlorides). After the initial report, Florida Power and Light has concluded that the event did not meet the reporting requirements on 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) since it was part of a normal plant shutdown. Therefore, this event is not considered an unplanned scram and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report per 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 571614 June 2024 17:52:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1352 EDT, on June 4, 2024 with Unit 2 at 92 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of condenser vacuum resulting from a circulating water pump trip. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by steam discharge to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. St. Lucie Unit 1 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 569123 January 2024 17:57:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

At 1257 EST on January 3, 2024, it was determined that a class 1 system barrier had a through wall flaw with leakage. The leakage renders both trains of high pressure safety injection inoperable. The unit is being cooled down to cold shutdown to comply with technical specifications. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officer Report Guidance: At the time of the discovery, the unit was shutdown in mode 3. The unit was experiencing signs of reactor coolant system leakage and a shutdown was initiated in order to search for possible sources. The unit is currently cooling down and proceeding to mode 5, where the safety function is not required.

  • * *UPDATE AT 1257 EST ON 02/12/24 FROM B. MURRELL TO T. HERRITY***

The purpose of this notification update is to retract a portion of a previous report, made on 1/03/2024 at 1257 EST (EN 56912). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of unit 2 high pressure safety injection system inoperable due to reactor coolant barrier through wall leak on the vent line for the 2A2 safety injection tank. Subsequent to the initial report, Florida Power and Light has concluded that the through wall leak rate was insignificant, and therefore the safety injection system's safety-related function was maintained. Therefore, this portion of the event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable to the NRC pursuant 10 CFR 50.72(3)(v)(D). This update does not affect the original 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) report for the degraded condition related to the reactor coolant barrier through wall leak. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5689316 December 2023 01:45:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

At 2045 EST on December 15, 2023, it was determined that the reactor coolant system barrier had a through wall flaw with leakage. The leakage is minor in nature and unquantifiable. The leakage is coming from the welded connection of a vent valve for safety injection tank 2A2 outlet valve rendering both trains of high-pressure safety injection inoperable. The unit is being cooled down to cold shutdown to comply with technical specifications. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The unit was heating up after a maintenance outage. The leak was discovered during mode 3 walkdown.

  • * *UPDATE AT 1254 EST ON 02/12/24 FROM B. MURRELL TO T. HERRITY***

The purpose of this notification update is to retract a portion of a previous report, made on 12/16/2023 at 0404 EST (EN 56893). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of unit 2 high pressure safety injection system inoperable due to reactor coolant barrier through wall leak on the vent line for the 2A2 safety injection tank. Subsequent to the initial report, Florida Power and Light has concluded that the through wall leak rate was insignificant, and therefore the safety injection system's safety-related function was maintained. Therefore, this portion of the event is not considered a safety system functional failure and is not reportable to the NRC pursuant 10 CFR 50.72(3)(v)(D). This update does not affect the original 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) report for the degraded condition related to the reactor coolant barrier through wall leak. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 568387 November 2023 17:00:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 07, 2023 at 1200 EST, it was discovered that all pumps in the Auxiliary Feedwater system were inoperable due to the loss of control power to the 'B' train Emergency Feedwater (EFW) flow control valve which supplies the 'D' steam generator. The redundant 'A' train EFW control valve for the 'D' steam generator remains functional, as well as the capability of the Auxiliary Feedwater system to supply all steam generators. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The 'A' and 'B' EFW Flow Control Valves are arranged in a series configuration for each Steam Generator. Failure of any of the 8 EFW Flow Control Valves to meet its Surveillance Requirements will render all EFW Pumps inoperable per tech specs.
ENS 568292 November 2023 12:15:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On November 2, 2023, at 0715 CDT, it was discovered that the results of a blind performance specimen provided to a Health & Human Services (HHS)-certified testing facility were not as expected. The blind specimen results indicated a false negative for MDA/MDMA and a false positive for amphetamines. Investigation is ongoing to determine if the results are accurate. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(2) and 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee."

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/25/24 AT 1139 EST FROM REX GUNDERSON TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

Follow-up investigation by an independent Health and Human Services laboratory confirmed that the blind specimen in question was analyzed correctly. The error is thought to have occurred during the preparation of the blind specimen, prior to delivery to the site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski) and FFD Group (email).

ENS 5681325 October 2023 01:59:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2159 on 10/24/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was automatically tripped due to an actuation signal into the Unit 3 reactor protection system protection rack during maintenance. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Decay heat is being removed via auxiliary feed water system and the steam dump system. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the automatic reactor trip will be investigated by the licensee.
ENS 5675522 September 2023 22:19:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1819 EDT on 9/22/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a main generator lockout. The probable cause of the main generator lockout was from a lightning strike. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the steam dump system. Unit 4 is not affected. Auxiliary feed water was actuated as expected as a result of the reactor trip. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 566584 August 2023 17:20:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1320 (EDT) on 08/04/2023, with the Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering level in the 3C steam generator. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Decay heat is being removed via the auxiliary feed water system and the atmospheric steam dumps. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of lowering level in the 3C steam generator was unknown at the time of the notification and will be investigated by the licensee.
ENS 5664530 July 2023 19:26:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On July 30, 2023 at 1526 EDT, with unit 1 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to low main turbine electro-hydraulic control oil level. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3. Decay heat removal is being accomplished using the steam dumps in steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency Feedwater actuated due to low-low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 565562 June 2023 18:30:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On June 2, 2023, a blind specimen provided to a laboratory did not analyze as expected. The specimen reported a false negative for amphetamines and a false positive for opiates. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(c)(2) and 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 0909 EDT ON JUNE 22, 2023 FROM ANDREW CORRETTE TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

Follow-up investigation by an independent Health and Human Services laboratory confirmed that the blind specimen in question was analyzed correctly. The error is thought to have occurred during the preparation of the blind specimen, prior to delivery to the site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R1DO (Eve) and FFD Group (email)

ENS 565656 May 2023 19:52:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 05/06/2023, at 1552 (EDT) with Seabrook Unit 1 in Mode 3 at zero percent power, while performing digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'E' stopped withdrawing. In response, the reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS). Subsequently, at 2253 while continuing to perform digital rod position indication system surveillance testing, shutdown bank 'C 'stopped inserting. Reactor trip breakers were manually opened, initiating a valid actuation of the RPS. The RPS responded as designed during both events, and both actuations are being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5647415 April 2023 15:12:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1112 EDT on 4/15/23, it was determined that the (reactor coolant system) RCS pressure boundary does not meet ASME Section XI, Table IWB-341 0-1, `Acceptable Standards,' due to through wall leak of the flux mapper seal table guide tube H-6. Corrective actions have been scheduled. `This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). A follow-up review of the condition revealed that 10 CFR 50.72 notification was applicable within 8 hours of the time of discovery on 04/15/23. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5656412 April 2023 15:07:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 12, 2023, with Seabrook Station Unit 1 in Mode 6 at zero percent power, a valid actuation of the 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) emergency power sequencer occurred due to a loss of power to the 'B' train emergency bus. The 'B' EDG was removed from service for scheduled maintenance during this time. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of the 'B' EDG emergency power sequencer. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 562648 December 2022 19:02:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1402 EST Turkey Point Unit 3, while operating at 100 percent, declared an Unusual Event due to unidentified leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute for more than 15 minutes. The abnormal procedure for Reactor Coolant System leakage was entered. The plant remains at 100 percent power. The cause of the leakage is under investigation. At 1446 EST it was verified that the leak had been isolated. The plant remains at 100 percent power. Unit 4 was unaffected. State and local authorities were notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Dest (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 12/08/22 AT 1621 (EST) FROM SZEMEI CHOI TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

Turkey Point Unit 3 has isolated the leak. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1558 EST. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller), NRR EO (Miller), and IR MOC (Crouch). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Dest (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM BRANDEN NATHE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1446 EST ON 1/9/2023 * * *

Turkey Point Nuclear Unit 3 is retracting this notification based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification, Following the event for unidentified RCS leakage on 12/8/22 at 1403 EST, additional information demonstrated that an RCS leak did not exist. A review of indications showed that the in-service seal water return filter D/P (Differential Pressure) rose from 1 psid to 6 psid with a corresponding rise in VCT (Volume Control Tank) level as would be seen with an increase in excess letdown flowrate. Additionally, the on-contact radiation dose rate from the excess letdown piping in the U3 Pipe and Valve Room was measured by RP (Radiation Personnel) to be significantly higher than normal with no other sources of elevated radiation levels noted. Following the closure of CV-3-387, RCS To Excess Letdown HX (Heat Exchanger) Control Valve, a nominal input/output flow balance was able to be restored. Containment parameters including pressure, temperature, sump level and radiation level did not change during the event. Due to the shared nature of piping between excess letdown and seal water return, a challenge to system integrity would not allow RCP (Reactor Coolant Pump) controlled bleed-off to remain in service with a normal flow balance which it has at all times subsequent to the event. Turkey Point Nuclear reported initially based on the available information at the time and to ensure timeliness with emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5613530 September 2022 20:08:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1608 (EDT) on September 30, 2022, it was discovered that both trains of the chemical volume and control system were simultaneously inoperable due to an unisolable piping flaw inside containment detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following a refueling outage. St. Lucie Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM RICHARD ROGERS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1155 EDT ON 11/11/2022 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 09/30/2022 at 1713 EDT (EN 56135). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of U1 Chemical and Volume Control System inoperable due to a piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following a refueling outage. Subsequent to the initial report, FPL (Florida Power and Light) has concluded that the flaw identified in line 2"-CH-109 did not exceed (with sufficient margin) the allowable axial flaw size utilizing the ASME Code Case N-869 methodology, and the Chemical and Volume Control System was operable but degraded for the period of concern. Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5612826 September 2022 21:41:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1741 EDT on September 26, 2022, it was discovered that both trains of the chemical volume and control system were simultaneously inoperable due to an unisolable piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following refueling outage. St. Lucie Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM RICHARD ROGERS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1155 EST ON 11/11/2022 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 09/26/2022 at 2239 EDT (EN 56128). Notification of the event to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring both trains of U1 Chemical and Volume Control System inoperable due to a piping flaw detected during plant pressurization in preparation for startup following a refueling outage. Subsequent to the initial report, FPL (Florida Power and Light) has concluded that the flaw identified in line 2"-CH(1)104 did not exceed (with sufficient margin) the allowable axial flaw size utilizing the ASME Code Case N-869 methodology, and the Chemical and Volume Control System was Operable but degraded for the period of concern. Therefore, this event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 560873 September 2022 02:48:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 09/02/2022 at 22:48 with Unit 1 at 40% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of the only operating main feed pump which caused lowering level in the steam generators. All systems responded as expected following the trip. Auxiliary feed actuation signal occurred due to lowering steam generator levels. The cause of the main feedwater pump trip is under investigation. St. Lucie Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100% power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) for the auxiliary feed actuation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Decay heat is being removed by using the atmospheric dump valves.
ENS 5598912 July 2022 14:51:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1051 EDT on July 12, 2022, Seabrook Station received report of inadvertent siren activation. Local authorities have been contacted to apprise them of inadvertent activation of sirens. No press release is planned at this time. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The inadvertent activation involved one group of nine (9) sirens in the Seabrook Beach area. The cause of the activation is under investigation.
ENS 558317 April 2022 23:00:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1900 EDT on 04/07/22, while Unit 4 was in Mode 4 following a refueling outage, it was discovered that both trains of residual heat removal (RHR) were simultaneously inoperable due to gas voiding. At 2032 EDT corrective actions were completed and both trains of RHR were declared operable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 04/11/22 AT 1022 EST FROM DAVID STOIA TO BRIAN SMITH * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 4/8/2022 at 0110 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 notified the (NRC Operations Center (NRCOC)) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) that both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) were simultaneously inoperable due to the presence of gas voids that were identified during scheduled system gas accumulation testing. Subsequent evaluation by (Florida Power & Light (FPL)) Engineering has concluded that both trains of RHR remained operable and capable of performing their specified safety function. This NRCOC notification is a retraction of EN# 55831. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Miller)

ENS 5580428 March 2022 14:25:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee possessed a prohibited substance (alcohol) within the Protected Area. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold pending results of an investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5578512 March 2022 05:50:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0050 EST on 3/12/22, while shutting down for entry into a scheduled refueling outage, the station discovered that a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (4A MSIV) did not fully close on demand. All other equipment operated as expected. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 04/26/22 AT 1422 EDT FROM DAVID STOIA TO BRIAN PARKS * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 3/12/2022 at 0656 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 notified the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) that a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) did not fully close when manually demanded from the control room during shutdown of Unit 4 for a refueling outage. Following disassembly and inspection of the MSIV, Florida Power & Light Engineering identified the cause of the deficiency and determined that the valve would have fully seated under its design accident conditions. This notification is a retraction of EN# 55785. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 557685 March 2022 15:30:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email: A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5575724 February 2022 21:50:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: A non-licensee contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 556937 January 2022 00:37:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn January 6, 2022 at 1937 (EST), St Lucie Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action 'e', due to Control Element Assembly number 27 slipping from 133 inches to 120 inches withdrawn and unable to be recovered within the prescribed time limits. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Unit 2 entered 6 hour LCO to shutdown to mode 3 at 1539 EST as required by Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 Action 'e'. There was no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 5564110 December 2021 15:24:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn 12/10/2021, at 1024 EST, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering level in the steam generators. All systems responded as expected following the trip. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 and operators restored steam generator level utilizing main feedwater. The cause of the reduction in feedwater flow is under investigation. St. Lucie Unit 2 was not affected and remains at 100 percent power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods inserted into the core during the trip. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. Decay heat is being maintained by steam discharge to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves.
ENS 5557412 November 2021 21:05:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1605 EST on 11/12/21, it was determined that the RCS Pressure Boundary does not meet ASME Section XI, Table IWB-341 0-1, 'Acceptable Standards' due to a through wall leak of the Core Exit Thermocouple Nozzle Assembly. Measures have been taken to establish Mode 5 for corrective actions. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 3/28/2022 AT 0849 EDT FROM DAVID STOIA TO MIKE STAFFORD * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 11/12/2021 EN 55574 reported possible evidence of pressure boundary through-wall leakage observed on a Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) tube. On 3/10/2022, based on laboratory analysis of the affected CET tube section, FPL Engineering determined that there was no pressure boundary through-wall leakage associated with this event. Analysis identified that the leakage likely originated from an adjacent threaded compression fitting on a tubing joint. This condition complies with ASME Section XI requirements and is therefore not reportable. This follow-up NRCOC notification is a retraction of EN 55574. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 555139 October 2021 07:00:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0300 EDT, with Unit 3 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System occurred when steam generator water level rose to 80 percent causing a Feedwater Isolation signal, which tripped the last remaining Steam Generator Feed Pump during plant cooldown. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed when the feedwater isolation signal was received. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the high steam generator level is under investigation.
ENS 5542624 August 2021 11:45:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe following was received from the Point Beach Station Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) via phone call to the Headquarters Operations Officer: Per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1), the Point Beach Station RPM reported to the NRC receipt of a package of radioactive material (new fuel shipment) with removable surface contamination greater than NRC reporting limits. The package was received Tuesday, August 24, 2021, at 0645 CDT. The package was surveyed and it was determined that the external surface of the package contained removable contamination that exceeded the regulatory limit of 240 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters. The measured level of removable contamination was 337.3 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters and contained Cobalt 60. The licensee's corrective actions were to conduct additional smears of the package, trailer, and truck, and to frisk the truck driver to ensure no further contamination. No contamination has been identified.
ENS 5541819 August 2021 13:42:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA covered employee had a confirmed positive during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5539031 July 2021 21:46:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt 1646 (CDT) on 7/31/21, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to control board indications of a Unit 1 'B' Main Feed Pump trip. After the reactor trip, one of the Condenser Steam Dump valves cycled to intermediate and remained stuck. The Condenser Steam Dump Valve was isolated locally using manual isolation valves. The 'B' Feed Regulating Bypass Valve did not control in automatic and was taken to manual to control the level in 'B' Steam Generator. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically actuated as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves due to condenser unavailability. Unit 2 is unaffected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. During the transient, all control rods inserted into the core. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. During the transient, no relief valves or safeties lifted. The plant is currently maintaining normal operating temperature and pressure with all safety equipment available. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
ENS 5538428 July 2021 17:45:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5515325 March 2021 01:29:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAn Unusual Event was declared at Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Generating Station at 2129 EDT on 03/24/2021 due to a Fire Alarm in Containment. The licensee was not able to validate the alarm within 15 minutes. Following containment entry there was not smoke or fire present. At 2214 EDT, Turkey Point Unit 4 Nuclear Generating Station terminated the Unusual Event. The cause of the spurious fire alarm is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), R2DO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 551171 March 2021 16:12:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 3/1/21 at 1112 EST, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP), the reactor automatically tripped. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide Steam Generator (S/G) water level control. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods are inserted, decay heat is being removed via S/G through normal secondary systems. The plant is in a normal electrical line-up. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is (unknown at this time and is) being investigated. There was no effect on Unit 4.
ENS 5510920 February 2021 23:30:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1830 (EST) on 02/20/21, Turkey Point Nuclear Station Security identified three distressed individuals, potentially drowning, in the bay just offshore of the Owner Controlled Area. The licensee contacted the U.S. Coast Guard and local sheriffs department for assistance. At 1852 all 3 individuals were reported as safe and onshore. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5507820 January 2021 23:22:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CEOn 1/20/2021 at 1822 EST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Motor Control Center 2B2. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Auxiliary feed-water automatically actuated on the 2A Steam Generator post trip. Current decay heat removal is the 2B main feedwater pump to both steam generators and the Steam Bypass Control System to the main condenser. Unit 1 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5503614 December 2020 17:40:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1240 EST on 12/14/20, it was determined that all Unit 4 Charging Pumps and Boration Flowpaths were simultaneously inoperable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 2/10/2021 AT 1210 EST FROM DAVID STOIA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

On 1/21/21 a past operability review was completed that assessed the event reported on 12/14/20. The evaluation concluded that the condition did not render any Unit 4 Charging Pump or all boration flowpaths inoperable, and that the 8-hour notification submitted on 12/14/20 was not required. This notification is a retraction of EN #55036. The NRC Site Resident has been notified of the EN #55036 retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 549303 October 2020 14:13:00Point BeachNRC Region 3During a scheduled refueling outage, a walkdown inside containment to investigate leakage revealed a pressure boundary leak upstream of 1RC-526B, HX-1B Steam Generator Channel Head Drain. This location would be considered part of the reactor coolant system as defined under 10 CFR 50.2. As such, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A). Unit 1 is currently in mode 4. Repairs for the condition are being determined. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The leak rate was determined to be 0.138 gpm.
ENS 5484721 August 2020 03:54:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2On 08/20/20 at 2354 (EDT), with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 34% RTP (Rated Thermal Power), the reactor was manually tripped. This was due to Steam Generator Water Level control issues that resulted in the only Steam Generator (S/G) Feed Pump tripping on low suction pressure. Unit 3 reactor was tripped manually upon the loss of the last running feed pump. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOPs have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) The NRC Resident Inspector bas been notified. Decay heat removal is by the steam dumps to atmosphere. Unit 4 is not affected. The cause of the low suction feed pressure to the steam generator feed pump is under investigation.
ENS 5484419 August 2020 17:25:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2On 08/19/20 at 1325 EDT, during Unit 3 startup at approximately 0 percent rated thermal power, the reactor automatically tripped. The trip was automatically initiated from the Source Range Nuclear Power Instrumentation. All other systems operated normally. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by Steam Dumps. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the Source Range Nuclear Power Instrumentation trip is under investigation.
ENS 5483918 August 2020 01:13:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2On 08/17/20 at 2113 EDT, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 92% (Rated Thermal Power) RTP, the reactor was manually tripped. This was due to a turbine runback caused by CV-3-2011, Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Control Valve, failing open, followed by rising Steam Generator (S/G) levels. Unit 3 reactor was tripped manually when the 3C S/G Level reached 78% narrow range. Unit 3 Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed manually in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) network due to 38 MSR Main Steam Stop valve position indication lost. All other systems operated normally. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide S/G water level control. EOPs have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods are inserted, decay heat is being removed via S/G through normal secondary systems. The plant is in normal electrical line up. Lightning strike is believed to be the initial cause of the runback.
ENS 5482610 August 2020 17:58:00Duane ArnoldNRC Region 3

At 1258 CDT on August 10, 2020, Duane Arnold Energy Center declared an Unusual Event due to a loss of offsite power due to high winds. The event at the single unit plant resulted in an automatic scram from 82 percent power (Mode-1) to zero percent power (Mode-3). They are headed to Mode-4. There is damage on site, but the Reactor Building is intact. All rods inserted and cooling is being addressed via Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) for level control and Safety Relief Valves are removing decay heat to the torus. Both Standby Diesel Generator are running. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Iowa Department of Emergency Management, and the Linn County and Benton County Emergency Management agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 08/10/2020 AT 1554 EDT FROM CURTIS HANSEN TO OSSY FONT * * *

This report is being made under CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) for an automatic reactor scram due to loss of offsite power due to high winds. In addition, this report is being made under CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) and (B) due to PCIS ((Primary Containment Isolation System)) Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (activating) due to loss of offsite power. All isolations went to completion. RCIC injecting for level control. All rods fully inserted during the scram. The plant electrical line up is both SBDGs (Standby Diesel Generators) are running. Decay heat is being removed via SRVs (Safety Relief Valves) to the torus. Progress towards shutdown cooling. NRC Senior Resident (Inspector) notified at 1448. Notified R3DO (Pelke).