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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5722010 July 2024 09:32:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On July 09, 2024, at 0455 CDT the National Weather Service reported to Cooper Nuclear Station that the National Warning System radio tower near Shubert, Nebraska was not working. The Shubert Tower transmitter activates the Emergency Alert System/Tone Alert Radios used for public notification. Additional information from the National Weather Service received July 10, 2024, at 0455 CDT determined that the Shubert Tower transmitter was not able to be repaired within 24 hours and is still non-functional. A backup notification system has been verified to be available during this period. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability. Due to the unplanned loss of the primary notification system for greater than 24 hours, this condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), since the backup alerting methods do not meet the primary system design objective. A backup notification system is available to use for notifications if needed. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 572062 July 2024 10:08:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1928 CDT on May 13, 2024, River Bend Station (RBS) was operating in Mode 1 at 100 percent power when an invalid isolation signal actuated multiple containment isolation valves in more than one system. The invalid isolation signal was caused by voltage perturbations on the offsite power distribution system due to multiple lightning strikes in the vicinity of RBS. The event caused one containment isolation valve to isolate in the floor and equipment drains system, and two containment isolation dampers to isolate in the auxiliary building ventilation system. This event was a partial system isolation for the affected systems and did not result in a full train actuation. This event meets the reportable criteria for 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and is being reported as any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). This notification is being provided in lieu of a Licensee Event Report as indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The valve and dampers were immediately re-opened. The standby gas treatment system automatically initiated due to the closure of the containment isolation dampers in the auxiliary building ventilation system.
ENS 5717516 June 2024 16:41:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On June 16, 2024, at 1233 CDT, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 was operating at 93 percent power when an automatic reactor trip occurred. Immediately following the reactor trip, emergency feedwater (EFW) actuated automatically. The unit is currently in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat removal is via the main condenser. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally after the reactor trip, except steam generator (SG) feedwater pump 'A' tripped and SG '1' main feed regulatory controller went to manual. Steam generator water levels are being controlled with the SG feedwater pump 'B'. The cause of the trip is currently being investigated. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the EFW system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5714023 May 2024 11:24:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: During a security inspection, it was determined that some past events at Entergy sites that were not reported may have met the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). As a result, the following event at Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 is now being conservatively reported: On May 15, 2023, a condition report was written to document that an individual who should have been placed in a follow-up fitness for duty program was not tested according to this program. The individual was no longer badged at Waterford 3 but is currently badged at another Entergy site. The resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5713923 May 2024 11:24:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: During a security inspection, it was determined that some past events at Entergy sites that were not reported may have met the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). As a result, the following events at River Bend Station, Unit 1 are now being conservatively reported: On March 21, 2023, a condition report was written to document that an individual who should have been placed in a follow-up fitness for duty (FFD) program was not tested according to this program. On May 11, 2023, a subsequent condition report was written to document that a different individual who should have been placed in a follow-up FFD program was not tested according to this program. The resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5713823 May 2024 11:24:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: During a security inspection, it was determined that some past events at Entergy sites that were not reported may have met the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). As a result, the following event at Grand Gulf, Unit 1 is now being conservatively reported: On May 11, 2023, a condition report was written to document that an individual who should have been placed in a follow-up fitness for duty program was not tested according to this program. The resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5713723 May 2024 11:24:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: During a security inspection, it was determined that some past events at Entergy sites that were not reported may have met the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). As a result, the following events at Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 are now being conservatively reported: On February 2, 2023, a condition report was written to document that an individual who should have been placed in a follow-up fitness for duty (FFD) program was not tested according to this program. On September 6, 2023, a subsequent condition report was written to document that a different individual who should have been placed in a follow-up FFD program was not tested according to this program. The resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5712312 May 2024 00:09:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax, email, and phone: At 2030 CDT on May 11, 2024, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 (ANO-1) determined that the State of Arkansas should be notified after greater than 100 gallons of refueling canal water overflowed from the borated water storage tank (BWST) onto the ground inside the protected area outside the ANO-1 Auxiliary Building. The activity for transferring water from the ANO-1 refueling canal to the BWST was stopped and the tank level was lowered to stop the overflow. None of the spilled liquid was introduced into a storm drain or other pathway to Lake Dardanelle. This condition did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) was unaffected by this event. This notification is being made as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers report guidance: The area where the liquid spill occurred is being controlled and a spill remediation plan is in progress.
ENS 5712211 May 2024 22:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1655 CDT, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 was in Mode 3 with all control rod element assemblies (CEA) fully inserted with reactor trip circuit breakers closed and individual CEA disconnects open for plant startup. During the performance of emergency feedwater surveillance testing, reactor protection system (RPS) trip set point and emergency feedwater actuation system (EFAS) initiation set point for steam generator level low was exceeded for steam generator 1. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods remain fully inserted. This event is being reported as a eight-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the RPS and emergency feedwater systems. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5705326 March 2024 16:21:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On March 26, 2024 at 1115 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station experienced an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) due to high reactor coolant system pressure. The plant was in Mode 4 at zero percent power and performing scram time testing. All rods were fully inserted at the time of the RPS actuation, and all required equipment responded as designed. This actuation is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The cause of the event is under investigation. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5704222 March 2024 01:17:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

The following information was provided by the licensee: A Notification of Unusual Event, HU4.4 (see note below) was declared based a fire in the protected area requiring off site assistance to extinguish. The fire was in the main transformer yard. The fire was detected at 2328 CDT on March 21, 2024, and the fire was declared out at 0009 CDT on at March 22, 2024. An automatic reactor trip was initiated due to a loss of offsite power to the "B" train and a failure to automatically transfer from unit auxiliary transformer "B" to startup transformer "B. The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC remained in Normal. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email). NOTE: Due to a typographical error initiating condition HU4.1 was initially recorded for the event. The correct initiating condition is HU4.4 as now shown.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0345 EDT ON 03/22/24 FROM LARRY GONSALES TO BILL GOTT * * *

The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 0221 CDT on 3/22/24. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gepford), IR-MOC (Grant), NRR-EO (Felts), DHS-SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0420EDT ON 03/22/24 FROM JOHN LEWIS TO BILL GOTT * * *

RPS ACTUATION The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On March 21, 2024, at 2328 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 was operating at 98 percent power when an automatic reactor trip was initiated due to a loss of offsite power to the B train and a failure to automatically transfer from unit auxiliary transformer B to startup transformer B. Emergency feedwater actuation signal 2 (EFAS), safety injection actuation signal (ECCS), containment isolation actuation signal and emergency diesel generators automatically actuated. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted and all other plant equipment functioned as expected. Forced circulation remains with one reactor coolant pump per loop running. Decay heat removal is via the main condenser. A train safety bus is being supplied by off-site power, and B train safety bus is being supplied by emergency diesel generator B. Following the loss of offsite power to the B train, it was reported that main transformer B and startup transformer B were both on fire. The Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at time 2337 CDT. The fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, and the Unusual Event was terminated at 0221 CDT on March 22, 2024. Offsite assistance was requested. The local fire department responded to the site but the fire was extinguished by the on-shift fire brigade. NRC Region IV management was contacted regarding the emergency plan entry at 0030 CDT on March 22, 2024. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system, ECCS, Containment Isolation and Emergency Diesel Generators. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Gepford)

  • * * RETRACTION OF NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT FROM ON 03/26/24 AT 1721 FROM L. BROWN TO K. COTTON * * *

The initial notification in event notice #57042 by Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, reported a Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE) emergency declaration due to a fire in the protected area requiring off site support to extinguish. The basis for retraction of the initial emergency notification is that this event did not meet the definition of a fire in the protected area that requires off site support to extinguish. Guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Rev. 6 and implemented in Waterfords Emergency Plan procedure, initiating Condition HU4.4 states, The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. (NOTE: The Initial Notification Form sent from the Control Room at 2341 CDT on March 21, 2024, requested by and provided to the NRC Headquarter Operations Center via e-mail at 0302 CDT on March 22, 2024, stated that the Emergency Classification had been made on Initiating Condition HU4.4 rather than HU4.1)" When the event occurred on March 21, 2024, the Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at 2337 CDT and requested offsite support based on the information available at that time including the initial assessment by the fire brigade leader and expected need for offsite support to extinguish the fire. As reported in the 0420 EDT update on March 22, 2024, the fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, by the Waterford Fire Brigade without the need of offsite support." Notified R4DO (Kellar).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1209 EDT ON 03/27/24 FROM JOHN LEWIS TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The initial notification in EN 57042 by Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, reported an emergency declaration of an Unusual Event due to a fire in the protected area requiring off site support to extinguish. The basis for the update to the initial notification is that this event did not meet the definition of a Fire in the Protected Area that requires offsite support to extinguish. As provided in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 and implemented in Waterfords emergency plan procedure, initiating condition HU4.4 states, The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Additionally, EAL 4.1 for a fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection in any Table H-1 fire area was not applicable because the fire did not occur in a Table H-1 fire area. When the event occurred on March 21, 2024, the Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at 2337 CDT and requested offsite support based on the information available at that time including the initial assessment by the fire brigade leader and expected need for offsite support to extinguish the fire. As reported in the 0420 EDT update on March 22, 2024, the fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, by the Waterford Fire Brigade without the need of offsite support. (NOTE: The Initial Notification Form sent from the Control Room at 2341 CDT on March 21, 2024, requested by and provided to the Headquarters Operation Center via e-mail at 0302 CDT on March 22, 2024, stated that the emergency classification had been made on initiating condition HU4.4 rather than HU4.1) In accordance with NRC Approved guidance in FAQ 21-02 (ML21117A104), Waterford 3 is retracting the initial event notification made at 0117 EDT on March 22, 2024. The remaining events that were reported in EN 57042 as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW (emergency feedwater) system, ECCS (emergency core cooling system), containment isolation and emergency diesel generators are still applicable and require no additional update at this time. The licensee also provided a site map. Notified R4DO (Kellar)

ENS 5704121 March 2024 16:54:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: At 0548 CDT on March 13, 2024, during a planned (high pressure coolant injection) HPCI maintenance window, a condition was identified not associated with the planned maintenance which caused HPCI to be inoperable. Specifically, the HPCI auxiliary oil pump start stop pressure switch could not be adjusted into calibration. Further investigation found that the pressure switch was not mounted as designed. Since HPCI is a single train system, this is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The condition was corrected prior to HPCI being declared operable on March 15, 2024. The reason for the delay in the event notification beyond 8 hours from the event time was due to not recognizing the need to report the condition while in a planned HPCI maintenance window. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5703216 March 2024 18:36:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1449 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station was operating at 100 percent power when a manual reactor trip was initiated due to main feed isolation valve (FW-184B) and main steam isolation valve (MS-124B) going closed unexpectedly. Emergency feedwater (EFW) was automatically actuated. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally after the reactor trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted as expected. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour nonemergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Decay heat is being removed through the turbine bypass valves and the atmospheric dump valve on loop '2'. There is no primary to secondary system leakage. The cause of the isolations is still being investigated.
ENS 570011 March 2024 13:50:00CooperNRC Region 4The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On August 27, 2022, while in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) identified a 3 drops per minute (dpm) oil leak from the radial (inboard) bearing housing cover on one of four residual heat removal (RHR) service water booster pumps (SWBP); specifically, SWBP-D. Subsequent analysis determined that the leak was a result of a deviation with the configuration of the labyrinth seal drain path. This deviation was due to an error introduced in a manufacturing drawing used by the vendor for the fabrication of four new replacement pumps. The bearing housing cover is a unique design to CNS for the RHR SWBPs. On March 1, 2024, NPPD completed a substantial safety hazard evaluation and determined that the manufacturing drawing error could cause a substantial safety hazard. The NRC Resident Senior Resident has been notified. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification will be provided within 30 days. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: All four SWBPs had a similar housing design. Three of the four pump housings have been replaced. No other nuclear plant is affected due to the housing design being unique to CNS.
ENS 5698922 February 2024 20:02:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1103 CST on February 22, 2024, a potential through-wall steam leak was identified on the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) steam supply 1-inch drain line. As a result, HPCI was declared inoperable. Since HPCI is a single-train system, this is a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) remain operable. Additional investigation is in progress. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5693829 January 2024 16:56:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1005 CST on January 29, 2024, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was conducting surveillance testing on the high pressure core spray system. During testing, the 1E22F012 minimum flow valve failed to return to the full closed position. The valve went from full open indication to dual indication. The event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Troubleshooting is in progress. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: All off-site power is available. No other systems are out of service and there are no compensatory measures taken. There is no increase to plant risk.
ENS 5689416 December 2023 08:22:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On December 16, 2023, at 0350 CST, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was operating in mode 1 at 81 percent power when an automatic scram occurred due to a turbine trip signal. Before the scram the unit was performing a rod sequence exchange, and no critical work was underway. The cause of the turbine trip signal is not known at this time and is being investigated. All control rods fully inserted, there were no complications, and all plant systems responded as designed. Reactor water level is being maintained by main feedwater and condensate. Reactor pressure is being maintained with main turbine bypass valves. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system when the reactor is critical and specified system actuation due to expected reactor water level 3 isolation signals on a reactor scram. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Group 2 and Group 3 isolations occurred on the Level 3 isolation signal.
ENS 5688713 December 2023 05:50:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0102 CST, while operating at 100 percent (reactor) power, River Bend Station experienced an automatic reactor scram caused by a turbine trip signal. The cause of the turbine trip signal is not known at this time and is being investigated. At 0108, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) was initiated due to a loss of reactor feed pumps following feedwater heater string isolation. At 0114, reactor water level control was transferred back to feedwater and RCIC was secured. Reactor water level is being maintained by feedwater pumps and reactor pressure is being maintained by turbine bypass valves. The scram was uncomplicated and all other plant systems responded as designed. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) specified system actuation as result of expected post scram (reactor water) level 3 isolations and manual initiation of RCIC. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the turbine trip, while still under investigation, was likely due to an electrical transient involving the main generator. Walkdowns in the switchyard post-scram identified damage to one of the output breaker disconnects.
ENS 5687529 November 2023 17:02:00Indian PointNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: This notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as a result of notifications made to State and local government agencies for the discovery of an oil sheen in the discharge canal outside Unit 3. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and Westchester County Department of Health were notified. No sheen was observed in the river or at the southern end of the discharge canal near the outfall gates. Clean up efforts are underway. The licensee will notify the NRC Project Manager.
ENS 5686318 November 2023 02:51:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On November 17, 2023, at 2215 CST, River Bend Station (RBS) was operating at 30 percent reactor power performing plant startup activities when an isolation of low-pressure feedwater string `A' occurred. The team entered applicable alternate operating procedures and inserted control rods to exit the restricted region of the power to flow map. Feedwater temperature continued to lower until it challenged the prohibited region of the AOP-0007 graph requiring a reactor scram. The team inserted a manual reactor scram at 2355 from 24 percent reactor power. All control rods fully inserted and there were no complications. All systems responded as designed. Currently RBS Unit 1 is stable with reactor level being maintained 10 to 51 inches with feed and condensate, and pressure being maintained 500 to 1090 psig using steam drains. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation as result of Group 3 isolations. The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The electric plant is in a normal lineup for current plant conditions with all emergency diesel generators available. The cause of the initial isolation of low-pressure feedwater string "A" is still under investigation.
ENS 5684911 November 2023 00:23:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1545 CST on November 10, 2023, personnel at Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 determined that 19 conduits in the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) auxiliary relay cabinets A and B did not have the required fire seals for bay separation. This condition meets the criteria involving an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety. The plant is currently defueled. Decay heat is being removed by normal spent fuel cooling system operations. ESFAS is not required to be operable in the current plant mode. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Region 4 Branch Chief (Dixon) has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/8/2024 AT 1222 EST FROM PETER RAMON TO ERNEST WEST * * *

On November 10, 2023, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 reported in EN 56849 that 19 conduits in engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) auxiliary relay cabinets A and B did not have the required fire seals for bay separation. This condition met the criteria involving an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety. Waterford 3 has determined that the ESFAS auxiliary relay cabinets A and B jumper conduits do not require fire seals based on review of an engineering specification that specifies the size and length of conduits which require fire seals to be installed. None of the nineteen affected conduits meet the size and length criteria that would necessitate installation of a fire seal. Based on this, the condition described in EN 56849 is not considered to be an unanalyzed condition that significantly affects plant safety as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and therefore is not reportable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy)

ENS 568345 November 2023 17:52:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1033 CST on November 5, 2023, while in a refueling outage, it was determined that Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, did not meet the performance criteria for steam generator structural integrity in accordance with Technical Specification 6.5.9.b.1, Steam Generator Program, due to two tube failures in the number 1 steam generator. The condition was identified during performance of in-situ pressure testing. The affected tubes will be plugged. The plant is currently stable with all fuel in the spent fuel pool. Decay heat is being removed by normal spent fuel cooling system operation. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a degraded condition. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5682531 October 2023 14:20:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: On October 31, 2023, at 0800 CDT, River Bend Station discovered that the results of a blind performance sample provided to an Health and Human Services (HHS)-certified testing facility were inaccurate (false negative). This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). The HHS-certified testing facility has been informed of the error. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 0946 EDT ON NOVEMBER 2, 2023 FROM MICAH NAVARRO TO SAMUEL COLVARD * * *

On November 1, 2023, River Bend Station personnel were informed by the HHS-certified testing facility that the cut-off levels used for analysis of the performance testing sample in question were the correct (higher) cut-off levels currently being used by the licensee. This resulted in a correct negative test. The performance testing sample sent to the HHS-certified testing facility was purchased for use based on the new lower cut-off levels in accordance with the new fit for duty (FFD) rule being implemented by the licensee on November 6, 2023. Because the higher confirmatory cut-off levels were used at the HHS-certified testing facility, the results provided were correct. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R1DO (Eve) and FFD Group (email)

ENS 5681122 October 2023 16:40:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via fax and phone: On October 22, 2023, at 1149 CDT, with the reactor at 100 percent core thermal power and steady state conditions, the Cooper Nuclear Station secondary containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.1 limit of -0.25 inches water gauge. The condition existed for approximately 80 seconds until the reactor building ventilation system responded to restore differential pressure to normal. Investigations identified a hinged duct access hatch found open. The hatch was closed and latched, and ventilation system parameters were returned to normal. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable as a result of not meeting TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: At the time the licensee notified the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer, the cause of the hinged access duct being open had not been determined. This event has been added to the licensee's corrective action program.
ENS 5678610 October 2023 19:44:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: On October 10, 2023, at 1553 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) was notified of a spurious actuation of a single alert notification system siren in Nemaha, Nebraska. The CNS Emergency Alert System (EAS) was not activated. The actuation occurred during siren testing conducted at approximately 1545 CDT. No emergency conditions are present at Cooper Nuclear Station. A press release from Nebraska Public Power District is not planned at this time. This condition is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made which is related to heightened public or government concern. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Offsite notification was to local Nemaha County Emergency Management.
ENS 567277 September 2023 23:35:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On September 7 at 1230 CDT, Arkansas Nuclear One personnel identified 5 bottles of vanilla extract in kitchen areas located inside the Protected Area. A total of 5 bottles were identified. The bottles ranged in sizes of 1 to 4 ounces. Ingredients were listed as vanilla extracts in water and alcohol. The percentage by volume of alcohol varied from 13 - 41 percent. This report satisfied the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 26.719. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 567247 September 2023 10:01:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On September 6 at 15:00 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station personnel identified a bottle of vanilla extract in a kitchen area located within the Protected Area. Ingredients were listed as 'pure vanilla extract in water and alcohol. The percentage by volume of alcohol was not specified. It was subsequently determined that the alcohol by volume was likely 35 percent. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 567226 September 2023 19:22:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: A supplemental contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
ENS 5669624 August 2023 21:30:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On August 23, 2023 at 2100 CDT, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was notified that a non-licensed supervisor violated the station's Fitness for Duty policy. The employee's unescorted access at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station has been terminated. This event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5664430 July 2023 17:25:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On July 30, 2023 at 1119 CDT, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 declared the control room envelope inoperable in accordance with technical specification (TS) 3.7.6.1 due to the control room envelope doors failing a door seal smoke test creating a breach in the control room envelope. Operations entered TS 3.7.6.1 Action b. Mitigating actions were implemented and tested satisfactorily by 1215 CDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, due to the control room envelope being inoperable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 09/12/23 AT 1357 EDT FROM MONICA PEAK TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The original operability determination of inoperable was made based on a conservative evaluation that with presence of smoke in-leakage through Door 261 and 262, the CRE boundary could not perform its safety function. A more detailed engineering evaluation was subsequently performed. No maintenance or intrusive testing was performed on the doors after initial test failure. As documented in version 2 operability determination for condition report WF3-2023-14604, the CRE boundary remained intact for the condition identified and was able to fulfill its safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Warnick).

ENS 5664126 July 2023 09:10:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6The following information is a synopsis provided by the licensee via email: River Bend Station completed an internal Part 21 evaluation concerning a motor driven relay that failed pre-installation testing due to a buildup of corrosion between the rotor and relay core. The relay was planned for use in the Remote Shutdown System. The NRC Resident has been notified. A written notification will be provided within 30 days. Affected known plants include only River Bend at the time of the notification.
ENS 5659829 June 2023 15:41:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 565098 May 2023 06:25:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: At time 0207 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) entered Technical Specification (Limiting Condition for Operation) LCO 3.0.3 due to declaring core spray subsystems A and B inoperable. This declaration was based on an issue with relays installed from the same manufacturing batch. The ability of the relays to function correctly to annunciate loss of logic power was called into question and they were declared inoperable. The plant has initiated actions to repair/replace affected relays. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as an initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications. In addition, this event Is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function for the core spray systems. NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/8/2023 AT 1335 EDT FROM ANDREW ASKINS TO BRIAN LIN * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 0805 CDT on May 8, 2023. A reasonable expectation of operability was developed for the core spray subsystems A and B. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Shutdown was initiated and power was reduced approximately 45 percent. Reactor power is currently at 55 percent at the time of notification. Notified R4DO (Werner) via email.

  • * * UPDATE ON 5/9/2023 AT 1441 EDT FROM ANDREW ASKINS TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: CNS is retracting the 8-hour 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) non-emergency notification, for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, made on May 8, 2023, at 0207 CDT (EN# 56509). Subsequent evaluation concluded that the core spray subsystems remained operable in accordance with the Technical Specifications Requirements 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating. As a result of the core spray system remaining operable, no loss of safety function occurred. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Werner).

ENS 565034 May 2023 12:25:00Indian PointNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following summary was provided by the licensee via phone: On May 4, 2023 at 1145 EDT, the licensee found contact dose rates of 215 and 555 millirem-per-hour at 2 separate spots on the top of an exclusive use package during receipt survey. These dose rates are above the 200 millirem-per-hour allowable. No loose surface contamination was identified. The package contains tools from Holtec and was intact on delivery. The package has subsequently been secured in a locked radiation storage building. No overexposure or unauthorized exposure resulted to plant personnel. The licensee suspects shielding, internal to the package, may have shifted and the licensee will investigate further. Dose rates at one foot from the package were recorded at 65 millirem per hour.
ENS 565012 May 2023 22:41:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1500 (EDT) on 5/2/2023, it was determined that the commercial telecommunications capacity was lost to the Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) control room and technical support center due to an issue with the telecommunications provider. After discovery of the condition it was discovered that this loss also included the emergency notification system (ENS). Communications link via the satellite phone was tested satisfactorly. In addition, if needed, the satellite phone would be used to initiate call-out of the emergency response organization. The condition did not affect the ENS or commercial telecommunications capabilities at the offsite Emergency Operations Facility. The telecommunications provider has not provided an estimated repair time. PNP will be notifying the NRC resident inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 06/22/23 AT 1358 EDT FROM J. LEWIS TO T. HERRITY * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This notification is being made to retract event EN 56501 that was reported on May 02, 2023. Based on further investigation, the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures provide an acceptable alternative routine communication system, which is satellite phones, for communicating with Federal, State, and local offsite agencies, that are in addition to the primary commercial telephone system. It was determined that no actual or potential loss of offsite communications capability existed per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1, 'Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii),' and NEI 13-01, Revision 0, 'Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.' The NRC Decommissioning Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Commercial telecommunications to the plant were restored at approximately 0600 EDT on 5/3/2023. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski)

ENS 5649126 April 2023 16:30:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5642823 March 2023 16:46:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6

A non-licensed contract supervisor was confirmed to have violated the FFD policy by attempting to subvert the testing process. The individual's authorization for site access was immediately terminated. The licensee notified the R4 Branch Chief (Josey)

  • * * RETRACTION FROM TITUS FOLDS TO JOHN RUSSELL AT 1606 EDT ON 05/03/2023 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The Medical Review Officer (MRO) was provided with additional information on the collection process in question. Based on this additional information, the MRO was unable to conclude with a high degree of certainty that an attempt to subvert the FFD collection process had occurred." Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and via email the FFD Group.

ENS 5640310 March 2023 07:25:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 03/09/2023 at 2200 CST, Waterford (Unit) 3 entered OP-901-111, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, and OP-901-403, High Activity In Containment, due to elevated reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage in containment. On 03/10/2023, at 0030 Operations entered Technical Specification 3.4.5.2 action (c) due to unidentified leakage exceeding 1 gallon per minute (gpm). Technical Specification 3.4.5.2 action (c) requires reducing the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. On 03/10/2023 at 0237 the plant discovered an unisolable RCS leak in the reactor coolant pump 1B cubicle and initiated action to complete a plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications. This event is being reported as a 4-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) as the initiation of plant shutdown required by technical specifications. Reactor was tripped at 0521 CST on 3/10/2023.
ENS 563905 March 2023 03:02:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2300 CST on March 4, 2023, River Bend Station (RBS) was shut down in Mode 5 when an individual was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. Due to the nature of the medical condition, the individual was not thoroughly surveyed prior to being transported offsite. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel. This is an eight-hour notification, non-emergency for the transportation of a contaminated person offsite. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5635114 February 2023 14:40:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4B&W-L-LPThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: On February 14, 2023 at 1103 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, (ANO-1) automatically tripped on reactor protection system actuation due to two reactor coolant pumps tripping. ANO-1 is currently stable in MODE 3 (Hot Standby) maintaining reactor coolant system pressure and temperature with main feedwater and steaming to the condenser. No additional safety system actuations occurred. All immediate actions were completed satisfactorily. There are no indications of a radiological release on either unit as a result of this event. This report satisfies the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the reactor protection system actuation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 was not affected. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee is investigating the cause of the two reactor coolant pump trips.
ENS 563469 February 2023 15:15:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5628220 December 2022 00:24:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2101 (CST) on December 19, 2022, a manual reactor scram was initiated at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS). Following the reactor scram, the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system was used to maintain reactor water level. The manual (reactor protection system) RPS actuation is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) and the HPCS actuation is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3). At 2058, GGNS experienced a loss of a condensate booster pump. At 2101, the `A' reactor feedwater pump tripped and the reactor was manually scrammed. All control rods were fully inserted into the core. At 2104, the `B' reactor feedwater pump tripped and HPCS was manually started. HPCS was manually injected to maintain reactor water level at 2121. The `A' reactor feedwater pump was successfully restarted at 2126. GGNS is currently in Mode 3. Reactor level is being maintained with the `A' reactor feedwater pump and pressure is being maintained with the turbine bypass valves. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5627817 December 2022 04:03:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On December 16, 2022 at 2351 CST, with the Unit in Mode 1 at 13 percent power, a manual scram was inserted due to lowering Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure, which occurred following an unexpected opening of Main Turbine Bypass Valve 1. All control rods fully inserted. Following actuation of the manual scram, RPV pressure lowered, resulting in an automatic Primary Containment lsolation (PCIS) Group 1 isolation (expected response). The main steam isolation valves and steam line drain valves all closed. The Group 1 (isolation) has been reset allowing RPV pressure control with steam line drains to the main condenser. All systems responded as designed. The plant is stable in Mode 3. Investigation of the bypass valve opening is ongoing. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation. There was no impact on health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5622013 November 2022 04:01:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee email: On November 12, 2022, at 2319 CST, an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) initiated a full scram. The plant was in Mode 2, reactor pressure was 149 pounds. The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) injection valve, HPCI-MOV-MO19, opened and injected cold water into the reactor vessel while HPCI system testing was in progress. The cause is still under investigation. All control rods inserted. Plant is currently in Mode 3 and stable. All systems operated as designed with no Primary Containment Isolation System group isolations. This event is being reported under two event classifications: 50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(B) -- "Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. 50. 72(b)(3)(iv)(A) -- "Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The NRC Resident has been informed.
ENS 562149 November 2022 15:37:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 562023 November 2022 14:05:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: This 60-day telephonic notification is being made in lieu of a licensee event report submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid engineered safety feature actuation signal. On September 6, 2022, at Waterford 3, while performing a plant protection system (PPS) power supply check, technicians observed an abnormally high voltage output. When the technicians opened the PPS bay cabinet door to adjust the voltage, they then observed low voltage indications. The direct cause of this issue is believed to be vibration induced relay chattering or an intermittent connection issue when opening the rear doors of PPS cabinets. This resulted in half the logic being met for the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal (ESFAS) signals to fully actuate. The ESFAS signal opened the following valves: EFW-228A (EFW to SG 1 Primary Isolation), EFW-229A (EFW to SG 1 Backup Isolation), EFW-228B (EFW to SG 2 Primary Isolation) and EFW-229B (EFW to SG 2 Backup Isolation). This was a partial actuation of ESFAS. Affected plant systems functioned successfully. The inadvertent actuation was caused by a spurious signal and was not a valid signal resulting from actual parameter inputs. The 1992 Statements of Consideration define an invalid signal to include spurious signals including jarring of a cabinet door. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) a telephone notification is being made in lieu of submitting a written licensee event report. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. These events did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.
ENS 5619231 October 2022 15:29:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On February 22, 2021 while in Mode 1 and at 100 percent power, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) identified through surveillance testing that the 208 foot elevation outer containment personnel airlock door failed its technical specification leakage test. Analysis indicated that the airlock equalizing valves were leaking due to lack of lubrication during installation. Subsequent analysis determined that the lubrication was to have been performed during a vendor's qualification / dedication process. GGNS completed a substantial safety hazard Evaluation and determined that the failure to lubricate the valve components constituted a substantial safety hazard. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified. This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification will be provided within 30 days. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: This condition has been corrected. This report is submitted to meet 10 CFR Part 21 reporting requirements.
ENS 5618527 October 2022 19:49:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1228 CDT on October 27, 2022, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was in Mode 1 at 88 percent power when a failure of a draw down surveillance resulted in the loss of secondary containment. During the performance of the surveillance GGNS was unable to maintain secondary containment pressure, as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.4, greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of water vacuum for 1 hour at a flow rate of less than or equal to 4000 cfm. The test was secured. Secondary containment was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 A.1 was entered at 1228 CDT. Secondary containment was restored to operable status at 1240 CDT by restoring the configuration to a previously known operable condition. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5617422 October 2022 17:36:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: During Mode 5 Refueling operations, while attempting to establish flow through the Fuel Pool Cooling system filter demineralizers, an air operated valve to a radioactive waste tank failed to close automatically. This caused the Fuel Pool Cooling system to pump water from the Skimmer Surge Tanks (SST) to the radioactive liquid waste system. In response to the loss of inventory from the SSTs, the Control Room operating crew started Core Spray Pump A to restore normal operating level In the SST. This prevented the loss of the Fuel Pool Cooling/Alternate Decay Heat Removal system which was the only in service system meeting the safety function of decay heat removal. Core Spray Pump A was used for Injection for less than 3 minutes. This is reportable as a discharge of ECCS into the RCS in response to an event, but not part of a pre-planned sequence under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) and actuation of a specified system under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(Iv)(A). The resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Licensee reported approximately 6000-7000 gallons of water was injected into the RCS. The stuck open air operated valve was closed. Proceeding with refueling outage operations.
ENS 5617120 October 2022 11:31:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0427 CDT on October 20, 2022, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power when a failure of a draw down surveillance resulted in the loss of secondary containment. During the performance of the surveillance GGNS was unable to maintain secondary containment pressure, as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.4, greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of water vacuum for 1 hour at a flow rate of less than or equal to 4000cfm. The test was secured. Secondary containment was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 A.1 was entered at 0427 CDT. Secondary containment was restored to operable status at 0520 CDT by restoring the configuration to a previously known operable condition. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.