Semantic search
| Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57328 | 17 September 2024 23:38:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: At 2005 EDT on 9/17/2024, it was discovered that steam propagation door DRCB/501 would not latch properly; thus making the door inoperable. Door DRCB/501 is required as a steam propagation barrier to protect both trains of engineered safety feature equipment from effects of a postulated steam line break. Due to this inoperability, the plant was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Steam propagation door DRCB/501 was repaired and maintained in the closed and latched position at 2032 EDT on 9/17/2024. |
| ENS 57291 | 26 August 2024 16:54:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 8/26/2024 at 1200 CDT, Farley Nuclear Plant Medical Services identified a false negative quality assurance test. (The contracted laboratory) was provided an adulterated sample of hydrocodone and hydromorphone that was part of a blind performance test. The results from the (contracted laboratory) returned a false negative. This false negative test result will be investigated, and the results reported as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(c)(3). The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officer Report Guidance: The contracted laboratory was a U.S. Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) certified laboratory.
The following update was provided by the licensee via email: Following further review of the event, it has been determined that this issue is not reportable under 10CFR26.719(c)(3) as the unsatisfactory test was not for a validity screening test. This event is reportable for testing errors in accordance with 10CFR26.719(c)(1) and a 30 day report will be submitted. Notified R2DO (Suber) and FFD Group (email). |
| ENS 57278 | 20 August 2024 23:32:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: At 2001 EDT on 8/20/2024, it was discovered that both trains of the control room ventilation system were simultaneously inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. One train of control room ventilation was restored to operable status at 2107 EDT on 8/20/2024. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: While performing canister maintenance on train B, it was discovered that the dampener for train A failed to close. Train B was restored at the conclusion of maintenance.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: This event is also reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), loss of emergency assessment capability, as the technical support center facility is located inside the control room envelope. Notified R2DO (Masters) |
| ENS 57213 | 8 July 2024 11:04:00 | Harris | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax and email: On July 8, 2024, at 0748 EDT, six emergency response sirens were inadvertently actuated. Four sirens are located in Chatham County and two sirens are in Wake County. The first notification was made to Wake County at 0754. Investigation is ongoing to determine the cause of the actuation. Duke Energy notified the state and all counties within the emergency planning zone (EPZ). A press release was issued by Wake and Chatham Counties. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for the notification of another government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 57158 | 2 June 2024 19:22:00 | Surry | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: Surry Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped at 1708 EDT on 6/2/24 due to a turbine trip (with the reactor operating at greater than 10 percent reactor power). The turbine control system is currently under investigation. Reactor coolant temperature is being maintained via main steam dumps with main feedwater supplying the steam generators. All systems operated as required. The trip was uncomplicated and all control rods fully inserted into the core. There was no emergency core cooling system (ECCS) or auxiliary feedwater system actuation. Offsite power remains available. There is no impact to Surry Unit 2. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for 4-hour notification of reactor protection system activation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There were no radiation releases, personnel injuries, or contamination events due to this event. |
| ENS 57155 | 30 May 2024 22:52:00 | Harris | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: On May 30, 2024, at 1949 EDT, Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100 percent power due to an electrical fault on the B unit auxiliary transformer. The unit has been stabilized in mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and all control rods fully inserted into the core. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system and Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 57148 | 29 May 2024 08:50:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: On May 29, 2024, at 0624 EDT, Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100 percent power due to a negative rate trip. The unit has been stabilized in mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and all control rods fully inserted into the core. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The auxiliary feedwater pumps actuated as designed because of the reactor trip and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system and Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The NRC Resident has been notified. |
| ENS 57132 | 19 May 2024 01:21:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0030 (EDT) on 5/19/24, with Beaver Valley Unit 1 in mode 1 at 14 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to inability to control the A steam generator water level. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump automatically started on a valid actuation signal. All control rods inserted into the core. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the feedwater system and the main condenser. Beaver Valley Unit 2 is unaffected. Due to the reactor protection system system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the emergency safety feature system actuation (automatic start of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump) while critical, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been verbally notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Unit 1 is stable on off-site power, normal configuration. All emergency systems are available. |
| ENS 57115 | 9 May 2024 11:48:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0800 EDT on May 9, 2024, it was identified during leak rate testing that through-wall flaws existed on reactor plant river water piping inside the containment building. This determination resulted in a containment bypass condition such that a gaseous release could have occurred at a location not analyzed for a release in the loss of coolant accident dose consequence analysis. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents. Evaluation of the condition of the piping is ongoing to support repair prior to startup. With the plant currently in cold shutdown, the containment, as specified in Technical Specification 3.6.1, is not required to be operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 57105 | 3 May 2024 17:16:00 | Surry | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1630 EDT on 5/3/2024, the supervisor of nuclear site safety contacted the Area Director of OSHA to notify them of a workers foot injury requiring removal of a toe to the first joint. This was a 24 hr notification in accordance with 29 CFR 1904.39. The NRC Residents have been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The individual was not contaminated or working in a radiological area at the time of injury. |
| ENS 57075 | 13 April 2024 03:55:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 0035 EDT on April 13, 2024, with Unit 1 at 97 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to 1 of 3 reactor coolant pump (RCP) low flow reactor trip (signal) associated with a loss of the A and B 4160 volt normal buses. Auxiliary feedwater and the 1-1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started on valid actuation signals. The 1-1 EDG sequenced on to supply all required loads per plant design. All control rods fully inserted and the trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators have responded and stabilized the unit in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser via the condenser steam dump system with steam generators being supplied by the main feedwater system. Unit 2 is not affected by the event. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Due to the valid actuations of auxiliary feedwater and the 1-1 EDG, this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Power for the A-E Bus is on the 1-1 EDG. The D-F Bus is on offsite power. One electrical train of offsite power is down. |
| ENS 57017 | 8 March 2024 13:59:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone call: A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive fitness for duty test. Unescorted access for the individual has been denied at all Dominion Energy sites. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56978 | 19 February 2024 06:32:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On February 19, 2024, at 0236 EST, with VC Summer Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the `B emergency diesel generator (EDG) occurred. The reason for the `B EDG auto-start was the trip of 1 `DB normal incoming breaker. The `B EDG automatically started as designed when the undervoltage signal was received. The `B emergency feedwater pump started due to the undervoltage signal and ran for approximately 1 minute and was secured by operations per procedure. Other plant equipment and systems also responded as expected. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the `B EDG and a valid actuation of the `B emergency feedwater pump. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The `A Emergency Diesel Generator was tagged out for maintenance earlier in the shift, but maintenance has not started. The plan is to restore the `A emergency diesel generator to an operable status and investigate the cause of the 1 `DB normal incoming breaker trip. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: This event resulted in the plant entering a 12 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) in accordance with technical specification (TS) 3.8.1.1.C. due to having one operable EDG and a loss of offsite power.
VC Summer is retracting event notification (EN) 56978 regarding the unexpected actuations of the B emergency diesel generator and B emergency feedwater pump on 02/19/2024. Both were previously reported as valid actuations under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Subsequent evaluation has determined that the actuations were the result of an invalid signal caused by equipment failure on the 1 DB bus undervoltage control circuit. The event, its cause, and corrective actions were reported in VC Summer licensee event report 2024-001-00 (ML24108A143) on 04/17/2024, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel as a result of the actuations. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Franke) |
| ENS 56971 | 16 February 2024 05:34:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0048 CST on February 16, 2024, with Unit 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of 2A 125V DC distribution panel. The trip was complex due to the loss of components associated with A-train DC power. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred due to low-low steam generator levels. The AFW auto-start is an expected response with low-low steam generator levels from the reactor trip. AFW is still currently controlling steam generator levels. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56864 | 19 November 2023 00:53:00 | Harris | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 2138 EST on November 18, 2023, Harris Nuclear Plant notified the National Response Center of a biodegradable oil leak that entered the Harris Lake. The North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality will also be notified of this condition on November 19, 2023. The oil leak was less than one gallon and came from a temporary pump. The leak has stopped, and spill cleanup is underway. This condition did not violate any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification to another government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56852 | 14 November 2023 14:36:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1041 CST on 11/14/23 with Farley Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 10 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to rising steam generator levels. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) was manually initiated in accordance with plant procedures and is feeding the steam generators. Heat removal is being provided via the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: All rods fully inserted. The licensee attempted to take manual control of the feedwater control valves to lower steam generator level but, due to reaching a steam generator level that requires a manual trip, the licensee manually tripped the reactor. |
| ENS 56813 | 25 October 2023 01:12:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2159 on 10/24/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was automatically tripped due to an actuation signal into the Unit 3 reactor protection system protection rack during maintenance. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Decay heat is being removed via auxiliary feed water system and the steam dump system. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the automatic reactor trip will be investigated by the licensee. |
| ENS 56787 | 11 October 2023 11:00:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid specific system actuation of the North Anna Power Station Unit 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). On 6/18/2023, a comparator card power supply associated with 1-CH-PC-1121A, charging pressure low-standby pump start signal comparator, failed and caused the `A' and `B' charging pumps to auto-start and the previously running `C' charging pump to trip and lock-out. This event is considered an invalid system actuation because the actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters and was not a manual initiation. The ECCS pumps functioned as expected in response to the actuation. The `A' Charging pump was shut down in accordance with plant procedures following replacement of the comparator card. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The reportability requirement was determined beyond the 60-day notification requirement on 9/21/2023. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56784 | 9 October 2023 21:52:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed employee supervisor failed a test specified by the fitness for duty testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56774 | 3 October 2023 12:55:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1154 EDT on 10/03/23, investigation into a boric acid indication was determined to be through a leak on a weld-o-let upstream of a pressurizer level transmitter isolation valve. Unit 2 is currently in MODE 6 with reactor coolant system (RCS) operational leakage limits not applicable. The leak is not quantifiable as it only consists of a small amount of dry boric acid at the location. The failure constitutes welding or material defects in the primary coolant system that are unacceptable under ASME Section XI. Therefore, this is a degraded condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 56755 | 22 September 2023 22:09:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1819 EDT on 9/22/2023, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a main generator lockout. The probable cause of the main generator lockout was from a lightning strike. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by the steam dump system. Unit 4 is not affected. Auxiliary feed water was actuated as expected as a result of the reactor trip. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56743 | 18 September 2023 14:48:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 09/17/2023 at 2218 (EDT), Operations identified that the bearing cooling (BC) tower basin was overflowing. Earlier in the day, the BC tower was isolated as part of a planned maintenance evolution and the overflow condition was due to isolation valve leak-by. At 2255, the leak-by was corrected and stopped the overflow. Approximately 75 gallons may have been discharged to the lake from the overflow. The BC water was sampled by Chemistry and all chemical parameters were within VP DES (Virginia Pollutant Discharge Elimination System) limits. At 1420 on 09/18/23, a 24-hour notification was made to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) in accordance with the North Anna VPDES permit. This issue is being reported per 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(xi) due to the notification of other government agency. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 56658 | 4 August 2023 15:30:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1320 (EDT) on 08/04/2023, with the Unit 3 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering level in the 3C steam generator. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post-trip. Decay heat is being removed via the auxiliary feed water system and the atmospheric steam dumps. Unit 4 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of lowering level in the 3C steam generator was unknown at the time of the notification and will be investigated by the licensee. |
| ENS 56618 | 11 July 2023 17:42:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1530 (EDT) on 7/11/2023, North Anna Power Station notified the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) that a small volume of filtered/purified water potentially discharged into Lake Anna from a leak from a reverse osmosis unit. The leak did not follow the normal release path for discharge through outfall 013. No environmental impact associated with this leak was observed or would be expected because the water in question is cleaner than the lake water, and would have met all discharge requirements for outfall 013. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). |
| ENS 56612 | 7 July 2023 12:51:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This is a non-emergency notification required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). A written notification in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) will be provided within 30 days. Steam generator emergency feedwater header discharge isolation check valves (XVC01009A-EF, XVC01009B-EF, and XVC01009C-EF) were designed specifically for and supplied to VC Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) by Flowserve under purchase order 4500653391 to replace the previous valves in the emergency feedwater system during refueling outage 27. On May 11, 2023, after valve installation, but prior to initial service, the socket head cap screws were identified as being shorter than the required design length. Valve drawings indicate a design length of 1.25" while the socket head cap screws received were 0.875". The correct length cap screws were installed prior to initial service. VCSNS completed a substantial safety hazard evaluation and determined that the improper length of the cap screws constituted a substantial safety hazard. This deviation in cap screw length resulted in a partial engagement of the cap screw to the cylinder rod extension and could potentially affect valve operation. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56585 | 22 June 2023 13:50:00 | Robinson | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1035, on June 22, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to `A' train reactor trip breaker and `B' train reactor trip bypass breaker opening during testing. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. MST-021 (Reactor Protection Logic Train `B' At Power) testing was in progress at the time of trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). As a result of the reactor trip, emergency feedwater actuated; therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56569 | 11 June 2023 09:02:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0130 EDT on June 11, 2023, it was discovered that the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 auxiliary building door A-35-5A, credited for tornado missile protection of the primary component cooling water system, was open and unlatched. Upon discovery, the door was shut and latched. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56527 | 19 May 2023 12:33:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0852 (EDT) on May 19, 2023, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at zero percent power, an actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) occurred. The reason for the AFW auto-start was a failed start attempt of the 'B' main feedwater pump. The 'A' and 'B' motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56519 | 16 May 2023 08:09:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: A licensed operator failed a test specified by the FFD testing program. The individual's site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56485 | 22 April 2023 21:35:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1942 EDT on April 22, 2023, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. The reactor vessel vent line penetration will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through-wall as there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified |
| ENS 56474 | 18 April 2023 03:56:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1112 EDT on 4/15/23, it was determined that the (reactor coolant system) RCS pressure boundary does not meet ASME Section XI, Table IWB-341 0-1, `Acceptable Standards,' due to through wall leak of the flux mapper seal table guide tube H-6. Corrective actions have been scheduled. `This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). A follow-up review of the condition revealed that 10 CFR 50.72 notification was applicable within 8 hours of the time of discovery on 04/15/23. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56453 | 5 April 2023 10:25:00 | Summer | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0651 EDT on April 5, 2023, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 85 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to loss of main feedwater pump 'C'. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Main feedwater pump 'B' had previously been removed from service in preparation for a planned shutdown as a part of refueling outage RF27. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the emergency feedwater system. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) resulting from valid actuation of the reactor protection and emergency feedwater systems. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee continues to investigate the loss of main feedwater pump 'C'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 56435 | 28 March 2023 08:59:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56374 | 20 February 2023 17:07:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: At 1618 EST on February 20, 2023, North Anna Power Station notified the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) that water discharged into Lake Anna following hydrostatic testing of tanks associated with a new on-site sewage treatment plant had exceeded the project's general permit (VAG83) pH value. Hydrostatic test water discharge activities to Lake Anna began on February 20, 2023 at 0900 EST. A pH sample was collected at 0955 EST on February 20, 2023 and determined to have a pH of 9.1 which exceeded the maximum permit pH of 9.0. Discharge ceased after the reading was collected. Approximately 354 gallons were discharged to Lake Anna. A follow-up ambient pH sample result of 7.8 was collected on February 20, 2023 at 1401 EST from Lake Anna in the vicinity of the discharge pipe. No evidence of dead fish, foam, or other negative environmental impacts were observed. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for 'Any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.'
The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone: The licensee called to correct the pH sample results from a pH of 9.1 to a pH of 9.93. Notified R2DO (Miller) via phone |
| ENS 56350 | 12 February 2023 14:41:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: At 0800 on February 12, 2023, it was discovered that both trains of control room emergency ventilation system were simultaneously inoperable due to a safety injection relief valve discharging to a Unit 1 sump. This leakage in conjunction with design basis loss of coolant accident may result in radiological dose exceeding limits to the exclusion area boundary and to the control room, which is common to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an 'Unanalyzed Condition and a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function.' There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Retraction of EN56350, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable: Based on subsequent evaluation, it was determined that the control room emergency ventilation system remained operable due to the maximum measured leak rate being within the bounds of the analysis. The maximum measured leak rate of 32,594 cc/hr from the safety injection system did not challenge the calculated maximum engineered safety features leak rate of 45,600 cc/hr and remained within the current dose analysis limits. As such, this was not an unanalyzed condition and did not prevent the fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett). |
| ENS 56329 | 1 February 2023 13:40:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0956 CST with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex with all safety related systems responding normally post-trip. During the trip, the non safety related '1A' 4160V bus lost power resulting in the loss of one Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP-1A). Operations responded and stabilized the plant. The '1A' 4160V bus was re-energized at 1031 CST. Decay heat is being removed by steam dumps to the main condenser. Farley Unit 2 is not affected. An automatic actuation of (Auxiliary Feedwater) AFW also occurred, which is an expected response from the reactor trip. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56264 | 8 December 2022 14:39:00 | Turkey Point | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1402 EST Turkey Point Unit 3, while operating at 100 percent, declared an Unusual Event due to unidentified leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute for more than 15 minutes. The abnormal procedure for Reactor Coolant System leakage was entered. The plant remains at 100 percent power. The cause of the leakage is under investigation. At 1446 EST it was verified that the leak had been isolated. The plant remains at 100 percent power. Unit 4 was unaffected. State and local authorities were notified by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Dest (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
Turkey Point Unit 3 has isolated the leak. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1558 EST. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller), NRR EO (Miller), and IR MOC (Crouch). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Dest (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
Turkey Point Nuclear Unit 3 is retracting this notification based on the following additional information not available at the time of the notification, Following the event for unidentified RCS leakage on 12/8/22 at 1403 EST, additional information demonstrated that an RCS leak did not exist. A review of indications showed that the in-service seal water return filter D/P (Differential Pressure) rose from 1 psid to 6 psid with a corresponding rise in VCT (Volume Control Tank) level as would be seen with an increase in excess letdown flowrate. Additionally, the on-contact radiation dose rate from the excess letdown piping in the U3 Pipe and Valve Room was measured by RP (Radiation Personnel) to be significantly higher than normal with no other sources of elevated radiation levels noted. Following the closure of CV-3-387, RCS To Excess Letdown HX (Heat Exchanger) Control Valve, a nominal input/output flow balance was able to be restored. Containment parameters including pressure, temperature, sump level and radiation level did not change during the event. Due to the shared nature of piping between excess letdown and seal water return, a challenge to system integrity would not allow RCP (Reactor Coolant Pump) controlled bleed-off to remain in service with a normal flow balance which it has at all times subsequent to the event. Turkey Point Nuclear reported initially based on the available information at the time and to ensure timeliness with emergency declaration and reporting notification requirements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller). |
| ENS 56190 | 31 October 2022 00:40:00 | Harris | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2057 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System occurred during an attempt to start the 'B' Main Feed Pump. The reason for the AFW system auto-start was due to the 'A' electrical bus being under clearance and the 'B' Main Feed Pump not starting, resulting in a valid actuation signal for loss of both Main Feedwater pumps. The 'A' and 'B' motor-driven AFW (MDAFW) pumps were running prior to the attempted start of the B Main Feedwater pump and continued to run. The MDAFW Flow Control Valves (FCVs) went full open automatically as designed when the MDAFW actuation signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56189 | 30 October 2022 09:43:00 | Harris | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0653 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 16 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to an under-voltage condition on the 'A' reactor coolant pump (RCP) and the 'C' RCP. Power was lost from the 'A' auxiliary bus while performing an operating procedure to transfer power from the 'A' start-up transformer to the 'A' unit auxiliary transformer. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the atmosphere using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56186 | 28 October 2022 02:24:00 | Harris | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2050 EDT (on October 27, 2022), with Unit 1 in Mode 3, it was discovered that all auxiliary feedwater pumps were simultaneously inoperable and the capability to supply the 'B' steam generator was not maintained; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The function of the auxiliary feedwater pumps to supply the 'A' steam generator and 'C' steam generator was maintained. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56112 | 17 September 2022 13:06:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the Southern Nuclear Company via email: At 2257 EDT on 09/16/2022, it was determined that there was a programmatic vulnerability of the Fleet FFD program. Specifically, it was determined that some individuals were not placed into the follow-up pool for additional screening when required by the program. All identified personnel were in the random FFD pool, and were subject to the behavioral observation program. This is reportable in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(4) for all Units and 10CFR26.417(b)(1) for Vogtle Units 3&4. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified. See EN#s 56113, 56114, and 56115. |
| ENS 56095 | 7 September 2022 15:06:00 | Surry | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | A licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. Unescorted access for the individual has been denied at all Dominion Energy sites. |
| ENS 56088 | 4 September 2022 20:30:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | At 1939 EDT, the North Anna Power Station Units 1/2 declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) under emergency declaration HU1.1 confirmed security event. Both units were unaffected by the event. The licensee exited the NOUE at 2036 EDT. |
| ENS 56075 | 28 August 2022 07:08:00 | Harris | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: (On 8/28/2022) at 0329 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a 'B' train main feedwater pump trip. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Steam generator levels are being maintained by AFW through the AFW flow control valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. The reason for the 'B' train main feedwater pump trip is under investigation. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The cause of the 'B' train main feedwater pump trip is suspected to be the result of an electrical transient due to the alarms that the operators received. In addition, the 'A' train main feedwater pump also tripped subsequent to the reactor trip and that cause is still under investigation. |
| ENS 56073 | 27 August 2022 12:13:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0810 EDT on August 27, 2022, with Unit 2 at 27% power, the operating crew received an annunciator for a Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip. At 0812 EDT, a report came in from the field of a fire in the north yard due to an "A" Main Transformer upper bushing failure. The station fire brigade was dispatched and offsite assistance was requested. However, at 0842 EDT the fire was put out, prior to needing the offsite assistance. No Emergency Action Level threshold was exceeded for this event. The switchyard is in a normal alignment for providing offsite power to Unit 2. At 1015 EDT, the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) was notified of the event. Additionally, a notification to the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality will be made due to approximately 100 gallons of oil reaching the ground. As such, this issue is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for "'Any event or situation for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made.' The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 56028 | 3 August 2022 16:25:00 | Farley | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1258 CDT on August 3, 2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to the supply breakers of the 1B startup transformer opening. The fast dead bus transfer for the reactor coolant pumps did not occur during the event. Currently the plant is in Mode 3 on natural circulation. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by steaming with atmospheric relief valves. Unit 2 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the 1B diesel occurred because of the power loss to the 1G 4160V bus. Additionally, the actuation of motor driven and turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (AFW) also occurred. AFW auto-start is an expected response from this reactor trip. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the 1B diesel and the auxiliary feedwater system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55953 | 21 June 2022 16:52:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1547 EDT on June 21, 2022, it was determined that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 experienced a reportable chemical leak. Approximately 261 gallons of a Sodium Hypochlorite/Sodium Bromine mixture reached the ground and approximately 130.5 gallons (of the 261 gallons) progressed to the Ohio River (via storm drain). The source of the leakage has been isolated and absorbent material has been placed to contain the leakage. Following confirmation of this leakage, notifications were made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1615 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report # 1339391) Pennsylvania Department Of Environmental Protection Beaver County Emergency Management This condition is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55943 | 15 June 2022 09:47:00 | Beaver Valley | NRC Region 1 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0724 EDT on 6/15/2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering Steam Generator levels due to a secondary plant perturbation in the Heater Drain System. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected and remains at 100 percent power and stable. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55873 | 3 May 2022 14:48:00 | North Anna | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A non-licensed Dominion Energy supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 55868 | 29 April 2022 07:49:00 | Harris | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0405 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: No Tech Spec limits were exceeded. Offsite power is available. The suspected cause for the loss of condenser vacuum is when performing the scheduled monthly swap of condenser vacuum pumps, a suction valve failed to shut. |