Text

Technical Specifications Revision to Allow File Movement with Refueling Interlocs Inoperable
	ML070530309
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	02/13/2007
From:	Stinson L; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR/ADRO
References
	NL-07-0258
	Download: ML070530309 (50)
	v • d • e

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 -1 295 February 13, 2007 Docket Nos.:

50-321 50-366

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SOUTH ERN&

COMPANY Energy to Serve Yourworld'"

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Refueling Interlocks Inoverable Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.90, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposes to revise the Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to Operating License DPF-57 and NPF-5, respectively.

On September 2,2003, SNC submitted a TS change proposal to allow in-vessel fuel movement with the refueling interlocks inoperable. The change was consistent with TSTF-225, Revision 2 and also contained a provision to decrease the frequency of the refueling interlock Channel Functional Test. As a result of mutual agreement, SNC withdrew the September 2 submittal, via a letter dated June 25,2005.

This letter requests that same change without the decrease in the frequency of the refueling interlock Channel Functional Test. The proposed change is consistent with the current BWRl4 Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-1433, Volume 1, Revision 3.0. provides a description and justification of the proposed change. Enclosure 2 contains the 10 CFR 50.92 evaluation and the justification for the exclusion from performing an environmental evaluation. Enclosure 3 provides the marked-up and clean-typed TS and TS Bases changes.

In accordance with the requirement of 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this letter and all applicable attachments will be sent to the designated state official of the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-05-1479 Page 2 Mr. L. M. Stinson states he is Vice President of the Southern Nuclear Operating Company and is authorized to execute the oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the statements set forth in this letter are true.

SNC requests this submittal be reviewed and approved no later than January 30,2008.

The proposed changes would be implemented within 30 days of issuance of the amendment.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY L. M. Stinson Vice President Fleet Operations Support

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Enclosures:

Enclosure 1 - Description and Justification for Change - No Significant Hazards Evaluation and Environmental Assessment - Marked-up and Clean-typed Technical Specifications and Technical Specifications Bases Pages cc:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President - Hatch RTYPE: CHA02.004 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager - Hatch Mr. D. S. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector -Hatch State of Georgia Mr. L. C. Barrett, Commissioner - Department of Natural Resources Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Inoperable Reheling Interlocks Description and Justification for Change Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Inoperable Refueling Interlocks Description and Justification for Change This is a proposed change to the Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks."

Specifically, an alternate Required Action is being proposed if the refueling interlocks become inoperable. This new ACTION will safely permit continued fuel movement provided:

a) a continuous rod withdrawal block is inserted to replace the conditional rod block provided by the interlocks and, b) all the control rods in the core are verified to be fully inserted.

These changes are based on Revision 2 of TSTF-225, and are completely consistent with Condition A of LC0 3.9.1 of the existing Standard BWRl4 Technical Specifications, NUREG 1433. Revision 2 of the TSTF also includes provisions to decrease the frequency of the channel functional test for the refueling interlocks (SR 3.9.1.1). This submittal does not request the change to the surveillance frequency.

The refueling interlocks are designed to restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent prompt reactivity excursions and that prevent the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling. The interlock circuitry senses the conditions of the refueling equipment and the position of the control rods. Depending on these conditions, the interlocks actuate to prevent the operation of the refueling equipment or the control rods.

There are three types of refueling interlocks:

1) those that prevent control rod motion by causing rod blocks,

2) those that prevent the refueling platform from traveling over the core and,

3) those that prevent hoist operation.

Briefly, the refueling interlocks will not allow fuel to be moved in or near the core unless all control rods are fully inserted. Additionally, they prevent the operation of loaded refueling equipment over the core when any control rod is withdrawn. The interlocks also prevent the withdrawal of any control rod when fuel is loaded on refueling equipment and operating over the core.

The refueling interlocks permit fuel movement to proceed without the need to have a control rod block in effect. Accordingly, the Plant Hatch Technical Specifications do not allow refueling to continue if the refueling interlocks are inoperable. However, there are alternate actions (fully insert all control rods and ensure a rod block is in affect) which will provide the same level of safety. The proposed change will allow the refueling Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Inoperable Refueling Interlocks Description and Justification for Change Page 2 of 2 interlocks to be inoperable and fuel movement to continue if a continuous control rod withdrawal block is placed in effect, and all control rods are verified to be fully inserted.

This will ensure that fuel loading will not occur with a control rod inappropriately withdrawn.

Actions are therefore proposed for LC0 3.9.1 to provide an alternate method for ensuring that the reactor remains shutdown during the refueling process if the refueling interlocks become inoperable.

The proposed ACTIONS are as follows:

LC0 ACTION 3.9.1.A. 1 currently requires the suspension of fuel movements if a refueling interlock is inoperable. This remains unchanged.

Proposed ACTION A.2.1 will state that, as an alternative to the suspension of fuel movements, a control rod block must be placed in effect.

Proposed ACTION A.2.2 will require verification that all control rods are indeed fully inserted. This is in addition to the requirements to periodically verify the position of the control rods already in effect via Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.9.3.1.

ACTIONS A.2.1 and A.2.2 also ensure that unacceptable operations are blocked (e.g.,

loading fuel into a cell with a withdrawn control rod).

This change allows Plant Hatch to continue to safely perform fuel movements in the vessel should the interlocks become inoperable for any reason.

These changes are consistent with the current BWRl4 Standard Technical Specifications (STS), NUREG-1433, Volume 1, Revision 3.0. In fact, the change to LC0 3.9.1 ACTION A is identical with the above referenced current STS. Additionally, the change to Bases ACTION A. 1, A.2.1, and A.2.2 is identical to the wording in the current STS Bases, NUREG-1433, Volume 2, Revision 3.0.

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Inoperable Refueling Interlocks No Significant Hazards Evaluation and Environmental Assessment Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Inoperable Refueling Interlocks No Significant Hazards Evaluation and Environmental Assessment Proposed Change An alternate Required Action is being provided in LC0 3.9.1 if the refueling interlocks become inoperable. Currently, in-vessel fuel movement must be suspended if the refueling interlocks become inoperable. This ACTION is being preserved, but an alternate action is proposed which will allow continued fuel movement provided:

a) that a continuous rod block is inserted to replace the conditional rod block provided by the interlocks, and b) that all control rods in the core are verified to be fully inserted.

10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation In 10 CFR 50,92(c), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) provides the following standards to be followed in determining the existence of a significant hazards consideration:

... a proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22, or for a testing facility, involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: ( I ) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or diflerent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) has reviewed the proposed amendment request and determined that its adoption does not involve a significant hazards consideration based upon the following discussion:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change provides additional actions for an inoperable refueling equipment interlock. The proposed actions will allow fuel movement with inoperable refueling interlocks, however, those actions will require the insertion of a continuous control rod withdrawal block, as well as verification that &l control rods are fully inserted, before the commencement of fuel movement. Since fuel movement with the refueling interlocks operable allows control rod withdrawal under some circumstances, complete prevention of control rod withdrawal with the refueling interlocks inoperable does not increase the likelihood of a reactivity event, and may in fact decrease its probability of occurrence.

Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Inoperable Refueling Interlocks No Significant Hazards Evaluation and Environmental Assessment Page 2 of 3 The refueling interlocks are not designed or otherwise intended to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the fuel handling accident. This proposed change does not involve those structures that could have an effect on the fuel handling accident and its consequences, such as the fuel design, the integrity of the refueling platform, and the integrity of the refueling mast and grapple. Furthermore, the consequences of the refueling accident are not increased since, should that accident occur while operating under the provisions of the alternate actions, all control rods will be fully inserted. The consequences of the fuel assembly insertion error event during refueling are not increased since this proposed change preserves the initial conditions of that transient event, i.e., all control rods inserted.

Implementing these changes will not increase the likelihood of an equipment failure resulting from the use of the refueling cranes and hoists. Such protection is afforded by other plant (owner controlled) specifications and procedures. These documents require testing and maintenance of these components separate from the requirements of LC0 3.9.1.

This submittal does not affect any other system, structure or component that is important with respect to the prevention and mitigation of other accidents or transients.

For the above reasons, this proposed Technical Specifications change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change provides additional actions (the insertion of a control rod block and verification that all control rods are fully inserted) for inoperable refueling interlocks.

This change does not involve any permanent alterations to plant systems or components.

Nor does it involve changes to operational configurations or to the maintenance and testing of systems or components. Consequently, no new modes of operation are being introduced. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Inoperable Refueling Interlocks No Significant Hazards Evaluation and Environmental Assessment Page 3 of 3

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety?

The proposed change provides additional actions for an inoperable required refueling equipment interlock. The new actions will require that all control rods be fully inserted and that a control rod block be in effect. Under the current specifications, control rod withdrawal is allowed during fuel movement under certain conditions. The alternate actions of the proposed specifications will not allow rod withdrawal under any circumstances during fuel movement operations, therefore, this proposed change provides a level of safety at least equivalent to the existing actions.

Consequently, the change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Applicable Regulatorv RequirementsICriteria There are no specific regulatory requirements applicable to the refueling interlocks.

The refueling interlocks provide circuitry which, under certain conditions, initiate a control rod withdrawal block. The requirements of General Design Criteria 26 are applicable to the control rods.

Environmental Assessment 10 CFR 5 1.22(~)(9) provides criteria for the categorical exclusion from performing an environmental assessment. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility requires no environmental assessment if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed license amendment will not:

1. Involve a significant hazards consideration;

2. Result in a significant change in the types, or a significant increase in the amounts of any efluents that may be released off-site, or,

3. Result in a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Southern Nuclear has evaluated the proposed changes and determined that the changes do not involve (1) a significant hazards consideration, (2) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released off-site, or (3) a significant increase in the individual or cumulative occupational exposure. Accordingly, the proposed changes meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 50.22(~)(9), and an environmental assessment of the proposed changes is not required.

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications Revision to Allow Fuel Movement with Inoperable Refueling Interlocks Marked-up and Clean-typed Technical Specifications and Technical Specifications Bases Pages

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)

Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves......................................................................... 3.6.15 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers..................... 3.6.1 7 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers................................... 3.6.1 9 Suppression Pool Average Temperature..................................................... 3.6.21 Suppression Pool Water Level.................................................................... 3.6.24 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling.......................... 3.6.25 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray............................. 3.6.27 Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System........................................ 3.6.29 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration............................................... 3.6.31 Secondary Containment.............................................................................. 3.6.32 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)....................................... 3.6.35 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System...................................................... 3.6.38 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7. 1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System.......................... 3.7.1 Plant Service Water (PSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)............. 3.7.3 Diesel Generator (DG) 1 B Standby Service Water (SSW) System.............. 3.7.6 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System..................... 3.7.8 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System............................................... 3.7.12 Main Condenser Offgas........................................................................... 3.7.1 6 Main Turbine Bypass System................................................................... 3.7.1 8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level.......................................................... 3.7.19 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS............................................................ 3.8.1 AC Sources.

Operating...............................................................................

3.8.1 AC Sources.

Shutdown.............................................................................. 3.8.20 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer. Lube Oil. and Starting Air............................... 3.8.23 DC Sources.

Operating.............................................................................. 3.8.26 DC Sources.

Shutdown...........................................................................

3.8.31 Battery Cell Parameters............................................................................... 3.8.33 Distribution Systems.

Operating............................................................. 3.8.36 Distribution Systems.

Shutdown................................................................. 3.8.39 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks..................................................................

Control Rod Position.................................................................................3..

Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock Control Rod Position Indication Control Rod OPERABILITY.

Refueling.......................................................

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 iii Amendment No. I

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

REFUELING OPERATIONS (continued)

Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level............................................. 3.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR).

High Water Level...................................... 3.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR).

Low Water Level....................................... 3.9 SPECIAL OPERATIONS............................................................................ 3.1 0-1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation....................................... 3.1 0-1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing 3.1 0-3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal.

Hot Shutdown........................................... 3.1 0-5 Single Control Rod Withdrawal.

Cold Shutdown......................................... 3.1 0-8 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal.

Refueling................................. 3.1 0-1 1 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal.

Refueling............................................... 3.10.1 3 Control Rod Testing.

Operating................................................................ 3.1 0-1 5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test.

Refueling........................................ 3.1 0-1 7 DESIGN FEATURES................................................................................

4.0.1 Site....................................................................................................... 4.0.1 Reactor Core............................................................................................... 4.0.1

. Fuel Storage.............................................................................................

4.0.2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS................................................................. 5.0.1 Responsibility..............................................................................................

5.0.1 Organization............................................................................................... 5.0.2 Unit Staff Qualifications.............................................................................. 5.0.5 Procedures.................................................................................................. 5.0.6 Programs and Manuals............................................................................ 5.0.7 Reporting Requirements......................................................................... 5.0.1 8 High Radiation Area.................................................................................. 5.0.21 (continued)

Amendment No.

HATCH UNIT 1

Refueling Equipment Interlocks 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks APPLICABILITY:

The refueling equipment interlocks shall be OPERABLE.

During in-vessel fuel movement with equipment associated with the interlocks.

ACTIONS I

I CONDITION I

REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME One or more required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Suspend in-vessel fuel movement with equipment associated with the inoperable interlock(s).

Immediately SURVEILLANCE Refuel platform position, FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each of the following required refueling equipment interlock inputs:

Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel loaded, 7 days Refuel platform fuel grapple full-up position, I Refuel platform frame-mounted hoist, fuel

loaded, Refuel platform trolley-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, and

g.

Service platform hoist, fuel loaded I

HATCH UNIT 1 Amendment No.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

Battery Cell Parameters.......................................................................... 3.8.33 Distribution Systems.

Operating............................................................. 3.8.36 Distribution Systems.

Shutdown............................................................

3.8.39 REFUELING OPERATIONS.................................................................... 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks................................................................. 3.9.

Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock........................................................ 3.9 Control Rod Position.................................................................................... 3.9 Control Rod Position Indication.................................................................... 3.9 Control Rod OPERABILITY.

Refueling....................................................... 3.9 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level............................................... 3.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR).

High Water Level...................................... 3.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR).

Low Water Level...................................... 3.9 SPECIAL OPERATIONS............................................................................

3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation 3.10.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing 3.1 0-3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal Hot Shutdown........................................... 3.1 0-5 Single Control Rod Withdrawal.

Cold Shutdown........................................ 3.1 0-8 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD)

Removal.

Refueling 3.1 0-1 1 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal.

Refueling 3.10.1 3 Control Rod Testing.

Operating 3.10.1 5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test.

Refueling 3.10.1 7 DESIGN FEATURES 4.0.1 Site 4.0.1 Reactor Core............................................................................................... 4.0-1 Fuel Storage 4.0-2 (continued)

Amendment No.

HATCH UNIT 2

Refueling Equipment Interlocks 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks The refueling equipment interlocks shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

During in-vessel fuel movement with equipment associated with the interlocks.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or more required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE A. 1 Suspend in-vessel fuel movement with equipment associated with the inoperable interlock(s).

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each of the following required refueling equipment interlock inputs:

Immediately Refuel platform position, Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel loaded, Refuel platform fuel grapple full-up position, Refuel platfonn frame-mounted hoist, fuel

loaded, Refuel platform trolley-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, and Service platform hoist, fuel loaded.

FREQUENCY 7 days HATCH UNIT 2 Amendment No.

TS INSERT OR -

A.2.1 Insert a control rod withdrawal block AND A.2.2 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

Immediately Immediately

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5. The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1,2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and CORE ALTERATIONS are not possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

, A.2.1, and A 2 2 I

ACTIONS A. I I

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I quired refueling equipment interlocks e placed in a condition in which the ssel fuel movement with the affected be immediately suspended. This action re not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.

The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input status that are available to unit operations personnel.

(continued)

REVISION HATCH UNIT 1

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5. The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1,2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and CORE ALTERATIONS are not possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

equipment interlocks in a condition in which the

-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Sus~ension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe poiition.

AddBtnsert SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any sariasofsequenti& ovedq@n&*

&am+

steps so that the entire channel is tested.

The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input status that are available to unit operations personnel.

(continued)

REVISION 1 HATCH UNIT 2

B INSERT Alternatively, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 require a control rod withdrawal block to be inserted, and all control rods to be subsequently verified to be fully inserted.

Required Action A.2.1 ensures no control rods can be withdrawn, because a block to control rod withdrawal is in place. The withdrawal block utilized must ensure that if rod withdrawal is requested, the rod will not respond (i.e., it will remain inserted). Required Action A.2.2 is performed after placing the rod withdrawal block in effect, and provides a verification that all control rods are fully inserted. This verification that all control rods are fully inserted is in addition to the periodic verification required by SR 3.9.3.1.

Like Required Action A.l, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 ensure unacceptable operations are blocked (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with the control rod withdrawn).

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued)

Low-Low Set (LLS) Valves 3.6-1 5 Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1 7 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1 9 Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.21 Suppression Pool Water Level 3.6.24 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling.......................... 3.6.25 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray............................ 3.6.27 Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System 3.6.29 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration.............................................. 3.6.31 Secondary Containment 3.6.32 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) 3.6.35 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System 3.6.38 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System.......................... 3.7.1 Plant Service Water (PSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)............ 3.7.3 Diesel Generator (DG) 1 B Standby Service Water (SSW) System............. 3.7.6 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System.................... 3.7.8 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System 3.7.1 2 Main Condenser Offgas 3.7.1 6 Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.1 8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level......................................................... 3.7.1 9 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS............................................................ 3.8.1 AC Sources.

Operating.............................................................................. 3.8.1 AC Sources Shutdown.............................................................................. 3.8-20 Diesel Fuel Oil and Transfer, Lube Oil, and Starting Air.............................. 3.8-23 DC Sources - Operating 3.8-26 DC Sources - Shutdown............................................................................. 3.8-31 Battery Cell Parameters 3.8-33 Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8-36 Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8-39 3.9 -

REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment l nterlocks 3.9-1 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9-3 3.9.3 Control Rod Position................................................................................... 3.9-4 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication.................................................................. 3.9-5 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling...................................................... 3.9-7 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 iii Amendment No.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.9 -

REFUELING OPERATIONS (continuedl 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level.............................................. 3.9-8 3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level..................................... 3.9.9 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR).

Low Water Level...................................... 3.9.1 1 3.10

- SPECIAL OPERATIONS 3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation...................................... 3.10.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing....................................................... 3.10-3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal.

Hot Shutdown.......................................... 3.1 0-5 Single Control Rod Withdrawal.

Cold Shutdown........................................ 3.1 0-8 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal.

Refueling................................ 3.10.1 1 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal.

Refueling............................................... 3.10.1 3 Control Rod Testing.

Operating................................................................ 3.10.1 5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test.

Refueling.......................................... 3.1 0-17 4.0 -

DESIGN FEATURES................................................................................. 4.0-1 4.1 Site............................................................................................................. 4.0-1 4.2 Reactor Core............................................................................................. 4.0.1 4.3 Fuel Storage.............................................................................................

4.0.2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS.............................................................. 5.0.1 Responsibility............................................................................................. 5.0.1 Organization.......................................................................................... 5.0.2 Unit Staff Qualifications.............................................................................. 5.0.5 Procedures................................................................................................. 5.0.6 Programs and Manuals............................................................................... 5.0.7 Reporting Requirements............................................................................. 5.0.1 8 High Radiation Area................................................................................. 5.0.21 HATCH UNIT 1 (continued)

Amendment No.

Refueling Equipment Interlocks 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks LC0 3.9.1 The refueling equipment interlocks shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

During in-vessel fuel movement with equipment associated with the interlocks.

ACTIONS HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-1 Amendment No.

CONDITION A.

One or more required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable.

REQLllRED ACTION A. 1 Suspend in-vessel fuel movement with equipment associated with the inoperable interlock(s).

OR A.2.1 Insert a control rod withdrawal block.

AND A.2.2 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately lmmediately

Refueling Equipment Interlocks 3.9.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

b.

Refuel platform position, SR 3.9.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each of the following required refueling equipment interlock inputs:

c.

Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel loaded, 7 days

d.

Refuel platform fuel grapple full-up position,

e.

Refuel platform frame-mounted hoist, fuel

loaded,

f.

Refuel platform trolley-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, and

g.

Service platform hoist, fuel loaded.

I HATCH UNIT 1 Amendment No.

I

Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock LC0 3.9.2 The refuel position one-rod-out interlock shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position and any control rod withdrawn.

ACTIONS CONDITION A.

Refuel position one-rod-out interlock inoperable.

REQUIRED ACTION A. 1 Suspend control rod withdrawal.

A.2 Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.2.1 Verify reactor mode switch locked in refuel position.

NOTE.............................

Not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after any control rod is withdrawn.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL 'TEST.

FREQUENCY 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 7 days HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-3 Amendment No.

Control Rod Position 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Control Rod Position LC0 3.9.3 All control rods shall be fully inserted.

APPI-ICABILITY:

When loading fuel assemblies into the core.

ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A.

One or more control rods not fully inserted.

SR 3.9.3.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months A.l Suspend loading fuel assemblies into the HATCH UNIT 1 Immediately Amendment No.

1

Control Rod Position lndication 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Control Rod Position lndication LC0 3.9.4 The control rod full-in position indication channel for each control rod shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5.

ACTIONS NOTE...........................................................

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each required channel.

A.

One or more required control rod position indication channels inoperable.

A.1.2 Suspend control rod A. 1.3 Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

A.2.1 lnitiate action to fully insert the control rod associated with the inoperable position HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-5 Amendment No.

I

Control Rod Position Indication 3.9.4 A.

(continued)

ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS' COMPLETION TIME

.CONDITION A.2.2 Initiate action to disarm the control rod drive associated with the fully inserted control rod.

SURVEILLANCE I

FREQUENCY REQUIRED ACTION Immediately HATCH UNIT 1 verify the required channel has no full-in indication on each control rod that is not full-in.

Amendment No.

1

'Each time the control rod is withdrawn from the full-in position

Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling 3.9.5 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling LC0 3.9.5 Each withdrawn control rod shall be OPERABLE.

APPI-ICABILITY:

MODE 5.

ACTIONS CONDITION I

REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A.

One or more withdrawn control rods inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE NO-rE..............................

Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn.

A. 1 Initiate action to fully insert inoperable withdrawn control rods.

Insert each withdrawn control rod at least one notch.

Immediately Verify each withdrawn control rod scram accumulator pressure is 2 940 psig.

FREQUENCY 7 days 7 days HATCH UNIT 1 Amendment No.

1

RPV Water Level 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level LC0 3.9.6 RPV water level shall be r 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.

APPLICABII-ITY:

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV, During movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV, when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated within the RPV.

ACTIONS handling of control rods within the RPV.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS HATCH UNIT 1 SR 3.9.6.1 Verify RPV water level is r 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.

Amendment No.

I 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

RHR - High Water Level 3.9.7 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level LC0 3.9.7 One RHR shutdown cooling subsystem shall be OPERABLE and in operation.

NOTE................................................

The required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem may be removed from operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level 1 22 ft 118 inches above the top of the RPV flange.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months thereafter A.

Required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem inoperable.

B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

A.l Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND B.l Suspend loading irradiated fuel assemblies into the RPV.

(continued)

Immediately B.2 Initiate action to restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

HATCH UNIT 1 3.9-9 Amendment No.

1 Immediately

RHR - High Water Level 3.9.7 B.

(continued)

ACTIONS 8.3 Initiate action to restore required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

B.4 Initiate action to restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.

COMPLETION TIME CONDITION Immediately REQUIRED ACTION Immediately C.

No RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation.

C. 1 Verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method.

C.2 Monitor reactor coolant temperature.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter Once per hour SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.7.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months HATCH UNIT 1 Amendment No.

I

RHR - Low Water Level 3.9.8 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level LC0 3.9.8 Two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE, and one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem shall be in operation.

The required operating shutdown cooling subsystem may be removed from operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level < 22 ft 118 inches above the top of the RPV flange.

ACTIONS A.

One or two required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable.

A.l Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available for each inoperable required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months thereafter B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B. 1 Initiate action to restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

I AND 6.2 Initiate action to restore required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

lmmediately lmmediately (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 Amendment No.

1

RHR - Low Water Level 3.9.8 B.

(continued)

ACTIONS B.3 Initiate action to restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.

1 Immediately COMPLETION TIME CONDITION C.

No RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation.

REQUIRED ACTION C. 1 Verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method.

C.2 Monitor reactor coolant temperature.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation 1 Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

, thereafter I Once per hour SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY HATCH UNIT 1 SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating.

Amendment No.

I 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

TABLE OF CONTENTS ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

Battery Cell Parameters......................................................................... 3.8.33 Distribution Systems.

Operating............................................................. 3.8.36 Distribution Systems.

Shutdown................................................................ 3.8.39 REFUELING OPERATIONS...................................................................... 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks.................................................................. 3.9.1 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock....................................................... 3.9.3 Control Rod Position................................................................................... 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication................................................................... 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY.

Refueling...................................................... 3.9.7 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level.............................................. 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR).

High Water Level..................................... 3.9.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR).

Low Water Level...................................... 3.9.1 1 SPECIAL OPERATIONS........................................................................ 3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation...................................... 3.10.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing....................................................... 3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal.

Hot Shutdown.......................................... 3.10.5 Single Control Rod Withdrawal.

Cold Shutdown........................................ 3.10.8 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD)

Removal.

Refueling........................................................................

3.10.1 1 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal.

Refueling............................................... 3.10.1 3 Control Rod Testing.

Operating..............................................................

3.10.1 5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test.

Refueling.......................................... 3.10.17 DESIGN FEATURES.................................................................................. 4.0.1 Site............................................................................................................. 4.0.1 Reactor Core.......................................................................................... 4.0.1 Fuel Storage.......................................................................................... 4.0.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 iv Amendment No.

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks LC0 3.9.1 The refueling equipment interlocks shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

During in-vessel fuel movement with equipment associated with the interlocks.

ACTIONS A.

One or more required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable.

A. 1 Suspend in-vessel fuel movement with equipment associated with the inoperable interlock(s).

A.2.1 Insert a control rod withdrawal block.

A.2.2 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

Immediately Immediately Immediately HATCH UNIT 2 Amendment No.

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNC'TIONAL TEST on each of the following required refuelirrg equipment interlock inputs:

b.

Refuel platform position,

c.

Refuel platform fuel grapple, fuel loaded,

d.

Refuel platform fuel grapple full-up position,

e.

Refuel platform frame-mounted hoist, fuel

loaded,

f.

Refuel platform trolley-mounted hoist, fuel loaded, and

g.

Service platform hoist, fuel loaded.

7 days HATCH UNIT 2 Amendment No.

1

Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock LC0 3.9.2 The refuel position one-rod-out interlock shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position and any control rod withdrawn.

ACTIONS CONDI'TION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Refuel position one-rod-out interlock inoperable.

A. 1 Suspend control rod withdrawal.

A.2 Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I

SURVEILLANCE 1

FREQUENCY SR 3.9.2.1 Verify reactor mode switch locked in refuel position.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.9.2.2 NOTE.............................

Not required to be performed until 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after any control rod is withdrawn.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL 'TEST.

7 days HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-3 Amendment No.

I

Control Rod Position 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Control Rod Position LC0 3.9.3 All control rods shall be fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY:

When loading fuel assemblies into the core.

ACTIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- I - - -

A.

One or more control rods A.l Suspend loading fuel not fully inserted.

assemblies into the core.

SURVEILLANCE Immediately I

FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3.1 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months HATCH UNIT 2 Amendment No.

1

Control Rod Position lndication 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Control Rod Position lndication LC0 3.9.4 The control rod full-in position indication channel for each control rod shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5.

ACTIONS NOTE............................................................

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each required channel.

HATCH UNIT 2 CONDITION A.

One or more required control rod position indication channels inoperable.

Amendment No.

1 REQUIRED ACTION A. 1.1 Suspend in-vessel fuel movement.

AND A.1.2 Suspend control rod withdrawal.

AND A.1.3 Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

OR -

A.2.1 Initiate action to fully insert the control rod associated with the inoperable position indicator.

AND -

COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately Immediately Immediately (continued)

Control Rod Position Indication 3.9.4 A.

(continued)

ACTIONS CONDITION A.2.2 Initiate action to disarm the control rod drive associated with the fully inserted control rod.

REQUIRED ACTION Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS HATCH UNIT 2 COMPLETION TIME SLIRVEILLANCE Verify the required channel has no full-in indication on each control rod that is not full-in.

Amendment No.

1 FREQUENCY Each time the control rod is withdrawn from the full-in position

Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling 3.9.5 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling LC0 3.9.5 Each withdrawn control rod shall be OPERABLE.

APPI-ICABILITY:

MODE 5.

ACTIONS A.

One or more withdrawn Initiate action to fully control rods inoperable.

insert inoperable withdrawn control rods.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS NOTE...............................

Not required to be performed until 7 days after the control rod is withdrawn.

Verify each withdrawn control rod scram accumulator pressure is 2 940 psig.

Insert each withdrawn control rod at least one notch.

7 days 7 days HATCH UNIT 2 Amendment No.

I

RPV Water Level 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level LC0 3.9.6 RPV water level shall be r 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.

APPLICABILITY:

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV, During movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV, when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated within the RPV.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A.

RPV water level not within limit.

HATCH UNIT 2 A.l Suspend movement of fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV.

SR 3.9.6.1 Verify RPV water level is r 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV.

Amendment No.

1 Immediately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

RHR - High Water Level 3.9.7 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level LC0 3.9.7 One RHR shutdown cooling subsystem shall be OPERABLE and in operation.

NOTE..............................................

The required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem may be removed from operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level 122 ft 118 inches above the top of the RPV flange.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months thereafter A.

Required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem inoperable.

Immediately A.l Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available.

B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND B.l Suspend loading irradiated fuel assemblies into the RPV.

(continued) 8.2 Initiate action to restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

HATCH UNIT 2 3.9-9 Amendment No.

1 Immediately

RHR - High Water Level 3.9.7 ACTIONS required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

isolation capability in secondary containment alternate method.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE I

FREQUENCY HATCH UNIT 2 SR 3.9.7.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating.

Amendment No.

I 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

RHR - Low Water Level 3.9.8 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level LC0 3.9.8 Two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE, and one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem shall be in operation.

NOTE.................................................

The required operating shutdown cooling subsystem may be removed from operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months period.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level < 22 ft 118 inches above the top of the RPV flange.

ACTIONS CONDITION I

REQUIRED ACTION

( COMPLETION TIME A.

One or two required RHR shutdown cooling subsystems inoperable.

A. 1 Verify an alternate method of decay heat removal is available for each inoperable required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months thereafter B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B. 1 Initiate action to restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

B.2 Initiate action to restore required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

Immediately Immediately (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 Amendment No.

1

RHR - Low Water Level 3.9.8 ACTIONS B.

(continued) isolation capability in secondary containment penetration flow path subsystem in operation.

Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY HATCH UNIT 2 SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating.

Amendment No.

I 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5. The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1,2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and CORE ALTERATIONS are not possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

A.l, A.2.1, and A.2.2 With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LC0 does not apply. Therefore, Required Action A.l requires that in-1 vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Alternatively, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 require a control rod withdrawal block to be inserted, and all control rods to be subsequently verified to be fully inserted. Required Action A.2.1 ensures no control rods can be withdrawn, because a block to control rod withdrawal is in place. The withdrawal block utilized must ensure that if rod withdrawal is requested, the rod will not respond (i.e., it will remain inserted). Required Action A.2.2 is performed after placing the rod withdrawal block in effect, and provides a verification that all control rods are fully inserted. This verification that all control rods are fully inserted is in addition to the periodic verification required by SR 3.9.3.1.

Like Required Action A.l, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 ensure unacceptable operations are blocked (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with the control rod withdrawn).

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.9-3

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. 'The CHANNEL FLINC'l7ONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.

The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input status that are available to unit operations personnel.

REFERENCES

1.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

2.

FSAR. Section 7.6.3.

3.

FSAR, Section 14.3.3.3.

4.

FSAR, Section 14.3.3.4.

5.

NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

HATCH UNIT 1 REVISION 1

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continued)

APPI-ICABILITY In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5. The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks.

In MODES 1, 2,3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and CORE ALTERATIONS are not possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

ACTIONS A.l, A.2.1, and A.2.2 With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LC0 does not apply. Therefore, Required Action A.l requires that in-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Alternatively, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 require a control rod withdrawal block to be inserted, and all control rods to be subsequently verified to be fully inserted. Required Action A.2.1 ensures no control rods can be withdrawn, because a block to control rod withdrawal is in place. The withdrawal block utilized must ensure that if rod withdrawal is requested, the rod will not respond (i.e., it will remain inserted). Required Action A.2.2 is performed after placing the rod withdrawal block in effect, and provides a verification that all control rods are fully inserted. This verification that all control rods are fully inserted is in addition to the periodic verification required by SR 3.9.3.1.

Like Required Action A.l, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 ensure unacceptable operations are blocked (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with the control rod withdrawn).

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.9-3 I

Refueling Equipment Interlocks B 3.9.1 BASES (continuedl SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps so that the entire channel is tested.

The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input status that are available to unit operations personnel.

REFERENCES

1.

10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 26.

2.

FSAR, Section 7.6.1.

3.

FSAR, Section 15.1.13.

4.

FSAR, Section 15.1.14.

5.

NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

HATCH UNIT 2 REVISION I

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MONTHYEAR2007-10-04 [Table View]

NL-07-0258, Technical Specifications Revision to Allow File Movement with Refueling Interlocs Inoperable

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