IR 05000424/2023011
| ML23222A008 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/2023 |
| From: | Alan Blamey Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Brown K Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2023011 | |
| Download: ML23222A008 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2-BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2023011 AND 05000425/2023011
Dear Keith Brown:
On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.
On August 4, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Robert Norris, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for problem identification and resolution programs.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
August 11, 2023 Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Alan J. Blamey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000424 and 05000425 License Nos. NPF68 and NPF81
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000424 and 05000425
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000424/2023011 and 05000425/2023011
Enterprise Identifier:
I2023011-0021
Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Waynesboro, GA
Inspection Dates:
June 12, 2023 to June 30, 2023
Inspectors:
A. Alen, Senior Project Engineer
J. Parent, Resident Inspector
E. Robinson, Resident Inspector
C. Scott, Senior Project Engineer
Approved By:
Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Engineered Safety Features Chillers Performance Data Not Considered During § 50.69 Periodic Review Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000424,05000425/202301102 Open/Closed
[P.4] - Trending 71152B An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.69(e), Feedback and Process Adjustment - Risk-Informed Safety Class 3 (RISC-3), was identified when the licensee failed to identify and consider failures of the engineered safety feature chillers during the periodic review of the essential chilled water system as required by licensee procedure.
Performance Data for RISC3 Structures, Systems, and Components Scoped-Out of the Maintenance Rule (§50.65) not considered during §50.69 Periodic Reviews Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000424,05000425/202301103 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152B An NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.69(e)(3), Feedback and Process Adjustment-RISC3, was identified for the licensees failure to assess performance data for RISC3 structures, systems, and components (SSCs) scoped-out of the maintenance rule (§ 50.65) to determine if adverse SSC performance resulted from the application of alternate treatment (§ 50.69).
Failure to Implement Maintenance Instructions for Component Cooling Water Pump Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000425/202301101 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71152B A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specifications 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to follow procedures for the maintenance and post-maintenance testing of Unit 2 A train (2A) component cooling water (CCW) pump #1. As a result, the 2A CCW pump #1 was rendered inoperable for approximately 26 days.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. Specifically, the team evaluated the licensee's compliance with their Problem Identification and Resolution program, as described in procedure NMP-GM002, "Corrective Action Program," version 16.0 and NRC regulations. The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports (CRs),generated since the last problem identification and resolution inspection (April 2021), associated with the auxiliary feedwater system, component cooling water system (CCW), and the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). These reviews included failures; corrective and preventive maintenance issues; surveillances; reliability; maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) performance; and alternative treatment (10 CFR 50.69)performance. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the CCW and CVCS systems. The corrective actions for the following notice of violation (NOVs), non-cited violations (NCVs), and minor violations (MVs) were evaluated as part of the assessment: NOV 202140101, NCV 202100402, NCV 202200101, NCV 202200201, NCV 202200301, NCV 202200302, NCV 202240301, NCV 202242001, NCV 2023001, and MV 2022002.
Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience. Specifically, the team reviewed issues identified through both NRC and industry operating experience that were documented in the licensee's Problem Identification and Resolution program and evaluated the licensee's compliance with their operating experience program, as described in NMP-GM008, "Operating Experience Program," version 24.0, and NMP-AD028, "10 CFR 21 Evaluations and Reporting Requirements," version 7.0.
Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments. Specifically, the team reviewed and evaluated condition reports generated as a result of completed self-assessments and/or audits required by the licensee's Quality Assurance Topical Report.
Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B 1) Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Problem Identification: With the exception noted below, the inspectors determined that the licensee was effective in identifying problems and entering them into the problem identification and resolution or corrective action program (CAP) and that there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating CRs as described in licensee procedure NMP-GM002, "Corrective Action Program," version 16.0, and management's expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate CRs. Additionally, site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues.
The inspectors reviewed various periodic reviews conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.69(e) for SSCs categorized per § 50.69(c). The inspectors noticed that the licensee did not consider (or screened out) failures of risk-informed safety class 3 (RISC3) SSCs on the bases that alternate treatment (i.e., other than maintenance rule - § 50.65) had not been applied to the affected SSCs despite having removed or scope-out the SSCs from the station's maintenance rule program. The inspectors concluded that the licensee was not assessing failures of RISC-3 SSCs, consistent with the § 50.69 Final Rule (FRN 6968008)and their 50.69 program procedure, to determine if adverse SSC performance resulted from the application of a treatment alternate to the maintenance effectiveness treatment requirements of § 50.65. This issue was determined to be a finding with an associated NCV, and it is documented in this report in the inspection results section.
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation: The inspectors reviewed CRs, technical evaluations (TEs), and completed and/or planned work orders (WOs). With the exceptions noted below, the inspectors concluded that problems were generally, prioritized and evaluate in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM002001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions," version 45.0. The inspectors determined that adequate consideration was given to SSC's operability and associated plant risk. The inspectors determined that, in general, plant personnel had conducted cause evaluations in accordance with licensee's CAP procedures, as described in NMP-GM002GL03, "Cause Analysis and Corrective Action Guideline," version 33.0, and cause determinations were appropriate, and considered the significance of the issues being evaluated.
The inspectors reviewed the § 50.69 periodic review for the essential chilled water (ECW)system for unit 1 and 2 that was completed on December 19, 2022. The inspectors noticed that two failures of the engineered safety feature (ESF) chillers that occurred during the periodic review monitoring period (November 1, 2019, to September 19, 2022) were not included. The inspectors concluded that the omission could potentially prevent the licensee identifying adverse trends in SSC performance resulting from the treatment adjustments allowed by § 50.69. This issue was determined to be a finding with an associated NCV, and it is documented in this report in the inspection results section.
The inspectors noted that NMP-GM002001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions" is not clear regarding all the conditions that the organization needs to take into consideration, such as technical specifications (TS), risk informed completion time (RICT), when determining whether an equipment reliability checklist (ERC) needs to be performed. This observation is document in this report in the inspection results section.
Corrective Actions: The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents, interviewed licensee staff, and verified completion of corrective actions. With the exceptions noted below, the inspectors determined that, generally, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected. The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in developing corrective actions that were appropriately focused. No significant conditions adverse to quality (SCAQ) were identified by the licensee over the 2-year assessment period; therefore, the team focused their review on ensuring that issues entered in the CAP were being properly screened and did not satisfy the criteria for being a SCAQ.
The inspectors reviewed corrective action report (CAR) 280456, "Unit 2 CCW Outboard Bearing Trouble." Inspectors noted that a corrective action (i.e., TE 1097976) initiated to correct a CCW pump maintenance procedure deficiency, as identified in CAR 280456, was closed without a resolution supporting that the required action was completed per CAP procedure NMP-GM002001. The issue was determined to be a minor violation and is documented in this report in the inspection results section.
The inspectors noted that operators do not log CCW pumps' oil levels per recommendations from a 'Large Pump Broadness Review' conducted for a degraded trend associated with oil leaks, oil levels, and/or oiler issues. This observation is documented in this report in the inspection results section.
Following a deficiency involving improperly set variable spring can supports on the nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) system piping, which was discovered by the NRC and documented in inspection report 2023001 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML23114A048), the inspectors noted that a § 50.69(e)feedback and process adjustment review has yet to be conducted by the licensee on the alternative treatment plan for the supports with regards to this issue. This observation is documented in this report in the inspection results section.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's CAP complied with regulatory requirements and self-imposed standards. The licensee's implementation of the CAP adequately supported nuclear safety.
2) Operating Experience The team determined that the licensee's processes for the use of industry and NRC operating experience information were effective and complied with regulatory requirements and licensee standards. The implementation of these programs adequately supported nuclear safety. The team concluded that operating experience was adequately evaluated for applicability and that appropriate actions were implemented in accordance with applicable procedures.
3) Self-Assessments and Audits The inspectors reviewed a sample of completed self-assessments and audits conducted by both plant and nuclear oversight personnel. The inspectors determined that the licensee was effective at performing self-assessments and audits to identify issues at a low level, properly evaluated those issues, and resolved them commensurate with their safety significance. The self-assessments and audits were adequately self-critical and performance-related issues were being appropriately identified. The inspectors verified that CRs were created to document areas for improvement and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations.
4) Safety-Conscious Work Environment The inspectors interviewed a sample of plant employees from various departments with varying roles and responsibilities within the organization. The inspectors determined that employees
- (1) were willing to raise nuclear safety concerns to their supervisor and manager or through the CAP,
- (2) were aware of alternative avenues for raising concerns such as the Employee Concern Program (ECP), and
- (3) had not experienced retaliation for raising safety concerns. Specifically, all individuals interviewed indicated that they feel comfortable in raising safety concerns. All individuals felt that their management was receptive to receiving safety concerns and generally addressed them promptly and commensurate with the significance of the concern. Most interviewees were aware of the licensee's ECP and stated they would use the program, if necessary. When asked whether there have been any instances where individuals experienced retaliation or other negative reaction for raising safety concerns, all individuals interviewed stated that they had neither experienced nor heard of an instance of retaliation at the site. To supplement these discussions, the team reviewed the ECP case log and interviewed the ECP Coordinator to assess their perception of the site employees' willingness to raise nuclear safety concerns. Also, the team reviewed a sample of the most recent Nuclear Safety Culture Leadership Team reports as well as the results from the most recent biennial safety culture survey and self-assessment from July 2022. The team determined that the processes in place to mitigate potential safety culture issues were adequately implemented.
Engineered Safety Features Chillers Performance Data Not Considered During § 50.69 Periodic Review Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000424,05000425/202301102 Open/Closed
[P.4] - Trending 71152B An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.69(e), Feedback and Process Adjustment - Risk-Informed Safety Class 3 (RISC-3), was identified when the licensee failed to identify and consider failures of the engineered safety feature (ESF) chillers during the periodic review of the essential chilled water (ECW) system as required by licensee procedure.
Description:
On December 19, 2022, the licensee completed a 10 CFR 50.69(e) periodic review of the ECW system for unit 1 and 2. This review looked at the system performance from November 1, 2019, to September 19, 2022, and it was conducted in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-ES065006, Requirements for the Immediate Reviews, Periodic Reviews and Performance Monitoring, version 6.0. The licensee uses this procedure to implement the requirement of 10 CFR 50.69(e) Feedback and Process Adjustment and Performance Monitoring - Risk-Informed Safety Class 3 (RISC-3). The purpose of this review is to identify potential adverse trends in system performance and component performance resulting from the treatment adjustments allowed by § 50.69.
The inspectors read the periodic review for the ECW system and noticed that two failures of the ESF chillers that occurred during the monitoring period were not included. The ESF chillers are RISC3 components and part of the ECW system. Condition report (CR)10691547 documented a failure of the Unit 1 'A' train ESF chiller and unplanned entry into Technical Specifications (TS) 3.7.14, Engineered Safety Features Room Cooler and Safety Related Chiller System, on February 28, 2020. Condition report 10699078 documented another failure of the Unit 1 'B' train ESF chiller and unplanned entry in TS 3.7.14 on March 27, 2020. Section 4.3 Periodic Review of Categorized Systems, Step 5
- (b) of NMP-ES065006, requires the licensee to identify failures of RISC-3 systems structures and components (SSC) in the corrective action program as a means to monitor equipment performance change.
Condition report 10983834 was written to address the inspectors observation. The licensee discovered that the search criteria used to identify failures of RISC3 SSCs in the corrective action program (CAP) did not identify the equipment failures of the ESF chillers. These CRs were not found because the CR TYPE field in the CAP database was not populated with EQUIP, which the query utilized to discriminate between equipment related and non-equipment related CRs. The licensee ran the search query again, but this time the CR TYPE was null. The licensee found 31 additional CRs for the ECW system that should have been identified and reviewed during the periodic review. The licensee reviewed the 31 additional CRs and determined that they did not impact the periodic review performed in December 2022. As a result of the inspectors questions, the licensee took corrective actions to revise the search criteria used to identify failures of RISC3 SSCs in the CAP during future § 50.69 periodic reviews. The inspectors concluded that the error in the search criteria could prevent the licensee from identifying adverse trends in system and component performance resulting from the treatment adjustments allowed by § 50.69.
Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated technical evaluation (TE) 1131665 to revise the periodic review template search criteria. The licensee also initiated actions to perform another search of the CAP to identify equipment failures that were not identified during recently completed periodic reviews.
Corrective Action References: CR 10983834, CRs not found during § 50.69 Periodic Review TE 1131665
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to identify equipment failures of the ESF chillers during the 10 CFR 50.69 periodic review of the ECW system as required by licensee procedure was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, equipment failures documented in the CAP may not be identified and considered during the periodic reviews to determine if there is an adverse impact to the performance of RISC3 SSCs due to the alternative treatment.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened to be of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.4 - Trending: The organization periodically analyzes information from the CAP and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and common cause issues. In this case the licensee failed to effectively identify CRs that detailed equipment failures of RISC3 SSCs in the CAP during periodic reviews.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50.69(e)(3) Feedback and Process Adjustment-Risk-Informed Safety Class 3 (RISC3), states the licensee shall consider data collected in §50.69(d)(2)(i) for RISC-3 SSCs to determine if there are any adverse changes in performance such that the SSC unreliability values approach or exceed the values used in the evaluations conducted to satisfy §50.69(c)(1)(iv). The licensee shall make adjustments as necessary to the categorization or treatment processes so that the categorization process and results are maintained valid.
The licensee established procedure NMP-ES065006, Requirements for Immediate Reviews, Periodic Reviews, and Performance Monitoring, to provide direction for implementing the requirements of 10 CFR 50.69(e)(3).
Section 4.3 requires identification of failures of RISC3 SSCs in the CAP as a means to monitor equipment performance change.
Contrary to the above, on December 19, 2022, the licensee failed to identify and consider two failures of the ESF chillers documented in the CAP during the periodic review of the ECW system.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Performance Data for RISC3 Structures, Systems, and Components Scoped-Out of the Maintenance Rule (§50.65) not considered during §50.69 Periodic Reviews Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000424,05000425/202301103 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152B An NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.69(e)(3), Feedback and Process Adjustment-Risk-Informed Safety Class 3 (RISC3), was identified for the licensees failure to assess performance data for RISC3 structures, systems, and components (SSCs) scoped-out of the maintenance rule (§50.65) to determine if adverse SSC performance resulted from the application of alternate treatment.
Description:
On December 15, 2022, the licensee completed a § 50.69 periodic review of the radiation monitoring system (RMS) for units 1 and 2 (documented in V2201-PR). The review looked at system performance from February 1, 2021, to September 19, 2022, and it was conducted in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-ES065006, Requirements for the Immediate Reviews, Periodic Reviews and Performance Monitoring, version 6.0. The licensee uses this procedure to implement the requirement of § 50.69(e) Feedback and Process Adjustment - Risk-Informed Safety Class 3 (RISC-3). Step 4.3.5 of the procedure directs performance monitoring of RISC3 SSCs, as required by 10 CFR 50.69(e)(3), to identify adverse trends of RISC3 SSC performance resulting from implementation of alternate treatment as allowed by 10 CFR 50.69. The procedure first requires the licensee to identify failures of RISC3 SSCs, as captured in the CAP. It then requires that the failures be assessed to determine if reduced performance is related to the application of alternate treatment. The inspectors read the periodic review for the RMS and noticed that there were eleven
- (11) condition reports associated with failures of RISC3 components. Failures included, in part, radiation monitor isolation valves and main control room air intake radiation gas monitors. The inspectors noted that the licensee did not assess if the failures resulted from the application of alternate treatment on the bases that alternate treatment (i.e., other than maintenance rule - § 50.65) had not been applied to the associated components. The inspectors questioned this conclusion because the RMS system had been removed or scoped-out of maintenance rule in its entirety since September 2017, and therefore the system was under alternate treatment status (i.e., maintenance effectiveness no longer being monitored under § 50.65) and SSC performance monitoring was now driven by the periodic review requirements in § 50.69(e).
Section III.4.4, Section 50.65 Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance, of the § 50.69 Final Rule (FRN 6968008) states that the maintenance rule monitoring, goal setting, corrective action, and periodic evaluation treatments required by § 50.65(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) are special treatment requirements. It further states that upon implementation of
§ 50.69, the licensee is not required to apply the treatments required by § 50.65(a)(1), (a)(2),and (a)(3) to RISC-3 SSCs. Instead, § 50.69 rule requires the licensee to use SSC performance information to feed back into its processes to adjust treatment when results (i.e.,
unacceptable performance) so indicate during the periodic review of RISC3 performance as required by § 50.69(e)(3). Because RMS system failures identified in the periodic review were incorrectly screened-out or not attributed to alternate treatment, despite the system no longer being monitored under § 50.65, the licensee was not using the available performance data to determine if alternate treatment adjustments were needed. The inspector noted that instructions in the licensees periodic review procedure NMP-ES065006 were consistent with the inspectors interpretation and the FRN. Specifically, step 4.3.5.b.(2)(c) provided a list of questions to consider when determining if alternate treatment had been applied to a component. The third question from the list asked if the component had been scoped-out of the maintenance rule. The licensee did not reach this step in the procedure during the review process because it incorrectly screened-out the failures as not related to alternate treatment in an earlier step in the procedure.
The inspectors extended their review to additional periodic review packages for other systems that were either completely or partially scoped-out of the maintenance rule program.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the containment spray system (V2302-PR, 02/28/2023), nuclear service cooling water and component cooling water systems (V2301-PR, 01/25/2023), chemical and volume control system (CVCS) (V2201-PR, 12/15/2022),and the essential chilled water and nuclear instrumentation systems (V2202-PR, 12/19/2022). The inspectors noted that, similarly to the RMS periodic review, the licensee did not consider failures of RISC3 components for the CVCS system from a maintenance rule alternate treatment standpoint (i.e., scoped-out). For the ESF chiller system, the periodic review did not identify any failures of RISC3 components; however, in response to the failures that were not considered, as documented in NCV 202301102 of this report, the licensee indicated, via interviews, that the outcome of the periodic review would not have been affected had the failures been considered because no alternate treatment had been applied to the components in question. For the remaining systems no RISC3 failures were identified and therefore an assessment of alternate treatment effects was not needed.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was not assessing, consistent with the FRN and program procedure, failures of RISC3 SSCs to determine if adverse SSC performance resulted from the application of a treatment alternate to the maintenance effectiveness treatment requirements of § 50.65.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this violation in their corrective action program.
Corrective actions had not been developed by the end of the inspection.
Corrective Action References: CR 10992390
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to assess performance data for RISC3 SSCs scoped-out of the maintenance rule (§50.65) to determine if adverse SSC performance was a result of the application of an alternate treatment, per §50.69 (e)(3), was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, unreliability of RISC3 SSCs resulting from treatment alternate to the maintenance effectiveness monitoring requirements of §50.65 (i.e., maintenance rule) could go undetected and invalidate the performance values assumed in the categorization process.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding screened to be of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because the performance deficiency did not represent a loss of the PRA function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 3 days.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, the licensee did not use procedure guidance when determining whether alternate treatment had been applied to RISC3 SSCs.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50.69(e)(3) Feedback and Process Adjustment - Risk-Informed Safety Class 3 (RISC3), states that the licensee shall consider data collected in §50.69(d)(2)(i) for RISC-3 SSCs to determine if there are any adverse changes in performance such that the SSC unreliability values approach or exceed the values used in the evaluations conducted to satisfy §50.69(c)(1)(iv). The licensee shall make adjustments as necessary to the categorization or treatment processes so that the categorization process and results are maintained valid.
Contrary to the above, in December 2022, the licensee failed to consider data collected in
§50.69(d)(2)(i) for RISC3 SSCs during periodic reviews of the RMS, CVCS, and ESF systems to determine if adverse changes in performance necessitated adjustments to the categorization or treatment processes. Specifically, failures of RISC3 SSCs were not assessed to determine if adverse SSC performance resulted from the application of a treatment alternate to the treatment requirements of §50.65.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Implement Maintenance Instructions for Component Cooling Water Pump Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000425/202301101 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71152B A self-revealing Green Finding and associated NCV of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to follow procedures for the maintenance and post-maintenance testing (PMT) of Unit 2 A train (2A) component cooling water (CCW) pump #1. As a result, the 2A CCW pump #1 was rendered inoperable for approximately 26 days.
Description:
On September 15, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 1, main control room operators received a high temperature alarm for the outboard bearing of the 2A CCW pump #1. The pump was stopped and declared inoperable. The pump had been placed inservice approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> before receiving the high temperature alarm as part of a routine pump swap operation. Prior to being placed in service the pump had been in standby since a 2-hour PMT conducted on August 20, 2021, following a replacement of the pumps outboard bearing per work order (WO) SNC1172499. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 10827428 and investigated the cause of the high bearing temperature.
Inspection of the pump identified that the outboard bearing had failed due to operation below the minimum oil level requirement. The lack of lubrication resulted from the failure to follow CCW maintenance procedure (27080C, Ingresoll Rand Model 10 x18 SE CCW Pump Maintenance, version 27.1) instructions for
- (1) assembling the automatic oil bubbler and for
- (2) filling the bearing oil reservoir during the August 2021 bearing replacement. In addition, the licensee had an opportunity to identify the insufficient oil condition during the PMT; however, the licensee did not follow the PMT instructions in the maintenance procedure. The following describes, in more detail, the procedural steps the licensee failed to follow with the August 2021 maintenance and restoration activities for the 2A CCW pump #1.
The procedures instructions (Figure 7, Trico Oiler Settings, of 27080C) for installation of the automatic oil bubbler included a note that cautioned not to install or extend the oil feed pipe into the bottom of the oil bubbler housing such that it contacts the level adjuster (flat disc) mechanism. Contact between the oil feed pipe and the disc can block oil flow from the bubbler to the bearing oil reservoir (refer to NRC Information Notice 200119 for additional operating experience information on this failure mechanism). As-found inspection of the oil bubbler determined that this caution was not followed because the feed pipe was found extended too far inside the housing, contacting the level adjuster disc. It is important to note that the CCW pumps are not equipped with independent oil sight glasses; therefore, proper oil level can only be established and verified by proper installation of the automatic oil bubbler.
Procedure step 4.3.12.1, in the main body of the procedure, instructed technicians to fill the bearing oil reservoir per the oil bubbler assembly instructions in Figure 7 at the back of the procedure. Step 4.3.12.1 also referred to the VEGP Lubrication Manual for specifications on the required oil. The lubrication manual specifies the type and amount of oil that is needed for the pump. Figure 7 instructed to repeatedly fill and pour the bubbler into its housing to fill the bearing oil reservoir until no air bubbles appeared in the bubbler (indication that reservoir is full). Asfound inspection noted that the bearing oil reservoir was approximately 4 ounces below the minimum required oil amount. Technicians failed to account or track the amount of oil added to ensure the required amount was supplied. Instead, technicians followed the fill and pour bubbler instructions until no air bubbles were observed. Due to the improper installation of the bubbler, at some point toward the end of the oil filling step, oil stopped flowing from the bubbler to the bearing reservoir giving technicians false indication that the reservoir was full.
Lastly, step 4.6.5 required the PMT to check for bearing excessive heat. The step included a note which stated, to run the pump at equilibrium temperatures for a minimum of four (4)hours. Review of plant computer equipment operating data shows that the 2A CCW pump #1 was ran on August 20, 2021, up until bearing temperatures began to stabilize at the 2-hour mark. It was at this point that the pump should have been ran for another 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at normal operating temperatures for a total run time of approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Because the high temperature alarm came-in at approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the pump was started on September 15, 2021, it is likely that the inadequate oil level condition would have been identified if the pump had been tested in accordance with the procedures PMT requirements.
Corrective Actions: The licensee
- (1) replaced the failed outboard bearing (WO SNC1178526),
- (2) included a discussion of the event and learnings in their technicians continuing training segment,
- (3) revised the maintenance procedure to include the required oil amount needed for the bearing reservoir,
- (4) developed a new fleet procedure (MNP-MA060, Operation and Installation of Trico Oil Bubbler Systems,) with more explicit guidance on the installation and maintenance of Trico automatic oilers,
- (5) added operations support task to CCW pump WOs with directions to perform operability runs per procedure 27080C, and
- (6) conducted an extent of condition to verify the condition was not present in the other Units 1 and 2 CCW pump.
Corrective Action References: CR 10827428 and corrective action report (CAR) 280456
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to implement maintenance and PMT instructions in accordance with procedure 27080C, Ingresoll Rand Model 10 x18 SE CCW Pump Maintenance, version 27.1, for 2A CCW pump #1 maintenance conducted in August 2021 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in inoperability of the 2A CCW pump #1 for approximately 26 days.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Utilizing Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) because all of the questions in Section A, Mitigating SSCs and PRA Functionality (except Reactivity Control Systems), were answered no. Specifically, operability of the 'A' train of the CCW system was not affected.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. In this case, while maintenance personnel did not follow maintenance procedure, given industry operating experience with the Trico oilers the procedure could have contained clearer guidance to ensure lubrication to the bearings was properly configured.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specifications 5.4.1.a, Procedures requires, in part, that written procedures be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 9.a of Appendix A of RG 1.33 requires, in part, that maintenance which can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be performed in accordance with written procedures. Procedure 27080C, CCW Pump Maintenance, is a maintenance procedure which can affect the performance the CCW pumps.
Contrary to this, on August 20, 2021, the station failed to implement CCW maintenance procedure 27080C, which affected the performance of the 2A CCW pump #1. Specifically, the licensee failed to
- (1) install the pump's outboard bearing oiler,
- (2) fill the bearing housing, and
- (3) conduct the PMT as required by the maintenance procedure. As a result, the pump was rendered inoperable until the condition was discovered on September 15, 2021.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Minor Violation 71152B Minor Violation: NRC-identified a Minor Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. The minor violation is for the licensee's failure to incorporate a corrective action into the component cooling water (CCW) pumps maintenance procedure, 27080C, "Ingresoll Rand Model 10 x 18 SE CCW Pump Maintenance." Specifically, the licensee's failure to implement a corrective action, technical evaluation (TE) 1097976, to update the CCW maintenance procedure to include the amount of oil required to fill the bearing reservoirs, with a supervision stoppage point if required amount is not added. The corrective action TE was identified as a result of the causal analysis performed for the Unit 2 CCW pump #1 failure due to low oil level on September 15, 2021. Corrective action program (CAP)procedure NMP-GM002001, step 4.7.1 states that CAP TE resolutions must provide adequate detail to support that the assigned action was completed as written. Also, if the action will not be completed as originally written, Attachment 4 was to be followed. TE 1097976 was closed without a resolution supporting that the required action was completed as written and was not revised per CAP procedure instructions. This issue was captured in CR 10981490.
Screening: The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to incorporate a corrective action into the CCW pumps' maintenance procedure was a minor performance deficiency. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee would have identified any issues with the maintenance of the pump during the post maintenance test, in which the pump would have been considered inoperable already due to the maintenance. Therefore, the performance deficiency did not adversely affect a cornerstone objective, would not lead to a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected, and could not reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a significant event.
Enforcement:
This failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Observation: NSCW Spring Can / Alternate Treatment Observation 71152B The licensee has adjusted the treatment plan for risk-informed safety class 3 (RISC3) low safety significance seismic supports to an alternative treatment plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.69. This alternate treatment plan replaces a special treatment plan based on performing in service inspection (ISI) samples on a selection of supports, with a more general area inspection requirement on all supports. A deficiency was discovered by the NRC in November of 2022 with regards to improperly set spring cans on the seismic supports of the nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) system. A feedback and process adjustment review has not yet been conducted by the licensee on the alternative treatment plan for the seismic supports with regards to this issue. This review could impact the alternative treatment plan as the treatment plan may need to be adjusted to address potential loss in detection abilities. The possibility of future failures of a similar nature going undetected should also be considered.
Observation: System operator rounds implementation of a recommendation from a 2021 broadness review on large pumps related to lubrication issues.
71152B The station implemented a recommendation from a 'Large Pump Broadness Review' (corrective action report (CAR) 279673) conducted for a degraded trend associated with oil leaks, oil levels, and/or oiler issues on large pumps. The review recommended to update the auxiliary building operator rounds procedure (118811/2) to remove subjectivity in which oil levels are logged or recorded (i.e., high, mid, low, etc.) for mitigating system performance index (MSPI) components. It recommended to incorporate, as feasible, a more qualitative means of logging oil levels in order to better trend oil levels. The inspectors noted that the recommendation, as tracked and implemented via technical evaluation (TE) 1093853, was incorporated into a note in the rounds procedure; however, operators continue to log oil levels in the former subjective manner. Implementing this recommendation would aid the station in better trending and combating additional failures related to lack of lubrication.
Observation: NMP-GM002001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions" -
clarification of when an Equipment Reliability Checklist is to be performed.
71152B The inspectors noted that the licensee has had four failures of the unit 1 emergency safety features chillers, since 2020 that have resulted in unplanned entry into technical specification (TS) 3.7.14 Engineered Safety Features Room Cooler and Safety Related Chiller System, Condition A. The required action statement completion time is 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. NMP-GM002001, "Corrective Action Program Instructions" says that an Equipment Reliability Checklist (ERC)is required for equipment failures which result in unplanned entry into a TS shutdown required action statement (RAS) less than or equal to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The licensee indicated that since a risk-informed completion time (RICT) greater than 72-hours was available, an ERC evaluation did not need to be performed. Clarification of NMP-GM002001 of when an ERC is required, based on traditional TS shutdown RAS and/or RICT, would aid the station in properly identifying when to perform an ERC.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On August 4, 2023, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Robert Norris, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
On June 29, 2023, the inspectors presented the Exit Meeting inspection results to Mr.
Robert Norris, Site Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
ALARA Plans
NMP-HP204F12
1R24 Vogtle 23-1302 Eddy Current Inspections on Steam
Generators 1, 2, 3, and 4
Ver. 1.2
Calibration
Records
43697C
Calibration Record for Instrument: VEGP-HP2009 (Ludlum
Model 2000)
2/15/2023
Calibration
Records
43697C
Calibration Record for Instrument: VEGP-HP2011 (Ludlum
Model 2000)
2/21/2023
Calibration
Records
43697C
Calibration Record for Instrument: VEGP-HP2010 (Ludlum
Model 2000)
2/21/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
10878333
Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip due to loss of 1B MFP
5/3/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
279643
ERC: Component Cooling Water Outboard Bearing Failure
11/04/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
2464
Perform LOE on 1A Safety Injection Pump (SIP) Inoperable
10/4/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
283482
NRC Apparent Violation which is being evaluated for
escalated enforcement
10/01/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
303729
O&P Checklist: Unit 2 Btrain NSCW Missed Surveillance
06/06/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
307081
NMP-AD025 Monthly Audit - Training Records Processed
Beyond 120 days of Final Record Approval.
04/29/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
27448
Complete a Human Performance Checklist - for the NRC
Violation: "Failure to Comply with Procedures for Entry into a
11/02/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
Perform OPC on 50.59 CISA identified - Procedure revision
do not have procedurally required ADs.
05/11/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
OPC - Determine Organizational Behaviors around oil leaks
on Large Pumps.
08/24/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
ERC and O&P: Unit 2 CCW Outboard Bearing Trouble
2/13/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Failed to maintain complete and accurate medical
qualification data for SRO.
Corrective Action
Level Evaluation Checklist
01/20/2022
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
O&P Checklist: NRC Green NCV for Failure to Perform RP
Surveys to Evaluate for Alpha Contamination
05/12/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
O&P Checklist: Control Room Emergency Filtration System
(CREFS) Carbon Samples not Tracked to Completion
06/30/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
O&P Checklist: Failure to Comply with Procedures for Entry
into a High Radiation Area
01/05/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Equipment Reliability Checklist (ERC): Failure of Unit 1
Btrain Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Lightning Arrester
2/02/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
O&P Checklist (O&P): Failure of Unit 1 Btrain Reserve
Auxiliary Transformer Lightning Arrester
2/02/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
NOS Identified: Temporary Procedure Changes not
processed per NMP-AP001003
04/18/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
10812516, 10889884, 10902701, 10920952, 10927394,
10940134, 10943889, 10945074, 10946071,
10960536,10797791, 10813421, 10818886, 10819895,
10839392, 10845917, 10872388,10891645, 10946609,
10959104, 10968891, 10970557, 10803857,10809351,
10832272, 10837239, 10844203, 10863378, 10885555,
10913297, 10938059, 10973327
Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Reports
(CR)
865511, 10002377, 10357654, 10668074, 10789942,
10790781, 10794193, 10801314, 10804585, 10809759,
10817209, 10818495, 10818886, 10826299, 10826329,
10826666, 10828083, 10833225, 10833653, 10834081,
10834111, 10835036, 10835980, 10836854, 10837094,
10844699, 10846802, 10848695, 10854505, 10864254,
10867100, 10868188, 10868209, 10870082, 10870283,
10871015, 10871387, 10871696, 10872050, 10873544,
10877198, 10883774, 10894283, 10913163, 10914526,
10920230, 10932397, 10944626, 10950967, 10951644,
10955834, 10968096, 10969196, 10983834, 10981490,
10979995, 10979958, 10959527, 10959525, 10959524,
10820887, 10820883,10928266, 10919978, 10957529,
10976303, 10975881, 10806448, 10908305, 10806448,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
10831842, 10880220, 10956195, 10878333, 10928266,
10919978, 10890881, 50144593, 10868188
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Reports (CARs)
279727, 302968, 304778,314862, 317230, 318566,
360838, 363741
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Reports (CARs)
196054, 278436, 279673, 279727, 302626, 303502,
27004, 322420, 319464, 308151, 302473, 302395,
2395_0, 283943, 308151_0, 319464, 313587, 282464,
279727, 308151, 317729, 319464, 322420, 313587
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 10847097
Unsealed penetrations in SI pump Rooms
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 10848644
System 1561 and 2108 / Door 12108L1B04. Degradation of
the gaskets around door 12108L1B04 which would effect the
doors ability to serve its' function as a barrier for the ESF
equipment room.
Corrective Action
Documents
Technical
Evaluations
1075098, 1075100, 1075101, 1103343, 1105121, 1105679,
1107999, 1115437, 1116482, 1120600,
Corrective Action
Documents
Technical
Evaluations
29197, 1101345, 1124819, 1106312, 945466, 1107999,
1067430
Corrective Action
Documents
Technical
Evaluations
1131540, 1115171, 1123354, 1123350, 1115171, 1120003,
28712, 1115684
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 10979958
NRC Identified Issue - Camera Wire running through a Sub
Door
06/14/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 10979995
Extent of Condition - Camera wire found passing through
watertight doorway
06/15/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 10981490
Procedure 27080C Correction
06/20/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
CR 10983834
CRs not found during 50.69 Periodic Review
06/28/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Resulting from
Inspection
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 10984204
NRC PI&R inspection observation: TRICO oilers are filled
>2/3 full
06/16/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 10984275
NRC PI&R observation: Operator Rounds - Oil levels not
recorded with quantitative values
06/29/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 10984389
NRC PI&R inspection observation on CEF's and ERC's
06/30/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 10992390
NRC PI&R 50.69 issue
07/31/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
TE 1131540
Extent of condition review of ESF Chillers
06/27/2023
Drawings
1X4DB136
Component Cooling Water System No. 1203
Ver. 24.0
Drawings
1X4DB137
Component Cooling Water System No. 1203
Ver. 19.0
Drawings
2X4DB136
Component Cooling Water System No. 1203
Ver. 33.0
Drawings
2X4DB137
Component Cooling Water System No. 1203
Ver. 21.0
Engineering
Changes
SNC1174713ED
Short Form Item Equivalency Evaluation (SIEE): Oiler,
TRICO - Evaluate replacement for TRICO oiler with wire
guard, with flat base level adjuster, opto-matic #2; capacity:
21/2 oz. (Mfg. part no. 40391)
09/09/2021
Engineering
Evaluations
Maintenance Rule
Evaluation TEs
1119547
Engineering
Evaluations
RER
SNC1495628
Evaluation of Obstructions in Doors 22108L1A78 and
2108L1D18
06/20/2023
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Engineering
Evaluations
SNC1398938
Documentation of Engineering Judgement: Variable Spring
Support Settings
11/4/2022
Engineering
Evaluations
TE 1057413
MSPI Failure Evaluation for unit 1 CCW pump #2 failing to
auto-start during test
01/15/2020
Miscellaneous
CNOS-22-208
Fleet-Ops-2022 Audit Package
Miscellaneous
CNOS-22-288
Fleet-EA-CHEM-2022 Audit Package
Miscellaneous
OR Management Review Committee (MRC) Agenda
06/13/2023
Miscellaneous
Management Review Committee (MRC0 Agenda HU MRC
06/13/2023
Miscellaneous
MRC Agenda
06/14/2023
Miscellaneous
2X4AF0100137
Instruction Manual Auxiliary Component Cooling Water
Pump
Ver. 27
Miscellaneous
701
Employee Concerns Program
11/20/2019
Miscellaneous
730002
Employee Concerns Guideline
November
2019
Miscellaneous
AX1D94A54
Auxiliary Building Units 1 & 2 Door Schedule Level B
Version 1.0
Miscellaneous
Crew Learning
Internal Operating Experience Crew Learning related to
Condition Report 10868188: Unanticipated Dose Rate Alarm
11/08/2022
Miscellaneous
DC1215
Design Basis: Auxiliary Building Drain System-
Nonradioactive
Rev 8
Miscellaneous
DC1302
Design Basis Document: Auxiliary Feedwater System
Rev. 18
Miscellaneous
ELV01212
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Response to Generic Letter
8913
01/25/1990
Miscellaneous
MPR Report No.
220009-
RPT001
SNC Large Pump and Motor Reliability Improvement Project
Rev. 0
Miscellaneous
NMD-AD028
CFR 21 Evaluations and Reporting Requirements
Ver. 7.0
Miscellaneous
NMP-AD010F01
CFR 50.59 Screening
Ver. 10.4
Miscellaneous
NMP-AD012
Version 16.0
Miscellaneous
NMP-AD012F01
Operability Determination Support Basis
Version 4.1
Miscellaneous
NMP-AD025
Quality Assurance and Non-Quality Assurance Records
Administration
Ver. 14.3
Miscellaneous
NMP-AP001
Development and Control of Southern Nuclear Procedures
Ver. 21.2
Miscellaneous
NMP-AP001003
Review and Approval of Site Procedures
Ver. 16.0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
NMP-AP001F09
SNC Temporary Procedure Change Form
Ver. 2.0
Miscellaneous
NMP-
GM002F08
Organizational and Programmatic (O&P) Screening Tool
Ver. 8.2
Miscellaneous
NMP-
GM002F31
Human Performance Checklist
Ver. 11.0
Miscellaneous
NMP-
GM006GL11
Work Prioritization Screening
Version 4.4
Miscellaneous
NMP-GM008
Operating Experience Program
Ver. 24.0
Miscellaneous
NMP-
GM016F01
Management Review Committee (MRC) Charter
Version 15.0
Miscellaneous
NOS101
Nuclear Oversight Organization and Responsibilities
Version 10.0
Miscellaneous
NOS101GL01
Nuclear Oversight Performance Indicator Guideline
Version 4.0
Miscellaneous
PMCR 91384
Class 2 and 3 Piping and Supports Categorized as RISC3
(LSS) per 10 CFR 50.69
Miscellaneous
VMEPP11604
Lesson Plan: Trico Oilers
Version 1.0
Miscellaneous
VRPJIT2023101
Just-InTime Training DBIG - Alpha Radiation Monitoring/RP
Rev. 1.0
Miscellaneous
VRPJIT2023101
Alpha Radiation Monitoring / RP - completed for 1R24 on
2/27/2023
Miscellaneous
VRPPP2022102
Alpha Radiation Monitoring (Radiation Protection Continuing
Training)
Ver. 1.0
Miscellaneous
VRPPP2022103
Alpha Radiation Monitoring (Radiation Protection Continuing
Training)
Ver. 2.0
NDE Reports
S04V2V006
Visual Examination (VT3) of Pipe Variable Spring Support:
V2 21202006-H028
04/19/2004
NDE Reports
S05V2V0049
Visual Examination (VT3) of Pipe Variable Spring Support:
V2 21202006-H054
09/23/2005
NDE Reports
S13V2V054
Visual Examination (VT3) of Pipe Variable Spring Support:
V2 21202006-H028
03/23/2013
NDE Reports
S16V2V069
Visual Examination (VT3) of Pipe Variable Spring Support:
V2 21202006-H054
03/32/2016
NDE Reports
S95V2V027
Visual Examination (VT3) of Pipe Variable Spring Support:
V2 21202006-H028
2/27/1995
NDE Reports
S96V2V680
Visual Examination (VT3) of Pipe Variable Spring Support:
V2 21202006-H054
10/10/1996
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Operability
Evaluations
Standing Order
2023-001
Unit 1 A/B Train Hydrogen Monitors Non-Functional
05/13/2023
Operability
Evaluations
Standing Order
2022-003
Unit 2 MSIV A Post Design Change Monitoring
05/05/2022
Operability
Evaluations
Standing Order
S2016007
EDG Frequency Limit for Safety-Related Equipment
Operability
2/21/2021
Operability
Evaluations
Standing Order
S2022017
Diesel Fire Pump #1 M&TE
10/05/2022
Procedures
118811
Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Rounds
4/21/2022
Procedures
13744A1
Train A Essential Chilled Water System
Procedures
170141
Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 14 on Panel 1B!
on the MCB
Ver. 18.1
Procedures
170151
Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 15 on Panel 1B1
on MCB
Ver. 53.0
Procedures
170202
Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 20 on Panel 2B2
on MCB
Ver. 53.2
Procedures
1705301
Annunciator Response Procedures for ALB 53 on QHVC
Panel
Procedures
27080C
Ingersoll Rand Model 10x18 SE CCW Pump Maintenance
Versions
27.1, 27.4,
and 27.5
Procedures
NMP-ES065
CFR 50.69 Program
Ver. 5.0
Procedures
NMP-ES065004
CFR 50.69 Alternative Treatment Requirements
Ver. 6.0
Procedures
NMP-ES065006
Requirements for Immediate Reviews, Periodic Reviews,
and Performance Monitoring
Ver. 6.0
Procedures
NMP-ES074006
Fleet Lubrication Instruction
Procedures
NMP-GM002
Corrective Action Program
Version 16.0
Procedures
NMP-
GM002001
Corrective Action Program Instructions
Version 45.0
Procedures
NMP-
GM002001
Corrective Action Program Instructions
Version 45.0
Procedures
NMP-
GM002002
Effectiveness Review Instructions
Version 6.0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
NMP-
GM002004
CAP Training and Qualification Plan Instruction
Version 6.1
Procedures
NMP-
GM002GL03
Cause Analysis and Corrective Actions Guideline
Ver. 33.0
Procedures
NMP-GM003
Self-Assessment and Benchmark Procedure
Version 34.0
Procedures
NMP-
GM006002
Surveillance Program
Version 4.4
Procedures
NMP-GM024
Nuclear Safety Culture Program
Version 9.1
Procedures
NMP-
GM024001
Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring and Review Process
Version 12.0
Procedures
NMP-
GM024F04
Nuclear Safety Culture Leadership Team Report Template
Version 4.1
Procedures
NMP-HP204
ALARA Planning and Job Review
Ver. 10.4
Procedures
NMP-HP204F02
Radiological Briefing Record
Ver. 2.5
Procedures
NMP-HP301001
Facility Alpha Characterization
Ver. 1.1
Procedures
NMP-HP305
Alpha Radiation Monitoring
Ver. 5.13
Procedures
NMP-MA014001
Post Maintenance Testing Guidance
Version 5.9
Procedures
NMP-MA014001
Post Maintenance Testing Guidance
Version 5.6
Procedures
NMP-MA060
Operation and Installation of Trico Oil Bubbler Systems
Version 2.0
Procedures
NMP-OS007003
Plant Operating Orders
Ver. 3.2
Procedures
V - 1 - 1302
Auxiliary Feedwater, MRule Function Scoping
5/11/2023
Radiation
Surveys
253135
Inside Bioshield (2RXC11)
03/21/2022
Radiation
Surveys
260425
Fuel Upender (rev #2) (RXA22)
03/05/2023
Radiation
Surveys
261021
Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)
03/15/2023
Radiation
Surveys
261089
Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)
03/16/2023
Radiation
Surveys
261144
Inside Bioshield Area (1RXC)
03/17/2023
Self-Assessments
Site KPI Report
May 2023
Self-Assessments CNOS21146
FLEET-RGA2021 AUDIT PACKAGE
6/16/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Self-Assessments NMP-
AD016004-F03
Annual Fatigue Management Report
22
Self-Assessments NMP-
AD016004-F03
Annual Fatigue Management Report
21
Self-Assessments NMP-
GM003F18
22 Plant Vogtle Nuclear Safety Culture Biennial
Assessment
July 2022
Self-Assessments NMP-
GM024F04
Vogtle NSCM First Period 20231
06/20/2023
Work Orders
SNC No.
(completed WOs)
543477, 846305, 949281, 1095618, 1183954, 1126518,
1172499, 1178526, 1183060, 1197303, 1249310, 1313074,
1332866, 1340034, 1418750, 1448175, 1172499
Work Orders
SNC No. (planned
WOs)
1013995, 1165760, 1273501, 1279666, 1289067, 1390713,
1449234, 1454429,