ML22279B064
| ML22279B064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hermes File:Kairos Power icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/06/2022 |
| From: | Kairos Power |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22279B062 | List: |
| References | |
| KP-NRC-2210-003 | |
| Download: ML22279B064 (7) | |
Text
KP-NRC-2210-003 Changes to Hermes PSAR Chapters 3 and 7 (Non-Proprietary)
PreliminarySafetyAnalysisReport
DesignofStructures,Systems,andComponents
KairosPowerHermesReactor 33 Revision1 Table3.11:DesignRelated10CFRRegulationsApplicabletotheDesign 10CFRRegulation Title(orsubjectofregulation)
SARSection 20.1406 MinimizationofContamination 5.1,5.2,9.1.1,9.1.2,9.1.3,9.1.4, 9.1.5,9.2,9.3,9.7,9.8,11.2 20.1601 ControlofAccesstoHighRadiationAreas 11.1.5 20.1602 ControlofAccesstoVeryHighRadiation Areas 11.1.5 20.1701 Useofprocessorotherengineering controls(containment,decontamination, orventilation) 4.4,9.1,9.3 50.34(a)(5)
Contentsofapplications;technical informationtechnicalspecifications
6.2,14.1,Table14.11 50.34(a)(8)
Contentsofapplications;technical informationSSCsrequiringfurther Research&Development
1.3 50.34(g)1 Contentsofapplications;technical informationcombustiblegascontrol
Nottechnicallyrelevantas discussed3.1.1.
Technicalspecifications.Limits
Technicalspecifications.Limitingsafety systemsettings
14.1 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(i)
Technicalspecifications.LCOs
14.1 10CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(B,C,D)
Technicalspecifications.LCOs
Technicalspecifications.LCOs
14.1 10CFR50.36(c)(38)
Technicalspecifications.LCOs 7.3,7.5 10CFR50.44(d)1 Combustiblegascontrolfornuclearpower reactorsrequirementsfornonwater cooledreactorapplicants Nottechnicallyrelevantas discussed3.1.1.
Codesandstandardsprotectionand safetysystems 7.3 10CFR50.64 Limitationsontheuseofhighly enricheduranium(HEU)indomesticnon powerreactors Chapter18 10CFR50AppendixE II EmergencyplanninginthePSAR Chapter12AppendixA 10CFR70.24 Criticalityaccidentrequirements 9.3 10CFR73.67 Licenseefixedsiteandintransit requirementsforthephysicalprotection
Addressedwithapplicationfor Part70license
PreliminarySafetyAnalysisReport
InstrumentationandControls
KairosPowerHermesReactor 715 Revision1 RPSisalsodesignedtoidentifypostulatedeventconditionsandinitiatepassiveinsertionof reactivityshutdownelementsandpassivedecayheatremoval.
ConsistentwithPDC21,theRPSisdesignedwithsufficientredundancyandindependencetoassure thannosinglefailureresultsinlossofitsprotectionfunction.IndividualcomponentsoftheRPSmay beremovedfromservicefortestingwithoutlossofrequiredminimumredundancy.TheRPSis designedtopermitperiodictesting.
ConsistentwithPDC22,theeffectsofnaturalphenomena,andofnormaloperating,maintenance, testing,andpostulatedeventconditions,donotresultinlossoftheprotectionfunctionfortheRPS.
TheRPSisdesignedwithsufficientfunctionalandcomponentdiversitytopreventthelossof functionfortheRPS.
Uponlossofelectricalpowerordetectionofadverseenvironmentalconditions,theRPSfailstoa safestate,consistentwithPDC23.
TheRPSsystemfunctionallyindependentfromthecontrolsystems,consistentwithPDC24.
ConsistentwithPDC25,theRPSisdesignedtoensurethatradionuclidereleasedesignlimitsarenot exceededuponreactortripactuation,includingintheeventofasinglefailureofthereactivity controlsystem.
ConsistentwithPDC28,theRPSsetpointsaredesignedtolimitthepotentialamountandrateof reactivitytoensuresufficientprotectionfrompostulatedeventsinvolvingreactivitytransients.The limitsaresetsuchthatreactivityeventscannotresultindamagetothereactorcoolantboundary greaterthanlimitedlocalyielding,andcannotsufficientlydisturbthecore,itssupportstructures,or otherreactorvesselinternalstoimpairsignificantlythecapabilitytocoolthecore.
TheRPSisdesignedtoberedundantanddiversetoassurethereisahighprobabilityof accomplishingitssafetyrelatedfunctionsinpostulatedevents,consistentwithPDC29.
Consistentwith10CFR50.55(i),TheRPSisdesigned,fabricated,erected,constructed,tested,and inspectedtoqualitystandardscommensuratewiththesafetyfunctiontobeperformed.
Consistentwith10CFR50.55a(h)(3),tTheRPSisdesignedinaccordancewithIEEEStd6032018 (Reference1).TheRPSisdesignedtomeetIEEEStd603asanalternativecodetoIEEEStd6031991 (Reference2)andthecorrectionsheetdatedJanuary30,1995.
7.3.3 SystemEvaluation TheRPSprovidesautomaticreactortrip(1)ifplantparametersexceedthenormaloperationenvelope (PDC20),(2)intheeventofstationblackout,and(3)manuallyusingsignalfromthemaincontrolroom orremoteonsiteshutdownpanel.TheRPSalsoensuresthattheDHRSisrunningwhenthereactortrips.
TheRPSisconsistentwith10CFR50.55a(h)(3)andNUREG1537,GuidelinesforPreparingand ReviewingApplicationsfortheLicensingofNonPowerReactors,bymeetingIEEE6032018.Table7.31 providesalistoftheconsensusstandardstowhichtheRPSisdesigned.
Chapter13describesthepostulatedeventstowhichtheRPSisdesignedtorespond.TheRPSusesthe samesetofoperatingparametersinthetripandactuationlogicforallmodesofreactoroperation.The setpointsareestablishedtoensurethatthedesignconditionsofthereactorcoolantboundaryarenot exceededduringoperationwithinthedesignbasis.ThisisconsistentwithPDC25becausemaintaining thereactorcoolantboundarywithindesignbasisboundswillensurethatradionuclidereleasedesign limitsarenotexceeded.Thesetpointsareestablishedandcalibratedusingthemethoddescribedin Section7.1.2.
Consistentwith10CFR50.55a(h)(3),rReactortripsimplementedbytheRPSmeetIEEE6032018, Section4.Theprimaryplanttripsignalisbasedoncoretemperaturemeasurement.Inaddition,the
PreliminarySafetyAnalysisReport
InstrumentationandControls
KairosPowerHermesReactor 717 Revision1 NoportionoftheRPSthatperformsasafetyfunctioncrossestheseismicisolationmoatthatis describedinSection3.5.TheRPSincludesablocktothePCStopreventanyPCSSSCsfrominterfering withasafetyrelatedSSCsperformanceofitssafetyfunction.TheRPSblockisaccomplishedby removingpowertoasafetyrelatedrelay.Thesafetyrelatedrelayisalsolocatedinthesafetyrelated portionoftheReactorBuilding,sonootherflexibledesignfeaturestoaddressdifferentialdisplacement arerequiredfortheRPStoaccomplishtheblocktothePCSduringpostulatedseismicevents.Thisis consistentwithPDCs2and4.
TheRPSisundertheQualityAssuranceProgramasdescribedinSection12.9whichisconsistentwith PDC1and10CFR50.55(i).
Consistentwith10CFR50.36,technicalspecificationscontainlimitingsafetysystemsettings,limiting conditionsofoperation,surveillancerequirements,andactionstatementsapplicabletotheRPS.
ImplementationoftechnicalspecificationsdonotinterferewiththeabilityoftheRPStoperformits protectivefunction,consistentwithPDC22.
7.3.4 TestingandInspection RPSparameterstowhichoperabilitycontrolsareappliedarereactorcoretemperature,reactorvessel level,sourceandpowerrangeneutronexcoredetectors.Surveillanceintervalsareestablishedbasedon operatingexperience,engineeringjudgement,andavailablevendorrecommendations.
Operabilitytestsareperformedpriortostartupandtestsandinspectionsconsistentwiththestandards discussedinSection7.3.3.
7.3.5 References
- 1. InstituteofElectricalandElectronicsEngineers,StandardIEEE6032018,StandardCriteriafor SafetySystemsforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations.2018.
- 2. InstituteofElectricalandElectronicsEngineers,StandardIEEE6031991,StandardCriteriafor SafetySystemsforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations.1991.
PreliminarySafetyAnalysisReport
InstrumentationandControls
KairosPowerHermesReactor 726 Revision1 7.5 SENSORS 7.5.1 Description Sensorsareusedtoprovideinformationabouttemperature,pressure,neutroncountrates,level,flow oftheprimarycoolantandarearadiationlevelsasinputtomultiplecontrolandprotectionsubsystems.
Independentsensorsareprovidedtothereactorprotectionsystemandtheplantcontrolsystem.Each sectionaboutspecificI&Csubsystemsincludesadiscussionofthesensorsthatsupportthatsubsystem andthetypeofsensorused(i.e.,analogordigital).
Temperature,pressure,level,andflowsensorsmeasureandmonitorplantoperatingprocess parametersandareusedtocontroloperationsandinitiatereactorprotectiveactions.Neutronsource rangesensorsprovideindicationofpowerlevelduringtheinitialstagesofstartup.Gammaradiation monitorsprovideinformationaboutarearadiationlevelsduringallplantmodesofoperation.
7.5.2 DesignBases ConsistentwithPDC1and10CFR50.55(i),safetyrelatedsensorsaredesigned,fabricated,erected, constructed,tested,andinspectedtoqualitystandardscommensuratewiththesafetyfunctiontobe performed.
ConsistentwithPDC2,safetyrelatedsensorsaredesignedtobeprotectedfromadverseeffectsof naturalphenomena.
ConsistentwithPDC3,safetyrelatedsensorsaredesignedandlocatedtominimizetheprobabilityand effectoffiresandexplosions.
ConsistentwithPDC13,safetyrelatedsensorsmonitorprocessvariablesandsystemsovertheir anticipatedrangesfornormaloperationandforpostulatedevents.
ConsistentwithPDC21,RPSsensorsaredesignedwithsufficientredundancyandindependenceto assurethatnosinglefailureresultsinlossofprotectionfunction.RPSsensorsaredesignedtopermit periodictestingandindividualsafetyrelatedsensorsmayberemovedfromservicefortestingand maintenancewithoutlossofrequiredminimumredundancy.
ConsistentwithPDC22,theeffectsofnaturalphenomena,andofnormaloperating,maintenance, testing,andpostulatedeventconditionsdonotresultinlossoftheprotectionfunctionforRPSsensors.
TheRPSsensorsaredesignedwithsufficientfunctionalandcomponentdiversitytopreventthelossof functionfortheRPScontrolsystems.
ConsistentwithPDC24,RPSsensorsarefunctionallyindependentfromthenonsafetyrelatedsensors.
ConsistentwithPDC29,RPSsensorsaredesignedtoberedundanttoassurethereisahighprobability ofaccomplishingthesafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheRPSinpostulatedevents.
Consistentwith10CFR50.36,technicalspecificationsaddresstestingofsensors.
7.5.3 SystemEvaluation SafetyrelatedsensorsarethosethatprovideinputtotheRPSsafetyfunctionsdiscussedinSection7.3.
TheirsafetyfunctionistoprovidesensorinputforthoseplantparametersneededbytheRPSto performitssafetyfunctions.SafetyrelatedsensorsarealsousedasinputstothePCSdiscussedin Section7.2,whichisnotasafetyrelatedfunctionofthesensors.SensorsthatprovideinputtothePCS
PreliminarySafetyAnalysisReport
InstrumentationandControls
KairosPowerHermesReactor 727 Revision1 butnottheRPSareclassifiedasnonsafetyrelated.InthiswaytheRPSsensorsarefunctionally independentfromthenonsafetyrelatedsensors,consistentwithPDC24.
Therangeoverwhichsafetyrelatedsensorsaredesignedtomonitorprocessvariablesreflectsthe rangeforpostulatedeventsandbounds,withmargin,therangefornormaloperation.Forexample, safetyrelatedsensorsaredesignedtomonitortemperaturesbetweenthefreezingtemperatureofthe primarycoolant,anduptotheacceptancecriterionforpeakvesselandcorebarreltemperature documentedinTable13.11,750°C.Table7.51providestherangeforparametersoverwhichsafety relatedsensorsaredesignedtooperate.BymonitoringvariablesovertherangeinTable7.51,the safetyrelatedsensorsmeetPDC13.
Nonsafetyrelatedsensorsaredesignedtomonitorprocessvariablesovertherangeofnormal operation.Forexample,thenonsafetyrelatedsensorsmonitortemperaturesbetweenthetemperature ofthecoldlegoftheprimaryheattransferloop,550°C,andthetemperatureattheoutletofthereactor vessel,650°C.Theparameterrangeoverwhichsensorsthatarenonsafetyrelatedareprovidedin Table7.52.BymonitoringvariablesovertherangeinTable7.52,thenonsafetyrelatedsensorsmeet PDC13.
RPSsensorsaredesignedtoberedundantsothatnosinglefailureresultsintheRPSlosingitsabilityto performitssafetyfunction.ThisisconsistentwithPDC21.Similarly,RPSsensorsaredesignedtobe redundantsothatthereisahighprobabilitythatthenecessaryinputsareprovidedtotheRPSduring normaloperationsandduringapostulatedevent,includingnaturalphenomena,consistentwithPDCs2, 22and29.ThenumberofRPSsensorsofeachtypeneededwillbeconsistentwiththesafetyanalysis andwillbespecifiedintheapplicationfortheOperatingLicense(OL).ThenumberofRPSsensorsof eachtypealsoaccountsforsensorsthatareremovedfromserviceforperiodictesting,whichis discussedfurtherinSection7.5.4.
TheOLapplicationwillspecifysensorsofeachtype(temperature,pressure,etc.)thataresuitablefor theenvironmentinwhichtheywillfunction.Thesensorsareratedtoperforminenvironments describedinTables7.51and7.52.
Safetyrelatedsensorsaredesignedtooperateinnormaloperatingandpostulatedeventenvironmental conditions.Inthiswaythesafetyrelatedsensorsaredesignedtobeconsistentwiththesafetyfunctions ofRPSthatthesafetyrelatedsensorssupport(10CFR50.55(i)).Nonsafetyrelatedsensorsdonot supportasafetyfunctionandaredesignedtooperateinnormaloperationenvironments.
ConsistentwithPDC3,theRPSsensorsaredesignedtoperformtheirsafetyfunctionintheeventofa firehazard.TheRPSsensorsaredesignedandlocatedtominimizetheprobabilityandeffectoffiresand explosionsbytheuseoflowcombustiblematerialsandphysicalseparation.Thesedesignfeatures,in conjunctionwiththefireprotectionprogramdescribedinSection9.4,provideassurancethattheRPS sensorsconformtoPDC3.
ConsistentwithPDC1,safetyrelatedsensorsareincludedinthequalityassuranceprogramdiscussedin Section12.9andaremaintainedasdescribedinSection7.5.4.
Therearenooperatoractionscreditedinthesafetyanalysis,thereforetherearenosensorsforwhich operatorsrelyontoinitiateasafetyfunction.
7.5.4 TestingandInspection Consistentwith10CFR50.36,technicalspecificationscontainlimitingsafetysystemsettings,limiting conditionsofoperation,surveillancerequirements,andactionstatementsforsensors.Operability
PreliminarySafetyAnalysisReport
InstrumentationandControls
KairosPowerHermesReactor 728 Revision1 controlsareappliedtosafetyrelatedsensors.Surveillanceintervalsforsensorsarespecifiedbasedon operatingexperience,engineeringjudgement,andvendorrecommendationifavailable.
Consistentwith10CFR50.55(i),Thesafetyrelatedsensorsaredesignedtoenableperiodictesting.
TestingandinspectionswillbeperformedsothatthereisahighprobabilitythattheRPSreceivesthe inputneededtoperformitssafetyfunctionsdescribedinSection7.3.TheRPSsensorsaredesignedso thatindividualRPSsensorscanberemovedfromservicefortestingeitherwithoutlosingminimum redundancyorwithademonstrationofacceptablereliabilityforoperationoftheprotectionsystem (PDC21).Operabilitytestsareperformedpriortostartup.Testsandinspectionsareperformed consistentwiththestandardsdiscussedinSection7.5.3.
7.5.5 References None