ML20237G632
| ML20237G632 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1987 |
| From: | SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-096, OL-5-I-SC-96, NUDOCS 8709020341 | |
| Download: ML20237G632 (143) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 87 AUG 25 A9 :15 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino card l
)
In the Ma'tter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
)
(EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
ATTACHMENTS TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM LEE COLWELL, DEPUTY INSPECTOR PETER F. COSGROVE, PHILIP EVANSr CHARLES B. PERRON, FORD ROWAN, LIEUTENANT JOHN W.
STREETER, JR., AND HAROLD RICHARD ZOOK t
ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY 5
REGARDING CONTENTION EX 50 -- TRAINING OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL March 20, 1987 8709020341ADOCKh 22 PDR pos O
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NUCLEAR REGULATOR) COMMISSION Deckel Nd-Efd <
Official Exfh Wo-
!s ce catter et'derdnr.~m 6_4en Mr.le..a un, A*,
I Staff IDENTIFIED j
Applient RECEIVED
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Interrenor REJECTED Coxt's Otre C ctracter DATE T-I P' 31 Other Witnese R porter M A C4 Lu..
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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'w ij Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board f
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In the Matter of
)
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
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(EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
1
)
ATTACHMENTS
'(
l TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM LEE,COLWELL, DEPUTY INSPECTOR PETER F. COSGROVE, PHILIP EVANS, CHARLES B.
PERROW, FORD ROWAN, LIEUTENANT JOHN W.
STREETER, JR., AND EAROLD RICHARD ZOOK ON BEHALF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY I
REGARDING l
CONTENTION EX 50 -- TRAINING OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL l
March 20, 1987
I ATTACHMENTS Professional Qualifications of William Lee Colwell l
Professional Qualifications of j
Deputy Inspector Peter F. Cosgrove 1
l Professional Qualifications of j
Charles B. Perrow 1
Professional Qualifications of I
Lieutenant John W.
Streeter j
1 Professional Qualifications of Harold Richard Zook Contention EX 50 Drill Report for June 6, 1986 1
l Drill Report for September 10, i
September 17, and October 1,
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1986 Drill Report for December 2 and December 10, 1986 0 SNRC-1269 - Letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton l
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1 ATTACHMENT 1
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WILLIAM LEE COLWELL
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ACADEMIC D3pREFS I
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, Little Rock University, 1961 Master of Public Administration, University of Southern 1
California, 1982 Doctor of Public Administration, University of Southern California, 1985 AWARDS Attorney General's Exceptional Service Award, January, 1983, in recognition of service to the FBI, the U.
S.
Department j
of Justice, and the American Public.
National Association of Schools of Public Administration and Affairs, Nominated as a Finalist for Annual Outstanding Award.
TEACHING EXPERIENCE FBI Academy Training Division, 1970-1973 -- Instruction on weekly basis addressing substantive and policy issues relative to criminal investigations.
Class Counselor, Instructor, Student Advisor and Evaluator to new Agents' classes, 1972-1973.
I 1
Lectured in areas related to inspection, professional responsibility, and implementation of policy, 1975-1977.
Participated in planning, development, and presentation of i
all executive type development courses sponsored by the Training Division, 1977-1985.
University of Vircinia (1973 - Present)
Adjunct Professor.
University of Southern California Washincton Public Affairs Center (1980 - 1985L Adjunct Professor, appeared regularly as Guest Lecturer and consultant on a variety of Public Administration topics.
t Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW) i Consultant and resource person.
University of Arkansas - Little Rock (1985 - Present)
Associate Professor - Criminal Justice Department.
Member of International Studies Faculty.
Evaluator and consultant through University of Arkansas at Little Rock to representatives of city, county and State i
governments on the effectiveness of police services, includ-l ing training, in the State of Arkansas, j
BIBLIOGRAPHY PUBLISHED AIttele Title Journal and Date
" Progressive Law Enforcement Arkansas Municipal Police in Arkansas" Journal, 1980 "The Effects of Budgetary Arkansas Municipal Police Constraints on Law Enforcement Journal, 1981-1982 Resource Management and Allocation"
" Good Manager Can Recognize Arkansas Municipal Police and Relieve Staff Stress" Journal, 1982-1983
" Fighting the Budget-Crunch --
Arkansas Municipal Police Is Japanese Management an Answer?"
Journal, 1983-1984
" Performance Measurement for Journal of Police Science Criminal Justice -- The FBI
& Administration, Vol.
Experience" 12, No.
2, Spring, 1984 Reprint Public Productivity Review, Fall, 1984
" Formulating a Corporate Response Arkansas Municipal Police to Terrorism" Journal, 1984-1985
" Reacting to Terrorism:
Security Management, Don't Fuel the Fire" February, 1985
" Designing a Corporate Response The Police Chie'f, to Terrorism" February, 1985 l
"Long Range Planning in the FBI" FBI Management Quarterly, September, 1985 Official FBI Research Documents Sample of Documents prepared by Dr. Colwell or under his immediate direction or general supervision.
Document Title Date Bank Robbery Suspects Program 1977 and Effectiveness of Bank Robbery Investigations Field Police Training 1977 Psychological Services Within the FBI 1977 Training of FBI Managerial Personnel 1977 Principal Administrative Features 1980 of the FBI, U.S. Department of Justice Problem Analysis - One Approach to 1980 Improve a System Within an Organization Policy Issues Affecting an Evalua-1981 tion of a More Active FBI Role in Drug Enforcement Drug Enforcement Efforts 1981 A Comparison of Selected Provisions 1981 of the U.S. Civil Service Reform f.ct of 1978 with Principal Practices in Personnel Administration Career Development Program 1981 An Analysis of Resource Allocation 1981 in a Law Enforcement Agency FBI Role in Police Training 1982 Establishing Recruiting Priorities 1982 and Capabilities Official FBI Research Documents (Continued)
Document Title Date Change and Its Importance to 1982 Public Administration Organizational Change Within 1982 the FBI FBI / DEA Budget Coordination 1984 Consolidation of FBI / DEA 1984 Procurement Functions Impact of Automation Efforts 1984
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The FBI's Role in Investigating 1984 Labor Racketeering Coordination and Collocation 1985 of FBI and DEA Training at the FBI Academy The Further Integration of 1985 Administrative Aspects of FBI l
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l Expanded Integration of Inspection /
1985 Evaluation Aspects of FBI and DEA Integration / Allocation of FBI / DEA 1985 l
Personnel Resources UNPUBLISHED "How to Prevent Interpersonal Change" 1982
" Qualitative Evaluation in the FBI" 1985 "An Examination of the 1982 Decision to Reorganize the FBI and DEA" (Doctoral Dissertation) l I
PAPERS PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES
" Role of FBI in Policing," International Association of Chiefs of Police, Annual Conference; Dallas, Texas; 1977.
PAPERS PRESENTED AT CONFERENCES (Continuedl
" Trends and Crime Prevention:
a Perspective," Sixth United Nations Congress, Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offender; Caracas, Venezuela; 1980 (participant and delegate).
" Allocation of Resources," American Psychological i
Association; Atlanta, Georgia; February,_1981.
" Role of FBI's Personal Crimes Program in Combating Violent l
Crime"; " FBI's Role in Combating Drug Trafficking," Interpol; Torremolinos, Spain; October, 1982.
" Performance Measurement Systems," American Society of Public Administration (ASPA) National Conference; New York; April, 1983.
WORK EXPERIENCE Dr. Colwell previously was the Associate Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a position that is regarded as the senior career law enforcement position in the entire United States.
He frequently served as Acting Director of the FBI.
As Chief Executive Officer of the FBI, Dr. Colwell was directly responsible for a budget in excess of one billion dollars, the direction of policy review and analysis, budget formulation and implementation, and allocation of FBI resources and oversight of all administrative investigative operations involving 20,000 employees in the FBI's 59 field offices and 14 foreign posts.
He was also responsible for program evaluation, long-range planning, and review of personnel actions.
He was instrumental in the development of an innovative management information system for the FBI.
He also oversaw FBI public affairs and congressional liaison functions and frequently testified before Congress.
A career employee, Dr. Colwell held every investigative and management position in the FBI.
He served as Executive Assistant Director for both Investigations and Administration.
He served on special assignment as Coordinator of the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee to review appropriations requests for entire management systems of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.
Dr. Colwell helped develop the FBI's National Emergency Operations Center located in FBI Headquarters, with links to the White House, Department of Justice, Department of Energy, Department of Defense, all FBI field divisions, and other local, state and federal agencies during a crisis.
In the absence of - _ _ _ - ---
I the FBI Director, Dr. Colwell was in command of any crisis I
situation that involved local, national, or international I
dimensions.
FBI Procrams Graduate of FBI Senior Executive Program and National Executive Institute.
j One of five original evaluators for the FBI's Personnel Assessment Center.
Reviewed leadership dimensions of candidates for supervisory positions.
Panels - Committees i
Law enforcement applicant interview panel, Pulaski County, Arkansas, Civil Service Commission i
Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism l
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University on Terrorism (chaired by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski) l l
Program Director for an international seminars security crisis management planning for seven Eastern Carribean nations in November 1985, and representatives from Turkey, l
March 1986 Sino-American Criminal Justice Institute, August 1986, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.
One of nine U.S.
representatives invited to participate in first such meeting.
Included lectures at Taiwan Central Police College and Tunghai University.
CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY During the period 1976-1985, Associate Director Colwell testified frequently before U.S.
Senate and U.S.
House of Representatives committees on topics such as terrorism, organized crime, and the administration of the FBI, including budget matters.
He testified regularly before the U.S. Department of Justice budget committees and the Office of Management and Budget.
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PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS American Management Association American Society of Industrial Security American Society of Public Administration Arkansas Law Enforcement Officers Association International Association of Chiefs of Police Maryland Law Enforcement Officers Association Police Management Association Society for Long Range Planning Tarrytown 100 (charter member along with Peter Drucker and others)
Texas Police Association Texas Sheriffs Association World Future Society 9
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j Personal Resume Deputy Inspector Peter F. Cosgrove Suffolk County Police Department Police Experience February, 1985 present Commanding Officer, Personnel Bureau January, 1984-Promoted to Deputy Inspector, February, 1985 Executive Of ficer, 3rd Precinct October, 1981 -
January, 1984 Commanding Officer, Police. Academy Section May, 1980 Promoted to Captain February, 1979 -
October, 1981 Commanding O f ficer, Pe rsonr.el Section i
September, 1977 -
1 February, 1979 Commanding Officer, Employee Relations Unit January, 1977 -
Assigned to Chief of Detectives Office September, 1977 to develop performance evaluation program September, 1975 Promoted to Lieutenant September, 1975 -
January, 1977 Assigned to Sixth Precinct, Patrol Supervisor December, 1972 -
Assigned to Police Academy Section, September, 1975 Recruit Training Unit October, 1971 Promoted to Sergeant J
October, 1971 -
December, 1972 Assigned to Fourth Precinct, Patrol Supervisor July, 1966 -
October, 1971 Assigned to Sixth Precinct, patrol duties May, 1966 Appointed to Suffolk County Police Department Formal Education:
i 1982 Completed course work for Master of Public Administration, C. W. Post College, L. I. University 1
1974 B.S. Behavioral Science, N.Y. Institute of Technology
Formal Education: (cont.)
1970 A.A.S. Police Science, Suffolk County Community College Related Training & Education:
1983 FBI National Academy, 132nd Session (Il weeks) 1974 Ethical Awareness Instructors Workshop N.Y.S. Bureau for Municipal Police (I week) 1974 Police Performance Appraisal Workshop Northwest Traffic Institute (I week) 1973 Basic Instructors School, Internal Revenue Service (2 weeks)
Related Experience:
1972 - Present Lecturer, Suffolk County Police Academy 1972 - Present Adjunct Asst. Prof., Suf folk County Community College 1973 - 1976 Training Instructor, N.Y.S. Bureau for Municipal Police i
1975 - Present Training Instructor, Suffolk County Department of Health j
1979 - Present Lecturer, Suf folk County Sherif f's i
Department
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l Certificates & Memberships:
Certified New York State Police Instructor l
New York State Association of Chiefs of Police National Academy Associates American Society of Personnel Administrators l
ATTACHMENT 3
6/86 Curriculum Vitae Charles B. Perrow Educatian i
University of California, Berkeley l
B.A.
1953, M.A.
1955, Ph.D. 1960, all in Sociology Present Position Professor, Department of Sociology Yale University, Box 1965 Yale Station New Haven, Connecticut 06520 Personal Born 1925, Tacoma, Washington Married, two children Social Security No. 532-18-4107 Igaching Positi m 1959-1963 Instructor to Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
1963-1966 Assistant to Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, and the School of Public and International Affairs, and the Administrative Science Center, University of Pittsburgh.
1966-1970 Associate Professor to Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin; Head, Social Organization Center, 1966-1970.
1968-1969 Visiting Professor, Inst'itute of Industrial Relations and School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley.
1970-1981 Professor, Department of Sociology, State University of New York at Stony Brook.
1972-1973 Visiting Professor, London Graduate School of Business, London.
1981-1982
- Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, California.
1981-Pres.
Professor, Department of Sociology, Yale University.
2 Maior Research Grants 1957-1958 NIMH Predoctoral Fellowship. Goals and authority in general hospital.
1958-1962 NIMH Grant.
Associate Study Director, comparative study of seven juvenile correctional institutions.
1963 NIMH Grant.
Panel study of a correctional institution.
1965-1967 NSF Grant.
Comparative study of eight industrial corporations.
1967-1968 NSF Grant and Vocational Rehabilitation Grant, Comparative study of fourteen industrial corporations.
1971-1972 NIMH Grant.
Insurgency and social change in U.S.,
1948-1970.
1973-1976 NIMH Grant.
Insurgency and social change in U.S.,
1948-1972.
1978 NSF Grant.
Origins of industrial bureaucracy in the U.S.
1980-1982 NSF Grant.
Accidents in High Risk Systems.
1982 Office of Naval Research Grant.
Organizational Context of Human Factors.
Consultancies and Miner Grants 1956-1958 Evaluation study for OVR of Home Care Program, Mount Zion Hospital; Evaluation study of alcoholic rehabilitation program, California State Alcoholism Commission.
1963-1964 Evaluation study of half-way home program for Federal Bureau of Prisons. (with other co-investigators); Consultant and research role for City Youth Commission.
1974-1975 Consultant to Philips Industries, Eindhoven,
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Holland, on work structuring program.
1972-1975-Consultant on various projects in public sector for Imperial College oJ-Science and Technology, London.
3 Consultaneita and Minor Grants (continued) 1972-1975 Workshop leader, for Dale-Loveluck Associates, running two-day workshops for executives in London.
1973-1974 Evaluation study of administrative practices in student services at Stony Brook.
1975 Consultant on evaluation strategies for AID rural health programs; Consultant, Office of Tele-communications Policy, electronic funds transfer.
1979 Background paper for President's Commission on the Three Mi'le Island Accident, "T M I-- A Normal Accident."
1979 Consultant to Institute of Public Service, New York City, interview and surveys of New York City Welfare Department employees.
1979-1980 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, panel member of Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants conferences.
1980-1981 Battelle Institute, panel member of group studying the optimum organizational structure for nuclear power plants, sponsored by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
1981-1982 Dioxin in the Office Building:
the Generation of Risk Assessment in Terms of Personal Tragedy and 4
Organizational Dilemmas.
Russell Sage Foundation, l
small grant.
1982 Consultant to Institute of Public Service, New York City, on survey of employee attitudes for Citibank.
1982 Testimony for Friends of the Earth at the Indian Point Restart Hearings before a three person special Federal Judge panel.
1985-Consultant to law firms regarding chemical plant accidents.
1985-Pro bono work for the Oil, Chemical and atomic Workers Union, regarding chemeial plant safety.
Igaphing Interests Complex Organizations, Industrial Society, Technology and Social
- Change, Social Movements, Research
- Design, Sociological Theory.
4 Honors and Memberships Phi Beta Kappa; Newhouse Fellowship (University of California)
Public Health Pre-Doctoral Fellowship Public Health Service, Special Fellowship Vice-President:
Eastern Sociological Society National Association for Advancement of Science, Fellow National Research Council, Committee on Human Factor Research, 1981-83 Editorial Board Membership:
American Sociological Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, American Journal of Health and Social Behavior, Administration and Society l
Council Member, Section'on Professions and Organizations:
American Sociological Association Sociology Panel:
National Science Foundation Senior Research Fellow:
Center for Policy Research Member AAAS, Nominating Committee, Section K.
Industrial Relations Association Eastern Sociological Society International Sociological Association Normal Accidents recipient of the 1985 George R. Terry Book Award, Academy of Management.
Books and Published Monograohs l
1.
Study nn Lht Enn=SezrtKaktd Bospihalkzakkan of Alanhnlin fatients in a General Enspital, (American Hospital Association, Hospital Monograph Series 7, 1959) with Mark Berke, Jack D. Gordon, M.D., and Robert I. Levy, M.D.,
120 pages.
2.
GrzankzaLkan tar 1rnahmenL1 A ComnaraLL11 BLudy DL Juvenile Correctional Institutions, New York:
The Free Press, 1966) with David Street and Robert D. Vinter.
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3 Organizational Analysisi A Sonininginal Yies, Belm on t, Ca.:
Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1970, (Chapters have been reprinted).
4.
EnmDitX DrEanizaLinns1 A Crihical Essax, Glenview, l
Ill. :Sc o t t,
- Foresman, 1972.
(Chapters have been reprinted.)
Revised edition, 1979.
Third edition:
1986.
5.
Ihn Radical'Athank on Business.
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.
6.
Entmal Ac ciden t s :
Living silh High Risk Technologi.es, l
l Basic Books, 1984.
5 Research Articles or Chapters 1.
"Are Retirement Adjustment Programs Necessary?,"
Harvard Business Review, 35:4 (July-August, 1957), 109-15."
2.
"Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft:
A Critical Analysis of the Use of a Polar Typology," Berkelev Publications in Institutinna and 3021212, 2:1 (Spring, 1956), 20-43 Also reprinted in AutonomnMa Group B u l le t i n_, XIII:1, 2 (Autumn-Winter, 1957), 10-16.
3.
"Research in a Home Care Program," American Journal nf Public Health, 49: 1 (January, 1959), 34-44.
4.
" Nonsegregated Hospitalization of Alcoholic Patients in a General Hospital,"
Hnspitals, Journal of the American Hospital Association, Vol.
33, (Nov.
16, 1959), 45-48, with Mark Berke, Jack D.
Go rd on, ' M.D.,
and Robert I. Levy, M.D.
l 5.
" organizational Prestige:
Some Functions ' and Dysfunctions," American.dnMrnal af Sanining2, 66:4 (January, 1961), 335-41.
Reprinted in 3 books.
6.
" Reality Shock:
A New Organization Confronts t h 'a Custody-Treatment Dilemma," Social Ernblema, 10:4 (Spring, 1963), 374-82.
7.
" Goals and Authority Structures, A Historical Case S t ud y," Cha p te r 4 i n -Iha Haasital in Endern SociatX, Eliot Freidson, (ed.), (The Free Press, 1963), 112-46.
8.
" Sociological Perspective and Political Pluralism,"
Social Beanarch, 31:4 (Winter, 1964-65), 411-22.
Reprinted.
9.
"The Reluctant Organization and the Aggressive Environ-ment," (with John Maniha),
Admin 111 rat 12e Sn12nna Quarter 1v, 10:2 (September, 1965), 238-57.
Reprinted.
l 10.
" Hospitals: Technology, Goals and Structure," Chapter l
22 in Handhnnk of Organizations, James March (ed.),
Rand McNally, 1965),. 910-71.
11.
" Reality Adjustment:
A Young Institution Se'ttles for Humane Care," Social Problema, 14:1 (Summer, 1966), 69-79.
12.
" Technology and Organizational Structure," Proceedings of the 19th Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, December 1966,.156-63.
{~
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6 Research Articles or Chaoter (continued) 13.
"A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Organizations," American Snainingisal Egylew, ( April, j
1967), 194-208.
Reprinted several times and in Bobbs-Berrill Series.
14.
" Organizational Goals," Inkarnational Encyclopedia of tha Snsial Ssignses, r e v i.3 e d e d i t i o n, ( M a c M i ll a n C o.,
1968), Vol.11, 3 0 5-11.
15.
"The Professional Army in the War on Poverty," " Focus Article" in EgygrLy and Human Egagurags AhstragLs, (January-February, 1968).
16.
" Technology and Structural Changes in Business Firms,"
industrial Be1LLions1 Sanhemporary 112ngs, B.C.
Roberts, (ed.), (MacMillan Co., 1968), 205-19.
17.
"Some Reflections on Technology and Organizations," in A.
R.
- Negandhi, et al.
( e d s.),
SamRaraLIXA AdminiatraL19n and ManagAment, Comparative Administration Research Series, No.
1 (Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 1969).
18.
" Members as a Resource in Voluntary Organization," in Draanizarian and Silents, W. R o s e n g r e n a n d. M. L e f t o n,
(eds.), Charles E. Merrill, 1970,93-116.
i 19.
" Departmental Power and Perspective in Industrial Firms," in Enwar in organizations, edited by Mayer Zald (Vanderbilt University Press, 1970), 59-89.
20.
"The Short and Glorious History of Organizational Theory," Organizational Dynamins, (Summer 1973),
2-16.
(Reprinted) 21.
" Zoo Story, or Life in the Organizational Sandpit,"
Chapter in course text, Peoole and Organizations, Open University (England), 1974.
Revision for 1980 edition.
22.
"Is Business Really Changing?"
Organizational Dynamina (Summer, 1974).
(Reprinted) i 23.
"The Bureaucratic Paradox:
The Efficient Organization Centralizes in Order to Decentrali2.e."
Organizational Dynamins, Spring, 1977, 2-14.
(Reprinted) 24.
"Three Types of Organizational Effectiveness," in Paul S.
Goodman and Johannes M.
- Pennings, ed.
Hag Entsp12Lkynn an Drzanizaklangi Effectiveness, Jossey-Bass, 1977,96-105.
7 Research Articles nn Chaoters (continued) 25.
" Insurgency of the Powerless:
Farm Worker Movements, 1946-1972" (with Craig Jenkins), American Soniglogical Review, 42, (April, 1977), 249-68.
)
26.
"Demystifying Organizations" in Rosemary C. Sarri and Yeheskel Hasenfeld eds. Ina Banagamani of Human Services, (New York: C ol o _a bi a University Press, 1978).
105-122.
27.
"The Sixties Observed," in iiayer M.
Zald and John D.
- McCarthy, eds.,
Iht D1namish of Bankki EnxemtnLA, Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers, 1979, 192-211.
28.
"The President's Commission and the Normal Accident,"
in David Sills, et al. (eds.) Ihn Annident at Ihrgg Bilm Island:
Ih2 HMman Dimensions, Boulder, Colorado:
The Westview Press, 1981.
29.
" Disintegrating Social Sciences,"
Egg York University Education Quarter 1v, vol. 12, no. 2 (Winter, 1981),
2-9.
30.
" Markets, Hierarchies and Hegemony:
A Critique of Chandler and W i l.1 1 a m s o n, " in Andrew Van de Ven and William Joyce, eds.
Eersparti1Hs on Draan12a11nn Design and Behazinr, New York:
Wiley Interscience, 1981, 371-386, 403-404.
31.
"This Week's Citation Classic,"
furrent Contenta,14 (April 6, 1981),
p.
14 (A reflection on item 15-
"F r a m ew o rk...")
32.
" Normal Accident at Three Mile Island," Sonigly, vol.
18, no. 5 (July / August, 1981), 17-26.
33.
"Three Mile Island:
a Normal Acci d e n t," David Dun ke rl e y a n d G ra e m e Sal a m a n, ed s., Iha International Xmarbook of Organization Studies, 1981, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, 1-25.
34.
"The Organizational Context of Human Factors,"
Technical Report, U.S. Navy, Of fice of Naval Research, Washington, D.C.,
- November, 1982, 1-50.
DTIC
- ADA123435.
35.
"The Organizational Context of Human Factors Engineering," Administrative Science Quarter 1v, vol.
28, Cornell University, 1983, 521-541.
36.
' "Journaling Careers,"
in L.L.
Cummings and Peter J.
Frost, eds.
Publishing in the Organizational Sciences, Homewood, Ill.:
Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1985, 220-230.
8 Research Artic121 nr Chaoters (continued) 37.
"Co m.m e n t on Langton's ' Ecological Theory of Burea uc ra cy,'"
Administrative S_pience Quarteriv, vol.
30, 1985, 278-283 38.
" Journal
'g Careers," Sociological Forum, 1:1, Winter 19u 169-177.
39
" Risky Systems:
The Habit of Courting Disaster," Ihg Nation, October 11, 1986.
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1 ATTACHMENT 4
RESUME John W.
S tree ter Jr.
Lieutenant Command 5124 Suffolk County Police Department EXPERIENCE 1986 - Present:
Suffolk County Police Department l
1986 Present:
Executive Officer of Police Academy (Lieutenant)
Direct the research, development, production, i
administration and evaluation of instructional television programs for county, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies within the
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county.
Oversee and direct entry level (re-cruit) training for county, state and local en-forcement agencies within the county.
Prima ry instructor for police response to critical in-cidents for recruit, in-service and supervisors; l
training needs assessment, and evaluation of l
training for new instructors:
Instructor-evalu-ator and critical incidents response instructor for Bureau for Municipal Police.
Meritorious Award for development of critical incidents response instruction methodology.
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l 1984 - 1986.
Commanding Officer In-Service Training (Lieutenant) l l
l Direct the research, development, administration, and evaluation of in-service training for county, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.
Primary instructor for critical incidents response, training needs assessment, evaluation of training, training coordinator for hostage negotiations and emergency service units.
Instructor - evaluator for Bureau for Municipal Polico.
Curriculum development, administrator and
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evaluation of Career Developmen't Course for in-service patrol personnel.
l Curriculum development, administration and evaluation of Career Development Course for in-service investigative personnel.
Outstanding Achievement Award for 1985 by the Federal Bureau of Investigation National
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Academy Association of Nassau and Suffolk Counties.
Bureau for Municipal Police (N.Y.S.) commit-tee member - developed new curriculum and standards for state mandated Police Super-vision Course.
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Bureau for Municipal Police (N.Y.S.) com-mittee member - for development of mandated in-service training standards.
1978 1984:
Commanding Officer Decentralized Individualized In-Service Training (Sergeant)
Developed, administered and evaluated training needs analysis and evaluation instruments.
Administered and evaluated instructional television programs for county, federal, s tat t e and local law enforcement agencies within the county.
Indepth evaluation and analysis of the use of instructional television on attitude, know-1 edge and retention.
l 1977 - 1978:
Patrol Supervision (Sergeant)
Generalis t police service first line supervisor for police officers a t precinct level.
1968 - 1977:
Police Officer Police servico generalist with specialization in Vehicle and Traffic Law enforcement and rescue work.
Professionalization Award Mul tiple Departmen t commendations 1965 - 1968:
Police OfficerInc. Village of Huntington Bay Police service generalist 1963 - 1965:
Security Officer Security Officer generalist for Hofstra University 1961 - 1963:
Electronic Productive Technician Potentiometer calibration technician for Computer Instrument Corp.
1961:
United States Marine Corps 1960 Infantryman i
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-3 PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES F.B.I.
National Academy Associates, Member.
International Association of Chiefs of Police, Associate Member.
Law Enforcement Training Director Association of New York State, Member.
Suffolk Sounty Police Conference, Member.
Suffolk County Police Association, dember.
Suffolk County Police Superior O'ficers Association, Member.
Suffolk County Police Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, Member.
Suffolk County Police Steuben Association, 1
Financial Secretary.
Suffolk County Police Columbian Association, Member.
EDUCATION F.B.I.
National Academy, (University of Virginia),
Diploma, 1985 S ta te University of New York at Stony Brook, M.A.,
Political Science, 1981 New York Institute of Technology, B.S.
Behav-ioral Science, 1976 Suffolk County Community College, A.A.S.,
Criminal Justice, 1975 i
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I ATTACHMENT 5
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- - - _ - - _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ ' - - - ^ - - - " " - - ~
RESUME Harold Richard Zock 10015 Chicot Road Little Rock, Arkansas 72209 Residence and Business (50.) 562-0610 Obiective:
General Information Emolovment:
1943 - 1947 Agency - United States Navy - Active Duty Position - E-5 Reason for Leaving - Honorable Discharge 1949 - 1971 Agency - Little Rock, Arkansas Police Department Position - Captain Reason for Leaving - Retired /22 years service 1971 - 1978 Agency - United States Government Veterans Administration Department of Medicine & Surgery, Washington, D.C.
Position-Regional Security Officer / Chief, Police Training Center 1980 - 1981 Agency - State of Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards Position-Executive Director Reaaon for Leaving - The Commission on Law En-forcement Standards and the Arkansas Law Enforcement Training Academy were con-solidated.
Director's position was offered on the condition of permanent change of residence to East Camden, Arkansas.
Position was declined.
Appointed Deputy Director for the Standards Division.
1981 - 1986 -
Agency - State of Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training Position-Deputy Director, Standards Division Reason for Leaving - Retired
t i
1986 -
Retired.' Continuing to serve as a consultant in Present Law Enforcement Administration and Management, remaining active as local, national and inter-national Criminal Justice Training Coordinator.
i Professional Organizations:
I Member:
Arkansas Municipal Police Association Member:
Arkansas Law Enforcement Officers' Association Member:
International Association of Chiefs of Police Member:
National Association of State Directors of Law Enforcement Training; Past President 1
Member:
Advisory Board - College of Liberal Arts University of Arkansas at Little Rock Member:
International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators Former Member:
Intern.'tional Association of Hospital Security L,
Regional Vice President
's j
Former i
Member:
Association of Federal Investigators Educational - Professional I
Acencies and Institutions Attended:
s United States Department of State i
i United States Department of Justice United States Department of Transportation j
s Federal Bureau of Investigation United States Bureau of Prisons United States Army United Stateq Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Agency
't United States Civil Service Commission N
University of Arkansas University of Arkansas Medical Sciences Campus Texas A & M University University of Georgia University of Michigan University of Indiana University of Cincinnati College of the Ozarks, Arkansas Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C.
Institute of Municipal Police Administration International Association of Chiefs of Police Little Rock Police Academy Missouri National Aquadic School ___ =-__-___
Education - Formal Central High School Little Rock, Arkansas 1940 - 1942 Little Rock Junior College (Now the University of Arkansas at Little Rock) 1947 - 1948 College of the Ozarks Clarksville, Arkansas 1980 - 1981 Phillips County Community College Helena, Arkansas 1982 - Sprit.g Semester Arkansas State University Jonesboro., Arkansas
,1 ! 94M tJ e t
17 8tf i
University of Arkansas Little Rock, Arkansas 1984 - Present Criminal Justice Major j
Other Significant Facts and Exoerience 1.
Assisted in development and implementation of the.Little Rock, Arkansas Police Training Division.
Served 12 years with the Little Rock Police Department in training capacity, retiring as Captain and Commander of the Little Rock Police Department's Training Division.
2.
For eignt years served at Little Rock Police Department as a bomb technician and officer in charge of identifying, trans-porting and disposing of improvised explosive devices, com-mercial chemical and military explosives.
3.
As Chief of The Veterans Administration Police Training C e r. t e r, supervised approximately 500 Veterans Administration police officers in 17 states and Puerto nico.
Developed, implemented and relocated the Veterans Administration National Police Training Center from Washington, D.C.
to North Little Rock, Arkansas.
The Center provides law enforcement training to Veterans Administration police officers and investigators from all facilities in the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
4.
Served as Project Director for the United States Department of Justice and National REacciation of State Directors of Law Enforcement Training in the delivery of National Train-ing Programs in witness assistance training, executive development, child abuse and neglect and general victimology to police officers la all 50 states.
5.
Currently serving the United States Department of State, Office of Counter Terrorism, as Coordinator and Instructor in VIP security, K-9 operations, SWAT operations and rendering cafe improvised explosive devices.
The training is provided to foreign law enforcement executives and operational personnel.
6.
Have been appointed by the United States Department of Transportation Safety Institute as an Associate Staff Member in providing counter terrorism training to foreign national law enforcement officers.
Provide instruction in hostige situations, personal protection of heads of State and 9ther dignitaries, improvised explosive devices in the areas of airports and ports and harbor security.
Developed counter ambush, counter assassination procedures for Presidential and Prime Ministers protective units of foreign nations.
7.
Assisting in coordination and development of exclusionary rule training program sponsored by the Attorney General of the United States.
Training will be provided to law enforcement officers of all 50 states.
8.
Previously employed as Executive Director of the Arkansas Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training.
In 1982 was elected to the Executive Board; in 1985 was electad President of the National Association of State Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (NASDLET).
NASDLET membership consists of the Executive Director or his designee from each of the 50 states.
The 50 members of NASDLET have the statutory authority to regulate and control all employment, training and certification or licensing of every sworn State, county and municipal law enforcement officer in the United States.
9.
Was a member of the United States Police Training delegation that traveled to The Peoples Republic of China in November 1986 for the purpose of participating in a technical exchange with Chinese police officers from the tiinistry of Public Security.
Was invited to return to China and present courses of instruction at three Ministry of PublLc Security Universities in Peking, Wuhan and Canton.
4 _
ATTACliMENT 6
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l CONTENTION EX 50 FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN LILCO'S TRAINING PROGRAM CQntention EX E0.
[The alleaed mistakes related to trainino raised in EX 42 will be dealt with under EX 50; and bases for EX 45 are consolidated _with EX 50).
The exercise demonstrated l
that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that members of LERO, as well as the personnel of various organizations upon which LILCO relies for implementation of the Plan, are unable to j
carry out effectively or~ accurately the LILCO Plan because of inadequate training.
Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO is responsible for the training l
and retraining of both LILCO and non-LILCO personnel in LERO.
l Training began in 1983 and, since that time, has consisted o.?
l classroom instruction, tabletop sessions, and drills / exercises.
I Plan at 5.1-1 thru 5.2-7 and Figs.
5.1.1, 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1.
j LILCO requires all LILCO members of LERO to participate in its training program on an annual basis.
Plan at 5.1-1, 5.1-7 and
)
5.1-8; OPIP 5.1.1.
At a minimum, this requires each LILCO worker j
in LERO, each year, to attend classroom instruction sessions on l
seven emergency response training modules and to participate in l
at least one tabletop session / drill /exarcise; on average, how-i ever, LILCO personnel are required, each year, to attend class-f room instruction sessions on nine modules and to participate in three tabletop sessions / drills / exercises.
Plan, Figs. 5.1.1 and 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1.
Thus, as of the time of the February 13 exer-cise, the bulk of LILCO's LERO personnel had already undergone
)
almost three years of training by LILCO involving, on ave: age, l
classroom instruction on a total of 27 training modules and participation in nine tabletop sessions / drills / exercises.
The large number of training deficiencies revealed during the exercise collectively demonstrate LILCO's lack of compliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and (15) and NUREG 0654, S II.N and O, and violations of LILCO's Plan and procedures (chiefly OPIP j
5.1.1), as well as LILCO's overall inability to implement the LILCO Plan and procedures as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
In its April 17, 3085 Partial Initial Decision, the ASLB found that the "LlLCO Plan training program meets the regulatory standards," but that conclusion was expressly:
made subject to confirmation by a finding, to be made by FEMA after a graded exercise, that the Plan can be satisfactorily implemented with the training program submitted and that LILCO possesses an adequate number of trained LERO workers.
l 21 NRC 644, 756.
No such findings have been made by FEMA; in fact, as noted below, in its Report FEMA identified a significant i
number of training deficiencies.
The exercise results thus dis-close fundamental flaws in LILCO's training program which pre-clude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer-gency.
1 Every instance of a LILCO training deficiency revealed I
during the exercise is not described at length in this contention l
because they are so numerous; virtually every error made by a LILCO player during the exercise involved to some degree a fail-ure of the LILCO training program to prepare personnel adequately I
to perform necessary actions.
Thus, each " deficiency" and each "ARCA" identified by FEMA, plus each additional error committed i
during the exercise and identified in other contentions, provides a basis for the Governments' allegation that the exercise results demonstrate a fundamental flaw in LILCO's training program.
l Because such errors are all identified elsewhere, in the interest of brevity and to avoid needless repetition, in subparts A-I below, the Governments use cross-references to identify specific
)
examples of the training deficiencies which support this contention.1 EX 50.A.
The exercise demonstrated that the LILCO program has not successfully or effectively trained or prepared LERO personnel to respond properly, appropriately, or effectively to unanticipated and unrehearsed situations likely to arise in an emergency.
Exercise actions and events which support this alle-gation are described in Contentions EX 38, EX 39, EX 41, and EA 42, and in the following FEMA Comments:
EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; PSA-D-1; PSA-D-6; R-D-2; EOC-ARCAs-2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA-2; PSA-ARCAs-5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
EX 50.B.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has been ineffective in instructing LERO personnel to follow and implement the LILCO Plan and LILCO procedures, and in imparting basic kndwledge and information essential to the ability to implement such procedures.
Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 36-39, EX 41, EX 42, EX 45, EX 49, and in the follcwing FEMA conclusions:
EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; R-D-2; PSA-D-6; EOC-ARCAs 2, 5,
6, 7, 9; PJSA-ARCA-1; PSA-ARCAs 3, 4,
7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; R-ARCAs 4, 5, 6; RC ARCA 1.
l 1
References in the subparts to FEMA deficiencies ("D") and ARCAs are to Table 3.1 in the FEMA Report, where the deficiencies and ARCAs are numbered and identified by LILCO facility.
Herein the Port Jeff.erson Staging Area is referred to as "PJSA"; the Riverhead and Patchogue Staging Areas as "RSA" and "PSA"; and the Reception Center as "RC."
1 EX 50.C.
(The alleced missteo described in EX 23 will be i
considered under this suboart).
The exercise demonstrated that the LILCO t~
sing program has not successfully or effectively trained LET e
-rsonnel to communicate necessary and sufficient data and inf
.mation, to inquire and obtain such information, or to recognize the need to do so.
Exercise actions and eventG which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 34, 36, 38, 39, EX 41, EX 42, EX 45, and in the following FEMA con-clusions:
EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; EOC-ARCAs 4, 5,
6, 7, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARCA 8, 9, 11, 12; R-ARCA 1.
EX 23.
(Not seoarately admitted but will be considered under subogIt C of EX 50].
EOC ARCA 5 refers to a 2.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> delay by LILCO personnel in correcting the error of reporting extrapolated dose data as actual measurements at other distances.
FEMA Report at 41.
This violates OPIP 3.5.2 and, depending upon the particular numbers involved in the error, could result in substantially erroneous dose projections and wholly inappropriate protective action recommendations.
Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that actual and potential offsite consequences of an accident are accurately assessed, and that appropriate protective actions can and will be chosen during an j
accident, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(9) and (b)(10).
It, i
I therefore, precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham accident.
EX 50.D.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO i
personnel to follow directions given by superiors during an emergency.
Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described'in Contentions EX 41, EX 42, EX 45 and in the following FEMA conclusions:
EOC-D-1; PSA-D-6; PJSA-ARCA 1; PSA-ARCAs 9, 13, 16; R-ARCAs 4, 6; RC-ARCA 1.
EX 50.E.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO per-sonnel to exercise independent judgment or good judgment, or to use common sense in dealing with situations presented during an emergency or in implementing the LILCO Plan and procedures.
Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 34, 36, 38-43, EX 45 and in the following FEMA conclusions:
EOC-D-1; PSA-D-1; RD-2; EOC-ARCAs 2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARCAs 5, 7, 8, 10, '2; R-ARCA 1.
EX 50.F.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO per-sonnel to deal with the media or otherwise provide timely, ac-curate, consistent and nonconflicting information to the public, through the media, during an emergency.
Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 37, EX 38, EX 40.C, and EX 43.A and in the following FEMA conclusions:
ENC-D-1; ENC-ARCAs 2, 3.. - - - - _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ -
EX 50.G.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO has fai ed to provide training to persons and organizations relied upon for the implementation of its Plan other than those employed by LILCO.
Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 27, EX 28 and in the following FEMA conclusions:
EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
EX 50.H.
[The alleaed errors described in EX 27 and 28 will be dealt with under this suboart).
The exercise demonstrated that LERO training is deficient in the area of dosimetry, exposure control, KI, understanding of radiation terminology, and related areas.
Such training deficiencies are very serious because members of the public and non-LILCO personnel relied upon to respond to a Shoreham accident (for example, school officials, special facility personnel, and other individuals who are expected by LILCO to respond on an ad hpg basis) would seek information on such subjects from LERO personnel during a real emergency.
Since LERO personnel do not understand and know how to use dosimetry equipment and the related procedures, they would be incapable of responding accurately or effectively concerning those subjects to members of the public, or other workers ex-pected to respond.
The following exercise actions and events are examples of dosimetry-related training deficiencies:
Contentions EX 42, EX 45, FEMA Conclusions EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15; PJSA-ARCA 1; PSA-ARCAs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; RSA-ARCAs 4, 5, 6.
EX 27.
[Not separatelv admitted but will be dealt with under subpart H of EX 5 0. ).
EOC FIELD ARCAS 1, 3 and 5 refer to the fact that school bus drivers have had no training in dosime-try, use of potassium iodide or excess exposure authorization procedures and that LILCO has not provided dosimetry or supplies of KI for them.
FEMA Report at 45-46.
According to the LILCO l
Plan, school bus drivers are relied upon for implementation of the protective actions of early dismissal and evacuation of school children in the EPC.
OPIP 3.6.5.
Thus, these deficien-cies preclude a finding that protective actions for school chil-l dren can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR l
5 50.47(b)(10), that means are in place for controlling radio-
]
logical exposure of emergency workers as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(11), or that radiological emergency response training har, been provided to those called upon to assist in an emergency, l
as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(15).
They also preclude a j
finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures I
can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
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EX 28.
[Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with
~
under suboart H of EX 50].
EOC FIELD ARCA 4 refe.rs to the fact that ambulette drivers are not all trained in excessive exposure i
authorization and procedures.
FEMA Report at 46.
According to
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the LILCO Plan, ambulette drivers are relied upon for implementa-tion of the protective action of evacuation for special facility residents and the homebound.
OPIP 3.6.5.
Thus, this deficiency l
precludes a finding that protective actions for special facility 1
1 1
l l i
residents and the homebound can and ' 9 1 be implemented as re-quired by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), tham
'ns are in place for con-trolling radiological exposure of emergency workers as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(ll), or that radiological emergency response training has been provided to those called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(15).
The deficiency also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.
EX 50.I.
The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's proposals to modify training materials or procedures to " emphasize" such things as " accurate use of field data," the need "to relay instructions," "the need to be more precise with information," or other matters already in'the procedures and training materials (ggg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1) -- training caterials and procedures which have been so unsuccessful for three years -- would not correct the flaws revealed by the exercise.
EX 45.A.
LILCO's response to C<1e two free play impediment messages involved numerous serious communications failures which played a major role in LILCO's inability to remove the simulated impediments as provided in the Plan, and as would be necessary to implement an evacuation.
In addition, the types of actions which, as described below, LERO personnel failed to take in response to the impediment messages are sitailar to those that would be required under the LILCO Plan in response to many other situations which would occur in substantial numbers during a real emergency.
Therefore, these failures are significant and preclude the reasonable assurance finding required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Specifically:
(i)
The Evacuation Coordinator, who is responsible for coordinating all evacuation traffic control, evacuation transportation, and evacuation implementation (OPIP 2.1.1) was never informed by LERO personnel of either of the free play impediment messages, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3 which requires such communication.
The Evacuation Route Coordinator was given the fuel truck impediment message at 11:00 and the gravel truck impediment message at 10:40.
The Evacuation Coordinator was not informed of either one, however, until after 12:13, when he was informed by the FEMA controller.
Sag FEMA Report at 36.
The late notification of the Evacuation Coordinator, as well as the lack of status updates and other necessary communications between and among the Evacuation Route Coordinator, the Traffic Control Coordinator, the Road Logistics Coordinator, the Transportation Support Coordinator, Lead Traffic Guides, Road Crews, Evacuation Route Spotters, and Evacuation Support Communicators, as required by OPIP 3.6.3, led to the substantial delays and ultimate inability to respond adequately to the impediments.
In fact, the delays caused by such failures would have been even greater in an __-__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i actual emergency, since in the exercise LERO never even discovered its errors; rather, it was the FEMA controller who 1
alerted LERO to the problem LERO itself had created.
(ii)
LERO personnel at the EOC failed to include essential information communicated to them via the free play 1
impediment messages on LERO message forms, nor did they otherwise l
communicate such critical data to the other LERO personnel expected to respond to the impediments, as required by OPIP 3.6.3 l
and OPIP 4.1.2.
Egg FEMA Report at 30.
For example, important information was not included on the 10:45 LERO message from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews regarding the gravel truck impediment, including the fact that three passenger cars were involved in the accident.
Similarly, essential information was not included on the 11:06 LERO message from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator l
regarding the fuel truck impediment, including that fuel was I
leaking, that there was the possibility of fire, and that both shoulders of the road were blocked.
Egg FEMA Report at 30.
Because of these failures, the equipment eventually sent to respond to the gravel truck impediment was inappropriate and inadequate to remove the simulated obstruction, and the equipment eventually sent to respond to the fuel truck impediment was so l
substantially delayed that LILCO's response was not observed by l
FEMA.
FEMA Report at 37, 39, 57-58.
(iii)
The Evacuation Coordinator and other LERO personnel were not properly informed concerning a " visual check" of the fuel truck impediment received by the Transportation i
Support Coordinator from the Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue l
l Staging Area, and appropriate actions therefore were not taken in response, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3 and OPIP 4.1.2, until more than three hours after the free play message had been injected.
Egg j
FEMA Report at 30, 57.
j l
(iv)
LERO personnel were unable to locate, communicate with, or timely dispatch a Route Spotter to investigate and verify the fuel truck impediment.
They were also unable to l
determine whether one had actually been dispatched.
Thus, at about 11:15, the Route Opotter/ Road Crew Communicator requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Communicator to determine
{
whether a Route Spctter had been dispatched as required under the Plan, and as apparently assumed by the LERO players.
The spotter was not in fact dispatched until about 12:02.
Egg FEMA Report at 37.
(v)
Although the FEMA controller had informed LERO personnel of their initial errors in dealing with the gravel and fuel truck impediments at about 12:13, and despite the fact that the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with some of his staff at about 12:16, as o2 12:40, the Transportation
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Support Coordinator still had not been informed that bus j
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evacuation route M-1 was potentially blocked by the gravel truck, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3.
And, as late as 1:48, the Road Logistics Coordinator had not been informed that there might be a need to send equipment to the site of the fuel truck impediment.
Egg FEMA Report at 36.
Thus, the initial errors, omissions, and failures to follow procedures and accurately transmit information were compounded by additional errors even after the first errors 3
had been identified for LERO by FEMA.
These later errors further
]
illustrate the significance of LERO's inability to obtain and transmit essential information, since they had demonstrable impact on other aspects of the overall emergency response.
(vi)
As a result of the numerous failures and delays in internal LERO communications, information concerning the road impediments and the need to avoid the blocked evacuation routes was not communicated to the public until 1:46 when EBS message number 8 was simulated.
This further demonstrates the impact of LERO's communications failures upon its ability to implement its Plan.
EX 45.B.
The response of LERO personnel to the Ridge Elementary School free play message also demonstrates LILCO's inability to communicate essential information to appropriate response personnel in a timely manner, as required by OPIP 3.6.5.
The free play message requesting LERO to p' ovide a bus and driver to assist in transporting 40 children from Ridge Elementary School was given to the Evacuation Coordinator at the LERO EOC at approximately 10:30.
The request was communicated to the Special Population Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area within about 10 minutes, but in violation of OPIP 3.6.5, the staging area personnel did not respond appropriately or quickly in i
processing the communication.
As a result, the bus driver was
{
not even dispatched to a bus yard to pick up a bus for 40 l
minutes.
Egg FEMA Report at 38, 66.
Furthermore, there were no apparent efforts by LERO personnel to follow up on their dispatch i
orders during the approximately three hour period prior to the i
report that the driver had arrived at the school.
- Finally, i
LERO's inability to contact, communicate with, or even locate the LERO bus driver, when as of 4:23 he had still not arrived at the Reception Center, further demonstrates LILCO's inability to obtain or follow up on the absence of information critical to the j
implementation of a required protective action.
EX 45.C.
LERO was unable to notify or communicate emergency information to the FAA or the LIRR, despite the provisions in j
OPIP 3.6.3 requiring notific1 tion of the FAA in order to have air traffic diverted from the EPZ, and the obvices need to have the LIRR divert its trains from the EPZ.
The failute of LERO personnel to perform these tasks evidences their inability to
'i appropriately process, act upon, and communicate emergency information.
Egg FEMA Report at 29. ;
i EX 45.D.
Communications relating to release data and dose projections were not handled properly or accurately as required by OPIP 3.6.1.
For example, LERO personnel failed to designate clearly on the EOC dose assessment status boards the distinctions between DOE RAP monitoring data and LILCO field monitoring data.
Egg FEMA Report at 29-30.
This failure demonstrates not only an i
inability to effectively communicate important dose information and potentially significant distinctions between the information j
from the two sources, but also an inability to recognize the j
f significance of that distinction, contrary to the requirements of OPIP 3.6.1.
Similarly, downwind distances of sample readings by field monitors were. incorrectly reported as 7000 meters instead of 700 meters for a thyroid dose.
This error resulted in an initial calculation of thyroid dose as 900 mrem /hr at 4.3 miles i
downwind, instead of 9000 mrem /hr at about 0.5 miles downwind.
Sgg FEMA Report at 33.
And, at the EOC, several extrapolated j
doses at various distances were reported as actual measurements rather than as projected data on the dose assessment status board.
It took two and one half hours to identify and correct this error.
Egg FEMA Report at 33.
These failures indicate a significant inattention to detail and accuracy in recording, processing, and communication of data critical to the accident assessment and protective action recommendation prccesses which are at the core of an emergency response.
Such failures could lead to dangerous errors in a real emergency.
EX 45.E.
During the exercise, the LERO Director apparently left the " command room" on several occasions, and therefore was not available to take calls over the RECS telephone or the i
dedicated telephone.
Since, pursuant to OPIP 3.1... and OPIP
{
3.3.1, data and information critical to command decisions are l
communicated by these means, his absence and resulting inability to obtain and act upon such data quickly was significant.
Moreover, the secretary who took the calls in the Director's absence merely told the callers that the Director would call back, and failed to take a message in writing and carry it to the Director immediately upon completion of the transmission.
Final-ly, LERO failed to have key events or evacuation status boards in the EOC command room.
Thus, updated information on the status of the emergency situation was not visible to LERO workers in those areas at all times.
Egg FEMA Report at 30.
These failures to obtain or communicate vital data, and to have updated information available and visible in the command room substantially impair the ability of command personnel to perform their duties under the Plan.
EX 45.F.
There were numerous failures to obtain, process, communicate and appropriately act upon important emergency information and data demonstrated by the performance of LERO ENC, Public Information and Rumor Control personrel, in violation of OPIP 3.8.1.
These are detailed in Contentions EX 38 and EX 39.
The fact that such personnel exhibited such communication inabilities is particularly significant since such individuals were purportedly selected for their LERO positions because of I
I their communications expertise.
EX 45.G.
LERO personnel at the staging areas evidenced an inability to accurately, appropriately or in a timely manner obtain, record, transmit, or act upon emergency data, in viola-tion of OPIPs 4.1.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.4, 3.6.5, and OPIP 3.9.1.
For example:
(i)
Personnel at the Riverhead Staging Area did not properly record or appropriately identify event status informa-tion on Emergency Event Status Forms or on status boards.
Egg FEMA Report at 72.
(ii)
Communication between the Port Jefferson Staging Area and Traffic Guides was difficult due to poor radio recep-tion, and disrupted other essential communications from that Staging Area.
Egg FEMA Report at 56.
Such difficulties would be much more serious in an actual emergency when many more traffic guides would be attempting to make radio communications with the staging areas involved.
i l
i (iii)
The Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area repeatedly made inaccurate and misleading announcements to bus drivers concerning the dose levels at which they were to call in.
l These incorrect instructions concerning such important informa-tion in fact led to confusion on the part of the bus drivers, ar.d could be very dangerous in a real emergency.
Egg FEMA Report at 68.
(iv)
The Transfer Point Coordinator at ;N ?cookhaven National Laboratory Transfer Point was unable to auit, instruc-tions and transmit information and directions frc, "ae staging area to bus drivers during the exercise.
For example, he di- '
rected a bus driver to the EWDF despite the fact that a message from the Bus Dispatcher to all Transfer Point Coordinators had directed that all drivers arriving at transfer points before 4:00 should be directed to the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center.
Egg FEMA Report at 65.
EX 45.H.
LERO personnel at the EOC and staging areas were unable to transmit consistent or accurate information concerning assistance from the Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD")
during tne exercise.
For example, at 9:19, the LERO Manager was told by simulators purportedly representing Suffolk County officials that no County resources would be available to assist LILCO during the exercise.
This fact was confirmed by the County simulators at 10:15, 10:26 and 10:36, according to the logs kept by the LERO Manager and Director.
However, at 9:20 the Evacua-tion Coordinator recorded in his log that the SCPD had offered to provide LILCO whatever assistance was required, and the Traffic Control Coordinator was advised of this purported information at l
1 J
l i
9:35.
At 10:02, the Evacuation Coordinator notified the staging f
areas that the SCPD had offered assistance on traffic control, i
route alerting, and route spotting, and that police officers l
would be dispatched to the staging areas for briefings.
- And, l
between 10:02 and 10:15, the Traffic Control Coordinator informed I
(i) the Riverhead Staging Area to expect 39 SCPD officers to f
report for assignment to traffic control and route spotting 1
functions; (ii) the Port Jefferson Staging Area to expect 74 SCPD officers and; (iii) the Patchogue Staging Area to expect 37 SCPD g
officers.
These messages, all of which conflicted with the facts i
known and recorded by the LERO Manager and Director, were in turn I
transmitted to Lead Traffic Guides, Dosimetry Recordkeepers, and other staging area personnel.
The erroneous information which had been communicated to the staging areas was not corrected until approximately 10:50.
In a real emergency, such a total failure of communication could lead to serious problems.
j
j ATTACHMENT 7
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1 1
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- y O
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IN(PELL Y coucsAnou October 31, 1905
'0630-031-NY-015 To:
From:
Subject:
Drill Renort 1,91 g. fga, M IQ,X, IE.3Q F acl it ie s - E yJ[q g Piverhead Stacinq h feartial)
Backcroundr A
drill was held on June 6, 1986 to exercisa portions of LERO.
Those portions that Were exercised on this date were the
- staff, administrative support staff, dosimetry staff and the traffic guides.
All other groups within the LERO were simulated.Shif t 2 was the team that participated.
Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario BA Rev.
0 (attachment 1) was used.
This scenario was essentially the same as was used during the FEMA graded exercise on February 13, 1985 uith the following major e:ceptions:
o The length of the drill was shortened from 12 to 8
hours; o
The start time was changed from 5:30 AM to 8:00 AH; o
The length of time between the events for the Unusual Event and the Alert was shortened; o
The LERO staff was prestaged at their respective facilities rather than being called out.
o Proposed Revision 7 to the LERO plan and procedures were testad; in particular the assignment of traffic guides for the 2
- mile evacuation, rad the neu position of Traffic Engineer.
As a
result of the FEMA evaluation of the February 13 exercise the following specific additional objectiven and tests were added to the scenarios o
Two impediments to evacuation were simulated to test the communications within LERO and LERO's response to the impediment; n7mely rerouting of traffic and public notification of the impediment; o
The perf ormance of traffic guides dispatched out of the Riverhead Staging Area was specifically loo!:ed at; namely all traffic guides stationed for a 2 - mile evacuation and the majority of the remainder, vere verified to be on station; o
Use of the Traffic Engineer as a new position within the LERO was exercised; I
.L765720 223 BROAD HouCW ROAD + MELVIRL NEW YORK 11747 + (516) 4 0 320e
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o Demonstrate adequate reproduction capabilities (Enc) throughout the duration of the exercise.
Scenario Obiectives Attached Maior Observer / Controller Commentst i
Jmercancv. 0nerations,Cgg,t;.2g (EOC)
- 1. Set-up of the facility was adequate, The EOC was declared i
activated 49 minutes after the participants were told to l
report.
- 2. The notification for early dismissal of the schools l
within the EPZ was not done efficiently.
It took 40 minutes to issue an ESS message following the declaration of the Alert.
Eventhough~ the EOC was not i
declared activated, the Director and the Public Information i
Coordinator could have expedited this process.
- 3. A simulator was used to simulate the presence of Suffolk j
County. He was not to assume command and control of'the EOC, but rather to offer any assistance to LERO which might be asked for, and which might be available from the County. The simulator proved to be a slight distraction to the Director of Local Response. EOC management personnel must be cognizant of outside parties in the EOC but should not lose sight of their prime responsibility unless that function is assumed l
by that outside party.
- 4. The preparation of ESS messages took too long. The Public Information Coordinator was getting involved in minute details of the message i.e.,
which persons were consulted by the Diractor.
This caused several of the messages to miss the 15 minute deadline.
- 5. The E3s message for the General Emergency took 25 minutes to issue following the decision to initiate protective actions.
This was due to the reasons stated above.
Personnel, particularly the Director and the Public Information Coordinator, must be aware of the 15 minute time limit with regards to the issuance of EDS message's.
- 6. It took between 10 to 15 minutes to get the word out to the Staying Areas about the evacuation.
Personn'el in the EOC responsible for passing this word out are relying too much on the use of written message forms and the EOC Communicator.
The use of the commercial phones on the kb
[765721
individuals dechs should be emphasized as a
means of communicating to the Staging Areas and then folloued up with the written message.
l 7.
Written messages were frequently written on scraps of and then transcribed onto the standard message form.
caner Often, no transcription took place.
Uhen the supply of message forms was depleted in the EOC, messages were not written down at. ell.
of the status boards in the EOC was not very 8.
Updating timely.
At times entries were 30 to 45 minutes behind the a
actual events.
9.
The Public Information staff did inform the EUC of the presence of the Suffolk County Simulator.
However they did not inform them that had relieved as Director.
There was a communications problem between the dose 10.
assessment staffs in the EOC and EOF. The problem was one of lac! of cooperation between the two organizations.
This ais an area to be emphasized during future training sessions.
11.
The IOC staff must talk to the TSC when the EOF is not staffed.
Delays were encountered in the 20C because the 307 not ready to assume command and control while tha EOC was was.
(This was due to the way that the EOC staff was prestaged).
In order to make contact with the TSC
- easier, telephone numbers of key individuals in the TSC should be placed in the L P.0 phone directory.
Telephone numbers of the Control Room would also be helpful.
The LO20 strif must be reminded that contact should only be with the facility which has command and control.
12.
In order to assist the dose assessment staff in dose projections, the telephone number for Neather Service Corporation should be included in the LEno phene boo:c.
13.
No comparison between the DOE field team data and the SMPS field team data was observed to be made by che R3C.
- 14. There is,a diff erence between the RECS forms used by the on site organization and the one in the OPIP's.
This caused a lot of confusion especially in transmittal of the Part III data.
This will be correctad in a future revision to the plan and procedures.
- 1. 5.
The nuclear Engineer did a good job of assessing plant conditions and conveying to the Director the various possibilities of core f ailure and release paths.
IMF140
[.765722
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o 15.
The Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator thought that the one-hour delay in the start of the evacuation process from the time the word is conveyad to the public applies to all LEno assisted evacuation processes. He wanted to wait one hour to evacuate the mobility impaired following the order to evacuate.
All persons should be reminded through training that the one-hour delay only applies to the buses leaving the transfer points for general public evacuation.
- 17. The Special Facilities Evacuation coordinator delayed in proceeding with the deaf notification process until he had a copy of the Eas message for the evacuation.
The only reason he needed the EBS message vas for the zones to be evacuated.
This information was readily available from other namely the status board which w
- sources, This delay was unnessary.as directly in front of desk.
his
- 18. The ambulance group did a fine job in dispatching of the simulated ambulances and in briefing the simulated ambulance drivers.
19.
was her first time in this position.The bus coordinator did a very good job considerin it 30 The Traffic Control Coordinator delayed in getting traffic guides out after the word to evacuate was given.
Stagingcook approximately 40 minutes to transmit the message to the It was knuwn in the EOC. Area from the time the General Emergency condition No??r This is a special objective item.
- 21. The handling of the first impediment to evacuation (
gravel truck) was generally done in a well organized and the expeditious manner.
The second road impediment (the fuel truck) was confused and the response was delayed.
comments on these two i= pediments are listed belous Specific M0??t These are speciel objective itsms.
The Transportation Support Coordinator should have done o
a better job of keeping control and managing his during the road impediment scenarios. No one individual group was assigned to be
'n charge of handling these impediments.
Because practically all groups' in the IOC need to be made aware of such a problem it is important that one individual be responsible for coordinating this effort.
o The RBC was not made aware of the impodiment to evacuation until 2:15 PM; 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 30 minuces after k5 I-785723
I tha event had occurred.
l
. as o The E35 message telling of the road impediment w
issued et 1:29 P3; almost 45 ninutes after the event l
i had occurred.
In addition this important piece of information was includad with tha :ntira 1T3 nassage r
and might hava bean nissal by the general public.
A special EBS message should have been issued.
message for the second road impediment was called The o
into the 300 and was properly logged on a message form,
- field, however when the information was relayed to the the wrong road was mentioned; Route 25-A vs. Route 25.
The word came ba:k from the controller, simulating a
route
- spotter, That there was no impediment at the i'
location indicatad.
At'that time it was assumed that the impediment uns either a false alarm or had been clearod, and no follow up action was taken.
It was not the contro.ler in the EOC prompted the players i
until
' three times to review the original message that any
. action was takan.
position of tie Traffic Engineer was utilized for l
22.
The the first time.
Their exact responsibilities was not very in their own ninds.
They became too involved in clear traffic engineering details, i.e. extent of the crown on the road and its effect on traffic flow, rather than quickly advising the Evacuation group of alternate evacuation routes and their effect on evacuation time astimatos.
4 3
ERG i
3.
The dedicated telephone line between the EOC and 2nc was not available for the dr311.
Backup commercial telephone lines were used satisfactorily.
Repairs tr the dedicated i
J line have subsequently been made.
l Of the two copier machines in the EUC, one fallad during 2.the drill. The repair technician was called twice and shoved j
two hours later.
As a result of this
- problem, press releases were not distributed in a timsly manner.
The total j
up copies made by the two machines were 1429 and 301 i
respectively.
The Emergency Preparedness Group is in the process of obtaining new reproduction equipment.
l EQTIl This is a special objective item.
I 21223L2 Areas
- 1. The lead traffic guide in Riverhead gave a clear and thorough briefing to the traffi guides.
IMPJ1()
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2.
The Traffic Guidoo waro dispatched approximately 12 minutes after the message to do so was transmitted som the ECC-This is an adequate time frame.
3.
The Patchogue communicator-in the EOC did not transmit the message to dispatch buses until prompted by the controller in Patchogue; 1-1/2 hours after the message was given to him by_the bus coordinator.
4.
When issuing revised or amended evacuation instructions to the staging Areas, entirely new forms should be filled out and transmitted.. The Patchogue Staging Area received a modified form fer bus d!,spatching and this created a lot of confusion in the. staging area.
5.
Of those Traffic Guides questioned, all were very familiar with their traffic guide duties.
Several heuever were still not clear on the procedure regarding reoching certain exposures, i.e.
3.5 Rem and 5 Rom.
This will continue to be stressed in future training sessions.
l summarvt This is the first LERO drill held since the February 13 exercise and the first drill with Shift 2 since the Fall. Many of the participants. were new to LERO and unfamiliar with their procedures and job functions.
Several new concepts were also exercised for the first time.
Overall response by the j
participants can be classified as poor, however due to the natura i
of the drill and the participants, this was not totally unexpected.
During the post drill critique, emphasis was placed upon rapid and accurate communications flow within the Eoc and to i
outside facilities, i.e.
Staging Areas, EUC and the general-public.
This is especially true during an evacuation when the evacuation process is impeded and a
radioactive release is imminent or in progress.
This is the first time.since the a::ercise that a
traffic impediment was simulated ducing a drill.
The response to the two impediments was generally good for the first one and somewhat poorer for the second one. The response by the public information group in getting the information out to the general public was not as rapid as it should have been.
Information flow to other groups within the EOC, i.e.
the Radiological group was almost non-existent..
continue to emphasize the response 'to traffic LERIO will impediments in all future drills and training sessions.
I i
e 765725 L
l ATTACHMENT 8
a g
O L%PELL coneonAnoN October 31, 1986 0630-031-NY-017 TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Drill Reoort f.g.r,Seotember 1Qg. Seotember 17,,..iluirl October in. 1215. f.nr. LEEQ Backaround:
As part of the quarterly Emergency Preparedness drill l
program, drills were held on September 10, September 17 and i
October 1,
1966 to test the response of the Local Emergency
Response
Organization's (LERO) to a simulated emergency at the l
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS).
The purpose of the drills was to exercise LERO's ability to implement the Offsite Radiological Emergency
Response
Plan Implementing Procedures (OPIP's) and to train new personnel to improve their ability to respond to an amergency, make appropriate recommendations to the public and implement those recommendations.
All sections of LERO participated ir. the drills with the exception of the Emergency News Center on September 17, LERO Relocation Center and Family Tracking on September 10.
The facilities which did participate l
included the Local Emergency Operations Center (EOC),
the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (ENDF),
Patchogue Staging Area (PSA),
Port Jefferson Staging Area (PJSA) and Riverhead Staging Area (RSA).
Due to the revisions being made in the plan, the Relocation Center was not tested at all.
Only 1/3 of the field personnel were exercised during each of the three drills. All field workers performed their normal emergency duties with the exception of the bus drivers who were involved in a
special training session to familiarize them with all bus yards and transfer points.
Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario 7A Revision 0
(objectives attached) was used for all three drills.
Shift 3
l participated on September 10 and 17, and Shift 2 participated on October 1.
Shift 3 had not drilled as a team since late in 1985, l
and Shift 2
was last drilled in June 1986.
Tne purpose of drilling Shift 3
on two consecutive weeks was to allow the l
participants to use the first week aa a learning process, and to allow the new members of the organization to become familiar with their new positions; and the second week would be conducted as a l
more normal " hands off" drill.
All LERO members were pre-staged, i.e.
told to report to their work locations at preassigned time, rather than exercise the normal notification and call out procedures.
To vary the scenario seen by Shift 3 personnel the EOC staff was told to report at 9:30 AM on September 17, rather than 8:00 AM.
In 225 BROAD HOLLOW ROAD + MELVILLE NEW YORK 11747 -(516) 420-32 @
765726 l
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addition the type and location of the traffic impediments were changed for the September 17 drill.
Revision 7
to the Offsite Radiological Emergency
Response
Plan and Procedures was in effect at the time of the drills and 011 persons were tested to that revision.
Specific objectives to demonstrate the response to this revision were as follows:
o Demonstrate the ability to assess the effect of toad impediments upon evacuation traffic and develop and implement timely response actions.
These actions may include rerouting and the broadcast of an associated EBS messtge, as necessary.
Demonstrate the ability to pre-assign Traffic Guides to o
Traffic Control Posts within the two mile EPZ an to dispatch the Traffic Guides in an expeditious manner at the appropriate time.
continue the bus driver training to ensure bus drivers o
are familiar with all bus yards and transfer points.
Reinforce the concepts of dosimetry and KI.
o Scenario Obiectives:
Attached Below is a
summary of the major comments generated by the Observer /Conrollers during the series of drills.
September 122 1986 Emeroency Ooeratiqng Center.
1.
The EOC was staffed and activated within 45 minutes of the time the players were told to report.
This is a very good response.
All personnel were actively helping to set up the facility.
2.
The Coordinator of Public Information was participating in his first drill, as were many of the people on his staff.
As such the controller assigned to that area was forced to walk the players through their procedures.
The EBS messages for the traffic impediments were slow in being generated. The wording was ambiguous and not concise.
3.
One EBS message out of approximately 7 was broadcast without the sounding of the sirens.
Better coordination is needed between the Director of Local
Response
and the Coordinator of Public Information.
4.
Several communications problems occurred during the day but were attended to and were repaired; the TSO in the public information area, the dedicated line between the EOC and PJSA and the radios ot PSA ar.d PJSA.
The staff was able IMPR@
765727
(,
to make use of the backup systems available.
S.
The Radiation Health Coordinator (RHC) ordered the ingestion of KI prior to performing the calculations j
necessary for the technical justification. This omission was pointed out at the post drill critique.
6.
Security was not observed to perform accountability checks of the EOC and a sweep of the facility to check for improper or non-existant identifications.
What security did do was have each person sign out as they left the facility and sign back in as they returned, however this procedure was not strictly adhered to.
7.
The dose assessment staff in the EOC had difficulties in obtaining data from the dos'e assessment staff in the EOF.
Only one (1) Part II RECS message was recieved during the drill. In addition, the lines of communication for technical data was almost non-existant. This matter was brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness group and will be an item for furthur discussion and training.
8.
Response
to the traffic impediments was generally good.
The Traffic Engineer was instrumental in developing rerouting schemes and there was good lines of communication among all groups in the EOC relative to the problems.
- 9. There was approximately a 1/2 hour delay at the Road Crew Communicator's desk in getting the message transmitted to respond to one of the road impediments.
It was stressed during the critique the importance of transmitting messages in a timely manner.
10.
The use of message forms needs to be improved.
It was observed that many people are using scraps of paper to transmit messages and therefore the appropriate copies are not being distributed, or that messages are being written on scraps of paper and then being incorrectly transcribed on the message forms.
Emeroency Worker Decontamination Facility 1.
The normal Brentwood Security was not prepared for the arrival of the emergency workers from the fiel.d and the workers were given different directions upon their arrival at Brentwood.
In addition, the direction given the workers at the staging areas, was not correct and the workers did not report to the correct gate.
The Emergency Preparedness group is aware of the problems and has ensured that Brentwood will be aware of the arrival of the emergency workers in future drills, and has revised the maps from the IMEN 765728
\\
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staging areas to the to the EWDF.
2.
The personnel reporting to establish the EUDF were not familiar with their jobs, and took no action until prompted by the controller.
3.
The personnel were unfamiliar with the location of the storage rooms for EWDF equipment.
The equipment checklist was not used per the procedure.
The correct setup of the facility was demonstrated by the controller.
~
4.
No check sources were available testing the survey instruments; several of the instruments had more than one-calibration sticker with conflicting
' information one-instrument's cable and detector f ailed due to a short; two instruments went into continuous alarm; one instrument was completely dead.
All equipment problems and shortages were brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness group and have been corrected.
Patchocue Stacina h 1.
Due to the lack of experience of the participants, the set up of the facility'was slow and undirected.
No priority was given to the activation activities. The establishment of security and issuing of badges was also slow.
These issues were discussed during the post drill critique..
2.
Briefings conducted by staging area management were.not very frequent.
This-led to a lack of information regarding the emergency withing the staging area..
The need to l
periodically conduct staff meeting and the need to keep the emergency workers informed of the status of the emergency was emphasized at the critique.
3.
Due to the problem mentioned earlier concerning communications, personnel. dispatched into the field were provided' telephone numbers during the briefings. This showed good foresight on the part of the Lead Traffic Guide.
4.
The dispatch of the Traffic Guides from the Staging Area was done in an efficient and timely manner.
The Traffic Guides necessary for the two mile evacuation were preassigned and were issued their equipment.
Upo.n the order to
- evacuate, they'were dispatched and the average time to arrive at their posts was approximately 30 minutes.
- 5. In all cases the Traffic Guides who were questioned were knowledgeable in their individual tasks relative to traffic guidance, however of the 9 Traffic Guides questioned most of them were not aware of the maximum allowable dose, and the IMERh 76E7' 9 2
)
l procedures governing the use of KI.
This will
~
proper continue to be stressed in all future training.
relative 6.
The performance of the emergency field workers to the traffic impediment was satisfactory.
They communicated the situation properly to the Staging Area and responded well to the direction of the Staging Area.
j Entt Jefferson Stacina Area 1.
Due to a turbine maintenance outage at. Port Jefferson, the turbine floor was not available for the drill.
As a
result temporary arrangements had to be made to accomodate the large number of participants. A tent was erected outside the Staging Area.
This additional problem compounded the lack of experience of the drill team and as a result the Controllers provided direction to the participants.
This situation existed during the September 17 and October 1
drills.
2.
The Traffic Guides for the two-mile evacuation were preassigned and were standing by prior to the evacuation order.
Once the message to evacuate was recieved from the EOC, they were dispatched within minutes.
- 3. The response to the traffic impediment at Traffic Control Post
- 45 was very slow.
There were repeated requests from i
the Traffic Guide as to the status of the road crew.
The Road Crew never did arrive.
Riverhead Stacina Area 1.
Similar to the other Stgaing Areas, the personnel at Riverhead were slow to activate the facility.
The controllers had to prompt and train the personnel during the drill as to their duties.
2.
Several
'P.A.
announcements were made during the
- day, however no staff briefings were conducted by the Staging Area Coordinator.
It was pointed out during the critique that it is important to keep key coordinators apprised of emergency conditions on a regular basis.
3.
The packets for the deaf notifications were missing from Riverhead and as a result this portion of the drill was not able to be demonstrated.
This was pointed out to the Emergency Preparedness group and has been corracted.
4.
The dispatch of the Route Spotters was delayed because the message f rom the EOC took 20 minutes to go from the Administrative Support Staff to the Lead Traffic Guide.
The IMPELL.Pr 765730
t importance of prompt handling of messages was stressed at the pont drill critique.
5.
The Road Crews which were dispatched from Riverhead arrived at their locations in a timely manner.
They had a
good general knowledge of road-clearing procedures, and maintained good communications with the EOC and other road crews.
6.
Two Road Crews questioned were not aware of the proper procedures regarding the use of dosimetry and max 3 mum exposure allowances. They were also not properly informed to take their KI tablets.
I September 1.h 113,5, EggIpency Ooerations Center 1.
The participants were prestaged so that notification wac not demonstrated.
The setup and activation of the facility from the time the participants were enld to arrive was approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
The activation ?f the facility was orderly and well'ecordinated.
2.
The Command and Control of the EOC was handled well by the Director and the Hanager.
- 3. The Coordinator of Public Information did a very good job in working with the Director in issuing EBS messages.
The CPI anticipated well and there was no delay in issuing the messages.
4.
The EBS message which was issued for tne traffic impediment gave too specific information relative to the new. traffic directions and rerouting.
The messages should br e been more general and should only have instructed the evacuses to follow the directions of the Traffic Guides.
This was pointed out at the post drill critique.
5.
The Radiation Health Coordinator did an excellent job in performing dose projections and assisting the Director in uaking the proper protective action recommendations.
The posting of the DOE / RAP team field data was a little slow and this was pointed out to the RBC.
6.
The overall response to the traffic impediment was good.
Improvement could be made in generating the rerouting information and arriving at new evacuation time estimates.
7.
Information flow from the Staging Area to the EOC needs improvement.
At times messages were left on the W(PE@
765731
l communicators desk for 10 to 15 minutes before it was transmitted to the proper individual in the EOC. In addition the flow from the EOC to the Staging Area could also be improved.
The message indicating that an Alert had been 6eclated was sent at 1038.
The announcement was made at l
1014.
8.
At times when the key coordinators were at staff
- meetings, their phenes would go unanswered.
It was pointed I
out at the critique that all phones should be monitored and answered if the person is not at his desk.
1 9.
The Special Facilities group performed well in carrying out their duties. All procedures were followed.
Eme rcen cy Worker Decontamination Facility 1.
The set up of the EWDF was done in an efficient manner and quickly. The Decon. Leaders took charge of the personnel arriving and began assigning tasks.
The status of the ecergency was known to the staff by periodic briefings.
2.
Several pieces of equipment had conflicting calibration stickers on them.
This was pointed out to the Emergency Preparedness group for resolution.
3.
There were several pieces of faulty equipment which were not recognized by the participants and were used to monitor the emergency workers. The equipment problem was pointed out the Emergency Preparedness group and the error in not checking the equipment procerly was pointed out to the participants at the post drill critique.
Patchocue Stacina Area 1.
In general, coomand and control of the facility was very good.
The Staging Area Coordinator made good use of the personnel available to him.
- 2. The documentation of messages in the Staging Area was net done on the standard message form.
Many messages were being written on blank pieces of paper and then later transcribed on the message form.
This caused delays in delivering the message to the appropriate party and caused transcription errors and erroneous information being transmitted.
The a
proper use of the approved message forms was reiterated at the post drill critique.
3.
The reassigning of Traffic Guides for the two mile evacuation was done in a timely manner.
1 Il4PJ1@
765732 I
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l 4.
The Traffic Guides which were observed demonstrated adequate knowledge in their duties and responsibilities and also were knowledgeable in proper radiation and exposure control.
Egit Jefferson Sfacina Area 1.
The set-up and activation of the facility went very smoothly and was better organized that the drill on September 10 with the same etew.
2.
The command and control of the facility oy the Staging Area Coordinator was very good.
He utilized the P.A. system effectively for general announcements and conducted briefings with his key coordinators as the need arose.
3.
The reassignment of the Traffic Guides for a two mile 1
evacuation was done promptly.
The Lead Traffic Guides performed properly and knew their procedures well.
'l 4.
Response to the traffic impediments by the field workers was very goo.d.
The information flov to the staging area was timely and accurate. The Road Crew arrived within 17 minutes of the request for help from the scene of the accident at Oakland Ave. and Rte. 25A.
l Riverhead Stacina M 1.
The setup and activation of the facility proceeded smoothly and was accomplished in a timely manner.
2.
The conduct of operations within the Staging Area were much improved over the previous week.
Briefings were better conducted and were more complete.
Communications between staging area personnel were improved.
- 3. The distribution of dosimetry was observed to be not well controlled. Emergency workers were arriving at the briefings near the completion of the session and were not afforded the benefit of a
complete briefing.
A better coordinated dosimetry briefing and issuing session was pointed out at the post drill critique.
4.
The response by the Road Crew to the traffic impediment.
was timely. He arrived within 10 minutes of being requested.
There was a problem however in the area of communications; several of the vehicles which are used for the road crew simulation do not have cigarette lighter receptacles for the radio power supply. This however is only of a concern curing a drill when actual road crew vehicles are not used.
IMPJ1:()
765733
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5.
The Traffic Guides which were observed performed satisfactorily.
Each arrived at his location in a timely manner and were knowledgeable in their procedures.
They periodically updated the EOC of traffic conditions.
The redirection of traffic following the traffic impediment was handled well.
The Traffic Guides were observed to i
perledically check their dosimetry per the procedure.
6.
The performance of the Route Spotter was very good.
He was familiar with his procedures and was in contact with the EOC.
His response to the simulated accident was prompt. He was observed to check his docimetry periodically and was knowledgeable as to as to maximum exposure allowances.
I October h 11Q1 Emeroency Doerations Center 1.
The participants were prestaged.
The facility was fully staffed and set-up within 45 minutes of the time the participants were told to report.
- 2. Only 2 general staff meetings were held by the Manager of Local Response.'Several more general announcements were made to the EOC floor.
It was pointed out at the critique that the information flow to the staff either through staff meetings or general status meetings could be improved.
3.
The distribution of RECS messages to the EOC staff was very slow.
This was due to the number of copies being distributed.
It was pointed out at the critique that the distribution should be reduced to expedite that process.
l 4.
The broadcast of the EBS messages was well coordinated with the sounding of the sirens and all messages were aired within 15 minutes of the decision to do so.
5.
The handling of the traffic impediments in the EOC was done very well. All persons concerned exhibited a high level of concern and urgency.
There was good coordination among all groups. The Traffic Engineer however, had to be prompted to develop revised evacuation time estimates based upon the rerouted traffic.
The information flow into the public informatica office could have been improved so that they would have information immediately available to them to generate the EBU messages.
These shortcomings were pointed out durir.g the post drill critique.
6.
The information flow between the EOF and the EOC in the dose assessment area was very good.
Both organizations were comparing data and field team deployment was well 765734
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coordinated.
- 7. The information flow from the EOC to the Staging Area was slow and as a result the field personnel were working with information and data that was up to 30 minutes old.
The rapid and accurate transmission of information to the field was emphasized during the critique.
8.
The generation of EBS Messages, Press Releases and Summary Sheets by the Public Information Staff in the EOC was very good.
However the information flow from the EOC to the ENC was poor.
Due to a malfunction of the TSO, and no alternate means of transmitting information to the ENC explored, the LERO Spokesperson in the ENC was not in " sync" with the SNPS Spokesperson during press briefings and press conferences.
It was pointed out during the critique that it it is imperative that both organizations represented at the News Center have the same information in the same time frame.
Emeroency Worker Decontamination Facility 1.
There were several pieces of equipment which were used during the drill which were not functioning properly or were used improperly; bad or dead batteries, broken connectors, wrong probe, open vs. closed window etc. The proper use and checking of the equipment was stressed,at the critique.
Equipment deficiencies were reported to the Emergency Preparedness group for resolution.
2.
The status of the emergency was not regularly announced to the EWDF staff. The importance of timely information flow was pointed out during the critique.
3.
The controller conducted several contamination scenarios which were presented to the participants for their resolution.
In one instance the contamination was not found due to poor monitoring techniques, in another the monitoring personnel cross-contaminated the area by improper controls.
These discrepancies were pointed out to the personnel during the critique.
Patchocue Stacing Area 1.
Briefings given by the coordinators to the Staging Area personnel were few in number and not specific enough.
Dosimetry information was not repeated during the briefings to the field workers. During the critique it was pointed out that the staff must be kept up to date with respect to the status of the emergency and this is done by frequent and timely briefings.
It was also pointed out that dosimetry IMPJJ1:()
765'735
n and exposure control procedures and criteria should be repeated as often as possible.
2.
The Lead Traffic Guides needed guidance to perform their function and implement their procedures. This was due to the fact that they were relatively new to the position.
3.
The message concerning the failed sirens was transmitted to the Staging Area by the EOC at 9:48 A.M.
It was not until 10:25 A.M.
that the Route Alert Drivers were dispatched. At the post drill critique it was stressed that message handling must be expedited especially when the Bispatch of field personnel is involved.
4.
The issuing of dosimetry and the dosimetry briefings got off to a slow start.
However as the drill progressed, the dosimetry briefings improved as the personnel gained experience.
5.
Information for transmittal was frequently given to the communicator verbally instead of written. The use of written messages and the procedure governing the handling of messages was discussed at the post drill critique.
6.
Of the 5 Traffic Guides questioned, all were unclear as to the maximum allowable doses.
i 7.
The.
Route Spotter questioned in the field was knowledgeable in his job function and was knowledgeable in dosimetry and exposure control.
8.
The Route Alert Drivers questioned were knowledgeable in their job function and were knowledgeable in dosimetry and exposure control.
Port Jefferson Stacine Area 1.
Many personnel at the facility were new to LERO and were participating in their first drill.
As such the more experienced personnel had to perform many of the tasks which otherwise could have been delegated. This detracted from the success of the drill.
2.
The message to dispatch the preassigned traffic guides
~
arrived in the Staging Area at 1245. This was approximately l
13 minutes after the information relative to the evacuation protective action recommendation was known to the evacuation group in the EOC.
This time could be reduced.
The traffic guides were dispatched from lhe Staging Area slower than previcusly due to confusion arrising when three seperate dispatch messages arrived in the Staging Area within a few i
IMP 114@
765736 3
I
I minutes of each other.
There was also confusion relative to the
, procedure for one-way traffic flow.
3.
The briefing of the players and the issuing of dosimetry by the Dosimetry Record Keepers was good. The briefings were clear and concise.
The DRK's displayed a good knosledge of their procedures.
4.
Several prompts were issued by the Communications Controller to the Staging Area coordinator to issue updates to the EOC relative to facility status and to request status reports from the EOC.
During the post drill critique it was stressed that the information flow is a "two-way street" and that the lines of communication must continually be open.
Riverhead Stacinc k;11 1.
Similar to the situation at Port Jefferson many of the to their position and had to be walked players were new through their jobs either by more experienced people or by the controllers.
2.
The message to dispatch the bus drivers following the recommendation by the EOC to do so was very late getting to the Staging Area.
It was not until 1:30 P.M.
that this information was available in the Staging Area and only af ter the Bus ' Dispatcher requested it from the EOC.
Another recieved in the Staging Area at 1:40 P.M. indicated message that a
release had occured at 12:35 P.M.
The bus drivers were dispatched into the plume without prior knowledge.
At the critique it was pointed out that this type of delay in transmission and working with information which is message very old can have negative results as was demonstrated in this case.
3.
The dispatch of the Traffic Guides for the 2
mile evacuation was done promptly following the instructions to do so by the EOC.
Epmmarv The concept of conducting drills on consecutive weeks with the same team proved to be beneficial especially in the Staging Ar c as. - Shift 3
personnel were better able to cope.
with the emergency on September 17 than they were on September 10.
Shift 2 on October 1, did not perform as well overall primarily due to the fact that they had not drilled since June.
The assessment of the response to the special objectives itemized in the
" Background" section of this report is as follows:
IMP,E_Q@
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)
l.
o The ability of the EOC staff to recognize and to plan to counteract impediments to traffic were develop a
generally good.
Communications within the EOC relative to the impediment and the cooperation of the various groups involved were good'.
The use of the Traffic Engineer proved to be very valuable in developing recommendations for alternate evacuation routes, however more emphasis should be placed on rapidly generating new evacuation time estimates, even if they are first order approximations, so that a more informed decision can be made.
In addition more emphasis needs be placed on the roll of the Public Information group.
EBS messages need to be streamlined concerning the j
impediment information and what the general public need know.
The flow of information into the Public Information Office needs to be improved-so that the messages can be
)
1 generated in more expeditious manner.
The response of the Staging Area to traffic impediments was also generally good.
The flow of information within the Staging Area and between the Staging Area and the field needs to be improved.
There is considerable delay caused by the handling of messages.
The response of the field forces to the impediment was good.
Generally, most'of the field personnel were knowledgeable in their procedures and would have been able to handle the situation in the field without
(
too much difficulty.
The procedure to pre-assign Traffic Guides for the tuo omile evacuation was demonstrated very well. The staff at the i
Staging Areas knew the procedures and were able to carry them out.
The dispatch of the Traffic Guides to the field once the order to do so was recieved from the EOC was generally good.
Some improvement could be attained in the area of establishing one way traffic flow per the procedures. Once dispatched, the Traffic Guides were able to locate their positions and establish the post in a
ruasonable amount of time.
o The continuation of the bus driver training did occur during this drill series. The results of that training is included in a seperate report.
The concepts of docimetry and KI were reinforced by the ocontrollers and the players during the briefings held by the Dosimetry Record Keepers.
- However, when questioned in the field by controllers, responses still showed a lack of understanding by some of the players. Continued education in this area is needed.
One of the major areas of concern during this drill series I
continues to be the communications between the EOC and the l
Staging Areas.
Long delays in getting information to the Staging l
INP111@
t f
765738 l
l l
? )
)
l Areas were experienced throughout the drills.
Much more emphasis needs be placed on communications, both in accuracy and timeliness.
Delays in the response by the Staging Areas can be traced back to delays in transmitting information or instructions by the EOC.
The information flow from the EOC to the ENC also proved to be major deficiency noted in one particular drill.
It cppears that the common denominator in communications delays is l
the EOC, and emphasis must be placed in training that facility.
The information available to the staff at a
particular
- fccility, i.e.
the EOC of the Staging Area is a function of how
- wall, how often and how accurate the staff briefings are. One of the major reasons for a lack of available accurate information was the lack of proper staff briefings.
During future training cessions this area o'f communication will be stressed.
l Another area of communications that has been a problem in l
the past, and is still a problem with certain shifts, is the i
communications link between the EOC and the EOF in the area of l
dose assessment.
The exchange of information from the EOF to the l
EOC needs to be improved.
This will continue to be examined in future drills where the EOF and the EOC are both participating.
l J
765739 1
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l l
l ATTACHMENT 9
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March 4, 1987 D.H. Crocker Drill Report for December 2 and December 10, 1985 for LERO Backaround
~
As part of the quarterly Emergency Preparedness drill program, drills were conducted on December 2 and December 10, 1985 to practice the response of the Local Emergency Response Organi-ation (LERO) to a simulated emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS).
The purpose of the drills was to exercise LERO's ability to implement the Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures (0 PIP's) to, improve their ability to respond to an emergency, make appropriate recommendations to the public and implement those recommendations. All sections of LERO participated in the drills with the exception of the LERO Relocation Center and the Evacuse Reception Centers.
The facilities which did participate 1.icluded the Local Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (EHDF), Patchogue Staging Area (PSA), Port Jefferson Staging area (PJSA), Riverhead Staging Aret (RSA), Family Tracking and the Emergency News Center (ENC). Only 1/2 of the field personnel were exercised during each of the two drills. All field workers performed their normal emergency duties with the exception of a few bus drivers who were involved in a make-up session to familiarize them with bus yards and transfer points.
Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario 8A Revisior. I was used for the December 2 drill and Scenario 7A Revision 1 for '.he December 10 drill.
Shift 1 participated in both drills.
They were last drilled in the February 13, 1986 exercise. The purpose of drilling Shift 1 on two consecutive weeks was to allow the participants to use the first week as a learning process to become familiar with the 1; test procedures and the second week to reinforce their knowledge gained during the first drill.
All LERO members were pre-staged, i.e. told to report to their work locations at preassigned time, rather than exercWe the normal notification and call-out procedures.
This prov;ded the opportunity to brief LERO personnel on procedure changes and reinforce earlier training on OPIP revisions.
Revision 8 to the Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Procedures was in effect at the time of the drills. All persons were drilled to that revision.
.I_
Scenario Obiectives The following is a summary of how well LERO performed the scenario l
objectives. The LERO objectives were the same for both scenarios and are ~~
l listed in Attachment 1.
l EOC Obiettive__1 l
December 2 &
December 10:
Initial and follow-up communications were accurately and timely received.
RECS messages from the TSC and EOF were telecopied to the EOC to prevent any misinformation.
l This objective was met for both drills.
EOC Obiective 2 December 2:
LERO EOC members were told to report at 0800. The EOC was fully staffed and operational at 0845.
However, the facility was not declared activated until 0910 because the TSC/ EOF staff were not pre-staged and were thus, not available. The Manager informed the Lead Controller c.
this and it was deemed acceptable to him.
I December 10:
LERO EOC members were told to report at 0800 with the EOC being declared activated at 0848.
EOC activation for both drills was adequate.
This objective was met.
During the February 13th exercise, LERO EOC members began arriving at 0707 with the EOC being declared activated at 0810.
EOC Obiective 3 i
~
December 2:
Rosters could not be found by the Lead Communicator.
The Equipment Controller for the EOC claims the rosters were on the cart but must have been misplaced during set-up.
This objective was not met.
The critique emphasized the importance of these rosters.
December 10:
Rosters were available to the Lead Communicator and he verified the ability to maintain 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing.
This fulfilled the objective.
EOC Obiective 4 December 2 &
December 10:
No shortage of space, equipment or supplies was observed l
during these drills. This objective was met.
~
. i
___b
EOC Obiective_5 December 2 &
December 10:
As stated in the objective, the RECS communicationsbetween the state and county were simulated.
In addition, communications with FEM, EBS station, local schools, hospitals and ambulance companies were simulated.
For December 10, communications with the radiological monitoring teams were also simulated (this was not practiced on December 2). All other communications were practiced and found satisfactory. On December 2, the EOC had minor difficulty receiving data from the EOF via thc dedicated line due to background noise by personnel in the room.
However, this did not hinder any response to the scenario and did not recur during the December 10 drill.
This objective was adequately met.
EOC Obiective 6 December 2:
Security was unable to locate their box of procedures for 20 minutes during the drill due to it being misplaced during set up.
However, Security was familiar enough with the procedures to do.without them. They also obtained pertinent procedures from the Hanager and Director. Therefore, their inability to locate their own procedures for 10 minutes did not hinder their performance.
Finally, Security did not maintain a log-in/ log-cat policy during the course of the drill.
Th' s should be done per procedure to maintain accountability in the EOC.
The need to maintain accountability with the log-in/ log-out procedure was stressed in the Critique and a form will be provided to Security in a later revision of the OPIPs to assist them in this matter.
This objective was partially met.
December 10-No problems were observed during the drill.
This objective was met.
EQC Obiective 7 December 2:
Six staff meetings wers held during the course of the drill which is adequate. All messages were properly logged by the Lead Communicator; however, some persons (approximately 207. estimated by the EOC Lead Controller) wrote messages on a scrap sheet of paper rather than standard LERO message forms.
Status boards were observed to be kept up-to-date and communications were observed to be transmitted accurately.
Proper use of message forms was discussed in the critique. _
Status updates from the EOC contained conflicting l.
information.
For example, at 1215 an EOC message was sent to the Riverhead Staging Area instructing field personnel to don their protective clothing and injest KI. At 1307, a status update was sent to Riverhead indicating no change in status with no recommendation to don protective clothing or injest KI.
This problem was l
addressed and corrected for the December 10 drill.
I This objective was partially met.
December 10:
Five staff meetings -were held during the course of the drill which is fewer than December 2 but is still adequate.
Two general status updates were made by the Lead Coordinators. All messages were properly logged by the Lead Communicator.
The information contained in the communications relative l
to the brush fire on the Long Island Expressway changed as the message was transmitted through the LERO Organization.
The message stated that a brush fire was causing a complete blockage of the east and westbound lanes of the Long Island Expressway and also the north and southbound lanes of Patchogue-Ht. Siani Road.
(Refer to LERO Message Nos. 14 and 14A).
The Lead Controller at the EOC decided to initiate the message at the ENC rather than at the EOC as the message dictates.
In the transmittal of the information from LERO ENC personnel to the EOC, the information on which roads were blocked was left out. This information was given l
to the Traffic Group at 0934.
The Traffic Group attempted to determine which roads were blocked by seeking information from the Patchogue Staging Area.
l The Public Information Graup was prompted by the Public Information Controller to re-contact the ENC for the l
road blockages.
This complete information was given to the Traffic Group at 0942. However, the Traffic Group l
continued its efforts to verify the road blockages.
l Ultimately, at 1025, through information provided by the l
Patchogue Staging Area (Patchogue Traffic Controller simulating a Route Spotter per the scenario) the information was that only the westbound lanes of the Long Island Expressway were blocked.
However, the E0C began investigating re-routing, if necessary, and the fire's effects on the evacuation time estimates at 1008.
The importance of obtaining all information was discussed with the Public Information staff.
In addition, the necessity of verifying reliable information (i.e. radio broadcast) was discussed at the critique.. _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
7 l -
i In an announcement to the EOC, the phrase "10-mile keyhole" was used to describe the area to pre-stage j
l buses which led to some confusion by the Transportation i
Group. However, this did not slow their response since l
these players are well versed in determining zones based j
on wind direction.
Still, the exact zone letters should j
be used and was mentioned in the critique.
l The Emergency Planning Group developed a new method to l
improve the speed and accuracy in which status updates j
are transmitted to the Staging Areas.
This new method j
was tested by LERO members in this drill.
Instead of t
being given to the Evacuation Support Communicators for j
transmission to the Staging Areas, the Lead Communicator, with help from.the Administrative Support l
Staff, telephoned status updates directly.
In addition, i
the Manager reviewed and approved all messages prior to their transmittal to ensure accuracy. This process worked well. This change will be reflected in a later revision to the procedures.
This objective was partially met.
i EOC Obiective 8 1
December 2:
The Director of Local Response was in control throughout the drill and decisions were handled in a proper and expeditious manner.
This objective was met.
{
December 10:
The Director of Local Response was in control throughout the drill; however, the PAR decision took from 1220 to 1250. The Director was trying to obtain information from the EOF relative to the declaration of the Genefal Emergency and the rationale for their protective action recommendations. The EOF recommended evacuation of zones A-J at 1225. The RHC and the Nuclear Engineer tried to obtain data from the EOF to make their i
independent assessment of the potential for containment failure.
Since the persons in the EOF were in a meeting l
at the time, the RHC and the Nuclear Engineer were l
content to wait. At 1250, the Lead Controller prompted the Director to call for an evacuation of the affected zones so as not to impact the remainder of the scenario. This objective was not adequately fulfilled.
I In the critique, the RHC and the Nuclear Engineer were informed that they weren't forceful enough in trying to l
obtain the data and they should have informed the Director so that he might try to obtain the information from another source. _ ________ _ __
EOC Obiective 9 December 2:
The Alert was declared at 0842. Th2 Director decided to recommend early school dismissal at 0908.
Sirens were activated at 0913 and an EBS message with early dismissal of schools was sent at 0914.
The Public and Private School Coordinators obtained a copy of the EBS message and contacted simulated schools.
December 10:
The Alert was declared at 0808.
The Director decided on an early dismissal of schools and sent an EBS message at 0828.
Sirens were activated at 0834 and EBS message
\\
with early dismissal of schools sent at 0833-0836.
The Public and Private School Coordinators obtained a copy of the EBS Hessage and contacted simulated schools.
Response at both drills' was adequate; this objective was met.
EOC Ob.iective 10 December 2:
EBS Message 1 - Alert declared at 0842.
. Director decides on PARS at 0908.
Sirens sounded at 0913 (simulated).
EBS aired at 0914 (simulated).
\\
EBS Message 2 - Site Area Emergency declared at 1010.
Director decides on PARS at 1027.
Sirens sounded at 1030 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1031 (simulated).
The section, referring to placing animals on stored feed was deleted and a follow-up message had to be issued.
This item was discussed at the December 9 critique with the Lead Controllers and the problem did not recur at the December 10 drill.
EBS Message 3 - General Emer~gency declared at 1132.
Director decides on PARS at 1149.
Sirens sounded at 1154 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1155 (simulated).
EBS Message 4 - This is a Traffic Impediment message and asesn't fall into the 15 minute criteria. Refer to EOC Objective 11 for further information.
EBS Message 5 - This is a Traffic Impediment message and doesn't full into the 15 minute criteria.
Refer to EOC Objective 11 for further information.
December 10:
EBS Message 1 - Alert declared a't 0808.
Director decides on PARS at 0828.
Sirens sounded-at 0834 (simulated).
EBS aired at 0833-0836 (simulated).
EBS Hessage 2 - Site Area Emergency declared at 0953.
Director decides on PARS at approx. 0955.
Sirens Sounded at 1002 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1003-1006 (simulated).
EBS Hessage 3 - General Emergency declared at 1202.
Director decides on PARS at 1205.
Sirens sounded at 1219 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1218 (simulated).
EBS Message 4 - Director decides on PARS at 1248.
Siren sounded at 1255 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1257-1302 (simulated).
EBS Hessage 5 - This is a Traffic Impediment message and doesn't fall into the 15 minute criteria.
Refer to EOC Objective 11 for further information.
EBS Message 6 - Director decides on PARS at 1355.
Sirens sounded at 1407 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1408-1415 (simulated).
EBS Message 7 - This is a Traffic Impediment message and doesn't fall into the 15 minute criteria.
Refer to EOC Objective 11 for further information.
All EBS Messages with protective actions met the objectives for both drills.
EOC Obiective 11 December 2:
The Traffic Group expeditiously handled two evacuation free play impediment messages that were introduced per the scenario in the field.
Specifically, the first impediment, a gravel truck and three passenger cars was introduced at 1315 from a Road Crew on location. The message was recorded accurately and completely by the Evacuation Support Communicator and by 1320 the Evacuation Coordinator and the rest of the Traffic Group were informed of the impediment.
Immediately the Traffic Engineer started evaluating the problem under direction of the Evacuation Coordinator and additional Road Crews were dispatched to the scene.
By 1328 the _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
Manager, Coordinator of Public Information and Transportation Support Coordinator were informed. At 1334 the Road Crew informed the EOC that removal of the impediment would take more than two hours.
Previously at 1328, the Traffic Group followed procedures and had obtained approvals on the proposed re-routing and had contacted TCP 10 by radio (as per procedures). A total of 13 minutes elapsed from notification of the impediment and the implementation of re-routing.
The Director decided to issue EBS Hessage No. 4 with traffic impediment information at 1330 and the EBS message was broadcast at 1341 (simulated).
The sirens were sounded at 1340 (simulated).
By 1337 the Manager briefed the EOC on the impediment and stated that an EBS message was being broadcast to alert motorists of the situation.
By 1349 an approved bus re-routing scheme was developed by the Traffic Engineer and the Transportation Support i
Coordinator.
The Evacuation Support Communicator l
transmitted this information at 1402.
Special Population Coordinators, whose functions may have been impeded by the accident, were informed at 1358.
This exhibited very good control and coordination by the Evacuation Coordinator and all other functional groups.
At 1404 Route Spotter 1005 called in a fuel truck impediment. The Evacuation Support Communicator quickly l
and accurately transcribed the message and gave it to
{
the Traffic Control Coordinator immediately.
By 1410 the entire Traffic Group was informed.
By 1412 the Traffic Engineer started working on re-routing because l
the Evacuation Coordinator realized it would be l
difficult to remove a leaking fuel truck. After following all procedures, at 1425 re-routing information l
was given to the Lead Traffic Guides at the Staging Areas.
A total of 21 minutes elapsed from the impediment notification to transmission of re-routing instructions.
The Traffic Control Point Coordinator was informed by the Traffic Controller that response may have been faster if the Traffic Control Points were radioed from the EOC with re-routing instructions as was done in the first impediment..Also, at 1425 the Mt.
Stani Fire Department was called (simulated) and was asked to respond as was the owner of the fuel truck.
Bus re-routing was completed by'the Traffic Engineer by 1450 and was transmitted to the Bus Dispatcher by 1455.
EBS Message No. 5 describing re-routing was approved oy the Director at 1418, broadcast (simulated) at 1437 and sirens were sounded (simulated) at 1436.
l - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Response to the rotd impediments was organized and-efficient due to good communication between and within the Traffic Group and other groups and upper EOC management. This objective was met for both impediments.
]
The EBS Messages for these Traffic Impediments contained specific re-routing information. Contents of EBS Message issued for Traffic Impediments was discussed in the December 9 critique with the Lead Controllers.
The-Emergency Preparedness Group is in the process of developing general guidelines of what should be included i
in these messages.
There are no Federal requirements.
In the December 10 drill, the EBS Messages for Traffic Impediments were improved over those for previous drills.
December 10:
Four impediments were introduced per the scenario.
The first impediment, a brush fire, was designed to test only the EOC's response to an impediment that blocked a major artery (LIE) and might possibly affect the evacuation time estimates.. No field workers were dispatched and the fire was extinguished before the evacuation per the scenario. The second impediment was removable and its intent was to pre-occupy the EOC while an evacuation was in progress and when the third and fourth immovable impediment were introduced. The third and fourth impediments were designed to test LERO's re-routing abilities.
]
Brush Fire Immediment - LIE & CR 83
- The.EOC was informed of the fire by the ENC at 0930.
The Public Affairs group gave the message to the Traffic J
Group and the Evacuation Coordinator was infortaed as of 0942.
By 0954 the Evacuation Coordinator instructed the-Evacuation Route Coordinator to get a Route Spotter out to check out the fire. The Traffic Engineer started
- working on potential re-routing, should it be necessary. At 0955 the Site Area Emergency was declared. The Route Spotter responded as of 1025 (Controller via radio at Patchogue, no personnel actually were dispatched to the fire per the scenario).
1 The Traffic Engineer discuss 6d the impact on the evacuation time estimates (reughly double) with the Radiation Health Coordinator and discussions took place on the possible effect on PARS. After questioned by the Traffic Controller, they indicated that this may sway a PAR toward sheltering if conditions degraded further.
The objective of this impediment was adequately fulfilled by EOC members.
Further details on problems with communications on the brush fire are included in EOCObjective7.
i
-g-
Duck Truck fmoediment
-This was introduced at the ENC at 1200. An EOC Public Information staff member gave the message to the Evacuation Coordinator at 1223.
This delay was because the ENC Controller had transmitted the message incorrectly indicating the EOC was already aware of the incident. The Public Information Controller corrected I
the response. At 1226 a Route Spotter was dispatched to report on the accident.. Note that this was prior to an evacuation order.
Previously the Traffic Control i
Coordinator and the Evacuation Route Coordinator had decided to dispatch the Evacuation Route Spotters because some were already at the Staging Arcas.
This was done without consulting with the Evacuation Coordinator.
By 1249 the Route Spotter reported the extent of the accident (T - 23 min.).
By 1252 the Evacuation Coordinator wanted a tow truck sent to the scene even though there was not an evacuation yet.
By 1353 this Road Crew reported to the scene (T = 61 min.
(Note that evacuation order came at 1254).
By 1400 the duck truck had been cleared.
The reasons for the delay was discussed with the Traffic Group at the drill critique.
Cement Hixer Imoediment This was introduced at the desk of the Evacuation Support Communicator at 1303.
By 1314 the Evacuation Coordinator ordered the Road Logistics Coordinator to send out two Road Crews while the Traffic Engineer developed alternatives.
Re-routing was presented at 1317 and was approved. At 1327 the Traffic Control Coordinator relayed modifications to the Riverhead Lead Traffic Guides because the Traffic Control Poiats were not yet manned. The appropriate Traffic Control Points were contacted by the Staging Area at 1331.
Very good response by the Traffic Engineer (T = 14 min.).
Bus re-routing was developed in 13 minutes (1330).
The total time for the entire response was 28 minutes. This time was very good.
EBS Hessage No. 5 with this traffic information was approved at 1330 and was broadcast between 1334-1339 (simulated). Sirens were sounded at 1333 (simulated). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Cessoool Truck Imoediment This was introduced at 1400 to an Evacuation Support Communicator.
Information was correctly disseminated and by 1412 the Traffic Engineer developed a re-routing scheme (T = 12 min., very good response). After approval was made, the Traffic Control Point Coordinator i
transmitted re-routing information directly to, Traffic Control Points 63 and 64 via radio at 1417.
Total l
response time was T - 17 min. (good response time).
Bus t
operations were not affected by this impediment.
EBS Hessage No. 7 with this traffic information was approved at 1432 and broadcast at 1437 (simulated). Sirens were sounded at 1435 (simulated).
This objective was partially met with the exception of l
the Duck Truck accident. As stated previously, the reasons for the delayed response was discussed at the drill critique.
l EOC General Comments l
December 2:
The procedure for the periodic estimation of total j
population exposure was not demonstrated.
However, the procedure allows for this estimation to be completed i
after the initial crisis is over and, due to the compact l
nature of the scenario, time would not permit this to i
occur.
{
For the pre-staging of buses, the Manager and Evacuation Coordinator wanted to wait until all of the required Bus l
Drivers were at the Staging Areas.
In fact by procedure, the order to pre-stage should be issued regardless of the number of drivers available and the Staging Area should assume the responsibility for l
dispatching the Bus Drivers at the proper time.
This I
was discussed at a critique held on December 9,1986 with the Lead Coordinators.
At the EHDF, two of the twelve RM-14s (#5253 and #5230) used during the drill were nearly discharged at the l
start of the drill.
The Decontamination Leader directed the monitoring personnel to check battery levels,every 15 minutes and change any that were below the acceptable level in anticipation of this problem. This was excellent guidance on the part of the Decontamination Leader. This equipment maintenance problem was brought l
to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness Group and j
has been resolved.
1 The Record Keepers at the EHDF were confused on the correct serial numbers to use for the TLD's.
LERIO is in the process of highlighting the serial numbers to avoid this confusion in the future.
December 10:
Again, estimation of total population exposure was not performed; however, it was considered.
The precedure was not demonstrated because the drill was terminated prior to its. implementation.
The practice of this procedure will be emphasized.in future drills.
At the ENDF, a field worker simulated to be contaminated walked approximately 20 feet in a clean area before being stopped by an ENDF person.
This was discussed at the drill critique.
t One problem was encountered with Family Tracking which concerned the EOC at Brentwood. The people receiving the calls in Brentwood were not returning the confirmations of delivery of the message to Family Tracking, they were returning them to the original caller instead.
Procedures call for them to call back to Family Tracking when the message has been delivered to the LERO worker.
Family Tracking would then call the original caller to confirm that the LERO worker had been reached.
This item will be stressed at future training sessions and drills.
The Special Facilities group and the Ambulance Coordinator did a very good job in performing their duties. The Home Coordinator however did not get a listing of the Reception Hospitals prior to calling the ~
homebound when the evacuation of additional zones P and S were called for.
This was discussed at the critique and will be stressed in future training sessions and drills.
A message was received from the ' field that an individual had received 4 Rem and was requesting authorization for additional exposure.
The location of this individual
~
was outside the radioactive plume and his reported exposure was never questioned.
In addition the Director authorized exposure up to 10 Rem and the RHC was not consulted.
This is a direct violation of the procedure and was discussed at the critigee.
The RHC assumed that no release was in progress at 1245, yet the Assistant RHC had information which was obtained 10 minutes earlier that field readings indicated 25-30 mr/hr near the site boundary.
This was due to contradictory data being given to the Assistant RHC by the Lead Controller. The data supplied by the Controller was lower then the data supplied by the EOF.
This was a problem with the scenario and not a problem with the players. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Stacina Areas Obiective 1 December 2 &
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchocue and Riverhead Emergency notifications were received in a timely manner.
This objective was met.
Staaina Areas Obiective 2 December 2:
Port Jefferson LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0900.
The Port Jefferson Staging Area was declared activated at 0845.
The Staging Area was ready at 0830, but they delayed stating that the Staging Area was activated until the EOC was ready to receive messages at 0845.
Patchocue LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Patchogue Staging Area was declared activated at 0830.
Riverhead LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Riverhead Staging Area was declared activated at 0815.
These times were adequate; this objective was met for all Staging Areas.
December 10:
Port Jefferson LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Patchogue Staging Area was declared activated at.
0820.
Patchoaue LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0B00.
The Patchogue Staging Area was declared activated at 0822.
Riverhead LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Riverhead Staging Area was declared activated at 0825.
These times were adequate; this objective was met for all Staging Areas. -_
i Stacina Areas Obiective 3 December 2&
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead Rosters were available to the Staging Area Coordinators to fulfill this objective.
Staaina Areas Obiettive 4 December 2:
Port Jefferson Sufficient space, parking, equipment and supplies were available to activate and support the Staging Area activities. One minor problem with equipment was that not enough magnetic-type antennas were available. Three Traffic Guides had to use the clip-type antennas and attach these to their windows since their cars did not have raingutters.
This did not prevent the Traffic Guides from performing their duties, however, the Emergency Preparedness Group is addressing the concern.
Patchoaue and Riverhead Sufficient space, parking, equipment and supplies were available to activate and support the Staging Area activities.
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchocue and Riverhead Sufficient space, parking, equipment t.nd supplies were available to activate and support the staging area activities. The concern about antennus for Port Jefferson was not resolved for this drill and is being addressed by the Emergency Preparedness Group.
This objective was met for both drills.
Staaina Areas Obiettive 5 December 2:
Riverhead j
The radio at Riverhead used to communicate to the field was inoperable at 1125. The Riverhead Staging Area called for a radio repair technician and the radio was back in service at 1215. Due to the problems with the Riverhead radio the Eastport Substation Transfer Point Coordinator phoned in to the Bus Dispatcher at Riverhead informed him that both he and the Brookhaven Substation I
and could not radio Riverhead.
He stated he would call l
in every 1/2 hour. As stated previously this problem l
was resolved at 1215.
This did not affect field j
operations and demonstrated a resourceful approach to problems.
14 -
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.____._.________._.___._______J
Port Jefferson and Patchoaue All communication links with these Staging Areas and the LERO EOC and field personnel were established and operated adequately.
This objective was met.
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead
.All communication links with these staging areas and the LERO EOC and field personnel were established and operated adequately. This objective was met.
Staaina Areas Obiective 6 December 2 &
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead Security was adequately maintained at these Staging Areas.
It should be noted that only 1/2 of the field personnel were instructed to ' report per drill.
This caused some problems with staffing security however-security was naintained with available personnel.
This objective was met.
Staaina Areas Obiective 7 i
December 2:
Port Jefferson l
I
.All messages were accurately transmitted and put on the l
proper message forms. Updating of the status boards were not consistently kept up-to-date.- Three updates from the EOC were received but on one, only some of the changes were reflected on the status board. Upon prompting, the status boards were corrected. The updating of status boards was stressed in the drill i
critique.
The PA system was regularly used to brief staging area personnel.
Patchoaue The entire communication staff was well trained in all aspects of their responsibilities, however, some messages were not. formally documented on a message form (i.e., Bus Dispatcher to radio operator to inform Transfer Points to begin evacuation at 1250 was done verbally). Use of message forms was discussed at the drill critique.,
.-_.___u
Status boards were adequately kept up-to-date and briefings were held frequently. However, the Bus Driver I
briefings held by the Bus Dispatchers were not well l
organized.
Bus Drivers came out of the briefings not knowing of their assignments or status of the emergency. This item was thoroughly discussed in the j
drill critique. There was no such problem in this group's subsequent drill of December 10.
The Staging Area Coordinator did not fill-out OPIP 4.1.4, Attachment 4 per his procedures and the Lead Coordinators did not document their critical actions / decisions.
This was discussed in the drill critique and did not recur in the December 10 drill.
Riverhead Messages were transmitted and recorded in an accurate and timely manner and were properly logged.
- However, status boards were not consistently maintained (i.e., at
(
1055 and 1115 the Staging Area received a status update but did not update board).
In addittan, status update announcements were lacking information and infrequent.
This was discussed at the drill critique.
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchocue and Riverhead All three Staging Areas performed well in fulfilling this objective. However, stating and writing "THIS IS A DRILL" was sometimes omitted from communications.
The use of this phrase was emphasized in the drill critique.
Staaina Area Obiettive 8 December 2&
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead The Staging Area Coordinators demonstrated that they were in charge and control of the overall response assigned to their Steging Areas.
This objective was met for both drills.
Staaina Area Obiettives 9. 10 and 11 December 2:
Port Jefferson Transportation - Bus Dispatcher received message from EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1110 for Hiller Place Shopping Center to pre-stage and 1210 for Norwood Avenue for evacuation of all zones. 'The Bus Drivers were dispatched by 1130 for Hiller Place and at 1210 for Norwood Avenue.
(Note:
Norwood Avenue Bus Drivers were assigned and ready to be dispatched at 1200. So, as soon as the order came in, they were dispatched.)
All were at the Transfer Points in time to support the evacuatiori.
Pre-staged Transfer Points were contacted at 1211 by the Staging Area and directed to begin dispatching of buses on their routes at 1300. This fulfills the requirements of the procedures.
Curbside Pick-up was simulated for this drill and the controllers provided names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinators at Miller Place and Norwood Avenue.
They were instructed to radio in these names between 1330 and 1430 (Refer to LERO Messages Nos.
34-38). The radioing of the names was performed at 1411 for Norwood Avenue and.1416 for Hiller Place.
Communication between the curbside Bus Drivers and Staging areas was established for curbside pickup and was adequate.
The Bus Dispatcher received message from EOC at 1509 to re-route buses due to fuel truck accident for Routes K5-6 and K4-5.
At 1510, the Bus Dispatcher contacted the Norwood Avenue Transfer Point to inform him of the re-routing.
He was informed that these routes were complete.
This shows good communications.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Transfer Point Coordinators were dispatched to their points earlier (at 1015) prior to the dispatching order to support the Bus Driver Road Rally.
(Refer to Staging Areas Objectives 13 and 14).
Staging Area objectives 9 and 10 were met for the Transportation Group.
Route Alert Drivers -
Lead Traffic Guides received message of siren failures (Sirens #50 and #33) at i
1025.
The route for siren 50 was divided among 2 drivers; those drivers were dispatched Et 1045. The route for i
siren 33 was divided among 3 drivers; those drivers were dispatched at 1045.
These routes were completed by 1330-. A slight delay in dispatching was a result of it taking 8 minutes to make copies of the' zone maps for dividing up the routes.
Note that no time frame for completing a route is required.
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Alert Drivers for deaf notification at 1208. Dispatching began at 1215 and was completed by 1225.
This time is adequate.
All Route Alert-Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive direction from the Lead Traffic Guides. This fulfills the requirements of the procedures.
Road Crews -
Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Road Crews at 1208.
Road Crews.were dispatched at 1217.
This tilte is adequate.
Road Crew 2011 was informed of the fuel truck accident at 1430. He was not asked to respond to accident; inform'ed that fuel company would handle.
These objectives were met for the Road Crews.
- Ib -
Evacuation Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch. Route Spotters at 1208. All Route Spotters were dispatched by 1225.
This time is adequate.
Route Spotter 1005 radioed in the fuel truck accident at 1405 (Refer to LERO Message No. 42). The EOC contacted Route Spotter 1005 at 1414 to obtain further information and received it at 1415. The EOC contacted the Route Spotter at 1430 to provide dosimetry protection to Fire Department and Oil Company personnel responding (simulated) to accident. The EOC again contacted Route Spotter 1005 for update on accident at 1512.
As evidenced above, communications were established with Route Spotters and the EOC was able to provide directives.
These objectives were met for the Route Spotters.
Traffic Guides - The General Emergency declared at 1132. PAR of Evacuation of Zone: A-S decided at 1149.
Traffic Guide posts to be manned sent to Port Jefferson at 1206 and received at 1208. Preassigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation (6) was dispatched at 1222.
Remaining Traffic Guides were dispatched by 1247.
The six preassigned Traffic Guides for a 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their posts as follows:
(Note that although 6 Traffic Guides are needed only 5 TCPS are required to be preassigned. 2 Traffic Guides report to TCP #5).
TCP #4 1244 1 Traffic Guide TCP #86 1243 1 Traffic Guide TCP #6 1258 1 Traffic Guide TCP #5 1257 2 Traffic Guides TCP #39 1246 1 Traffic Guide This time frame is less than adeauate because only 3 of the 5 Traffic Control Points were manned within 1-hour of the time the EBS Message was aired (1155).
The inadequacy was not serious however, because the two remaining Traffic Control Points were manned within 63 minutes. Objective 11 was partially met for Port Jefferson.
Only 3 TCPs out of the 38 activated for i
this drill were unable to communicate with the Staging Area.
These were TCPs 74, 113 and 50. Two of there radios (2100 used by TCP 74 and 1056 used by TCP 113) were used on December 10 and were operating well.
Radio 2111 (used by TCP 50) was brought to the attention j
of the Emergency Planning Group and the problem will be resolved by the next drills.
During re-routing for the fuel truck impediment (at 1502-1510) TCP 56 could not be reached via radio by either the EOC, Port Jefferson Staging Area, or by TCP 55.
These Traffic Guides were rieeded to implement the re-routing plan.
Initial communication between the Fort Jefferson Staging Area and TCP 56 was established at 1255 and TCP 56 radioed in at 1313 upon arrival at i
TCP. After interviewing a Traffic Guide at TCP 56, he informed me that he tried to reach the Staging Area to verify his re-routing responsibilities but the frequency was being used by others.
He eveatually did get through to the Staging Area at approximately 1320. At this time, he was told to report to the ENDF.
During the time 4
that TCP 56 was unteachable by his radio, the Lead Traffic Guide used good initiative by employing TCP 55 as an available means to contact TCP 56 directly. TCP 56 was aware of his responsibilities and would have assisted in the re-routing scheme (if time permitted) to ensure adequate evacuation filow.
TCP 55 was contacted and given the appropriate instructions for re-routing.
The performance of these instructions by the Traffic Guides at TCP 55, however, were not observed as time did not allow for the performance.
Communications were established and maintained throughout the drill and the Staging Area and EOC were able to issue directives for re-routing. Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the Traffic Guides.
One of the 7 TCPs that the Port Jefferson A nld Controller visited was not manned. This was TCP #40 and was visited by the Controller at 1335. TCP
- 40 did not arrive until 1351. This was because the Traffic Guide assigned to TCP #40 was last to receive dosimetry and briefing.
The lateness of dispatch for this and four other TCPs were discussed during the critique to emphasize to the Lead Traffic Guide the importance cf making sure there posts are manned in a timely manner.
These problems did not recur in the December 10 drill.
Patchoaue Transportation - Staging Area received message from EOC te dispatch Bus Drivers at 1055 for pre-stage of zones A-J and at 1207 for evacuation of all zones.
By 1145 the required General Population Bus Drivers were dispatched for pre-stage and by 1225 for the additional zones. Special Population Bus Drivers were dispatched by 1110 for pre-stage. No additional Special Population Bus Drivers were dispatched for additional zones since no Bus Drivers were available because only 1/2 of the required field members were participating per the scenario.
All General Population Bus Drivers were at the Transfer Points in time to support the evacuation and all Special Population Bus Drivers returned to the Staging Area in time to receive their assignments to support the evacuation.
Special Population Bus Drivers were dispatched on their assignments at 1245.
Pre-staged Transfer Points were contacted at 1237 and directed to begin dispatching of buses on their routes at 1250.
This fulfills the requirements of the procedures.
Curbside Pick-up was simulated for this drill and the controllers provided names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinators at Brookhaven National Laboratory and Coram Plaza Shopping Center (Refer to LERO Hessage Nos. 34-38). This was performed at 1320 for Brookhaven National Laboratory and at 1355 for Coram Plaza.
Communications were established for curbside purposes and were adequate.
In addition. Special Population Bus Drivers assigned to Health Facilities notified the Health Facilities Coordinator upon completing their assignment.
Transfer Poi.nt Coordinators were.
dispatched to their points at 1120 and were at their Transfer Points by 1145.
These objectives 9 and 10 were met for.
the Transportation Group.
Route Alert Drivers -
Lead Traffic Guides received message of siren failures (Sirens #19 and #45) at 1018.
Both Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1025.
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Alert Drivers for Deat Notification at 1212. Dispatching was completed by 1219.
These time frames were adequate.
The Route Alert Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive directions from the Lead Traffic Guides. Deaf Notification was completed by 1414 and notification because of siren failure was completed-by 1400.
No time frame for completing
a route is required.
Lead Traffic
)
Guides will be encouraged to dispatch multiple Route Alert Drivers, when they are available, to expedite the Route Alerting Process.
Road Crews -
Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Road Crews at 1155. Road Crews were dispatched at 1200'. This time is adequate.
Communications were established with the Road Crews by the EOC.. Road Crews from Patchogue were not needed for this drill's Traffic Impediments.
These objectives were met for,the Road i
Crews.
Evacuation i
Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received a message to dispatch Route Spotters at 1158.
Route Spotters were dispatched at 1205. This time is excellant.
Communications were established with the Evacuation Route Spotters by the EOC. Route Spotters from Patchogue were not needed for this drill's Traffic Impediments.
These objectives were met for the Evacuation Route Spottcrs.
Traffic Guides - The Ganeral Emergency was declared at 1132. PARS of evacuation of zones A-S decided at 1149. Traffic Guide posts to be manned sent to Patchogue at 1200.
Preassigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation (18 of the 21 required) were dispatched by 1216.
18 Traffic Guides were used since only 1/2.of the field personnel were invited per the scenario. This did not adversely affect the drill.
Remaining Traffic Guides were dispatched by 1218 also..
6e
The 18 preassigned Traffic Guides for 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their posts (13 posts; some posts required more than one TG) between 1230 and 1258.
(Note that the Traffic Guide for TCP 75 - one of the TCPs required for a 0-2 mile evacuation - was sent home because of illness. He was not replaced since no other Traffic Guides were available at the Staging Area and it was not necessary to call someone out). This time frame is less than adequate because some Traffic Control Posts were not manned within 1-hour of the time the EBS Message was aired
.(1155). The inadequacy was not serious however, because the posts were manned within 63 minutes, objective 11 was partially met for Patchogue.
No controller was sent to observe the times of arrivals for the Traffic Guides since no Patchogue Traffic.
Guides were needed for this drill's Traffic Impediments per the scenario.
Communications were established and maintained for the Traffic Guides. All Traffic Guides reported in by radio of their errival at their TCPs by 1258.
These objectives were met by the Traffic Guides.
i l
l Riverhead Transportation - Staging Area received m(~ sage from EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1115 for pre-stage of zones A-J and at 1200 for evacuation of all zones.
By 1119 all required Bus Drivers for pre-staging were dispatched and by 1235 for evacuation of remaining zones. All Bus Drivers were at the Transfer Points in time to support the evacuation.
Ij The pre-staged Transfer Points were not-contacted per procedures:to begin dispatching of buses on their routes 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after General Public notified. As a result of this, the Brookhaven
. Substation Transfer Point began dispatching Bus Drivers at 1200. The critique stressed the.need to follow.
the procedure and wait I hour before dispatching buses. This waiting requirement stated in the procedures will be stressed in future training sessions and drills.
Note that proper notification of Transfer Points occurred in the December 10 drill.
Curbside pick-up was simulated for this l
. drill and the controllers provided l
names of individuals to the Transfer l
Point Coordinators at Shirley Hall l
(Refer to LERO Message Nos. 34-38).
l The curbside pick-ups were radioed in to the Staging Area.
This was-successfully completed at 1350.
The Bus Dispatcher received message from EOC at 1400 to re-route Buses on routes H-1, I-1, and 3-1.
This.
information was not relayed to the Brookhaven Substation.
The importance of transmitting this information will be stressed in future Training Sessions and drills. Re-routing information was properly transmitted at the December 10 drill.
Transfer Point Coordinators were dispatched to their points prior to the dispatching order (at 1100) to support the Bus Driver Road Rally (Refer to Staging Area Objectives 13 and 14).
O 9
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Route Alert Drivers -
Lead Traffic Guides received message of siren failure (Sirens #60 and #89) at 1024.
Two Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1040.
l In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Alert Drivers for Deaf Notification at 1204. Dispatching was completed by 1230.
1 These dispatching times were adequate.
The Route Alert Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive j
direction from the Lead Traffic.
Guides.
Deaf Notification was completed by 1330 and siren failure notification was completed by 1130 for siren #89 and by 1210 for siren #60.
No time frame for completing a route is required.
Lead Traffic Guides will be encouraged to dispatch multiple Route Alert Drivers when they are available, j
to expedite the Route Alerting Process.
Road Crews -
Lead Traffic Guides received' messages to dispatch Road Crews at 1158.
Road Crews were dispatched at 1205.
This is a good time frame.
Road Crew #2004 vent to his location with a Traffic Guide Radio rather then sith a Road Crew radio. A Traffic Guide was dispatched to location #2004 j
with the proper radio at 1230.
This showed good response by the Staging Area.
i i
Road Crew #2002 radioed in at 1315 to inform of Gravel Truck Accident. At 1320, EOC contacts Road Crews 2002, 2003 and 2001 to respond to accident.
Road Crew 2002 asks for heavy duty wrecker and indicates clearing of accident will take greater then 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. At 1342. EOC contacts Road Crew 2002 for status of impediment, Road Crew 2002 indicates no change and EOC contac%s again at 1355. At 1356, Road Crew 2002 informs EOC that the 3 cars are cleared but road still blocked by gravel truck. At 1435. EOC contacts Road Crew 2002 to ask if heavy wrecker arrived.
Road Crew 2002 indicated he will contact when it does.
Road Crew 2002 contacts E0C at 1503 to inform accident has been cleared.
Communications and response by the Road Crew were good. Objectives were met.
Evacuation Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Spotters at 1155. All Route Spotters were dispatched by 1205.
This time is excellent.'
Route Spotter 1007 contacts EOC to inform them of Traffic build-up on Route 25.
EOC contacts Route Spotter 1007 at 1326 to proceed to the accident scene.
Route Spotter arrives at accident at 1329.
The EOC contacted Route Spotter 1007 at 1400 to travel South on Grumman Boulevard to inform residents of new Bus Pick-up location.
The Route Spotter observed (1007) made frequent contact with the EOC (approximately every 15 minutes).
This is good use of the Route Spotters and demonstrated good communications.
Objectives were met for the Route Spotters.
T.raffic Guides - The General Emergency was declared at 1132.
PARS of Evacuation of Zones A-S decided at 1149.
Traffic Guide Posts to be manned sent to Riverhead at 1155.
Pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation (32 of the 36 required) were dispatched by 1222. Note that TCPs 39, 34, 36 and 115 required for a 0-2 mile evacuation were going to be manned however, due to the requirements of the scenario, the Traffic Guides were reassigned to other
TCPs.
(Refer to LERO Hessage No.
26R).
Remaining Traffic Guides were also dispatched by 1222.
The 32 Pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their posts (26 posts, excluding the four TCPs mentioned above. Also more than one Traffic Guide required at some posts) by 1310.
This time frame is less than adequate because some Traffic Control Posts were not manned within l
1-hour of the time the EBS Hessage was aired (1155). Objective 11 was partially met for Riverhead.
All Traffic Guides were able to establish communication with the Staging Area and radioed in upon their arrival at their TCP.
TCP 10 radioed in the Gravel Truck Accident to the Riverhead Staging Area at 1307. He was given re-routing instructions from the EOC at 1328.
Procedures for re-routing were verbally demonstrated to the Riverhead Field Controller and were adequate.
The Traffic Guides at TCPs 13 and 14 were contacted at 1430 to determine traffic flow at their posts since they were near the Gravel Truck Accident.
The response to the Gravel Truck traffic impediment was good.
Two of the 11 TCPs observed had no Traffic Guides present.
TCP 73 radioed in at 1240 that he was at the post but was not there at 1435 and TCP 15 radioed in at 1235 that he was at his post but was not there at 1440. After interviewing the Controller and the Traffic Guides at those posts, it was determined that the Traffic Guides were there parked at a location where the Field Contro11er'could not see them (i.e., Traffic Guide for TCP 73 was parked in a driveway).
These objectives were met by the Traffic Guides. _ _ _ _ _ -
It should be pointed out that later on in the drill, the EOC decided to
' extend the evacuation:to include zones P and S.
Since only 1/2 of the field personnel were invited to this drill per the scenario, no additional personnel were available to respond'to this extension. The responses to this extension were therefore simulated.
. December 10:
Port Jefferson Transportation - Staging Area received a messa'ge from EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1025 for pre-staging of zones A-J, K, L,.M, N, 0, R and at 1258 to evacuate the above zones. By 1115 all required Bus Drivers for pre-staging were dispatched. No additional Bus Drivers were required'to be dispatched for evacuation purposes. All Bus Drivers were at the Transfer Points in time to support the evacuation.
The Pre-staged Transfer Points were contacted at 1300 to inform when to begin the evacuation.
This is adequate per procedures.
Curbside pick-up was simulated for this drill and the controllers provided names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinators at Miller Place and Norwood Avenues (Refer to LERO Messages 42-46). Miller Place radioed in their 1
curbside pick-ups at 1400 for Van F1, 1430 for Van F2 and 1450 for Van F3.
l This was immediately transmitted to the Bus Coordinator at the EOC at 1410, 1440 and 1450 respectively and given to the Home Coordinator. Norwood Avenue radioed in their Curbside pick-ups at 1315 for Van F4, Bus G and Van Q were not radioed in. This information for Van F4 was immediately transmitted to the Bus Coordinator at the EOC at 1320 and given to th.e Home Coordinator.
Although Norwood Avenue did not radio in for Bus G and Van Q, this portion of i
the drill was simulated. The purpose of this portion was to check the communication links which were adequate.
Re-routing for buses was not necessary.
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r Transfer Point Coordinators were
^ '
dispatched to their points prior to the dispatching order (at 0940 and 0943) to support the Bus Driver Road Rally (Refer to Staging Area Objectives 13 and 14).
Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the t
Port Jefferson Transportation Group.
Route Alert Driver -
Lecd Traffic Guides received message of Siren Failures (Sirens #9 and #29) at 0938.
Six Route Alert Drivers were dispatched on these two routes (routes i
divided among the Drivers) at 1003.
1 In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides received a message to dispatch Route Alert Drivers for Deaf Notification at 1305.
Dispatching was completed by 1330.
The Route Alert Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive direction from the Lead Traffic Guides.
Deaf notification was E
coiviated at 1420 for zone K and 1500
(
for zont F.
Siren failure notification was completed at 1210 for siren #9 and 1350 for siren #29. No time frame for completing a route is required.
At 1245, the EOC notified the Staging Area to have the Route Alert Drivers re-notify the public for Siren Failures
- 9 and #29.
This was not performed due to a lack of field personnel (only 1/2 of the required field workers were
~~~
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invited per the scenario). What would be done was discussed with the controller.
These objectives were met.
Road Crews -
Staging Area received message to dispatch Road Crews 1250 for Road Crews 2009, 2011, 2012 and all tankers and 1255 for Road Crew 2010. All Road Crews were dispatched by 1325.
This time frame is adequate.
,+
30 -
e.
Road Crew 2010 was initially dispatched by the Staging Area at 1255 to the Duck Truck Accident.
He was contacted at 1300 by the EOC and told to report to accident.
Road Crew 2010 arrived at the accident at 1352 and reported to the EOC at 1400 that the accident hs.d been cleared.
This time is less than adequate.
It should be noted that the EOC did not dispatch a Road Crew when first notified of accident (at 1245) because at that time evacuation was not the FAR. The EOC assumed that prior to an evacuation recommendation County Police would handle this situation as part of their normal duties. Once the evacuation PAR was made at 1248, LERO responded to the accident by dispatching Road Crews at 1255.
Communications were established.
Objectives were partially met by the Road Crews.
Reporting to an accident quickly, will be stressed in future training and drills.
Evacuation
. Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides' received message to dispatch Route Spotter 1001 at 1030 and remaining Route Spotters at 1315.
Route Spotter '001 was dispatched at 1045 and the others were dispatched by 1348.
These tim'es are adequate.
EOC contacts Route Spotters 1001 at approximately 1230 to have him respond to Duck Truck acci~ dent.
Route Spotter arrives at scene at approximately 1245 and relays status of accident and requests a Road Crew. Continuous communication occurred between the EOC and Route Spotter 1001 until 1400 (when accident was cleared).
Communications were good.
Object'.ves were met for Route Spotters.
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Traffic Guides - The' General Emergency was declared at 1202. PARS of evacuation of zones A-J, K, L, M, N, 0, R made-at 1248. Traffic Golde Posts to be manned sent to Port Jefferson at 1258. Pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation (6) were dispatched by i
1314.
Remaining Traffic Guides were dispatched by 1345. The six preassigned Traffic Guides required for the 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their 5 posts (TCP 5 requires 2 Traffic Guides) by 1346. This time frame is adequate as it falls within 1-hour of the time the EBS Message was aired (1257). Objective 11 was met for Port Jefferson.
All Traffic Guides established communications with the Staging Area.
All TCPs observed by the Port Jefferson l
Field Controller had Traffic Guides at j
their posts when visited.
l No re-routing was required for Port l
Jefferson Traffic Guides.
Patchocue i
Transportation - Sta'ging Area received message from EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1029 for Pre-stage of zones A-0, R and at 1257 i
to evacuate above zones. All Bus l
Drivers (Special and General Population) were dispatched by 1100 for pre-staging.
No additional Bus Drivers were required to be dispatched for evacuation purposes. All Bus Drivers were at their Transfer Points in time to support the evacuation.
Pre-staged Special Population Bus Drivers returned to the Staging Area by 1120.. They were dispatched on their assignments by 1300.,
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The pre-staged Transfer Points were contacted at 1300 to inform when to begin evacuation.
This is adequate per procedures.
Curbside Pickup was simulated for'the drill and the controllers provided names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinators at Brookhaven National Laboratory and Coram Plaza Shopping Center (Refer to LERO Message Nos. 42-46).
The Brookhaven National Laboratory radioed in their curbside pick-ups at 1440 for Bus B, C, D and at 1445 for Van E..Coram Plaza radioed in their Curbside Pick-ups at 1455..
Patchogue Bus Dispatcher simulated'this information being sent to the EOC due to it being near end of drill.
The following through with information to the proper positions will be stressed and observed in future drills.
Re-routing of Buses was not necessary for Patchogue.
Transfer Point Coordinator were i
dispatched to the points by 1030 and declared their Transfer Points operational by 1105.
These objectives were met by the Transportation Group.
Route Alert l
Drivers -
Lead Traffic Guides received message of siren failures (Sirens #19 and #40) at 0940.
Two Route Alert Drivers were dispatched on,these two routes at 0950.
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides l
received message to dispatch Route i
Alert Drivers for Deaf Notification at '
l 1313.
Dispatching was completed by 1315.
l These dispatching times are excellent.
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Route Alert Driv'ers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive direction from the Lead Traffic Guides.
Deaf Notification was completed by_1422.
Siren failure R
notification was completed at 1118 for Siren #19 and 1130 for Siren #40. No time frame for completing a route is I
required.
Lead Traffic Guides will be encouraged to dispatch multiple Route Alert Drivers, when they are available, I
to expedite the Route Alerting Process.
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At 1254, the EOC requested that Routes for Sirens #19 and #40 be re-run. Two
. other Route Alert Drivers were immediately dispatched (dispatch form I
indicates 1254). These routes were not J
completed by drill termination.
1 Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the Patchogue Route Alert Drivers.
Road Crews -
Staging Area received message to dispatch Road Crews at 1310. All Road Crews were dispatched by 1312. This time frame is excellent.
I Road Crew 2005 was contacted by the EOC
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at 1410 to report to the Cesspool Truck
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accident.
They arrived at the accident at 1440 and reported per the scenario that accident would take over 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to clear.
They were instructed by the EOC to remain at the location.
Communications were established with all Road Crews. Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the Road Crews.
l Evacur. tion
-l Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received message to l
dispatch Route Spotters at 1020 and l
were dispatched by 1025. This time was adequate.
The EOC requested at 1305 that routes 1010 and 1011 were also to be patrolled. This was simulated by the Staging Area since no personnel were available (only 1/2 of the field 1
l workers were invited for this drill per l
the scenario).
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No Route Spotters tere requested to respond to the traffic impediments.
Communications with the EOC was maintained by the Route Spotters.
These objectives were met for the Route Spotters.
Traffic Guides - The General Emergency was declared at 1202.
PARS of evacuation of zones A-0, R made at 1250.
The Traffic Guide Posts to be manned sent to Patchogue at 1311.
Pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation (21) were dispatched by 1325.
Remaining Traffic Guides were dispatched by 1325 also.
The 21 pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their posts (13 posts; more than one Traffic Guide required at some posts) between 1324 and 1401 (TCP 77 did not arrive until 1447). Other than TCP 77, this time was adequate as they fall within 1-hour of the time the EBS Message was aired (1257). Objective 11 was partially mst for Patchogue. The importance of arriving in a timely manner will be stressed to the Traffic Guide at TCP 77 at future training sessions and drills.
In addition, TCP 126 did not radio in their time of arrival.
The importance of transmitting arrival times will be stressed in future drills and training sessions.
The field controller did not observe the times of arrival of Traffic Guides due to the lateness of the evacuation order and his requirements per the scenario, he observed TCP 64 only.
The Traffic Guide at TCP 64 radioed in the Cesspool Truck Accident to the Staging Area at 1353. This information was relayed to the EOC at 1400.
Re-routing information was transmitted to TCPs 63 and 64 from the EOC at 1417.
This response tine is adequate.
Communications cere established and maintained for all Traffic Guides and all transmitted their arrival at their TCPs by 1447, except for TCP 126 mentioned earlier.
(1 TCP out of 23 TCPs manned).
These objectives were met by the Traffic Guides.
Riverhead Transportation - Bus Dispatcher received message from i
EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1040 for pre-stage of zones A-0, R and at 1257 for evacuation of the above zones.
By 1116 all required Bus Drivers for pre-staging were dispatched. No additional Bus Drivers were required to be dispatched for evacuation purposes.
All Bus Drivers were at the Transfer Points in time to support the evacuation.
The pre-staged Transfer Points were contacted at 1257 to inform when to begin evacuation. This is adequate per-procedures.
Curbside pick-up was simulated for this drill and the controllers provided names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinator at Shirley Hall (Roter to LERO Hessage Nos. 42-46).
The names were radioed in to the Staging Area at 1400. This information was promptly relayed to the EOC at 1415.
This time frame is adequate.
The Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point-Coordinator received a message from EOC at 1345 to re-route Bus Route J-1 due to the Cement Truck traffic impediment.
This information was acequately relayed to the Bus Drivers.
This is good communications and response. -
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Transfer Point Coordinators were dispatched to their points prior to the dispatching order (at 1030) to support the Bus Driver Road Rally (Refer to Staging Area Objectives 13 and 14).
All Transfer Points.were operational by 1103.
Thase objectives were met by the Transportation Group.
Route Alert Drivers -
Staging Area received siren failure message at 0937.
Lead Traffic Guides received message of siren failure (Sirens #99 and #107) at 1011. Two Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1018. The time delay between'the timeliness the Staging Area received the message and the ti'ne given to the Lead Traffic Guide is not adequate.
The importance of the timeliness of distributing information will be stressed in future training sessions and drills.
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route i
Alert Drivers for Deaf notification at 1315 for zones E. J. N and at 1400 for zones P and S.
Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1326 for zones E, J, N and at 1415 for zones P and S.
This time frame is adequate.
The Route Alert Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive direction from the Lead Traffic Guides. Deaf Notification was completed at 1440 for zone E and 1418 for zone J.
Time did not permit for zones N, P and S to be completed.
4 4
Siren failure notification cas completed at 1050 for Siren #99 and 1130 for siren #107.
In addition, the EOC requested at approximately 1259 that the routes be run again for sirens
- 99 and #107.
These new Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1258 and phoned in upon. completion of their routes at 1405 for siren #99 and 1406 for siren #107.
No time frame for completing a route is required.
Lead Traffic Guides will be encouraged to dispatch multiple Route Alert Drivers, when they are available, to expedite the Route Alerting Process.
All Route Alert Driver information was relayed to the Special Facility Evacuation Coordinator.
These objectives were met by the Route Alert Drivers.
Road Crews -
Staging Area received message to dispatch Road Crews at 1309. All Road
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Crews were dispatched by 1315.
This time frame is adequate.
The EOC contacted Road Crew 2004 at 1342 and Road Crew 2003 at 1328 to proceed to Cement Truck accident.
Road Crew 2004 arrived at accident at 1345.
At 1350, Road Crew 2004 radioed in to the EOC that removal of impediment would take over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
He also requested another Road Crew. At 1405, Road Crew 2003 calls in to EOC, he had problems with his radio and went to Road Crew 2002 and radioed in from there.
He is instructed to proceed to accident.
Road Crew 2003 arrives at accident at 1423 and radios in to EOC.
At.1.400, the EOC contacts Road Crew 2001 to proceed to accident. At 1450, EOC contacts Road Crew 2004 to contact Road Crew 2001. At 1455 Road Crew 2004 contacts EOC to inform that he could not reach Road Crew 2001.
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At 1500. EOC contacts Road Crew 2004 for status.
Road Crew 2004 indicates clearing of accident will take another hour.
Communications with Road Crews were-established and adequately maintained _
with the EOC with the exception of Road Crews 2001 and 2003. However, Road Crew 2001 responded at 1339 to injest KI. The non-communication of Road Crews 2001 and 2003 was brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness group and will be observed in future-drills.
Evacuation Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received message to
. dispatch Route Spotters at 1021 and were dispatched at 1025.
This time frame is excellent,.
Route Spotter 1009 called in Cement Truck accident at 1305 to the EOC.
Route Spotter 1007 contacted the EOC at 1357 to report on his traffic conditions. At 1404, Route Spotter.
1009 contacts the EOC to' inform of Road Crew 2004 arrival.
Communications was maintained by the Route Spotters and EOC on a regular basis. These objectives were met.
Traffic Guides - The General Emergency was declared at 1202.
PARS of evacuation of zones A-0, R made at 1250.
The Traffic Guide Posts to be manned sent to Riverhead at 1309.
Pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for 0-2 mile evacuation (26 of the 36 required) were dispatched by 1327.
Note that TCPs 3, 7, 128, 115, 127, 73, 108, 39, 36 and 62 required for a 022 mile evacuation were going to be manned, however, due to the requirements of the scenario, were re-assigned-to other TCPs.
(Refer to LERO Message No. 30R). Remaining Traffic Guides were also dispatched by 1327. The 26 preassigned Traffic 1
Guides required-for a 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their posts (20 Posts, excluding the 10 TCPs mentioned above. Also, more than one Traffic Guide required at some posts) by 1415.
This time frame is less than. adequate because some Traffic Control. Posts were not manned within 1-hour of the time the EBS Message was aired (1257).
Objective 11 was partially met for Riverhead.
All Traffic Guides were able to establish communications with the Staging Area and radioed in upon their arrival at the TCP, with the exception of TCP 87.
His radio is being checked by the Emergency Preparedness Group and-will be observed in future drills.
The two TCPs observed by the Field Controller had Traffic Guides at their posts when visited.
TCPs 16,15, 29' and 19 were contacted' 1
by the Staging Area on re-routing at 1331 due to the Cement Truck accident.
The implementation of the re-routing was simulated by the Traffic Guide at TCP 16 and proved adequate.
]
Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the 1
Traffic Guides.
Staaina Area Obiective 12
]
December 2 &
)
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead Field Controllers observing various locations (i.e.,
Transfer Points. TCPs) reported field workers reading their dosimeters every 15 minutes and aware of their usage and limits. New LERO Badges were distributed to field workers containing pertinent radiological information.
Field workers were briefed on the use of these b.ndges and field workers were urged to refer to these b,sdges when necessary.
All field workers were notified when to injkst KI and don protective clothing.
This objective was adequately met.
'l December 2:
Port Jefferson A centro 11er initiated LERO Message No. 46 at approximately 1430 stating that TCPs 4, 5, 6 and 86 were reporting 4 Rem readings. The EOC responded quickly reporting at 1437 to have these Traffic Guides proceed I
to the EHOF. No replacements were dispatched because it was late in the scenario nor were higher doses authorized.
The response time was adequate.
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December 10:
Port Jefferson
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A controller initiated LERO Message No. 40 at'1405 to the Bus Dispatcher simulating that personnel at the Miller Place Transfer Point were reporting 4 Rem 4
readings. The EOC responded quickly and by 1430 i
reported that the Director of Local Response has l
authorized readings to 10 Rem.
This. response time is i
adequate and proper procedures were followed.
(Refer to EOC General Comments for December 10 on the EOCs response to this message).
Patchoaue O'ne road crew member of the two man crew for Road Criew 2005 was not observed to read his dosimeters every 15 minutes. The importance of. reading his dosimeters was stressed at the location.
Stacina Area Obiectives 13 and 14 December 2 &
December 10:
Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead
]
Make-up sessions for Phase II of the Bus Driver Driving Instruction Training were held at both drills.
These make-up sessions were Phase II of LILCO's response to a deficiency cited in the FEMA Post Exercise Assessment for the February 13, 1986 Exercise regarding Bus Drivers who were unable to find their assigned locations.- The purpose of these sessions was to familiarize LERO Bus Drivers with their appropriate Transfer Points and the new Bus Company yard - Suburbia Bus Corp. in Bohemia.
In addition, Bus Drivers from the Riverhead Staging Area were required to travel to Baumann and Sons Buses Inc.
i in Hesthampton.
j.
I As you may recall, Phase I of the Bus Driver Driving i
Instruction Training required the Bus Drivers to travel j
to seventeen (17) Bus Company yards. Upon the conclusion of Phase II, our response will be completed 1
since LERO Bus Drivers will have visited all LERO-contracted Bus Company yards and their appropriate Transfer Points by following driving instructions-similar to those to be used in an actual emergency.
Refer to Section 4.4 of both scenarios for further details.
For both drills, thirty-eight (38) Bus Drivers participated out of the 66 Bus Drivers scheduled resulting in a 581. attendance rate.
The sessions were incorporated as part of the LERO drills scheduled for these days. The Bus Drivers involved in the make-up Road Rallies, instead of performing their normal LERO functions, were di.spatched to travel to all Transfer Points coinciding with their Staging Areas and.to the Suburbia Bus Corporation in Bohemia. As mentioned above, Riverhead Bus Drivers additionally had to travel to the Baumann & Sons. Buses, Inc. in Westhampton. Only Riverhead Bus Drivers were required to travel to this yard since only five (5) l buses are contracted at this yard and will most often' be i
assigned to the Riverhead Staging Area in an emergency.
Upon arrival at their Staging Areas, Bus Drivers signed-in and received their dosimetry. At their drill briefings, Bus Dispatchers briefed the Bus Drivers on the specifics of their assignments and assigned a drill l
deadline time of 1500 whereby all Bus Drivers were instructed to proceed to the ENDF to hand in their equipment, driving instructions and verification cover sheets.
Make-up Bus Drivers were dispatched by the Transportation Controllers (one per car) from their Staging Area. Before leaving, the Bus Drivers received j
the Session's Driving Instructions II, the Session's Verification Cover Sheet II.(inserted into the Driving i
Instruction Book), and a box lunch.
Transfer Point Coordinators were assigned to their I
Transfer Points to perform as controllers for the session. The Transfer Point Coordinators were briefed i
by the Bus Dispatchers of their responsibilities. Two other controllers were assigned to the two Pus Company yards.
i !
Transfer Point Coordinators / Controllers set up.at their Transfer Points as normal and the Bus ~ Company controllers set.up outside the Bus Company yard at an area void of any complications. All placed orange cones near their location. Upon arrival of..the Bus Drivers, the controllers hole-punched, initialed and wrote the time of the Bus Driver's arrival on each Bus Driver's Session Verification Cover Sheet II. -Note that each controller had either a heart, diamond, club or-spade-shaped hole-punch to avoid unauthorized marking of the cover sheet.
After traveling to all of their assigned locations, Bus Drivers then traveled to the ENDF for monitoring and possible decontamination. Also at the ENDF, Bus. Drivers handed-in their. driving instructions and verification
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cover sheets.
For the December 10 drill, one (1) Bus Driver from the Patchogue Staging Area failed to locate the Suburbia Bus Corp. in Bohemia and arrived.at the ENDF with Suburbia not verified.
In addition, the Bus. Controller at Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. in Hesthampton was not permitted to remain at the-location since.the yard is located on Suffolk County property. All Riverhead Bus Drivers participating in the.. December 10 make-up session will be credited for this locttion as all indicated they traveled to the location, but no controller was there.
Refer to memorandum from Bruce P.M. Kobel, dated 12/11/86, "Baumann Situation" for further details.
These sessions were the'last to be held and concludss LILCO's initial response to the Bus Driver deficiency sited by FEMA. A final report summarizing this entire effort will be issued at a later date.
For the bus drivers who had already completed Road Rally i
training, the final response to this deficiency was -
initiated for these drills. All Bus Drivers who previously participated in the Bus Driver Driving Instruction Training Sessions were involved in the Bus-Driver Maintenance System as described below.
l 1.
1
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LERIO instituted a maintenance system to ensure that Bus Drivers are assigned to different Bus Company yards and Transfer Points during these and future drills and are not assigned to the same locations each time.
This maintenance system consisted of the four steps outlined below:
1.
During pre-drill preparation, LERIO arranged for buses to be available at only a few of the Bus Company yards per drill.
For these drills, Suburbia Bus Corp. in hiddle Island, Baumann & Sons in Bohemia and Hesthampton, and United Bus Corp. In Coram. The yards will be rotated for each subsequent drill to ensure that Bus Drivers have the i
opportunity to visit all the yards and will not be driving to the same yard each drill.
2.
Bus Dispatchers were told not to call for volunteers for assignment to a spectfic Bus Company yard or Transfer Point.
This eliminated the problem of Bus Drivers familiar with a certain location volunteering fer assignment to that location.
3.
A computer program is being developed to trcck the l
progress and validity of the Maintenance System.
After each drill, LERIO collected the Bus / Van Dispatching Forms (Attachment 7 of OPIP 3.6.4) which were initialed and hole-punched by controllers at j
the above Bus Company yards.
This data will be input into a spreadsheet program.
4.
This computer report will be reviewed periodically to ensure the effectiveness of the system and to allow for immediate resolution of any problems, should they occur.
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1 _ _ _.
ENC Obiective 1 (LERO Ontv)
December 2:
LERO ENC members were told to report at 0800 with all required staff present by 0845. Clerical assistance normally supplied by the EOC was not provided per the drill requirements.
December 10:
LERO ENC members were told to report at 0800 with all required staff present by 0830. Clerical assistance normally supplied by the EOC was not provided per the drill re:iuirements.
ENC Obiective 2 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: The ENC would contact the EOC and the EOC would maintain staffing of the ENC through rosters.
This was performed at both drills. This objective was met.
ENC Obiective 3 (LERO Oniv)
December 2:
Six simulated media t'riefings were held and were adequate and timely. Presentations were understandable and clear.
Maps and other visual aids were available.
It should be noted that the briefing of 1155 was not actually held because of non-LERO related problems with the briefing room l
and was merely stated.as being helt.- This objective was met.
l December 10:
Four of the five simulated media briefings were held and were adequate and timely. One exception is the first i
briefing which was not held until 1000 while the Alert was declared at 0808.
This delay was a result of LILCO l
l personnel (onsite) not arriving until later since they were l
.not pre-staged.
LERO, however, was ready sooner.
This objective was met.
i ENC Obiective 4 (LERQ,f)niv)
December 2 &
December 10: This function was adequately simulated as no other agencies participated in these drills per the scenario.
This objective was met.
ElgJbiective n (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: kumor control was established and performed adequately for both drills. The response to questions was performed in a timely manner (average of 15 minutes)..
(
ENC Obiective 6 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10:
For both drills, only a portion of the ENC was activated due to outside commitments of the Holiday Inn. However, space was adequate for the area activated.
Because of this, the telecopier was located in the hallway making the telecopying of information inconvenient.
However, this did not hinder ENC operations.
LERO News Release Paper ran out during the drills. This was brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness Staff and an adequate supply of this paper will be available.
ENC Obiective 7 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10:
This objective was not observed by the ENC LERO Controller. This is not a LERO concern but an onsite concern and will be removed as a LERO objective for further drills.
ENC Obiettive 8 (LERO On1v)
December 2 &
December 10: The ENC copying capabilities were adequate for both drills.
No problems were observed.
This objective was met.
ENC Obiective 9 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: Two LERO Spokespersons were used for both drills. The reason was that one was being trained by the other for this position as this was the first drill for this LERO Spokesperson.
In light of this, the new LERO Spokesperson performed his job adequately and effectively.
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Areas Recuirino Corrective Action (ARCA)
The following is a summary of LERO's response to the.ARCAs cited by FEMA for the February 13,.1986 Exercise.
Refer to Part I of Attachment 1 of SNRC-1276 for details on the ARCAs.
10C-2 December 2:
Notification of FEMA was performed to a simulated' phone number by the Director.
Refer to LERO Message No. 4 for the simulated phone number.
December 10: Notification of FEMA was performed to a simulated phone i
number by the Director.
Refer to LERO Message No. 5 for l
the simulated phone number.
EQC_3 December 2:
Notification of the LIRR was performed to a simulated phone number for this drill by the Evacuation Coordinator. Refer to LERO Message No. 4 for the simulated phone number.
December 10: Notification of the LIRR was performed to a simulated phone number for this drill by the Evacuation Coordinator.
Refer to LERO Hessage No. 5 for the simulated phone number.
10C-4 December 2 &
December 10: Modifications were completed and reviewed with DOE prior to these drills.
The new status boards were used in both drills.
(Refer to memorandum to LERO File from D.
Dreikorn, dated 1/9/87, "Heeting with DOE" for Status Board discussions).
EQC-5 December 2 &
December 10: The reporting of this data was not observed for these drills as DOE was not participating.
47 -
EOC-6 1
December 2 &
j December 10:
The DOE did not participate in these drills thus no field data was extrapolated.
During a meeting with the DOE (Refer to memorandum from D. Dreikorn, dated 1/9/87, "Heeting with DOE") this matter was discussed and it was agreed that any extrapolated field data by DOE RAP will be indicated as such when reported to the EDC.
Simulated field data (actual) was presented to the RHC by the controller and doses were projected based on this data.
These projected doses were placed in the appropriate columns.
EOC-7 December 2 &
December 10:
No observation was made at either drill regarding the misstating of PAGs by the Health Services Coordinator. The j
corrective actions taken last spring was effective.
LDC.-1 Not-Applicable EOC-9 December 2 &
December 10: The expedited dispatching of fleid personnel to respond to traffic impediments was not part of these scenarios.
It will be practiced in future scenarios.
EOC-10 Not-Applicable EOC-11 Throuah 15 Not-Applicable. Neither School Bus Drivers nor Ambulance /Ambulette Drivers participated in these drills.
ENC-2 December 2 &
December 10: Both the EPZ Map and ECL Status Board were available at the ENC and were utilized in both drills.
EHC-3 December 2:
Ncws Releases #1 and #2 were posted with minor cross-cuts indicated on the releases.
This was due to the computer not being in operation at the beginning of the drill.
The remaining press releases were properly issued using the computer.
December 10: All press releases were issued by the computer and did not contain any marks which could add to confusion.
Port Jefferson-1 December 2 &
December 10: New LERO badges containing radiological and dosimetry information were given to field personnel for both drills.
Field members were instructed on the use of these badges.
Field members observed by controllers were aware of their dosimetry and radiological requirements.
Patchoaue-2 Throuah 5 December 2 &
December 10: The new security procedure was implemented for these drills and security was observed to be adequate.
Patchocue-7 December 2 &
December 10:
The new LERO badges issued to field workers contain job specific information as well as the radiological and dosimetry information mentioned earlier.
The Traffic Guide badges state that the Traffic Guide should inform evacuees to listen to the EBS station for latest information on the emergency. All field personnel were adequately briefed on the use of these badges.
Patchocue-8 December 2 &
December 10:
Field personnel responding to the road impediments for both drills maintained adequate communication with the EOC regarding the impediment. Any requests for addition &1 support was transmitted to the EOC from the field. An example of this is evidenced by, on December 2, Roao Crew 2002 out of Riverhead radioing in to the EOC at 1335 requesting a heavy wrecker to assist in removal of the i
gravel tru:k impediment.
I
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Patchocue-9 December 2 &
December 10: The proper and accurate relaying of information from the Staging Area by the Transfer Point Coordinator to the Bus Drivers was observed during both drills.
This was evidenced by the relaying to Bus Drivers to don protective clothing, take KI and when to begin the evacuation routes.
A specific example to illustrate this was the Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point Coordinator accurately explaining the rerouting of zone J-1 to the Bus Drivers durir,g the December 10 drill. The re-routing instructions were given to the Transfer Point Coordinator by the EOC.
Patchocue-10 December 2 &
December 10: As cf the date of this report, more detailed maps for the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired pick-ups have not been developed.
The same maps were used for these drills that were used for the exercise. More detailed maps will be developed in the near future.
Patchocue-11 December 2 &
December 10: Administrative Support personnel assisted in the dispatchir.g of Special Population Bus Drivers for both drills.
For the December 10 drill, a request came in from the EOC to the Special Population Bus Dispatcher at 1034 to pre-stage an additional bus for the evacuation of the Millcrest Adult Home.
This Bus Driver was dispatched at 1120 to the home. The Bus Dispatcher waited for the return of pre-staged Special Population Bus Drivers who were dispatched at 1030. This is a good response for two reasons:
- 1) For the ARCA (resulting from February 13 Exercise), it took 40 minutes for a bus to be dispatched to a Bus Company, pick-up a bus, then proceed to the school.
For December 10, the Bus Driver proceeded directly to the Hillcrest Adult Home because he already had the bus.
Even though it took 46 minutes to dispatch the bus, it would arrive at the home well before the bus which wasn't pre-staged. 2) An evacuation wasn't declared until 1250, therefore this bus would already be at the home to assist if an evacuation was called.
l Patchoaue-12 December 2 &
December 10:
The briefings held by the Bus Dispatchers at Patchogue did not contain any misleading information. As stated previously, new LERO badges containing radiological and dosimetry information dere used for both drills. The Bus Dispatchers adequately and correctly briefed Bus Drivers on the use of these badges and the information on them.
Patchoaue-13-16 December 2 &
December 10: New LERO badges containing radiological and dosimetry information, including the use of KI and authorization of I
higher dose limits, were given to field personnel for both drills.
Field members were adequately briefed on the use of these badges. Those field members questioned by controllers were aware of these requirements.
j l
Riverhead-1 December 2 &
December 10: Times of the update were properly placed on the status-i boards during both drills.
(Refer to Staging Areas I
l Objective 7 for further information).
Riverhead-3 December 2 &
December 10: The Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point was used at both l
drills. No problems were observed,~although weather was not inclement during the drills.
Riverhead-4 Throuah 6 December 2 &
December 10: New LERO badges containing radiological and dosimetry information, incluaing the use of KI and authorization of higher dose limits, were given to field personnel for both drills. Field members were edequately briefed on the use of these badges.
Those field members observed by controllers were aware of these requirements.
RefJtntion Center-1 Not Applicable.
The new Reception Centers were not activated for these drills as they are still in the construction phase.
Concrecate Care-1 Not Applicable.
Congregate Care Facilities did not participate in these drills per the scenario.
N_
n
. Markovich Attachment ec:
B. R. McCaffrey w/ Attachment C. A. Daverio w/ Attachment V. H. Palmiotto w/ Attachment LERO File w/ Attachment
ATTACHMENT 1 LILCO Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario i
Scenario No. 8A - Rev.1 1
1 1.2. LERO OBJECTIVES A.
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and follow-up l
emergency notifications.
l 2.
Demonstrate the ability to activate the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) EOC in a timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate through rosters, the ability to maintain staffing in the LERO EOC on a 24-hour basis.
l 4.
Demonstrate that the LERO EOC has adequate space, j
equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
l S.
Demonstrate that the LERO can establish appropriate I
communication links, both primary and backup systems
{
(communication with the State and county via RECS to be j
simulated).
j 6.
Demonstrate that the LERO EOC has adequate access control
)
and that security can be maintained.
i l
i 7.
Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accura,te
)
and timely manner, messages are properly logged, that i
status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that I
frequent and appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
8.
Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response including l
decisions on protective actic-commendations.
i 9.
Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect l
an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 10. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and implement EBS in a timely manner (i.e., within 15 minutes after comand and control decision for implementation of protective action recommendations).
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to assess the effect of road i
impediments upon evacuation traffic and develop and implement timely response actions. These actions may include rerouting and the broadcast of an associated EBS message, as necessary.
1-6
{
ATTACHMENT 1 LILCO Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario Scenario No. 8A - Rev. 1 B.
Emergency News Center (ENC) 1.
Demonstrate the ability to activate LERO functions at the ENC in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing of LERO functions at the ENC on a 24-hour basis.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear accurate, and timely manner.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to share information with other agencies at the ENC prior to its release.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated manner.
6.
Demonstrate that the ENC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
7.
flemonstrate that the ENC has adequate access control and that security can be maintained.
8.
Demonstrate that the ENC has adequate reproduction capabilities to support rumor control and media briefing activities.
I 9.
Demonstrate the effective use of the LERO spokesperson to present timely and accurate information to the media.
C.
Staging Areas 1.
Demonstrate the ability to receive emergency notifications.
t 2.
Demonstrate the ability'to activate the staging areas in a I
ticiely manner.
l 3.
Demonstration through rosters, the ability t.o maintain staffing at the staging areds on a 24-hour basis, l
l l-7 l
I i
L i
~ - - "+
ATTACHMENT 1 LZLCO Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario
$cenario No. 8A - Rev. 1 4.
Demonstrate that the staging areas have adequate space, parking area, equipment, and supplies.to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate that the staging areas can establish appropriate communication links with the LERO EOC and field personnel using both primary and backup systems.
6.
Demonstrate that the staging areas have adequate access control and that security can be maintained.
7.
Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in 'an accurate and timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that ircoming personnel are briefed.
8.
Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall response assigned to the staging area.
9.
Demonstrate the ability to dispatch to and direct emergency workers in the field.
10.
Demonstrate the ability to comunicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and fiel.d personnel.
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to assign Traffic Guides to Traffic Control posts within the two mile EPZ and to dispatch traffic guides to Traffic Control Posts in a timely manner at the appropriate. time.
- 12. Demonstrate knowledge on the part of emergency workers of dosimetry and Pctassium Iodide usage procedures and the procedures for authorization of radiation exposures above permissable limits.
- 13. Continue bus driver training to ensure bus drivers are familiar with a11Tus yards and transfer points.
14.
Institute the Bus Driver Maintenance System to ensure LERO Bus Drivers do not continually travel to the same Bus Company yrrds and Transfer Points.
In addition, these drills will serve as a make-up for Phase II of the Bus Drivers Driving Instruction Manuals.
1-8
2 l
I 1
4
)
-i
. i i
s l
ATTACHMENT 10 l
i l
i lt---.------______
f 1
ggE,g"O LONG ISL.AND LIGHTING COMPANY SHOREHAM NUCLEAR FOWER STATION P.o. SOX G18. NORTH CouMYRY Ro AD
- WADING RtVgR, N,y.11792 J0MN D. LE ONAAO, J4, vic,emos=f.sevettaa ostaations SNRC-1269 JUN 2 01986 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 3
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 4
Submittal of LILCO's Response to the FEMA Post Exercise Report For Shoreham Emergency Exercise of. February 13, 1986 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322
Dear Mr. Denton:
I On April 30, 1986 the NRC Region I forwarded to LILCO the FEMA Pegion II Post Exercise Assessment for the Shoreham Emergency Oxercise held on February 13, 1986, along with a request for LILCO's re.ponse.
This assessment identified five deficiencies and 38 Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA).
LILCO's response to the FEMA assessment, appropriate remedial actions, and a schedule for implementation are detailed in Enclosure 1.
LILCO believes that these actions, when complete, will enable the NRC to conclude, with reasonable assarance, t h a",t appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the Shoreham vicinity in the e' vent of a i
radiological emergency.
4 LILCO is issuing, under separate cover, Revision 7 of the SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Procedures to resolve those deficiencies identified by the FEMA exercise assessment requiring plan and/or procedure changes.
We ask that you cause a request to be made to FEMA, pursuant to the NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, for an expedited review of LILCO's response to the FEMA Exercise Assessment.
To this end, we are forwarding under separate cover sixteen (16) copies directly to members of the RAC.
a..es-14os Pago 3 Should you have any questions, please contact this office l~$% YA ' '[l.,/*
John D. Leonar Jr-Vice President - Fuelear Operation CAD:ck Enclosures cc: J. A. Berry R. Caruso/R. Lo 8
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