ML20210V516
| ML20210V516 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1986 |
| From: | Kidwell J GENERAL PHYSICS CORP., GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210V518 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#486-1027 LRP, NUDOCS 8610100718 | |
| Download: ML20210V516 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE PRESIDING BOARD DOCKETED Y 0 j
4 16 OCT -9 P2 :17
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In the Matter of
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0FFICE OF 3Ef irt iAky t
00CKETING A SERVICE
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INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND
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Docket.No. LRh UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA
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FALSIFICATION
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN M.
KIDWELL My name is John M.
Kidwell, and I am employed by General Physics Corporation.
I was in the United States Navy from August of 1961 until January of 1969.
After I left the Navy,I was a line mechanic for Howe Motors, Inc, in early 1969.
Later in 1969 I was employed by Monsanto Research Corporation.
In early 1974, I went to Three Mile Island as an auxiliary operator in Unit 1.
In 1978, I was promoted to control room operator in Unit 2.
In 1979, I was promoted to shift foreman in Unit 2.
I left Three Mile Island in October of 1980 for a position with Energy Incorporated.
In late,1985, I obtained my curreat employment with General Physics.
During 1978 and through March 28, 1979, I was a control room operator at TMI Unit 2.
My shift supervisor was Joseph Chwastyk, my shift foreman was William T.
Conaway, and my fellow control room operators were Theodore Illjes and Charles 5th%BE!"BIh8$$a T
DSO3 1
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Mell.
Previously, I had worked under shift supervisor Bernard Smith and shift foreman Kenneth Hoyt, with control room operators Raymond Booher and Harold Hartman.
As a control room operator, it was one of my responsibilities to conduct primary leak rate testing.
It is my recollection that we had 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to obtain a good leak rate test; that is, one with unidentified leakage less than 1 g.p.m.
At the time I believed that a test with under 1 g.p.m.
unidentified leakage re-established the time clock so that we had a new 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time period to obtain a test within the technical specification limits.
If through the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period,,
a leak rate test with a number within limits could not be obtained, but plant conditions did not make us feel the number was reasonably correct, the leak rate test was re-run and we did not enter the action statement.
Some of the plant conditions we looked at to make this judgment were sump level changes, makeup tank changes, airborne activity, and steam generator activity.
When my shift assumed the watch, I recall that we would first take a verbal turnover and check plant documents that s.
were pertinent to current events.
The panel operator would scan the control and alarm boards.
Quite often after the shift relief, a shift meeting consisting of the shift supervisor, shift foreman, reactor operators, and auxiliary operators was held to discuss plant conditions and upcoming events.
If it was my turn to perform surveillances I would usually start a leak rate test using the computer.
The leak rate test was,run for-an hour, and at the end of the hour whoever heard the computer print out the leak rate document would usually type in how much the water inventory changed.
After the proper entries were made the computer would calculate the primary leakage in gallons per minute.
It could and did happen that a leak rate calculation was in progress without the other operators being aware of it.
If I learned that I had not taken credit on the computer sheet for an inventory change, I would discard the test result.
To aid shift communication, we sometimes placed a note on the makeup tank inventory control switches and the -
computer key board indicating that a leak rate test was in progress.
If I obtained a computer generated leak rate test that did not meet the technical specification requirements, I would attempt to find out why.
I recall cases where the results were in error due to changing reactor power level or changing boron concentration by feeding and bleeding.
These leak rate tests were thrown away after another test came out within the technical specification limits.
I have no idea where the practice of throwing away leak rates originated; that is just the way it was performed.
I did not question the practice because we had a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> window, the tests were not signed and approved (thus not a legal document), and I believed at the time that we did not have a leakage problem..
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I do recall running more than one test on some shifts.
If time and work load permitted, I would run leak rate tests until I received one within requirements, provided there was not a reason to question the obtained results.
I relied on the computer to perform the leak rate test and, thus, on its results to satisfy the technical specification requirements.
I did not consider the test a particularly reliable indicator of the existence of an exact amount of leakage.
On the average, it provided a good trend indicator and that trend used with common sense was a reliable indicator of leakage problems.
Prior to Harold Hartman's allegations, I had no knowledge whatsoever of operators deliberately adding hydrogen or water -
to the makeup tank for the purpose of manipulating the end' result of the leak rate calculation.
I do not recall receiving instruction in any form that provided me with guidance that I was to refrain from adding hydrogen during leak rate tests.
I do not recall reading the October 1978 LER; however, my initials are on it, so I must have seen it.
I do not recall receiving an explantion of the LER's contents, and I do not remember being told to change my interpretation of the leak rate technical specification.
I have no recollection of reviewing an operations memorandum from that same time period.
I do remember hearing of some commotion that I now associate with Donald Haverkamp, but all that I can remember is that it..
k had something to do with a leak rate test Mr. Haverkamp found somewhere.
To conclude, I have no objection to discussing my past operatoring practices with those who wish to know why certain practices were employed.
My possible errors in interpreting the technical specifications and administrative controls for operations were due to inexperience, never contempt for the public or for the nuclear industry.
I sincerely believe that this is a great industry.
I have tremendous loyalty to it and respect for it and the people and companies involved with it.
I intend to remain a part of the industry to share my experience with those of lesser experience so that we can shape a more reliable future for the industry as a whole.
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