ML20210M521
| ML20210M521 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1997 |
| From: | John Miller UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| GDP-97-0148, GDP-97-148, NUDOCS 9708220008 | |
| Download: ML20210M521 (185) | |
Text
_ _ -- _ _ _
United States Enrichment Coricration 2 Democracy Center 6903 nockledge DrNe Dethesda, MD 20817 Tel: (301)$64 3200 rar(301)664 3201 JAMES H. MILLER Dir. (301)$04 3309 Vice PRESIDENT, PRoouctioN For (301) 671-8279 August 18,1997 Dr. Carl J. Paperiello SEIUAL: GDP 97-0148 Director, Ollice of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Attention: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 0001 Portsmouth Gaseous I)iffusion Plant (PORTS)
Docket No. 70-7002 Certificate Amendment Request - Update the Application Safety Analysis Report
Dear Dr. Paperiello:
Issue 2 of DOE /ORO 2027, " Plan for Achieving Compliance with NRC Regulations at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant" (the Compliance Plan) requires, in part, that the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) submit an update to the application Safety Analysis Report (SAR) based largely on the DOE site-wide SAR by August 17,1997. USEC's efforts to complete the SAR Update (SARUP) submittal have been undenvay since we received the DOE upgraded SAR (POEF LMES 89) on February 18,1997 and the supporting documents in late March /carly April. USEC has determined during the SAR review process that insufficient time had been allocated in the Compliance Plan to accomplish the preparation and icview activities necessary to ensure completeness and accuracy of the SARUP prior to submittal to the NRC. This was the basis for USEC's request to the NRC in Reference
_1 for approval of a change in the submittal date from August 17,1997 to October 31,1997. USEC identified that the additional time would be required to complete the activities necessary to ensure completeness and accuracy of the SARUP submittal to the NRC including:
Resolve internal comments from plant support groups Evaluate changes to the plant since the DOE cut off date and identified as found condit%ns for their impact on SARUP Review the SARUP supporting documents
+
Obtain final Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) approval of the proposed application changes 9708220000 970018 l!lj l!l l{l}' llll'l]l'{
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Dr. Carl J. Paperiello August 18,1997 GDI 97 0148 Page 2 to this letter provides a detailed status of the activities that must be completed for the remaining portions of the SARUP.
USEC has identified severalinaccuracies in POEF LMES 89 during our preparation of the S ARUP and efforts have been initiated to correct the inaccuracies identified to-date. As recuested in the NRC's i
August 12,1997 letter (Reference 2), Enclosure 1 also includes an identification of known limitationc and inaccuracles related to the remaining portions of the SARUP. Limitations and inaccuracies will be addressed in detail with each portion of the SARUP submittal.
As discussed in meetings with the NRC on July 22, July 31, and August 14, 1997, USEC has identified errors in the facility and process descriptions contained in Application SAR Chapter 3. This issue is also addressed in the August 12,1997 letters from the NRC and DOE (see References 2 and 3, respectively). Specifically, the facility and process descriptions contained in Application SAR Chapter 3 contain known disc *cpancies from as found conditions hi the plant. Discrepancies between the Application SAR and as-found conditions in the plant are processed in accordance with plant procedures to ensure continued safe operation until the discrepancy is ultimately resolved Discrepancies found in this chapter will continue to be processed in accordance with plant procedures until a systematic review, update, and confirmation of the information contained in Application SAR Chapter 3 has been completed.
As part of our preparation of the SARUP, USEC has evaluated the identified discrepancies in Application SAR Chapter 3 against the SARUP information. The efTect of these discrepancies on the SARUP has been minor and changes are being made as necessary. Based on representations by DOE in Reference 3 and our evaluations to-date, we believe any future discrepancies in Application SAR Chapter 3 will have little or no effect on the hazard and accident analyses contained m the SARUP, Accordingly, USEC has completed its review of certain portions of the S ARUP and hereby submits in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45 a request for amendment to the certificate of compliance for the Portsmouth, Ohio Gaseous DifTusion Plant (GDP) for NRC review and approval. The following portions of the SAR Update are included with this submittal:
Changes to Application SAR Chapter 2," Site Characteristics" New SAR Sections 4.1,4.2.1 through 4.2.5,4.3.1, and 4.4 Except for Chapter 3, USEC will submit the remaining portions of the SARUP by October 31,1997.
USEC's efforts to-date in response to Compliance Plan Issue 2 have not included a systematic review, update, and confirmation of the information contained in Application SAR Chapter 3. It is also our understanding from Reference 3 that such a review was also not performed by DOE as part of their efforts to prepare the corresponding materialin the upgraded SAR (DOE S AR Chapter 2). Ily this letter, USEC commits to perfonning a systematic review, update, and confirmation of the information contained in Application SAR Chapter 3 and to make necessary changes to the SARUP analyses and supporting documents by no later than October 31,2000. Planning activities for the SAR Chapter 3 update have been initiated and a plan of action and schedule will be submitted for NRC review and approval by y
1 Dr. Carl J. Paperiello August 18,1997 GDP 97-0148 Page 3 October 31,1997. Based on a preliminary review, USEC believes that 18 to 24 months will be required to complete the Chapter 3 update activities _and an additional 9 to 12 months may be needed to make necessary changes to the SARUP analyses and supporting documents. Basic steps of the effort include:
1.
Develop the detailed plan of action and schedule by October 31,1997.
2.
Review, update, and confirm information in Application SAR Chapter 3 no later than October 31,1999, a.
Identify stmetures, systems, components, and processes to be described b.
Develop the outline of the new chapter 3 c.
Establish the level-of-detail and subsection breakdown d.
Prepare the initial draft based on available information e.
Verify / validate draft sections based on field walkdowns and document reviews
(
f.
Incorporate changes, complete final sections
}-
3.
Make necessary changes to the SARUP submittal and SARUP supporting documents by no later than October 31,2000.
Ery;losure 2 provides a description of the SARUP sections submitted by this letter and concludes that the information contained in the SARUP involves an unreviewed safety question. Enclosure 3 provides the changed pages for the requested amendment. Enclosure 4 provides the basis for USEC's conclusion that the amendment should be considered sign:ficant in accordance with 10 CFR 76. Enclosure 5 includes the information required by items 3.a),3.b), and 4 of the Plan of Action and Schedule for Compliance Plan issue 2. Enclosure 6 identifies new commitments made in this submittal.
Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to Mr. Steve Routh at (301) 564 3251.
Sincerely, Vr J
s IL Miller ce President, Production
l Dr. Carl J. Paperiello
. August 18,1997 GDP 97 0143 Page 4 cc:
NRC Region 111 Office, w/ enclosures NRC Resident inspector - PORTS, w/ enclosures i
NRC Resident inspector PGDP, w/ enclosures 1
Mr. Joe W. Parks (DOE), w/ enclosures Mr. Randall M. DeVault, w/ enclosures 3
Enclosures:
1.
SAR Update Status -
2.
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), Proposed Certificate Amendment Request, Update the Application Safety Analysis Report, Detailed Description ofChange 3.
NRC Cer1ificate Amendment Request, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Letter GDP 97-0148, Safety Analysis Report Update 4.
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), Proposed Certificate Amendment Request, Update the Application Safety Analysis Report, Significance Determination 5.
United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), Proposed Certificate
[
Amendment Request, Update the Application Safety Analysis Report, Identification and Evaluation of Differences Required by Compliance Plan
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issue 2 6.
Commitments Contained in this Submittal L
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Dr. Carl J. Paperiello August 18,1997 GDP 97 0148 Page 5 l
References:
1.
Letter from James 11. Miller (USEC) to Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC, Certificate A,nendment Request - Update the Application Safety Analysis Report, USEC Letter GDP 97-0122, July 18,1997.
l 2.
Letter from Robert C. Pierson (NRC) Mr. George P. Rifakes (USEC), USEC Safety Analysis Upgrade (SARUP) Submittal, August 12,1997.
i 3.
Letter from Joe W. Parks (DOE) to Mr. George P. Rifakes, DOE Safety l
Analyils Reports, August 12,1997.
I OATil AND AFFIRMATION I, James 11. Miller, swear and aflirm that I am Vice President, Production, of the United States l
Enrichment Corporation (USEC), that I am authorized by USEC to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this Certificate Amendment Request for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, that I am familiar with the contents thereof, and that the statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.
amesII. Miller On this 18th day of August 1997, the officer signing above personally appeared before me, is known by me to be the person whose name is subscribed to within the instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the same for the purposes therein contained.
In witness hereofI hereunto set my hand and official seal.
MIMIL N7.
u((tr L'aurie M. Knisley, Notary Public d
State of Maryland, Montgomery County
- My commission expires March 17,1998
GDP 97-0148 SAR Update Status Page1 of4 lSection Section Title Status 1.0 Introduction and General No changes anticipated as part of SARUP.
Description of the Facility 2.0 Site Characteristics Submittal Date:
August 18,1997 by letter GDP 97-0148, Known limitations or Inaccuracies:
See Enclosure 2 to GDP 97-0148 dated 8/l8/97 3.1-3.I4 Facility and Process Description USEC commits to performmg a systematic review, update, and confirmation of the 3.1-3.7 information contained in Apphcation SAR Chapter 3 and to make necessary changes to the SARUP analyscs and supporting documents by no later than October 31,2000. Planmng activities for the SAR Chapter 3 update have been imtiated and a plan of action and schedule will be submitted for NRC resicw and approval by October 31,1997. Based on a preliminary review, USEC belies es that I 8 to 24 months will be reqtared to complete the Chapter 3 update actisitics and an additional 9 to 12 months may be needed to make necessary changes to the SARUP analyscs and supporting documents Basic steps of the effort include:
1.
Develop the detailed plan of action and schedule by October 31,1997.
2.
Review, update, and confinn infonnation in Application SAR Chapter 3 no later than October 31,1999:
a.
- dentify structures, systems, components, and piw to be descnbed b.
Develop the outline of the new Chapter 3 c.
Estabhsh the level-of-dctail and subsection breakdown d.
Prepare the initial draft based on available information e.
Venfy/ validate draft sections based on field wa!Ldowns and document revn:ws f Incorporate changes, complete final sections 3.
Make necessary changes to the SARUP submittal and SARUP supro ting documents by no later than October 31,2000.
i
_a
Enclosure I GDP 97-0148 l
SAR Update States Page 2 of4 Section Section Title States j
3.15 Boundary Dermitions for Q and AQ Forecast Submittal Date-10/31/97 3.8 SSCs Activities Rcmanung to be Completed.
Comment Ir-puidion Compicuan of SAR Sectons 4311 tinu 4326 Evaluate Plant Changes and Identified As-Founds Reviews ofSupportag Documents PORC/GM Approval Known Linutations or Inaccuracies-PGDP based on 0.15g EBE PGDP based on '00' modifications cr-pletal 4.0 Hazard and Accident Analyses 4.1 Introduction Sulmuttal Date:
August 18,1997 by letter GDP 97-0148.
KnownlirJtations orInaccuracies:
See Enclosure 2 to GDP 974148 dated 8/18!97.
4.2 Hazard Analysis 421 Evaluauon Guidelines Submittal Date-August 18,1997 byletter GDP 97-0148.
4.2.2 Criteria for the Classificaton of Known linutations or Inaccuracies:
See Er.d--c 2 to GDP 97-0148 dated 8/18/97.
Structures, Systems, and Co..gs 413 Criteria for Techmcal Safety Reguranent Selection 414 Ilazard Screenmg and Threshold Analysis 4.2.5 Hazard Analysis MetivvL*g 4.2.6 Hazard Analysis Results Forecast Submittal Date-10/31/97 Activitics Remaining to be Cornpicted:
Comment hwpuidion Evaluate Plant Changes and Identifed As-Founds Reviews of Supportmg D+ -- ---e=
PORC/GM Approval Known Limitations or inaccuracies NoneIdentified to Date
Erla=re 1 GDP 97-0148 SAR Update Status Page 3 of4 Section SectionTitle States 43 Accident Analysis 43.1 Accident Analysis Methodology Submittal Date-August 18,1997 by Ictner GDP 97-0148.
43.1.1 Operational Analysis Known limitauons or inaccuracies-See F=cla=re 2 to GDP 97-0148 dated 8/18/97.
43.1.2 C-,---- - Analysis Methodology 43.13 NaturalPiso.s Methodology 43.2 Accident Analysis Results Forecast Submittal Date-10/31/97 43.2.1 Cascade Facilitics Activities Fe==iaing to be Completed:
Comment Incorporation 43.2.2 UF. Handling & Storage Facilitics Evaluats. Plant O y and identified As-Founds 43.23 Mim18=ean Waste Storage and Renews ofSupportmg Duu-u.s IIandling Facihtics.
PORC/GM Approval 43.2.4 Miscellaneous Support Facilitics Resision to PCR Procedure 43.2.5 Natural Fis-,c.a Known Umi'=sinns or inaccuracies' IIGSYSTEM lift-offcorrection factor 43.2.6 Criticality Events PIPELEAK does not address cylinder heads PGDP based on 0.15g EBE PGDP based on W modifications completed PGDP C-315 accum=1=anr capacity & line size PGDP C-310, C-315 accumulators durmg EBE Pigtmlsize Pc,tential for liquid UF. above d=9* r vaht Ausoclave head-kHdicil O-nng leakage 5.0 Nuclear Safety Programs 5.1 Ennronmental Protection-No changes anticipated as part of SARUP.
Radiological 5.2 Nuclear Criticality Safety Forecast Submittal Date:
10/31/97 Comment ' m= m mion 5.2A Criticality Accident Analysis Activities Remaining to bc Completed.
u PORC/GM Approval Known Limitations orinaccuracies Noneidentifxxito Date
Enclosure I GDP 97-0148 SAR Update Status Page 4 of4 k'
Section Secties Tstle Status 53 Radiation Protection No changes anhcapated as part of SARUP.
5.4 Fire Protechon 5.5 Transportation 5.6 rhem4.1 Safety 5.7 AnalyticalSupport 6.0 Orgamzabon and Operating No changes anticipated as part of SARUP.
Progmns Quality Assurance Program No changes anticipated as part of SARUP.
E.m sucy Plan Envii -.=:=1 Compliance Status FNMCP Transportauon Secunty Plan PhysicalSecunty Plan Classified Matter Protection Plan RWWP Depleted Uranium Management Plan Decomnussiomng Funding Program Supp' --- e=1 Eumu...eaal Infor.
TechnicalSafety Requirements Forecast Submittal Date:
10/31/97 Activitics Remaming to bc Completed:
Comment Iwpvision Resolution of operaung mode differences Con:pichon ofSAR 3cchons 4 3.2. I thru 43.2.6 PORC/GM Approval Known Limitauons orInaccuracies:
MoneIdentified to Date
____..:1__ '. _
GDP 97 0148 Page1of3 United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
Proposed Certificate Annendment Request Update the Application Safety Analysis Report Detailed Description of Change 1,0 Purpose The purpose of this certificate amendment request is to submit portions of the Safety Analysis Report Update (SARUP) to the NRC for review and approval.
Issue 2 of DOE /ORO 2027," Plan for Achieving Compliance with NRC Regulations at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant" (the Compliance Plan) requires, in part, that the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) submit an update to the application Safety Analysis Report (SAR) based largely on the DOE site wide SAR by August 17,1997. Specifically, items 3 and 4 of the Plan of Action and Schedule for Compliance Plan issue 2 state:
- 3. By no later than August 17, 1997, USEC shall submit an amendment to their Certifi:ation Application which includes:
l a) identification of all information, findings, and secommendations which indicate differences between the DOE site wide Safety Analysis Report and the USEC Application for Certification.
b) an evaluation of the effects of those differences on the safety of workers, and off-site members of the public.
c) proposed modificat;ons to the compliance certificate and/or facility, including proposed modifications to the Application SAR and TSRs.
- 4. At the same time the Application amendment is due, USEC shall also submit for NRC approval, its proposed resolution of matters contained in the DOE approved site wide Safety Analysis Repon not incorporated by USEC in its request for amendment of their Application for Certification.
USEC's efforts to complete the S AR Update (SARUP) submittal have been underway since we received the DOE upgraded SAR (POEF LMES-89) on Febmary 18,1997 and the supporting documents in late-March /early April. USEC has determined during the SAR review process that insuflicient time had been allocated in the Compliance Plan to accomplish the preparation and review activities necessary to ensure completeness and accuracy of the SARUP prior to submittal to the NRC. This was the basis for USEC's request to the NRC in letter GDP 97-0122 dated July 18,1997 for approval of a change in the submittal date from August 17,1997 to October 31,1997.
9
GDP 97-0148 4
Page 2 of 3 USEC identified that the additional time would be required to complete the activities necessary to ensure completeness and accuracy of the SARUP submittal to the NRC including:
Resolve internal comments from plant support groups Evaluate changes to the plant since the DOE cut off date and identified as found conditions for their impact on SARUP J
Review the SARUP supponing documents Obtain final Plant Operations Review Conunittee (PORC) approval of the proposed
+
application changes The following portions of the SAR Update (SARUP) are included with this submittal:
Changes to Application SAR Chapter 2," Site Characteristics" New SAR Sections 4.1,4.2.1 through 4.2.5,4.3.1, and 4.4
- to this letter provides a detailed status of the activities that must be completed for the remaining sections of the SARUP.
2.0 Description of Submittal The following changes to the Certification Application are proposed by this certificate amendment request to incorporate infonnation from the DOE upgraded SAR. These changes are included in Enclosure 3.
The changes to Application SAR Chapter 2, " Site Characteristics," include updated information on geography and demography, meteorology, surface hydrology, subsurface hydrology, geology and seismology, natural phenomena events, and external man-made events.
The sections of the new Chapter 4 include the following information: introduction, evaluation guidelines for the new hazard and accident analysis; criteria for the classification of stmetures, systems, and components; criteria for Technical Safety Requirement selection; hazard screening thresholds; description of the hazard analysis methodology; and description of the accident analysis methodology including source term methodology, in-building transport methodology, and outdoor atmospheric transport methodology.
i to this letter includes the information required by items 3.a), 3.b), and 4 of the Plan of Action and Schedule for Compliance Plan Issue 2.
A 10 CFR 76.68(a) review of the overall changes proposed by the SARUP has been performed.
The conclusion of this review is that the SARUP information involves an unreviewed safety
y GDP 97-0148 y_
Tage 3 of 3 question because the new analyses and Application changes may identify increased probabilities and consequences of accidents and may resua in reductions in the margins of safety as defined in the bases for the Technical Safety Requirements.
As requested in the August 12, 1997 letter from the NRC, the fcilowing limitations or inaccuracies have been identified with the portions of the SARUP included in this submittal:
New SAR Section 4.3.1.2.3.4.1, " Development of HGSYSTEM/UF6," includes corrections to the " Briggs well mixed wake model and " lift off correction factor" that were identified by reviewers during development of the code. Changes to new SAR Section 4.2.6, " Accident Analysis Results," have been initiated.
New SAR Section 4.3.1.2.1.1,"PIPELEAK," describes the PIPELEAK code which is a variant of the CYLIND code developed by the NRC to estimate release rates for UF6 cylinders. The PIPELEAK codes models the cylinders as right circular cylinders and does not account for the elliptical heads. The impact of this modelling on new SAR Section 4.2.6,
}
" Accident Analysis Results,"is being evaluated.
m M
I GDP 97-0148 NRC Certificate Amendment Request Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Letter GDP 97-0148 Safety Analysis Report Update Attached are the following sections of the SAR Upd:te:
Changes to Application SAR Chapter 2," Site Characteristics" a
New SAR Sections 4.1,4.2.1 through 4.2.5,4.3.1, and 4.4 Revision bars are provided in the right-hand margin to indicate the SARUP-proposed changes to the Certification Application.
A "S ARUP List of Effective Pages" is also provided.
6
SARUP PORTS August 17, 1997 SARUP LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES UARUP Pane
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SARUP-2
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17.1997 RAC 97-X0248(RO)
CHAPTER 2 CONTENTS bKt 2.
SITE CHARACTERISTICS OF TIIE PORTS 510UTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT (PORTS).................................
2.1-1 2.!
GEOGRAPIIY AND DEMOGRAPHY OF TIIE SITE,............
2.1-1 2.1.1 Site Location 2.1 1 2.1.2 Sit e Description..................................
2.1-2
-2.1.3 Population.....................................
2.1 -3 2.1.4 Uses of Nearby Land and Waters......................
2.1 5 2.2 NEARBY INDUSTRIAL, TRANSPORTATION, AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES......,,...................,,,....
2.2 1 2.2.1 Industrial Facilities..
2.2-1 2.2.2 Transportation Systems and Routes 2.2-1 2.2.3 Military Activities..........,.............,....... 2.2-1 2.2.4 DOE Activities.................................
2.2-2 2.3 METEOROLOGY,.........,.....................,.,, 2.3-1 2.3.1 Regional Climatology................,...........
2.3 1 l
2.3.2 On-Site Meteorological Measurements Program.........,,, 2.3-1 l
2.3.3 Local Meteorology.,.
2.3-2 l
2.4 SURFACE HYDROLOGY,...............
4........,....
2,4-1 2.4.1 Hydrologic Description.................,..,........
2,4-1 2.4.2 Flood Illstory......................
2.4-3 2.4.3 Probable Maximum Flood 2.4-4 2.4.4 Potential Seismically Induced Dam Failures..............
2.4-8 2.4.5 Channel Diversions and Ice Formation en the Scioto River.....
2.4-8 2.4.6 Low Water Considerations 2.4-8 2.4.7 Dilution of Effluents 2.4-9 2.5 SUBSURFACE HYDROLOGY,...
. 2.5-1 2.5.1 Regional and Area Characteristics 2.5-1 2.5.2 Site Characteristics 2.5-4 ii
1 i
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248(R0)
CONTENTS (continued) -
Pane 2.6
' GEOLOGY AND hEISMOLOGY 2.6-1 2.6.1 Basic Geologic and Seismic Information..................
2.61
. 2.6.2 Site Physiography and Geology 2.63 l
2.6.3 Analysis of Geologic Stability 2.6-9 l
l 2.7-NATURAL PHENOMENA THREATS...............,,......
2.7-1 l
a 2.7.1 Earthquake Hazard............
2,7-1 l
l 2.7.2 Flood Hazard...................................
- 2. 7 3 l
2.7.3 Wind Hazard......................
2.7-3 l
- [
2.8 EXTERNAL MAN-MADE THREATS
..-2.8-1 l
[
2.8.1 Aircraft Crashes.................................. 2.8-1 l
2.8.2 Highway Accidents Near the Facility,..................
2.8-1 l
1 2.8.3 Ban ge TrafHc Accidents on Nearby Waterways....,........ 2.8 1 l
2,8.4 Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines 2.8-1 l
2.9 REFERENCES
2.9 1 l
k LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 1
Tables l
l 2.1 1 Current (1990) and projected population density within 5 miles of PORT 3 j
(person /mi2)............................
2.1-7 2.3-1 Precipitation in inches as a function of recurrence interval and storm duration for the l
PO RTS area..................................
2.3 3 l
2.3 2 - Joint frequency distribution, in %, of atmospheric stability, wind direction, and wind l
speed at 10 m above ground at PORTS for 1993.
2,3-4 l
l.
2.3-3 ' Joint frequency distribution, in %, of atmospheric stability, wind direction, and wind l
speed at 32 m above ground at PORTS for 1993.............
2.3-8 l
i 2.41 - Comparison of Good elevations of the Scioto River near PORTS with the plant nominal grade elevation 2.4 10 i
2.4 2 Precipitation as a function of recurrence interval and storm duration for PORTS (Johnson et al 1993, p. 4-2) 2,4-11 2.4 3 The 10,000-year nood levels and related information for the live local 1
st reams at PO RTS.......................................... 2.4-12 2.5-1 = Regional stratigraphic and hydrogeologic subdivisions (Lee,1991, p.10)....... 2.5-9 j.
2.5-2 Summary of mean hydraulic conductivity data for various formations........ 2.5-10 2.5-3 Sununary of hydraulic conductivities used in the Geraghty & Miller PORTS groundwater Dow model..
2.5 11 111 i
i
4 1
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248(RO)
L LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES (Continued) 2.5-4' Hydraulic conductivity values used in the calibrated Quadrant II RFI groundwat er model......................................... 2.5-12 2.5 5 Recharge values used in the Geraghty & hiiller Quadrant II RFI groundwater model......................................... 2.5-13 r
j 2.6 1 Table deleted l
l Figures 2.1-1 The location of PORTS 2.1-8 2.1-2 PORTS and the surrounding region.............................
2.1-9 l
2.1 3 DOE property boundary, nearby conununities, roads, and bodies of water 2.1-10 2.1-4 PO RTS sit e............................. -................. 2.1-11 2.1 Sa Facilities leased to USEC at PORTS site 2.1 13 2.15b Facilities retained by DOE at PORTS site.........,....,....,
2.1-19 2.1-6 Ma,jor wastewater systems and sources at PORTS..................... 2.1-21 2.1 7 The 1990 population, by sectors and annull, within 5 miles of PORTS....,... 2.1-22 2.1-8 Schools and day care facilities within 5 miles of PORTS
................ 2.1-23 2.1 9 Hospital and nursing homes in the PORTS vicinity..,,,.
2.1-24 2.110 Public recreation areas in the PORTS vicinity..,,,,,.
2.1-25 2.1 11 Land uses within 5 miles of PORTS,,.,.......,...............
2.1-26 2.3 1 Monthly mean temperatures averaged over the period from 1951 to 1980 at Waverly, l
Ohio (Data source: p. 863, Ruffner 1985) 2.3-12 l
2.3 2 Monthly meen precipitation averaged over the period from 1951 to 1980 at Waverly, l
Ohio (Data source: p. 863, Ruffner 1985),,....,.................... 2.3 13 l
2.3-3 Monthly mean snowfall averaged over the period from 1951 to 1980 at Waverly, l
Ohio (Data source: p. 863, Ruffner 1985).........
2.3-14 l
.2.3-4 Hourly temperatures at 10-m and 32-m levels above ground at PORTS for 1994 2.3-15 l
2.3-5 Hourly relative humidity data at PORTS for 1994..................... 2.3 16 l
2.3-6 Hourly wind ' speeds at 10-m and 32-m levels above ground at PORTS for 1994.. 2.3-17 l
2.3-7 ' Hourly wind directions at 10-m and 32-m levels above ground at PORTS for 1994 2.3-18 l
2.3-8 Comparison of wind roses at 10-m (top) and 32 m (bottom) levels at PORTS for l
1993 (Source: Kornegay et Al.1994) 2.3-19 = l 2.3 9 Average wind rose at 10-m level at PORTS 1992 94. (Source: Sharp 1995)....
2.3 20 l-2.3-10 Average wind rose at 32-m level at PORTS 1992-94. (Source: Sharp 1995)..... 2.3-21 l
2,4-1 Scioto River watershed (COE 1%7,' p.11-91)..,,,....,,...
2.4-13 2.4-2 Location of rivers and creeks in the vicinity of PORTS (Johnson et al.
1993, p. 1 -4),,................,..........
2.4-14 2.4-3 Located groundwater wells in the vicinhy of PORTS (LETC 1982, Fig.
3.6; Saylor et al.1990, p. 6-25)........,..............
2.4-15 2.4-4 Local drainage at PORTS (Rogers et al.,1989, p.10; Johnson et al.
1993, p. 3-3).................
2.4-17 iv
~.
_.~.. _
l i
SAR. PORTS '
PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248(R0)
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES (Continued) 2,4-5. Elevations of roadways and of the surrounding areas of main process buildings (Johnson et al.1993, p. 3 7)............................. 2.4-18
-2.46 Stonn sewer outfalls at PORTS (Johnson et al.1993, p. 3-4)...
2.4-19 2.4-7 Ponds and lagoons at PORTS (Johnson et al.1993, p. 3-5).......,....... 2,4-20 2.4-8 The 10,000-year intensity versus duration graph for PORTS (Johnson et
'al.1993, p. 4-4) 2.4 21 2.4-9 Locations of creek cross sections where the stage-discharge relations were 4
4
_ evaluated (Johnson et al.1993, p. 4 7)......,..................... 2,4-22 2.5 1 Location of the ancient Newark (modern Scioto) and Teays River valleys j-in the PORTS vicinity (Lee 1991, p.12).. _..........,,.........
2.5-14 2.5-2 Geologic cross section in the PORTS vicinity (Lee 1991, p.9),,........,... 2.5-15 4
2.5-3 _ Geologic map of the PORTS region and generalized groundwater flow t
directions in Mississippian bedrock near PORTS (Lee 1991, p.11).......... 2.5-16 j
2.5 Potentiometric surface of the Gallia aquifer for December 12,1988........
2.5-17 2.5-5 Potentiometric surface of the Berea aquifer for December 12,1988...
2.5-18 4
2.5-6 Geologic column at PORTS (Geraghty & Miller,1989a, Fig. 2.4).....,..... 2.5-19 2.5 Hydrogeologic map of PORTS showing approximate outcrop /subcrop i
patterns of Mississippian bedrock (Geraghty & Miller 1989b, Fig.1.1) 2.5-7 2.5 8 Bedrock surface beneath PORTS showing the narrow operdng between the X-701B area and Little Beaver Creek to the east....,.............. 2.5 21 2.6-1 Regional phyelographic map (after Fenneman and Johnson 1946)..,,....... 2.6-14 2.6-2 Regional geologic setting (modified from Rudman et al)...............,. - 2.6-15 2.6-3 Regional geologic map (from King,1974, the U.S.G.S. Geologic Map of
)
the United States,1974) 2.6-17.
2.6-4 Regional profile (from Fing 1974) 2.6,
]
2.6-5 Site plan, locations of summary borings, and geologic profile limits (1 in. = 2000 ft).....................,.........,..,....... 2.6-20 l
2.6-6 Seismotectonic provinces and epicenters of historical earthquakes, 1776-1990.,, 2.6-21 1
2.6-7. Figure Deleted l
i 2.6-8 Figure Deleted l
2.6-9 Figure Deleted l
1-2.6-10 Figure Deleted l
2.6-11 Figure Deleted l
2.6-12 Figure Deleted l
2.7-1 Mean seismic hazard curves for the Portsmouth area (ES/CPNE-95-2. Seismic Hazard l
Criteria for the Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Padocah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio. U.S. _ [
Departmcat of Energy Reservations. December 1995).,,,.............. 2.7-5 l
2.7-2 Evaluation basis earthquake response spectra horizontal ground motion for Portsmouth l
(ES/CPNE-95/2, Seismic Hazard Cdteria for the Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; - l and Portsmomh, Ohio, U.S. Department of Energy Reservations. December 1995). 2.7-6 l
2.7-3 Wind Hazard at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Ohio. (Source: Coats and Murray l
1985)
. 2.7-7
-l V
i
.wo r
rer
=
PROPOSED SAR PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
A notable portion of the land within 50 miles of PORTS is held in the public trust as forest land or for recreational use. State parks of Ohio and Kentucky occupy over 38,000 acres ofland within 50 miles of PORTS (OHDNR, n.d.; Hardy,1993). 'Ihe Ohio Department of Natural Resources (OHDNR) also manages approximately 165,000 acres of land as state forests, natural preserves, and wildlife areas (OHDNR,1992).
Wayne National Forest occupies approximately 120,000 acres ofland within 50 miles of PORTS (R. Jones 1993).
Very few urban areas are located within 50 miles of PORTS. The cities of Chiillcott.e, Ohio (1990 population of 21,923), and Portsmouth, Ohio (1990 population of 22,676), lie approximately 25 miles away, and the metropolitan area comprising primarily Huntington, West Virginia (pop. 54,844), and Ash;and, Kentucky (pop. 23,622), lies approximately 50 miles southeast of PORTS.
No known public or private water supply draws from the Scioto River downstream of PORTS discharge (Kornegay et al.,1991, p. vii).
3 I
d
~
2.1-6
SAR PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) 2,3 METEOROLOGY PROPOSED This sectN, avides a meteorological description of PORTS and its surrounding area, ne purpose is to provide meteon;,.gical information necessary to understand the regional weather phenomena of concern for the PORTS operation and to understand the dispersion analyses performed (DOE 1994, p. 25).
Meteorological ccnditions that influence the design and operation of the facility are identified in Section 2.7.
2.3.1 Regional Climatology Located west of the Appalachian Mountains, the region around PORTS has a climate essentially continental in nature, characterized by moderate extremes of heat and cold and wetness and dryness (Ruffner 1985, p. 843). Figure 2.3-1 graphically portrays monthly mean temperatures averaged over the period from 1951 to 1980 (Ruffner 1985, p. 863) at Waverly, Ohio, which is about 8 miles north of PORTS. Daily maximum and minimum temperatures averaged over the period from 1951 to 1980 are also shown in the figure. July is the hottest month, with an average monthly temperature of 74*F, and January is the coldest month with an average temperature of 30'F. He highest and lowest daily temperatures from 1951 to 1980 were 103 and -25'F on July 14,1954, and February 3,1951, respectively. For the results presented above, data from Waverly are used because of the availability of published long-term data.
Moisture in the area is predominantly supplied by air moving northward from the Gulf of Mexico (Ruffner 1985, p. 863), Precipien is abundant from March through August and sparse in October and February (Figure 2.3-2). The average annual precipitation at Waverly, Ohio, for the period from 1951 to 1980 was 40.4 in. (Ruffner 1985, p. 863). The greatest daily rainfall during this period was 3.38 in.,
occurring on June 26,1971. Snowfall occurrence varies from year to year, but is common from November through March (see Figure 2.3-3). The average annual snowfall for the area is about 22 in., based on the 1951-1980 data. During that time period, the maximum monthly snowfall was 25.4 in., occurring in January 1978.
Occasionally, heavy amounts of rain associated with thunderstorms or low pressure systems will fall in a short period of time. The U.S. Weather Bureau has published values of the total precipitation for durations from 30 min to 24 h and return periods from 1 to 100 yr (Hershfield 1%3). The results for the geographic locale including FORTS are summarized in Table 2.3-1. A local drainage analysis for extreme storms at PORTS has been performed (see Johnson et al.1993).
The predominant winds at PORTS blow from the south or southwest and at times from the north (ERDA 1977, p. 3-18). The average wind speed is about 5 mph. On the average, from 1953 to 1989,14 tornadoes per year were reported in Ohio, but the total varies widely from year to year (e.g., 43 in 1973 and 0 in 1988) (Bair 1992, p. I10). Pike County, where PORTS is located, had two tornadoes during the 20-yr period from 1953 to 1972 (Davis 1973).
2.3.2 On-Site Meteorological Measurements Progrmn PORTS maintairrd a single 131 ft meteorological tower (Building X-120; plant coordinates: E 8500 ft N 4100 ft located south of XT-801) before 1995, it was equipped with instrument packages at the 33-and 105-ft (10- and 32-m) levels that measure air temperature, relative humidity, and wind speed and direction (Kornegay et al.1994, p. 5-10). [Results labeled as 131 or 105 ft (40 or 32 m) in this section were all measured at 105 ft (32 m)]. Prior to 1995, not all the meteorological instrumentation at PORTS might be reliable (Kornegay et al.1994, p. 5-11). Since January 1995, a new 200-ft (60-m) tower has been in use. it is equipped with instrument packages at the 33,98, and 200 ft (10, 30, and 60 m) levels (Blythe 1995). In addition, ground-level instrumentation measures solar radiation, barometric pressure, precipitation, and soil 2.3-1
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
(Kornegay et al,1994, p. 5-10), [Results labeled as 131 or 105 ft (40 or 32 m) in this section were all measured at 105 ft (32 m)). Prior to 1995, not all the meteorological instrumentation at PORTS might be reliable (Kornegay et al.1994, p. 5 11). Since January 1995, a new 200-ft (60 m) tower has been in use. It is equipped with instrument packages at the 33,98, and 200 ft (10, 30, and 60 m) levels, la addition, ground-levelinstrumentation measures solar radiation, barometric pressure, precipitation, and soil temperatures at I-and 2-ft depths.
2.3,3 Local Meteorology Hourly temperatures at 33 and 105-11(10. arxl 32 m) (labeled as 40 m) levels above the ground were recorded at the PORTS meteorological tower before 1995. The results for 1994 are shown in Figure 2.3-4 At each level,8555 of the possible 8760 data points are available. The seasonal temperature variation and the daily temperature fluctuations are consistent with the long term averages shown in Figure 2.3-1 for Waverly, Ohio. He two sets of temperature readings at the PORTS meteorological tower are highly correlated, as one would expect. Since January 1995, temperatures at 33,98, and 200 ft (10, 30, and 60 m) have been measured at the new tower.
Hourly relative humidity data for 1994 are plotted in Figure 2.3-5. Out of the possible 8760 data points, 8629 are available. The average relative humidity from this period, 85.3%, is not typical for this region. For example, the average annual relative humidities at Lexington (Kentucky), Cincinnati and Columbus (Ohio), and Charleston (West Virginia) are all very close to 70% (Bair 1992, pp. 553, 689, 697, and 821), Among the 8629 data poims shown in Figure 2.3-5, 3143 have the value of 100%. The high relative humidity readings might have been caused by a near by creek, which is only about 500 ft west of the meteorological tower, or by an incorrectly calibrated instrument.
Hourly wind speed and wind direction data for 1994 are plotted in Figures 2.3-6 and 2.3-7, respectively. Out of 8760 possible hourly data sets,8430 are available for wind speed and 8423 for wind direction. The average wind speeds were 3.7 and 6.0 mph at 33-and 105-ft (10- and 32-m) levels, respectively, Wind roses at 33 and 105 ft (labeled as 131 ft) [10 and 32 m (labeled as 40 m)) at PORTS constructed from the 1993 data are compared in Figure 2.3-8. Average wind roses constructed from 1992-1994 data are shown in Figures 2.3-9 and 2.3-10 for 33-and 105-ft (10- and 32-m) levels, respectively.
Joint frequency distribution of atmospheric stability, wind direction, and wind speed at 33-ft and 105-ft (10- and 32-m) above ground at PORTS for 1993 are shown in Tables 2.3-2 and 2.3-3. Sigma theta data (standard deviations of the wind direction) were used when available and AT/a2 values were used otherwise.
~
2.3-2
4 SAR PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
Table 2.3-1. Precipitation in inches as a function of recurrence interval and storm duration for the PORTS area s
Recurrence Storm durados (b) laterval (yr) 0.5 1
2 3
6 12 24 1
0.85 1.06 1.34 1.44 1.75 2.04 2.43 i
)
2 1.04 1.28 1.57 1.71 2.02 2.44 2.70 5
1.36 1.66 1.98 2.14 2.52 2.98 3.41 10 1.52 1.93 2.30 2.52 2.98 3.40 3.90 I
25 1.76 2.24 2.64 2.92 3.38 3.91 4.55 i
50 1.%
2.51 2.97 3,16 3.78 4.20 4.93 l
100 2.16 2.73 3.22 3.48 4.00 4.88 5.26 1 in. = 2.54 cm.
Source: Johnson et al.1993. p. 4-2.
2.3-3
.. _ -. - _ _. ~. _ _ _. _ _.. _ _.... _ _ _ _.... _. _. _. _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _
l
).
I i
SAR. PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) d l
. Table 2.3 2. Joint frequency distribution, in %, of atmospheric stability, wind direction, and wind speed at 10 m above ground at PORTS for 1993 4
Stabuity
-Wind Wind speed class (m/s) category direction
<2 2-4 4-6 6 8-10
> 10 Total N
0.86 0.60 0.23 0.02 0
0 1.71
)
NNE' O.94 0.56 0.03 0
0 0
1.53 l
NE 1.45 0.30 0
0 0-0 1.76 ENE 1.26 0.24 0
0 0
0 1.50 l
E--
- 1.33 0.30 0
0 0
0 1.63 j
ESE 1.49 0.36 0
0 0
0 1.86 i
f SE 1.70 0.28 0
0 0
0 1.98 E
SSE 2.43 0.24 0
0 0
0 2.67 l-A S
3.58 0.66 0
0 0
0 4.25 i
SSW 3.23 1.07 0.05 0
0 0
4.35 h
SW 3.17 1.41 0.05 0
0 0
4.63 WSW 2.57 1.57-0.18 0.03 0
0 4.35 i
W 1.94 0.74 0.11 0.08 0
0 2.87 WNW 1.55 0.53 0.08 0
0 0
2,17 1
l NW 1.25 0.42-0.02 0:
0 0
1.69 l
NNW 1.27 0.64 0.09 0.02 0
0 2.02 I
Total 30.02 9.93 0.86 0.15 0
0 40.96 l
N 0.14 0.29 0.24 0.05 0.03 0
O.75 NNE 0.21 0.16
- 0.03 0
-0 0
0.41 NE 0.43 0.15 0
0-0 0
0.58 j
ENE 0.58 0.18
'0 0
0 0
0.77 E-0.71 0.27
-0.02 0
0 0
1.00
~
ESE 0.92' O.49 0.02 0
0 0
1.43 -
i SE 0.68 0.40 0
0 0
0 1.08 SSE 0.99 0.47 -
0.05 0
0 0
1.51 I
B S
1.83 0.75 0.09 0
0 0
2.67
.b SSW 1.71 1.41 0.21 0
0 0
3.34
).
SW-0.94 0.79 -
0.19 0.02 0
0 1.95 WSW 0.60 '
O.71 0.16 0.01 0
0 1.48
)
W 0.32
-0.23 0.04 0
0 0
0.60 ii WNW 0.19 0.22 0.02 0
0 0
0.43 i
NW 0.22 0.23 0.06 0
0 0
0.51 NNW 0.32 0.44 -
0.13 0.02 0
0 0.90 l-Total 10.77 7.19 1.27 0.14 0.03 '
O 19.40 2.3-4 c
k' 4
I Q
e --.
.y--.
,-----n--
y
.?,
4 PROPOSED SAR PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
Table 2.3 2 (continued) l Stability
-Wind Wind speed class (m/s) category direction
<2 24 4-6 6-4 8-10
> 10 Total N
0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 0
0.24 -
j-NNE 0.19 0.39 0.28 0.10 0-0 0.96 NE 0.59 0.27 0
0 0
0 0.84 ENE 0.47 0.20 0.02 0
0 0
0.69 E
0.83-0.26 0.02 0
0 0
1.11-ESE 0.78 0.39 0
0 0
0 1.18 f-SE 0.42 0.13
-0 0
0 0
0.56 i
SSE 0.94 0.22 0.04 0.01 0
0 1.21
[
C E
? 15 0.85 0.18-0.02 0
0 3.20
[
..v1 0.93 0.20 0
0 0
-3.14 S~W 0.66 0.29 0.04 0
0 0
0.99 WSW 0.50 0.59 0.47 0.09 0
0 1.65 i
W 0.33 0.81
- 0. >t 0.15 0
0 1.94 WNW 0.30 1.00 0.22 0.02 0.
0 1.54 NW 0.23 0.66 0.20 0
0 0
1.08 I
NNW 0.15 0.25 0.04 0.03 0
0 0.47 Total 10.63 7.26 2.41 0.44 0.04 0
20.78 N-0.02 0
0 0
0 0
0.02
(_
NNE 0.21 0.27 0.08 0.02 0
0 0.57 j
NE 0.40 0.53 0.21 0
0 0
1 14 l-ENE 0.29 0.08 0
0 0
0 0.37 E
0.44 0.08 0
0 0
0 0.52 ESE 0.35 0.03 0
0 0
0 0.38 SE 0.20 0
0 0
0 0
0.20 SSE 0.79 0
0 0
0 0
0.79 i_
D S
1.43' O.04 0.01 0
0 0
1.48 4
i SSW 0.86 0.03 0
0 0
0 0.90 SW 0.23
-0
-0 0-0 0
0.23 s'
WSW 0.27 0.17 0.06 0.02 0
0
-0.52 W
0.23 0.27 0.10 0.01 0
0 0.60 i
WNW 0.17~
0.12 0
0 0
0 0.29 i
NW 0.10 0.15 0.02 0
0 0
0.26 l
NNW 0.02 0.01 0
0 0
0 0.03 Total 5.99 1.78
-0.49 0.05 0
0 8.30 4
4 2.3-5 I
i SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
Table 2.3 2 (continued)
Stability Wind Wind speed class (m/s) category dimtion
<2 2-4 4
4 8-0
> 10 Total E
N O
O O
0-0 0
0 NNE 0.02 0
0.02 0
0 0
0.04 i
NE 0.04 0.03-0 0
0 0
0.07 ENE 0.02 0
0 0
0 0
0.03 E
0.08 0
0 0
0 0
0.08 ESE 0.03 0
0 0
0 0
0.03 SE 0.04 0
0 0
0 0
0.04 SSE
- 0.18 0
0 0
0 0 _
0.18 E
S 0.30 0
0 0
0 0
0.30
{
SSW '
O.17 0
0 0
0 0
0.17 SW 0.02 0
0 0
0 0
0.02 WSW 0.02 0
0 0
0 0
0.02 4
W 0.01 0
-0 0
0 0
0.02 WNW 0.03 0
0 0
0.
0 0.03 NW 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
NNW 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Total 0.95 0.05 0.02 0
0 0
1.02~
N 4.79 0
0 0
0 0
4.79 i
NNE 0.11 0
0 0
0-0 0.11 NE 0.14 0
0 0
0 0
0.14 ENE 0.21 0
0 0
0 0
0.21 E
0.40 0
0 0
0 0
0.40 ESE
- 0.32 0
0 0
'O O
0.32 SE 0.47 0
0 0
0 0
0.47 SSE 0.69 0
0 0
0 0
0.69 F
S 0.82 0
0 0
0 0
0.82 SSW 0.48 0
0 0
0 0
0.48 SW 0.32 0-0 0
0 0
0.32 WSW-0.20 0
0 0
0 0
0.20 t
W 0.18 0
0 0'
0 0
0.18 WNW 0.16 0
0 0
0 0
0.16 NW 0.11 0
0 0
0 0
0.11
~
NNW 0.14 0
0 0
0 0
0.14 Tots!
9.54 0
0 0
0 0
9.54 2.3-6 4
4 d
- f a
4,'w'~
w
,4..--m.
,m
.w c
.e
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
Table 2.3 2 (continued) '
Stability Wind -
Wind speed class (m/s) cat e -
dimtion
<2 2-4 4-6 6-4 S-10
> 10 Total N
5.89 0.%
0.51 0.09 0.06 0
7.51 NNE 1.67 1.38 0.44 0.12 0
0 3.62 NE 3.04 1.26 0.22 0
0 0
4.52 ENE 2.83 0.71 0.03 0
0 0
3.56 E
3.78 0.90 0.05 0
0 0
4.73 ESE 3.89 1.27 0.03
-0 0
0 5.19 SE 3.50 0.81 0
0 0
0 4.32 SSE 6.01 0,93 0.09 0.02 0
0 7.06 A
L S
10.12 2.30, 0.28 0.03 0
0 12.73 L
SSW 8.46 3.44 0.46 0
0 0
12.37 SW 5.33 2.49 0.28 0 03 0
0 8.13 WSW 4.15 3.04 0.88 0.15 0
0 8.22 W
3.01 2.05 0.90 0.24 0
0 6.20 WNW 2.41 1.88 0.32 0.03 0
0 4.62 NW 1.90 1.46 0.30 0
0 0
3.66 NNW 1.90 1.34 0.25 0.06 0
0 3.56 Total 67.89 26.21 5.05 0.77 0.08 0
-100.00 2.3-7
i SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)E
[
Table 2.3 3, joint frequency distribution, in %, of atmospheric stability, wind direction, and wind speed at 32 m above ground at PORTS for 1993 j
Stabilky Wind Wind speed class (m/s) j category direction 6-2.1 2.1-3.6 3.6-5.7 5.7-8.7 8.7-10.8
>10.8 Total N
0.83 0.6%
0.21 0.10 0
0 1.79 NNE 0.93 0.70 0.07 0
0 0
1.71 i
NE 0.78 0.30 0
0 0
0 1.09 ENE 0.69 0.25 0.02 0
0 0
0.%
l-E 0.65 -
0.22 0
0 0
0 0.87 ESE 0.65 0.16 0
0 0
0 0.80 f-SE 0.84 0.14 0
0 0
0 0.99 i
SSE 1.00 0.15 0
0 0
0 1.16 t
{'
A S
1.25 0.18 0
0 0
0 1.46 i-SSW 1.53 0.33 0.02 0
0 0
1.88 4
1-SW 1.61 0.45 0.05 0
0 0
2.12 WSW 1.36
-0.39 0.07 0.03
.02 0
1.87 W
1.05 0.37 0.12 0.08
.05 0
1.67 l-WNW 0.85 0.30 0.13 0.02 0
0 1.30
}-
NW 0.71 0.320 0.05 0
0 0
1.08 f
NNW 0.71 0.51 0.11 0.01 0
0 1.35
{
Total 15.43 5.42 0.88 0.27
.08 0
22.09 l
N 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.04 0
0 0.38
}
NNE 0.16 0.13 0.03 0
0 0
0.31 i
NE 0.17 0.13 0
0 0
0 0.31 ENE-0.28 0.22 0.04 0
0 0
0.54
+
E 0.26 0.25-0.03 0
0 0
0.54 l-ESE 0.23 0.24 0.03 0
0 0
0.51 i
SE 0.30 0.17 0.02 0
0 0
0.49 SSE 0.36 0.14 0.02 0
0 0
0.51
[
B S
0.54 0.22 0.03 O
O O
0.80
[
SSW 0.60 0.40 0.09 0-0 0
1.09 SW 0.63 0.45 0.17 0.02 0
0 1.28
[
WSW 0.43 0.30 0.09 0.04 0
0 0.88 W
0.36 0.21 0.07 0.02 0
0 0.66 i-WNW 0.24 0.12 0.06 0.01 0
0 0.42 j
NW 0.21 0.13 0.06 0.01 0
0 0.42 NNW 0.12 0.23 0.11 0.04
.02 0.01 0.54
].
Total 5.00 3.45 0.97 0.20
.04
O.02 9.68 2.3-8 2-4
-r.--.
-l I
SAR PORTS PROPOSED
^"#
' RAC 97-X0248 (RO) i.
Table 2.3 3 (continued) l Stability Wlad Wind speed class (m/s) i category direction 6-2,1 2.1-3.6 3.6-5.7 5.7-8.7 8.7 10.8
>10.8 Total N
0.09 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.56 NNE 0.15 0.20 0.05 0
0 0
0.41 NE 0.36 0.27 0.02 0
0 0
0.65 ENE 0.31 0.41 0.09 0
0 0
0.81 E
0.30 0.51 0.11 0
0 0
0.92 ESE 0.26 0.56 0.17 0
0 0
1.00 SE 0.36 0.49 0.22 0.01 0
0 1.09 SSE
'O.54 0.44 0.15 0.03 0
0 1.16 C
S 0.79 0.65 0.41 0.09 0
0 1.94 SSW 0.89 0.98 0.58 0.21 0
0 2.68 SW 0.72 0.87 0.85 0.24 0.03 0
2.72 WSW 0.50 0.55 0.43 0.18 0.04 0
1.71 W
0.41 0.30 0.23 0.11 0.02 0
1.08 WNW 0.30 0.29 0.22 0.07 0
0 0.89 NW 0.14 0.34 0.22 0.06 0.02 0
0.78 NNW 0.11 0.38 0.22 J.05 0.01 0
0.77 Total 6.25 7.41 4.11 1.18 0.15 0.06 19.17 N
0.07 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.36 NNE 0.29 0.42 0.28 0.09 0.02 0
1.11 NE 0.38 0.70 0.16 0
0 0
1.25 ENE 0.33 0.51 0.13 0
0 0
0.97 E
0.27 0.78 0.16 0.01 0
0 1.22 ESE 0.32 1.09 0.41 0.05 0
0 1.87 SE 0.40 0.74 0.30 0.02 0
0 1.47 SSE 0.84 0.53 0.48 0.18 0.03 0.01 2.08 D
S 1.02 1.91 1.13 0.26 0.01 0
4.34 SSW 0.79 1.70 1.32 0.51 0.08 0
4.42 SW 0.84 1.27 0.88 0.38 '
O.06
-0 3.43 WSW 0.71 0.88 0.91 0.56-0.35 0.07' 3.48 W
0.57 0.77 0.83 0.62 0.19 0.08 3.05 WNW 0.36 0.74 0.88 0.33 0.05 0
2.35 NW-0.11 0.59
').38 0.15 0.02 0
1.24 NNW 0.03 0.27 0.03 0
0 0
0.32 Total 7.33 12.%
8.38 3.23
.85
.22 32.97 2.3-9
-)
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997-j
- RAC 97 X0.48 (RO) -
1 Table 2,3 3 (continued) i Stabilky
- Wlad.
Wlad speed class (m/s) category direction 0-2.1 2.1-3.6 3.6-5.7 5.7-8.7 '
8.7-10.8
>10.8 Total N-0 0
-0 0.01-0 0'
O.05 NNE 0.18 0.69 0.35 0.17 0.07 0
1.47 NE 0.19 0.60
- 0.35 0.10 0
0 1.23 ENE 0.13 -
0.34 0.04 0
0 0
0.50
~
E 0.19 0.28 0
0 0
0 0.47 ESE 0.11 0.34 0.04 0
0 0
0.50 SE 0.22 0.16 0
0 0
0 0.38 r
SSE 0.51 0.20 0.03 0.03 0
0 0.76 I
E S
0.58 0.69 0.10-
-0 0
0 1.37 SSW 0.36 0.89 0.32 0
0 0 --
1.56 SW 0.37 0.42 0.04 0
0 0
0.83 1
f WSW 0.54 0.31 0.11 0.03 0
0 0.99 i
W 0.22 0.27 0.07 0.03 0
0 0.59 4
~
WNW 0.19 0.45 0.14 0.05 0-0-
0.84 NW 0.05 O.19 0.08 0.02 0
0 0.34 NNW 0
0.03 0
0-0 0
0.04 Total 3.85 5.87 1.69
.42
.08 0
11.93 i
N 0.39 0
0 0
0 0-
- 0.39 t-NNE 0.12 0.12 0.06
.01 0
0 ~
0.31 NE 0.11 0.13 0.03 0
0 0
0.28 1-ENE-0.11 0.02 0
0 0
0 0.13
?
E 0.22 0.03 0
0 0
0 0.24 l:
ESE 0.12 0
0 0
0 0
0.12 SE 0.19 0.02 0
0 0
0 0.21 SSE 0.28 0.02 0
0 0
-0 0.30 F
3 0.30 0.10 0
0 0
0 0.41 SSW-0.27 0.07 0
0 0
0 0.35 i
SW 0.24 0.02 0
0-0 0
0.25 WSW-0.43 0.03 0
-0 0
0 0.46 4
W 0.30' O
O O-0' O
0.31 WNW 0.17
-0.02 0
0 0
0-0.19 i-NW 0.12 0.02 0.01 0
0 0
0.15 i
'NNW-0.07 0
0 0
0 0
0.07 2 _
Total 3.43
.60
.13
.01 0
0-4.17-2.310 k
4
_m-_..____-_._______i__._______,__1_______.
SAR+ PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
Table 2.3 3 (continued)
Stability Wind Wind speed class (m/s) category direction 0-2.1 2.1-3.6 3.6-5.7 5.7-8.7 8.7-10.8
>10.8 Total N
1.50 1.00 0.57 0.33 0.06 0.07 3.52 NNE 1.83 2.26 0.85 0.28 0.09 0
5.32 NE 1.99 2.15 0.57 0.10 0
0 4.81 ENE 1.84 1.74 0.32 0.01 0
0 3.91 E
1.89 2.05
- 0.31 0.01 0
0 4.27 ESE 1.69 2.39 0.66 0.06 0
0 4.80 SE 2.32 1.72 0.55 0.03 0
0 4.63 SSE 3.52 1.49 0.68 0.23 0.03 0.02 5.98 A
L S
4.48 3.75 1.69 0.36 0.02 O
10.31 L
SSW 4.44 4.37 2.34 0.73 0.09 0
11.97 SW 4.40 3.48 1.98 0.66 0.09 0.01 10.62 WSW 3.98 2.45 1.61 0.83 0.42 0.08 9.38 W
2.90 1.93 1,32 0.85 0.27 0.09 7.36 WNW 2.11 1.91 1.44 0.48 0.06 0
6.00 NW 1.35 1.59 0.80 0.24 0.03 0
4.01 NNW 1.06 1.42 0.47 0.10 0.04 0.02 3.10 Total 41.29 35.72 16.16 5.32 1.21
.31 100.00 2.311
55*
hg xx 90 -
85!
A x
I S
80-daily m
maximum rz.
g 70-average 8
M
~$ 60 -
40 a
mx 8 50-o x
v 3
Y E-*
da,ily M
o E 40-minimum as g
1
> 30 -
20 -
10 I
I I
i g
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Atig Sept Oct Nov Dee c
Month 2
i Figure 2.31. Monthly encan temperatures averaged over the period frorn 1951 to 1980 at
'G Waverly, Ohio. (Data source: p. 863, Ruffner 1985)
. _._ _ ~. _.. _ _ -_ _._. _.. _ _... _. -. __. -.....-.
_ _... _ _. _. _. _... =. _
k
)
pm.
t y
O.
5-ks i
Sd i
z s'
t n 4-r i
.d
~
d
~
l v
r t
..o.
I Y
as 3-
.A.
m i
o o
P
.e 3
i
't' 4
<n
?
G lle m
2-O i
O ce i
as b
e 1
4 1-f
}
1 0
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
Jan' Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept.
Oct Nov Dec y
Mont.h
]
_G i
Figure 2.3-2. Monthly mean precipitation averaged over the period from 1951 to 1998 at Waverly, Ohio.
(Data source: p. 863, Ruffner 1985)
[
-1 I
l i
i
._a.+4s y
A.
,_A s
_E ea.
4 e
4
_ ass 4 m
om._4.A_
$^
o@
sa B-kw Bd'
~
A
^5 7-S m,$ 6 -
v o
.$ 5 -
0 A
in 4-O u
~
3 4'
e I
m m
af g_3-
>4 2-1-
I, o
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dee Month I
a
~
Figure 2.3-3. Afonthly inean snowfall averaged over the period froen 1951 to 1980 at Waverly, Ohio.
(Data source: p. 863, Ruffner 1985) t
PROPOSED SAR-PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) 100 1994 80 -
a g
o v
60 -
3-g m
co a
e 40 -
e
^
u
. ~ -
a l
2 20 -
g.'
I e
a 5
ei?
.;/
0 0~
,a
........ f i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i i
i
-20 0
20 40 60 80 100 Temperature at 10m (oF)
Figure 2.3-4. Hourly temperatures at 10-m and 32-m levels above ground at PORTS for 1994.
I l
l 2.3-15
en.
yN.
Omm
?O x *i 0tn a=
ms, x ry..- :!p.,t,~..--.gp'r" :gmyn :q.m 5l:ye.:,...;.g.;.2.q::y. ;v;.:.-.c 3; :. :.::-:.y.-m?.*qmy:. tja z:
100 -
~
.i.,...
e
- .~,f
- ..;..:.,:,.%.. :,' Y. p>&c.-l.-2,.* h :
N.:;
- ;c,.
- . :.,e:,...t~,.c..:.;:.<..; q.'......,:.- ;
n
.::.:.:*-v.c5.f.:.=..y:.c.y.
- .+
- y.:
o i..
i
.>3_
- ....'...<.,si
..,..~..:...r.
.....:b..,-;,. Q.
.4..*
- .,..,. : y;. ~v- :
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t p A.,.;,:. t. y,:: 7:
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g h. e :. -
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.. ~
- *.-:.1 c.
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s.-
s.: y..,.:. - : ~>< ; 2:.~ :-.r,. 3. I..
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r.
8-L 4..^., ~s::
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- t. :
.,.,. +..
. n..... :..r... ~:*,. g,. =
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. ;.s.-::.
x.
s., r,.se.
.s.."..
r-
. z.,.
,.g......
~.
5 80 -
-f.s s~.'
.... '. - :r: - ; s. >....'. -.
..... >.... : 0. * : s::. ' '*
. $ c.y -
- ,a
- -
m
. :c:.
,z.
w e
Y 4
s
- 7... ; +z
...a.. s. -
- e. ;.,. t -
.O,
.~
u p.
l..,<.
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.=
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. -) 2 O
.n.
43-tg
. t.
e
.s
- 5 I O
i'(4 in 40 -
i, 8,-
,A.,
e I
i.l olI 20 -
~
average = 86.3%
0 i
i i
i i
i i
i i
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Spt Oct Nov Dec i
Month
.a
~
Figure 2.3-5. Ilourly relative hunddity data at PORTS for 1994.
j m
gN l
^
height = 32 m n
av = 6.0 mph gg 30 -
x :=
8d I.
A
~
-i j<g il
{;*
j g20 -
!}i
[ ' h,
,. *.Q:i !. '. $ $.
j j' i*
I 4
y.:
I I
0 height = 10 m
- b av = 3.7 mph j
W W
i 30 -
t' O
I D
~
o f
g 20 -
N N
i'$ [
j35 ' :.D...
.,5 i 4
T ~ ~ ~~ i ' ' T ~ I' ~ ' i
~ ~ ~
a i
i 0-i f
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Spt Oct Nv Dec Mont.h i
a G
i I
Figure 2.3-6. Ilourly wind speeds at 10-m and 32-m levels above ground at PORTS for 1994.
f i
PROPOSED
)
SAR. PORTS August 17,1997 i
RAC 97.X0248 (RO) 1
$....... x.-..M4 MS....".
.=.
i e *i M,..,ijbk.,..h..Q...,..i...'q.:C..
2.
8
..,i
- m..
,. --.w_
. s.,
- r.g/,
.*s s.* *
...,.,,.,,,.r.
..,* : r-
... -.=w :.
o
-.....-..s.~...
e 1
z
- .~... m.
i
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... n. s....,..
.,.;;;r:.-Q.r:s s*w!*. ;; a,se.-
- S. ;., n,g,s..
.y o
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o p:
- e t'-
a
.~ :. 9. '.%.:, pr.. :
5, R
...:'.u %y."
s... _:.
- v. - - ~-
- ,.,.:. -v m
w J.,. a_..
.r...".. -.. -
- -l 7:a.
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h' T...., :
c
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m::
- : H.v s a m,o. r.. :.-
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=
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,a. s.,. -
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- J.N.....v.:
u,
- g.. g:s.
35BE%.8%
1
- k..,
- r. n. m....,..
g w..
- m..e..
.. =..
.,, :.. _. r.,...
a
~ < * = ~
.:..w,... -c.s:'.'..
.a.
- -:i.:
,c::
=
n.1,
-:.:: 4,.:.
. _.w. e. _... _.-
a...
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.e...
.e.
- m.,
.s -. w <.,.
.~... w.,_.-. -
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~.
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i i
i i
f y
d u
z z
m M
uoncel!G pula II2noH 2.3-18 i
e
PROPOSED
\\
SAR PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
NNw NNE
\\
NW NE
..s tHE E
i ESE WsW m'S e o a o,,,
sw
$$W sSE A
tren ORNL-OWG 94M 7069 NNW unt NE i.s
.e ENE www e
E W
ESE WSW
"'S g
60 80 45 49 134 179 SSW 34 Figure 2.3-8 Comparison of wind roses at 10-m (top) and 32-m (bottom) levels at PORTS for 1993 (Source: Kornegay et. al.1994) 2.3-19
PROF '; SED SAR. PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) 3 4
o f
2 d
w 5
k 5
~
&I i
3i l j
g 2
a w
~
w
.7 e,
g I
w s
k:
A e
E
.I 5
Ic E
%i W
i b
e s
e.
c b
-a a
y 2,3-20
~
l
- c sn tt i
O Nr fir 4E e4 with 94.6*/. of possible data
$< O 4
- o Sd F1E A
NW 8
,+
At
\\
ENE Wr#/
'I S
g
/
2 f Ellt2 H--d l
E W
i e
v M
mo ESE WSW e
SW SE so so 20 40 r_ aml 00 45 8.9 3
S cD E
.U Figure 2.3-10. Average wind rase at 32-m level at PORTS 1992-94. (&wrce-Sharp 1995)
PROPOSED SAR PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) and 34, respectively, use groundwater wells. Their 1975 water use rates were 1.1 cfs and 0.54 efs, respectively (OHDNR 1%3, p. 7; ERDA 1977, p. 3 37). The city of Portsmouth has a population of 22,676 and uses water from the Ohio River through an intake at the Ohio River at RM 350.8, which is 5.7 miles upstream from the mouth of the Scioto River (ORSANCOM 1988, p. 34). The pumping rate is about 11 efs.
In 1975, the rural domestic groundwater use in the county was estimated to be 1.8 cfs (ERDA 1977, p.3 37); wells located in the vicinity of PORTS are shown in Figure 2.4 3.
V'ater used at PORTS normally comes from grourdwater (Saylor et al.1990, p. 5 29) (Figure 2,4-3).
Of an average 19 cfs,15 cfs is for cooling water makeup and 4 cfs for sanitary purposes (PMD and ECD 1989, app. 3) Currently, all water is supplied by wells in the Scioto River alluvium. These wells are located near the cast bank of the Scioto River, downstream from Piketon. Four well fields (X-605G, X-608A, X-6088, and X 6609) have the capacity to supply re!! ably between 36.4 and 40.2 cfs.
2.4.1.2 The PORTS Area PORTS is located about 2.5 miles east of the confluence of the Scioto River and Big Beaver Creek near RM 27.5 (Figure 2.4-2). The plant site occupies an upland area bounded on the east and west by ridges of low lying hills that have been deeply dissected by present and past drainage features. The plant nominal elevadon is 670 ft, which is about 130 ft above the normal stage of the Scioto River. Both groundwater and surface water at PORTS are drained from the plant site by a network of tributaries of the Scioto River.
Both Big Beaver ani Uttle Beaver creeks receive runoff from the northeastern and northern portions i
of PORTS. Little Beaver Creek, the largest stream oa the pwperty, flows northwesterly just north of the main plant area (Figure 2.4-2). It drains the northern and northeastern parts of the main plant site (Figure 2,4-4) before discharging into Big Seaver. About 2 miles from the "nfluence of the two creeks, Big Beaver Creek empties into the Scioto River at RM 27.5 (Figure 2,4 2). Upstream from the plant, Little Beaver Creek has interminent flow throughout the year.
In the southeast portion of the site, the southctly flowing Big Run Creek (Figure 2,4 2) is situated in a relatively broad, gently sloping valley where significant deposits of recent alluvium have been laid down by the stream (Rogers et al.1989, p. 8). 'Ihis intermittent stream receives overflow from the south holding pond (X 230K), which collects discharge of storm sewers on the south end of the plant site. Big Run Creek empties into the Scioto River about 5 miles downstream from the mouth of Big Beaver Creek (Figure 2.4 2).
Two uruumed interminent streams drain the wes'ern portion of the plant site (Figures 2,4 2 and 2,4-4). The stream in the site's southwest portion flows southerly and westerly in a narrow, steep walled valley with little recent alluvium, it drains the southwest corner of the facility via the southwest holding pond. The stream near the west central portion of the plant site flows northwesterly and receives runoff from the central and western part of the site via the west drainage ditch. Both unnamed streams flow directly to the Scioto River and carry only storm water runoff (Rogers et al.1989, p. 8).
Little Beaver Creek receives 39 percent of the total PORTS effluents, Big Run Creek,9 percent.
4 2.4-2
PROPOSED SAR PORTS Augt.st 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
Inundated, storm water terds to flow from catchments having higher water levels to ones having lower water levels. Pressurization of the storm sewer system after filling with water has been neglected. Runoff from streets ard local topography, either natural or manmade, has also been neglected. %ese factors tend to reduce the calculated water levels.
De effect of a clogged storm sewer system on the ponding depth has been considered (Johnson et al.
1993, p. 415). The ponding levels computed with an inoperable sewer system are similar to the results obtained when the system is functional. The relative average water depths predicted by both analysts are i
similar in magnitude. Because the storm sewer flow is approdmately one fourth of the total 10,000-year storm flow, the overtard drainage system is the deminant factor in determining the wat:r depth at the base of the buildings. Thus local pording levels can be controlled by keeping natural surfaces within the security fence grassed, mowed, and free of high weeds, and by keeping debris from blocking urbanized surfaces. This would prevent water from backing up to higher levels than those presented above. Additionally, the tunnels could be potentiaPy affected due to infiltration of water; however, tunnels are only used for cable runs and are otherwise abandoned. it is unlikely that significant safety problerns would develop from tunnel flooding.
Ponding on the site is not expected to impact safe operations.
Results for Ponds and Lagoons To assess whether failures of the local dams could conceivably jeopardize the safety of critical systems, holding ponds, lagoons, and retention basins formed by these dams were considered in the local drainage analysis (Johnson et al.1993, pp.3 36 to 4-39). Rey include the west drainage ditch; X 2230N west-central holding pord 2, X 2230M southwest holding pond I, X 230K south holding pond, east drainage ditch, X 70lB holding ponds (northwest, cental, and southeast portions), storm sewer L, X 230L north holding pond, X 6110 sludge lagoon, 'md X-611 A lagoons (north, middle, and south lagoons)(Johnson et al.1993,
- p. 4 37. Table 4.13). The only bodies of water that could affect the main proecss buldings are the X-611B sludge lagoon and the three portions of the X-701B holding ponds. The remaining water surface elevations are so far below the 670-fc minimum grade elevation of the main process buildings that further consideration is not warranted.
The X 701B holding ponds are located in the immediate vicinity of Outfalls D and E. After being remediated to the Ohio EPA's acceptance, the associated east and west containment ponds have been filled in, and only the central X-701B holding pond remains. Main process buildings are protected from this holding pond and the drainage ditch of the outfalls by a berm that rises to an elevation between 672 and 674 ft. This bern, encompasses the X 701B holding pord and the Outfall D and E drainageway. The analysis demonstrates that this holding pond and outfall area would not overflow and inundate the main process buildings during an approximate 10,000 yr er.treme storm (Johnson et al.1993, p. 4 37).
The water level elevation of the X-611B sludge lagoon at 668.8 ft is close to the 670-ft minimum grade elevation at the main process buildings. De elevation of the top of the dam forming the lagoon is 676.3 ft and exceeds the 670 ft minimum. However, when the conservative estimate of flood wave height (4/9 of the dam height)is used, the flood elevation resulting from a break in the dam would be only 652.8 ft. The flom! wave
.learly poses no threat to the PORTS plant proper because it could not overtop Perimeter Road (!nhnson et al.1993, p. 4-37).
2.4-6
l PROPOSED SAR PORTS
,,gz g997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) l Results for Ditches and Culverts ne PORTS storm sewer system discharges through each of the outfalls shown in Figure 2.4-6 into a series of ditches, culverts, and holding ponds, with eventual discharge to nearby creeks or to the Scioto River directly.
Outfalls at PORTS have been analyzed to predict their response during a 10,000 year storm (Johnson et al.1993, pp. 416 to 4 39). Outfalls A, D J. N, atxt O (Figure 2.4-6) were treated as broad-crested welts with no storm water flowing tnrough culverts that pass beneath roads and raltroad tracks. None of the calculated water surface elevations for these outfalls results in local flooding of the main process buildings located at a 670-ft grade elevation. Discharge from Outfalls C, K, L, and M occurs along the outer periphery of Perimeter Road where steep slopes promote the now of rainwater away from the plant. Local Gooding of the main process buildings attributable to these outfalls is not anticipated.
Outfalls D and E (Figure 2.4-6) discharge storm water to two culverts that pass beneath Perimeter Road to permit drainage to Little Beaver Creek. The calculated wrter surface behind these two culverts is below the grade elevation at the main process buildings. During an extreme storm, water surface will first rise above the inlets of the culverts, but pressurization and a concomitant increase in total discharge will then enable these culverts to pass the rainwater received. If clogging of the two culverts below Outfalls D and E occurs, the main process buildings could be Gooded locally because Perimeter Road rises to an elevation of 674 ft at this location.
De remaining 3 of the 14 outfalls, Outfalls F, G, and H (Figure 2.4-6), associated with X 230K pond ard Big Run Creek, were also analyzed (Johmon et al.1993, pp. 4-29 to 4 36). Although some of the culverts would be incapable of carrying the influx of rainwater and some overbanking would happen during a 10,000-year ctorm, water surface elevations computed for flows in all of the related culverts are below grade elevation anhe main process buildings and would not cause local flooding at these buildings during a 10,000-year storm.
Effects of Ice and Snow PORTS has a generally malerate climate. W' ters in the area are moderately cold. On the average, m
I there are 112 days per year below 32 'F, but only 3 days per year at or below 0 *F (ERDA 1977, p. 317).
l The average annual snowfall is 22 in. To estimate the extreme snowfall at PORTS, values for three l
i surrounding cities are used. De maximum monthly snowfalls of record for Columbus (Ohio), Charleston (West Virginia), and Louisville (Kentucky) are 34,4, 39.5, and 28.4 in., respectively, measured in January 1978 (Weather Almanac 1992, pp. 557,697, and 821). If the largest value among the three is used for PORTS, and if an average density of 0.1 for freshly fellen snow is assumed (Linsley Jr. et al.1982, p. 82),
this snowfall corresponds to 3.95 in. of rainfall.
2.4.3.2 Probable Maximum Flood on Rivers ne maps and the procedure outlined in Sect. B.3.2.2 of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.59 were used to estimate the FMF discharge. The log log plot of the data approximates a straight line. The drainage area of the Scioto River basin above Higby is 5131 square miles (USGS 1992b, p.144), above Piketon is 5,824 square 2.4-7
PROPOSED SAR PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) miles (OHDNR,1%3 Table 13), and above the mouth of the river is 6,517 square miles (COE 1991, p.
he drainage area of the Scioto River above PORTS (RM 27.5)is estimated from these values to be 6,000 square miles. PMF discharge of the Scioto River at PORTS as taken from the log log plot is approxim j
1,000,000 cfs. This value is adopted as the PMF discharge near PORTS (Wang et al.1992, p. 8).
Coincident Wind Wave Activity A conser/atively high wird velocity of 40 mph blowing over tard from the most adverse direction was adopted to associate with the PMF elevatinn at PORTS in accordance with Alternatives I and 11 in Appe A of NRC Regulatory Oulde 1.59. S bl3 Sngth near PORTS during the PMF of the Scioto River was estimated from USGS topographic quEn.re w;s having a 1:24,000 scale to be 1 mile. The increase of flood elevations of the Scioto River near ratM due to this wind wave aedvity was estimated to be 1.8 ft (Linsley ard Franzini 1972, p.181 Fig. 711). The PMF plus this coincident wind wave activity would have a flomt stage of 571 ft.
Comparison of Flood Levels with PORTS Elevations he nominal, topef. grade elevation at PORTS is 670 ft, about 99 ft above the PMF plus wind wave activity tiood stage of 571 ft. The top-of-slab tioor elevadons for the three critical, safety related process buildings have values ranging from 670.4 to 671.4 ft. These buildings, therefore, would not be inundated b the Scioto River during a PMF superimposed with wind wave activity.
The PORTS water supply facility near RM 32.5 of the Scioto River, pumphouse X608, and groundwater well fields, may expect flooding (ERDA 1977, p. 3-8). Using the estimate that the Seloto River drops approximately 31 ft between the Higby gauging station (RM 55.5) and the bridge at Highway 23 (RM 34)(Wang et al.1992, p. 8, Table 2.1), the tku! stages of the Sciolo River near the water supply facility were estimated to be 575 ft for the PMF. All equipment in the X-608 pumphouse is located above the 571 ft level (ERDA 1977, p. 3-8). Thus, under extreme conditions, the water supply to the enrichment process cooling system can be afTected by flooding. However, such impacts on the cooling system would not result in a release of UP.. The enrichment process can be secdonalized into an isolated cell configuration by closing strategic valves, and during severe conditions all or part of the cascade can be shut down.
2.4.4 Potential Selsmically Induced Dam Failures Several dam failures are considered in this section. The domino-type failure of the O'Shaughnessy and Griggs on the Scioto River, failures of individual dams on the tributaries of the Seloto River, and individual dam failurea combined with either a 25 year flood or one half of the PMF of the Scioto River may result in flood elevations that are comparable or even greater than that of the PMF 569 ft. However, even when a conservative wave height of 41.3 ft is used, the PORTS site clearly would not be threatened by this cascade of dam failures because the nominal plant grade elevation is 670 ft, which is 130 ft higher than the normal Seloto River level.
2.4.5 Channel Divers!ons and Ice Formation on the Scioto River The ancient Newark River was a major channel for alluvium-bearing meltwater frorn the continental 2.4-8
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) i glaciations (LETC 1978, p. 513). This river system ended when its deep valley and those of other major south 4ndning streams were partially filled with silt, sand, and gravel outwash. The present Scioto River was developed on top of dds glacial outwash during the final retreat of glaciers from the area (Lee 1991, p. 4; Norris and Fidler 1%9, p. 8). The Scioto River apparently has a smaller flow and hence a more restricted channel. Derefore, charmel diversions of the lower stem of the Scioto River out of the ancient Newarl: Flver Valley are unlikely, lee occurs on all streams in the Ohio River basin, ar'd during the severe knuary of 1963 more than 18 lt' oflee was formed on the Ohio River tributaries (COE 1966, p.10) Winters near the PORTS area are moderately cold. On the average, there are 112 days per year below 32 'F, but oruy 3 days per year at or below 0 'F (ERDA 1977, p. 317). Ice on the Scioto Riv-r should not affect tne water supply to PORTS because the plant uses groundwater taken from near the river. Additionally, lee formation would not pose a threat of flooding to PORTS, given the high -Irvation of the plant relative to the river.
2.4.6 Low Water Considerations Water used at PORTS, an average of,
- d. can be supplied from wells in the Scioto River alluvium.
The raw water is pumped through a 48 in wawr line (ERDA 1977, p. 3 9) to water treatment plant X 611 located near the northeastern corner of the site just outside the perimeter road. The pumphouse X-608 near the well fields can also pump water frorn the Scioto River and is a backup system that is used only when the well systems are unable to produce sulficient water to meet the plant demand (ERDA 1977, p. 2-113).
At the Higby gauging station, which is approximately 13 miles north of PORTS, the mhtimum river flow measured from 1930 to 1991 was 244 efs on October 23,1930 (USGS 1992b p.144). The consecutive 7 day minimum discharge record of 255 efs occurred during October 19 25,1930 (COE 1966, Table 9). The volumetric river flow is much greater than the PORTS water use.
2.4.7 Dilution of Effluents ne average discharge of the Scioto River near PORTS is 4,654 cfs. Potentially, this discharge rate has a large capacity for reducing the concentration of received contaminants. For example, the uranium discharged from PORTS through the local drainage system to the Scioto River was estimated to be 45 kg during 1990 (Kornegay et al.1991, p. 60). In 1990, the bulk of the uranium (76 percent) was discharged through Outfall 001 to Little Beaver Creek (Kornegay et al.1991, p. 56). Assuming a full dilution, this would 4
result in an average uranium concentration of 1.1 x 10 mg/L in the Scioto River.
i 2.4-9 l
1 I
l PROPOSED SAR PORTS RAC 97.X0248 (RO)
Table 2.5 3. Swnmary of hydraulic conductivities used in the j
Gerashly & Miller PORTS groundwater flow model.
l-Conductivity Conductivity Formation (horizontal)
(vertical)
(ft/d)
(ft/d)
Cuyahoga 0.46 Gailla/Minford 0.17 2.0 5.8 14.0 Sunbury (average) 0.000554 Berea 30.
170.
Bedford 33.
Source.* Geraghty & Miller 1989a, Table 2.1.
I 2.5 11
PROIOSED SAR PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97.X0248 (RO) 2.6 GEOLOGY AND SEISMOLGGY This section describes the geology and seismology, vibratory ground motion, surface faulting, and geologic structure at PORTS. Regional and site specific physiography, stratigraphy, geologic history, structural setting, and engineering geology are described. Information on earthquake history and selsmic hazards analysis is provided as well.
2.6.1 Basic Geologic and Seismic Information 2.6.1.1 Regional Physlography PORTS is located within the Interior Low Plateaus 'physlographic province, about 20 miles south of l
Its northwestern edge, it is bordered on the north and west by the Central 1.owlands province and on the south and east by the Appalachian Plateaus province. Figure 2.61 shows the relationship of the site to the l
physlographic provinces within a 200 mile radius of the site (Fenneman and Johnson 1946).
De Appalachian Plateaus province is composed of mature upland areas that have been dissected by erosion and now exhibit moderate to strong relief. Bis province is underlain by gently dipping Mississippian, Pennsylvanlan, and Permian Age shale and sandstone. Both the adjacent Central Lowlands and the Interior low Plateaus provinces are underlain by relatively flat lying Paleozoic A e limestone and shale, The Interior E
Low Plateaus (Lexington Plain section) to the south and west is a mature to old plain oflow relief, whereas the Central Lowlands (Till Plains section) to the north and west is a young fe'.ture oflow relief. De Valley and Ridge (Tennessee section) is underlain by thrust faulted Paleozoic !!mestone, dolostone, shale, and sandstone of moderate relief.
Portions of the Appalachlan Plateaus, Central lowlands, and Interior Low Plateaus provinces have been glaciated, but the site is south of the region covered by Pleistocene glaciation. However, alluvium and transponed glacial sediments form a surface veneer in the mile wide, broad valley where PORTS is loca*.ed.
The surrounding hills have been maturely dissected by erosion, exposing the underlying, nearly flat lying shale and sandstone of Mississipplan and Pennsylvanlan Age. Ground elevations within the plant generally range from about 660 ft MSL to 680 ft MSL, although the ground rises to about 700 ft MSL at the base of hills that border the Perimeter Road; the surrounding hills utend up to about 1,200 ft MSL.
2.6.1.2 Regional Geologic History and Geolegy De site is located near the western edge of the Appalachian Basin, a generally circular basin in which a thick column of Paleozoic sediments accumulated (Figure 2.6-2), he thickness of these Paleozoic Age rocks increases markedly south and east of the site (where several tens of thousands of feet of relatively undeformed Early Paleozoic sediments occur), but the nearest basement well (Ohio Permit No. 212-about 30 miles southeast of the site) encountered only about 5,600 ft of Paleozoic sediments overlying Precambrian bedreak.
The Appalachian Basin is separated from the Illinois Basin to the west by the Cincinnati Arch and the Kankakee Arch and from the Michigan Basin by the Indiana-Ohio Platform and the Findlay Arch. Both the Michigan Basin and the !!!!nois Basin are semicircular basins that contain thousands of feet of relatively undeformed Early to Late Paleozoic clastic sediments. The Cincinnati and Kankakee Arches are composed of Early Paleozoic limestone and shale overlying a topographic high of Precambrian bedrock. Figure 2.6-3 2.6-1
SAR PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) depicts the regional geology. A nonhwest to southeast trending regional geologic protile is presented in Figure 2.64.
Ancient rift zones are significant in eastern Nonh America because they are potential sites for tractivation in the contemporary stress field (Zoback 1992). The Rome trough is the nearest known ancient rift zone to the Portsmouth site, nis structure was active as a rift zone in late Precambrian and Cambrian times. De Rome trough trends east west through east central Kentucky. It terminates on the west against the Lexington fault in central Kentucky and is bounded on the north and south by the Kentucky River fault system and the Rock Castle fault system, respectively. The Rome trough turns toward the northeast in w; stern West I
Virginia and continues on into western Pennsylvania and New York. More than 10,000 ft of Cambrian strata were deposited in most of the Rome trough during active rifting. Younger Paleozole strata are much thinner l
in the Rome trough, which ruggests that the most active rifting had run its course by the end of Cambrian time.
l l
Continental glaciation covered about two thirds of Ohio, with the glacier scouring rock and soll from l
the land surface to the north and depositing materials under it and at its southern edge. The last ice sheet receded from Ohio about 15.000 years ago, but it and its predecessors never advanced to cover the area of the site.
De presence of continental glaciation to the immediate nonh during the Quaternary Epoch interrupted l
and blocked drainage of pre-Pleistocene northward and estward flowing rivers and formed glacial lakes south of the glaciers. Consequently, sediment from the inflowing ancient Teays River and tributaries such as the Portsmouth River and sediment carried by glacial meltwater from the nonh were deposited in the river valleys.
In the Portsmouth Valley, these sediments wre deposited up to about 860 ft MSL. Since the retreat of the last glacier, the area has eroded and most of the glacial sediments have been removed. The remaining glacial sediments consist of about 3 ft of Portsmouth River alluvium overlain by about 23 ft of proglacial lakebed l
sediments (lacustrine deposits of the Teays Formation) consisting of silt and clay.
2.6.1.3 Regional Stratigraphy and Lithology Much of the region consists of undeformed or only slightly deformed bedrock contained in the Appalachian, Illinois, and Michigan Basins. De Patrozoic rocks of the Appalachian Plateaus and the bordering Interior Low Plateau and Central Lowlands within 50 miles of the site are relatively undeformed and dip to the southeast at about 30 ft/ mile. A broad arch of early Paleozoic Age (i.e., the Waverly Arch) may have been formed by Cambrian and Ordovician rocks beneath the site. Calvert (1%8) questions the existence of the Waverly arch because Ocdovician mountain building (orogenic movements) activity is unknown, but a postulated Paleozoic fault trending north-south in central Ohio may explain such an arch (ERCE 1990).
The nearest mapped surface tectonic features are high-angle, normal faults of the Kentucky River fault system, located about 60 miles to the south, and the Lexington fault system, about 50 miles to the southwest.
Rese two fault systems form the nonh and west boundaries of the Rome trough, respectively. Both fault systems offset Ordovician to Pennsylvanian strata, which suggests sporad;c activity in the Rome trough throughout Paleozoic time. Based on documents that preceded the work of Vanarsdale (1986), no Quaternary strata have been offset, indicating that these faults have not been active in the past 1.6 million years.
More recently, Vanarsdale (1986) mapped subtle Pliocene / Pleistocene displacements (1 to 2 ft) and possible Holocene warping along branches of the Kentucky River fault system. These displacements are both 2.62
PROPOSED SAR PORTS RAC 97.X0248 (RO) strike slip and reverse slip and are compatible with the contemporary stress field of Zoback (1992).
To the south and west, a few normal, high angle faults in indlana have been dated to be at least Pilocene (i.e., greater than 1.6 million years old) age (Ault et al.1985).
Further to the southeast (i.e., about 150 miles, Paleozoic rocks at the margin of the Appalachlan Platem and within the Appalachlan Valley and Ridge province are broken by numerous thrust faults. This faulting is generally accepted as having occurred during the late Paleozoic or early hiesozole. Because these are low angle thrust faults, they do not penetrate deep into the earth's crust and probably react passively to the contemporary stress field.
Clastic rocks (i.e., sandstone and shale) undertle the soll at the site and these rock types extend downward to a depth of about 500 ft. Soluble bedmck (i.e., limestone and dolostone) is not present within 500 ft of the ground surface, although it crops out several miles to the north and west.
There are areas of surface karst development and caverns in the adjacent physiographic provinces, but none occur in the Appalachian Plateaus province near the site. Soluble bedrock is not present within 500 ft of the ground surface at the site, and there is a very low probability of solution ef the bedrock producing caverns or karst terrain at the site.
He plan'. ls situated in the middle of a relatively flat, broad, river valley, and almost all slopes that exist within the plant have inc!! nations of less than 3 horizontal to i vertical (3H:lV) Landslides occur only in areas of more steeply sloping ground such as the adjacent hills; because of the relatively Dat slopes, there is only a very remote possibility of slope failures in the plant area due to heavy precipitation and/or ground shaking. However, there is a higher possibility of surficial (i.e., topsoil) slope failures in steeper cut and fill slopes outside the perimeter road and in the adjacent hills during periods of intense rainfall and/or ground shaking.
Coal is present only in the Pennsylvanian rocks of the region to the east at higher elevations. Further, there are no known underground mines developed for extracting aggregate or other mineral resources in the area that would affect the performance of the facility.
A modest, spotty production of natural gas from the underlying Ohio shale occurs within a 5 mile radius of the plant. The nearest known producing well is about 3,000 ft northeast of the site; it is currently producing about 50,000 ft' of gas per day (50 hiD). Four other natural gas wells are located 3 to 5 miles to the southeast; production from them ranges from 5 hiD to 40 hiD. There are no reports of subsidence due to hydrocarbon extraction in southern Ohio, he area is not known to be undergoing regional warping, but a very modest amount of rebound due to glacial unloading may still tw occurring.
2.6.2 Site Physiography and Geology l
2.6.2.1 Site Physiography De plant is located within a broad, Dat valley that was (1) primarily developed by long term erosion 2.6-3
PROPOSED SAR PORTS g
RAC 97 X0248 (RO) of the shale and sandstone ths.t underlies the Interior Low Plateaus physlographic province, (2) subsequently l
modified by parual filling by glacial and alluvial sediments, and (3) later subjected to erosion. De prolonged erosion since the end of the Permian Period (since 245 Ma) has produced the dominant topography. Ground elevations within the site range from about 620 ft MSL to 700 ft MSL; the highest elevations occur along the eastern and northwestern sides of the plant site where the Perimeter Road skirts the base of low hills. The nearby Scioto Riv.:r (at about elevation 510 ft MSL) is the lowest elevation within 5 miles. The highest elevations (1,200 ft MSL) occur ln a few of the surrounding maturely d!ssected hills.
Prior to construction of the plant, the area was farmland that formed a portion of the watershed for the nearby Scioto River. A drainage divide (about elevation 675 ft MSL) was at about plant coordinate N 9000, which separated gullies and streams flowing to the north frorr those Dowing west and south. Generally, site preparation and grading involved only minor surface modification. With the exception of a few drainage features (swales) that required as much as 20 ft of fill, most of the area developed was cut less than 10 ft and filled less than 12 ft. Elevations within the Perimeter Road now range from 620 ft MSL to 702 ft MSL, with most of the plant area at about 670 ft MSL Within the Perimeter Road is one slope about 10 ft high that has a slope of 2H:lV; other slopes have inclinations of 3H:lV or less.
2.6.2.2 Site Geologic lilstory Erosion of the region between the Triassic and Neogene Periods has produced the general shape of the region and the site. The regional drainage estsblished during this period was the Teays River System, which originated in North Carolina and flowed generally west and north through Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, he glaciation, begmning atxxit 1.6 Ma and extending to about 10,000 years ago, had a marked effect l
on the geology of the site. Obstruction of the Teays River system (including the Portsmouth River and other drainage ways) by the advancing glacier created a series of finger lakes in the area (glacial Lake Tight).
Sediments were deposited in these finger lakes from the inflowing rivers and from glacial meltwater, creating lacustrine (lake) deposits (Gallia sand and Minford clay) of the Teays Formation discussed earlier. The age of the Teays Formation is thought to range from 0.7 Ma to 1.5 Ma. As Lake Tight continued to be tilled with glacial meltwater containing sediment, a new drainage path us finally established. The new drainage path was via the ancient Newark River; this river joined the ancecral Ohio River by flowing south along the approximate route of the existing Scioto River Valley. During the drainage to the south, significant erosion of glacial sediments occurred in vallep such as the one carved by the adent Portsmouth River; an estimated 200 ft of sediment (i.e., from elevation 260 ft MSL to 660 ft MSL) was eroded. During the past 10,000 years, j
the site has been mostly undergoing erosion, with local streams depositing alluvium in response to flooding.
2.6.2.3 Site Geology and Stratigraphy l
Aside from roadways 2nd other ancillary structures outside the Perimeter Road, the plar.t is located within the valley eroded into the bedrock by the ancient Portsmouth River and later filled by glacial Lake Tight sediments. Except for a few low hills that extend into the plant site between N 5800 and N 10000, the Perimeter Road on the west and east generally follows the lateral limits of the ancient Portsmouth River Valley. The valley is bounded on the west by a series of low hills extending up to elevation 840 ft MSL that have been maturely dissected; these hills expose nearly flat lying Mississippian Age shales of the Sunbury and Cuyahoga Formations. 'The Sunbury and Cuyahoga Formations are also exposed in the maturely dissected low 2.6-4
SAR PORTS PROPOSED RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
^ " E"* '
ft/ mile (l.e., less than 1/2 a degree). hills east of the plant site. The ownward to the east about 27 Drainage that developed at the site prior to glaciation consisted of a n maser stream (the ancient Teays River) and tributaries such as the ancien River deposimd a thln discontinuous veneer of alluvium in the she valley by lacustrine deposits of glacial orldn, Only the small streams that ver. The Portsmouth subsequently been covered alluvium.
e site contain recent Pleistocene lacustrine deposits of glacial origin, and old
-l Connolldned deposits within 500 ft of the ground surface consist of D e stocene),
c ent Portsmouth River.
shale and sandstone. Dose formations in and near the site that are pre an, and Pennsylvania surface are described in the following subsections.
t of the ground Unconsolidated material 1.
thickness, but up to 20 ft of fill was placed in former s o 3 ft in building construction. De fill is composed mostly of clean, silty clay (US evelop a plateau for southwest of the plant. De fill is quite variable in den e organic rea compacted to at least 95 percent ofits muimum dry on data Proctor).
2.
Lacustrine deposits-Lacustrine deposits averaging 23 ft ln thickness a surface over much of the site and under!!e All at the remainder of the site n
termed the Mlaford clays, Minford silts, or the Minford Clay Member of the Teay general soll profile is composed of about 16 ft of clay underlain by about 7 ft of rmation. The types are firm to very stiff, overconsolldated, and classified as silty clay and sitt (US ML, respeedvely), but some highly plastic clay (USCS = CH) occurs near the and clays are mainly illite with some chlorite, minor vermicullte, and montm quartz and feldspar with Illite and kaolinite.
3.
Older alludum-he lacustrine deposits are underlain by a discontinuous interval o gravel (Gallia sand)(USCS = SC and GM)depodted by the ancient Portsmouth River is commonly referred to as the Oallla Sand Member of the Teays Foundatio Vall:y, The average thickness is about 3 ft; the madmum thickness of the alluvium i to dense. The sand is mostly quartz with chert and goethite; the clay fraction is com kaolinite, and montmorillonite.
)
Consolidated material 1.
Cuyahoga Formation-This Mississippian formation crops out in hills adjacent to th base of the formation at elevation 639 ft MSL (coordinates N 8400, E 10597) Becau filmile regional dip, its base (as well as the other formational contacts) is at a lower 2.65
i SAR PORTS PROPOSED RAC 97 X0248 (RO) the east. When unnatheted, the Cuyahoga consists of about 339 ft of hard grey to grey green shale with lenses of sandstone, in the hillsides above the plant, the upper portion is reported to be conglomeratic.
2.
Sunbury Formation-Underlying the Cuyahoga is a 19. to 20 ft thick interval of hard, black, carbonaceous shale containing pyrite and marcasite nodules. The top of this formation is at 640 ft MSL and the base is at 620 ft MSL in Boring 848DC; it underlies the unconsolidated sediments l
beneath most of the plant site.
l 3.
Ihrea Formation-At Boring 848 DC, the Berea Formation underlies the Sunbury shale and extends downward to elevation 590 ft MSL. It is composed of about 30 to 35 ft of grey thick bedded, fine-grained sandstone with shale faminations.
4.
Bedford Formathm-ne Bedford is composed of about 98 ft of varicolored shale with interbeds of sandstone and siltstone. The sandstone may be calcareous, and some sandstone beds within it contain crude oil. The base of the Bedford in Boring 848DC is at 492 ft MSL.
5.
Ohki Fornuthm-ne Ohio Shale is the uppermost Devonian Formation ( > 360 Ma) under the plant site, it is composed of 300 to 600 ft of dark brown, dark grey, and black fissile shale. This formation extends downward to at least 192 ft MSL.
2.6.2.4 Site Structural Setting Essentially all of the site bedrock is covered by lacustrine deposits; some stream beds contain recent alluvium. Little bedrock is exposed at the site except in the hills surrounding the plant. Neither the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers studies nor the Law Engineering Study in 1978 discovered evidence of bedrock faulting.
The available data indicates that the underlying bedrock is not faulted; it has a strike of N28'E and a homoc!!nical dip to the southeast of about 1/2 a degree. Mapping of joints in bedrock exposures in the adjacent hills and photo lineament analysis (Geraghty and Miller 1989b) show two approximately orthogonal joint sets at N55'E to 65'E and at N25'W to 40'W, respectively. The relative cluster of joint measurements around these two orientations suggests that the rock is not structurally deformed. Figure 2.6 5 shows a site plan, the locations of borings, and the limits of geologic profiles.
2.6.2.5 Engineering Geology ne available evidence irdicates the favorable performance of the facility since its constniction in the 1950's with respect to bearing capacity, settlement, and modest seismic events.
No shears, folds, or other structural weaknesses are known to be in the bedrock. Measurements of joint sets in bedrock exposed around the plant site exhibit jointing typteal of undeformed bedrock. These joints have no effect on the performance of foundations since they are covered by an interval of lacustrine glacial deposits. No evidence from the borings indicates zones of deep weathering that might indicate faulting or shearing.
No published data exist on unrelieved stresses in the bedrock, but the geologic history suggests that the bedrock may still be undergoing a very slow isostatic rebound. This rebound is due to a combination of the past loading and subsequent unloading of the bedrock by the Pleistocene glaciers and/or stress relief from 2.64
f PROPOSED SAR PORTS Mgust th 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) l erosion of the unconsolidated lacustdne sediments.
{
ne consolidated bedrock within 500 ft of the ground surface is predominsicly clasde in origin (shale l
and sandstone). Although the Berea sandstone underlying the slie is not calcareous, portions of the Berea l
Formation are calcareous in other areas. A calcareous sandstone might be subject to a slight loss in volume due to soludon, ne likelihood of such volume loss at the slie is very low.
Weathering of portions of the Sunbury shale containing marcasite and pyrite may produce some net expansion, but these formations are not exposed at the ground surface at the site and such weathering should have no effect on the facility.
Most of the unconsolidated soils are cohesive and overconsolidated (i.e., they are not thlxotropic) and relatively uniform in thickness and extent %e soils exhibit a low potential for liquefaction and differential setdement. Cohesive solls exposed at the surface may exhibit minor shrinkage cracks resulting from moisture loss.
The geologic literature and records of mineral production in the slie area indicate no mineral extraction has been done beneath the site. The potential exists for minor oil and gas accumulations in the underlying j
consolidated strata, but there are no records of significant gas or oil production within 5 miles of the site.
ne soil at the site is primarily low plasticity clay and silty clay (USCS = CL and ML). The bedrock is composed of hard shale and sandstone.
No limestone, dolomite gypsum, salt, or marble strata are contained within the uppermost 500 ft of the bedrock underlying the plant. Although thin-bedded strata of the Berea sandstone are reported to be calcareous in southern Ohio, none of the literature Indicates it is calcareous at the plant site Bedrock soludon, caves, and karst development are not a consideration at the site.
The regional geologic histo y and extensive amount of exploratory data indicate no evidence of tectonic depressions, shears, faults, or folds.
The plant uses process water from the aquifer below the Scioto River, and no groundwater is withdrawn from the subsurface at the plant site. There is no shallow or deep well injection of water or other liquids or waste at the plant site, and there has been none in the past.
De exploratory and laboratory test data indicate that the glacial and alluvial soils are over-consolidated and have moisture contents well below their liquid limit (i.e., they are not thlxotropic). Engineering studies have shown the sol!s are only moderately compressible under applied foundation loads, and the satisfactory performance of the various foundadons attests to that. The potential is low for surface fissuring of soils resulting from a period of extreme drought (desiccation).
- The 1952 Site Clearing and Grading plan shows that building areas that required fill received Class C fill Class C fill consisted of soil with crushed limestone that was compacted to at least 95 percent of ASTM D 698. Other documents indicate that th compaction requirement for engineered fill was at least 95 percent of the soil's maximum dry density according to ASTM D 698. De criterion for compaction of fill placed outside buildings is not known, but one 6cument indicates that the fill where Building X-344 was constructed was densified to an average of 94 percent of ASTM D 698.
2.67
PROPOSED SAR PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
Fourtlations for the nujor structures (Duildings X 330, X 333, X 326, X 700, X 710, and X 720) bear upon the soll at shallow depths (<5 ft) using conventional foundations proportioned for allowable bearing capacities up to 4.0 kips /ft'. A tunnel in Building X 705 bears on soll at a depth of about 25 ft (i.e., elevation 648 ft amsl). Construction records document that where fat clays (i.e., highly plastic clays wherein physical propenies are very sensitive to changes in moisture content) or soft alluvial soll were encountered at foundation locations, they were excavated and replaced with stone or low plasticity clay compacted to 95% of its maximum dry density according to ASTM D 698.
The studles by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers and Law Engineering in the 1970's in the area south-southeast and southwest of the plant found gmundwater between 65v ft MSL and 665 ft MSL. The basal older alluvium exhibits no evidence of artesian conditions. Limited data on groundwater fluctuations Indleate variations of between 3 ft to 5 ft over a period of 6 months. The groundwater level responds to annual precipitation.
Except in rare Instances, no significant problems were encountered with groundwater during construction of the facility. Most fours!ations bear upon the stiff lacustrine soils at depths of 5 ft or less below the Onished door elevation of the buildings. In Instances where deep excavations were required to Install features such as tunnels (i.e., the tunnel in Building X 705), unstable soll was encountered below the groundwater level.
No slopes within the Perimeter Road have inclination of 3H:lV or greater except for one slope; this skpe is not adjacent to any structures (ERCE 1990). Low inclination slopes less than 20 ft in height that have soil parameters of & = 10*, c = 1000 will have a static safety factor of at least 2.0 and a dynamic safety factor of at least 1.5 under a peak ground acceleration of 0.21 g. The natural ground and engineered fill upon which the structures are founded have been analyzed for shear failure and settlement. Design documents show the factor of safety against shear failure under static conditions is more than 2.0, and predicted total settlements of foundations are less than 2 in. Because of the stiff nature of the foundation soils, negilgible settlement will occur as a result of the evaluation basis earthquake (EBE).
2.6.2.6 Geok>gic llazards This subsection summarizes potential regional and sitewide geologic hazards at PORTS. The following sections provide supporting details. Conclusions are based on a report by ERCE (1990) and on site drilling data provided by COE and by LETC (1978),
2.6.2,6.1 Subsidence llazard There is very little potential for natural or man induced subsidence at PORTS. No carbonate or evaporite rocks are found within 500 ft of the surface. Significant solution cavities are unlikely to form at greater depths, without which karst topography cannot develop at the surface. The youngest strata beneath the site are Mississippian age; the oldest coal seams are in still younger nearby Pennsylvanian age rocks but are not present beneath the site. No other mines of any type are within 5 miles of the site. There are five natural gas wells within 5 miles of PORTS; the nearest well is located about 3000 ft northeast of the site.
These wells produce small quantities of gas from the Ohio shale, which lies about 500 ft beneath the site.
Subsidence related to this production is likely to be small and relatively uniform at the surface. No other hydrocarbons are produced within 5 miles of the site, and any future hydrocarbon or groundwater production from fully consolidated Paleozoic rocks beneath the site would be unlikely to cause significant subsidence.
2.5-8
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) here is little or to potential for groundwater production from the lacustrine (lakebed) silts and clays beneath the site. De Pleistocene alluvial aquifer beneath the on-site lakebed sediments is too limited in extent to support significant grourstwater production. Off site groundwater production is en 'endy limited; there is no on-site production of groundwater. Differential settlement of consTuction fdl aru lakebed sediments ran its course within the first few years of construction at PORTS.
l 2.6.2.6.2 Landslide llazard l
nere is very little potential for landslides at PORTS. Slope s are generally gentler than 3H:1V. Static and dynamic factors of safety for low inclination skpes of less than 20 ft in height generally exceed 2 and 1.5, respectively, for cohesive clays with friction angles less than 10' and cohesive strengths exceeding 1000 psi.
%e dynamic factor of safety is based on an carthquake ground rrotion of 0.21 g. Slopes are unlikely to fall unless crosion during a flood oversteepens the slope's toe.
l 2.6.3 Analysts of Geologic Stability 2.6.3.1 Earthquake Illstory Between 1776 and August 17,1990,264 earthquakes have occurred within 200 miles of the site.
The location of the epicenters of the largest recorded earthquakes within 200 miles of the plant are shown in Figure 2.64. He record extends from 1776 through August 17, 1990, and includes all tremors shown on the figure with Richter magnitudes of 4.0 or greater, as well as all earthquakes where a magnitude has tot been assigned. Events with a magnitude of up to 3.9 are not shown. The tremors shown on the figure with no assigned magnitude are of low energy. Two earthquakes of Richter magnitude 5.0 or greater (5.80 FA,1897; 5.1 mb,1980) have occurred within this 204 mile radius in the 204-year period. The 1980 event had an epicenter in the central stable portion (Interior Low Plateaus physiographic province) and the 1897 event occurred in the deformed Appalachlan Highlands (Valley and Ridge physiographic province). The Richter 5.1 mb event in northern Kentucky at 38.2'N,83.9'W occurred at depth in the basement where geologic structure is poorly understood. The focal mechanism for the Kentucky earthquake is consistent with the contemporary stress field (Mauk et al,1982). The 5.80 FA May 31,1897, event at 37.3*N,80.7'W on the Virginia West Virginia border is believed to have been located in the basement, based on observations of recent seismic activity by Dollinger and Wheeler (1988). A basement structure has been tentatively identified by Dollinger arxl Wheeler that has a more northerly orientation than surficial Appalachian highland structures.
Observations of Mauk, Bollinger, and their coworkers raise doubts that surtidal structures bear any relation to contemporary seismicity in this region. PORTS operating personnel indicate nat the facility has performed without seismic damage or interruption of operations during its existence, and there have been no observed ground ruptures, sand boils, or subsidence at the site.
2.6.3.2 Identification and Description of Capable Faults Inchaling multiple fault systems and groups of related faults, 376 faults are mapped within a 200 mile radius of the site. %cse have been compiled from existing published and unpublished geologic literature. Fault studies by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which contained information on 375 of these faults, show that only the " White Mountain Fault 7one" may be capable, i.e. exhibited movement at or near the surface in the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurring nature in the past 500,000 years. nis fault is 20.5 miles in length and is located in Bell and Knox Counties, Kentucky, about 155 miles south-southwest of the site.
2.69
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97.X0248 (RO)
More recent studies saggest the psibility that some faults have been active more recently than earlier 4
believed. Such faults are located in Ill.nols, Indiana, and Kentucky.
A few low-displacement thrust faults to the west in Ind14na have been described by Ault et al. (1985) and Ault and Sullivan (1982), and similar faults in southern Illinola have also been described (ERCE 1990).
i In each case, faults are described as (1) being post Permsylvanian and pre Pleistocene in age, (2) thrust faults that are cor tained endrely within Pennsylvanian coal seams, and (3) aligned with the contemporary stress Held.
5 The Kentucky Wver and Rock Castle fault systems form the northern and southern boundaries, itspectively, of the Rome trougn in eastern Kentucky (Harris and Drahovzal 1996). De Rome trough extends eastward from central Kentucky, nen it bends northeasterly through western West Virginia and western l
Pennsylvarda to ustern New York. The Rome trough is a late Precambrian to lower Paleozoic rraben (rlft rone) that contains 10,000 ft or more of Cambrian sediments, ne Paint Creek fault system lies within the Rome troughi The Lexington fault system and the Precambrian Grenville Front form the western boundary 4
of the Rome trough.
At least one fault system (Kentucky River) within the Rome trough has reactivated in the contemporary stress field. Vanarsdale (1986) mapped subtle Pilocene/ Pleistocene displacements in alluvium along the Kentucky River fault system and possible Holocene warping along branches of this system. Senses of displacement (i.e., strike slip and reverse fauldng) along these structures are compatible with the contemporary stress acid of Zohnck (1992). However, there is no evidence that the Kentucky River fault system is capable
-1 in the regulatory sense.
De Rough Creek fault system (almost 200 miles to the southwest in Kentucky) is shown on numerous geologie quadrangles across Kentucky as being post Pennsylvanian, pre Pleistocene (loess) in age.
Thrust huldng, generally associated with strata in the Valley and Ridge province, is found within the southeastern portion of the 200 mile radius of the site. De nearest example of this is the Pine Mountain fault.
Further to the southeast in Virginia and Tennessee, numerous faults and portions of faults are shown as being of post Pennsylvanian age. The general consensus of opinion is that the hundreds of thrust faults within the Valley and Ridge (inc!ading the Pine Mountain fault) and within the Blue Ridge occurred as a result of the Appalachlan orogeny. These low angle, non-basement-penetrating thrust faults are not believed to be active la the contemporary strest Held.
Most historical selsmicity in the region is believed to be associated with reactivation of deep seated Paleozoic and Precambrian rift zones in the contemporary stress neld. Many of these rift zones have not been well documented and have no surface expression. One excepdon is the Rome trough, a Precambrian / lower Paleozoic rift zone that is oriented in an east west direction through east central Kentucky and West Virginia, ne Rome trough is bounded on the north and south by the Kentucky River and Castle Rock fault systems, respectively. Another fault system (Irvine Paint Creek) lies within the Rome trough. - All of these fault 4
systems are easily traced on the surface. Deep wells drilled between the Kentucky River and Castle Rock fault systems encounter abnormally thick sections of Cambrian sediments. Vanarsdale (1986) shows that the Kentucky River fault system was reactivated as recently as Pliocere Pleistocene time. Total displacement over the last several million years is on the order of I or 2 ft.
Branches of the Kentucky River fault system are not believed to be capable of surface rupture in the regulatory sense because only one displacement oflimited magnitude (1 to 2 ft) has been identined on any one 2.610 i
SAR PORTS PROPOSED gz g997 RAC 97.X0248 (RO) fault in the last 1.6 million years. One of the strongest twentieth century earthquakes in the eastern United I
States occurred in tids general region: the Maysville, Kentucky, earthquake of July 1980 (Mauk et al.1982),
I ne relationship between this earthquake and the Rome trough is uncertain.
2.6.3.3 Surface Faulting he published map of Ohio [1920, revised 1947 and subsequently reprinted 1981 (13ownocker 1981))
shows no faults within 50 miles of the site The state map of Kentucky shows faults about 50 miles southwest of the site and 60 miles south of the site.
De geologic setting of the site suggests there is a low probability of faulting within 5 miles of the site, No data from the three extensive geotechnical studies at the site (rock shearing, sharp changes in strata dip, and Dexures) are characteristic of faulted rocks. De available data indicates the site bedrock is not faulted.
Although 7%-minute geologic maps are not available, Ohio Geological Survey representatives do not believe there are any capable faults in the area ror widdn 5 miles of'he PORTS facility De available seismic and geologic data and geologic history suggest that capable faults are not likely in the area.
The USGS National Earthquake Information Center Earthquake Database System shows no record of earthquakes within 5 miles of the site from 1776 through August 17,1990. The nearest reported earthquake hypocenter was about 22 miles north of the site (39.3'N,83.0'W) on November 22,1899; its epicenter is unknown. That earthquake had a reported Mailfied Mercalli Intensity of IV, ne focal depths of the 264 earthquakes of record within 200 miles of the site have ranged from 0.62 to 20 miles, Nearly all earthquakes with accurate focal depth determinations occurred within the geologic basement at depths of 6.2 miles or more.
2.6-11
l SAR PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) l, i
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2.6 12
PROPOSED SAR PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
Table 2.61 Deleted l
2.6-13
PROPOSED SAR PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) 2.7 NATURAL PilENOMENA TIIREATS ne natural phenomena (NP) hazards described in this section are earthquake, wind, and flood. The NP hazards were evaluated to determine the evaluation basis levels in accordance with DOE requirement documents, ne NP haurd evaluations and evaluation basis levels are described in the following sections.
2.7.1 Earthquakellazard The earthquake haard was evaluated by performing site specific studies. He site specific studies included performing probabilistic and deterministic seismic hazard analyses to define rock outcrop motions and soll arr.,-!!fication analyses to determine the EDE ground surface motions.
The seismic hazard analyses are described and documented in Seismic Ha:ard Evaluation for the Ponsmouth Gaseous DFusion Plant, Ponsmouth, Ohio (Risk Engineering, Inc.1992), ne probabilistic seismic hazard analyses were performed using the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) seismic hazard methodologies. The LLNL and EPRI seismic hazard methodologies represent major efforts to characterize the scismic hazard for nuclear power plants in the central and eastern United States aral use the most recent, up to-date understandings of seismicity and ground motion relations for the region. The results of these studies and the two methodologies were used to develop the seismic hazard for PORTS. Both the LLNL and EPRI studies utilize a point source representation of earthquakes, thereby ignoring the nonzero dimensions of earthquake ruptures. 'Ihis simplification is appropriate for this site because earthquakes with large ruptures are highly unlikely to occur near the site (because of low values of maximum magnitude),
ne probabilistic seismic hazard results from the LLNL and the EPRI methodologies were used in accordance with the Guidelines)br Use ofProbabillstic Seismic Ha:a d Curves at Depanment ofEnergy Sites (DOE 1992) to develop site-specific uniform hazard rock response spectra. The DOE guidelines (DOE 1992) provide a methodology for combining the seismic hazard results from LLNL and EPRI to obtain a mean uniform hazard response spectra. Additional evaluations were made to address the uncertainty in the low frequency range (2.5 Hz and less) of the response spectra and are documented in a letter report from the Center for Natural Phenomena Engineering (Hunt 1993) and is. Seismic Ha:ardfor the Oak Ridge, Tennessert Paducah, Kentucky / and Ponsmouth, Ohio, Depanment ofEnergy Reservations (CPNE 1995).
He deterministic seismic hazard analyses was performed by obtaining actual earthquake ncords with magnitudes and site characteristics similar to the Portsmouth seismic environment, ne response spectra obtained from the earthquake recordings were compared with the probabilistic site-spo & u jform t*T /
response spectra to illustrate that the uniform haurd response spectra were appropriate W k PORTS /n.
Independent calculations and a review of the seismic hazard analyses for the site were performed b3 USGS. He results of the USGS review are documented in Review ofEanhquake Ha:ard Assessments offlant Sites at Paducah, Kentucky, and Ponsmouth, Ohio (USGS 1992a). The independent review of the seismic hazard results by USGS indicated th:t the seismic sources, recurrence rates, maximum magnitudes, and attenuation functions used in these analyses were representative of a wide range of professional opinion and were suitable for obtaining probabilistically based seismic hazard estimates, ne USGS independent calculations for peak horizontal rock acceleration at the annual hazard probability of I x 104 resulted in about 0.08 G, which compares favorably with the 0.06 G derived from combining the EPRI and LLNL results according to the DOE guidelines (DOE 1992). The USGS uniform hazard response spectra are also in 2.7 1 e
PROPOSED SAR PORTS RAC 97 X0248 (RO) reasonable agreement with the site specific spectra, particularly in the frequency range 2.5 liz and less, which ls the range of the predominant frequencies of the stmetures at this sita. The differences in the wtiform hazard response spectra can be attributed mainly to the magnitudes of the earthquakes used in the attenuadon functions, resulting in the USGS results being more representative of stiff soil accelerations than rock accelerations.
Based on the rock outcrop motions defined in the seismic hazard analyses, soll ampilfication and liquefaction evaluations were performed, ne soll amplification evaluation is documented in a COE report, Site Spec @c Eanhquake Respmse Analysirfor Ponsmouth Gaseous DIDialon Plant, Ponsmouth, Ohio (5ykora and Davis 1993). ne soil amplification analyses were performed to calculate a reasonable range of expected site specific, free field earthquake responses to the rock outcrop motions of three hazard level earthquakes:
500,1000, and a 5000 yr events. From the geotechnical and geophysical investigations,15 individual soll columns were derived for use in the amplification analyses. Also an average soll column was created to conduct sensitivity studies. The average soil column is used to represent the overall site. The geotechnical information from past site studies defining the variation of shear modulus and damping ratio with shear strain was used along with standard relationships developed by others. These standard relationships typically represent a best estimate fit of numerous compiled data from investigations conducted throughout the United States.
De computer program SilAKE (Sykora and Davis 1993) was used to perform the soil amplification analyses and to calculate the free fleid ground motions for each of the 15 soil columns and the average soil column. De predominate site period is about 0.1 sec. Other site periods were also calculated corresponding to sites with a thicker soil deposit or higher shear wave velocity. De motions calculated at the ground surface of free-field (soil over rock) were amplified over rock outcrop motions for all cases at almost all periods.
Sensitivity studies were also conducted using the average soil column. The effects of bedrcck impedance ratio, depth to bedrock, shear modulus relationship used, damping ratio relationship used, and the maximum shear modulus were investigated, ne results of the sensitivity stuM suggest that the depth to bedrock and maximum shear modulus are the two most important factors for the site response calculations. The bedrock impedance ratio is also important but to a lesser degree. The assignment of shear modulus and damping ratio relationships was found to have a small effect on the analyses, primarily because the site-specific relationships do not vary considerably and are very similar to the standardized curves, it was determined that the range of resporse udng the 15 individud soil columns is comparable to, or even wider than, the results of the sensitivity studies considering all possible combinations of variability and uncertainty using guidelines such as those established by NRC (NRC 1989). Therefore, the individual responses from the 15 soil columns were used to determine the free field ground surface motions. The soll liquefaction evaluation is documented in a report prepared by ERCE, vonsmou:h Gaseour Dlfi slon Plant FinalSafety Analysis Repon, Section 3.6, Geology and Seismicity (ERCE 1990). The liquefaction evaluation demonstrated that liquefaction was not a concern for the EBE at the site.
Based on the seismic hazard analyses and soll amplification evaluation, the seismic hazard curve for peak ground surface acceleration arxl the EBE ground response spectra were determined. The seismic hazard curve for peak horizontal ground surface acceleration is shown in Figure 2.71. De EBE return period to be used for the site is 250 yr. The justification for contimted use of an approximate 250-year return period for the evalwi on basis earthquake was developed by DOE (DOE 1995). De justification demonstrated that the t
risk of serious injuries or deaths per year from a conservative estimate of the releases ' Tom a collapse of major cascade buildings was low and low in comparison to normal societal risks. !n adtition, the plants are not expected to operate for a large number of additional years. Given the low risk from a major release, previous 2.7 2
SAR PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO) estimates of building capacities, and short life of the facilities, the facilities were not believed modifiable within the remaining life in such a time frame that benefit would be achieved.
Based on a return period of 250 yr, the EDE horizontal ground response spectra for 5% damping is shown in Figure 2.7 2. The EBE response spectra was determined by scaling the 504yr return period response spectra by the ratio of PGA of the 250 yr return period earthquake divided by PGA of the 500 yr return period earthquake, ne vertical earthquake ground motion is two thirds of the horizontal ground motion. Earthquake time histories representative of the EBE ground response spectra were also developed for use in structural and equipment evaluations. The development of these carthquake time histories is documented in a report by Risk Engineering, Inc., Development ofAny!cial Eanhquake Ground Afotionsfor
\\
the Ponsmouth Gaseous Dfusion Plant, Ponsmouth, Ohio, (Risk Engineering, Inc.1993).
2.7.2 Flood llazard he flood hazard was evaluated by performing site-specific river flooding analyses from extreme river flooding and flooding due to local intense site precipitation. These flood hazard studies are documented in Extreme Flood Estimates Along the Scioto River Adjacent to the Ponsmouth Gaseous Dfusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio (Wang et al.1992) and LocalDrainage Analysis ofthe Ponsmouth Gaseous Dfusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, During an ittreme Storm (Johnson et al.1993).
The Scioto River, which flows in a north to-south direction and empties into the Ohio River at Portsmouth, is located 1.9 miles west of the plant site. The plant site is situated about 141 ft above the banks of the Scioto River, ne river flood study evaluated the potential for inundation of the plant site during a flood having a recurrence interval of 10,000 yr on the Scioto River, his was accomplished by applying statistical methods to extmpolate flood data recorded at the liigby, Ohio, gauging station to the 10,004yr interval. Two different statistical methods, as well as a least-squares methodology, are utilized to calculate the flood stage.
The calculated flood stage is about 97 ft below nominal plant grade; therefore, river flooding does not constitute a hazard.
A local drainage analysis was also performed for the plant site. He intent of this study was to detennine whether local flooding from creeks, ditches, storm sewers, culverts, and roof drainage systems during an extreme storm having an approximate recurrence interval of 10,000 yr poses a serious concern.
He task was accomplished by perfonning hydraulle and hydrologic analyses of creeks, ditches, storm sewers, culverts, and roof drainage systems using standard methods to determine if the influx of rainwater that occurs during an extreme storm can be conveyed away from critical, safety-related structures, ne results of the study indicated the local intense precipitation does not pose a flood hazard to structures except where roof ponding can occur. He effects of roof ponding were considered in the structural evaluations, wideh are described in Chapter 4.
2.7.3 Wind llazard The wind hazard was evaluated by performing a site-specific analysis. The site specific study is documented in Natural Phenomena Hazards blodeling Project: Extreme Wind / Tornado Ha:ard Sicdelsfor Depanment ofEnergy Sites (Coats and Murny,1985). LLNL utilized recognized experts in the field of wind hazards for the genention of this study which establishes the wind / tornado hazard curves for the Portsmouth site.
2,7-3
PROPOSED SAR PORTS August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
De wird hazard curve is shown in Figure 2.7 3 (Coats and Murray,1985), ne evaluadon basis wind (EBW) return period to be used for the site was specified by DOE to be 250 yr (Jackson 1995). Based on a return period of 250 yr, EBW has a wind speed of 78 mph.
De juttification for use of an approximate 250 year return period for wind was based on the rationale for the seismic return period. Wind damage at the plants is less likely to result in a significant release of hazardous mate.m than the direct failure of cascade equipment under seismic loading. Wind is more likely than seismic knds to cause exterior damcge to the buildings wit %ut extensive damage Internally, in addition, t
high winds will rapidly disperse any hazardous material released as well as reduce exposure dmes down wind, Therefore the risk of serious injuries and/or deaths is substantially lower for high winds than an equivalent seismic event. Given the much lower risk of public health consequences with high wind damage than from a seismic event and the short life of the facilities, modifications would not achieve significant benefit.
Extreme wind dominates in the 250 year frequency range for the PORTS. As noted alxwe, the extreme wind value is used in this study and tornado wind loadings are not considered. Tornados do occur in Southern Ohio; however, specific analyses of the frequency of tornados in thc region show that they are rare. Recent analyses covering a 32-year period for the United States show an estimated strike frequency within the fenced area of the plant of approximately I event per 30,000 years at PORTS. Ahhough tornados are extremely destructive in a localized area, the actual damage expected to cascade internal equipment and structures is also expected to be substantially less than the seismic event and may be minimal on the cell floor due to the large reservoir of air between the building roof and the cell 11oor of each building. Dus given the short operating Ilfe of the plants and the expectation of risk far less than a seismic event, a 250-year return period excluding tornados is believed justified.
2.7-1
PROPOSED SAR PORTS A"N I7' I997 i
RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
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2.7-6
PROPOSED SAR PORTS
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SAR-PORTS August 17, 1991
[
RAC 97 X0?48 (RO) 2.8 EXTERNAL MAN MADE TIIREATS b
A number of man-made threats external to the PORTS facilities were identified for further study with regard to their potentialimpact on the operation of the plant. Specifically, these threats include aircraft flying nearby that could crash on the plant site, transportation accidents on neatby public highways resulting in explosions affecting the facility, transportation accidents involving barge traffic that could result in an explosion affecting the facility, the rupture of natura! gas transmission pipelines located near the plant, a ' the release of toxins or asphyxiants that could affect plant operations personnel due to an accident.
2-?.1 Aircraft Crashes l
An in-depth analysis was performed to study the probability of aircraft crashes resulting in damage to the plant facilities. His analysis was based on a methodology established in the NRC Standard Review Plan (Dagenhart 1995). It is bascd primarily on the distance between the site under evaluation and the various saurces of aircraft hazards. These sources include, but are not limited to, airports, heliports, federal airways, holding patterns, approach pattems, restricted airspaces, military training routes, and military operation areas.
This analysis shows that the largest structures evaluated (Bui! tings X-330 and X-326) each have an 4
3 annual frequency of 2.1 x 10 per year of Ning struck by an aircraft. This frequency is below the risk of concern when compared with other risks associated with oper: tion of PORTS.
L 2.8.2 Highway Ac-idents Near the Facility Traffic accidents on public highways near the plant were considered to have the potential to affect plant structures because of overpressures that could reach the site as the result of an explosion. A calculation was performed using the contents of an 18-wheel tanker truck carrying gasoline as the worst case source of an overpressure event. His calculation was performed using accepted principles of overpressure calculation set forth in DOD Ammwtition and Explosives bafety Standards.
The results of this calculation show that the plant is located a sufficient distance from the nearest highway likely to encounter tractor-trailer traffic (i.e., U. S. Highway 23, which is nominally 1 mile away from the plant) such that explosions being initiated frot. an accident of this type would not affect the site.
2.8.3 Barge Traffic Accidents on Nearby Waterways 1
1 Barge traffic does not flow on the Scioto River, which lies about I mile from the PORTS facility, he Ohio River does accommodate barge traffic; however, it is situated outside of the 5-mile evaluation zone.
2.8.4 Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines No natural gas transmission pipelines were identified as being near the PORTS facility.
1 M
~
2.8-1
?
SAR-PORTS 4
August 17, 1997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 1
2.9 REFERENCES
l Ault, C. H. and D. M. Sullivan 1982. Faulting in Southwest Indiana, NUREG/CR-29us, It: diana Geological l
Survey Anit, C. H., D. Harper, C. R. Smith, and M. A. Wright 1985. Faulting and Jointing in andNear Surface Mines ofSouthwestern Indiana, NUREG/CR-4117, Indiana Geological Survey.
i Balt, F. E.1992, ne %'eather Almanac,6th ed., Gale Research, Detroit l
Barker,1993, February. Pike County Engineers Office, Waverly, Ohio, personal communication to M.
Schexnayder, Oak Ridge National Laboratnry, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Battelic 1981. ' Final Repon, Hydrogeologic Sist E,uluation of the Depanment of Energy Ponsmouth Uranlum Enrichment Facility, Battelle, Cc,h:n bus, Ohio.
Beavers, J. E,, Hammond, C. R., and Manrod, W. E., Recommended Stralght %'ind Tornado, and Mind Generated Missiles Ha::ardsfor the Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Paducah, Kentucky: Fernald, Ohio:
Miamisburge, Ohio: and Ponsmouth, Ohio, Department of Energy Reservations, YlEN-1036 (UNCLASSIFIED), Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
I Bollinger, G. A. and R. L. Wheeler 1988. De Giles Coumy, Virginia, Seismic Zone-SeismologicalResults and Geologic Interpretations, Professional Paper 1355, U.S. Geological Survey, Denver Bownocker, J.A., Geologic Map of Ohio Department of Natural Resources, 'Nte of Ohio, Scale 1:500,000, 1981 report.
Calvert, W. A.1968. " Surface and Subsurface Stratigraphy of Adams and Scioto Counties, Ohio. Geologic Aspects of the Maysville-Portsmouth Region, Southern Ohio and Northeastern Kentucky," pp. 63 87, l
In Guidebookfor the Joint Field Conference Ohio Geological Society and Geological Society of 3
Kentucky, May 17-18, 1 % 8.
CNPE 1995. Seismic Ha ard Criteriaforthe Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Paducah, Kentucky and Ponsmouth, Ohio, U. S. Deparrment ofEnergy Resenutions, ES/CNPE-95/2, Center for Natural Phenomena Engineering, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Coats and Murray 1985. Natural Phenomena Ha ards Modeling Project: Enreme Wind / Tornado Ha ard
- Models for Depanment of Energy Sites, UCRL-53526, Rev.1, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA COE 1966. Hydrology of the Ohio River, Appendix C, Osw River Basin Comprehensive Survey Vol. IV, 4
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Ohio River, Cincinnati, Ohio.
COE 1967. Flood Control in the Ohio River Basin, Appendix M Ohio River Basin Comprehensive Survey, Vol. XIV, U. S. Army Engineer Division, Ohio River, Cincinnati, Ohio.
2.9-1 J
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
COE 1991 Water Resources Development in Ohio 1991 Ohio River Division, North Central Division,
_ Ohio.
Dagenhatt, W. K.1995. De Annual Probability of an Aircrqf Crash at the U. S. Depanment ofEnergy Ponsmouth Gaseous Dijialon Plant, K/GDP/SAR-78, August I
Davis, J. M., Tomadoes in Ohio, Ohio Rep. 58(2); 46-48. 1973.
DOE 1987.
Environmental Survey Preliminary repon, Ponsmouth Uranium Enrichment Complex, Piketon, Ohio DOE /EH/OEV-04P, Office of Environmental Audit, V!ashington, D.C.
1 DOE 1992. Guidelines)br use ofProbabilistic Schmic Ha:ard Curves at Depanmat ofEnergy Sites, DOE-STD 1024-92, Department of Energy, December.
DOE 1994. Preparation Guidefor U.S. Department ofEnergy Nmreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Repons, DOE STD-3009-94, Department of Energy.
DOE 1995. Gaseous Dlficion Plant (GDP) Safety Analysis Repon (SAR) Upgrade Program Natural Phenomena Analysir Criteria, J. Dale Jackson to T, Angelelli, November 15, 1995.
f-
\\
ERCE 1990. Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 3.6 geology and Seismicity.
ERDA 1977. Final Environmentalimpact Statement, Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant Site, Piketon, Ohio, ERDA-1555.
Fenneman, N. M.; Johnson, D. W., Map of Physical Divisions of the United States, in cooperation with the Physiographic Committee of the U. S. Geological Survey,1946.
Gamble, Dana 1993b. January 22. ODNR, Divis'on of Forestry, Chillicothe, Ohio, personal communication with M. Schexnayder, ORNL, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Geraghty & Miller 1989a Site-Wide Ground Water Flow Model of the Ponsmouth Gaseous D! fusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, Dublin, Ohio Geraghty & Miller 1989b. Ground-Water Quality Assessment of Four RCRA Units, Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, Dublin, Ohio Geraghty & Miller 1990. Analysis ofLong-Term Hydrologic Budgetfor the Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, October 1968 September 1989, Dublin, Ohio Geraghty & Miller 1992. Quadrant 11. RFI Drap Final Report, for the Portsmouth Gaseous Difution Plant, Piketon, Ohio, Dublin, Ohio.
Gideon, John 1993. February 4.
Employee Activities Committee, PORTS, Piketon, Ohio, personal communication with M. Schexnayder, ORNL, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
2.9-2
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
Hardy, Buela 1993. March 11. Kentucky Parics Department, Frankfurt, Ky., personal communication with M. Schexnayder, ORNL, Oak Ridge, Tenn. Herrmann, R. Computer Programs in Seemi y, t
Vols.1-8, St. Louis University.
Harris, D. C. ard J. A. Drahovzal 1996. " Cambrian Potential Irdicated in Kentucky Rome Trough," Oiland Gas Joumal,52 57, February 19 Hershfield, D. M.1%3. " Rainfall Frequency Atlas of the United States for Durations from 30 Minutes to 24 Hours and Return Periods from 1 to 100 years, "U.S. Weather Bureau Technical Paper No.
40, National Climatic Data Center, Asheville, N.C.
Hunt, R. J.,1993. Development of the Evaluation Basis Eanhquakefor the Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant, memorandum to K. E. Shaffer, Center for Natural Phenomena Engineering, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Jackson, J. D.1995. U. S. Department of Energy, letter T. A. Angelelli, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Gaseous Diffusion Plant Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program, November 16.
Johnson, R. O., J. C. Wang, and D. W. Lee 1993. Local Drainage Analysis of the Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, During an Enreme Storm. KlGDPISAR 29, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Jones, Richard 1943. March 17. Realty Specialist, Wayne National Forest, Ironton District, Ironton, l
Ohio, personal communication with M. Schexnayder, ORNL, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
l King, P, B.; Beikman, H. M., Geologic Map of the United States, U. S. Geological Survey,1977, Scale 1:2,500,000,3 sheets.
Kornegay, F. C. et al.1991. Ponsmouth Caseous Lant EnvironmentalReportfor 19M, ESIESH-181V4, Martin Marietta Energy System, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Kornegay, F. C., et al.1990. Ponsmouth Gmeous DIDialon Plant Environmental Repon for 1989, POEF 2025, MMES, ORNL, and PORTS.
Kornegay, F. C. et al.1994 Ponsmouth Gaseous Plant Environmental Reponfor 1993, ESIESH-50, Martin Marietta Eccrgy System, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Lambert, Betty 1993b. Executive Secretary, Pike County Schools, Piketon, Ohio, personal communication with Susan M. Schexnayder, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.,
February 17.
Lambert, Betty 1993b. Executive Secretary, Pike County Schools, Piketon, Ohio, personal communication with Susan M. Schexnayder, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.,
January 19.
Lee R. R.1991. Ponsmouth Gmeous Difusion Plant Safety Analysis Repon, Section 3.5.1, Regional 2.9-3
August 17, 1997 Subsurface Hydrology, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
LETC (Law Engineering Testing Co.) 1978. Final Report: Gas Centr (fuge Enrichment Plant, Ponsmouth, Ohio, Geotechnical Investigation,1.aw Engineering Testing Co., Marietta, Ga.
LETC (Law Engineering Testing Co.) 1982. Soil and Ground Water investigations for the GCEP IAndfilPathwys Analysis-FinalRepon, Denver, Colo.
Linsley, R. K., and J. B. Pranzini 1972. Water-Resources Engineering, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Linsley, R. K. Jr., M. A. Kohler, and J. L. H. Paulhus 1982. Hydrologyfor Engineers, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Mauk, F. J. et al.1982. "'Ihe Sharpsburg, Kentucky, Earthquake 27 July 1980: Main Shock Parameters and Isoscismal Maps," Bulletin ofthe Seismological Society ofAmerica 72(1), 221 36 Norris, S.E., and R. E. Fidler,1%9 "Hydrogeology of the Scioto River Valley near Piketon, South-Central Ohio," U.S. Geological Survey Professional Water Supply Paper 1872.
Norris, S. E.1983a Aquifer Tests and Well Field Performance, Scioto River Valley,0hio, Pan i Groundwter, 21 (3).
NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 1977. U.S. Nucleas Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.59, Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix B.
NRC 1989. Seismic System Analysis, Standard Review Plan 3.7.2, Nuclear Regulatory Commissionl Ohio Data Users Center 1991.1990 Ohio County Profles. Ohio Department of Development, narrhn Ohio.
OHDNR (Ohio Department of Natural Resources) 1%3. Water Inventory ofthe Scioto River Basin Ohio Water Plan Inventory Report No.17, Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water, Columbus, Ohio.
OHDNR (Ohio Department of Natural Resources) 1992. Ohio County Repon. Data sheets printed July 28.
ORDNR (Ohio Department of Natural Resources) n.d. Park Directory. Division of Parks and Recman Columbus, Ohio.
Ohio Department of Health 1991. Directory ofNursing Homes, Rest Homes and Homesfor the Aged, and Other Cenfied Facilutes in Oh'o, Division of Health Facilities Regulation, Bureau of Long Term Care, Columbus, Ohio, July.
Ohio Department of Human Sarvices 1992. Day Care Centers. Computers Data Sheets,SIQR12Pl.
Columbus, Ohio, Octobee 1.
2.9-4 i
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97 X0248 (RO)
ORSANCOM (Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission) 1988. Ohio River Water Quality Fact Book, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Patrick, Thomas 1993. Pike Lake State park, Morgantown, Ohio, personal communication with Susan M, Schexnayder, Oak Ridge, Tenn., January 19.
Perkins, R. G.1996. Memorandum to K. D. Keith, Oak Ridge K 25 Site, Oak Ridge, Tenn., January 30.
l Pfeifer, Ron 1993. Pike County Office of Community Deve'opment, Waverly, Ohio, personal communication with Susan M. Schexnayder, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., January 13.
PMD and ECD 1989. Long-Range Environmentaland Waste Management Plan, Fiscal Years 1989-1995, POEF-2006, Planning and Methods Development and Environmental Control Group, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Piketon, Ohio.
PORTS (Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant) 1982. "2-ft Contour Interval Topographic Maps and Index (P&L Systems Ltd.)," Drawing number X-200-200C (index), and X-200-200.lC through X-200 200.8C (8 detail sheets), all Revision 0, Piketon, Ohio.
Raab, J. M.1989. Ground Water Resources ofPike County, ODNR, Division of Water.
Rehme, J.1990. Plannmg Division, Special Saxiles Branch, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntington, W.
Va., personal communication to R.O. Johnson, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, l
Tennessee, December 5.
I
\\
Risk Engineering 1992. Seismic Ha::ard Evaluationfor the Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant, Ponsnwuth, Ohio, K/GDP/SAR/SUB-2/RI.
Risk Engineering 1993. Development ofArnfcial Earthquake Ground Afotionsfor the Ponsmouth Gaseous Difialon Plant, Portsmouth, Ohio.
Rogers, J. G., et al.1989. Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant Site Environmental Repon for 1988 Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Rudman, A. J.; Summerson, C. H.; Henze, U. J., Geology of Basement in Afidwestern United States, Bullet a of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, Vol. 49, No. 7,1970, pp. 894-t 904.
RufEner, J. A.1985. Climates of the States, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Narrative Summaries, Tables, and Mapsfor Each State with Overviews ofState Climatologist Programs, 3rd ed.,
Gale Research, Detroit Saylor, R. E., et al.1990. Data Packagefor the Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) Plant EnvironmentalImpact Statement, ORNL/TM-Il482, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Shepherd, Sherry 1993. Pike Community Hospital, Waverly, Ohio, personal communication with Susan 2.9-5
PROPOSED SAR-PORTS August 17, 1997 RAC 97.X0248 (RO)
M, Schexnayder, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Tenn., January 21.
Sykora, D. W. and J. 3. Davis 1993. Site-Specffic Eanhquake Response Analysisfor Ponsmouth Gaseous DI. fusion Plant, Ponsmouth, Ohio, GL-93-13. Department of the Army, Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers.
U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973. " Characteristics of the Population: Part 37, Ohio, "in Census of Population: 1970, Vol.1.
U.S. Bureau of the Census 1987.1987 Census of Agriculture U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988. 1986 Population and 1985 Per Capita income Estimatesfor Counties and Incorporated Places, Current Population Reports, Series P 26.
7 U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992. Population and Housing Summary Tape File I-A. CD Rom.
USGS (U.S. Geological Survey) 1979 (photoinspected). "Piketon Quadrangle Ohio-Pike County 7.5 Mhmte % ries Topographic Map," DMA 4462 III SW-Series v852, Reston, Va.
USGS 1990 (May 17) USGS Grounducter Site inventory Databasefbr Pike County, Ohio.
USGS 1992a. Review of Eanhquake Ha:ard Assessments of Plant Sites at Paducah, Kentucky, and Ponsmouth, Ohio, K/GDPISAR-15, U. S. Geological Survey for Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
USGS 1992b. Water Resources Data, Ohio, Water Year 1991, Water-Data Report OH-91-1, prepared in cooperation with the State of Ohio and other agencies, Columbus, Ohio.
Vanarsdale, R. B,1986. " Quaternary Displacements on Faults Within the Kentucky River Fault System of East-Central Kentucky," Geological Society ofAmerica Bulletin 97,138-92 Walker, A.1985. Ground-water Resources ofJackson and vinton Counties, ODNR, Division of Water.
Wang,1. C., R. O. Johnson, and D. W. Lee 1992. Extreme Flood Estimates Along the Scioto River Adjacent to the Ponsmouth Gaseous Difusion Plant, Piketon, Ohio, KlGDPISAR-6, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
Weather Almanac 1992. 7he Weather Almanac, ed. F. E. Bair, Gale Research, Inc., Detroit, Mich.
Zoback, M. L.1992. "First-and Second-Order Patterns of Stress in the Lithosphere: the World Stress Map Project," J. Geophysical Research 97(B8),11,703-28 2.9-6 l
SARUP-PORTS August 17,1997-RAC 97X0315,97X0316 SARUP CIIAPTER 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS _
4.
HAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS.........................
4.1-1
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.1 - 1 4.2-IIAZARD ANALYSIS.................................
4.2-1 4.2.1 Evaluation Guidelines 4.2 1 l
l 4.2.1.1 Initiating Event Frequency Categories
..,,. 4.2-1 4.2.1.2 Evaluation Guidelines............
4.2-2 4.2.2 Criteria for the Classification of Structures, Systems, and Com ponents............,,......,,........,.
4.2-6 4.2.3 Criteria for Technical Safety Requirement Selection..........
4.2-7 4.2.4 Ilazard Screening and Threshold Analysis................
4.2-8 4.2.5 Hazard Analysis hiethodology........................
4.2-8 4.2.5.1 IIazard Identification 4.2-9 4.2.5.2 Ilazard Evaluation...................
4.2-10 4.2.5.3 Accident Selection......................... 4.2-12 4.2.6 Ilazard Analysis Results 4.3 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS...........................
4.3-1 4.3.1 Accident Analysis hiethodology.....
4.3-1
'4.3.1.1 Operational Analysis..,................
. 4.3-1 4.3.1.2 Consequence Analysis Afethodology..
4.3-3 4.3.1.3 Natural Phenomena SIcthodology 4.3-28 4.3.2 Accident Analysis Results
4.4 REFERENCES
. 4.4-1 i
SARUP-PORTS -
August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0315,97X0316 SARUP CHAITER '4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section 4.2 Tables and Finures Table 4.2-1 Initiating Event Frequency. Categories Table 4.2-2 Evaluation Guidelines Table 4.2-3 Screening Thresholds i
Table 4.2-4 Qualitative Consequence Categories.
Tabla 4.2-5 Example Initiating Event - Operating Mode - Hazard State Matrix Figure 4.2-1 Hazard Identification
. Figure t.2-2 Hazard Evaluation Figure 4.2-3 Limiting Initiating Event Selection Section 4.3 Tables and Finures Table 4.3-1 Safety Actions Table 4.3-2 Natural Phenomena Load Combinations Table 4.3-3 ARS Frequency Array Figure 4.3-1 Operational Analysis Figure 4.3-2 Summer Ventilation Pattern of One Unit of the Process Building Figure 4.3-3 Control Volum and Unit Layout of a "000" Building Figure 4.3-4 MELCOR Control Volumes of One Unit in the Process Building Figure 4.3-5 Assumed MELCOR Flow Paths of Cell Housing Leakage Figure 4.3-6. Schematic Diagram of Processes Involved in UF Releases Figure 4.3-7 Example of Possible Plu:ne Trajectory From a Moderate-Velocity, Vertical Release of UF. Vapor -
Figure 4.3-8 Schematic Showing the Development and Enhancements of HGSYSTEM/UF.
Figure 4.3-9 Flow Over a Building for Wind Normal to the Upwing Face Figure 4.3-10 Mixture Mass Fraction, #, for HGSYSTEM/UF. Predictions (left side) and for Rodean's (1989) Equilibrium Solution (right side).
ii
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 4.0 IIAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the hazard and accident analysis perfornied for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS).
The hazard analysis methodology consists of the identification and evaluation of facility hazards.
Hazard identification is a comprehensive assessment of process-related, natural phenomena and external hazards that may result in onsite or offsite consequences of interest if an accident occurs. Hazard evaluation generates the largely qualitative consequence and likelihood estimates used to characterize hazards in the context of potential accidents. This method provides a thorough, predominantly qualitative evaluation of the spectrum of risks to the public, onsite personnel, and the environment resulting from potential accidents involving the identified hazards, The results of the hazard analysis include the identification of a reasonable spectrum of initiating events for evaluation in the accident analysis.
The initiating events that are chosen for evaluation in the accident analysis are defined as limiting initiating events. Limiting initiating events are those initiating events that can result in the most severe accident in a given frequency category 'see Section 4.2.5.3). All limiting initiating events are compared with Evaluation Guidelines (EGs) to identify and assess the adequacy of existing SSCs.
Selection criteria are applied to the results of the hazard and accident analyses to derive the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs).
The hazard and accident anal is uses a graded approach to determine the level of analysis applied to each identified hazard. This :.eeroach requires that the level of analysis and documentation for each facility be commensurate with the following:
The magnitude of the hazards being addressed.
The stage or stages of the facility life cycle.
The complexity of the facility and/or systems being relied on to maintain an acceptable level of risk.
In general, because grading is a function of both hazard potential and complexity, a graded approach l
dictates an assessment of complex, higher-hazard facilities that is more thoroughly documented than I
assessments of simple, lower-hazard facilities. If a hazard poses a more significant threat for the facility (i.e., health consequences), a more detailed analysis is performed. Note that standard industrial hazards for which national consensus codes and/or standards (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations] exist are not in the scope of this SAR except where these hazards are identified as initiators or contributors to accidents in the facility.
4.1 1
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 Grading was also applied at each of the four major steps of the analysis process:
Hazard identification and screening.
Hazard classification.
Ilazard analysis.
Accident analysis and development of safety controls.
liazard identificatic n and screening was used to review facility hazards to determine whether sny l
safety analysis was required. This was accomplished by comparing the hazards with a screening value as described in Section 4.2.4. If the identified hazards remained below the screening values, the results were documented, and no additional analysis was required for the facility. The second step of the process l
involved classifying the facility in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92 (Reference 1). The third step required analysis of the hazards associated with the facility. One of the elements of the graded approach j
for hazard analysis is a function of selecting techniques for hazard evaluation depending on the complexity of the process and the significance of the hazard. The techniques used for hazard evaluation can range I
from simple checklists or "What If" analyses to systematic parameter examinations. The technique selected need not be more sophisticated or detailed than is necessary to provide a comprehensive examination of the hazards associated with the facility operations. For example, a simple storage operation may be adequately evaluated by a preliminary hazard analysis or a structured "What If" analysis. The final step of the overall process involved taking the most significant hazards within the facility, determining specific accident scenarios, identifying safety controls that can minimize the frequency of the event, and identifying safety controls that can be used to mitigate the consequences should the event occur.
The hazard analysis methodology and results, presented in Section 4.2, include the hazard identification, classification, and evaluation tasks, including limiting initiating event selection. Section 4.3 describes the accident analysis methodology and results for each of the limiting initiating events identified in Section 4.2. The discussion summarizes the accident scenario development, sot rce-term analysis, and consequence analysis, provides a comparison with guidelines, and summarizes SSCs and TSR controls.
4.1-2
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997-
- RAC 97X0315-4.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS This section describes the hazard analysis methodology and results. The overall methodology integrated'the hazard analysis, accident analysis, system classification, and TSR select _ ion to ensure consistency throughout the analysis process. The methodology description also addresses the generic parts of the analysis and the specific portions that relate to hazard analysis.
Section 4.2.1 provides a discussion of the Evaluation Guidelines established for the hazard and-accident analysis, The Evaluation Guidelines are used to identify and assess the adequacy of existing
- stmetures, systems, and components (SSCs). Section 4.2.2 establishes SSC classification criteria These
- criteria are applied to the results of the hazard and accident analyses to establish the level of quality to
- be applied to SSCs based on their relative importance to safety. Section 4.2.3 identifies the selection criteria for deriving the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). Section 4.2.4 provides a discussion of the screening thresholds established as part of the hazard analysis. Sections 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 present the -
hazard analysis methodology and hazard analysis results, respectively.
4.2.1' Evaluation Guidelhaes A key element of the analysis methodology is the establishment of Evaluation Guidelines (EGs) to ensure a consistent and cystematic approach in all steps of the analysis process. The overall objective of establishing EGs is to limit _ consequences to smaller values for initiating events of higher frequency.
This approach provides a logical response to different levels of risk by providing greater protection as the potential consequences increase. To accomplish this objective, plant Operating Conditions (OCs) and consequence guidelines for each plant operating condition were established. Together, this information forms the EGs for the hazard and accident analysis process.
It is important to note that because PORTS is an existing, operating facility, these Evaluation-
--Guidelines may not be achievable for all accident sequences. Design conditions were not applied to PORTS specifically for the protection of the public. This analysis has identified and addressed those situations.
4.2.1.1 Initiating Event Frequency Categories Consistent with the objective of providing protection commensurate with risk (i.e., potential consequences over the full range of plant Operating Conditions), idiating event frequency categories were first defined.10 CFR 76.85 requires an assessment of accidents be perfonned by reviewing the full range of operation using an expected release rate resulting from anticipated operational occurrences and accidents. This statement implies three basic frequency categories or Operating Conditions that have been established for the accident analysis as shown in Table 4.2-1: Normal Operation, Anticipated Events (AEs),' and Evaluation Basis Events (EBEs). The bases for these categories are provided as follows:
Normal Operation (OC-1)
The Normal Operation frequency category is based on normal operations that are planned for plant facilities. Normal operation of the facility was evaluated to determine initial conditions assumed 4.2-1
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997-RAC 97X0315 in the accident analysis as well as any nor. al operational safety programs (e.g., radiation protection) and administrative controls used to prevent t -1 initiating event.
Anticinated Yvents (OC-2) i The Anticipated Event frequency :ategory addresses deviations from normal operation that are j:
anticipated ;o occur during the life of the icility. This category ranges from normal operation to those -
thr.t have en initiating event frequency of gt tter than or equal to 10-2 per year or consistent with an event j
expected,o occur in the life of a new fac 'ity The AE frequency category was established with a 10-2 j
per year lower bound to provide a conset ative margin based on the qualititative definition. Based on the rela *,v:ly short remaining life of the pla t, this category provides a conservative binning of initiating 3
events :stimated to occur more frequently. ;han 10-2per year.
4 Evaluation Basis Events (OC-3) i
' These initiating events address the :maining events fer the GDPs considered credible.
i 4 2.1.2 Evaluation Guidelines l
l Evaluation Guidelines (EGs 1 throi gh 6) were established for each initiating event frequency category to ensure operational requirements tre met during all plant conditions. The EGs used in the i-GDP accident analysis methodology were at 1pted from the commercial reactor industry (Reference 1) i and are provided in Table 4.2-2. Limiting in lating events (see Section 4.2.5.3) are compared with the
'l Evaluation Guidelines to identify and assess ate adequacy of existing SSCs. The basis for each of the EGs is as follows:
. Evaluation Guideline 1 (EG 1)
The purpose of EG 1 is to establish rad alogical dose guidelines for members of the offsite public and onsite personnel.
The following radiological dose guidelines were established for the offsite public:
~ For Normal Operation (OC-1 10 CFR 20.1301 identifies dose limits for individual members of the public.
For Anticipated Events (OC-21, the value of 5 rem TEDE/ event was established for the e
offsite public based on onsite :e luirements for adult occupational dose limits defm' ed i_n 10 CFR 20.1201(a)(1)(i). This I mit was conservatively applied to the offsite public for Anticipated Events.
For Evaluation Basis Events (CC-3), the value of 25 rem TEDE/ event was established based on 10 CFR 100 and the Statements of Consideration for the 10 CFR 76 final rule which references this value in Part C of the " Summary of Requirements and Analysis of Public Comments" (Federal Register, Vol. 59, No.184,9/23/94, page 48954).
4.2-2
. ~
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0315 The following radiological dose guidelines were established for onsite personnel:
For Normal Operation (OC-1),10 CFR 20.1201 identifies occupational dose limits for adults.
For Anticipated Events (OC-2) and Evaluation Basis Events (OC 3), the guideline established was to ensure that onsite personnel are not exposed to life-threatening or serious health effects from the release of radioactive materials.
Because NRC regulations do not specify limits (or evaluation guidelines) for accident exposures to onsite personnel, specific radiological exposure values for AEs and EBEs were not established for onsite personnel as part of EG 1. For releases of UF., HF, and other corrosive gases, the
'ee and flee" policy trains employees to flee an area immediately upon detection by sight or smell of releases of UF. or other corrosive gases. Operating experience at the plants has demonstrated the effectiveness of the see and flee policy because no individual has been significantly injured by a UF. release. This policy, coupled with the requirements of the programmatic TSR on worker protection from UF. process hazards and the characteristics of UF.,
liF, and other toxic gases, adequately controls potential onsite toxic consequences. Qualitiative evaluations have been performed as part of the hazard and accident analyses to assess the potential for life-threatening or serious health effects to onsite personnel from the release of radioactive materials.
Evahration Guideline 2 (EG 2)
The purpose of EG 2 is to establish nonradiological dose guidelines for members of the offsite public and onsite personnel due to a release of radioactive materials.
The following nonradiological dose guidelines were established for the offsite public:
For Normal Operation (OC-1),10 CFR 20.1301 identifies uranium dose limits for individual members of the public.
For Anticipated Events (OC-2), the value of 10 mg soluble uranium intake / event is based on 10 CFR 20.1201(e), which uses this value for onsite workers for a period of I week.
This limit was conservatively applied to the offsite public for Anticipated Events.
For Evaluation Basis Events (OC-3), the value of 30 mg soluble uranium intake / event was established based on the Statements of Consideration for the 10 CFR 76 final rule which references this value in Part C of the " Summary of Requirements and Analysis of Public Comments" (Federal Register, Vol. 59, No.184, 9/23/94, page 48954).
The following nonradiological dose guidelines were established for onsite personnel:
For Normal Operation (OC-1),10 CFR 20.1201 identifies occupational uranium dose limits for adults.
4.2-3 l
l
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED Augast 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 For Anticipated Events (OC 2) and Evaluation Basis Events (OC-3), the guideline established was to ensure that onsite personnel are not exposed to life-threatening or serious health effects from the release of radioactive materials.
For the same reasons discussed above for EG 1, specific nonradiological exposure values for AEs and EBEs were not established for onsite personnel as part of EG 2. Qualitiative evaluations have been performed as part of the hazard and accident analyses to assess the potential for life-threatening or serious health effects to onsite personnel from the release of radioactive materials.
In addition to the radiological and uranium toxicity concerns, the by-product of a UF.-moisture reaction [i.e., hydrogen fluoride (HF)] could result in potential health effects. Because HF is produced in direct proportion to the amount of UO F produced, the AE and EBE guideline values for soluble 2 2 uranium provide adequate control of HF. Consequently, consistent with the Statements of Consideration for the 10 CFR 76 final rule, no specific criterion for HF exposure was established. Ilowever, potential HF concentrations have been calculated and characterized as part of the consequence analyses.
Evaluation Guideline 3 (EG.))
The purpose of EG 3 is to establish pressure and temperature guidelines.
EG 3 requires that system pressure and temperature be controlled to minimize the potential for a loss of primary system integrity. This guideline only applies when a postulated failure of the primary system could exceed EGs I or 2 (i.e., if a failure of the primary system would not exceed EG 1 or 2, then EG 3 is not applicable). Additionally, EG 3 would not apply if the event is a loss of primary system integrity since the intent of EG 3 is to prevent failure.
For Normal Opeation (OC-1), temperatures should be maintained within the design rating for the equipment. Primary system pressure should be maintained below the hiaximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP), or design pressure rating if the h!AWP is not available during nomial operation.
For Anticipated Events (OC-2), primary system pressure should be maintained below the MAWP (or design rating) plus the ASME code allowable stresses for overpressure protection. (Refer to Appendix A of Chap;er 1 for a discussion of ASME code applicability.)
For Evaluation Basis Events (OC-3), primary containment system pressure (when a containment system is present to contain hazardous releases) should not exceed the system's hydrostatic test pressure.
Evaluation Guideline 4 fEG 4)
The purpose of EG 4 is to require that the normal operation or initiating event be controlled within the guidelines of the double contingency principle for nuclear criticality safety.
For Normal Operation (OC-1), EG 4 is satisfied when the process is provided with two independent criticality safety controls.
4.2-4
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 For Anticipated Events (OC 2), one of the two independent criticality safety controls is assumed to fail. Therefore, one criticality safety control is required to be available for an AE.
For Evaluation Basis Events (OC-3), EG 4 does not apply because an EBE postulates the loss of controls resulting in a criticality accident.
The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) program described in Section 5.2 documents the required NCS controls. Any exceptions to the double contingency principle are identified and discussed in Section 5.2.
Evnluation Guideline 5 TG 5)
The purpose of EG S is to identify controls required to ensure normal operations are conducted within the assumptions and initial conditions of the accident analysis.
Evaluation Guidellite 6 mG 6)
The purpose of EG 6 is to ensure a habitable environment for operations personnel to perform required manual safety actions in response to an initiating event. In accordance with the see and flee policy, operator actions are only assumed to reliably occur if they can be accomplished during evacuation of the area or if the operator is provided with personal protective equipment (PPE) such as breathing apparatus. As a result, the accident analysis evaluated " evacuation of the area" as a potential initiating event for all nuclear operations.
The safety of operations involving toxic (but non-nuclear) chemicals is provided through compliance with OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) requirements. Therefore, Evaluation Guidelines for postulated chemical releases (e.g., flourine, chlorine) have not been established as part of EGs 1 through 6. In addition, specific controls for these operations are not specified through the accident analysis or facility-specific TSRs. The programmatic TSR on the chemical safety program requires that a chemical safety program be established, implemented, and maintained as described in Section 5.6.
Section 5.6 includes a commitment to implementing the OSHA PSM requirements. A sununary of the process for how potential hazards from chtmical releases are evaluated and controlled is as follows:
1.
Determine which chemicals exceed the process safety management (PSM) threshold values as defined in 29 CFR 1910.119, 2.
For those chemicals that have values greater than the threshold values, evaluate and control the process in accordance with the 29 CFR 1910.119 requirements and determir.e the potential impact of releases on nuclear-related operations (see EG 6 for how this is evalua:ed).
3.
For those chemicals that have values less than the threshold values, treat the hazard as a standard industrial hazard and determine the potential impact of releases on nuclear-related operations (see EG 6 for how this is evaluated).
4.2-5 i
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 4.2.2 Criteria for the Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components Structures, systems, and components are either (1) important to safety or (2) non-safety.
Important to safety SSCs are classified as either Q or AQ. Non safety SSCs are identified as NS.
SSCs will be classified in accordance with the following criteria bued on the initiating events analyzed. These criteria are applied to the results of the hazard and accident analyses to establish the level of quality to be applied to SSCs based on their relative importance to safety.
Catecon O Category Q structures, systems, and components are those important to safety SSCs that are necessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that could result in a member of the general public located offsite being exposed to:
More than 25 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) over the course of the event Inhalation of more than 30 mg of soluble uranium over the course of the event These limits correspond to the guideline values established in EGs 1 and 2 for Evaluation Basis Events. See the discussion in Section 4.2.1.2.
Cateuory AO Category AQ structures, systems, and components are those important to safety SSCs that:
Are necessary to maintain an initial condition required to support the accident analysis Are necessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of events that could result ht life-threatening or serious health effects to onsite personnel from the release of radioactive materials Are necessary to meet the double contingency principle for the prevention of an accidental nuclear criticality Represent the single contingent control to prevent an accidental nuclear criticality where the double contingency principle is not met Are necessary to detect and alarm an accidental nuclear criticality Are necessary to mitigate the consequences of a fire (fixed fire suppression systems only) 4.2-6
SAR PORTS -
PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97XO315 l Are part of the cascade piping and equipment including UF, process piping 2 inches and larger, expansionjoints, valves, and process equipment that provide the UF, containment pressure boundary Are structures or portions of enrichment process facilities necessary to physically support process piping, equipment, and their support systems Catenory NS Category NS includes non-safety structures, systems, and components.
Refer to Section 3.8 for an identification of Q and AQ SSCs, Refer to the Quality Assurance Program Description in Volume 3 for the quality assurance requirements applied to Q and AQ SSCs.
4.2.3 Criteda for Tecimical Safety Requirement Selection Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) will be established as required by 10 CFR 76.87 to include safety limits, limiting control settings, limiting conditions for operation, design features, surveillance requirements, and administrative controls.
Based on the limiting initiating events analyzed in Section 4.3.2, a TSR limiting condition for operation will be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria:
4 1.
An active structure, system, or component that prevents exceeding the EG 1 or EG 2 offsite evaluation guidelines for Anticipated Events and Evaluation Basis Events (see Table 4.2-2).
2.
A process variable or operating restriction tnat preserves an initial condition for the analysis of-an Anticipated Event or Evaluation Basis Event that could otherwise exceed the EG 1 or EG 2 offsite evaluation guidelines.
3.
An active structure, system, or component that prevents or mitigates an event that could result in life-threatening or serious health effects to onsite personnel from the release of radioactive materials.
L 4.
A single contingent control to prevent an accidental nuclear criticality where the double contingency principle is not met.
t' 5.
Installed instrumentation that is used to detect and alarm an accidental nuclear criticality.
Refer to the individual accident scenarios in Section 4.3.2 for an identification of essential controls that require TSRs.
4.2-7
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0315 4.2.4 Ilazard Screening nt i Threshold Analysis In addition to the E' duation Guidelines, screening thresholds were established as part of the hazard analysis to distinguish t : different levels of analysis and the level of documentation necessary to support a graded approach. Table 4.2-3 summarizes the screening thresholds and the level of documentation used for the 1 izard analysis. The consequences listed in Table 4.2-3 assume that no mitigation is provided. The b. sis for each of the thresholds is provided below.
Preliminary ha:ard ses "ening (PHS) threshold. The PHS threshold uses the reportable quantity values in 40 CFR 302, Table '02.4, plus those in Appendix B of 40 CFR 302. These values establish the lowest threshold of concer, for the hazard analysis process.
l Pivcess ha:ard analys!. (Pr#A) threshold. The PrHA radiological threshold uses the inventory of radiological materials speca ed in Appendix A of DOE-STD-1027 92 (Reference 2) for Category 3 facilities. For nonradiological t :zards, the PrHA screening threshold is not easily based on a threshold quantity of material because a the different types of hazards that could be present and the different consequences that could result. 3erefore, the nonradiological PrHA screening threshold is considered exceeded when a release of the aplicable nonstandard hazard could result in life-threatening or serious health effects in the vicinity of a < event. This threshold limits the hazard and unmitigated consequences to a value at which operating : rsonnel are capable of evacuating the area and minimizes the risk of serious health effects caused r > 2 release of the hazard. This threshold also considers that operating personnel are trained in the t): of operation they are asked to perform and the hazards involved in accordance with OSHA standard and regulations and the plant procedure and training program.
Plant sqfety opemtional a alysis (PSOA) threshold. The PSOA threshold is established to ensure that any hazard that can result in p <entially signincant onsite consequences (i.e., significant consequences beyond the immediate area) or 01 site consequences is evaluated in detail to establish controls that may prevent exceeding the EGs. 'I e PSOA radiological and nonradiological thresholds for offsite consequences are the same as the 1Gs for the Anticipated Event frequency category. The PSOA onsite radiological threshold was estab shed by using the inventory of radiological materials specified in Appendix A of DOE-STD-1027-91 Tor Category 2 facilities as well as the EG for the Anticipated Event frequency category. Nonradiologn ;l health effects were established to ensure that a detailed analysis is performed of initiating events and lazards that could result in life-threatening or serious health effects beyond the inunediate area of the : cility.
These thresholds, in comi nation with the EGs, aided in ensuring that a consistent level of analysis was applied to various t) es of hazards and that a graded approach was used based on the potential unmitigated consequences ;sociated with the hazards of concern. Different levels of analysis are provided depending on which th ; holds are exceeded. The different levels of analysis, methods for performing the analysis, and docua atation requirements are described in Section 4.2.5.1.
4.2.5 Hazard Analysis Methodolot Hazard analysis is the prou s of identifying facility hazards and evaluating potential initiating events, consequences that may resu from accidents involving these hazards, and controls that can be 4.2-8
i SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 used to prevent or miti ate the consequences. The hazard analysis was divided into two parts: hazard B
identification and hazard evaluation.
Hazard identification involved selecting those facilities that possess nonstandard industrial hazards that present a threat to the heahh and safety of on-site workers or the general public. Hazard identification also involved detennining which hazards require more detailed analysis based on the consequence screening criteria. Hazards that were not ' screened out" in this process were subject to hazard evaluation.
Hazard evaluation involved qualitatively determining the unmitigated consequences of potential accidents involving a given hazard, the initiating events for the accident, the frequency of the initiating events, and controls that can be used to prevent or mitigate the initiating events. The unmitigated consequences were compared with threshold consequence values to determine whether more detailed accident analysis may be required. The hazard analysis (1) documented the hazards of concern, (2) detennined the initiating events and consequences, (3) identified controls to minimize potential consequences, (4) identified limiting initiating events that require more detailed analysis, and (5) selected controls that were determined to be AQ because of their importance in the event scenario for protecting onsite workers.
4.2.5.1 Ilazard identification PORTS consists of many facilities and processes. The first step of the hazard analysis was to identify the plant facilities and track each facility for evaluation. Figure 4.2-1 outlines the steps in the hazard identification task.
The hazard analysis involved identifying facilities with nonstandard industrial hazards that may threaten onsite workers or the offsite public. Because many facilities have only standard industrial hazards encounte r '
here in industry, a screening process was used to focus on the nonstandard industrial hazards.
4 6 - Ninary Hazard Screening (PHS) was this initial screening process. In the PHS process, the '
threshold from Table 4.2 3 was used to determine whether a facility
" screens in" or "st N first step of the PHS was a brief examination of the facilities to identify those that obvic.
he PHS threshold. These facilities were automatically screened in to the next level of analysis e sut any additional review or screening. The remaining facilities were evaluated using the PHS thresholds listed in Table 4.2-3. If the threshold values associated with the variour hazards were not exceeded, no additional analysis was required. if one or more of the hazards in a facility exceeded a threshold value, then the facility required additional review, and completion of the PHS fonn was not required. The PHS process provides the safety analysis documentation for the facilities that screen out.
The next step of the hazard identification process was to establish a hazard category for the facility in accordance with DOE-STD-1027-92. This standard provides a categorization of nuclear facilities (Categories 1, 2, and 3; Category 1 is the highest-hazard category) based on inventory of radiological material. Hazard categorization was also used as input to applying the graded approach. If the facility did not exceed the Category 3 threshold quantities listed in DOE-STD-1027-92 and if it 4.2-9
i SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0315 exceeded the PHS threshold for radiological material, the facility was categorized as a " radiological"
- facility, The final step of the hazard identification task was to determine the facilities that exceeded the PrHA threshold. The analysis statement level of documentation indicated in Table 4.2-3 was applied to the facilities that exceeded the PHS threshold but did not exceed the PrHA threshold. This level of documentation was typically used for facilities that exceeded the low PHS threshold but have no release mechanisms that could cause any significant health effects to onsite or offsite personnel. Typically, these facilities were reviewed to determine whether the hazard was controlled by existing facility safety management programs, if the hazard was controlled, a statement was provided to document this decision in the PrHA for the facility, and no additional analysis was required for the facility. If the hazard was not controlled, the facility progressed to the hazard evaluation task described in Section 4.2.5.2.
To summarize, the final product of the hazard identification task was a listing of facilities that contain hazards exceeding the PrHA threshold and that have a radiological hazards categorization.
Nonstandard industrial hazards that required additional analysis were identified by comparing their potential unmitigated consequences with PHS and PrHA threshold values (Table 4.2-3). This set of facilities was analyzed in the hazard evaluation task described in Section 4.2.5.2.
4.2.5.2 Hazard Evaluation Hazard evaluation is the process of identifying initiating events that can lead to accidents involving the hazards screened in from the hazard identification process (Section 4.2.5.1), qualitatively determining the consequences of such accidents, estimating the initiating event frequencies, comparing the consequences with threshold values, and identifying the controls needed to prevent such accidents or to mitigate their consequences. The objective of this process was to identify AQ SSCs and the limiting initiating events that could exceed EGs. Because of its importance to the accident analysis, the selection of limiting initiating events is presented separately (Section 4.2.5.3). The process used for the hazard evahiation was called Process Hazard Analysis (PrHA) and i': outlined in Figure 4.2-2. The PrHA was a largely qualitative process for evaluating hazards that exceed the PrHA threshold as determined during the hazard identification process. One of several evaluation techniques were used for the PrHA, depending on the complexity of the process. The evaluation technique includes justification. The PrHA identified the initiating events and hazard combinations that could result in consequences that exceed the PSOA thresholds listed in Table 4.2-3.
In the first step of the hazard evaluation process, an appropriate analysis technique was determined and applied to the facility and its associated hazards. Several standard techniques are well documented in the industry and provide acceptable methods for performing a PrHA. Some of these analysis techniques include What If, Checklist, Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Fault Trees, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. The type of analysis selected depended on the hazards present and the complexity of the facility.
The second step of the PrHA process was to evaluate the hazards present that. if released, could exceed the PrHA threshold. Any facility operations and/or controls that could be used to prevent or mitigate an initiating event were also identified. Facility safety programs were also considered and 4.2-10
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0315 included as potential controls for prevention and mitigation. For hazards related to nuclear criticality, the PrHA identified criticality as a hazard of concern and relied on the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS)
Program (see Section 5.2) to evaluate the hazards related to accidental criticality. The NCS Program is responsible for identifying the controls necessary to address the double-contingency principle for criticality safety. For fire-related hazards associated with the facility or process, the PrHA identified any specific controls deemed necessary to prevent a fire from causing a significant release of the hazard (s).
The Fire Protection Program (which includes an on-site fire department (see Section 5.4)] is responsible for ensuring that sufficient preventive and mitigative controls are in place to minimize the risk of a fire-related event. In addition, for areas with a criticality concern, fire-fighting techniques in these facilities are coordinated with the NCS Program.
The next step of the hazard evaluation process was to develop the following information for each hazard that, if released, could result in unmitigated consequences exceeding the PrHA threshold:
Process parameter of interest Initiating events Initiating event frequencies (Table 4.2-1)
Qualitative consequence categories (Table 4.2-4)
Preventive and mitigative controls Threshold analysis Providing this information for all PrHAs provided consistency in the analysis results independent of the analysis method (e.g., What If, HAZOP) chosen.
The preventive and mitigative controls identified in the PrHA provide an indication of the defense-in-depth provided by the facility for potential accidents. Programs and plans were also used in the PrHA process to provide preventive and mitigative functions in addition to the facility SSCs. These programs and plans include the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, Radiation Protection Program, Chemical Safety Program, Fire Protection Program, Emergency Plan, Quality Assurance Program Description, etc. They may apply to any facility in which a relevant hazard is identified, and they provide administrative controls to support defense-in-depth. The programs and plans and their purposes are described in SAR Chapter 5 and Volume 3 of the Certification Application.
To summarize, hazard evaluation resulted in the identification of controls that can help prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of the postulated initiating events. These controls were then reviewed
~
and a summary of their importance to the hazard analysis is presented in Section 4.2.6. Next, the criteria outlined in Section 4.2.2 were used to determine which controls should be classified as AQ. Those controls that require coverage in the TSRs were then determined using the criteria outlined in Section 4.2.3. Initiating events that resulted in accidents that could exceed a PSOA threshold are also identified as possible limiting initiating events and are evaluated as described in Section 4.2.5.3, 4.2-11
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0315 4.2,5.3 Accident Selection The objective of the accident selection portion of the hazard evaluation was to identify a representative set of events for accident analysis. This representative set of events is termed " limiting initiating events" in the remainder of this analysis. A " limiting initiating event" is defined as follows:
An initiating event that can have unmitigated consequences that exceed the PSOA threshold.
The initiating event results in the most limiting change in a process parameter of interest for the applicable frequency category.
The essential protective controls (i.e., those required to meet the Evaluation Guidelines, if possible) for controlling the initiating event are unique for each event identified by the first two items above.
The process for determining the limiting initiating events consisted of five steps (Figure 4.2 3):
l 1.
Develop facility operating modes l.
2.
Identify specific hazard states for each hazard 3.
Develop operating mode-hazard-hazard state matrix
}
4.
Develop initiating event-operating mode-hazard-hazard state matrix 5.
Select and defm' e limiting initiating events n
The development of specific facility operating modes was key to accomplishing this part of the analysis. These operating modes are also used in the TSRs. These modes were used to ensure that all combinations of operations, hazards, and equipment configurations were considered.
The next step of the process was to define the hazard states for each of the hazards that could result in the PSOA threshold being exceeded. For some hazardous materials, the physical state (e.g.,
solid, liquid, gas) has a direct bearing on the potential consequences should a releas: occur. Therefore, identification of the hazard state (s) of interest was required. UF is a primary hazard of interest for the GDPs, and its physical state has a significant impact on potential consequences. The quantity of material at risk was determined by the normal operating mode and the initial conditions at the time of the event.
Once the operating modes and hazard states were identified, a matrix was defined that identified the hazard and hazard state (s) applicable to each operating mode. This matrix was based on facility operations and discussions with facility personnel. This matrix was used to ensure that each initiating event considered the hazard condition and operating condition that could be applicable.
Initiating events from the PrHA that could exceed the PSOA consequence thresholds (Table 4.2-3) were considered with each operating mode and hazard state for which they were applicable. This information was used to develop the combinations as illustrated in the example in Table 4.2-5. This matrix, which includes the operating modes, hazard states, and initiating events along with the process parameters of interest, provides a systematic method of identifying the complete spectrum of hazards, hazard states, operating modes, and initiating events that may result in accidents with consequences of 4.2-12 l
' ~ - -
_ l
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 interest. The hazard matrix provides the foundation for detailed analysis to determine the TSRs, system classifications, and accident analyses. Each specific combination required analysis to determine whether protective action is required to prevent exceeding an Evaluation Guideline. An example of one combination taken from Table 4.2-5 follows:
Process parameter of interest-pressure increase.
Initiating event-steam control valve fails to open.
Operating modes-heating and sampling.
Ilazard state for each mode-liquid.
=
The matrix combinations were evaluated to determine the minimum set of controls that could prevent exceeding the Fialuation Guidelines should the event occur. The combination that results in the most severe consequences (i.e., bounds all other initiating events by consequence) is identified as the limiting initiating event for that combination.
Each combination of initiating event, hazard state, and operating mode was reviewed as described for the operational analysis task (Section 4.3.1.1). Defining the limiting initiating events for a facility i
l required consideration of the integrated response of the facility to each initiating event without any mitigative action. If the initiating even: could result in a parameter change with unmitigated consequences that exceed any Evaluation Guideline for the applicable frequency category, the initiating event was a candidate for a limiting initiating event. The definition of a limiting initiating event described above was I
used to finalize the set of limiting initiating events. The resulting set of limiting initiating events was subjected to the detailed accident analysis described in Section 4.3.2. Initiating events that exceed the PSOA thresholds and are not limiting initiating events are documented in the analysis for the facility with justification provided for them-being bounded by the limiting events along with the controls necessary to support meeting the Evaluation Guidelines.
4.2-13
_ SAR PORTS PROPOSED
- August 17,1997 iRAC 97XO315
- Table 4.2-1. Initiating Event Frequency Categories.
l-Operating Annual Condition Description Frequency (f) ~
' Normal Operation Operations that are planned to occur
/>llyr i-(OC-1) regularly in the course of facility operation (i.e., operating modes).
Anticipated Event initiating events of moderate frequency 10'2/yr 5 f < 1/yr -
(OC-2) :
that may occur one or more times during the life of the facility.
Evaluation Basis Event Initiating events which are not expected 104/yr <f < 10'2/yr (OC-3)-
to occur during the life of the facility but that are postulated because their
= consequences would include the potential for the release of significant amounts of radioactive material and because they represent upper bounds on failures or accidents with a probability of occurrence sufficiently high to require consideration,
- SAR-PORTS.
-PROPOSED
_ August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0315 Ji
- Table 4.2-2. Evaluation Guidelines.
Operating Condition Plant Evaluation Guidelines Normal _
Anticipated Evaluation Operation Events Basis Events (OC 1)
(OC2)
(OC-3).
I' EG 1: Radiological Dose l-
' For the Offsite Public, the normal 10 CFR 20.1301 5 rem TEDE 25 rem TEDE operaton orinitiating event shalbe controNed such that the radiological l
L dose is within 10 CFR 20 Emits for OC 1 and within the guideline values identified for OC-2 and 0C 3, For Onsite Personnel, the normal 10 CFR 20.1201 No hfe-No life-operation or initiating event shaR be threatening or threatening or controlled such that the radiological serious health senous health dose is within 10 CFR 20 limits for effects to onsite effects to onsite OC 1 and does not result in life-personnelfrom personnelfrom threatening or sanous liealth effects the release of the release of for OC-2 and OC-3.
radioactive radioactive materials materials EG 2; ' Nonradiological Dose For the Offsite Public, the normal 10 CFR 20.1301 10 mg U 30 mg U operation or initiating event shan be controlled such thatthe nonradologicaldoseis within 10 CFR 20 Imrts for OC-1 and wrthin the guideline values identified for t
- OC 2 and OC-3.
For Onsde Personnel, the normal 10 CFR 20.1201 No hfe-No life-operation or inr!)atng event shoQ be threatening or o.reatening or controHed such that the serious health serious health nonradiological dose is within effects to onsite effects to onsite 10 CFR 20 limits for OC-1 and does personnelfrom -
personnelfrom not resultin life-threatening or the release of the release of serious health effects for OC-2 and radioactve' radioactive OC 3.
materials
- matenals
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 Table 4.2-2. (continued)
Operating Condition Plant Evaluation Guidelines Normal Anticipated Evaluation Operation Events Basis Events (OC-1)
(OC-2)
(OC 3)
EG 3:
Pressure / Temperature The normal operaton or initiating Maintain Maintain Primary event shall be controlled within the temperature pressure below containment pressure and temperature limits within the design MAWP (or system pressure identfied.
rating. Maintain design ratng) less than or pressure below plus the ASME equal to system MAWP or design cr de allowable hydrostatic test pressure ratng stresses for pressure (if MAWP is not overpressure available dunng protecton normal operation)
EG 4: Double Contingency Principle The normal operaton or initiatng Applies Applies EG 4 does not event shall be controlled within the appy to OC 3 guidelines of the double contingency principle.
EG 5:
Initial Conditions The normal operation shall be Applies EG S does not EG 5 does not controlled so that there is not a apply to OC 2 apply to OC-3 condition outside the accident analysis (i.e., maintain inital condrtions).
EG 6: Control Atea Habrtabihty The initiatng event shall be EG 6 does not Applies Applies controlled to ensure habitability of a apply to OC-1 required control area is sufficiently maintained to accomplish the required operator acton,
m
$5-o :=
cm Table 4.2-3. Screening Thresholds.
M$.
o4-
' W v1 v.
Onsite Onside Docusment Type Radiological Neeradiological Radiological NonE " "- ;" al c
Preliminary llazard s 40 CIR 302.4 s 40 CIR 302.4 N/A'
'N/A Screening Analysis Statement -
> 40 CFR 302.4 and
> 40 CFR 302.4 and N/A
_N/A
< DOE-STD-1027-92 qualitative and Category 3 limits con q - wouki not result in life-tlueatening health cfTects close to the y
M event O
Process llazards 2 DOE-STD-1027-92
' Qualititative N/A
.N/A b
Analysis Category 3 limit::
consequences that
,t could result in life-O threatening healdi effects close to the event Plant Safety :
2 25 rem anywhere Qualitative 25 rem Qualitative Operational Analysis.
onsite or 2 DOE-STD-consequences that cong-that 1027-92 Category 2 '
could resultin life-cookiresult in limits threatening health irreversible or other cfTcx:ts beyoralthe serious heakh effects -
immediate facility thatcoukiimpair area ability to take protective action g
$=
.U
SAR. PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 Table 4.2 4 Qualitative Consequence Categories.
Screening Consequence thresliold code Description execeded NONL 1here are no radiologkal or nontaduilogkal effects for this everit (ie., no None release of the huard will occur)
MINR Radiologkal eflects are minor (e g, release of material frem contaminated Pils. radiological equipment), Radlation Protection Program is sufficient to convol the huard.
MINT Nonradiologkal efTects are minor (e s, resentble healtn iffects). Chemkal PilS. nonradlologkal Safety Program is sufficient to control the hazard.
MINRT Radiological and nonradiologkal elTects are minor. Administruthe control Pilk. radiological &
programs (Radiation Protection and Chemical Safety) are sufficient to control nonradiologkal the huard 1.OWOR Radiologkal quantities could exceed DOL STD 1027 92 Category 3 levels, PrilA. radiological but off46te radiological eficcts are negligible.
' ')WOT On46te nonradiologkal efTects could result in life threniening health eflects in PrilA.
area operating personnel. Ucyond the immediate area, only resersible health nonradiological effects are credible.
VRT Radlologkal quantities could escred IXE$1D 1027 92 Category 3 lesels, PrilA. radiologkal &
but off46te radiologkul effects are negligible, On-site nontadiologkal effects nonradiologkal could result in life threatening health etTects in area operating personnel.
Deyond the immediate area, only reversible health effects are credible MO!X)R On ante radlological etiects could escced 25 rem at the facility.
PSOA. on site radiological MO!X)T onaite nonradiologkal effects could result in life-threatening health effects P50A on site beyond the immediate area.
nonradiologkal MODRT On4lte radiological effects could ciceed 25 rem at the facility and otshe PSOA on4ite nonradiological effects could result in life threatening health effects beyond radiological &
the immediate area.
nonradiological OllR2 OIT4ite radiologkal esposure could escced 5 rem.
PSOA. otT4lte radiologkal OllT2 OIT site nonradioloskal effects could result in irreversible health effects PSOA. otT site nonradiological SIGRT Off4tte radiologkal exposure could exceed 5 rem and off-site nonradiologka: PSOA. off-site ellects cou1J result in irresersibic health eficcts radiological &
nonradiolockal Notes: Pils = Preliminary llazard Screening; PrilA = Process ll,stards Analysis; PSOA = Plant safety Operational Analysis
i 1
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17.1997 RAC 97X0315 j
Table 4.2 5. Example initiating Event-Openting hiode-Ilazard State hiatrix, e
Autoclave Autoclave open standby IIcating Sampling Anticipated operating operating opresting operating l
Initiating event mode anode taode mode llazard state l'ressure lucrease Autoclave steam Liquid Liquid control valve falls open Temperature increse Fires All states All states All states Liquid l'rlmary system integrity Minor lenks of All states All states Liquid UF. inside autoclave l
Minor leaks of All states All states All states Liquid UF, to atmoephere 1
j
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--*-wrrw---- - -
-+----st*
w- - ' -
=-n-**a-&-2 i.A
~ no-w
--~r-o-
e-r--
r--
e w
i SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 iPHs i
I i
i 1-1 identify feellities for i
I enelyele I
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a Perform llazard Evaluation (see Figure 4.2 2)
Figure 4.21 Ilazard IdentlGcation as
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 Detonnine type of hasoni eneerste d
[ Type of \\
/
\\
4 o
u H n h*88'd Fl**ll' idenufy facetr (Fire motoriel operecens and (NCS coeir,is laeoivtes Prowctnpe Program) hasards from Re 4J 1 Presreal d
identih prosses pwometers of interset d
identih initiethg wents and causes b
n initiating eve Categortte initteting threshold frequency categortestion%
"# N"'""
ansfroke guedelinajs u
Queutethe Categores Threshold consequence unmstigated analysis resulte categones consequences rg e.w x
4 is
(,,, g,, p,gg identify preventNo PSCA and mitigetNo PSOA and c.cument certtrole thresholds r4,* >e T,se Perforin lladdas lattiagnon event selection (see Rgure 4J J)
Figure 4.2 2 Hazard Evaluation i
.,.., -... ~,
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17.1997 RAC 97XO315 Define normal operating modes ir Identify hazard states for hazards from Fig. 4.2 2 ir Develop operating mode Initiating event-hazard state matrix ir Identify limiting and non limiting taltlating events -
1
' m;>i o
Perform operational analysis on limitin8 tantiating even's (Fig. 4.31) ir n s' Figure 4.2 3 Limiting Initiating Event Selection
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 4.3 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS this section presents the development of the potential accidents identified in the accident selection portion of Section 4.2.6. Each limiting initiating event was evaluated to identify the essential safety actions and controls to suppon the EOs. Foi.ne limiting initiating events identified in Section 4.2.6, the accident analysis documents the most limiting scenario associated with the initiating event, operating mode, and hazard state. Additionally, the controls that require TSRs were also identified as a result of the analysis.
4.3.1 Accident Analysis Methodology The accident analysis methodology t: sed the operational analysis (OA) outlined in Figure 4.31 to develop the scenarios presented in this section. The OA was applied to each limiting initiating event, operating mode, and nazard state as identified in Section 4.2.6 of the hazard analysis to develop the scenarios. Once the OA was accomplished, the controls selected in the PrilA and OA were classified as described in Section 4.2.2. The methods used for developing source-tenn modeling and consequence analysis are described in Section 4.3.1.2.
4.3.1.1 Operational Analysis Each of the limiting initiating events was reviewed in detail to determine the required safety actions (Table 4.31) and controls necessary to suppon the Evaluation Guidelines (see Section 4.2.1). T he objectives of the Operational Analysis were as follows:
Evaluate normal operation and unmitigated initiating events to Identify essential safety actions.
Identify essential systems, structures, or components required to perform safety actions.
Evaluate essential system capabilities and supporting system' requirements (i.e., air, electrical).
Develop operating limits [i.e., safety limits (SLs), limiting condition settings (LCSs),
limiting conditions of operation (LCOs), and surveillance requirements (SRs)) and appropriate technical bases.
4.3.1.1.1 Essential Safety Actions Safety actions are defined as the ac: ions required to prevent exceeding the Evaluation Guidelines
- (EGs) for initiating events that could exceed the PSOA threshold. Table 4.3-1 lists typical safety actions used for the GDPs. Each safety action has a description of the function it provides for mitigation or prevention of a potential initiating event.
1
-4.3 1
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 The first objective of Operational Analysis-identification of essential safety actions-involved evaluating each limiting initiating event combination identified in the hazard analysis. Only safety actions required to prevent exceeding the EGs were identified. This evaluation used the EGs given in Table i
4.2 2, a consequence ccreening threshold analysis, and engineering judgment to determine whether a safety action is required to prevent exceeding the EGs.
l Each limiting initiating event combination, along with its associated unmitigated consequences, was compared with the EGs for the same frequency category to determine whether the EG could be exceeded, if no EG could be exceeded, justification is provided, and no additional analysis is required for that particular combination. For each combination that requires a safety action to prevent exceeding an EO, a safety action was selected, and appropriatejustification is provided. The combinations requiring safety actions are considered in the evaluation described in Section 4.3.1.1.2.
l 4.3.1.1.2 Essential Controls l
The second objecthe of Operational Analysis-identification of essential systems, structures, or components required to perform safety actions-was accomplished by using the results of the evaluation described in Section 4.3.1.1.1. The identified set of essential controls is the minimum set of controls necessary to support meeting the EGs, and tims it provides the primary input for Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) selection. The analysis addressed each combination of safety action, initiating event, operating rnode, and hazard state. For each safety action, the minimum set of controls required to accomplish it was selected. The essential controls that were selected during the evaluation were listed along with their respective safety functions. The scope of each control associated with performing the associated safety function was explicitly defined to support subsequent analyses of the system and to establish functional requhements.
4.3.1.1.3 Essential System Capabilities and Support Requirements When a sy: tem, structure, or component was selected as essential as described in Section 4.3.1.1.2, the installed configuration of the control is typically subjected to a more detailed review to verify the capability of the control to accomplish the required safety action (s)as follows:
Active controls selected that require TSRs were evaluated to identify the required components, their positions (e.g., valve positions), and the support systems required to accomplish the safety action (the analysis performed should be centered on the hardware only, with operator interface being the initiator for manually initiated systems).
Controls selected that were assumed to perform a safety function during events related to natural phenomena were evaluated as described in Section 4.3.1.3.
The discussion of results for essential system capabilities and support requirements is presented in Section 3.8.
4.3-2
L SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17. 1997 RAC 97X0315,97XO316 l
4.3.1.1.4 Operating Limits l
The final objective of the Operational Analysis-development of operating limits and appropriate technical bases-was accomplished using a three step process: (1) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) development, (2) Surveillance Requirements (SR) development, and (3) Safety Limits (SL) and Limiting Control Settings (LCS) development.-
LCO development, The first step, LCO development, used the identified essential controls described in Section 4.3.1.1.2. LCOs were derived by requiring essential active controls meeting the TSR selection guidelines (Section 4.2.3) to be operable in each operating mode and hazard state combination for which a safety action is required. This established the applicability statement and LCO statement for each control.
SR development. The second step SR development, used the qualitative analyses required by Section 4.3.1.1.3 to establish SRs to verify operability of the required control. SRs include appropriate testing requirements to ensure that each portion of the control can accomplish its required safety action.
Surveillance intervals are based on industry standards and on current testing intervals described for the GDps for similar SRs. Current testing intervals are based on historical information for the type of equipment being used in the GDps. Where historical evidence was not available, the current testing interval was used with a recommendation to trend any failures for potential changes to the testing intervals.
SL and LCS develogwnent. The final step, operating limit development, established the appropriate SLs and LCSs (if applicable) for each essential control. This step requires evaluation of each initiating event, operating mode, and hazard state to determine which combination results in the most stringent demand on the control. For systems requiring SLs and LCSs, an analysis of the limiting transient is performed and the results are used to establish the SL, LCS, and the associated technical bases. This may require specific transient response calculations to characterize system response to the -
initiating challenge and to provide a basis for any SL and LCS. Only controls selected to prevent an EDE, which could exceed the off site EGs, were typically considered for establishing an SL and LCS.
Operating limits for essential systems are presented in the TSRs.
4.3.1.2 Consequence Analysis Methodology This section summarizes the methods used to quantify the consequences of operational accidents, natural phenomena events, and external events selected in Section 4.2.6.L3. This section discusses the development and application of computer models that provided estimates of (1) source terms (Section 4.3.1.2.1), (2) in-building transport (Section 4.3.1.2.2), and (3) outdoor atmospheric transport (Section 4.3.1.2.3).
4.3.1.2.1 Source-Term Methodology This section discusses the source term methodology used in the SAR. Two models are described in this section: (1) the pipELEAR code which was used to estimate release rates from UF, cylinders, 4.3-3
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0316 and (2) the improved Multi-site Productivity Program (IMPP), which was used to predict pressures and interstage flow rates for each cell in the enrichment cascade.
4.3,1.2.1.1 PIPELEAK The PlPELEAK code is a variant of the CYLIND code developed by the NRC to estimate release rates for UF cylinders as detailed by NUREG/CR-4360 (Reference 1). The code simulates the release of UP. from a :ylinder through either a breach in the cylinder itself or through a broken or misvalved transfer piping system. There have been some improvements to the original version of CYLIND. The primary modifications involve the PIPSYS subroutine, which evaluated releases through a piping system.
The version of CYLIND documented la NUREG/CR-4360 would attempt to divide by zero in certain piping conngurations. These errors have been corrected, and the modifications are documented in a letter from J.11. Clinton to R. W. Schmidt (Reference 2). The PIPELEAK code used for this analysis is documented in Reference 3 and overcomes the shortcomings that existed in the original CYLIND code.
Estimating releases from cylinders is complicated by UF. phase behavior. Two or three phases of UF. may be present inside the cylinder. As UF, moves along the release pathway (e.g., broken transfer piping or a cylinder breach), the material's phase composition is likely to change, and special considerations are needed if the flow at any point in the pathway approaches the UF. triple point (see Figure 3.1.1 1). The P!PELEAK code uses mass and energy balances around the cylinder and associated piping, along with detailed UF, physical property data, to track the cylinder pressure as well as the phase and temperatu.te changes of bo'h the UF. remaining in the cylinder and the UF, released to the atmosphete. Also, the code offers the choice of assuming isentropic (i.e., constant temperature) or isenthalpic (i.e., constant heat) flashing (i.e., rapid conversion of UF. liquid to the solid and vapor phases) modes.
To estimate telease rates through a cylinder breach or transfer piping system PIPELEAK first assumes a UF velocity through the release path. The standard multiph.se flow calculations are performed to determine the pressure drop across each segment of the release path. The UF. velocity is corrected until the calculated pressure drop across the release path equals the actual pressure difference between the cylinder and the ambient air. The release rates calculated by PIPELEAK are reasonably consistent with those calculated by other multiphase release models, although the pure vapor alease rates generated by PIPELEAK are somewhat higher than rates calculated with standard equations for single-phase flow through an orifice.
Many of the potential releases modeled using PlPELEAK would involve cylinders with pressures above pure UF. vapor pressure at a specified temperature because of the presence of noncondensable gases. Because the PIPELEAK code is limited to handling pure UF. only, two model runs can be made to simulate the effects of noncondensable gas pressure. The first run (called the correct temperature run) l is made at the scenario temperature, with the vapor pressure of liquid UF, at this temperature. The second l
run (called the correct pressure run) is made at a higher temperature, providing a pure UF liquid vapor l
pressure at the desired scenario pressure. The correct pressure run is used to estimate the correct release l
rate while the liquid level in the cylinder is above the opening. Once the liquid level in the cylinder falls below the opening, the noncondensable gases would escape, and the release would continue as in the correct temperature run (the first run made). The amount of UF. release from a liquid source (e.g., a 4.3-4 i
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 source with the liquid level in the cylinder above the opening) would be taken from the correct temperature run because the higher temperature in the correct pressure case would overestimate the height of the liquid in the cylinder because of the additional thermal expansion of liquid UF..
4.3.1.2.1.2 Improved hjulti-site Productivity Program The improved hiulti site Productivity Program (th1PP) is a standard productivity code for use at the GDPs. This code was used to prepare flowsheet data for PORTS operating at its nameplate power level (2260 htW). The flowsheets provide pressures and interstage flow rates for each cell in the enrichment cascade. 'these data were used to estimate cell inventories and potential release rates from line ruptures in a cell due to closing of a B line block valve while the A line valve remains open. The following equation is a curve-fit to these flowsheet data:
r,N.tr_.p )l lj (1) lyr. Arst y
where INV is the mass of UP. In the involved stages (Ib),
MSP is the mass per stage pressure equal to 65.3 lb UF. / stage psia, Py is the normal high side pressure equal to 21.0 psie.
L P,,, is the maximum pressure at the closed block valve (psia), and I
N is the number of stages with elevated pressure.
4.3.1.2.2 In Building Transport hiet! nlology This section discusses the in-building transport methodology used in the SAR. The methods described within this section are for UF. releases that occur inside the process buildings, specifically Building X 333 at PORTS. When UF, is released into the process building air, it will undergo an exothermic chemical reaction with water vapor to fonn UO F and HF. The in-building transport 22 methodology was used to estimate the amount of UO F and ilF retained in the building and, conversely.
2 2 the amount of these materials released into the atmosphere that may be dispersed downwind.
4.3.1.2.2.1 Background on Previous hiethods For previous GDP safety studies, a lumped parameter model was developed by Williams (Reference 4) to evaluate in-building transport from releases of UF. Inside a process building. The model hicluded treatment of UF. in solid, liquid, and vapor phases, and treatment of HF and water in the liquid and vapor phases. Polymerization of HF was also employed in the Williams model, referred to as the cascade-summer (CSCDSht) model, because the model was developed to estimate in building transport of UF, and its reaction products with summer ventilation rates in the process buildings.
The CSCDShi model solves mass and energy balance equations for a compartment with a single-volume representation; in CSCDShi, UF. released from process building piping is assumed to flash instantaneously to solid and vapor. The solid UF. is assumed to be dispersed uniformly throughout the mixing volume C e., the entire process building) and subjected to gravitational settling only, neglecting 4.3-5
N SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 other mechanisms (e.g. agglomeration). The mass of solid UF, particles (Am,,) that is removed from the in-building air over time (t) is calculated as:
s. y vias,
(2)
Am
%here m, is the particle mass (g),
V is the inside volume of the process building (m'),
v is the aerosol settling velocity (fixed at 0.01 m/s), and 2
A is Door area (m ).
The CSCDShi model assumes that process building volume is well represented by simple geometry (e.g., the process building is divided into control volumes equal to the size of one unit), thereby ignoring spatial effects of particle distribution and deposition on equipment and piping surfaces. Because of the Ihnitations of the CSCDSM model(i.e., consideration of gravitational settling only with a constant
+
settling velocity of 0.01 m/s and single-volume, simple-geometry representation of the process buildings),
new computer modules were developed to simulate in-building transport. These new modules were linked to the MELCOR computer code (Reference 5) and are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.1.2.2.2.
4.3.1.2.2.2 In Building Transport Methods Used for this SAR The hiELCOR model computer code, developed by the NRC, is widely used for simulating severe accidents in nuclear reactor facilities. htELCOR is written in a highly modular fashion, in which modules may be changed or replaced, allowing the user to focus on their particular application. This modular nature facilitated the development of an in-building transport model for use for the PORTS X-333 process building. For the remainder of this section, the in-building transport model will be referred to simply as hiELCOR: however, the remaining discussion will focus on the new modules incorporated 4
into the model that deal specifically whh transport of UF. in the X 333 process building. The following information is a summary from Kim et al. (Reference 6).
a.
Develomnent and Features of NELCOR The htELCOR code was first used to develop a single-volume representation of the process building, and the results were used to benchmark the code with the CSCDSh!. As with CSCDShi, the htELCOR model was developed for the summer ventilatica configuration. During summer, the ventilation system works as a once through system in which air is drawn into the operating floor of the process building and then forced to the cell floor by a large blower (as shown in Figure 4.3-2). The summer ventilation system results in the largest amount of material mass (e.g., UO F and HF) to be released to 22 the outside atmosphere after a potential accident, h1ELCOR estimates for the single-volume representation t
were found to be comparable to the CSCDSh1 model (Reference 6),
J The next step examined the effect of finer nodalization by specifying the cell housing as a separate volume in order to observe spatial effects from multi volume calculations on particle and vapor transport (e.g., three control volumes were used to simulate a single unit in the process building). This examination 4.3-6
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 revealed that far fewer UO F particles were estimated to be released to the outside atmosphere than were 2
estimated for the single volume representation (i.e., more particles settled in the building). Ilowever, the review neglected many of the spatial effects of air flow distribution and mixing behavior that would occur in the entire process building under the summer ventilation system. For the purpose of the SAR, the entire process building was divided into a much finer nodalized system, discussed in more detail in the next section.
b.
MELCOM Nodalization of the Process Building Figure 4.3 3 shows the control volume and unit layout of the process buildings at the GDPs, specifically Building X 333 at PORTS, containing eight units, and Building C 337 at PODP, containing six units. Each unit is combined into a single control volume, except for Unit 4. Because the fifth ceil in Unit 4 (note each unit contains ten cells) is the postulated location of the pipe break, the volume cf this unit is finely nodalized to capture the temporal and spatial effects of the particle and vapor dispersion in the inunediate vicinity of the source. Specifically, the cell floor area of Unit 4 is divided into three-story control volumes, as seen in Figure 4.3-4. The first floor consists of 20 control volumes because each cell at this level has 2 control volumes: (1) the cell housing and (2) the cell floor volume outside the cell housing. The second story was nodalized into ten control volumes, one corresponding to each -
cell, and the third story volume is treated as a single large control volume. Several other control volumes serve to model the outside atmosphere and the released source term (l.c., the material released into the environment). Also, several flow paths connect the control volumes as described in detail in Kim et al.
(Reference 6).
c.
Modelhw of Cell llousinn Wall Leaka=e The cell housing wall is constructed of steel framing with 0.4 in. (1-cm) thick transite siding bolted in place. Ahhough the housing seams are tightly closed, the cell housing was not designed to provide continement of released UF. In the event of a line rupture inside the housing. The air inside the housing will heat up due to heat (both convective and radiative) from equipment surfaces such as compressors. A significant temperature difference between inside and outside the housing develops buoyancy forces, convecting air naturally through the cracks in the housing, untightened seams, and other leak paths. As shown in Figure 4.3 5, three flow paths are assumed during steady state conditions (i.e.
nonnal operationi due to convection: (1) leak in at wall, (2) leak out at wall, and (3) leak out at ceiling.
When UF,is released into the housing cell, a 7-by 3 ft (2.1 by 0.91 m) door is assumed to swing open to the outside because no restraint is installed to restrict the door from opening (Reference 6). Therefore, the door is assumed to stay open during the MELCOR simulations. This adds an additional flow path (Figure 4.3 5) wrt cf the cell housing.
To obtain an appropriate size of the four cell housing flow paths, localized, three-dimensional flow simulations were performed using the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) tool, CFDS FLOW 3D (a conuucrcially available program developed by AEA Technology Engineering Software, Inc). For the CFDS-FLOW 3D simulations, a single cell housing was divided into about 50,000 small control volumes (Reference 7). In the simulations, particles were uniformly sourced into the cell housing as tracers; however, particle deposition was not considered due to limitations of the code. A steady-state (i.e.,
normal cell operation) simulation was established, and then a transient (i.e., after a UF. release) 4.3-7
l l
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 simulation was performed. Results of the CFDS FLOW 3D steady state simulation showed that 50% of-the particles released into the cell housing are exhausted through the roof vents, and the remaining 50%
exit through the motor exhaust or are passed on to an adjacent cell. The transient simulation was then run using the steady state simulation as the initial conditions, and the results showed that 70% of the released particles would eset.pe through the roof vent due to the increased convection caused by the exothermic
- heat generated by the UF reactions. To produce results compatible with CFDS FLOW 3D, input into the MELCOR model that specified the four cell housing leakage flow paths (Figure 4.3 5) was calibrated to match the transient simulation results from CFDS FLOW 3D.
d.
Sensible Enerny and Chemical Reaction of Gaseous UF, Releases into the Cell flousinn As gaseous UF. is released, the cell housing is subjected not only to exothermic energy generated from the UP. hydrolysis reaction, but also to sensible energy carried by the UF. gas. The magnitude of -
the UF. gas sensible energy is a function of the temperature of the UF,. Tu, at the release point. The enthalpy of gaseous UF., liv, is obtained from Williams (Reference 4):
43.2614 9.21307 = 10:Ty. 6.26265 = 10*Tj 2
3.0939 = 10'TJ2gZw) v where 11, is given in Btu /lb and Tu is given in *R. The compressibility factor. Z, is calculated as r,i l
z.
(4)
Tj. 4.8923 = lo'r where p is the pressure (psla).
The gaseous UF. is assumed to mix instantaneously with the air in the control volume and
- undergoes an instantaneous chemical reaction:
UF,. 211,0 - UO F, 411F 0.33Mng of UF, reacted (5) 3 liowever, this chemical reaction is limited in magnitude by the availability of moisture in the air.
MELCOR simulates the moisture limited UF. reaction process through a series of control functions designed to monitor moisture content in each control volume atmosphere, to calculate the UF. reaction rate limited by the moisture content, and to determine the rate of moisture consumption in the control volume. Such amount of moisture consumption is used as input to the Control Volume Hydrodynamics (CVil) package of MELCOR as a mass sink in corresponding control volumes Because each control volume is connected, the air flow path is updated by air being circulated into the control volume. Any unreacted UF. gas is subjected to convection and transport into neighboring control volumes and to chemical reactions with the moisture present in those neighboring volumes.
4.3-8
)
I SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 e.
Par 11cle Transport Model The radionuclide package of MELCOR simulates many of the particle transport phenomena that may occur in the process buildings:
Particle condensation, evaporation, agglomeration, deposition, and scavenging by engineering safety features (e.g., filter trapping, pool scrubbing, spray washout).
Particle movement, as the particles grow by agglomeration, to larger size bins through the use of multiple particle size bins that are user-defined.
Gravitational settling, Brownian diffusion, thermophoresis (i.e., a process caucing migration of l
particles from higher to lower temperatures), and diffusiophoresis (i.e., deposi' ion induced by l
condensation of water vapor onto structural surfaces) deposition mechanisms.
For simulations of accidental UP. releases, the effect of gravitational settling dominates other deposition processes (e.g., thennophoresis and diffuslophoresis) by 1 to 2 orders of magnitude (Reference 6).
For MELCOR calculations, UO F is assumed always to be a solid, with initial particle size 2 2 assumed to be a log normal distribution between 0.4 and 2.5 pm. This particle-size range is based on guidance from the uranium particle-size distribution measurements taken at Sequoyah Nuclear Fuel Plant (Reference 8). According to these air filter measurements, most of the uranium particles fell in the size range between 0.4 and 2.5 pm, with a peak between 1.3 and 1.6 pm. Experiments by Pickrell (Reference
- 9) and Lux (Reference 10) corroborate the data obtained from the Sequoyah measurements.
For the deposition calculations, the surfaces of equipment and piping are included in addition to the floor surfaces. The gravitational settling model of MELCOR calculates particle mass settled on heat structure surfaces (e.g., floors, equipment, walls) based on a settling velocity that accounts for various indoor atmospheric conditions J.g., temperature and relative humidity). Ilowever, the model does not track individual particle paths for settling. Consequently, the model does not acknowledge the relative altitude of various structures in the panicle-settling calculation (i.e., particle settling length is not factored into the calculation). Therefore, to account for the particle-settling length, equipment and piping surface measurements were increased to twice what would actually be in the cell housing. This change has the effect of uniformly distributing the surfaces throughout the different elevations in the control housing volume.
4.3.1.2.3 Atmospheric Transport Methodology This section discusses the atmospheric transport methodology used in the SAR. Potential accidental releases of UF. to the atmosphere are a more likely threat to human health and safety than other potential, but unlikely, environmental transport pathways (i.e., water and soil). Four topics important in the development of the atmospheric transport methodology are summarized: (1) historical accidental atmospheric releases of UF., (2) reactions and dispersion of UF. in the atmosphere (3) backgramd on previous methods used to auess releases of UF., and (4) atmospheric transport methods used for this SAR.
4.3 9 1
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SAR. PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 t
RAC 97X0316 4.3.1.2.3.1 Illstorical Accidental Atmospheric Releases of UF.
This section discusses three historical accidental atmospheric releases of UP.: the Comurhex plant l
release, the PORTS occurrence, and the Sequoyah Fuels Corporation occurrence. Because there have been virtually no controlled field data experiments for large releases of UF. to the atmosphere, these t
incidents helped provide an understanding of the potential downwind dispersion associated with an accidental release and were germane in formulating the accident analysis methodology.
4.3.1.2.3.1.1 Comurhex Plant Release On July 1,1977, a large release of UP occurred at the Comurhex plant in Pierrelatte, France
[
(Reference 11), in which a valve ruptured on a cylinder heated to 194-203*F (90-9$'C). Liquid UP. was released for 10-15 min, until the liquid level in the container had fallen below the valve opening. After this, UP. escaped in the gas phase until the release was contained 15 min later. In the total release time of 30 min,16.000 lb (7100 kg) of UF. was released into the atmosphere. The weather favored rapid dilution because the atmosphere was unstable (warm and sunny conditions), and tne wind speed was 19 l
mph (9 m/s) (Reference 12).
Most of the uranium released was recovered within a distance of 2000 ft (600 m), suggesting that I
most of the solid uranium compounds settled in a relatively small area [about 0.25 acres (0.10 hectares)].
At 2000 ft (600 m) downwind of the release, ambient air monitoring showed that atmospheric concen-5 trations of uranium were about 10 mg/m, and ilF concentrations exceeded the French workplace limit of 2.4 mg/m out to a distance of 3900 ft (1200 m) (Reference 13). About 7 percent of the uranium was 5
not recovered and is believed to have dispersed into the atmosphere.
4.3,l.2.3.1.2 PORTS Occurrence On March 7,1978. a liquid filled 14 ton UF cylinder ruptured in a PORTS cylinder yard (Lot No. X 745 B) after being dropped about 9 in (23 cm). At the time of release, light snow and freezing rain were falling, and about 0.6 in (1.5 cm) of snow covered the ground in the cylinder yard. The tunbient air temperature was about 32'F (0*C), with the wind blowing from the northeast at about 5 mph (2 m/s). The distance from the release point to the nearest site boundary in the direction of the wind was about 1.4 mi (2.2 km).
Within I h, about 21,100 lb (9500 kg) of UF. [14,300 lb (6400 kg) of uranium) was released from the ruptured cylinder. About 1200 lb (550 kg) of uranium was recovered from the snow in the cylinder yard. About 2500 lb (1130 kg) of uranium was carried by melted snow to the plant's west drainage ditch, of which 1500 lb (680 kg) was transported through the ditch and was released into the Scioto River and about 450 kg (1000 lb) was retained in the ditch impoundment. Therefore,10,300 lb (4720 kg)(about 76 percent of the uranium released) left the area as an altbome plume and dispersed in
. the atmosphere (Reference 14).
Environmental sampling after the release showed that significant soll and water contamination were confined to distances of a few hundred meters from the release point (Reference 14). Five workers who drove through the plume on the perimeter road [about 7218 ft (2200 m) from the release point]
4.3-10 I
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l SAR FORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0316 showed no hannful amount of uranium in their urine samples and experienced only brief discomfort (e.g.,
eye irritation) frorn llF exposure. Ilecause on site aquatic and terrestrial biota were exposed to elevated uranium and IIF concentrations for only a short time, environmental impacts were minimal. Also, no public exposure was reported (Reference 14).
Observers of this release indicate that the visible portion of the plume (i.e., solid UF, and UO F )
2 2 hovered over the ground for the first few hundred meters, mixing very little in the vertical. At about 980-1300 ft (300-400 m) downwind (southwest) of the release point, the plume stretched vertically, and the plume centerline lifted off the ground (Reference 14). Observations of the deposition of solid UF. and UO,F, within the first few hundred meters from the release point agree qualitatively with these observations. The snow amt freer.ing rain that were falling at the time may have contributed significantly l
to the amount of uranium deposited.
4.3.1.2.3.1.3 Sequoyah Fuels Corporation Occurrence On January 4,1986, at Sequoyah Fuels Corporation in Gore, Oklahoma, 30,800 lb (14,000 kg) of UF. was released from a 14 ton cylinder that had ruptured because of overfilling. The rupture was about 4 ft (1.2 m)long, and most of trie UF. was released in less than 1 min (Reference 12). At the time of release, winds were from the north-northwest at about 18 mph (8 m/s) with gusts to about 30 mph (14 m/s). Atmospheric stability, not measured on site, was assumed to be neutral due to the high wind speeds (Reference 8).
Estimates of uranium recovery rant;ed from 35 perunt to 50 percent; most of the uranium was found on the ground near the release point as solid UF. and UO F. The amount of uranium that was 2 2 transported offsite [i.e., at distances greater than about 980 ft (300 m)) in an atmospheric plume was between about 7300 and 10,000 lb (3300 and 4700 kg).
One worker died from liF exposure as a result of the release. Several other workers experienced reversible effects of acute llF exposure, including skin burns and irritation to the eyes, mucous membranes, and respiratory tract. No symptoms of kidney injury occurred from chemical exposure to uranium, although nine workers exceeded NRC's regulatory limit for uranium Inhalation (10.0 mg over a 1.wk period)(Reference 12) An air monitor at the site boundary directly downwind of the release
[about 984 ft (300 ra) from the release] measured a maximum ground level uranium concentration of 120 mg/m' (aseraged over a 10-min period) (Reference 8). Another monitor, located about 5250 ft (1600 m) downwind of the release, recorded a maximum uranium concentration over the same averaging 3
time of 12 mg/m (Reference 8). This monitor was located about 1300 ft (400 m) from the projected plume centerline (Reference 8). Computer modeling performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory estimated that maximum liF concentrations at receptors located off site were about 15 mg/m 2
(averaged over a 20-min period) (Reference 8),
The worker killed during this release was on a scrubbing tower 165 ft (50 m) from the release point. Observations of the plume indicated that he was quickly enveloped in a dense, white cloud. The process building (the largest structure at the Sequoyah plant), positioned just downwind of the release point, was also engulfed by the white plume (Reference 8).
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SAR FORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 4.3.1.2.3.2 Reactions and Dispersion of UF,in the Atmosphere The following infonnation on UF, reactions and dispersion in the atmosphere is surnmarized from References 15,16, and 17. For more details, the reader is directed to these references, particularly Chapter 5 in Reference 17 and Chapter 2 in Reference 15.
At normal atmospheric temperatures and pressures, UF. exists only as a gas or solid (see Figure 3.1.1 1, UP. phase diagram). Liquid UP exists at pressures exceeding about 1.6 atm (160 kPa) and temperatures exceeding 147'F (M'C). If exposed directly to atmospheric temperatures and pressures (e.g., during a breach of a heated 14-ton storage cylinder), liquid UF, will Dash (i.e., immediately partition) to a mixture of vapor and solid particles. The solid UF. will sublimate to the vapor fonn within a few minutes after release. The UP vapor, which is much denser than ambient alt, reacts exothermically with atmospheric water vapor entrained into the plume, forming IIF vapor and solid UO F :
2 3 UF.(g), 21{2O(g) - UO F (s), 411F(g)
(6) 3 3 This reaction releases about 25,000 Bru/lb mol (58 k.1/g-mol) of 110, which heats the plume. At the same 2
time, the sublimation of solid UP.to the vapor phase cools the plume. At normal atmospheric pressures, liF vapor is assumed to polymerize and depolymerize as an equilibrium mixture of the dimer, (liF)2, hexamer (IlF)., octamer (IIF)., and the liF il O compound as described by the following equations 2
(Reference 18):
211F. (11F),
(7) 611F - (liF).
(8) 811F - (liF),
(9) liF, !!:0 - (lif ell:0)
(10)
Figure 4.3-6 (Reference 17) shows the two-phase mixture of chemical species that may be present in a plume resulting from an atmospheric release of UP., Because of this two-phase mixture and the heating and cooling effects of the reactions and phase changes, the plume may alternate between negative, neutral, and positive buoyancy caused by varying plume density. Figure 4.3-7 (Reference 15) is an example of the special complications (i.e., those complications caused by the varying plume den >ity) in simulating dispersion. Figure 4.3 7 schematically represents a moderate velocity, vertical release of UF.
to the atmosphere. Although the plume is initially much denser than the ambient air, the momentum of the vertical release initially causes the plume to rise as it moves downwind, as shown in Region 1 of the figure. As the momentum slows, the plume may sink as shown in Region 2 of the figure, because the plume can be much denser than tne surrounding air, if it sinks all the way to the ground, the plume is r
designated a ground-hovering plume, as shown in Region 3 of the Ogure. During (and before) this ground-hovering plume phase, UF reactions with water vapor occur and release more heat than the heat removed by sublimation of solid UF. to the vapor phase. The net heat released and the entrainment of air may cause the plume to become less dense, in tum, the plume may rise, as shown in Region 4 of the Ogure. In Region 5, the plume becomes neutrally buoyant because concentrations of uranium and ilF are 4.3 12
1 l
SAR FORTS FROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97XO316 small, reactions are essentially complete, and the temperature is close to ambient. The Gaussian plume methodology for passive, nonbouyant plumes is appropriate to model plume behavior in Region 5.
l Many variations in plume trajectory shown may occur, as shown schematically in Figure 4.b7.
Depewng on the release rate and mass flow of the mixture, rapid entrainment of ambient air may cause the plume to become neutrally buoyant (Region 5) very quickly. Alternatively, the UP. mixture may be released downward, causing a strong interaction with the ground and a direct transition into a ground-hovering plume, represented in Region 3. For a pure UP. gas release, the plume density may decrease by as much as a factor of 12 (the ratio, about 350:29, between the molecular weights of UF. and dry air) between the release point and a downwind distance of a few hundred meters.
Equations (6) through (10) are the basic chemical reactions equations used in UF. chemistry modules Although included in the models, the tendency of IIF polymers to form in plumes resulting from UF. releases [Eqs. (7) through (10)) is minimized because liF concentrations are Senerally far below the concentrations of about 10% required for significant polymerization (Reference 19). Because the chemical reaction of UF. with water vapor proceeds at an extremely high rate (Reference 20), the UF.
hydrolysis reaction [ Equation (6)} dominates the overall reaction sequence, in other words, water vapor entrained into the plume will first react with UF., which is restricted by a mass transfer limited reaction rate (i.e., the limited mass transfer that occurs between the plume and ambient air at the edges of the plume) due to incomplete mixing (References 21 amd 22). Any remaining water vapor mixes into the plume and reacts with the liF created by the UF. hydrolysis reaction.
The mass transfer-limited reaction rate (hereafter called the turbulence limited reaction rate to confonn with previous conventions established in the literature, where turbulence indicates the turbulent edge of the plung not atmospheric turbulence), A (kmol/s ), of UF. and entrained water vapor is 2
assumed to be determined by the mixing properties of the expanding plume (Reference 15):
,, m, ' u, u,, '
(g3)
A
,2M, My where v, is the entrainment velocity (m/s).
A is the ratio of the plume cross-sectional area to plume circumference (m), and M, and M, are the molar flow rates (kmole/s) for water vapor and UF. vapor, respectively.
The entralnment velocity, v,, is on the order of 0.6 times the jet speed (m/s) or 0.6 times the ambient friction velocity (a reference velocity that depends on the nature of the surface over which the plume is traveling and the mean wind speed in a shallow layer above the ground surface) for a low-momentum, ground hovering plume. The ratio A is half the plume radius for a circular cross section.
4.3.1.2.3.3 Backgroumi on Previous Methods j
i This subsection discusses the different methodologies employed in the atmospheric transport analyses after a release of UF.. The purpose of this section is to establish a basis for selecting the 4.3-13
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 l
methodology for this SAR. Three previous analyses are discussed: (1) the analysis used in the 1985 PORTS FSAR (Reference 23), (2) the analysis recommended by the NRC (Reference 12), and (3) the analysis used by Loulslana Energy Services for the Claiborne Enrichment Center SAR (Reference 24).
4.3.1.2.3.3.1 1985 PORTS FSAR in 1978 existing atmospheric dispersion codes were surveyed to determine the availability of exisdng dispersion models that could be used to simulate atmospheric transport of a plume containing UP.
l and UF. hydrolysis products. At that time atmospheric plume dispersion was modeled almost exclusively by assuming a Gaussian distribution in both the vertical and cross wind (perpendicular to the horizontal wind component) directions. Because the standard Gaussian methodology does not accurately simulate key elements of UF. plume dispersion, such as chemical reactivity, release of the heat of reaction, and the density variations of a UF. plume, DOE funded the development of a UF, dispersion model. The code developed and used in the 1985 PORTS FSAR was called PLUMEA. The methods used to model UF, dispersion and the development of the code are detailed in Reference 15, in which updates to the algorithm are included and the model is renamed PLM89A: the special aspects of UF. dispersion are incorporated into the model. The model incorporates the following:
The exothermic reaction associated with the hydrolysis of UF. is taken into account.
A plume containing a mixture of UP. and its hydrolysis products may be positively, negatively, or neutrally buoyant, depending on the density, composition, and temperature.
A plume containing a mixture of Uri hydrolysis products may be either elevated or ground-hovering (gravity spreading).
Phase changes, such as UF. sublimation and condensation of hydrofluoric acid (a condensed mixture of IIF and water) and the associated consumption or release of heat are included.
The plume density may decrease by more than a factor of 12 as the UP. reacts with ambient moisture and is diluted by air entrained into the plume.
in addition to simulating the dispersion of UF, and its hydrolysis products, PLM89A can simulate the dispersion and atmospheric chemical reactions associated with releases of CIF. F, and llF.
3 2
For the 1985 FSAR. uranium and liF concentrations were calculated for atmospheric releases of UF. associated with accidents occurring in the uranium enrichment cascade. For this analysis, the released UP. was assumed to pass immediately through the ventilation system into the outdoor atmosphete.
Different release quantities of UF. were simulated. The results show that only a release of 20,000 lb (9000 kg) or more of UF. to the atmosphere would have toxic effects on personnel downwind of the large process buildings.
4.3.1.2.3.3.2 NUREG I140 The purpose of NUREG 1140 is to evaluate emergency preparedness requirements for NRC material licensees possessing large quantities of radioactive materials (e.g., the GDPs)(Reference 12).
NUREG 1140 establishes relatively simple calculations to determine radiation doses and chemical exposure that would occur after an accidental release at a fuel cycle facility. For the GDPs, NUREG 1140 recommends that a release of UF. from a hot (-250'F (120'C) or more] 14-ton cylinder be used to 4.3 14
l SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 i
establish emergency preparedness guidelines. This release was chosen because it represents the largest l
release of UP. from many possible accidents that were analyzed in two studies (References 25 and 26).
This release scermio is sirnilar to accidents that occurred at PORTS, the Sequoyah conversion plant, and the Comurhex plant.
NUREG il40 assumes that 21,000 lb (9500 kg) of UP. is released in 15 min due to the rupture outdoors of a heated 14 ton cylinder, in which 11,000 lb (4800 kg) of uranium and 3600 lb (1620 kg) of IIF become airborne. These altborne masses were calculated by conservatively assuming that all hydrolysis reactions and agglomeration and deposition of solid UO F, particles occur at the moment of 2
release. Also, NUREG ll40 assumes the plume centerline rises to a final height of 66 ft (20 m) within 660 ft (200 m) of the release because of the heat generated during the hydrolysis reactions. This plume height was chosen on the basis of PLM89A model estirnates (Reference 12). With these assumptions, the mass of uranium hihaled, I(kg), is calculated as 1 qu xB=1 (12)
G where qu is the released quantity of uranium (4800 kg),
B is the breathing rate (2.66 x 104 m /s),
8 x is the atmospheric concentration (g/m'), and G is the release rate (g/s).
Values for the atmospheric dispersion term : /G (s/m'), were directly obtained from a standard Gaussian plume model.
For liF exposure, NUREG-ll40 uses a similar calculation to calculate concentrations, x (kg/m'),
downwind of the release:
o 1
(13)
- 1. qn, x t x
G=
where War is the released quantity of IIF (1620 kg), and I is the release time (assumed to be 900 s).
Based on these equations, fixed values of downwind exposure were calculated for (1) very adverse meteorological conditions (i.e., atmospheric stability equal to F with a wind speed equal to 1 m/s) and (2) more typical (but not particularly favorable) meteorological conditions (atmospheric stability equal to D with a wind speed equal to 4.5 m/s) (Reference 12) From these calculations, NUREG ll40 concludes that consequences from chemical exposure of uranium and ilF are similar in severity.
Additionally, the consequences of chemical exposure are much greater than consequences resulting from radioactive dose received from uranium exposure. Tims, a uranium enrichment plant can be considered more of a potential chemical hazard than a radiation hazard. The assumptions used the NUREG 1140 analysis (e.g., maximum quantity released, minimum atmospheric dilution, receptor at the plume 4.3 15
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SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 centerline) to provide an extreme consequence estimate (i.e., estimates that result in the absolute maximum downwind exposure to the public) from the many types of releases that could occur at PORTS.
4.3.1.2.3.3.3 Loulslana Energy Services SAR in the Loulslana Energy Services SAR (Reference 24), two " worst case" UF, release scenarios were identified that resulted in off site impact. The first scenario was a storage yard fire, which was analyzed following NUREG ll40 (described in Section 4.3.1.2.3.3.2). The second scenario was an autoclave heater malfunction for which three different release cases were analyzed to determine offsite impacts: (1) plume dispersion for which there is no building confinement (i.e., the release occurs in an open field); (2) plume dispersion frem the facility stack (i.e., an elevated release) after the released material has mixed, reacted, and ratled within the building; and (3) plume dispersion from the doors and other openings on the sides of the building (i.e., a ground level release) after the released material has mixed, reacted. and settled within the building.
The three cases were simulated using (1) the NUREG 1140 modeling metod (as described above), (2) a modified version of the NUREG-ll40 modeling method where x/G values are obtained from NRC Regulatory Guide 1.145, Atmospheric Dispersion Afodelsfor Potential Accident Consequence Assessments at Nucimr Power Plants, and (3) the TRIAD UF. atmospheric dispersion model (Reference 26). Estimates from the TRIAD madel are much lower than those from the other two methods because TRIAD includes the effects of exothermic / endothermic chemical reactions on plume buoyancy as well as particle deposition and settling. Plume rise estimates among the three modeling methods were found to be especially significant in estimating downwind concentrations; a higher final plume height resulted in a lower ground level concentration.
4.3.1.2.3.4 Atmospheric Transport Methods Used in this SAR in 1992, then h1artin h1arietta Energy Systems, Inc. (hih1ES), sponsored a review of existing atmospheric dispersion models to determine the most appropriate basis for development of a model for predicting the consequences of an accidental UP. release. The review was conducted by the Aeronautical Research Associates Princeton (ARAP) Group and summarized in a report by Sykes and Lewellen (Reference 27). Five models were examined in detail by Sykes and Lewellen.
PLht89A-a UF. dispersion model developed by Lockheed h1artin Energy Systems, Inc. (LhtES, formerly htartin htarletta Energy Systems, Inc.) (Reference 15).
TRIAD-a UF. model developed by the Nation Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) Air Resource Laboratory (Reference 26).
IlGSYSTEht-a suite of codes that model dense gas dispersion and liF chemical and thenno-dynamic processes developed by Witlox et al. (Reference 28) of Shell Research Ltd. and available through the American Petroleum Institute (API).
ADAht-a dense gas model developed by Raj and htorris (Reference 29) for the United States Air Force.
_ SLAB-a dense-gas model developed by Ermak (Reference 30) and available from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
4.3 16
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SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 Sykes and Lewellen recommended the following two possible model development and modi 0 cation options because none of the five candidate models completely met the eleven requirements listed as relevant to safety analysis application:
Revise PLh189A's dense gas dispersion algorithms but retain its sophisticated treatment of UF.
chemistry and thermodynamics, or Revise llGSYSTEht-because it is widely accepted and includes llF chemistry--to include the UF, chemistry and thermodynamic modules employed by the PLh189A.
Sykes and Lewellen reported that the basis for selecting IIGSYSTEh! over SLAB and ADAh!
was not overly compelling. !!GSYSTEh1 and ADAh! had existing IIF chemistry modules that made them favorable to SLAB; however, ilGSYSTEh! has a more modular construction than ADAhi, which would ease import of UF, and chemistry modules. Furthemiore, the main module in llGSYSTEhi, llEGADAS, has undergone more extensive testing as a dense-gas model than ADAh! and therefore is more widely accepted.
After the ARAP review, hih1ES decided that the best course of action would be to rc,.se llGSYSTEh! on the basis of the model's existing heavy gas treatment, acceptance in the community, and the amount of work required to update PLh189A. The new flGSYSTEht/UP model, developed by llanna et al. (Reference 17) of Earth Technology Corporation under the sponsorship of th1ES, is a hybrid model containing the best attributes of the IIGSYSTEh! and PLh189A models. Figure 4.3 8 shows a schematic of the development of IIGSYSTEhi/UF..
The following sections discuss the development, major features, evaluation, and limitations of IIGSYSTEhi/UF.. See References 16,17,31, and 32 for more detailed information.
4.3,1,2.3,4.1 Development of IIGSYSTEht/UF.
IIGSYSTEh1 was originally developed by Shell Research, Ltd., in the mid-to-late H86: to simulate a wide variety of hazardous gas releases, including two-phase aerosol jets of IIF resul'.mg from ruptures of valves and pipelines on pressurized ilF tanks (References 28 and 33). The fhst version of IIGSYSTEht, released in 1990, incorporud the dense-gas dispersion model HEGADAS, which was developed in the late 1970s to simulate liquid spills and subsequent evaporation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liqueRed petroleum gas (LPG) (Reference 34) By the time it was incorporated into llGSYSTEht, llEGADAS had already undergone extensive evaluation and been approved by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as an alternative regulatory model (40 CFR 51, App, W).
In 1994 an updated version of IIGSYSTEh! (Version 3.0) was released by Shell Research Ltd.,
with several enhancements sponsored by API. Like IIEGADAS, HGSYSTEh! Version 3.0 was approved by the EPA as an alternative regulatory model (40 CFR 51, App. W) Development of IIGSYSTEh!
Version 3.0 was closely coordinated with development of IIGSYSTEht/UF. (Reference 17) All improvements to the Shell llGSYSTEh! model have been incorporated into llGSYSTEht/UF.. The final Shell technical documentation and user's guide contain descriptions of the UF. modules.
4.3-17
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SAR PORTS PROPOSED August l,1997 l
RAC 97XO316 As shown in Figure 4.3-8, the UF. modeling system is divided into three, interrelated subprocesses: (1) plume dispersion and entrainment, (2) UF chemistry, and (3) UF./liF thennodynamics.
The key component in the plume dispersion subprocess is the calculation of entrainment rate. In turn, the entrainment rate determines the mixing limited chemical teaction rate, which provides values for the amounts of entrained dry air and water vapor. Calculation of chemical reactions provides the heats of reaction for the thermodynamics module and determines the changes of the amounts of the UF., ilF, water vapor, and UO F in the plume. In the thermodynamics equilibrium routine, partitioning of phases 4
(which a1Tect the chemical reaction) leads to the calculation of plume density and buoyancy (which drive the plume dispersion). The numerical method and the implementation of these three interrelated subprocesses are described in detall in Chapter 5 of Reference 17.
Several enhancements were incorporated into ilGSYSTEhi/UF., including (1) effects of buildings on plume dispersion, (2) lift off of the plume centerline from ground level as buoyancy changes from negative to positive as a result of heat input due to chemical reactions, (3) removal of gases and particles by wet and dry deposition, (4) parameterization of some meteorological variables using recent boundary-layer theory, and (5) accounting for variations in concentration with averaging time. The development of the UF, chemistry and thennodynamics modules and some key enhancements pertinent to this SAR are discussed inunediately below.
a.
Effects of Buildines on Plume Dimersion in the development of IIGSYSTEhi/UF., enhancements were made to the model to account for the influence of buildings on dispersion. Because of the turbulent eddles that form around buildings, algorilluns to model the effect of buildings on downwind concentrations, such as trapping of emissions from vents flush with the roof or with the side of a building, were incorporated into llGSYSTEhi/UF..
Ilowever, these algorithms are only applicable for nonbuoyant releases.
Two additional models have been developed for ilGSYSTEhi/UF that simulate the influence of buildings on wann plumes (e.g., those plumes associated with a release of UP. from buildings at the GDPs). The first model, called WAKE, simulates a positively buoyant plume released from vents flush with the roofs of the large process buildings (Building X 333). Although the WAKE model was developed ith the large PORTS process building in mind, the fomiulations are sufficiently general that they can oc applied to a broad range of warm plumes emitted from industrial buildings.
Figur'. 4.3-9 is a schematic of the complex flow that develops around large buildings. As the wind field impacts ths upwind face of the building, streamlines will split, with a significant fraction of the flow ascending over the roof of the building. Downwind of the building, streamlines descend toward the ground surface. As the flow is split and streamlines ascend and descend over the building, many rurbulent zones are created. A positively buoyant plume emitted at roof level may be affected by one or more of these turbulent zones as the rising plume passes through the region of the building wake. For instance, if a vent is located within the roof recirculation region near the upwind edge of the building, rnuch of the plume may be recirculated toward the roof level, and relatively high concentrations would be expected (Reference 35). Also, as a positively buoyant plume rises through the roof recirculation cavity or the high-turbulence zone, it will be rapidly diluted (to ambient density), causing the height of final plume rise 4.3 18
\\
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SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 to be shorter, and the plume vertical width to be larger, than that of a plume released in the absence of a building (Reference 36).
On the lee side of the building, a recirculation cavity may form. (This region is also called the near wake.) Any fraction of the positively buoyant plume captured in the near wake would be rapidly brought to ground level along recirculation streamlines. The remaining fraction of the positively buoyant plume not captured in the recirculation cavity would be influenced by the turbulent wake zone, where streamlines descend near the lee side of the building (down vash). Recent wind iunnel studies conducted by EPA (References 37 and 38) show that the actual trajectory of a rising plume is substantially affected by building downwash. With certain combinations of wind speed and direction. Scire et al. (Reference
- 39) report that a positively buoyant plume may actually descend to the grottnd surface because streamline descent overcomes the effects of buoyancy.
A primary assumption in the development of the WAKE model, as applied to the PGDP process buildings, is that all chemical reactions are completed inside the building before release to the atmosphere. Therefore, the reaction products (UO F and 11F il 0) are dispersed as nonreactive but warm 22 2
gases, and atmospheric chemical reactions can be ignored. Following ASilRAE (Reference 40), Schulman and Scire (Reference 41), and Wilson (Reference 42), the WAKE model splits the plume into two components: (1) the fraction.f,, of the plume captured in the near wake and then transported into the far wake region and (2) the remaining fraction,1f,, of the plume that rises through the turbulent wake directly above the building. The total ground level concentration, Cw, at downwind distances from the release point is the sum of the ground level concentrations from these two components (Reference 43):
Cw. C. C,,,
(14) where C, is the ground level concentration (mg/m') from the componen: of the plume caught in the wake (f, ), and C,is.he ground-level concentration (mg/m') from the component of the plume that rises above the wake (1 -f,).
The development of equations used to calculate C,. are summarized in 11 anna and Chang (Reference 43), in the near wake, C, is calculated using formulations empirically derived from recent wind tunnel data (Reference 42):
C
' 7y',,., y c'.
(15)
I, i. 13 7 4 aj N,
where G,is equal to thef, x 0, and G is the mass Oux (kg/s) of the p'ume constituent (either UO:F:
or 11F),
S V,is the plume volume Oux at the vent (m /s),
T, is the temperature of the ambient air (K),
T, is the temperature of the plume at the vent (K),
4.3-19
I SAR PORTS PR0p0 SED August 17, 1997 RAC 97XO316 l
w, is the initial plume speed (m/s),
u is the wind speed at the top of the building (m/s), and n
x, is the " stretched string" distance from the source to the receptor (m).
In the denominator of Equation (15), V,is included to make sure that the predicted concentrations do not exceed the initial concentration in the vent plume. The second term, the one with T,/T,, takes into account reductions in concentrations due to the initial rise of the plume out of the jet. This term should be set equal to zero for capped roof vents (Reference 41). The third tenn calculates the concentrations l
on the roof and downwind sides of the buildings, similar to previous zero-momentum release algorithms incorporated in llGSYSTEM/UP. (Reference 17).
Equation (15) applies until the plume gr;ws to the point that the estimated concentrations drop
. to the concentrations calculated using a model for a well-mixed building wake. The well mixed building model is used to calculate concentrations at downwind distances beyond this point and is given as V
c' 2
f
'4 is d
'u,R
,a o,o (16) 1037 0.03
. F8 where 2
2 R is the scaling area in the wake as defined by Wilson (Reference 42) (m ), w th R being the representative scaling length of the building (m),
Sw is the nondimensional buoyant lift off term, x is the downwind distance from the source to the receptor (m),
H, is the height of the building (m),
F is the nondimensional buoyancy flux, described below, and o, and o, are the Gaussian horizontal and vertical dispersion parameters, respectively (m).
Equation (16), an empirical formula derived by Briggs (Reference 44), provides a conservative test fit to wind tunnel data gathered by 1lall and Waters (Reference 45) and llall et al. (Reference 46).
Both wind tunnel experiments focused on buoyant plumes affected by building wakes. The latter set of wind tunnel experiments (Reference 46) involved relatively complicated release simulations for a variety of vent configurations, building shapes, and wind angles. More details on the derivation of Equation (16) are detailed in llanna and Chang (Reference 43).
In Equation (16), Bw, describes the decrease in ground level concentration due to buoyant lifting of the plume, which is determined by a,. ev (6r.'.')
(17) 4.3 20 l
l SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 in Equation (17), F is the nondimendonal buoyancy flux of the tenn, calculated as F.. *
~,
(18) where F, is the buoyancy flux calculated using the standard Briggs plume rise equations (m*/s')
(References 47 and 48).
The first three bracketed terms in the denominator of Equation (16) correspond to (1) plume dilu-tion across the building face and recirculation cavity, (2) plume diluation due to expansion with downwind
- distance, and (3) plume dilution due to growth caused by buoyancy. The fourth term accounts for disper-sion of the plume due to ambient turbulence not related to the presence of the building, where the Gaussian plume model is applicable. Each of the four terms is consistent with fundamental physical relations developed and verified over the past two decades (Reference 43).
To estimate ground level concentrations resulting from the part of the plume that rises through the building wake, C, [ Equation (14)], the Industrial Source Complex-Version 3 (ISC3) (Reference 49) dispersion model is used. In calculating C,, ISC3 is run as with building wake parameters, because the buoyant plume would be affected by the wake when rising. The source term for the part of the plume above the wake, Q,, is calculated as:
Q,. (1-f,) G.
(19)
The total downwind ' concentration, C,, is calculated using Equation (14).
The second model to simulate the influence of buildings on warm plumes, called UF. MIXER, simulates the d. rifting of plumes in the horizontal direction out of a building into the lee side recirculation
- cavity [i.e., the movement of an accidental release of pressurized UF., caused by a valve or pipe rupture during transfer operations, moving out of the large bay doors of the X 334-A transfer building). The,let of UF released in sucit a scenario would mix with air in the transfer building as it flows around various obstacles (e.g., tanks a4xl pipes). This in-building mixing is taken into account by assuming that the area of the plume when it exits the building is a fraction.f4, of the area of the downwind face of the building (equal to the building width, W,, multiplied by the building height, H,). As a maximum, fa equals the ratio of the area of the open doors to the area of the downwind face of the building. The value off, is a key input into the model, such that with increasing fa values, the amount of UF that reacts in the
- building increases.
The UF. MIXER model first calculates the amount of UF. that has reacted to form UO F and HF 2 2 in the building. Ambient air is introduced incrementally, and all available water vapor introduced during that step is assumed to react with UP. completely according to Equation (6); These incremental reactions continue until the plume grows to the specified size in the building as determined by/4 From this point, two cases are calculated by UF. MIXER and compared. Case I assumes that all the UP. has reacted in the building. Equations (15) and (16) are used to calculate ground level 4.3 21
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97XO316 concentrations in the wake. Equation (17) is used to calculate Bw, which is applied to take into account any plume lift-off that may occur. When using Equation (17), F is calculated using the temperature of the plume at the end of the chemical reactions (i.e., buoyancy flux is assumed to be conserved once UP.
hydrolysis reactions have ceased).
l Case 11 assumes that a significant traction of the plume is unreacted as it leaves the building and l
that the plume is relatively dense as it enters the recirculation cavity. As the plume exits the building, a complete description of the plume state is input into a modified fonn of llEGADAS/UF. In the recirculation cavity, the llEGADAS/UP. model is mn using stability class B (unstable), which is intended to characterize the turbulence in the near wake. The selection of stability class B as representative of turbulent conditions in the recirculation cavity is consistent with Wilson's (Reference 42) solution [i.e.,
the term u.ti/16 in Equation (15)] when made equivalent to the Gaussian plume method. At the end of the recirculation cavity, llEGADAS/UF is applied using the original stability class (i.e., the atmospheric stability class appropriate for a given scenario). The calculation of F is made with plume vatiab'es calculated in llEGADAS/UF. at downwind increments because buoyancy flux is not conserved if UF.
hydrolysis reactions are occurring. (This use of F.. with llEGADAS is discussed in more detail in the next section.)
The results of Case I and 11 are compared in the final phase of the UF. MIXER shnulation. In the recirculation cavity, the higher of the predicted concentrations is selected to estimate impacts. To maintain consis'ency, concentrations for the far wake are selected from the method having the highest concentration I
estimated in the near wake, b,
1,1ft Off of Ground-14tel Buovnnt Plumes if the UF. plume centerline is on the ground (or very near the ground), either because it was initially released at ground level or because it slumped due to the high plume density, it may eventually lift off the ground. Lift-off occurs if the buoyancy forces, which lift the plume, exceed the turbulent forces in the ambient boundary layer, which spreads the plume laterally (Reference 19).
Reductions in ground-level concentrations due to lift-off of the plume centerline may be taken into account by applying the buoyant lift off tenn, Bw [ Equation (17)). Originally, Bw was suggested by Briggs (Reference 44) for use with buoyant plumes that conserve their buoyancy flux, F,, (i.e., the buoyancy fiux would be detennined by release conditions and/or building dimensions). However, llanna and Chang (Reference 43) applied Bw to plumes with buoyancy fluxes that vary with time and distance, such as a reactive UF. plume. In this application, the u and W, terms in Equation (18) are the local n
plume advection speed and local plume width output by the HEGADAS/UF. model at a particular downwind distance. The assumption nude by llanna and Chang (Reference 43) is that Bw is applicable to a wide range of imthily ground-based, buoyant plumes. Based on this assumption, the applicadon of Bw to llEGADAS/UF. is appropriate to determine the reduction of ground-level concentraties that would occur as a warm UF. plune lifts off of the ground. The plume lift-off calculations are applied as a postprocessor to llEGADAS/UF..
4.3 22
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0316 c.
}YtLn_pd. Dry _Deimition of Particles. Acrosols, and Gas from tbc Phune As the UF. plume is transported downwind, it will be composed of a mixture of gases, solid particles, and aerosols. To estimate the effects of deposition from an accidental UF. release, dry and wet depcsition algorithms are applied as postprocessors to llGSYSTEM/UF.. For both wet and dry removal, there is no feedback mee tism between plume chemistry and thermodynamics and deposition, in running IIGSYSTEM/UF., all of the UF, in the plume is assumed to react to form IlF and UO F : however, 2 2 some UP. may actually be removed via deposition. This assumption results in upper bound estimates of airborne uranium and ilF concentrations received by a downwind receptor and, consequently, provides a conservative estimate of impact to human heahh.
For small particles, drops, and gases (i.e., those with aciodynamic diameters less than about 50 pm), the dry deposition modules in the ISC3 (Reference 49) dispersion model have been adopted for use in the llGSYSTEM/UF. postprocessor. ISC3 estimates dry depos; tion by assuming that the dry deposition flux, F,(g/m: s), is linearly proportional to the air concentration, C E
C*v (20) s s,
where v is the deposition velocity (m/s), which is calculated using the resistance analog technique s
(Reference 50). The equations for deposition velocity are described in detail in the ISCJ User's Manual (Reference 49).
The initial Dashing process may result in the formation of large aerosols and particles with diameters of thousands of micrometers (i.e., a few millimeters). Particles and aerosols with aerodynamic diameters of about 1 mm or greater have a gravitational settling speed greater than 1 m/s (Reference 16),
and simple gravitational settling (as described by Stoke's Law) can be used to estimate v,:
s, (p - p,)
(21) v f
where 3
e, is the particle or aerosol density (g/m ),
p, is the air density (g/m'J, g is the gravitational constant (9.802 m/s:),
D, is the aerodynamic diameter of the particle (m),
p is the dynamic viscosity of air (g/m:-s), and Sc, is the slip correction factor.
The slip correction factor, Scy, is applied to account for particles with aerodynamic diameters of 50-1000 pm and is given by the empirical formula Sy. l. 0,13[1.257 0Aexp( 8 SD,)].
(22)
Concentration values from IlGSYSTEM/UF. are applied to Equation (20) using deposition velocitics calculated using Equation (21) or the ISC3 resistance model. A percentage of the concentration is applied 4.3 23
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 I
to' fixed-particle size diameters that vary as a function of distance. In other words, the percentage of particles with large D, decreases with downwind distance because these particles will rapidly settle out of the plume, llGSYSTEM/UF. estimates wet deposition flux, F,,, using a below cloud scavenging mechanism (i.e., raindrops scrub plume gases and solids from the plume) employed by PLM89A and Ramsdell et al. (Reference 51). In-cloud scavenging (i.e., removal of plume gases and solids by impact with fog droplets) is neglected by the current version of IIGSYSTEM/UF. because it is u.:ignificant for short plume-travel times (Reference 17).
4.3.1.2.3.4.2 Mgjor Features of HGSYSTEM/UF, j
The llGSYSTEM/UF. dispersion code suite consists of the following models applied to various stages of the plume or puff; a.
AERQPLUME/RK This model estimates near field (i.e., downwind distances ranging from tens to hundreds of meters) dispersion of elevated, two-phase (aerosol and vapor) momentum jets of UF and its reaction products. This model applies to releases from pressurized tanks or cylinders at the point of release to tne time when they either (1) strongly interact with the ground and become a dense ground-based plume or (2) become passive (i.e., the density approaches ambient air density and chemical reactions cease).
The initials RK stand for the inclusion of a robust Runge Kutta numerical solver that enables the user to model situations in which the plume angle changes rapidly with time, such as UF. releases with steep jet angles (between -10 and -45' from the horizontal) pointing toward the ground. The RK numerical solver replaces the SPRINT numerical solver employed in HGSYSTEM Version 3, which could not consistently sinnlate UF. releases with steep jet angles (Reference 43). The UF. chemistry and thermodynamics modules used in this model are the same as those used by HEGADAS/UF. (discussed below),
b.
HEGADAS/UF, This model applies to continuous, ground-hovering plumes. The modd is used for either (1) area source releases (i.e., spills) or (2) the point where AEROPLUME predicts that the dense plume will be in direct contact with the ground. Steady-state (HEGADAS-S) and transient (HEGADAS-T) modules are incorporated into the model, The trarsient module is used for finite duration releases (< ~2 min).
HEGADAS/UF. uses the same UF. modules as AEROPLUME/RK.
c.
PGPLGIE This model is used in the fir.al passive phase of the plume, in which the Gaussian plume
-*hodology is applicable. The Gaussian plume methodology is a well documented industry standard that aurarates: emission, downwind. crosswind, and vertical factor.,
No chemical reactions or =
thermouynamic processes are modeled in PGPLUME. AEROPLUME/RK will transition to PGPLUME if the plume becomes passive (neutral buoyancy /non-reactive). This would simulate the plume dynamics of region five from Figure 4.3-7.
4.3 24
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 d.
WAKE This model is used ta simulate releases from roof vents and stacks on the GDP process buildings.
WAKE determines the dimensions of the recirculation cavity, and calculates the plume rise to estimate the fraction of the plume captured in the cavity. It calculates the concentration for the part of the plume etptured in the cavity based on the Wilson / Briggs model and estimates the correction to the concentrations for the part of the plume captured in the cavity due to possible plume lift-off based on the Briggs model.
WAKE then creates all of the necessary input files for the ISC3 model for the part of the plume that escapes the cavity. A postprocessor merges the results from (1) the WAKE model for the part of the plume captured in the cavity and (2) the ISC3 model for the part of the plume that escapes the cavity, c.
1&Ca The basis of the 153 model is the straight-line, steady-state Gaussian plume equation, which is used with some modifications to model simple point source emissions from stacks, emissions from stacks that experience the effects of aerodynamic downwash due to nearby buildings, isolated vents, or multiple vents. It uses meteorological data to define the conditions for plume rise, transport, diffusion, and deposition. The model estimates the concentration or deposition value for each source and receptor combination. ISC3 is used in conjunction with WAKE and its postprocessors to model releases from roof vents and stacks on the GDP process buildings.
f.
UF. MIXER This model and its postprocessors are used to simulate releases from the open bay doors of the GDP transfer buildings. UF. MIXER determines the dimensions of the recirculation cavity and estimates the plume states (e.g., the total plume mass emission rate, the plume composition, the plume temperature, etc.) after the essumed in-building dilution and associated chemical reactions. It then estimates the plume buoyancy flux and the equivalent mass emission rr cs for UO:F, HF, U, and F when all chemical 2
reactions have been completed (the buoyancy Hux and the mass emission rates are required by the Wilson / Briggs model). Using the Wilson / Briggs model, it calculates the concentrations and prepares the required input files for the modined version of HEGADAS/UF.,
This modified version of HEGADAS/UF. assumes a B stability class in the cavity to account for the observed effects of enhanced dilution in building waku, regardless of the stability class specified by the user for the ambient atmosphere, g.
POSTMIX This UF. MIXER postprocessor retrieves the plume geometry and density information from the HEGADAS/UF. predictions to estimate the downwind distribution of the plume buoyancy flux, which in turn is used to estimate the correction to concentrations predicted by HEGADAS/UF. due to possible plume lift-off based on the Briggs model. The postprocessor will then select the UO F, HF, U, and F 2 2 concentrations predicted by the Wilson / Briggs model at downwind distances that are (1) less than the length of the cavity based on which model gives higher predicted concentrations for U, and (2) greater than the length of the cavity based on which model gives higher predicted concentrations for U at the end of the cuity.
4.3-25
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 4.3.1.2.3.4.3 Evaluation of I!GSYSTEM/UF.
Three types of evaluations were made to assess the performance of HGSYSTEM/UF., as detailed in Cha,*.:er 8 of Reference 17. The first evaluation compared results from HGSYSTEM/UF. with data from seven field tests reported by Hanna et al. (Reference 52). These field tests involved releases of nonreactive dense gases (e.g., LNG, LPG, and Freon) and aerosols (e.g., ammonium and polymerized IIF). In essence, this evaluation assessed the perfom ance of dense gas dispersion algorithms in HGSYSTEM/UF. without the use of the UF. chemistry and thermodynamic modules. Thirteen other hazardo'is gas models were considered in the comparisons, including an earlier (1990) version of IIGSY u EM. The comparison showed that (1) IIGSYSTEM/UF. produced results that are very similar to the 1990 version of IIGSYSTEM, (2) the llEGABOX model, developed for instantaneous dense-gas releases, produced results that are in good agreement with the Thorney Island field data (i.e., data from an instantaneous release of dense gas), and (3) the performance measures (e.g., fractional mean bias and normalized mean square error) for the HGSYSTEM/UF. concentration estimates were cousistently at the level of the six best-performing models.
The second evaluation compared concentration and lateral plume with observations from three French UF field experiments with calculations using IlGSYSTEM/UF (References 53, 54, 55, and 56).
The release rate in the French field experiment was about 0.2 lb/s (0.08 kg/s), about two orders of magnitude less than a potential 14-ton cylinder rupture. Also, because UF. was released entirely in the l
gas phase, UF. particle sut>l1mation was not a factor. When HGSYSTEM/UF. is applied to these release l
conditions, the model quickly transitions from AEROPLUME/UF., the dense gas jet model, to PGPLUME, the passive gas model. Therefore. t le French field data represent a passive gas release and are not adequate for assessing the performance on the UF. chemistry and thermodynamics modules or the dense gas dispersion. However, results from PGPLUME were compared with the ISC model (a standard Gaussian plume model) and field data. Both PGPLUME and ISC showed fair agreement with the field data. PGPLUME tended to show slight (15 percent to 50 percent) underpredictions in lateral dispersion (Reference 17).
The third evaluation compared the UF. chemistry and thermodynamics modules in llGSYSTEM/UF. with equilibrium analytical solutions calculated by Rodean (Reference 57). Rodean assumed that the initial temperature of the UF. release was 180'F (82*C) and that the initial release mixture was 50 percent gas and 50 percent solid. The ambient temperature was assumed to be 77'F (25'C), and the ambient relative humidity was assumed to be 100 percent. The AEROPLUME/UF. model was applied using input values that simulated Rodean's release conditions (Reference 16). As shown in Figure 4.3-10, results of the two solutions agree wel!. Differences between the two arise because the AEROPLUME/UF. model assumes turbulence-limited reaction rates (i.e., the solution is not in equilibrium).
An independent peer review panel (Reference 58) met in August 1996 to evaluate HGSYSTEM/UF. in general, and to evaluate in detail the building wake models (i.e., WAKE and UF. MIXER) and the plume-lift algorithms incorporated in HGSYSTEM/UF.. The review panel found in general that the models were " reasonable and scientifically dependable for complex problems in an area where scientific understanding was still improving " Additionally, the peer reviewers found that "the desire for conservative predictions was apparent; if a modeling uncertainty arose, a reasonable, 4.3-26 1
l
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0316 conservative option was followed." The building wake equations used in WAKE and UF. MIXER were developed from fundamental physical principles and were calibrated with wind tunnel observations by llall and Waters (Reference 45) and llall et al. (Reference 46). The equations in these models were shown by llanna and Chang (Reference 43) to be conservative with respect to laboratory observations, and were designed to be conservative for building geometries typical of the GDPs (i.e., building widths much greater than building heights).
4.3.1.2.3.4.J Limitations of IIGSYSTEM/UF.
The following list of model limitations is sununarized from Reference 19:
As with all models, llGSYSTEM/UF. was developed with certain release scenarios and meteoro-logical conditions in mind. For example. a release from a nozzle on a pressurized 14-ton cylinder has been a primary test case. Similarly, the meteorological input conditions of interest have emphasized light-to-moderate wind speeds, neutral-to-stable conditions, and small-to-moderate surface roughness conditions.
Primary concern has been for dense (negatively buoyant), neutral, or slightly positively buoyant plumes. The entrainment relations have not been fully tested for strongly positively buoyant plumes.
The meteorological parameterizations for the ambient atmospheric boundary layer are valid primarily for heights less than about 160 ft (50 m).
Distances of interest range from the edge of the building to a few kilometers because the distances to the plant fence lines or to the point where concentrations drop below toxic levels are usually in that range.
Releases of mixtures of two or more chemicals (i.e., multicomponents) can be modeled only if the chemical and thermodynamic properties of the mixture can be represented by a " pseudo chemical" wi;h molecular weight given by the weighted average of the components.
4.3-27
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 4.3.1.3 Natural Phenomena Methodology The evaluation basis earthquake and wind events for the PORTS site have been established as 250-yr return period events, with a 0.05-g peak ground acceleration (PGA) and 78-mph fastest-mile wind speed, respectively (Reference 59). A probable maximum flood (PMF) was also considered. Four analyses (i.e., structural, equipment, piping system, and overhead crane analyses) were performed to address natural phenomena hazards. (See Chapter 2 for input to these analyses.) The structural analysis was performed first, and the results of this analysis were then used as input to the remaining analyses.
The following sections describe the methods used for each type of analysis.
4.3.1.3.1 Structural Analysis The seismic provisions of UCRL-15910 (Reference 60) were used for buildings analyzed prior to the issuance of DOE-STD 1020-94 (Reference 61). After the issuance, DOE-STD-1020-94 was used to determine seismic load levels on the buildings.
l Two of the major differences between UCRL 15910 and DOE-STD-1020-94 are as follows:
DOE STD-1020-94 includes a seismic load factor for brittle failure modes. This factor is 1.0 for PC3 facilities, which equates to UCRL-15910 " moderate hazard" category criteria because UCRL-15910 does not use a seismic load factor.
UCRL-15910 uses different inelastic energy absorption factors for different categories of structures. With the exception of in-plane shear walls, factors from UCRL-15910 moderate hazard facilities closely match the factors in DOE-STD-1020-94. For shear walls, UCRL-15910 uses a factor of 1.7 for moderate hazard facilities, whereas DOE-STD-1020-94 specifies a value of 1.5, resulting in slightly higher demands.
For the analyses performed here, either UCRL-15910 moderate hazard or DOE-STD-1020-94 PC3 procedures were followed, and there is little difference between the two.
Computer models of the buildings were developed to obtain response to loads resulting from natural phenomena events acting in conjunction with existing in-place loads. For all but very simple structures, three-dimensional models were used.
Design drawings, design specifications, and walkdown packages were used to model, as closely as possible, existing conditions of the structures. Design drawings and specifications were used to define geometry and material properties. Walkdown packages were used to establish changes to geometry, structural changes (e.g., added or removed walls), and in-place loads.
The walkdown packages were detailed studies that identified major configuration changes, in-place loads, reference document lists, and member sampling data, which established relevance of existing design drawings. 4.3-28 i
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97XO315 Where detailed three-dimensional models were used, all primary structural elements, including mezzanines, were incorporated into the model. Roof trusses either were modeled uscretely or were represented by equivalent beam elements. For simpler structures, three-dimensional stick models were used by hand-calculating global stiffness and mass properties.
4.3.1.3.1.1 Earthquake The structural analysis proceeded generally as follows.
The site-specinc spectra and the mathematical model of the structure were used and an elastic dynamic analysis was performed to determine the elastic seismic demand.
The inelastic earthquake demand was evaluated as the elastic demand divided by the inelastic demand-capacity ratio, F.
The total demand for the components was evaluated by adding the gravity demand and the j
inelastic seismic demand.
i Member capacities were evaluated from code ultimate or yield values.
Demand was compared with capacity. If the demand was less than the capacity, the member l
satisfied the seismic requirements. If the demand was greater than the capacity, the capacity was expressed in terms of a threshold PGA.
Story drifts were evaluated.
Peer review of the analysis was implemented.
For demand calculations, a 250-yr return period earthquake was used as the EBE. For PORTS, the 250-yr earthquake has a PGA of 0.05 g (see Chapter 2).
Dynamic analyses were used to determine building responses to earthquake input. In general, masses were taken from walkdown packages supplemented by information found on the original design drawings.
Two analyses were perfomied for each structure evaluated. First, a dynamic response spectrum analysis using mode superposition was used to determine the evaluation basis response of the structural elements. Second, a mode superposition dynamic time history analysis was performed to generate amplified, in-structure response spectra to be used for the analysis of equipment within the buildings. Site-specific input (response spectra and time histories) was used.
In the analysis, the best estimates of in-place loads were used. Included in the loads and masses on the buildings were slabs, framing, walls, equipment, and miscellaneous loads identified from walkdowns.
4.3-29 l
l
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 j
Masses were lumped at nodes. Enough natural frequencies were calculated and retained in the analysis that no less than 90 percent of the total mass in each direction considered (north-south, cast-west, and venical) was accounted for in the retained modes. This is in accordance with ASCE 4-86 (Reference 62) as referenced in DOE-STD 1020-94. The mass not explicitly included in the calculated modes was not ignored, but results were scaled up to approximate the effects of missing modes.
For large two-dimensional and three-dimensional models, the computer program GTSTRUDL (Reference 63) was used.
Where fewer than 50 modes were required for the analysis, modal combinations were made using either the complete quadratic combination (CQC) method or the NRC 10 percent method. When more than 50 modes were required, the NRC 10 percent method was used exclusively because of the increased computational effort required in the CQC method. The two horizontal seismic components (north-south and east-west) were always combined using the square root-sum of squares (SRSS) method. The NRC and CQC methods for modal combinations and the SRSS method for directional combination are in accordance with ASCE 4-86. The vertical contribution to seismic response was computed by including vertical modes in the modal superposition or as an equivalent static load. This static load was taken as l
1.5 times the peak vertical ground acceleration times the structure gravity load. This vertical static load was combined with the horizontal seismic response and dead load.
l l
In computing seismic demand, the inelastic energy absorption factor, F, was taken from DOE-STD-1020-94, Load factors of unity were used in seismic load combinations. This is in agreement with DOE-STD-1020-94 when the EBE is for the safe shutdown condition, as is the case for the structures evaluated herein. Actual stresses were compared with code ultimate values to determine the adequacy of I
each member. In general, code checking of steel components was done internally by the computer programs, and concrete code checks were done by hand Components were allowed to yield under the load combinations. The load combinations considered are shown in Table 4.3-2.
Beams, columns, walls, diaphragms, and footings were checked for the appropriate loads Story drifts were compared with allowable levels. For in-structure spectra generation, the range of frequencies considered is shown in Table 4.3-3. These ranges are in accordance with ASCE 4-86. In addition, the natural frequencies of the structure were included in the frequency envelope, 4.3.1.3.1.2 Wind in the structural analysis, wind loads were applied in accordance with ASCE 7-88 (Reference 64) as referenced by UCRL-15910 and DOE-STD-1020-94. Static analyses were performed to determine the response of the buildings to wind loads in combination with gravity loads (i.e., walls, slabs, framing, equipment, miscellaneous loads).
The same models used for the dynamic seismic analyses were used for the static wind analyses.
Beams, columns, walls, diaphragms, and footings were checked for the appropriate loads. Story drifts were compared with allowable levels.
4.3-30
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315
- A 250-yr retum period straight wind was taken as the EBE. For PORTS, the 250-yr wind speed '
is 78 mph (see Chapter 2).
The north-south wind was assumed to act independently of the east-west wind. This is in accordance with ASCE 7-88.
Actual stresses were compared to code ultimate values to determine the adequacy of each member. For steel elements, these code checks were done internally by the computer software (Reference 63). Concrete elements were checked by hand.
4.3.1.3.1.3 Flood The plant elevation is above the PMF (see Chapter 2). Therefore, river and stream flooding is not a hazard for the buildings. However, local ponding was investigated for the buildings. For typical buildings, the primary drainage system is roof drains. Some buildings have scuppers in the parapet. For l
ponding effects analysis, the primary drainage was considered to be completely blocked. In general, this meant that the roof structure had to be evaluated for a depth of rainwater up to the parapet height. This involves evaluating the roof beams, the deck, and the building columns for the load induced by standing water on the roof.
4.3.1.3.2 Equipment Analysis The evaluation methodology for equipment analysis followed the general philosophy of the experience-based methods used by the commercial nuclear industry to evaluate equipment in older nuclear power plants for which documentation of seismic qualification was incomplete. The equipment evaluated was selected through the accident analysis process, which identified equipment whose failure from a natural phenomena event could release UF. or other hazardous materials. Therefore, the performance goal is defmed as containment of hazardous materials or pressure boundary integrity Continued operation of the diffusion equipment during or after a natural phenomena event is not required, The equipment is located in two large process buildings, two feed facilities, two product withdrawal facilities, a tails withdrawal facility, a toll enrichment services facility, and tie-line structures connecting the various buildings. Because much of the equipment and connecting piping consists of similar components arrayed in repeated patterns, equipment capacities were determined on a representative s_ ample. About 7 percent of the equipment in the prccess buildings and more than 10 percent in the other buildings or facilities was sampled.
-- A two-step process was used to evaluate the seismic capacity of equipment identified by the accident analysis process. First, a procedurally controlled walkdown inspection of the equipment was performed to determine existing conditions and to identify equipment attributes that may result in the vulnerability of the equipment to natural phenomena effects. Next, the capacity of equipment was determined by calculating the capacity of vulnerable elements or weak links. The capacity of the equipment was expressed b terms of PGA for the earthquake hazard and fastest-mile wind speed for the wind hazard, from which the annual probabilities of failure were calculated.
4.3-31
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97X0315 4.3.1.3.2.1 Earthquake The equipment evaluation process, walkdown inspection, and structural assessment address two categories of equipment: that which is included in the 22 classes for which earthquake experience data are given in the DOE Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) database and that which is not in the DOE EPRl/SQUG database (References 65 and 66).
Comparisons were made between the equipment selected for evaluation and the equipment that the nuclear industry has found from experience to be seismically rugged in actual earthquakes. Equipment that is similar to the rugged equipment but does not possess all the attributes of the rugged equipment was called an outlier and was evaluated individually by analysis. The equipment not in the database was treated as an outlier and was evaluated by analysis. The EPRI/SQUG and outlier evaluation processes are described in References 65 and 67.
4.3.1.3.2.2 Wind Equipment potentially exposed to wind effects was evaluated for fastest-mile wind pressures using the methodology described in DOE-STD-1020-94. Equipment located in buildings with siding or enclosures that were capable of withstanding the wind forces was not evaluated. In cases where the siding of the building had a low wind-speed capacity, the siding was assumed to fail, and the full pressure force from the wind was applied to exposed equipment. Wind-or tomado-driven missiles are not likely to occur for a 78-mph wind speed and were not considered.
4.3.1.3.2.3 Flood t
The elevation of the ground floor slabs in buildings housing equipment identified by the accident analysis process was compared with the level of the PMF. In all cases the elevation of the ground floors of the buildings housing the equipment exceeded the water level associated with the PMF. Therefore, the effect of regional flooding was not considered further. The flood hazard for the PORTS site is described in Chapter 2.
Potential water inflow from pending on roofs, from roof leaks, and from local flooding was determined not to affect the pressure boundary integrity function of equipment.
4.3.1.3.3 Piping Systems The piping systems evaluated were selected through the accident analysis process, which identified piping whose failure from a natural phenomena event could release UF. or other potentially hazardous materials.
The performance goal is containment of hazardous materials. The equipment is located in two large process buildings, two feed facilities, two product withdrawal facilities, a tails withdrawal facility, a toll enrichment services facility and tie-line structures connecting the various buildings. Because much of the piping, pipe supports, and pipe-supported components are similar and are arrayed in repeated patterns, capacities of piping systems were determined from a representative sample. Approximately 7 4.3-32
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 percent of the piping systems in the process buildings and more than 10 percent in the other buildings or facilities were sampled.
4.3.1.3.3.1 Earthquake The evaluation methodology of piping systems for natural phenomena hazards generally follows the philosophy of experience-based methods. Earthquake experience data for piping systems are not currently included in the DOE's 22 EPRI/SQUG equipment classes, although there are considerable experience data on piping systems in earthquakes. The evaluation process focused on identifying weak links that could result in loss of pressure boundary integrity in the piping system during a seismic event.
The experience-based method for piping systems developed by Lockheed Martin Energy Systems (LMES) for use in the evaluations of piping systems at PORTS is described in References 68 and 69.
Subsequent to developing these guidelines, DOE also developed similar guidelines for trial use in evaluating piping systems in existing DOE facilities (Reference 70). Both DOE and LMES utilize a two-step process consisting of a walkdown inspection and screening procedure followed by a structural assessment for piping systems that are not screened as rugged. Piping and piping supports judged to be rugged were assumed to have a capacity defined by the reference spectrum (Reference 65). The two methods are judged to give approximately the same results.
As stated previously, a two-step process was used to evaluate piping systems identified by the accident analyses. A procedurally controlled walkdown inspection of the pipe, pipe supports, and in-line components such as valves, expansionjoints, ard reducers was conducted to determine existing conditions and identify attributes that may make the equipment vulnerable in a seismic event. The capacity of the piping system was determined by assessing the capacity of the vulnerable features or weak links. Only certain types of valves from the GDP piping systems are included in the DOE EPRI/SQUG database.
These vaives were evaluated by comparing them with the database valves. All other piping system components were evaluated by analysis in accordance with guidance documents (Refernces 68 and 69),
The capacities of the piping system components are expressed in terms of the PGA, from which an annual probability of failure was calculated.
4.3.1.3.3.2 Wind Piping systems exposed to wind effects were evaluated for the wind-induced pressure forces. The wind pressure forces are calculated by the method described in DOE-STD-1020-94. In cases where the building's siding had a low wind speed capacity, the siding was assumed to fail, and the full wind pressure force was applied to the exposed piping.
4.3.1.3.3.3 Flood The elevations of the piping systems were compared with the level of the PMF (see Chapter 2).
'Ihe elevations of the ground floors of the buildings housing the piping systems are above the water level from a PMF. Therefore, regional flooding was not considered further.
4.3-33
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 IMC 97XO315 Potential water inflow from ponding on the building roof, from roof leaks, and from local flooding was determined not to adversely affect the pressure boundary integrity of piping systems components.
4.3.1.3.4 Oterhead Cranes Cranes are used throughout PORTS to lift and transport equipment and materials. During operations and while in their parked position, cranes frequently are located above equipment, piping, and components containing hazardous materials. Those cranes whose failure could potentially result in a release of hazardous materials when they are subjected to the natural phenomena hazards (e.g.,
earthquake and wind) were evaluated. Failure was considered to occur when either the hook load is dropped or the overhead crane falls from its support structure. Therefore, the performance objective was position retention of both the crane and hook load.
4.3.1.3.4.1 Earthquake Cranes and crane support structures were evaluated for the -valuation basis earthquake using the methods given in Reference 61. Because the performance objective was simply position retention, in contrast to continuing operation during and after an earthquake, stress levels and deflections in the crane support structure defined in Reference 61 were relaxed.
4.3.1.3.4.2 Wind Cranes and their Lupport structures exposed to wind effects were evaluated for the pressure forces from a 78-mph fastest-mile wind speed. The evaluation methodology used is given in Reference 61.
4.3-34
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 RAC 97XO315 Table 4.31. Safety Actions.
Safety action name Safety aciton piirpose A
PRIMARY SYSTEM This safety action is required to maintain system (c g is also used to assure primary system integrity UF6 system) integrity during normal
- l'RESSURE CONTROL operation as wcil as during events. This safety action (passive).
CYLINDER IIANDijNG This safety action is required to support all normal operational cylinder handling restrictions.
RESTRICTION INSPEC'IlON/ITSTING/
This safety action is required to support all inspections and testing performed during normal SURVLlLLANCE operations.
PRIMARY SYSTEM This safety action is required to detcet when the primary system intecrity has failed and when l
LEAKAGE DETLCflON leakage or the hazard has occurred. De detceton of tiic feakage will be required to meet this safety action.
f50LA'llON RIMARY SYSTEM His safety action is required to close the primary system isolation vahes when a leak is dctccted outside primary containment.
i 1
ESTAtiLISil PRIMARY This safety action is required to establish and maintain primary containment integrity durms upset CONTAINMENT conditions.
AUTOCl. AVE WATER nis safety tiction is required to maintain conditions withM primary containment autoclaves within INVENTORY CONTROL predefined limits to anure autoclave integrity should a release of UF6 occur inside the autoclave.
)
CRillCAllTY SAFELY This safety action is required to maintain essential criticality controls during normal operation and CON 1ROL upset conditions,
[
ASSAY CONTROL his _ safety action is required to.naintain essential criticality controls during normal and upset j
conditions.
f GEOMETRY CONTROL This safety action is required to maintain cuential criticality controls during normal and upset conditions.
I EMERGENCY RESPONSE His safety action is required to limit hazardous material releases to preestablished guidelines during upset conditions via admmistratne controls.
PRIMARY SYSTEM This safety action is required to hmit temperature excursions within the primary system to prevent TEMPERATURE CONTROL failures that will result in a toss of primary system integrity.
CRITICALITY This safety action is required to provide alarms to area personnel of a criticality accident for NOTIFICATION emergency evacuation.
NO SAFETY ACTION IS REQUIRED FIRE PROTECTION This safety action is required to provide fire protection systems to mitigate potential ctreets of the cvent.
OXIDANT CONCENTRA.
This safety action is required to limit the amounts of oxidant concentration below acceptable TION CONiROL amounts to preclude a Stolent reaction and subsequent loss of primary system integrity.
DENSilY CONTROL This safety action is required to maintain essential criticality controls during normal operation and upset conditions.
DUILDING llOLDUP This safety action is required to provide a temporary holdup of UF released into the area and allow Jeposition within the facihty. This will reduce the concentration of UF. leaving the building.
TOXIC GAS CONTROL This safety action is required to prevent, detect, and/or mitigate the effects of a toxic material reicase.
IIAZARDOUS MATERIAL This safety action is required to limit the amount of hazardous material to levels that will not INVENTORY CONTROL require protection to meet the EOs should the material be released.
SAFE ilANDI.!NG This safety action is required to ensure that good safe handling practices are in place and are PRACTICES FOR followed in accordance with an estabhshed program.
APPLICABLE HAZARD l
_A
i i
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 Table 4.3-2 Natural Phenomena Load Combinations.
DL + DI,w, + DI.,n, + EL + ML + L' DL + DI,% + Dl.ca + EL + ML E'
DL + Dl,%, + DI,ow + EL + ML + WLNS DL + Dl.a., + Dl.o, + EL + ML + WLEW DL + Dia, + Dl ca + EL + ML + 1.2F, Notes: DL includes slabs, mezzanines, and supponing beams; EL includes equipment loads; ML includes miscellaneous supponed loads; E' is the canhquake load; WLNS is the Nonh/ South wind load; WLEW is the East / West wind load; and F, is the roof ponding load.
. SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 Table 4.3-3. ARS Frequency Array From frequency To frequency Use interval 0.5 Hz 1,6 IIz 0.10 Hz 1.6 Hz 2.8 Hz 0.20 Hz 2.8 Hz 4.0 Hz 0.30 Hz 4.0 Hz 9.0 Hz 0.50 Hz d
9.0 Hz 16.0 Hz 1.00 Hz 16.0 Hz 22.0 !!z 2.00 Hz 22.0 Hz 50.0 Hz 3.00 Hz i
_U
SAR. PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315 A
A ns. 4n u4 ns. u 4 s
4 a
l t
,W Docunient l
Evaluate normal j
g noulltulting i
operation and 3
i / Evaluatiori Inl ng W IGs events i
I Docume t results to Select SAs necessary ons in P ^ '"
to meet EGs m% EG i
s na o I
i 4
i M"ent r.iltlntion N
I I
Evaluate system Select essential 8
I capabilitise and systems to perform guidelines l
support requirements SAs l
I I
,i i
i l
l Perform transient Develop LCOs, LCSs, e
on I
analysis for LCSs SLs, SRf., and guidelinn 6
I and SLs technica', bases I
- m. u4 s
i I
L. - - - - - -
i nr System Document Me tem classification classification criteria and results h
Develop sourta terms for limiting events Note:
LCS = limited condition setting 4
LCO = limited condition of operation Perform 'Jispersion SL = safety limit and consequence SR = surveillance requirement analyses h
Compare with evaluation guld lines y
sne Figure 4.31 Operational Analysis
I SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997
- RAC 97X0316 I
Roof Exhaust i
I Cell Floor Compartment Cell Housing Wall Leakage T
Motor Exhaust
/
Supply Air t, _ :. :
l
}
Cell Housing r-Air Blower inlet Air Operating Floor
' Compartment Figure 4.3 2 Sununer ventilation pattern of one unit of the process building.
'4
SAR PORTS PROTOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 -
8-0 e
e e
e e g 3
I 9 e t
8 8 g 8
8 Unit 4 Unit 3 ll l 'l Paducah e
~
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ll
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l lil l.
l l
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l ll Portsmouth l
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e e,
g s
e i e
e s
e s
le Unit 6 Unit 1 l
l e
e a
e e e
e s e s
8 8 g j (
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8 e
s l.e.......
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3r
,r i
e a
8 8
l Unit 7 Unit 8 i
e e
e e
8 e
a 8
.......................................a Figure 4.3-3 Control solume and unit layout of a "000" building.
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 -
l
//
/
// //
f
/ /
/
/4
/.
/
/
/
/
/ r/ D '. /
/
/
/
/ L//
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1 1
y
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er 1
av Cell Housing i
L/i Unit 4 Figure 4.3 4 MELCOR control volumes of one unit in the process building.
a
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97XO316 4
, Leak at ceiling s
i Leak-out at wall Cell Housing
=
Leak-in at wall Access door Figure 4.3-5 Assumed MELCOR ilow paths of cell housing leakage.
l
...._ _ J
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 Stages Enthalpy Enthalpy Enthalpy Enthalpy No Enthalpy Change Change Change Change
- Change, Dominated Donunsted by Dommated by Dommated by Passive by Flashing Sublimation Reaction Entrainment Plume Proces:e:
Chemical Reactions Chemical Reactions Chemical Reactions Passive involved Dilution HF Polymenzation HF Depolymerization Entrainment i
g I
Sublimation Entrainment l
Flashing i Entrainment l
I i
1 e !
l V
i I
T l
Mixture l
l Components Air Air PI assive UFs Gas
,l g g UFs Gas y,,,, y,,,,
Dispersion I J,I
,Q l
WaarVaPar l
of y
L bI i
HF l
HF HF.H O ap UQW: solid 2
I an,d UOzF M ***
uoc. solid l
i,,, g,o a,,
uor: solid 2
er Solid UFs HF.
O Gas HF. H2OGas l
l l
1 f
I 4
i A
A I
i 8
I l
I I
8*'"
- 0 I
I Heat inputs I
b0 MO I b -0 I
I to Plume l
H,e > 0 N, or < 0 g B,w = 0 l
H.
= (T.-T,)
H r. (T.-T,)
H, = (T.-T,) l l
l 1
1 I
I I
100%
c i
l (fraction bf UFs wnicn is vapor)l l
I l
I T
T. _
(plume' temperature) l I
l l
1 I
P*
oi i
(plume l density) g g
I I
I Fig. 4.3-6.
Schematic diagram of processes involved in UF. releases.
....i.n-,
..i...,r,
,i-.
g g-ex S3 u n Region Region
$1 2
5 I
I I
I Region Region Region i
I i
i i
8
-1 i
i 3
4
~
i
=
5 I
I I
E I
I I
Q O
I I
I e
i i
s E
a 2
8 1
1 I
g o
i I
E I
I cn 55 I
i Downwind Distance Fig. 4.3-7.
Example of a possible plume trajectory from a moderate-velocity, vertical release of UF, vapor.
g n
b
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0316 HGSYSTEM PLM89A
- Dense gas algorithms UFs hemistry and c
- Entrainment formulas thermodynamics
- HF chemistry and thermodynamics
- Equation solver
- Framework for software HGSYSTEM/UFs [:
n ENHANCEMENTS
- Building wake effects
- Local plume rise
- Transient release /toxicloading
- Dry and wet deposition Fig. 4.3-8.
Schematic showing the development and enhancements of HGSYSTEM/UF..
i
)
ne So xx O -4 ld u a
Undisturbed flow F High turbulence region g
n r-High turbulence region
=
~
y,.
i 1.5R A ~ ~, _{l_ i
. g -
Building wake
> ~:-
- DI recirculation N
1 -
- i region g
~g U,,
H H,
j h
j w-l.
1 1
y m
4-X,->l A
i 3
A U
^
?
H
=
=
H -
l q
n
+
n if V
e if F481Peth)J* W2969.J214M24%9ff 62t4371FA69326tM1.GLWAEKiE96932 3f$2BEntrFSat*;cMin9 W$
L
(
Fig. 4.3-9.
Flow over a building for wind normal to the upwind face.
N9n
.G S
L
]
I 55 O(UF,) = 15.0 kg/s o*
1.00 S3 1.00.... i.... i...
.....i....i....
xx s
I-
- I.
l II 8d g
[a = 1 l' T, = 82*C 0.50 a,= 1/2 e
II
~
T, = 17.5*C, p = 0.5906, l
E y, = 0.1382 e
e c
0.20 a
.9 q=1.________________
13 e
g-l T, = 74.7*C, e
u-l
$e = 0.1663 m
l@ 0.10 n 0.10 l
)
T, -+I l
o E
l l
~
3 n
m 2
0.05 8
s c
.III i
III l
l l
T,
- l 0.02 l
l t
t.
'''''''I''''I''''
I I
0.01 O.01 10 20 30
'40 50 60 70 80 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Equilibrium Temperature ('C)
T (*C) '
$c Fig. 4.3-10.
Mixture mass fraction, p, for IIGSYSTEM/UF, predictions (left side) and for Rodean's (1989) equilibrienn sohstion 5
(right side). Three regions are seen: 0) cooling due to evaporation of solid UF.; GI) warniing due te ntaction of UF.
vapor with water vapor; and (III) dilution of products GIF and UO F ) by entrainneent.
2 2
..-,.....i.....,i..s.
-;i-A,
....,...r_-
--t.-
1 SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315,97X0316
4.4 REFERENCES
References for Section 4.1 1,
DOE 1992, lla:ani Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniquesfor Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuc.' ear Safety Analysis Reports, DOE-STD-1027-92, Department of Enctgy.
References for Section 4.2 1.
ANSI-ANS (American National Standards Institute-American Nuclear Society) 1983a. American National Standards Institute /American Nuclear Society-Nuclear Safety Criteriafor the Design of Stationary Pressuri:ed Water Reactor Plants, ANSIIANS 5l.1.
2.
DOE 1992. Ilazard Categori:ation and Accident Analysis Techniquesfor Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, DOE-STD-1027-92, Department of Energy.
Rektences for Section 4.3 1.
NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 1985. Calculational Afethodsfor Analysis of Postulated UF, Releases, NUREGICR-4360.
2.
Clinton, James H.1996. Letter to Russell W. Schmidt: Afaking C)LIND Operablefor Attached Piping Systems, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN.
3.
Schmidt, R. W. I997. Summary Repon Describing PIPELEAK, a Variant of the C)LIND Code, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN.
4.
Williams, W. R.1986. Computer Programsfor Developing Source Termsfor a UF, Dispersion Afodel To Simulate Postulated UF, Releasesfrom Buildings, KID-5695, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge K-25 Site, Oak Ridge Tenn.
5.
Summers, R. M. et al.1991. AtELCOR 1.8,0: A Computer Codefor Nuclear Reactor Severe Accident Source Term and Risk Assessment Analyses, NUREGICR-5531, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
6.
Kim, S. H., N. C. J. Chen, R. P. Taleyarkhan, M. W. Wendel, K. D. Keith, R. W. Schmidt, J.
C. Carter, and R. H. Dyer 1996. Source Term Evaluationfor Postulated UF, Release Accidents, in Gaseous Difusion Plants-Summer Ventilation ofode (Non-Seismic Cases), ORNLITM-13251, Lockheed Martin Energy Research Corp., Oak Ridge Natl. Lab., Oak Ridge, Tenn.
7.
Wendel, M. W, et al.1996. " Computational Fluid Dynamics Tracking of UF. Reaction Products Release into a Gaseous Diffusion Plant Cell Housing," in AShfE 1996 Fluids Engineering Division Summer Afecting, San Diego, Cahfornia, July 1996, American Society of Mech.
Engineers.
4.4-1
SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315,97X0316 8.
NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 1986. Assessment of the Public Health Impactfrom the Accidental Release of UF, at the Sequoyah Fuels Corporation Facility at Gore, Oklahoma, NUREG ll89, Vol.1.
9.
Pickrell, P. W. Apr. 30, 1982. Characterization of the Solid, Airborne Afaterial Created by Interaction of UF, with Atmospheric hioisture in a Contained Volume, N1PS-144, Union Carbide Corp., Nuclear Division, Oak Ridge. Tenn.
- 10. Lux, C. J. June 3,1982. UF, Release S*: dies Under Controlled Conditions GATIGDP-2014, Goodyear Atomic Corp., Piketon, Ohio.
I1. Ducouret, A. J.1977. "An experience of Accidental Release of UF.." white paper, Publisher, Pierrelatte, France.
- 12. McGuire, S. A.1988. A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparednessfor Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Afaterial Licensees, NUREG.1140, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Res.
- 13. IIeudorfer, W. and S.11artwig 1983. "A Comparison of Consequences of Different Types of UF. Accidents," Heaty Gas and Risk Assessment-II, S. Hartwig (ed.), Battelle Institute e.V.,
Frankfurt am Main, Germany, i
- 14. ORO (Oak Ridge Operations) June 1,1979. Investigation of Occurrence involving Release of Uranium Hexapuoridefrom Fourteen-Ton cylinder at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant on Afarch 7,1978, ORO-757, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
- 15. Bloom, S. G, R. A. Just, and W. R. Williams 1989. A Computer Programfor Simulating the Atmospheric Dispersion of UF, and Other Reactive Gases Having Positive, Neutral, or Negative Buoyancy, K/D 5694, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge K-25 Site, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
- 16. Hanna, S. R., J. C. Chang, and J. X. Zhang 1995. " Modifications to HGSYSTEM to Account for UF. Chemistry and Thermodynamic," in Proceedings of the International Conference and Workshop on Afodeling and Mitigating the Consequences of Accidental Releases of Hazardous Materials, New Orleans, Louisiana. June 26-29.
- 17. Hanna, S. R., J. C. Chang, and J. X. Zhang 1996. Technical Documentation of HGSYSTEM/UF3 Model, K/SUB/93-XJ947, Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Oak Ridge K 25 Site, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
- 18. Schotte, W.1987. " Fog Formation of Hydrogen Fluoride in Air," Ind. Eng. Chem. Res., 26, 300-306.
4.4-2
1 SAR-PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997 l
RAC 97X0315,97X0316
- 19. Ilanna, S. R., J. C. Chang, and J. X. Zhang 1997. "hfodeling Accidental Releases to the Atmosphere of a Dense Reactive Chemical (Uranfun Hexafluoride)," Atmos. Endron.
31(6):901-908.
I
- 20. Armstrong, D. P., W. D. Bostick, and Fletcher 1991. "An FT-IR Study of the Atmospheric l
Hydrolysis of Uranium Hexafluoride," Appl. Spectros. 45,1008-16.
- 21. Varma, A. K., E. S. Fishburne, and R. A Beddini 1977. A Second-Order Closure Analysis of Turbulent Diffusion Flames, NASA CR 145226, Natl. Aeronautics and Space Administration, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Va.
- 22. Varma, A. K. I982. Development of Modelsfor the Analysis of Atmospheric Releases of Pressurl:cd Uranium Hexafluoride, No. 482, Aeronautical Research Associates of Princeton, Princeton, N.J.
- 23. PGDP (Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant) 1985. Final Safety Analysis Reportfor the Paducah Gascous Dl]Jhsion Plant, KY-734, htartin hfarietta Energy Systems, Paducah, Ky.
- 25. NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commisslon) 1984. Environmental Impact Appraisalfar Renewal of Source Material License No. SUD-326, Allied Chemical Company UFe Conversion Plant, NUREG-1071, Office of Nuclear hiaterial Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D. C.
- 26. Ilicks, B. B., K. S. Rao, R. J. Dobosy, R. P. Hosker, Jr., J. A. Herwehe, and W. R.
Pendergrass 1989. TRMD: A Puf. trajectory Modelfor Reactive Gas Dispersion with Application to UF, Releases into the Atmosphere, NOAA Technical Memorandum ERL ARL-168,
- 27. Sykes, R. L and W. S. Lewellen 1992. Review of PotentialModelsfor UF, Dispersion, K/GDP/SAR-19, ARAP Group, Titan Corporation, Princeton, N.J.
28, Witlox, H. W. bl., K. hicFarlane, F. J. Rees, and J. S. Puttock 1990. Development and Validation of Atmospheric Dispersion Modelsfor ideal Gases and Hydrogen Fluoride, Part H, HGSYSTEM Program Uter's Manual, TNER.90.0.16, Shell Research Ltd., Thorton Research Centre, Chester, U.K.
- 29. Ra), P. K. and J. A. Morris 1987. Source Characteri:ation of Heavy Gas Dispersion Modelsfor Reactive Chemical, Vol,1, AFGL-TR-99-0003-VOL-1, Technology and hianagement Systems, Burlington, biass.
- 30. Ermak, D. L.1990. User's Manualfor SLAB: An Atmospheric Dispersion Modelfor Denser-Than-Air Releases. UCRL-h1A-105607, Lawrence Livermore Natl. Lab., Livermore, Calif.
4.4-3
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17, 1997
- RAC 97X0315,97X0316
- 31. Post, L 1994a. HGSYSTEM J.0 Technical Reference Manual, TNER. 94.059, Shell Research Ltd., Thorton Research Centre, Chester, U.K.
- 32. Post, L 1994b. HGSYSTEM J.0 User's Manual, TNER. 94.058, Shell Research Ltd., 'Ihorton Research Centre, Chester U.K.
33, McFarlane, K., A. Prothero, J. S. Puttock, P. T. Roberts, and H. W. M. Witlock 1990.
Development and Validation ofAtmospheric Dispersion Modelsfor ideal Gases and Hydroger Fluoride, TNER.90.0.15, Shell Research Ltd., Thorton Research Centre, Ches'er, U.K.
- 34. - Colenbrander, G. W.1980. "A Mathematical Model for the Transient Behavior of Dense Vapor Clouds," in Proc. of the 3rd International Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries.
- 35. Hosker, R. P.1984. " Flow and Diffusion Near Obstacles," Atmospheric Science and Power Production, D. Randerson (ed.), DOE / TIC-27601, U.S. DOE, Office of Energy Research.
- 35. Schulman, L. L. and J. S. Scire 1980. Buoyant Line and Point Source (BLP) Dispersion Model User's Guide, P-7304B, Environ. Res. And Technol., Concord, Mass.
- 37. Snyder, W. H.1993. "Downwash of Plumes in the Vicinity of Buildings: A Wind Tunnel Study," in NATO Advanced Research Workshop, Recent Advances in the Fluid Mechanics of Turbulent Jets and Plumes, Viano so Castelo,. Portugal, June 28-July 2, Publisher, Location.
I l
- 38. Snyder, W. H. and R. E. Lawson Jr.1994. " Wind tunnel measurements of flow fields in the a
I vicinity of buildings," 8th AMS Conference on Application of Air Poll. Meteorol., with AWMA.
Nashville, TN, Jan 23 33,
- 39. Scire, J. S., L. L. Schulman, and D. G. Strimaitis 1995. " Observations of Plume Descent Downwind of ~ Buildings," in Proceedings of the 88th AnnualMeeting and Exhibition of the Air and Waste Management Association, San Antonio, Texas, June 18-23.
- 40. ASHRAE (American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-conditioning Engineers, Inc.)
1993. " Air Flow Around Buildings," Chap.14 in ASHRAE Handbook-1993 Fundamentals,
= Atlanta.
- 41. _ Schulman, L. L. and J. S. Scire 1993. " Building Downwash Screening Modeling for the Downwind Recirculation Cavity," J. Air Waste Manage. Assoc.,43,1122-27.
- 42. Wilson, D. J.1995. " Numerical Modeling of Dispersion from Short Stacks," in Seminar 14:
Accuracy and Realism of ASHRAL flandbook Esti. nates of Exhaust Gas Contamination of Nearby AirIntakes, American Society r?.ieating, Refrigerating and Air <onditioning Engineers, Atlanta.
4.4-4
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315,97XO316 9
- 43. I1 anna, S. R. and J. C. Chang 1997. HGSYSIDl/UF, blodel Enhancementsfor Plume Rise and Dispersion Around Buildings, Lift-off of Buoyant Plumes, and Robustness of Numerical Solver, Earth Tech, Concord, biass.
- 44. Brl gs, O. A.1996. " Conservative Re fitting of Lift-off Equations," Letter to S. R. Ilanna.
F Earth Tech, Inc., Concord, hiassachusetts, August 15.
- 45. I(all. D. J. and R. A. Waters 1986. Further E.nperiments on a Buoyars: Emissionfrom a Building, LR 567 PA, Warren Spring Lah. Stevenage, liertfordshore, U.K.
- 46. Itall, D. J., V. Kukadia, S. Walker, and O. W. hlarsland,1995. " Plume Dispersion from Chemical Watchouse Fires." BRE Report CR $6/95, Building Research Establishment, Garston, Watford, WD275R, UK.
- 47. Briggs, G. A. Nov. 26,1973. Lift off of Buoyant Gas initially m the Ground, draft, ATDD-NOAA, Oak Ridge Tenn.
- 48. Briggs. G. A.1975. " Plume Rise Predictions," Lectures on Air Pollution and Environmental Impact Analyses, D. A. llaugen (ed.), American hieteorological Society, Boston.
(
49 EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) 1995. User's Guidefor the Industrial Source Comple.t (ISCJ) Dispersion hfodels Office of Air Quality and Plann. Standards, Research Triangle Park, N.C.
- 50. Ilickz, B. B., D. D. Baldocchi, R. P-llosker Jr., B. A. Ilutsheson, D. R. hiatt, R. T.
bich1illen, and L. C. Satterfield 1985. On the Use of Afonitored Air Concentrations To h fer Dry t
Deposition, ERL ARL-141, Natl. Oceanic.nd Atmospheric Administration, Air Resources Laboratory, Silver Springs, hid.
- 51. Ramsdell, J. V. Jr., C. A. Simonen, and K. W. Burk 1993. Regional Atmospheric Transport Codefor Hanford Emission Tracking IRATCHET), Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Wash.
- 52. Ilanna, S. R., J. C. Chang, and D. G. Strimaltis 1993. "llazardous Gas hiodel Evaluation with Field Observations," Atmos. Environ., 27A, 2265-85.
- 53. Crabol, B, C. Geisse, L. lacona, D. Bouland, and G. Deville-Cavelin 1991. " Presentation and interpretation of Field Experiments of Gaseous UF, Releases in the Atmosphere " pp. 320-50 in Proceedings of the OECDINEA/CSNI/ Specialist bleeting on Safety and Risk Assessmentin Fuel Cycle Facilities, Tokyo.
- 54. Just, R. A.1986. Analysis of the April 18.1986 UF, Release Test, KID-5720, h1artin h1arietta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge K-25 Site Oak Ridge, Tenn.
4.4-5
I SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315,97X0316
- 55. Just, R. A. and S. G. Bloom 1989. Analysis of the April 10,1987 UF, Release Test, K/D-5806, h1artin hlarletta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge K 25 Site, Oak Ridge, Tenn.
- 56. Bloom, S. G. and R. A. Just 1993. Analysis of the June 5,1989 UF, Release Test, KID 6092, h1artin hiarietta Energy Systems Oak Ridge K 25 Site, Oak Ridge Tenn.
- 57. Rodean, i1. C.1989. Toward Atore Realistic ofaterla! Afodelsfor Release and Dispersion of lleaiy Gases, UCRL-53902, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Calif.
- 56. Britter, R. Briggs, G. A., and Sykes, I.,1996. "IIGSYSTEhi/UP, Peer Review Panel Report,"
Letter frora S. R.11 anna. Earth Tech, Inc., Concord, hiassachusetts, September 3.
- 59. Jackson, J. D.1995. " Gaseous Diffusion Plant Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program-Natural Phenomena Analysis Criteria," November 16,1995 letter to T. Angelelli, DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office.
- 60. UCRL (University of California Research Laboratory) 1990. Design and Evaluation Guidelines for Department of Energy Facilities Subjected to Natural Phenomena Ha:ards, UCRL 15910.
61, DOB (U.S. Department of Enetgy) 1994c. Natural Phenomena Ha:ards Design and Evaluation Criteriafor Department of Energy Facilities, DOE STD 1020-94.
- 62. ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers) 1986. Selsmic Analysis of Safety Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary on Standardfor Seismic of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures, ASCE 4 86.
- 63. GTS 1994. GTSTRUDL Computer Program, version 940lRS, Computer Alded Structural Engineering Center, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology.
- 64. ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers) 1988. Afinimum Design Loadsfor Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7 88.
- 65. DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) 1994d. DOE Workshop on Walkdown Field Guide and SQUG/EPRI Seismic Evaluation hiaterial, Volumes 1 through 8. San Francisco, California, h1 arch.
- 66. SQUG (Seismic Qualification Utilities Group) 1992. Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP)for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, Rev. 2.
- 67. Lh1ES (Lockheed h1artin Energy Systems) 1996a. Guidelinesfor Emluations of Equipmentfor NPH, K/GDP/SAR 56 Rev.1.
4.4 6
SAR PORTS PROPOSED August 17,1997 RAC 97X0315,97X0316
- 68. LMES (Lockheed Martin En~gy Systems) 1996b. H'alkthrough Screening Guidelinesfor Gaseous Difusion Plant Piping Systems, KIGDPISAR $1, Rev. 3.
- 69. LMES (Lockheed Martin Energy Systems) 1996c Structural AssessmentMethodsfor Gaseous Difusion Plant Piping Systems, KIL DPISAR-58, Rev. 2.
- 70. WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company) 1994. Procedurefor Seismic Evaluation of Piping Systems Using Screening Criteria, WSRC TR 94-0343, Rev. B.
4.4-7
GDP 97-0148 Page1of3 United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
Proposed Certificate Amendment Request Update the Application Safety Analysis Report Significance Determination The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) has reviewed the proposed changes associated with this cenificate amendment request and has concluded that they should be considered significant in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45 based on the following Significance Determination.
1.
No Significant Decrease in the Effectiveness of the Plant's Safety. Safeguards. or Security
. Programs The Safety Analysis Repon Update (SARUP) proposes changes to the following sections of the Certification Application:
Chapter 2, Site Characteristics Chapter 3, Facility and Process Description Chapter 4, Accident Analysis Section 5.2, Nuclear Criticality Safety Technical Safety Requirements No changes are anticipated the plant's safety, safeguards, or security programs described in Volume 3 of the Cenification Application. Therefore, there will be no sigificant decrease in the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards, or security programs.
2.
No Signihcant Change to Any Conditions to the Certificate of Comoliance There are no proposed changes to any conditions of the Certificate of Compliance as part of the SARUP.
3.
Significant Chance to a Condition of the Anoroved Comoliance Plan Issue 2 of DOE /ORO-2027, " Plan for Achieving Compliance with NRC Regulations at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant" (the Compliance Plan) requires, in pan, that the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) submit an update to the application Safety Analysis Report (SAR) based largely on the DOE site wide SAR by August 17,1997. USEC's efforts to complete the SAR Update (SARUP) submittal have been underway since we received the DOE upgraded SAR (POEF-LMES 89) on February 18,1997 and the supporting documents in late March /early-April.
USEC has determined during the SAR review process that insufficient time had been allocated in the Compliance Plan to accomplish the preparation and review activities necessary to ensure completeness and accuracy of the SARUP prior to submittal to the NRC. This was the basis for USEC's request to the NRC in letter GDP 97-
1 GDP 97 0148 Page 2 of 3 0122 dated July 18,1997 for approval of a change in the submittal date from August 17,1997 to October 31,1997. USEC identified that the additional time would be required to complete the activities necessary to ensure completeness and accuracy of the SARUP submittal to the NRC including:
?
Resolve internal comments from plant support groups Evaluate changes to the plant since the DOE cut-off date and identified as-found conditions for their impact on SARUP Review the SARUP supporting documents
+
Obtain final Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) approval of the proposed application changes Enclosure I to this letter provides a detailed status of the activities that must be completed for the remaining sections of the SARUP.
Because this submittal only partially meets all of the Compliance Plan conditions, and since a new schedule and plan of action is required to fully meet the conditions, this Certificate Amendment Request does represent a significant change to the approved Compliance Plan.
i 4,
No Significant increase in the Probability of Occurrence or Consecuences of Previousiv i
Evaluated Accidents Changes are proposed to SAR Chapter 2 to include the results of re-analyses of natural phenomena and external man-made threats. No significant changes are identified.
5.
No New or DifTerent Tvpe of Accident The sections of the SARUP that are included as part of this submittal do not propose any new or ditTerent type of accidents than those currently evaluated in the Certification Application.
i 6.
No Significant Reduction in Margins of Safety The sections of the SARUP that are included as part of this submittal have no impact on the margins of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Safety Requirement. Therefore, no significant reductions in margins of safety will result.
7.
No Siunificant Decrease in the Effectiveness of any Program or Plans Contained in the Certificate ApplicatiQD 1
For the reasons discussed in the response to Itemt above, there will be no signficant decrease in the effectiveness of any program or plan contained in Volume 3 of the Certification Application.
l GDP 97 0148 Page 3 of 3 8.
The nrooogd changes do not result in undue risk to 1) oublic health and safety. 2) common defense and security. and 3) the environment The proposed SARUP changes reflect new accident analysis methodologies and consequences.
liowever, no undue risks to public health and s'.fety, common defense and security, or to the l
environment have been identified.
9.
No Change in the Tvoes or Significant Increase in the Amounts of Anv Emuents that May be Released Offsite The sections of the SARUP that are included as part of this submittal do not propose any change in the amounts of any emuents that may be released offsite.
- 10. No Sienificant increase in Individual or Cumulative Occuontional Radiation Excosuts The sections of the SARUP that are included as part of this submittal do not propose ahy change in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
I1. No Siunificant Construction Imnact The sections of the SARUP that are included as part of this submittal do not result in any construction impact.
- 12. No Significant Increase in the Potential for. or Radiological or Chemical Conscaucnces from.
Previously Analyzed Accidents Changes are proposed to SAR Chapter 2 to include the results of re analyses of natural phenomena and external man made threats. No significant changes are identified.
GDP 97-0148 26 Pages Total United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
Proposed Certincate Amendment Request Update the Application Safety Analysis Report Identification and Evaluation of Differences Required by Compliance Plan Issue 2
~
Items 3.a),3.b), and 4 of the Plan of Action and Schedule for issue 2 of DOE /ORO 2027, " Plan for Achieving Compliance with NRC Regulations at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant"(the 1
Compliance Plan) state:
l 3.
By no later than August 17, 1997, USEC shall submit an amendment to their l
Certification Application which includes:
a) identification of all information, findings, and recommendations which indicate differences between the DOE site-wide Safety Analysis Report and the USEC Application for Certification.
4 b) an evaluation of the effects of those differences on the safety of workers, j
and off site members of the public.
i 4.
At the same time the Application amendment is due, USEC shall also submit for NRC approval, its proposed resolution of matters contained in the DOE approved l
site-wide Safety Analysis Report not incorporated by USEC in its request for amendment of their Application for Certification.
i The table that follows provides the above-requested information for those sections of the SARUP that are included in this submittal. The following notes accompany the table:
Note 1:
In the first part of the top block, the difference between the current Certification Application (USEC-02) and the DOE upgraded SAR (POEF-LMES-89) is identified. This identification is required by Item 3.a) of the Plan of Action and Schedule for Compliance Plan Issue 2,
)
l Note 2:
In the second part of the top block, an evaluation of the difference between USEC-02 and POEF-LMES-89 is provided. This evaluation is required by Item 3.b) of the Plan of Action and Schedule for Compliance Plan Issue 2.
Note 3:
In the first part of the bottom block, the difference between the USEC SARUP submittal and POEF-LMES 89 is identified. In the second part of the bottom block, a resolution of the difference between the USEC SARUP submittal and POEF LMES 89 is provided. The identification and resolution of differences is required by Item 4 of the Plan of Action and Schedule for Compliance Plan Issue 2.
m
1 Portssaouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Cosnparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS l
l USEC-42 Difference Between USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Nese 1)
POEF-Section Evaluation of Diference se Safety of Workers and Offnese Publee (Nese 2) i 131ES-89 Section USEC SARUP-PORTS Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Sectiem med POEF-IJf ES-89 5ection (Nece 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-LMES-39 Infersmation Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Note 3) 1.1 SAR 2.
Difference-Infmnatim is smular, but not identical Evaluation: Introductory infmnation - no impact on safety of unters and offsite pubix:
SAR 2.
Difference: Infmnatim is sinular, but not identical Resolution: Infamation in USEC-02 retained for SARUP.
1.2 SAR 2.
Difference Summary of DOE requirements for safety basis of facahty is not contamed in SAR 2.
Evaluation: SAR references quo uuugs of 7635(a)(8), uluch are applicable to PORTS.
SAR 2.
Difference-Summary of DOE.wuu wists for safety basis of facihty is not contamed in SAR 2.
Resolutnorr Information in USEC-02 renamed for SARUP - IVRTS comphes with 10 CFR 76, not DOE
. quo u,sts.
13 NA Drfference: See specific secticos that folks.
Evr.lustum: See specific sectxms that follow.
NA Drfrerence-See specsse sectxms that follow.
Resolutiort See specific sectxms that folkm-13.1 SAR 21 Difference Introductory information on site desmption and geography axxe than what is in SAR 2.1.
Evaluatiort Intro &ctory mformatxm - no impact on safety of uuters and offsite public.
SAR 2.1 Difference: Introductory information on site descriptum and geography more than what is in SAR 21.
Resolution: Information in USEC-02 retained for SARUP.
SAR 2-1
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Difference Between USEC-02 Satism and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note I)
POEF-Section Evaluation of Difference on Safety of Workers and ONsite Public (Note 2)
LM ES-89 S,cago.
USEC SARUP-PORTS Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Sation (Note 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-131ES-89 Infornentian Not Included in SARUP-PORTS (Nose 3) j i3.1.1 SAR 2.1.2 DifTerence-Number of acres in reservation; distance of facahty from Columbus, Portsmouth ami Chalhcothe,
[
supportmg reference not in SAR.
Evaluation: Differences have no impact on safety of workas and ofTsite public.
SAR 2.1.2 DifTerence: Number of acres in reservation; distance of facihty from Columbus, Portsmouth and Chtlhcothe; supportmg reference not in SAR.
Resolutiort Information in USEC-02 retained for SARUP - information more accurate.
I31.2 LAR 2.1.2. I Difference-Second sentence not in SAR.
Evaluatierr Desenptiw:information.
SAR 2.1.2.1 DifTacnce: Second sentence not m SAR.
Resolutiorr Information not included in SARUP I3.1.2.I SAR 2.1.2.1 DifTerence: Information similar but not wurd-for-word, reference not included.
Evaluatiair Descriptive information,ir.aroductory in nature.
SAR 2.1.2.1 DitTerence. Information similar but not word for-word, refaence not included.
Resolution: USEC-02 information retamed fu SARUP.
I3.1.2.2 SAR 2.1.23 DifTerence Desenpten of belicopter pad use; reference to 1990 cmmonmental report;origm ofelectncal power, reference to process vs. flammable gases.
Evaluation: SAR information more correcthrxwe accurate, or information is contamed in other Application documents.
SAR 2.1.23 Di!Terence Description of helicopter pad use; reference to 1990 environmental report; origin of electnca! power; reference to process vs. flammabic gases.
l Resolution: Info mation contained in USEC-02 retained for SARUP.
t SAR 2-2 l
l
Portsenenth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Cornparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Diference Between USEC-02 Secties and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 1)
POEF-Section Evaluation of DiNerence en Safety of Werkers and ONosee Feldic (Note 2)
LM ES-89 USEC SARUP-PORTS Dsterence Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Secties and POEF-LMES-89 Sectise (Neee 3).
sect;,,
Section Resolutiec of POEF-LM ES-89 Infernesties Not incleded in SARUP-PORTS (Neee 3)
I 3. I.23 SAR 2.1.2.4. 2.1.2.5 Dttference: Information on handimg secunty threats; height of secunty fence; badgmg requirements; security infonnsum, regulatxcis govenung cmtrolled area; <fe-between potential effluent release pomis to sac boundary Evaluation: Infonnation is o*M in specific plans rather than in SAR; regulatxxis governing cmtrolled a: ras are NRC, not DOE; infmnatkm m releases addressed in Accalent Anal}s SAR 2.1.2 4,2.1.2.5 DttTerence-Infixmatica m handimg security threats, height of secunty fence, badging +m; secunty informatim; regulations governing controlled area; distances between potential effluent release pxnts to site boundary Resolutiorr Information in USEC-02 retained for SARUP.
I3.1.2.4 SAR 2.1 Differenx Section not in SAR Evaluation Informatkmal only; sectam points to evaluation guidehnes that are addressed in Acc> dent Analysis.
SAR 2.1 Difference Sectum not in SAR.
Resolution: Incl ofinfonnatuxi in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP 13.2 SAR 2.13 Differerce Sentencenotin SAR.
Evaluation: Introductory infonnation only.
SAR 2.13 Differenecc Sentence not in SAR.
Resolutxxt lett of& tail in USEC-02 retatacd in SARUP.
13.2.1 SAR 2.13.1 Difference: Tabulation of number of employees on sate per stuft not inchaled in SAR.
Evaluation: Number changes and is informatkmal ordy - no impact on aante/offsite cmsequences.
SAR 2.13.1 Ddrerence-Tabulation of number ofemplo>res on sete per shift not included in SAR Resolution: Incl of detail in SAR retamed for SARUP.
SAR 2-3
Portssmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Cornparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC42 Dinerence Betneen USEC-02 Section and POEF-LM ES-89 Secties (Nese 1)
POEF-Section Evaluation of DiNerence on Safety of Workers and OWssee Public (Neee 2)
LMES-89 Section USEC SARUP-PORTS DiNerence Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-LM ES-89 Information Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Note 3) 2 13.2.2 SAR 2.13.2 DdTererx:c: "about 6800" vs. "approumately 6780"; 50-mde radms populatxms Evaluatum: Populatxm t. umber approumate; informatxn oc population beyormi 5 nules not necessary for accxlent analystsmuua:e detemunatka SAR 2.13.2 Diffaence "about 6800" vs *approumately 6780"; 50-anic radms populatums Resolution: Information and leni ofdetail in USEC-02 retaired in SARUP.
I3.23.1 SAR 2.13 3 Ddrerence: Number of elementary sdmots, mfurmation on day-care and afia-sclxxd care.
Evaluation: USEC-02 informaton more conect-SAR 2.133 Difference: Number of elementary scixels, mfunnatum cn day-care and after-school care.
Resolution: Information in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
I3.23.2 SAR 2. I33 Ddrerence: 45 vs. 40 operstmg beds; miensne care urut not addressed in SAR; 4 vs 3 hcensed nursing lxunes, one vs. two neighbonng PORTS, two separate locations Fr home for n..ntally retarded vs one m Wakefiekt Evaluation: Informatum in USEC-02 more correct.
SAR 2.133 Difference:45 vs. 40 operating beds; intensiw care umt not addressed in SAR; 4 vs. 3 bcensed nursmg homes, one vs. two neighboring PORTS, two separate kxathms for home for mentally retarded vs one m Wakefwl.1 Resolutiour Information in USEC-02 retamol for SARUP.
I3.23.4 SAR 2.1.4 Diffaence-Informatam on forest types, land usage withm 50 mdes,50-unte percentage of pubhc land use, use of surface waters not in SAR 2.1.4; specific vs. approumate distance from facahty to Ashland, Ky.
Evaluation: Infonnation on forest types, text usage, surface watas not germane to safety basis, hr to Ashland rede<wd SAR 2.1.4 Ddrerence: Infonnation on fwest types,larmi usage mthm 50 mdes,50-mde percentage of pubhc land use, use of surface watas not in SAR 2. I.4; specdic vs. approumate distance from facthty to Asidand, Ky.
Resolution: ixvel ofdetail and informatum in USEC42 retamed fir SARUP.
SAR 2-4 a
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 DiNerence Between USEC-02 Section med POEF-LAES-395ecties (Neee 1)
{
POEF-Section Evaluation of DiNerence om Safety of Weekers and ONeiec Public (Note 2)
~
LM ES-89 Sec,go, USEC SARUP-PORTS DiNerence Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Sec:3ea and POEF-LMES-39 Secties (Nese 3)
Section Reselidion of POEF-LMES-89 Informaation Net included in SARUP-PORTS (Nese 3) 1.4.1 SAR23 DifTerence-Introductwy paragraph on meteorology not in SAR 23.
Evaluation: Meteorology informatum imp (xtant to a:calent analysis cr_mm determmatums.
SAR 23 DifTerence: tkxie Resolutxm: Use POEF-IATES-89 infmnatha in SAF UP.
l.4.1.1 SAR 23 Differencc Information on reponal chmatology covered at w.ou.g level in SAR 23 as opposed to detaded discussion presented in POEF-IAiES-89.
Evaluation: Meteorology informatxm important to accxlent analysis ammyuuw descrmmatxxa SAR 23 DifTerence:Ikme Resolutiert Use POEF-11tES-89 informatxm in SARUP.
l.4.1.2, SAR 23 DiTerence: Information on on-site meteorolopcal measurements program an! local mescorology presented at 1.4. I J summary level in SAR 23, new meteorokg tower not addressed in SAR.
a Evaluation: Meteorology informatxxi important to accident analy.us ummyouw determmations.
SAR 23 Differerxx None Resohniorr Use POEF-IATES-89 informatam in SARUP.
1.4.2,1.4.2.1 SAR 2.4.1 DifTererxr introductory infinnation not included in SAR 2.4.1.
.l Evaluatiort Introductory mformatim - cot germane to safety basis.
1 SAR 2.4.1 DifTerence: Ir.troduc*ory information not included in SAR 2.41.
Resolution: Level ofdetail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
]
4 SAR 2-5
i l
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 DiKerence Between USEC 02 Section and POEF-LMES49 Section (Nose I)
POEF-Section Evaluation of DiNerence on Safety of Workers and Offeise Pubhe (Note 2)
LAfES-89 Section USECSARUP-POR13 DiNerence Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section med POEF-LMES49 Secties (Note 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-LMES49 Informaatina Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Note 3) 1.4 2 1.1.1 SAR 2.1.4.1 Difference-Wata use for city of Portsmouth vs wata use fw PORTS facihty in SAR; populatum of Beawr, Pike Courity and groundwater use information not in SAR; groundwater use estimate 1.9 vs.1.8 ftVs in SAR.
Evaluation: Water use shoukt be for city of Portsmouth, not PORTS facihty; populatum and groumfwater use information not gcrmane to safety basis SAR 2.1.4.1 Difference: Populatio of Beaver, Pike County am! groum! water use infmnation not in SAR, groundwater use estimate 1.9 vs. I 8 fIVs in SAIL Resolution: SARUP corrected for water use of Portsnouth; otherwise, information and Icwl ofdetail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.4.2.1.1.2 SAR 2.1.4.2 Difference: Informatka on Scioto River channel, poor inflow to Little Beaver Creek, NPDES regulasse of plant liquid effluents not in SAR 2.1.42.
Evaluation: Includmg such informatam in SARI tP not necessary, not germane to safety basis. Liqumi efIluent information addressed in ECSR.
SAR 2.1.4.2 Difference: Infonnation on Scioto Rsver channel, pnar inflow to Little Beawr Creek NPDES regulation of plara liquid effluents not in SAR 2.1.4 2.
Resolution: Level ordetad in USEC4)2 retained for SARUP.
1.4.2.1.1.3 SAR 2.1.42 2.1.4.3 Difference: Determmation of clevations from topo maps, outfall dramages, outfall descnptiori and sludge lagoons not in SAR 2.1.4.3; potential fkuhng problem relaton to PORTS operation Evaluation: 1xwl ofdetail not necessary for safety basis or information is amtained in SAR Sectxms 3 6 3 and 5.1 and the ECSR.
SAR 2.1.4.2,2.1.4.3 Difference: Determination ofelevations from topo maps, outfall drainages,outfall desenption and sludge lagoons not in SAR 2.I.4.3; potential ikuhng problem relation to IM)RTS operation.
Resolutiorr informatam and level ofdetail m USEC-02 rctained for SARUP.
SAR. 2-6
Pert:. aut*.a Gaseous Diffusion Plant Compari<ca of POEF-IJ1ES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 DiNerence Between USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 1)
POEF-Section Evaluation of Differenes en Safety of Workers and Offsite Paine (Note 2)
LM ES-89 Section USEC SARUP-PORTS Difference Betwe-n USEC S.*.RUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 3)
Section Renointion of POEF-LM ES-89 Inforniation Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Note 3) 1.4.2.1.2.1 SAR 2 43.I Difference. Evaluation cnteria not in SAR 2.43.1.
Evaluatierr Summary informatam only - not germane to safety basis.
SAR 2.43.1 Difference: Evaluation cnteria not in SAR 2.43 1.
Resolution: Level of detail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.4.2.1.2.4 SAR 2 4 31 DifTerence: 37I4 vs. 3800 acres, last two sentences on Innkhng tunnel floodmg not stated speerfically m SAR, wwds "may be affected by other factors
- replaced with *are conservative *.
Evaluation General size of reservation acceptable for cmtext, SAR states posrtive conclusion that ttanel ikxximg would not likely result in significant safdy problems, and factors stated in paragraph tend to reduce water level SAR 2,431 DifTeren:e: }714 vs. 3800 acres, last two sentences on buikhng tunnel floodmg not stated specifically in SAR.
words "may be afrected by other fw: tors" replaced with "are conservatin".
Resolution: Information in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.4.2.1.2.5 SAR 2.43.1 DitTerence: Information on three runotTeomponents, clogging assumrtions for ditches and culwits not in SAR.
Evaluation: Information not germane to safety basis.
SAR 2.431 Dif crence: Information on three runoff components, cloggmg assumptions for ditches and cuhrrts not m SAR.
Resolution: Level of detail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.4.2.1.2.6 SAR 2.43.1 DdTerence-Results for ponds and lagoons, results for roofs not included in SAR.
1.4.2.1.27 Evaluation: Information on ponds arki lagoons ra:cessary for completeness of floodmg analysis, roof results are addressed in Accident Analysis, SAR presents only reference discussion.
SAR 2.431 DifTercrm Results for roofs not mcluded in SAR 2.431.
Resolutiost Information on ponds and lagoons inccrporated in SARUP;roofresults are presented in SARUP Chapter 4.
SAR 2-7
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Difference Between USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Secties (Nese 1)
POEF-Section Evaluaties of Difference on Safety of Workers med Offssee Public (Nose 2)
LMES-89 Sect; USEC SARUP-PORTS Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Sectism (Neee 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-LM ES-89 informaties Net Included im SARUP-PORTS (Neee 3) 1.4.2.1.2.8 SAR 2.43.1 Difference Average anrmal preerpitation information not in SAR; awrage annual snowfai!is 22 in vs 20 4 ut Evaluation: Average annual precipitation information not uccesary for safety analysis; snowfall informatum will be revised.
SAR 2.43.1 Difference: Average annual precipitation informatux not in SAR.
Resolution: level ofdetail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP; average annual snowfall mill be changed to 22 in 1.4.2.13.2, SAR 2.43,2 43.2 Difference: Discussums of flood evaluatxm basis, evaluatxxts of flood Ibws, water lew! determmatums at 1.4.2.133, summary level ofdetailin SAR.
1.4.2.13 4 Evaluatiorr Summary level for this information acceptable - unportant informatxm and conclusaans have been maintained.
SAR 2.43,2.43.2 Difference. Discussams of flood evaluation basis, evalumuons of flood flows, water level deter===<b,= si summary levelofdetailin SAR.
Resolution. level ofdetail in I 85EC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.4.2.13.6 SAR 2.43.2 Difference-Relatxmslup of PMF flood level to 10.000 year ikxx s, water shortage informarxm not m SAR or a
addressed in summary fastuen.
Evaluation: Informatum in SAR acceptable for safety basis determmatxxt SAR 2.43.2 Difference: Relatumship of PMF flood lewI to 10,0(X) year floods, water shortage irformatxx not in SAR or addressed m s munary fashxxt Resolution: Level ofdetail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.4.2.1.4 SAR 2.43,2.4.4 Difference-Entire sectum on potential scistucally induced dam fadures presented in summary form m SAR Evaluation: Summary presentation acceptable, since resultmg water lewi would not come near to impactmg the site.
SAR 2.43,2.4.4 Difference-Entire section on potential seismically induced dam failures presented m summary form in SAR.
Reso!ution: level ofdetad in USEC-02 retained Ibr SARUP.
SAR 2-8 1
.- ~.
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Difference Between USEC-82 Sectiae and POEF-LMES-39 Secties (Nese 1)
POEF-Secties Evaluation of Difference en Safety etWerhers and Offsite Public (Nese 2)
LMES-89 Section USEC SARUP-POR13 Difference Between USEC S ARUP-PORTS Secties and POEF-LMES-89 Secties (Nese 3)
Section Resoluties of POEF-LMES-Il9 Inforsmaties Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Nese 3) 1.4.2.1.5 SAR 2.4 6 Difference: Informa; ion m low flow frequerces of average discharges at liigby hot m SAR.
Evaluation: SAR concludes that vohanetnc nver flow is much greater than PORTS water use meumets -
information not requned for safety basis determmation SAR 2.4 6 Ddrerence: Informaton on low flow frequencies of awrage discharges at Ifigby not in SAR.
Resolution-lael of detail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
i 1.4.2.1.6, SAR 2.4.7 Ddrerence: Information startmg with *Durmg 1990 ts not in SAR.
1.4.2.1.7 Evaluatmrt Discussion relates to a DOE site-wide issue, is not germane m safety basis of USEC-leased facihties and areas.
! ^
SAR 2.4.7 Difference: Information startmg mtli Durmg 1990 is not in SAR.
Resolution-Imel of detad in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.42.2 SAR 2.5 Ddrerence Second, third and fourth sentences nor m SAR.
Evaluation: Introductory infamation, not germane to safety basis.
I SAR 2.5 Dtfrerence-Sceond, third and fourth sentences not m SAR.
Resolution: Icel of detail in USEC-02 retamed in SARUP.
SAR 2-9 1
i I
I l
l
1 i
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Coenparison of POEF-131ES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 2 DiNercace Between USEC-82 Secties and POEF-LM ES-89 Section (Note I)
I POEF-Secties Evaluation of Diference en Saiety of Werkers med ONeise Public (Nese 2)
LMES-89 sec,;,,
USEC SARUP-PORTS Diference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section med POEF-LMES-89 Secties (Neee 3)
Section Reordatine of POEF-LM ES.39 Intersmaties Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Nese 3) i 1.4.2.2.1.2 SAR 2.5.1.1,212.1, Ddraence Not in Salt Portion of secoal parapaph startmg with "USGS reports
- ami third parapaph. portmo 2 5 2.2 of fourth parapaph startmg with "The smulanty* and fifth paragraph,last scracnce of sixth paragaph cw-mg Galha aquifx, second sentence of severah parapaph concerning Imnted regmnal data, tlurd and followmg sentences in eighth paragaph, all but last two sentences in nmth paragraph, tenth, eleventh, thuteenth, fourtcemh, sixteenth, seventeenth parapaphs, all but fourth sentence in fdtcenth paragraph.
Evaluation. Deleted information in secund through rfth paragraphs relates to DOE site-wide propams ami does i
not impact safety basis of USEC temet facahtics an. veas, summ=ginfosmanon dc!cted provide detaded information that is not germane to the safety basis.
SAR 251.1,2311, DitTerence: Not in Salt Portmn of second parapaph startmg with "USGS reports
- art
- dmd paragraph, portmn 23 2.2 cf fourth paragraph startmg with *1he smnianty* and fifth paragraph,last sentence ofsix:b parapaph conu:rnmg Gallia aquifer, second sentence of seventh paragraph concernmg lunited regonal data, third and followmg sentences in eighth paragraph, all but last two =t-in ninth paragraph, tenth eicventh, thuteenth, fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth parapaphs, all but fourth sentence in fificenth paragraph.
Resolution. ScTe ofinformaton and level ofdetad of USEC-02 retamed for 5ARUP.
1.4.212.4 SAR 2523 Difference Term
- water table
- in first sentence replaced weh *potenbometnc raface* in SAR.
Evaluation: SAR text matches tnles of figures being desenbed.
SAR 2.5.2 3 Difference-Term
- water tabic
- in first scnicace replaced with *putentiometnc surface
- in SAR.
i Resolution: Infonnaten in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
4 1 4 2.2.2 3 SAR 2123 Dtiference: Paragraphs I and 3 through 7 rx4 m SAR Evaluation: Detailed information which is apphcable to site-wide issues, and not to safety basis of USEC-Ica cd facahties and areas. SAR,lowever, concludes that *In general,only snull I concentrations of rahoactive contammants wrre fourxt*
SAR 2523 DdTerence: Parapaphs I aml 3 through 7 not in SAR i
Resoluuon: Inti of detad of USEC-02 retak:J for SARUP.
SAR 2-10 i
.=.
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Dwerence Between USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Sectnee (Neee 1)
POEF-Secties Es aluatise of Dwerence en Safety of Workers and Offswe PubMe (Nese 2)
LMES-89 Section USEC SARUF-PORTS Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Secties (Nese 3)
Secties Reseistice of POEF-LM ES-39 Inferneaties Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Nese 3) 1.4.2.23 SAR 2.5.23 Dt!Terence-Entre section on contammant transport analysis not in SAR Evaluation: The specifics of the analysis is a DOE site-wide issue, and is not specific to the safety basis of USEC-leased facilities and areas.
SAR 2.5.23 DifTerence' Enti e section on contammant transport analysis not in SAR.
Resolution-Level ofdetail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.43 SAR 2.6 Difference Introduction ddraent than introductaxiin SAR Evaluation: Introductory insxmation - not germane to safety basis.
I SAR 2.6 Difference: Introduction dtfTerent than introductxx iri SAR Resolution: Information in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.43.I SAR 2.6. I DdTerencer. PORTS located in Interior Low Plateaus prmince vs. Appalactuan in SAR. SAR identifies Interar i
law Plateaus to south and west, locates Valley and Ridge provinces to sou:h and east rather than Appaladuan Evaluatxxt SAR information is uxxurect.
j SAR 2.6. I DifTacnce-None f
Resolution: None
[
1.43.1.1 SAR 2.612 Dtfrerence-Rome trough, other geologic features not mund or different mformatixt is gmn in SAR Evaluathur Dtfrerent studies and references between two documents, POEF-13.fES-89 mformation consistent
[
with geologic information used in Accident Analyss..
SAR 2.61.2 Dtfrerence-None
[
Resolution: None l'
i SAR 2-11 i
l Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Cotuparison of POEF-LMES-89 Vetsus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Difference Betweca USEC-42 Secties and POEF-IRES-39 Section (Nese I)
POEF-Section Evaluation of DiKerence en Safety of Werkers and Offsite Public (Nese 2)
LMES-89 Section USEC SARUP-PORTS DiNerence Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Sectiea and POEF-LMES-39 5ection (Nose 3)
Section Resnietion of POEF-IR ES-89 Informistion Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Nese 3) 1.4 3 1.2 SAR 2 6.13 Difference: I;tst sentence of first paragraph ami secoal through fifth paragraphs not in SAR;last ser:tence of sixth paragraph concernmg probabihty of bedrock dissdution ont in SAR; detaded informanon on reponal warping in paragraph 10 not in SAR.
Evalustiert Study results in first five paragraphs r=aw with stabes conducted fw geolope features addressed in ambi analysis Probability of bedrock dissolution, reponal warpmg informauen not sipuficars to safety basis.
SAR 2.6.13 Difference-Last sentence ofsixth paragraph concernmg probabihty of bedrock dissolution not in SAR, detai!cd infonnation on regional warping in paragraph 10 not in SAR.
Resolut.on: Study results updated to match studies in presious section, remamder ofinformation from USEC-02 retained for SARUP.
1.43.2 SAR 2 6.2.1 DCerence Inteiior Low Plateaus instead of Appalachian m SAR.
Inaluation:SAR irxxwrect, should be Intenor low Plateaus.
SAR 2.611 Difference-None Resolution: None I.4 3.2. I SAR 26 2.2 DtfTerence: End of glauntion penod 10,000 years ago vs 15,000 years ago in SAR; reference to figure on pre-Pleistocene and P!cistocene drainage features not m SAR.
Evaluatmer 10.000 years more correct; informaten on dramage features not sipuficant to safety basis SAR 2.6.2.2 Difference-Reference to figure on pre-Pleistocene and Pleistocene dramage features not in SAR.
Resolutiort Level ofdetail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
SAR 2-12
Portsmouth Gastons Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Venus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 DNerence Betneen USEC-02 Secties and POEF-LMES49 Section (Neee I)
POEF-Section Evaluaties of Difference se Sdety of Werkers and ONssee Pubbe (Nese 2)
LMES-89 Section USEC SARUP-TORTS Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORE Secties and POEF-LMES-39 Sectica Ciese 3)
Section Resolution cf POEF-LM ES49 Internation Net included im SARUP-PORTS INete 3) 1.43.2.2.2 SAR 2.6.23 Difference Parapaph desmbmg site burmg progam not m SAR.
Evaluatim: Summary informatim a sne barmg program contamed a SAR 2.6.2.4 is suf5cient detail for this progrant SAR 26.23 Difference-Paragraph describmg site burmg program not m SAR.
Resolution: level of detail in USEC4)2 retamed fx SARUP.
1.43.23, SAR 2.6.2.5 Difference Last two sentences of first sectum, all of second and tinrd section not in SAR.
1.4324 Evaluatum:Some ofconstructum hiskxical data contamed in SAR, but not all. Third parapaph from sectum I.43.2.5 1.43.2.5 is mcorporated, remamdcr ofinformatam not added because it is not sigmficant to safety basis.
SAR 2.615 Difference: Last two sentences of first sectxm. all of secxxxl sectam and aII but thud paragraph of third sectam not in SAR.
Resolutxxt Inti of detail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.43.26 SAR 16.2.5 Differtext Second, ninth and eleventh parapaphs not in SAR; last sentence of paragraph 10 not in SAR; m fifth parapaph, SAR 2ates *Weathermg shtvAl have no effect on the facahty
- vs. Weathermg M _*
Evaluatum: DeMed informatxm in parapaphs 2,9 azxi 10 rs summary information or information containing no conclusions pertaung to safety basis of facahty; parapaph I I has been =Lhi, SAR statement on weathermg is less conclusive and therefore more conservative.
SAR 2.6.2.5 Difference-Second and amth parapaphs not in SAR;last sentence ofparapaph to not in SAR,in fifth paragraph, SAR states Weathermg should hwe no effect on the facshty _ s s, "Weathermg wJ. -
Resolutiert Inti of detail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
SAR 2-13
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant t
Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Difference Between USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Nede I)
POEF-Section Esaiuation of Difference en Safety of Workers and Offsite Public (Nese 2)
LMES-89 U iEC SARUP-PORTS Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 3)
S,ce;,,
Section Resolutina of POEF-LMES-89 Infermiation Not included in SARUP-POR13 (Note 3) i 1.4 33 SAR 2.6 2.5 Di!Terence: Sectxm on geologic hazards not in SAR Evaluatiort: Informatkm added to be consistent with accalent analysis.
SAR 2.6.2.5,2.63.2 DdTerence: Nme Resolutiert All ofsection on geologic hazard added to SARUP; second and third paragraphs of 1.4 33 3 are inserted into SAR sectkm 2.63.2 for cousistency of diums= of Rome truugft 1.43.4.I, SAR 2.63 Ddrerence-Informatson on vibratory ground motion mA in SAR 1.43.4.2 Evaluation: Information only - no conclusions that impact safety basis SAR 2.63 Ddrerence Informatkm m vibratory groum! motxe ext m SAR Resolutierr Level ofdctail in USEC-02 retained for SARUP.
I.43.43 SAR 2.6 3 Ddrerence: F-==i=*er of first paragraph atter first sentence concernmg methods ofestanstmg peak ground accelerations not in SAR Evaluation: Infonnation only - no conclusions with impact on safety basis.
SAR 2.63 Difference Remamder of first paragraph after first sentence concernmg methods ofestimating peak ground accelerations rxx in SAR Resolutiort Level of detail in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.43.4.4 SAR 2.631 Ddrerence: location of two earthquakes not desenbed in SAR in same manner Evaluatiert Additxmalinformation mLbi SAR 2.6 31 Ddrerence-Nane Resolutkm: None SAR 2-14
'l Portsamenth Gasecus DiiTusion Plant Coenparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUF-PORTS USEC-82 Dnerence Between USEC42 Secties and P9EF-LMES49 Sectase (Note 1)
POEF-Secties Evsamatise of DWerence== S4cty of Werkers and ONedee PeMee (Neee 2)
LMES49 USEC SARUP-PORTS Diiference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Sectise and POEF-LMES49 Sectose (Neee 3)
Section Secties Resolation of POEF-LMES49 Intermeaties Not lecloded in SARUP-PORTS (Nese 3) 1.43.43 SAR 2.633,163.4 Difference: Information on fauh stuses re< in SAR.
2.633,263.6,163.7 Evaluatxxt SAR Sectxxis 2.633 through 2.63.7 have been replaced with mformation from sectxx:s I 43 43 and 1.433, except for repetitne infmnatun m Rome trough SAR 163.2.1633 Ddrerence-Infmnation on Rome trough, which is repetitne of mformatim =Lht to SAR 163.2 from an carher sectxxi.
Resolution-None 1.4352, SAR 2.63 Difference-Informatum m identification of capable faults and carthquakes Maai with capable fauhs not m I.43.53 SAR.
Evaluatxu: Informatxm added to be consistat with accxient anah SAR 2.633 Difference None Resolutioit None 13 SAR 2.
Differenm Informatxm on Natural Phenomena 1hreats rxx in SAR.
Evaluarxmt Informatxni =Lhi to be consistent muh accilent analysis SAR 2.7 Difference None Resolutim: Nonc 1.6 SAR 2.1 Difference-Information on External Man-Made Threats not in SAll Evaluation: Informatum alled to be const.aent with accxlent analysis SAR 2_8 Difference-None Resolution: None SAR 2-15
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 DWerence Letween USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-39 Section (Note 1)
POEF-Section Evaluaties of DMerence om Saf ty of Werkers and offsite Public (No:e 2)
LMES-89 Section USEC SARUP-PORTS DNerence Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Secties (Neee 3)
Section Ruolution of POEF-LM ES-89 Inforniation Net Included in SARUP-PORTS (Nese 3) 1.7 SAR 2.1,2.2 Difference-Paragsph summarmng schools, hospitals,(by-care, parks, etc not in SAR, paragraph on GCEP hisk ry not in SAR; Retro Europe Progam not covced to lewI ofdetail in SAR; paragraph on nearby nuclear facilities not in SAR; paragraph on ancrgercy management coordination not in SAR.
Evaluation-Information is duplicatim ofinformation prmided carher, histoncal or general information, or cmtained elsewhere in Apphcation documents (e g Eruusumy Plan). No impact on safety basis.
t SAR 2.1,2.2 DttTerence: Parapaph summarmng s~hools, hospitals, day-care, parks, etc. not in SAR; parapaph on GCEP history not in SAR; Retro Europe Program not covered to level ofdetail in SAR; parapaph on nearby nuclear facihties tut in SAR; paragt aph on emergency marmgement coordmatum not in SAR.
Resohmm: Information and level of detail in USEC-02 retamed ftr SARUP.
1.7.1,1.7.2 SAR 2.2 Difference-Editorial and Mail differences between docurrrnts in da==g industrial facihties and t ansportation spcms and ruutes
[
Evaluatxm: Informatxn only - no impact on safety basis SAR 2.2 Difference: Editorial and detad ddrerences between documen.s m discussmg industnal facahtnes and transportation systems and routes Resolutiour Level ofdetail rat information in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
1.73 SAR 2.2 Dtiference: Information on local institutions relevant to wm guiy response not in SAR.
Es aluatiert Information on cmergency response presented in Euu sumy Plan, more appropnate than SAR.
SAR 2_2 Difference-Infonnatum on local institutxms relevant to uuu sugy response not in SAR.
Resolution: Ixvel of detail in USEC4)2 reemed for SARUP.
t t
SAR 2-16
[
3 t
I
Portsmouth Gaseous Dihsion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 DiNerence Bet =cen USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMEW Secties (Note I)
POEF-Section Evaluation of Diference ce Safety of Workers and OKeite Public (Nese 2)
IAIES-89 3,cg;o, USEC SARUP-PORE CiNerence Bet *een USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Secties (Note 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-131ES-89 lesarmation Not Included in SARUP-PORE (Note 3) 1.8 SAR 2.
Differera: Informatux on valainty ofexistmg cmronmental analyses as m SAR_
Evaluatm Informaton pcrtaining to USEC cmmunmental operatums foumi m SAR 5 I,3.6.3 ami ECSR - mx appropnate to pa esent infonnatum in this chapter SAR 2.
Dtiference-Informatum on valahty of existmg enuronmenta: analyses ax in SAR.
Resolutiert Level of detail and kratam of mfonnatum in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
References SAR 2.8 Difference-Not all references included in SAR Evaluatxur References for =tbi information at bi to reference hst.
SAR 2.9 Difference: References for inLemation not added to SARUP.
Resolutiort None Figure I.3-4 Figures 2.1-4,2.1-Sa, Dtiference-Site map and leasedtewmed lacahties prexated differently in SAR.
2.1-5b Evaluatum: Informr ion reused through 10 CFR 7668 process to update hst ofIcased'rctamed facahties and to indicate creation of DMSAs.
Figures 2.1-4,2.1-Sa, Dtfrerence: Site map and inei/rctained facahues presented ddicrently in SAR.
2.1-5b Resolutxm: More current informatam in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
t i.
SAR 2-17
Portsmooth Gastous Diffusion Plant Contparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 DNerence Between USEC-02 Secties and POEF-LMES-39 5ectase (Nese 1)
POEF-Section Evalention of DWerence em Safety of Weekers and Offssee Public (Neee 2)
LMES-89 sect;,,
USEC SARUP-POR'13 DWerence Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Secties and POEF-LMES-39 5ecties (Nese 3)
Section Reseletime of POEF-LM ES-39 Interneaties Not Incieded in SARUP-PORTS (Neee 31
]
Figures 13-SAR Figures '
Dtiference: Figures not used in SAR. Table 23-1 used to present chmatology data msend of figures 1.4-I 6,13-8 to through 1.4-7.
13-16,1.4-1 Evaluatxur Figares 1.4-1 through 1.4-7 mil be sued in place ofTable 23-1 to support =m4evised text Other to 1.4-7,1.4-figures will not be used because ww-., ug text was not used - see specific pern*== abow:.
I5,1.4-20, 1.4-23 to 1.4-25,1.4-331 SAR Figures 23-1 Dtiference Except for Figures I.4-1 through I 4-7, hsted figures not used in SAR.
1.4-47,1.4-through 23-7 Resolution: Only use figures supported by text 50,1.4-52 to 1.4-55.I.4-57a to 1.4-59f Figures 1.4-8 SAR Figure 23-1 Difference Information in figures does not match informataxiin SAR Figure 23-1.
through I.4-Evaluation: SAR Figure based on old met tower information, new met. tower data mil be used.
10 SAR Figures 23-8,23-Difference: None 9,23-10 Resolution: None Figure 1.4-51 SAR Figure 2 6-4 Difference-Figure references Kmg 1977, whde SAR tigure references Kmg 1974 Evaluation: No change - information presented m figures is the same.
SAR Figure 2.6-4 DtfTerence Figure references King 1977,ulule SAR figure references Kmg 1974.
Resolutierr Informatxxx in USEC-02 retamed in SARUP.
SAR 2-18
Portsasouth Gaseous Dihsion Plant Connparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Diference Between USIC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Secties (Neee I)
POEF.
Section Evaluation of Diference en Safety of Werkers and Offsete PmMee (Nete 2)
LMES-89 USEC SARUP-PORTS Diference rietween USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Sectase (Nose 3)
Sect;,,
Section Resolution of POEF-LMES-39 Infernesties Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Naec 3).
Figures 1.5-SAR Figures 2.6-7 Difference: New figures and new informatxm xxA in SAR 1,1.5-2 through 2 6-12 Evaluathm: SAR figures 2 6-7 through 2 6-12 will be rerrxwed, since older sersunc studies have been &leted and replaced with newer studies. Referenced figures from POEF-I.MES-89 will be tesed to suppxt carthquake hazard discussion in SARUP SAR Section 2.7.
SAR Figures 2.7-1,2.7-Difference-None 2
Resolution: None Figure 15-3 SAR Figure 23-2 Difference: Figure is essentially identral to SAR Figure 23-2, but reference for figure is di& cat.
Evaluatum: SAR Figure 23-2 mil become Figure 2.7-3, in support of wmd hazard information, and change reference to Coats and Murray UCRL An
-nr SAR Figure 2.7-3 Dtfrerence: None Resolutiort None Tables 13-I SAR 2.1 Difference Tables, or equrraient, not used in SAR.
through 13-6 Evaluatxxt Number of employees onsite changes, informatxm not pertment to safety basis,50-rrnic rad:us population estimates rxt Ami in text, as justified alme.
SAR 2.1 Difference: Tables, or equivalent, not used in SAR.
Resolution: Scope of mformatam in USEC-02 renamed for SARUP.
Table 13-7 SAR Table 2.1-1 Difference: Equivalent SAR table only uses 5-unle populathm density columrt Evaluatkm: Populatkm density informatum be3und 5 miles rx4 used, not pertment to safety basis.
SAR Table 2.1-1 Ddrerence: Equivalent SAR table <mly uses 5-nule pyulation density column Resolution. Scope ofinfennatum in USEC-02 retamed for SARUP.
SAR 2-19
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-39 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-82 Difference Betweca USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note I)
POEF-Section Evaluaties of Difference es Safety of Werkers med Offssee Pabsc (Nese 2)
LMES-89 Sect;,
USEC SARUP-POR13 Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Secties and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 3)
Section Resciution of POEF-LMES-89 Inferneation Not Included in SARUP-PORTS (Nete 3)
Table 1.4-1 SAR Table 23-2 Ddrerence: Table m SAR eq sivalent, but 10.OfX) year estunated data i* added.
Evaluatiert Use table from POEF-utES-89 to be consistent ulth text changes.
SAR Table 23-1 Diffaencer ikme Resolution: None Table 1.4-2 SAR Table 23-3 Difference-1993 data, dMacnt me bod of gr sentation ofinformatxm used from SAR.
Evaluation: Use table from POEF-MIES-89 to be consistent witn text changes.
SAR Table 23-2 Difference-None Resolution: None Table 1.4-3 SAR Table 23-4 Difference: 1993 data, different method of presentatxm of mformatam used from SAR. Also,32 meter icwl reported mstead of40 meter level.
Evaluation: Use table from POEF-GtES-89 to be consistent with text changes.
SAR Table 23-3 Dt!Terence: None Resolutnn: None Tables 1.4-4 SAR2.
Difference: Tables not used in SAR.
1.4-8 through Evalua' ion: Tables present mformatum matching text that will rxA be used perj e Ae _-s above.
a 1,4-12.1.4-18 through SAR 2.
Dtiference: Tables not used in SAR.
1,4-29 Resolution: Scope ofinformation m USEC-02 retan'ed for SARUP.
Table 1.4 15 SAR Table 23-3 Dtfrerence: Presentatum ofinformaton does rxA nutch SAR for Sunbury, Berea and 13edford Evaluation: SAR editorially inwerect will te corrected m SARUP.
SAR Table 2.5-3 Dfererxr None Resolution: None SAR 2-20
Portsmouth Gaseous Dihsion Plant Comp"-
of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Difference Between USEC-42 Section and POEF-LMES49 Sectosa W.e I) l POEF-Section Evaluation of Difference on Safety of Weekers and OfFesse Public (Nese 2)
[
LMES-89 USEC SARUP-PORTS DiNerence ktween USEC SARUP-PORTS Section ned POEF-LMES49 5ectiea (Note 3)
Section Section Resoluties of POEF-LM ES-89 Inf.ormation Not included in SARUP-PORTS (Note 3)
SAR Table 2.6-1 Difference SAR table.informarxx not presc:sted in POEF-IATES-89.
Evalratxxt Table supports older scisnue hazard stales which have been replaced by newer stmhes - table will be I
deleted for SARUP.
Dtfrerence: None Resolutior None SAR 2-21 l
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 DiNerence Between USEC-02 Section and POEF-IRES-89 Section (Note 1)
POEF.
Section Evaluation of DiNerence on Safety of Workers and ONte Pnblic (Note 2)
IRES-89 Section USEC SARUP-PORTS DiNerence Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-1RES-89 Section (Note 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-IRES-89 Inforniation Not Included in SARUP-PORTS (Note 3) 3.1
4.0 Difference
The POEF-LMES-89 hazard and accident analysis methodology is a bottoms-up approach that l
addresses all facilities and hazards in a graded approach. The meihbtogy uses screenmg values at various points in the process to assess the level of safety documentation required. The main steps of the process include hazard identifiestion and screening, hazard analysis, accident analysis, and development of safety controls.
Limiting events are devekred from the hazards analysis and are carned forward to the accident analysts.
Important-to-safety SSCs and TSRs arr designated based on criteria shed at assurmg worker and public safety, and based on the results of the accider. and hazards analysis. Source terms and consequences are developed for the boundin;;ihsting events. Advanced analysis codes were used for source term and consequence calculations which incorporated the release mechanics of a UF6 accident. Natural pha evaluation methodology is based on current DOE guidance and criteria A revised site-specific EBE of 0.15g was used. Walldowns were l
used to verify configuration and 3 dunensional modelling was empi6ycd. Piping and equipment evaluation utilized SQUG database comparison methods.
Evaluation: The hazard and accident analysis methodology in POEF-IMES-89 is based on s e <c up-to-date methods than USEC-02. This will ensure a more comprehensive and accurate analysis ofpotential accidents and consequences These new analyses may impact existing controls relied upon for worker and pubhc safety.
4.1 Difference
Deleted direct references to DOE Orders where possible.
Resolution: Discussion provides an adequate description of the process utilized without reference to DOE orders.
3.2 N/A Difference No similar section.
Evaluation: N/A N/A Difference: Section deleted.
Resolutior: Section primanly listed DOE requirements.
SAR 3-1 lL-
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Difference Beineen USEC-02 Section and POEF-IAf ES-89 Section (Note 1)
POEF-Section Evaluation of Difference on Safety of Workers and Offsite Public (Note 2) 131ES-89 Section USEC SARUP-PORTS Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-IAIES-89 Inforniation Not Incieded in SARUP-PORTS (Note 3) 3.3.1 40 See discussion for POEF-I ATES-89 Section 3 1.
d 4.I 3.4.1.1.5 4.2.1 - 4.2.5 Difference:
(1)
Added a discussion of the initiating event frequency categories (OCs) and their bases, and deleted beyond evaluation basis events as an applicable operating condition. Provided more infonnation to better desenbe the EGs. Made minor wordmg changes to EOs.
(2)
Deleted direct references to DOE Order ahere possible.
(3)
Adopted qualitative consequerxx criteria tor as-nent of the adequacy of SSCs during postulated accidents for onsite personnel protection versus POEF-IATES-89 quantitative enteria.
(4)
Provided additional infbrmation regardmg lanv chemical release accidents are treated by de methodology, aral provided a basis for wA addressing chemical releases within the accident analysis.
(5)
Provided the enteria for classification of SSCs in Section 4.2.2. 'Ihe cnteria is based on Q/AQ quality classification versus safety class / safety significant in POEF-IAtES-89 Section 4.1. Q critena is equivalent to POEF-IAUIS-89 safety class cniena. Differences between AQ cnteria and POEF-1AiES-89 safety significant criteria are summarized below in the context of the proposed AQ criteria:
(New cnteria) Represent the smgle contingent catrol to prevent an accia atal nuclear criticality w here the double contingency pnneiple is not met (New criteria) Are necessary to mitigate the consequences of a fire (fixed fire suppression systems only)
(New criteria) Are part of the cascade piping and equipment including LT6 process piping 2 inches and larger, expansion joints, valves, and prtress equipment that provide the UF6 containment pressure boundary (New criteria) Ane structures or portions ofenrichment process facilities ihy to physically support paress piping, equipment, arxl their suppost systems (Deleted criteria) Safety significant based on the hazard analysis and the importance the SSC has in the analysis, excluding the items mentioned previously.
(6)
Provided specific cnteria for selectmg TSR LCOs m Sectwn 4.2.3 versus general criteria provided in POEF-lifES-89 Section 3.4.1.1.5.
SAR 3-2
l Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS USEC-02 Diference Between USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 1)
I POEF-Section Evaluation of DiKerence on Safety of Werkers med OKeite Public (Note 2)
LM ES-89
- Sectio, USEC SARUP-PORTS Diference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-LMES-89 Informention Not Included im SARUP-PORTS (Note 3) 3.3.1 4.2.1 - 4.2_5 (Continued) 4.1 (Cmtinued) 3.4.1.1.5 Resolution:
(Continued)
(1)
Additions and clarifications result in en improved description in SARUP. OCs I through 3 address all initiating events considered credible and are cms stent with 10 CFR 76.85 requirements.
(2)
Discussion provides and adequate description of the process without reference to DOE Orders.
(3)
See discussion in SARUP Section 4.2.1.2 at the end ofEvaluation Guidelmes I and 2. Althwh quantitative guidelines were established in POEF-LMES-89, only qualitative calculations of o.. ate personnel exposure were performed. While quantitative calculations can be perfonned, such calculations are very sensitive to assumptims, the assumptions typically cannot be controlled, and the analysis results contain much uncertainty. Comparison of onsite consequences to qualitative gmdelines is a reasonable approach to assure onsite personnel protection.
(4)
The potential for chemical releases is addressed by the chernical safety program and the programmatic TSR on this program. See the discussion in SARUP Section 4.2.1.2 after Evaluation Guideline 6.
(5)
SARUP Section 4.2.2 Q/AQ designations are consistent with current Quality Assurance Program POEF-LMES-89 safety significant criteria deleted from SARUP AQ criteria were rum-specific.
Additional AQ criteria provide increased controls over POEF-LMES-89. Inclusion of cascade piping and process buildmg structures in AQ category is consistent with current AQ classification of these SSCs.
(6)
Specific criteria for selecting TSR LCOs in SARUP Section 4.2.3 were developed considering the POEF-LMES-89 general guidarm Criteria for TSR safety limits, limiting control settings, design features, and admmistrative controls are adequately defined in 10 CFR 76.4 and 10 CFR 76.87.
3.4.1.1 40 DifTerence: See discussion for POEF-LMES-89 Section 3.1.
Evaluation: See discussion for POL 7F-LMES-89 Section 3 1.
4.3.1.1 Difference: No significant difTerences in wording. Rekx:ated TSR selection criteria to SARUP Section 4.2.3.
Resolution: N/A SAR 3-3
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Comparison of POEF-LMES-89 Versus USEC-02 and USEC SARUP-PORTS i
USEC-02 Eifference Between USEC-02 Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Note 1) i POEF-Section Evaluation of Difference on Safety of Workers and Offsite Public (Note 2) 111ES-89 Section USEC SARUP-PORTS Difference Between USEC SARUP-PORTS Section and POEF-LMES-89 Section (Neee 3)
Section Resolution of POEF-IAIES-89 Inforniation Not Included in SARUP-PORTS (Note 3) 3 4.1.2
4.0 DifTerence
See discussion for POEF-IAIES-89 Section 3.1.
3.4.1.3 Evaluation: See discussion for POEF-IAiES-89 Section 3.1.
l 4.3.1.2 DifTerence: Added infonnation on each cale in the IIGSYSTEM/UF6 suite. Removed 11GSYSTIIM/CIF3 code 4.3 1.3 discussion since it is not used in the USEC SARUP accident analysis. The CYLIND discussion was amended to discuss the change to the PIPSYS subroutine auf changing the code's name to PIPI1EAK Corrected ~ Briggs well mixed wake model" and
- lift ofTeorrection factor" for IIGSYSTEM code.
Resolution: Additions and clarifications result in an improved description in USEC's SARUP versus POEF-IAiES-89.
References N/A DifTerence: POEF-IAiES-89 identifies new references.
Evaluation: POEF-111ES-89 references not used in current accidst analysis.
4.4 DifTerence
POEF-LMES-89 identifies additional references for results sections.
Resolution: Only references for SARUPsections submitted are currently included in SARUP Section 4.4.
SAR 3-4
GDP 97-0148 Page1ofI Commitments Contained in this Submittal 1.
Limitations and in.ecuracies will be addressed in detail with each portion of the SARUP submittal.
I 2.
Discrepancies between the Application SAR and as-found conditions in the plant are processed in accordance with plant procedures to ensure continued safe operation until the discrepancy is ultimately resolved. Discrepancies found in this chapter will continue to be processed in accordance with plant procedures until a systematic review, update, and confirmation of the information contained in Application SAR Chapter 3 hcs been completed.
3.
Except for Chapter 3, the remaining portions of the S ARUP will be submitted by
- October 31,1997.
4.
USEC commits to perfomilag a systematic review, update, cnd confirmation of the information contained in Application SAR Chapter 3 and to make necessary changes to the SARUP analyses and supporting documents by no later than October 31, 2000. Planning activities for the SAR Chapter 3 update have been initiated and a plan of action and schedule will be submitted for NRC review and approval by October 31,1997. Based on a preliminary review, USEC believes that 18 to 24 months will be required to complete the Chapter 3 update activities and an additional 9 to 12 months may be needed to make necessary changes to the SARUP analyses and supporting documents. Basic steps of the effort include:
1.
Develop the detailed plan of action and schedule by October 31,1997, 2.
Review, update, and confirm information in Application SAR Chapter 3 no later than October 31,1999:
Identify structures, systems, components, and processes to be described a.
b.
Develop the outline of the new Chapter 3 c.
Establish the level-of-detail and subsection breakdown d.
Prepare the initial draft based on available information e.
Verify / validate draft sections based on field walkdowns and document reviews f.
Incorporate changes, complete final sections 3.
Make necessary changes to the SARUP submittal and SARUP supporting documents by no later than October 31,2000.
I k