ML20207C794

Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1986

ML20207C794
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	04/30/1986
From:	Khazrai M, Storz L TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:	Haller N NRC OFFICE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (ORM)
References
KB86-0448, KB86-448, NUDOCS 8607210435
Download: ML20207C794 (14)

Text

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AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL 4

DOCKET NO.

50-346 Davis-Besse Unit 1 WIT DATE May 12, 1986 COMPLETED BY Morteza Khazrai l

TELEPHONE (419) 249-5000 Ext. 7290 April 1986 DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)

(MWe-Net) 1 0

37 0

2 0

0 gg 3

0 19 0

4 0

20 0

l 5

0 21 0

l 6

0 0

22 7

0 23 0

8 0

24 0

9 0

0 25 10 0

26 0

1I 0

0 27 12 0

28 0

13 0

0 29 14 0

0 30 15 0

3g 16 0

INSTRUCTIONS On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe Net for each day in the reporting inonth. Compute to the nearest whole rnegawatt.

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OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NO. '90-146 DATE May 12, 1986 COMPLETED BY _ Morteza Khazrai TELEPHONE (419) 249-5000, OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name:

Davis-Besse Unit 1 Notes

2. Reporting Period:

April 1986

3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt):

2772

4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe):

925

/

l S. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe):

906

6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe):

904

7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe):

860

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report. Give Reasons:

1

9. Power Level To Which Restricted. If Any (Net MWe):

10. Reasons For Restrictions.If Any:

This Month Yr to-Date Cumulative

11. Hours in Reporting Period 719.0 2.879.0 67.944.0

12. Number Of Hours Reactor was Criticaj 0.0 0.0 35,877.1

13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 0.0 0.0 4,058.8

14. Hours Generator On-Line 0.0 0

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34.371.8

15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0.0 0.0 1.732.5

16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 0.0 0.0 81,297,600

17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) 0 d, 0.0 26,933,622

18. Net Electrical EnerFy Generated (MWH) 0.0 0.0 25,233,177

19. Unit Service Facto:

0.0 0.0 50.6

20. Unit Asailability Factor 0.0 0.0 53.1 J

21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 0.0 0.0 43.2

22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 0.0 0.0 41.0 l

23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 100.0 100.0 29.7

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type.Date.and Duration of Each):

i

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period. Estimated Date of Startup:

October 18, 1986 f

26. Units in Test Status (Prior to Commercial operation):

Forecast Achiesed 4

INITIAL CRITICA LITY INITIAL ELECTRICITY COMMERCIA L OPER ATION (4/77 )

_. _ - - ~. _ - - _ - _. -..

DOCKET NO.

50-346 UNIT SHUTDOWNS A:in PU.l]D REDUCTEONS UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1 DATE May 12, 1986 COMPLETED'BY Morteza Khazrai REPORT MONTH April 1986' TELEPHONE (419) 249-5000, Ext. 7290

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Action to No.

Date N

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Report #

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85 06 09 F

719 A

4 LER 85-013 JK SC

-[he unit remained shutdown following Contd the reactor trip on June 9, 1985.

See Operational Summary for further details.

I 2

3 4

F: Forced Reason:

Method:

Exhibit G - Instructions S: Scheduled A-Equipment Failure (Explain) 1-Manual for Preparation of Data B-Maintenance or Test 2-Manual Scram Entry Sheets for Licensee C-Refueling 3-Automatic Scram Event Report (LER) File D-Regulatory Restriction 4-Continuation from (NUREG-0161)

E-Operator Training & License Examination Previous Month F-Administrative 5-Load Reduction 5

G-Operational Error (Explain) 9-Other (Explain)

Exhibit I - Same Source (9/77)

H-Other (Explain)

OPERATIONAL

SUMMARY

APRIL, 1986 The unit remained shutdown the entire month of April following the reactor trip on June 9, 1985. Corrective actions continue.

Below are some of the major activities performed during this month:

1)

Continued testing as part of the System Review and Test Program.

2)

Continued MOVATS activities.

3)

Replaced Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 2-1 motor and ran motor uncoupled to verify proper rotation. Reinstalled shaft in RCP 2-1.

4)

Reinstalled seals on all four Reactor Coolant Pumps.

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REFUELING INFORMATION DATE: April, 1986 1.

Name of facility: Davis-Besse Unit 1 2.

Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: October, 1987 3.

Scheduled date for restart following refueling: December, 1987 4.

Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what in general will these be? If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuraticn been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

Ans: Expect the Reload Report to require standard reload fuel design Technical Specification changes (3/4.1 Reactivity Control Systems and 3/4.2 Power Distribution Limits).

5.

Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and i

supporting information:

Summer, 1986 6.

Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g.,

new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.

Ans: None identified to date.

7.

The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage pool.

(a) 177 (b) 2' 6 - Spent Fuel Assemblies 8.

The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies.

Present:

735 Increase size by: 0 (zero) 9.

The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity.

Date:

1993 - assuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained.

BMS/005

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 83-008 SYSTEM: Various COMPONENT: Cable APAC205A, B, C l

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR wrapped cables APAC205(A), APAC205(B),

and APAC205(C) with Bishop No. 43A are proofing tape.

This work was completed February 26, 1986.

REASON FOR CHANCE: The originally installed non-qualified 5 KV power cable had to be wrapped with fire proofing tape to meet Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Fire Hazard Analysis Report (FHAR) commitments.

j SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The non-qualified feeder cables to the Personnel l

Processing Facility and construction fabrication shop perform no safety function. Their service is non-nuclear safety related.

In addition, 480 volt security lighting, 120 volt UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) security circuits, and communication circuits are run in separate designated l

raceways, i

The principle concern on the use of non-qualified cables for this application was the original installation was in violation of FSAR and FHAR commitments in regard to flame retardant requirements.

I Use of these feeders was acceptable because each power cable is run in independently from any Class 1E circuit.

In addition, the non-metallic conduits are encased in concrete which are Seismic Class 1 structures.

Based upon review of these areas of concern, there is no safety related system whose operability is impaired; therefore, there is no unreviewed i

safety question.

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J-I COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST c

1 FCR NO: 84-073 SYSTEM: Component Cooling Water i

COMPONENT: Various i

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR approved a test to demonstrate the capabilities of a leak measuring device and acoustic leak sensing equipment i

on the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.

REASON FOR CHANGE: This test is gathered information which was used in a topical report to the NRC and Toledo Edison. The topical report was used to reduce ASME hydrostatic and pressure testing requirements based on information gained.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This test will only affect Train #1 while Train #2 provides normal CCW functions.

It should be noted that this activity will result in entering a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement per Technical Specification 3.7.3.

An operator and an electrician will be stationed to 4

I make Train #1 available for emergency operation. This test will not

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prevent the CCW System from providing the required cooling capacity to i

mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Since CCW System Train #2 was available throughout the test, and Train #1 i

is available with operator assistance within the constraints of a Technical l

l Specification Limiting Condition for Operation, the proposed test does not j

constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST I

FCR NO: 84-100 SYSTEM: N/A

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COMPONENT: N/A CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR has added Section 6.2.3 to Technical Specifications to include limits en overtime of Davis-Besse Unit #1 personnel who perform safety related functions.

This addition was completed March 4, 1986.

REASON FOR CHANGE: This section to the Technical Specifications was added i

for compliance with NUREG-0737 Item I.A.1.3.1.

The above requirement is specified in NRC letter dated February 8,1984, Serial No. 1445.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This FCR has added Technical Specification Section 6.2.3 to include limits on working hours for personnel who perform safety related functions.

The proposed new section recognizes the need for personnel overtime, while at the same time limiting the excessive use of overtime. The safety of the plant is enhanced due to reduction of potential human errors that may be caused by fatigue. This new requirement is virtually no different than past Company practice.

It is concluded that the new requirement does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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l COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 84-126 SYSTEM: Makeup and Purification COMPONENT: MU-347 1

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR has modified valve MU-347 by replacing i

the 2" lift check valve with a 1 " lift check valve.

This work was completed February 21, 1986.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The original valve had a crack in the valve body. The available valve in stock to replace this valve is a 1 " lift check valve.

Lead time for a new 2" valve would require being out of service for an excessive time.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

MU-347 is a 2" check valve on the discharge of Boric Acid Pump #2.

Calculations have been performed indicating that replacing the 2" check valve with a 1 " check valve will increase the pressure drop of the line. This increase in pressure drop will cause a reduction of flow of approximately 1-2 gpm.

This change will not violate the requirements for boric acid flow of Technical Specifications 3.1.2.2 and 3.1.2.7.

Based on the above analysis, this FCR does not constitute an unreviewed l

safety question.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO:

79-106 SYSTEM: Miscellaneous Liquid Radwaste COMPONENT: Miscellaneous Waste Monitoring Tank CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR has modified the control and alarm circuits for the Miscellaneous Waste Monitoring Tank (MWMT). Pump and annunciator alarm changes were made to interlock the pump motor with the low level alarm so that if the pump stops, as designed, no low level alarm is generated.

i This work was completed February 9,1986.

REASON FOR CHANGE: To eliminate the nuisance annunciator alarm.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMNARY: Portions of this FCR are nuclear safety related only due to the need to core drill a negative pressure boundary.

The Core Drill Cutout Report 1-211 will assure that maximum total open area in the negative pressure boundaries are not exceeded. No unreviewed safety question exists.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 82-158 SYSTEM: Technical Specifications COMPONENT: N/A CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR modified Sections 3.0.3 and 4.0.3 of the Technical Specifications. Section 3.0.5 was also added to the Technical Specifications.

This work was completed March 7, 1986.

REASON FOR CHANGE: The safety function of Sections 3.0.3 and 3.0.5 of the Technical Specification is to provide for a safe shutdown of the unit due to equipment inoperability that places the plant both outside the Limiting Conditions for Operation and applicable action statement.

Technical Surveillance 4.0.3 allows time to perform a missed surveillance test to avoid a forced shutdown.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This FCR changes Sections 3.0.3 and 4.0.3, and adds Section 3.0.5 of the Davis-Besse Technical Specifications. The safety function of Sections 3.0.3 and 3.0.5 is to provide for a shutdown of the unit, if required, due to equipment inoperability that places the plant both outside the Limiting Condition for Operation and the applicable action statement.

The safety function of Section 4.0.3 is to provide guidance in the determina-tion of equipment / system operability in the event of missed surveillance tests. This amendment adds up to a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period to allow the missed test to be performed before entry into the shutdown statement is required.

This period will help avoid an unnecessary transient on the plant and, therefore, a potential challenge to safety systems.

Section 3.0.5 to be added to the Davis-Besse Technical Specifications details the operability and action requirements for systems and equipment when either its normal or emergency power supply is inoperable. No new requirements are added; the existing requirements are clarified and simplified.

Based on engineering judgment, the margin of safety of Davis-Besse will not be decreased; therefore, this change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 79-404 SYSTEM: Communications / Data Transmission COMPONENT: N/A CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR provided for the installation of a CCTV camera in the Control Room and a TV monitor for visual monitoring of the Control Room at the Technical Support Center (TSC).

4 This work was completed February 24, 1986.

i REASON FOR CHANCE: To meet NRC requirements of a Technical Support Center

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with event analysis capabilities as per NUREG-0578 Items 31N, Section 2.2.2.C. Appendix A.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

This FCR is designated nuclear safety related.

only because of required "Q" core drill / cutouts and seismic mounting of t

the TV camera. The CCTV does not perform any safety related function.

The system is non-safety related.

The nuclear safety related portion of this FCR is due to "Q" core drill /

4 cutouts. This change will enhance post-accident monitoring capability in the TSC. No new adverse conditions will be created. This change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST FCR NO: 82-130 i

SYSTEM: Decay Heat Removal COMPONENT: Valve DH-13A l

CHANGE, TEST OR EXPERIMENT: This FCR modified DH 1-2 Bypass Valve (DH13A) to maintain the valve in the closed position by pinning the outboard end of the shaft to the bearing bracket and removing the air supply to the actuator. This work was completed February 21, 1986.

I REASON FOR CHANGE: This FCR was originated due to the shearing off of the key pins on the valve. Until the valve can be repaired, DH13A was pinned

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in the closed position.

SAFETY EVALUATION SEMMARY: DH13A is the decay heat cooler bypass control valve for Decay Heat Loop #2. The valve's safety function is to maintain-the pressure boundary of the Decay Heat System and to actuate to the closed position upon Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) actuation to prevent bypass of the decay heat cooler in the Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) mode.

This modification, until a new shaft is installed, assures the position of the valve and does not involve pressure boundary components. This modifica-tion does not create any new adverse environment and does not constitute 7

an unreviewed safety question.

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EXEDO

% EDISON May 12, 1986 Log No. KB86-0448 File:

RR 2 (P-6-86-04)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Mr. Norman Haller, Director Office of Management and Program Analysis U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Haller:

Monthly Operating Report, April 1986 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Enclosed are ten copies of the Monthly Operating Report for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 for the month of April 1986.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Morteza Khazrai at (419) 249-5000, Extension 7290.

Yours truly,

'd f

Louis F. Storz /'

Plant Manager Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station LFS/MK/lj k Enclosures

'Mr. James G. Keppler, w/1 cc:

Regional Administrator, Region III Mr. James M. Taylor, Director, w/2 Office of Inspection and Enforcement Mr. Paul Byron, w/l NRC Resident Inspector N

S:9>\\

i i LJK/002 THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEDO, OHIO 43652