ML20206E527
| ML20206E527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/24/1985 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Jennifer Davis NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606230408 | |
| Download: ML20206E527 (95) | |
Text
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MAY E 4125 I
MEMORANDUM FOR:
John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguurds FROM:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING By memorandum of February 13, 1984, " Control of NRC Rulemaking by Offices Reporting to the EDO," Offices were directed that effective April 1,1984, (1) all offices under EDO purview must obtain my approval to begin and/or continue a specific rulemaking, (2) resources were not to be expended on rule-makings that have not been approved, and (3) RES would independently review rulemaking proposals forwarded for my approval and make recommendations to me concerning whether or not and how to proceed with the rulemakings.
Ir. accordance with my directive, the following proposal concerning rulemaking has been forwarded for my approval.
Proposed rule,10 CFR Part 73, ' Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments."
(Sponsored by NMSS. memorandum, Minogue to EDO dated May 17,1985.)
I approve continuation of this rulemaking.
The NRC Regulatory Agenda (NUREG-0936) should be modified to reflect the status of this rulemaking.
Winfam1.Dircks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations cc:
V. Stello J. Roe H. R. Denton J. Taylor R. B. Minogue P. G. Norry Distribution:
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l MEMORANDUM FOR:
William J. Dircks l
Executive Director for Operations l
l FROM:
Robert B. Minogue, Director l.
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
CONTROL 0F NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RULEMAKING SPONSORED BY NMSS Based on our independent review of the ongoing rulemaking, " Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments," (10 CFR Part 73), sponsored by NMSS, RES recommends that this rulemaking effort should continue. The basis for our recommendation is as follows.
Since July 1979, the NRC has required its licensees to comply with an interim rule, 10 CFR 73, which provides a comprehensive set of requirements to protect spent fuel shipments against sabotage. The interim requirements were issued in reaction to crude estimates made by a contractor indicating that the respirable release of radioactive material from successful sabotage of a spent fuel truck cask in a heavily populated area could range as high as 14,000 grams. Such release could have health consequences of tens of early radiological fatalities (within one year) and hundreds of subsequent radiologically induced latent cancer fatalities. Larger releases and higher consequences were predicted for the larger spent fuel railroad casks. This interim rule was to continue effective until the results of a planned research program to develop a more accurate assessment of the magnitude of the source term (from which consequences can be estimated) became available and were analyzed at which time the rule would be reassessed.
The plar.ned research, including explosive experiments, including some with sophisticated shaped changes against both real and simulated spent fuel casks, has been carried out. The results of the research show that the public health consequences of successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment in a heavily populated area would be far lower than the consequence estimates that prompted the NPC to issue the interim rule. On the basis of this information NMSS concluded that the interim rule should be moderated.
This rulemaking is designed to effect tnat moderation. Certain requirements as proposed in the draft final rule are retained from the interim rule to protect against prolonged loss of control of shipments since if a saboteur gains protracted control of a shipment with unhindered movement and progressively more destructive resources, releases beyond those predicted by the research cannot confidently be ruled out, l
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l William J. Dircks 2
1 NAY 171985 The revised requirements would:
o Provide for early detection of malevolent moves either against or loss of control of a shipment; I
o Provide a means of sumroning assistar.ce from a local law enforcement agency; i
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o Provide, for truck shipments, a means to impede unauthorized movement of a shipment; Reduce the licensees' annual cost of protection for approximately 250 o
shipments by $74,000; 1
o Reduce the NRC staff inspection requirements by 1.5 staff years annually and decrease related travel by about $8000 annually.
i The Director of NMSS recommends continuation of this rulemaking.
The complete RES independent review package has been sent to OED0 (Attn:
DEDROGR) and to the Director, HMSS. This package includes some suggested wording changes in the rulemaking package which we believe will improve the quality of the supporting documentation for the proposal, ufh h{<a ~
l Robert B. Minogue, Di ctor I
Office of huclear Regulatory Research 1
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NAY 171985 i
MEMORANDUM FOR:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM:
Robert B. Minogue Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONGOING RULEMAKING SPONSORED BY MMSS g
Based on our independent review of the ongoing rulemaking, " Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments " (10 CFR Part 73), sponsored by MMSS, RES recommends that this rulemaking effort should continue. The basis for our recossendation is as follows.
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Since July 1979, the NRC has required its licensees to comply with an interim
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rule,10 CFR 73, which provides a comprehent,ite set of requirements to protect spent fuel shipments against sabotage. The interim requirements were issued as a prudent response to estimates indicating that the respirable release of radioactive material from successful sabotage of a spent fuel truck cask in a
_ heavily populated area could range as high as 14,000 grams. Such release could have health consequences of tens of early radiological fatalities (within one year) and hundreds of subsequent radiologically induced latent cancer fatalities. Larger releases and higher consequences were predicted for the larger spent fuel railroad casks. This interim rule was to continue effective until the results of a planned confimatory research program became available and were analyzed at which time the rule would be reassessed.
The planned research, including explosive experiments against both real and simulated spent fuel casks, has been carried out. The results of the research j
show that the public health consequences of successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment in a heavily populated area would be far lower than the consequence estimates that prompted the NRC to issue the interim rule. On ti,e basis of this information the RES concluded that the interim rule should be moderated. This rulemaking is designed to effect that moderation. Certain requirements as proposed in the revised final rule are retained from the interim rule to protect against prolonged loss of control of shipments since if a saboteur gains protracted control of a shipment with unhindared movement and progressively more destructive resources, releases beyond those predicted by the research cannot confidently be ruled out.
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i NAY 171985 The revised requirements would:
o Provide for early detection of malevolent moves either.against or loss of control of a shipment; o
Provide a means cf summoning assistance from a local law enforcement agency; o
Pmvide, for truck shipments, a means to impede unauthorized movement of a shipment; o
Reduce the licensees' annual cost of protection for approximately 250 shipments by $74,000; y
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Reduce the NRC staff inspection requirements by 1.5 staff years annually and decrease related travel by about $8000 annually.
f The Director of IstSS recommends continuation of this rulemaking.
i ThecompleteRESindependentreviewpackagehasbeensenttoOEDO(Attn:
g" DEDROGR) and to the Director,19tSS. This package includes s ee suggested r
wording changes in the rulemaking package which we believe will improve the quality of the supporting documentation for the proposal.
f Robert 8. Minogue. Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research 3
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The revised requirements would:
Provide for early detection of malevole,gt ves either against or loss o
of control of a shipment;
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o Provide a means of summoning assistance from a local law enforcement mv agency; o
Provide, for truck shipments, a means to impede unauthorized movement of a shipment; Reduce the licensees' annual cost of protection for approximately 2s0 o
3 shipments by $74,000; i.
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Reduce the NRC staff inspection requirements by 1.s staff years C
o annually and decressa related travel by about $8000 annually.
The Director of ESS recommends continuation of this ruleeding.
4 The complete RES independent review package has been sent to OED0 (Attn:
y DEDROGR) and to the Director, HMSS.
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F Robert B. Minogue Director i
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w RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD VOTING SHEET TO:
F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM:
K. R. Goller, Member, RIRB TITLE OF RULEMAKING: Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments (10 CFR Part 73) i AGREE WITH tEC0fttENDATIONS X
IN RES RULEMAKING REVIEW PACKAGE MODIFY RECOR4ENDATIONS IN NOT PARTICIPATING
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F. P. GILLESPIE. CHAIRMAN. RIRB FROM:
G. A. Arlotto. Member. RIRB T!TLE OF RULEMAKING: Modification of Protection Requirments for Spent Fuel Shipments (10 CFR Part 73)
AGREE WITH hCOMENMTIONS f
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MODIFY ltECOMENDATIONS IN NOT PARTICIPATING.
RES RULEMAKING REVIEW PACKAGE AS INDICATED BELOW Co m ENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:
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RES 1NDEPENDEtG I?EvlEW B01,RD VOTING SHEET TO:
F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIR3 FROM:
W. M. Morrison, Member, RIRB 1
TITLE OF RULEMAKING: Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments (10 CFR Part 73)
AGREE WITH RECOMMENDATIONS IN RES RULEMAKING REVIEW PACKAGE s
e MODIFY RECOMMENDATIONS IN NOT PARTICIPATING.
X RES RULEMAKING REVIEW l
PACKAGE AS INDICATED BELOW J
COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:
I agree that the RES recomendation with regard to this rulemaking is that it should be continued to reflect the results of the confirmatory research in the rule. The draft Minogue to Dircks memorandum which provides the results of the RES Independent Review should be modiiied so that it provides such an RES basis for our recomendation. As presently written, it does not provide such a basis even though the first paragraph indicates the folicwing paragraphs provide the basis.
(it is not clear how many of the following paragraphs are included in the "as follows.")
The first paragraph which purports to provide the basis does not provide any basis; rather it provides the background leading up to the present rulemaking.
The following paragraph does refer to the research and notes that "NRC concluded that moderation of the interim rule should be considered." If this was meant to be the RES basis, then the NRC should be changed to RES and the "considera-tion" should be strengthened to something like " promulgated." The last two sentences of this paragraph should be deleted since they aren't germane or necessary.
The top paragraph on page 2 does not provide any basis; it just enumerates the provisions of the revised requirements.
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'W, M. MORRISON MEE ER, RIRB APRIL 24, 1985 DATE
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~We are at step III.C.2, "RIRS deliberations," of.the RES independe'it review procedures for the attached
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specific ongoing rulemaking sponsored by A M 9 ?
Please evaluate the. attached dra'ft independent review package and provide RAltRB with your voting sheet indicating your. position on the rulemaking.
Your response by c.o.b.
APR 2 S' M will assist in RES' iuaking independsnt recommendations to the ED0 in a timely manner.
no por ese this Germ as a RECORD et approvals, eencurreness, espesets, essereness, and esmaer semens funas. psame, ers. ermeer, Asency/reso neem No.-Genig.
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,x MEMORAh0:F. FOR:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operatfor.s FR3M:
Robert B. Minogue. Director Office of Nucisar Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONGOING RULEMAKINC SPONSORED BY fptSS r
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E Sased on our independent review of the ongolog rulemaking. " Modification of protection Sequirements for Spent Fee) 5:.ipments.* (10 CFR Part 73), sponsored by 19455. RES recommends that this rulemaking effort should continue. The basis for sur recommendation is as follows.
Since July 1979. the NRC has required its licensees to comply with an interia rule 10 CFR 73, which provides a ccepreinansive set of requirements to protect spent feel skipeents against sabotage. The interie requirements were issued in reaction to crude estimates made by a contractor indicating that the fg respirable release of radioactive material from successful sabotage of a spent
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feel truck cask 'n a heavily populated area could range as high as 14.000 g
. grams. Such release could have healt'n consequences of tens of early t
radiological fatalities (within one year) and inundreds of subsequent p
raatologically induced latent cancer fatalities. Larger releases and higher consequences were predicted for the larger spent fuel railroad casks. This y
interia rule was to continue effectivo entti the results of a planned research program to deeelop a more acesrate assessment of the magnitude of the r
sc4erce ters tfrom which conseguences can be estimated) became available and F
wtre analyzed at which time the rule would be reassessed.
The planned research. including explosive egeriments. including some with h
sophisticited shaped changes against both real and simulated spent fuel essks.
I has been carried out. The results of the research show that the public health I
consequer.ces of succassful sabotage of a spent fuel shirsekt in a heavily populated area would be far lower than the consequence estimates that prompted i
the NRC to issue the interim rule. On the basis of this ir. form tion NMSS concluded tha^ the interim rule shoald be moderated. This rulemaking is i
desigrrd to effect that moderation. Certain requirements as proposed in the draf t final rule are retained from the interim rule to protect against prolonged loss of control of shipments since if a saboteur galas protracted control of a shipment with enhindered m3vement and progressieely more destructive resources, releases beyond those predicted by the research cannot confidently be ruled on..
4 h
y William J. Dircks 2
i The revised requirements would:
o Provide for early detection of malevolent moves either against or loss of control of a shipment; Provide a means of sumoning assistance from a local law enforcement agency; o
Provide, fer truck shipments, a means to impede unauthorized movement of a shipment; o
Reduce the licensees' annual cost of protection for approximately 2s0 shipments by $74,000; c
Reduce the NRC staff inspection requirements by 1.5 staff years
,~
annually and decrease related travel by about $8000 annually.
The Director of HMSS recomends continuation of tnis rulemaking.
The complete RES independent review pacLage has been sent to OED0 (Attn:
DEDROGR) a*.C to the Director, NMSS.
1 Robert B. Minogue. Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
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RES TASK LEADER EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION 4
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RES STAFF REVIEW
SUMMARY
SHEET 1)
Review of the completeness of the Rulemaking Review Package, a.
The NRC Regulatory Agenda entry has been updated to reflect the most current status of the rule.
b.
The rulemaking package as it is currently proposed for publication in the Federal Register is complete.
c.
The office director's recommendations to the EDO concerning whether and how to continue with the rulemaking were included.
d.
The results of the sponsoring office review was complete.
e.
A copy of the Commission paper, regulatory analysis, CRGR package, and underlying documents relied upon by the sponsoring office in conducting its office review were complete.
f.
No summary sheets, forms, or other documentation were requested by OEDO or "others" to assist in their review of the rulemaking therefore, no such items were included in the review package.
2)
Results of Review by the RES Task Leader a.
The rulemaking evaluation addressed the issues of the intended rulemaking. However, all of the issues were not addressed in a
" Evaluation of Rulemaking" package but were scattered throughout the rulemaking package.
b.
The necessity and urgency of the rulemaking are reasonable as presented in the packsge.
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The alternative to rulemaking discussed in the package is s0Und.
d.
The issue addressed through the rulemaking.which is the moderation of the interim rule which required licensees to comply with a comprehensive set of requirements to protect spent fuel shipments against sabotage is sound. The moderation is based upon planned research that show that the public health consequences of successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment in a heavily populated area would be far lower than the consequence estimates that prompted the NRC to
,~
issue the interim rule.
i e.
An evaluation of the impact to the public, industry, and the NRC by the proposed final rule was performed and appears reasonable. Public comments on the proposed rule were taken into account and a recommended final rule which reflects these considerations was prepared.
J f.
The NRC Resources needed for this rulemaking and the scheduling were analyzed and judged to be reasonable.
3)
General Comments and Recommendations a.
The need for this rulemaking which is to moderate the existing interim rule requirements based on completed and ongoing research results has been established. The rulemaking is consistent with applicable policies and planning guidance and is a matter of moderate urgency relative to accomplishing the NRC's mandate.
b.
It is recommended that the rulemaking should proceed.
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APR 011985
%,.....f MEMORANDUM FOR:
J. A. Norberg, Chief Human Factors and Safeguards Branch, DRA0 FROM:
Frank P. Gillespie, Chairman RES Independent Review Board
SUBJECT:
CONTROL 0F NRC RULEMAKING: RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RULEMAKING Enclosed is a rulemaking (review package received from a sponsoring office for RES independent review. )
In accordance with procedures approved by the ED0 on May 30,1984, the rule-making review package is assigned to your branch for action.
(Enclosure 2).
The ED0-approved procedures allow a total of 20 working days for completing the RES independent review. To assist RES in completing its independent review in a timely manner, please submit the draft independent review package for this specific rulemaking to RAMRB by 7 working days from the date of this memorandum.
Frank P. Gillespie, Chairman RES Independent Review Board
Enclosures:
1.
Physical Protection Requirements for Non-power Reactor Licensees Possessing Fomula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material (10 CFR 50, 70, 73) 2.
Procedures for Conducting RES Independent Review of Rulemakings
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we u a MEMORANDUM FOR:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM:
John G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
SUBJECT:
CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING - EDO QUARTERLY REVIEW In response to your memorandum of February 13, 1984, and in accordance with J
, instructions provided in subsequent memoranda from the Office of Nuclear Regu '
i latory Research (NRR), the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) has reviewed the ongoing or proposed rulemaking activities listed in to this memorandum.
On the basis of our review, we recommend approval of continued activity on these rules, with the exception of "Certifi-cation of Industrial Radiographers" and " Shallow Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste". Staff efforts on these are now directed toward terminating the two rulemaking activities.
Also, as directed by your memorandum and the subsequent instructions from RES, we have prepared Review Packages for all of the listed rulemaking activities.
These are included as attachments to this memorandum, with copies forwarded to RES and the other reviewing office.
f-J hn G. Davis, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Attachments:
As stated 9
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I DIVISION OF SAFEGUARDS
" Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments"
Contact:
Carl Sawyer 427-4186 O
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TITLE:
Modification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments CFR CITATION:
10 CFR 73 ABSTRACT:
A final rule is being drafted to moderate the present interim requirements for the protection of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel cooled for 150 days or more. Recent research shows that the quantity of radioactive material that would be released as a result of. successful sabotage is much smaller than was supposed at the time that the interim rule was issued.
The alternatives considered were: (1) let the current interim requirements continue in force; (2) moderate the current requirements; and (3) eliminate all interim requirements. The alternative of moderating the requirements was selected. The moierated requirements would provide for (1) shipments to be accompanied by an unarmed escort, who may be driver or carrier employe&
and may have other duties. (2) on-board connunications, and (3) innobilization capability for trucked shipments. Present interim requirements will continue to be effective for shipments of irradiated reactor fuel cooled less than 150 days. The benefit of the proposed rule would be the elimination of unnecessarily ~ strict requirements which presently apply to spent fuel ship-ments.
The modified requirements will result in an estimated savings to licensees of about $20,000 to $30,000 annually, assuming 135 shipments annually.
l Adoption of the final rule would free an estimated 1.5 staff years annually for other assignments and, in addition,.about $8,000 annually in staff travel would be, saved.
Public protection would be unchanged, since only unneeded
- requirements would be eliminated. The. proposed rule (attached) was published for public connent in June 1984.
About 0.36 staff year will be expended in completing the final rule.
TIMETABLE:
To E00/CRGR 5/85 To Connission 6/85 LEGAL AlmiORITY:
42 USC 2201; 42 USC '5841 EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS AND OTHER ENTITIES:
No AGENCY CONTACT:
Carl B. Sawyer Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Washington, DC 20555 301 427-4186 I
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TITLE:
Nodification of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments CFR CITATION:
10 CFR 73 ABSTRACT:
The proposed rule would moderate the present interim requirements i
for the protection of shipments of irradiated reactor fuel cooled for 150 days or more. Recent research shows that the quantity of radioactive material that would be released as a result of successful sabotage is much smaller than was supposed at the time that the interim rule was issued. The alternatives considered during the development of the proposal were: (1) let the current interim requirements continue in force; (2) moderate the current requirements; and (3) eliminate all interim requirements. The alternative of moderating the requirements was selected because the moderated requirements would provide for (1) shipments to be accompanied by an unarmed escort, who may be driver or carrier employee and may have other duties, (2) on-board communications, and (3) ammobilization capability for trucked shipments. Present interim requirements will continue to be ef fective for shipments of irradiated reactor fual cooled Isss than 150 days. The benefit of the proposed rule would be the elimination of unnecessarily strict requirements which presently apply to spent fuel shipments. It is estimated that the modified requirements will result in a savings to licensees of about $20,000 to $30,000 annually, assuming the present rate of 135 shipments annually. Adoption of the proposed amendments would free about 1.5 NRC staff-years annually for other assignments and would reduce NRC travel cost by about $8,000 annually. A proposed rule has been published for public comment.
TIMETABLE:
NPRM 06/08/84 49 FR 23867 NPRM Comment Period Begin 06/08/84 NPRM Comment Period End 09/10/84 Final Rule to Commission 02/00/85 i
Final Action 02/00/85 LEGAL AUTBORITY:
42 USC 2201; 42 USC 5841 EFFECTS ON SMALL SUSINESS AND OTHER ENTITIES: No AGENCY CONTACT:
Carl B. Sawyer Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Washington, DC 20555 301 427-4186 614 NMf6-O'3I*
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For:
The Commissioners 1
From:
Williams J. Dircks 1
Executive Director for Operations s
S'ubject:
H00ERATION OF PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS:
FINAL RULE
Purpose:
To consider issuance of amendments to moderate current require-ments for protection of spent fuel shipment g x
Category:
AsafeguardspolicymatterrequiringCommissionapprovab x
Issues:
1.
Does new information from NRC and DOE rrsearch programs, which shows that the consequences of successful sabotage are much lower than previously supposed, justify moderation j
of current requirements for the protection of spent fuel shipments?
2.
Does the view expressed by some states (governors and state officials), that the current requirements have fortuitous safety benefits, justify retention of the requirements?
3.
If moderation is justified, are the amended requirements in appropriate?
Contact:
C. Sawyer 427-4186 l
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The Commissioners 2
t Discussion:
Since July 1979 the NRC has required its licensees to comply with a comprehensive set of requirements to protect spent fuel ship-ments against sabotage.
The requirements were issued as a prudent response to estimates (see Enclosure 1, p.*) indicating that the respirable release from successful sabotage of a spent fuel truck 4
i cask in a heavily populated area could range as high as 14,000 grams with health consequences of tens of early fatalities and i
hundreds of subsequent later.t cancer fatalities.
Larger releases and higher consequences wera predicted for rail casks.
Early (radiological) fatalities are those that occur within a year.
Latent radiological fatalities are those that occur subsequently.
The requirements (44 FP. 34466 and 45 FR 3799), sometimes called the interim rule, were to continue into effect until the results of a planned confirmatory research program became available and were analyzed.
The planned research, including explosive experiments against both real and simulated spent fuel casks, has been carried out.
The results of the research show that the public health conse-quences of successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment in a heavily populated area would be far lower than the consequence estimates that prompted the NRC to issue the interim rule. On l
the basis of this information the NRC concluded that moderation of the interim rule should be considered. Accordingly, on June 8, 1984, a proposed rule to moderate the interim require-ments was issued in the Federal Register (49 FR 23867). The statement of considerations that accompanied the proposed rule describes the research, identifies the research reports, and sets forth the NRC rationale for the specific rule changes proposed. to this Commission paper is a summary comparison of the interim rule with the proposed rule.
CReference designations throughout paper will be completed when paper approaches final form.
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?
e The Commissioners 3
t The NRC received 32 letters in response to its invitation for public comment on the proposed rule. The letters are from the following sources:
Citizen 3
Environmental protection group 2
Nuclear industry or related groups 14 City government 1
State government 11 Federal agency 1
TOTAL 32 Each of the letters contains numerous comments and suggestions.
In aggregate, virtually every conceivable viewpoint is expressed.
Licensees and nuclear industry organizations generally supported the rule, while states 1, environmental groups, and citizens generally objected to moderation. The effect of the comments on the drafting of the final rule is discussed here in terms of three alternatives:
Alternative 1 - Keep present requirements Alternative 2 - Eliminate all requirements Alternative 3 - Moderate present requirements Alternative 1 - Keep present requirmnents The staff continues to believe that this alternative is inappro-priate for fuel cooled 150 days or more.
Issuance of the present requirements was based on estimates of high health consequences and large uncertainties in the release estinatas. The recent
'During August 1985 and before the rule is transmitted to EDO, NRC representatives will meet with State representatives to discuss transportation issues, including spent fuel shipment protection requirements.
Any additional State comments will be addressed and taken into account as appropriate.
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The Commissioners 4
research, however, shows that the health consequences of success-ful sabotage in a heavily populated area are far lower (no early fatalities and a few latent cancer fatalities, 43 FR 23868) than the estimates that prompted issuance of the present requirements.
The staff views the health consequences as being well within the range of health consequences widely accepted in the U.S. in other activities that potentially affect the public.
Representative' opposing views and the staff response to each are summarized as follows:
a.
Opposing View: The present requirements should be retained because they have significant safety benefits (as distin-guished from safeguards benefits) to transportation.
(Enclosure 1, Comments
)
Sta'ff Position: Regulation of radioactive material in transit in the interest of safety is the domain of the Department of Transportation (DOT). The DOT has recently completed and litigated through the U.S. Supreme Court a comprehensive rulemaking for the safe transport of radio-active. materials, including spent fuel. DOT concludes that its safe'ty requirements are adequate.1 b.
Opposing view: The present requirements should be retained because the research upon which proposed moderation is based is flawed in some significant respect.
(Enclosure 1, Comments
)
2Because NRC is proposing to eliminate route survey requirements, we have written to DDT requesting that it advise us whether DOT believes its requirements on routing should be expanded on include route specific evaluation and designation of safe routes for highway transport of spent fuel.
Also, we have written to DOE asking whether it would be willing to expand its present programs for aid-to-States to include assistance in evaluating and designating safe highway routes for transport of spent fuel.
The responses, when received, will be discussed here or in another appropriate location in the paper.
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I Staff position: Staff review of the comments revealed no flaw sufficient to reverse the paramount conclusion that
{
the consequences of successful sabotage are far lower than the estimates that prompted issuance of the present requirements.
\\
c.
Opposing View: The present requirements should be retained l
because the cost of property damage.from successful sabotage is orders of magnitude higher than the annual cost of retain-g ing the present requirements.
(Enclosure 1, Comments
')
Staff position:
In U.S. culture, health and life have traditionally been valued above property, which at least in concept can be repaired or restored. For that reason 1
l the staff believes that health consequence is the preferred i
criterion for deciding whether to adopt proposed safeguards regulations. Secondarily, the staff notes that protection 1
requirements that would be retained in the interest of pro-i taction of public health also protect against property damage, d.
Opposing view: The present requirements should be retained because they represent the wil.1 of the people.
The public is not impressed by technical arguments.
(Enclosure 1, t
Comments
)
j Staff view: The NRC has a legal responsibility to regulate 3
j the licensed nuclear industry so as to protect the public j
health and safety and the common defense and security.
In carrying out this responsibility, the staff believes that sound technical rationale should o'e relied upon.whenever it is available.
i i
The interesting and controversial aspects of the rule address j
shipments of fuel coole1 150 days or more, and the assemblies DRAFT 03/15/85 CP 10 CFR PART 73
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actually being shipped have these longer cooling times. Nonethe-less, for completeness the review must also consider fuel cooled less than 150 days. Some casks are certified for fuel cooled less than 150 days and these types of shipments are conceivable.
Safeguards analysis and consequence calculations have not been extended to this class of fuel. But it is known that shorter-half-life isotopes, which can otherwise be neglected, become i
progressively more dominant in determining health effects as cooling time decreases.
Health effects from a given release would increase. Because of these remaining uncertainties i
Alternative 1 (retention of current requirements) was proposed ~
for shipments of fuel cooled less than 150 days in order to protect the public health and safety.
The comments raised no significant objection to the proposal (Enclosure 1, p.
).
j Alternative 2 - Eliminate All Requirements For fuel cooled 150 days or more, the predicted low consequence of successful sabotage in a heavily populated area provides j
strong support for elimination of all shipment protection requirements.
During the drafting of the proposed rule, the chief reason for notadoptinghlternative2forfuelcooled150daysormore i
stemmed from the design of the sabotage research programs.
In that design, the staff defined a reference explosive sabotage event in which saboteur skill level, kinds and quantites of l
explosive used, and cask contents are all specified. The l
prescribed reference event is quite severe, and the scenario allows the saboteur to carry it out unhindered. More severe i
events are, of course, conceivable, but these increasingly severe events require progressively less credible resources and circumstances. The research revealed no mechanisms by which a i
disproportionately large increase in radioactive release can be obtained with an incremental increase in a saboteur's resources.
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L However, if the scenario chosen grants a saboteur protracted control of a shipment, unhindered movement, and progressively more destructive resources, releases beyond those predicted by the research cannot confidently be ruled out.
For these reasons, prudence suggests that requirements be retained to protect against prolonged loss of control of shipments as discussed under Alternative 3.
No comment proposed elimination of all requirements.
s Alternative 3 - Moderate Present Requirements Alternative 3 was considered for fuel cooled 150 days or more.
The chief advantage of this alternative is that the set of requirements can be tailored to be consistent with the new calculated consequences and the remaining uncertainties.
i The aim of the alternativa is to protect against long term loss of control of a shipment. To do this, the moderated requirements should:
Provide for early detection of malevolent moves against or loss of control of a shipment; Provide a means of summoning assistance from a local law enforcement agency; and Provide, for truck shipments, a means to impede unauthorized movement of a shipment.
The proposed regulation was designed to achieve these objectives 1
and was developed using the current set of requirements as a prototype.
Requirements were then eliminated one by one from the prototype until a new set emerged which had the minimua requirements deemed necessary to achieve the objectives.
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1 The results of this approach are listed in Enclosure 2 and the reasons for retaining or dropping each requirement is set forth in Enclosure 3.
Persons objecting to Alternative 3 put forth opposing views similar to those that were summarized in connec-tion with Alternative 1.
Staff The staff concludes that Alternative 1 (keep the present
==
Conclusion:==
requirements) is appropriate for shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days; and that Alternative 3 (to moderate the present requirements) is appropriate for shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more. A recommended final rule which reflects these conclusions has been prepared (Enclosure 1).
The only significant difference between the rule proposed and the recommended final rule is that the latter contains no require-ment for the protection of schedule information for shipments
' cooled 150 days or more., p.
gives the staff's basis for this change. Other thanges, believed by the staff to be ins b ificant, are listed in Enclosure 1, commencing on page Impacts on Acenrding to staff estimates, licensees would incur the follow-Licensees:
ing annual costs, assuming continuation of the approximately 250 current shipments annually (up from 135 annually reported in i
the proposed rule).
Present rule Moderated rule Armed Escorts
$50,000 None Maintenance of Equipment 14,000
$14,000 Planning & Administration 37,000 13,000 Accordingly, the annual cost reduction (for licensees) associated with the moderated rule is $74,000.
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t Impacts No NRC Office would need additional staffing as a result of adop-o on NRC:
tion of the recommended amendments.
The staff estimates that adop-tion of the recommended amendments would free 1.5 staff years annually for other assignments because route surveys and contin-gency planning for spent fuel shipments would be eliminated.
Related travel cost of about $8,000 annually would also be eliminated.
Recommendation:
That the Commission:
1.
Approve publication of final amendments (Enclosure 1) to 10 CFR Part 73 to provide for moderation of present require-ments for the protection of spent fuel shipments against sabotage.
2.
Certify, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that this rule, if promulgated, will not'have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
This l
Certification is included in the enclosed Federal Register notice.
3.
Note:
That the proposed new regulations will be published in a.
the Federal Reaister and will become effective 30 days after publication, b.
That the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the DRAFT 03/15/85 CP 10 CFR PART 73
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House Committee on Energy and Commerc ye +% ht ~
committee on En "r- ::ct, Ener d Natural Resources ouse Committee on Government Opera s will be informed.
c.
That a public announcement such as Enclosure 4 will be issued by the Office of Public Affairs when the notice of proposed rulemaking is filed with the Office of the Federal Register.
ft.12(c)C )
d.
That pursuant to 10 CFR
.5(d no environmental impact appraisal, negative declaration or environmental impact statement for this rulemaking action is required.
That the Department of Transportation has reviewed the e.
recommended revisions and has no objection.
f.
That copies of this notice will be distributed to affected licensees and other interested persons by the Office of Administration.
g.
That the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration will be informed of the certi-fication and the reasons for it as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
l h.
That the Office of Management and Budget has been notified of the reduction in the reporting and record-keeping requirement contained in @ 73.72.
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The Commissioners 11 I
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That the supporting documents cited in Enclosure 1 o
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room before the rule is released for publication in the Federal Register.
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
Statement of Considerations and the Final Amendment to 10 CFR Part 73 2.
List of Rule Changes 3.
Discussion of Rule Changes 4.
Public Anr.ouncement s
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t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 Moderation of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION:
Final rule.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations, for the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel (spent fuel) in transit.
The issues addressed concern safeguards rather than safety.
The amendments take into account new data, principally from research programs, that indicate that the health consequences of successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment in a heavily populated area would be small compa' red to the consequence estimates that prompted issuance of the current rule'.
The amended rule provides continued protection against sabotage of spent fuel shipments, but unneeded requirements have been eliminated.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
(30 days after date of publication)
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Carl B. Sawyer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone:
301-427-4186.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
g BACKGROUND Since July 1979 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has required its licensees to comply with a comprehensive set of requirements to protect spent fuel shipments against sabotage. These requirements
[44 FR 34466 (Reference *) and 45 FR 37399 (Reference *)], which came to be called the interim requirements or the interim rule, were to continue, g
in effect until the results of a planned confirmatory research program became available and were analyzed.
The planne,d research, including explosive experiments against both real and simulated spent fuel casks, has been carried out. The results of the research show that the public health corisequences of successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment in a heavily pop'ulated area would be far lower than the consequence estimates that prompted the NRC to issue the interim rule.
On the basis of this information, the NRC concluded that moderation of the interim rule should be considered. Accordingly, on June 8, 1984, a proposed rule moderating the interim requirements was issued in the Federal Register [43 FR 23867 (Reference *)].
The statement of considera-tions that accompanied the proposed rcle describes the research, identifies the research reports, and sets forth the NRC rationale for the specific rule changes proposed.
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i In response to its invitation for public comment on the proposed t
rule, the NRC received 32 letters.
The letters'are from the following sources:
Citizen 3
Environmental protection group 2
i Nuclear industry or related groups 14 i
City government 1
1 l
State government 11 g
Federal agency 2 1
TOTAL 32
- COMMISSION QUESTIONS s
i In the statement of considerations that accompanied the proposed rule, the Commission particularly solicited comment on three topics or questions. These questions and an analysis of the responses follow.
2During August 1985 and before the rule is transmitted to EDO, NRC repre-sentatives will meet with State representatives to discuss transportation issues, including spent fuel shipment protection requirements. Any addi-tional state comments will be addressed and taken into account as appro-priate.
28ecause NRC is proposing to eliminate route survey requirements, we have written to DOT requesting that it advise us whether DOT believes its require-ments on routing should be expanded on include route specific evaluation and designation of safe routes for highway transport of spent fuel. Also, we have written to DOE asking whether it would be willing to expand its present programs for afd-to-States to include assistance in evaluating and designat-ing safe highway routes for transport of spent fuel.
The responses, when received, will be discussed here or in another appropriate location in the paper.
03/15/85 3
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Question:
Is more research justified for safeguards for shipments 1
cooled less than 150 days before shipment?
Analysis of respon:;e: This question stems from the fact that the NRC selected 150 days cooling as the threshold beyond which moderated protection requirements would apply. The 150-day figure, in turn, was 3
chosen because:
(i) most of the current cask designs are for fuel cooled 150 days or more; (ii) a large body of health effects calculations is available for fuel cooled 150 days; and (iii) from the NRC staff viewpoint, there is currantly no evident economic or technical incentive to consicer shipment of fuc1 cooled less than 150 days. Comments respond-ing to this question are unanimous in the view that additional research is not needed. Most responcents cited reason (iii) as the basis for their view.
Inasmuch as the comments introduced no new information on the matter, the NRC concludes that additional research on fuel cooled for less than
-150 dayl is not needed at this time.
Question: Should the NRC simplify its regulations by prohibiting shipment of spent fuel cooled less.than 150 days?
Analysis of re:; pense: The NRC staff wants to avoid protection regu-l lations that could unwittingly influence future cask design. As a con-j sequence, the proposed rule devotes considerable space to. regulations
]
l governing protection of shipments containing spent fuel cooled less than l
l 150 days desotte evidence that such shipments are unlikely. The require-l 1
ments were retained to make clear that there is no overriding safeguards reason for prohibition of such shipments, if suitable casks become avail-able. Most respondents were against prohibition.
The most frequent reason cited is that protection rules should be in place against the unlikely pessibility that shipment of such fuel is needed in an emergency.
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One commentor believes that the advantages of simplification justify pro-t hibition.
The NRC staff concludes that there is'no clear safeguards reason for prohibiting shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days.
Current safety criteria also would continue to apply to such shipments to assure that they present no meaningful radiological hazard to the public.
Question: Are the NRC cost estimates in accord vith licensee practice?
Analysis of response.
In the statement of considerations that accompanied the proposed rule, the NRC staff estimated the cost impact,
s of the proposed rule upon licensees.
In brief summary, the estimates were based on a shipment rate of 135 shipments annually and concluded that the proposed requirements would cost licensees about $21,000 annually, or about $156 per shipment. These costs are those directly attributable to the rule change and do not include any spin-off costs, such as those attributable to State regulations. Most licensees who commented agreed that the NRC estimates were comparable with their experience. One licensee however, put forth the view that the NRC requirements had stimulated States to impose additional restrictions.
The licensee estimates that he will incur escort costs of about $250,000 in connection with 223 shipments or about $1100 per shipment in escort costs alone.
COMMENT ANALYSIS Most letters contain numerous comments and suggestions. The NRC has studied and considered these individual comments and suggestions.
In what follows, the individual comments and suggestions are discussed 03/15/85 5
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under one of two headings:
(A) those that led to a change in the 8
1 regulations as proposed; and (B) those that were not adopted.
In the discussion there is 4 need to refer to the following documents, in addition to those already identified.
SAND 77-1927, Transportation of Radionuclides in Urban Environs:
A Working Draft Assessment, May 1978 (Refere.7ce *).
This is the document that led to issuance of the interim rule.
NUREG/CR-0743, Transportation of Radionuclides in Urban Environs, Draft Environmental Assessment, July 1980 (Reference *). 'This is the '
I final version of Reference *.
NUREG/CR-2472, Final Report on Shipping Cask Sabotaae Source Term Investiaation October 1982 (Reference *).
This is the chief document describing the NRC-sponsored research carried out by Battelle Columbus Laboratories.
SAND 82-2365, An Assessment of the Safety of Spent Fuel Transporta-tion in Urban Environs, June 1983 (Reference *).
This is the chief docu-
]
ment describing the resear.ch sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) and carried out by Sandia Naticnal Laboratorios.
Review of Hiah Explosive Device Testina Against Fuel Shipping i
Casks, U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory, October 1983 (Reference
- ).
This document is often referred to as "The Peer Review."
A.
Comments that led to changes in the rule as proposed.
Information protection unjustified.
Comment: The proposed rule calls for the retention of the current requirement for protection of shipment schedule information against unauthorized public disclosure long enough v
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for a shipment to reach its destination.
Such a requirement appears to no longer be justified under the information protection criteria.
Response: The NRC staff agrees with the comment.
The relevant passage i
i of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, requires that "The Commission shall exercise the authority of this [ Safeguards Information]
subsection (A) so as to apply the niinimum restrictions needed to protect the health :nd safety of the public or the common defense and security, and (B) upon a detemination that the ur. authorized disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse '
s effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of theft, diversion, j
or sabotage of such material er such facility." Because of the likely low health consequcnces that would result from even successful sabotage of a spent fuel shipment, the staff believes that Criterion B is not satisfied. Accordingly the schedule information protection requirement j
has been deleted from the final rule.
Advance notification:
Lead time. Comment: NRC regulations in
$73.37(f) require a licensee who plans to make a shipment of spent fuel to notify the governor (or governor's designee) before transport i
commences within or through the governor's State. Although the amend-ments proposed did not address advance notification, some comments suggested changes.
NRC regulations in $73.37(f) permit the notifica-tion to be by mail postmarked 7 days in advance of transport within or through a State.
Some governor's designees report that the 7-day advance period prescribed is insufficient for timely receipt of the advance notification.
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s Response: The NRC statement of considerations that accompanied the advance notification rule (47 FR 603) noted that the notification lead time was selected to offer a workable tradeoff among needs for (1) timely advance notification, (2) avoidance of unnecessarily long periods for pro-tection of schedule information, and (3) avoidance of unnecessary numbers of renotifications stemming from schedule changes.
It now appears that i
the intended criterion of timely advance notification is not being satis-fied by notifications postmarked 7 days in advance of shipment. Accord-ingly, the suggestion is adopted through a requirement in the final rule
{
for notifications to be postmarked 10 days in advance of transport.
Advance notification:
Purpose of requirement. Comment: The advance notification requirement is chiefly a reporting or safety requirement and therefore should not be included as one of the requirements for physical l
protection of spent fuel shipments.
1 Response: The NRC agrees with the view that advance notification is better described as a reporting requirement rather than as a physical protection requirement. Accordingly, the requirement for advance notifi-cation has been moved to $73.72, which contains other notification require-ments.
Communication flexibility.
Comment: Proposed paragraphs $73.37(f)(7),
(f)(9), and (f)(10) would require an onboard capability for the escort aboard the shipment vehicle to communicate directly with law enforcement authorities.
Consider allowing licensees a degree of flexibility wherein l
l the escort would be permitted to either (1) communicate with the law enforcement authorities directly as in the proposed paragraphs, or (2) communicate with a licensee provided communications point, which in 1
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turn, has the capabil'ity to call the appropriate law enforcement author-ity for assistance.
O Response: The NRC finds this suggestion to be in accord with the communication objective as set forth in conclusion 3 of the statement of considerations for the proposed rule. Accordingly, the suggested change has been incorporated in the final rule.
Escort requirement clarification. Comment: The escort requirements in proposed paragraph 6 73.37(f)(6) should be revised to make clear that s
(i) for a short distance shipment by truck, only one escort is needed arid that escort may also serve as the truck driver, provided the individual is trained, qualified, and capable of simultaneously carrying out all app!icable escort and driver requirements; and (ii) the escort need not be armed [i.e., need not be an armed escort, as defined in paragraph
$ 73.2(u)].
Response: The interpretation reflects NRC intent.
Clarifications have been incorporated into the final ru'e.
B.
The Commission also received a number of comments and suggestions which were considered but which did not lead to changes in the amend-ments as proposed.
Following is a discussion of those comments.
Advance route approval:
Rail and water routes.
Comment:
In drop-ping its route approval requirement in favor of the DOT requirement, it appears that the NRC failed to take into account that the NRC require-ment applies to road, rail, and water routes, while the DOT requirement applies only to road routes. What will happen to route surveys in the case of rail and water routes?
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Response: The observation that the DOT requirement applies only to shipments by highway is correct; however, the NR'C has not ignored rail and water routes. One should take into account that 4
shipments by rail or water are not amenable to hijacking in the same sense as a truck shipment. Some severe sabotage scenarios (such as hijacking fellowed by relocation to a heavily populated area before sabotage) are inherently avoided.
In addition, in the case of rail s'hipments, inspectors from the Federal Railroad Administration currently inspect the route to be used for rail shipments shortly before shipment is to be made.
Route approval:
Routina near water supplies. Comment: Shipments should be routed to avoid proximity to drinking water supplies.
i
Response
If spent fuel is to be moved from one place to another in an orderly way, then shipment routes must cross rivers, streams, tributaries, and the like, many of which are on a watershed serving a water supply source'. A nationwide rule that protects each of these interests individually and yet permits orderly shipment of spent fuel is i
i impractical. The NRC approach to this situation is through the use of a cask designed to withstand the rigors of a severe accident (including one followed by cask submersion in water), without release of the spent fuel content of the cask. We believe that this approach is superior to one based on use of routes to avoid selected areas, structures, or institu-i tions. Moreover, the NRC staff believes that spent fuel packaged accord-ing to NRC requirements is safe to transport over any route in the United States that is designed to bear the shipment weight. Nonetneless, in deference to the views of States, current NRC and DOT rules pertaining to spent fuel shipments by road permit the cognizant State agency to specify i
t l
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a " State preferred route" for spent fuel shipment if the State agency t
wishes to avoid selected areas.
Route approvalt: Carrier attitudes.
Comment: The advance route approval requirement should be retained because carriers will not pick the best (most secure) route unless required to do so.
Response: NRC licensees must continue to comply with DOT routing requirements. On the basis of its experience in carrying out route
~
surveys since 1979, the NRC. staff believes that routes selected in q
accordance with DOT regulations will be as secure as those currently selected under NRC rules, j
Advance notification to citizens along the shipment route.
Comment: Citizens along the shipment route should be notified of impend-ing shipments so that if they choose they can leave the area to avoid exposure to the shipment.
~
Response: Thousands of shipments of spent fuel have been made in i
j the United States with no identifiable radiological injury.
Additionally, the technical studies carried out by the NRC, such as NUREG-0170, Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Transportation i
of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes (Reference *), all con-clude that the risk to the public from transport of radioactive material, f
including spent 1.al is extremely small. The NRC staff believes that advance notification to citizens along a shipment route is not needed.
i Advance coordination. Comment: The NRC currently requires licensees to carry out advance coordination with law enforcement officials.
This requirement should be retained to facilitate surveillance, security or other action that may be needed.
t 03/15/85 11 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 I
___,,_m_.,.,,--mm-_.-
.,-,, _ _,,,,,,_,m,.-w,
,,.___,.,.,,_.,,_,__,__,____,-.7,_,,,
...y,_
g,,
9 -
_..,m m,-r_,,.
[7590-01]
Response: As is noted in the statement of considerations for the I
proposed rule, a separate NRC rule [the present 973.37(f)] requires the notification of governors (or designated State officials) whenever spent fuel is to be transported within a State. This rule enables the State to contribute to the safety, security, and ease of transport of the ship-ment.
State law enforcer.ent authorities typically are informed of impend-ing shipments through this process.
Shipment vehicles will continue to have onboard communication equipment for use in the event assistance is needed. The NRC staff concludes that the current rule for advance coordination is no longer needed.
Communication centers. Comment: The NRC currently requires its licensees to establish and maintain a communications center capable of communicating with the shipment vehicle, of tracking its progress, and of communicating with appropriate law enforcement authorities in the event that required call-ins are not received from the shipment vehicle.
This requirement should be retained so that authorities will know where to begin a search in the event of a missing shipe,er'. vehicle.
Response: This requirement was one of these designed to provide additional protection against sabotage, when serious public health con-sequences could not be ruled out.
Research now shows that the health consequences of successful sabotage in a heavily populated areas are far I
lower than those that influenced design of the current requirements.
Because the calculated health consequences are lower and inasmuch as the on board communications capability is retrained, the NRC believes that the communication center requirement is one of those that can be dropped.
Safe haven selection criteria.
Comment:
The NRC currently allows places such as truck stops, truck weighing stations, and other similar 03/15/85 12 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 2
.. _ _. _ _ ~,. _ _ _ _ _ _.., _ _, _ _ _
s
[7590-01]
places to serve as safe havens in the event of delays caused by factors such as weather or mechanical breakdown.
The criteria should be more restrictive so as to limit havens to areas of high security, such as military or State police posts.
Response: Safe havens are to be used in the event of unplanned and unpredictable events, such as breakdown or bad weather.
Unpredictable timing in the use of safe havens contributes to their secu-rity. The NRC staff believes that a larger number of safe havens of the
]
kind presently called for by the staff practice is a better course of action than a smaller number of more secure but more widely spaced loca-i i
tions. The staff notes that safe havens selected under present criteria i
j are generally not in locations where successful sabotage would lead to high health consequences.
l Carrier role in carrying out protection requirements.
Comment:
The proposed $73.37(f) is susceptible to the interpretation that the licensee, rather than the carrier, is responsible for carrying out requirements for the protection of spent fuel shipments.
Since the 4
l carrier has control of the shipment, the carrier should be responsible j
for carrying out protection requirements, including the requirements I
pertaining to escorts.
Response: The NRC intends that licensees who offer spent fuel for shipment, and not carriers, should have the responsibility for carrying out the physical protection requirements set forth in $73.37. Under the provisions of $70.20a carriers do, however, become general licensees of the NRC from the time the shipment is accepted until the shipment is i
delivered.
Under these provisions carriers must (i) assure or receive certification from the shipper that transportation is in accordance with i
03/15/85 13 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
applicable provisions of $73.37; and (ii) report to the NRC promptly if a shipment is lost, stolen, or missing. After review, the NRC has decided that clarifying language in these requirements is not needed.
Responsibilities of railroad operators. Comment: A railroad opera-tor should not be required to provide either the escort or the communica-tions capability called out in the regulations for rail shipments of spent fuel.
Response: NRC regulations do not require a railroad operator to provide either the escort or the communications capability. On the other hand, the NRC does not object if a railroad operator provides the services to a licensee who offers the shipment for transport.
Fuel cooling time. Comment: The moderated requirements would apply for fuel cooled 150 days or more. The NRC should require cooling for 2 or 3 years before moderated reauirements would apply, thereby taking advantage of the fact that a release from fuel cooled 2 or 3 years would have lower health consequences than from a corresponding release from fuel cooled 150 days.
Response: The NRC agrees with the observation that health effects decline with increase in cooling time. Although not reported in the statement of considerations for the proposed rule, the variation in health effects as cooling time is varied from 90 days to 10 years was calculated as part of the research. The health effects, relative to 1
those from 150 day cooling, range from about 115% for 90-day cooling to about 47% for 10 year cooling. Health effects increase rapidly for cool-ing times less than 150 days because of the effects of short half-life i
isotopes. The health effects curve between 150 days and about 3 yeers is smooth. There is no abrupt " knee" or other natural break point at i
i 03/15/85 14 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
,g,
w
[7590-01]
which to set the cooling time.
Practically any point in this region could be chosen.
The 150-day cooling time was selected because (i) several of the more p:pular casks are certified for fuel cooled to that time or longer; (ii) there is no economic incentive to consider shorter cooling times; (iii) a large body of health consequence data exists for the 150-day point, including the DOE study results, thereby simplifying public evaluation of the research results and of the rule.
Alternatives to moderating protection requirements.
Comment: The NRC should have considered alternatives to relaxing the protection requirements. Possible alternatives include (i) ferry-borne shipaents to avoid road shipments through New York City; and (ii) use of road routes through less densely populated areas.
Response: Alternatives were considered in drafting the proposed rule, but not along the lines suggested in the comment. The results of the supporting research indicate that consequence estimates that led to issuance of the current requirements were overly conservative and there-fore the current requirements likewisa are viewed as being overly con-servative. Alternatives to relaxing protection requirements (i.e.,
alternatives that would lead to more severe requirements) are inappro-priate in the face of the research results.
In arriving at the set of proposed requirements for fuel cooled more than 150 days, the staff con-sidered the following alternatives:
(i) retain the current requirements; (ii) eliminate all requirements; and (iii) moderate the current require-ments by eliminating some. A number of subalternatives was considered under alternative (iii). One of these subalternatives was selected as the prototype set for the proposed rule.
03/15/85 15 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
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Influence of rule on States.
Comment: Codification of the proposed rule would inform States that NRC believes stringent protection require-f ments for spent fuel shipments are unnecessary.
Response: The NRC's purpose in issuing the moderated requirements is elimination of what the NitC considers to be unneeded requirements.
Public views.
Comment: The requirements should be retained.
The public is vocal in my State (or area or city) concerning spent fuel ship-ments.
Reduction in security requirements is sure to arouse the public.
Moreover, technical arguments (as set forth in support of the proposed '
g rule) do not impress the public.
Response: The NRC has a statutory responsibility to regulate the licensed nuclear industry, so as to protect the public health and safety and the common defense and security.
In carrying out this responsibility the NRC staff believes that sound technical rationale should be relied on whenever it is available.
In this particular rulemaking a large body of relevant technical data has been developed, and the staff believes the data should be used as a reasonable, prudent basis for regulatien.
Number shipments. Comment:
The current requirements should be retained because repository operations will lead to a monumental increase in the number of spent fuel shipments.
Response: The shipment rate when the proposed rule was drafted was 135 annually (current data shows 250 annually).
The staff agrees with the view that there will be a very large increase when repository operations begin. But in considering whether shipment protection requirements should be retained, factors in addition to shipment rate should be taken into account.
First, the staff believes that there is no strong relationship between the number of annual shipments and the likelihood of successful 03/15/85 16 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
6-(
[7590-01]
sabotage.
Even if an adversary interested in shipment sabotage were t
present, an increase in'the annual number of available targets would make no difference. The estimated 135 appears to offer all the opportunities a saboteur can use, and additional shipments offer no meaningful new opportunities. Second, one should take into account that the reposi-tories referred to in the comment will not be in place until at least sometime in the 1990s. The staff concludes that the expected increase in the number of spent fuel shipments attributable to respository opera-tions should not be a significant determinant in this rulemaking.
Route approval: Over-dependence on DOT rule. Comment: ThepropoIed rulemaking would drop the current advance route approval requirement.
The reason given by the NRC is that the advance route approval requirement duplicates a Department of Transportation (DOT) rule. The NRC rule is based on deliberate, malevolent action, while the DOT rule is based on accident. How can the one replace the other?
Response: After surveying a large number of licensee proposed road routes, the staff concluded that routes selected under the DOT criteria (use of interstate or state preferred routes, and routing around popula-tion centers where bypasses exist) would simultaneously satisfy NRC safe-guards criteria (quick police rasponse, avoidance of tactically disadvan-tageous positions, availability of appropriate rest and refueling stops, and availability of good transportation safety design features).
In the case of separate sets of regulations without meaningful, useful differ-ences, one set or the other should be eliminated. DOT is the lead agency for transportation regulations and therefore, the NRC concludes that its requirement can be withdrawn.
03/15/85 17 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[75"C-01]
Irrational attack.
Comment: The research was carried out in a rational manner.
Unfortunately, those most likely to attack a shipment are those least likely to be rational.
Response: Fortunately, the laws of physics apply to the rational and the irrational alike. Whether rational or irrational, those who would carry out the scenario specified in the research must gain control of a shipment, move it to a heavily populated area, carry out complex sabotage at a time of day and at a location where the population is extraordinarily dense, and have good luck with the wind direction and other meteorological conditions.
The NRC staff believes it has specified a severe scenario. The consequences of such a scenario, if successfully carried out, have been calculated. Those consequences were found to be far lower than previously expected, and a rule change in response to the new infomation is proposed.
These factors are all independent of whether sabotage is carried out by rational or irrational individuals.
The NRC staff concludes that the possible inclusion of irrational individuals in the sabotage scenario is not a sound basis for changing the proposed rule.
Sabotage of defective cask.
Comment: The attack might be directed against an improperly sealed or defective cask.
Response
Even if it is generously assumed that there is a shipment in a defective or improperly sealed cask, the implication is that the saboteur group would somehow be able to distinguish between that shipment and the far greater number of normal shipments and be preparad to pass up opportunities to sabotage normal shipments in favor of gaining an opportu-nity to sabotage the defective shipment cask.
Such a scenario is conceiv-able, but it appears to be stretching credibility to the extreme. The NRC 03/15/85 18 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
staff concludes that the suggestion does not set forth a sound basis for t
I changing the proposed regulations.
Nonradiological health effects.
Comment: The NRC case for moderat-ing the protection requirements is based entirely upon a calculated reduc-tion in radiological health effects supported by the research. The rule-I making should take into account the nonradiological health effects of sabotage or attempted sabotage, such as injuries and deaths from exp1'osives and gunfire.
Response
Studies do address nonradiological injury to the extent' of pointing out that early fatalities from a sabotage attempt would likely be dominated by the effects of the explosion. However, the staff does not believe it appropriate to recommend extension of NRC regulatory authority into nonradiological areas of public health and safety. These q
areas are already addressed by federal, state, and local law. The staff foresees regulatory duplication and legal confusion if more than one agency attempts to regulate a given activity. The staff concludes that to follow the suggestion would set an unwise precedent with no clearcut benefit.
Effects of nonrespirable particles.
Comments: The research considers j
only respirable particles. What of the thousands of grams of nonrespirable particles that would be scattered over the landscape and the inhabitants therein?
Response: The effects of nonrespirable particles are considered in i
deference
- commencing on page 129.
The particular scenario considered assumes that explosive sabotage ejects three spent fuel assemblies (1.4 million grams of spent fuel) from a cask into a street in a heavily popu-lated area.
The surrounding population is exposed to direct radiation for 15 minutes.
The resulting health effects (discounting all effects due to 03/15/P5 19 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
-.,--__---..w._
__,._.7_ _ -..... _ _. -.. _. _ _ _ _,,, -
[7590-01) the explosion) are calculated to be 20 to 108 early fatalities plus 4 to 25 latent cancer fatalities, depending on the de' tailed population distrib-ution at the time of the sabotage event.
The analysis points out that the calculated early fatalities would likely die from the effects of the explosion rather than from radiation. Thus, even with no radioactive material in the cask, the specified sabotage event would likely lead to a comparable number of early fatalities.
Data from experiments (Reference *)
indicates that the expected material ejected from the cask as a result of a severe sabotage event is about 5 thousand grams rather than 1.4 million grams.
Elementary calculations based on a 5-thousand gram release suggest 4
health effects far lower than those predicted for a 1.4-million gram release.* The NRC staff continues to believe that health effects from nonrespirable particles would be masked by the effects of the explosive.
For these reasons, the staff concludes that the regulation need not be influenced by calculated health effects from a nonrespirable release.
1 Discrepancies in consequence estimates.
Comment: The striking dis-crepancy between the SAND 77-1927 estimates and those of the NRC and DOE research seems to leave a lot of room for doubt regarding the accuracy of the latter studies.
Response: There is indeed a large difference between certain esti-mates in SAND 77-1927 and those in the NRC and DOE research. As is explained in the statement of considerations accompanying the proposed rule, issuance of the interim rule was based chiefly on consequence esti-mates set forth in SAND 77-1927.
A baseline estimate, a high estimate, j
and a low estimate were provided in that report. At the time the rule l
issuance was under consideration, the high consequence estimate was based on 14,000 grams of respirable release for a truck cask containing three i
03/15/85 20 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
1
[7590-01]
t fuel assemblies and on 47,000 grams of respirable release from a rail cask. Although not based on experimental evidence, these estimates were the best available at the time, and the high-estimate releases could not be ruled out. The calculated average consequences for truck cask sabotage were summarized as several tens of early fatalities and hundreds of latent cancer fatalities. The calculated average consequences for a rail cask were summarized as hundreds of early fatalities and thousands of latent cancer fatalities.
Experimental data from the research carried out by two separate studies (one sponsored by DOE, the other by NRC) now show '
i
)
that the likely respirable release from a severe sabotage event and the resulting consequences are but a tiny percentage of the estimated values which originally prompted issuance of the rule. Accordingly, the original i
basis for the rule is no longer valid. The staff concludes that its rule should be based on the final experimental data rather than on the more uncertain original release estimates.
Short-lived isotopes not considered. Comment: Numerous relatively short-lived isotopes not present in the 6-1/2 year cooled spent fuel used j
in the research would be present in 150-day cooled fuel. The effects of these isotopes need to be taken into account.
I Response: The staff agrees with the observation that uncooled or briefly cooled spent fuel contains numerous short-lived isotopes not
{
mentioned in the Battelle tests, in NUREG-0743, or in SAND 77-1927. How-ever, short-lived isotopes have been taken into account in calculation of the health effects discussed in this proceeding.
Calculation of health effects usually begins with a computer readout of the isotopes (in grams or curies) associated with a metric ton of spent fuel cooled for a speci-fied period.
The computer readouts are known as ORIGIN runs, the acronym l
03/15/85 21 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
referring to Oak Ridge National Laboratory Isotopes Generation and Deple-8 tion Code.
In a typical run used in this procee' ding, 116 fission product isotopes (including short-lived ones), plus 37 actinide isotopes are con-t j
sidered. After considering for each isotope the number of curies in a fuel assembly and the number of rems per curie, all but about 26 isotopes can be dismissed as having no potential for significant contribution to health effects.
Further analysis leads to an even shorter list, such.as that referred to in the Battelle report. Different investigators may examine and base health effects calculations on more or fewer isotopes,,
depending on the way their available computer programs are set up and on the spent fuel parameters. As one typical example, it can be shown that about 98% of the health effects from postulated release of 120-day cooled spent fuel wculd be caused by only 10 isotopes.
Even fewer isotopes are needed to adequately describe the effects after fuel has been cooled for multiyear periods.
1 New cask designs. Comment: The requirements should be retained because the use of casks larger and less expensive than those used in the research is being considered in connection with the future transport of spent fuel to repositories. The new casks may not be as sabotage-resistant as the ones used in the research.
Response: The dominant factor in the sabotage resistance of a cask is the kind and thickness of cask materials between the spent fuel pay-load and the environment. The kind and thickness of materials for use in casks is determined largely by the need for radiation shielding and acci-dent resistance. The NRC has no plan to reduce these requirements for the new casks that will be considered.
The new casks most likely will be con-structed of steel, lead, depleted uranium, and nodular cast iron in some 03/15/85 22 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
,. -. _ ~.., - - -. - -
.,,_.7-----
-,,,.,e.-,.
i
[7590-01]
combination yet to be determined.
Depending on the materials actually selected for construction, the cask thickness is expected to be either com-parable to or greater than that of current casks. "Accordingly, the NRC i
staff expects the sabotage resistance to be comparable to or greater than that of current casks. The details of thickness are not likely to be explicitly resolved until new cask designs are presented to the NRC for review no earlier than 1988 and perhaps as late as the 1990s.
The size of a cask is a factor but not an overwhelming factor in the sabotage resistance of the cask. A large cask can, of course, carry moFe fuel assemblies but it would also be thicker and therefore more sabotage resistant than a smaller cask.
Release in the event of successful sabotage would most likely increase roughly in proportion to the square root of the number of contained assemblies, as will be discussed later.
The projected cost of a cask is not a criterion for NRC approval or disapproval of a cask design. The NRC staff concludes that the details of future cask design are not an adequate basis for retaining all of the requirements of the current sp3nt fuel shipment protection rule.
Chemical reactivity of short-lived isotopes. Comment:
Short-lived isotopes are chemically reactive in ways different from those surviving after 6 1/2 years and such reactivity could influence the disproportiona-tion factor discussed in Chapter 5 of the BCL report, Reference.*
Response: The term "disproportionation" in the comment refers to the concern that some of elements or compounds contained in spent fuel may be released in amounts greater than their proportion in the fuel.
Disproportion action, if occurring in materials that have the greatest health effects, or if occurring in other materials by orders of magnitude, could influence the health effects.
In the research, alpha and gamma 03/15/85 23 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
- ~. - _ - - _
1
[7590-01]
' scans made with sensitive instrumentation did not reveal disproportiona-t tion to a degree that would materially affect th'e health consequence con-clusions. Thus, the research does not support the view that dispropor-l tionation of short-lived isotopes could somehow invalidate health conse-l quence conclusions.
Vaporized materials. Comment: Vaporized materials were not analyzed by the BCL tests.
For example, some fission products such as iodine and
{
plutonium can combine chemically to form compounds (e.g., Pul ) that 3
i volatilize at the temperatures involved in the BCL tests. BCL only 3
y examined samples captured in filters; there was no indication of chemical i
filtration to analyze volatilized or gaseous fission products or corrosion products. Such materials do not exhibit the rapid settling of particles 4
and so could cause a dispropor,tionately greater problem because of their I
increased residence time in the environment. Once again, the use of 6-1/2 year old fuel would also have eliminated some volatile fission products A
even if analysis of gaseous products had been performed.
Response: The NRC staff disagrees with the view that BCL tests did not adequately account for vaporized materials. Materials vaporized by t
the shaped charge jet would soon recondense in the lower temperature environment within the sampling chamber. "In its recondensed state, the i
j material would be detected by one or more of the sampling instruments, and subsequently taken into account in the health effects calculations.
j Materials that are in the gaseous state at room (and higher) tempera-i l
l tures are likely unaccounted for. However, this leads to no meaningful loss of health effects accuracy because the health effects attributable to true gaseous materials (at room temperature) are insignificant relative l
to those of respirable solid particles.
i 03/15/85 24 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 i
.i i
_,. _ _ - _... -....~. _ _..--,.--- ~ - _- -.-.. _
_,m,.._._,,..r_~,...-_..-_._.-...,__._-_...._-_-..,__._,...-.._
[7590-01]
Once recondensed, vaporized material was treated as aerosolized mate
- rial.
Accordingly, the# discussion concerning d'isproportionation in para-O graph
- applies to these recondensed materials.
Crud: Accounting for 150-day coolino.
Comment: The research does not adequately account for the effect of crud on 150-day cooled fuel.
Response: The term " crud" as used in this context refers to corro-sion from primary parts of the reactor that adheres to' the fuel rods that make up the fuel assemblies.
The NRC staff believes that " crud" has been adequately considered in the health effects calculations. Measurements-nave shown that the reactivity of " crud" on 150-day cooled fuel is about 180 microcuries per square centimeter of fuel rod surface (Reference *).
The total surface area of a pressurized water reactor fuel assembly con-sisting of a 16 x 16 array of 363-cm long (effactive length) rods 1 cm in diameter is about 2.92E+5 cm. Multiplication of appropriate terms 2
leads to a conclusion of about 52.6 curies per assembly or about 158 curies for 3 assemblies. Using more precise dimensions, Reference
- estimates 154 curies for three assemblies, the value used in the health effects calculation.
In the studies all of these curies were treated as being generated by Co-60, a conservative assumption as will be shown subsequently.
Crud: Discrepancies in values listed for Co-60.
Comment: The v'alue listed for Co-60 in Table 4.6.2 of SAND 82-2365 is significantly dif ferent from the value listed in Table G.12 of NUREG-0575. Moreover, certain other isotopes listed in SAND 82-2365 are listed at values lower than those in NUREG-0575 or are omitted entirely.
Response: Co-60 and certain other isotopes in reactor fuel assemblies have been studied and estimated from two different viewpoints. One of 03/15/85 25 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
these is the " crud" viewpoint which has already been discussed.
The second is that of materials of construction.
Th' ese are the materials, mostly metals, used in the rods, endplates and other support structures in a fuel assembly. When irradiated, materials of construction yield Co-60 and other isotopes. This component of Co-60 is the one reported in Table G-12.
It is large compared with the component of Co-60 found in
" crud" and reported in Table 4.6.2 of SAND 82-2365. The malevolent use of a shaped charge against the structural components of a fuel assembly would result in far lower health effects than if used against the fuel--
containing pcrts of the assembly, as was assumed in this proceeding.
This results from the fact that the actinides, which dominate the health effects in the case of a respirable release of solids, are contained in the fuel rather than in the materials of construction.
As is noted in the comment, the two tables cited do list different quantities of actinides and fission products, even after adjustment for quantity of fuel and for differing fuel cooling times. The differences range from a few per cent to a few tens of per cent and stem from the assumptions made concerning operating conditions in the reactor before shutdown. Apart from the primary factors of burnup and power density, other factors such as flux density and capacity factor can influence the amounts of actinides and fission products generated. The isotope list-ings in SAND 82-2365 and in NUREG-0575, though somewhat different, are well within the range that is representative of reasonable reactor opera-tion. Moreover, the differences between the values are not sufficient to suggest a need for modification of the regulatory conclusions.
, Crud: Geleases at elevated temperature.
Comment: According to NUREG/CR-0163, at 100*C " crud" will flake off of cladding into respirable 03/15/85 26 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
-[7590-01]
t l
8 particles. The Sandia study (Reference *) states that temperatures approached 1850*C in the full scale test, thus providing the condition for a disproportionately high release of " crud."
Response: The 1850*C temperature mentioned in SAND 82-2365 is a highly localized effect, while " crud" is located over the approximately 12-foot effective length of the fuel rods.
The temperature cited reached, at most, only a few inches from the centerline of the jet. Thus little
{
" crud" would be affectad. The localized temperature mentioned does not i
appear to be a sound basis for an excessive disproportionation of " crud" s
release. Moreover, it must be taken into account that Battelle measure-ments did not reveal a meaningful disproportionation of " crud" constituents.
Crud: Certain isotopes not considered. Comment:
The use of 6-1/2 years cooled (rather than 150-day cooled) fuel, coupled with failure to l
consider " crud" isotopes such as Co-58, Mn-54, Fe-59, and Cr-51, would j
result in an underestimate of the health effects from " crud."
Response: The NRC staff agrees that the health effects of the above named isotopes would be lower for 61/2 year cooled fuel then for 150-day
\\.4 cooled fuel.
However, the comment fails to take into account that although the Battelle work used 61/2 year cooled fuel to determine the quantity of respirable material released, subsequent health effects calculations were based on 150-day cooled fuel. As is discussed in a previous comment, separate data and calculations have shown that the total " crud" in 150-day cooled fuel is about 154 curies. The health consequences are greater if the entire 154 curies is assumed to be associated with Co-60 because the dose factor per curie is higher fer Co-60 than for the other isotopes present in " crud." Finally, and most importantly, it can be shown that the health effects of a specified fractional release of Co-60 in spent fuel 03/15/85 27 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
i
[7590-01]
are negligible compared to those of some of the actinides, such as Pu-238. t Accordingly, " crud" (and its individual components) are not considered to i
be significant in the sabotage context.
Thermal effects of 150 day cooled fuel upon " crud." Comment: The thermal effects of 150-day cooled fuel upon " crud" will be more intense i
than those of the 6 1/2 year cooled fuel used in the research. The 4
research results should be modified to take this into account.
Response: Being developed.
Effect of irradiation on respirable particle production. Comment, s
When one test resulted in a ratio of 125:1 (spent fuel to unirradiated surrogate fuel), it was averaged with others thereby diluting its effect (or, conversely, skewing the other results improperly).
It was assumed that " gain swelling in the reactor environment" resulted in breakdown of the matrix, but there was no discussion of how often such breakdown occur-red. Past studies seem to show that grain swelling (and other fuel fail-ures) have come in spurts, possibly the result of occasional fuel produc-tion deficiencies. To properly factor the 125:1 ratio, some idea of the fraction of actual grain swelling in reactors is needed before the final ratio of spent fuel to depleted U02 can be used with any credibility.
Response
Sandia conducted separate explosive experiments on both irradiated and unirradiated fuel to determine the quantity of fuel that would have been released if the full scale fuel had been irradiated.
In simplest mathematical symbols, if y = quantity of irradiated respirable fuel released in an experiment using irradiated fuel, and if x = quantity of unirradiated fuel released in an otherwise identical experiment using unirradiated fuel, then x and y are related by som* function, symbolized by y = f(x). The problem is to determine f(x). As is correctly indicated 03/15/85 28 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 g
r-
r--
,-.=.y,,,-..
.,._w
.,--,_.,..-p.,,em y,,,
.,,-.,,w
i
[7590-01]
in the comment, one outlying data point suggests that y = 125x. However,t j
all other data suggest values in the range y ='0.42x to y = 5.6x.
The comment focuses on this outlying point, and suggests more work should be done before the 125 value can safely be handled by ordinary statistical mathematics.
Three different techniques for determining the value of f(x) were used and numerous measured data points were taken into account. Battelle used the highest value its data justified, y = 3.0x.
Sandia used conven-j tional statistics on all its data, including the 125 value, and arrived s
at the conclusion y = 5.6x.
To some analysts the acst satisfying value is simply y = x, i.e., irradiated and unitradiated fuel targets subjected to identical explosive sabotage produce the same quantity of respirable particles. The staff concludes that the value of 3.0 used by Battelle and the value of 5.6 used by Sandia are well justified by the data and that additional work in this area need not be undertaken.
Effect of chamber upon experiments.
Comment: The experiment's to determine the respirable particle release were carried out inside a chamber. The chamber would lead to a higher aerosol concentration, more rapid particle agglomeration, and therefore larger particle size and more rapid settling. The experiments would therefore understate the respir-able release, but to what degree is unknown.
Response: The NRC staff disagrees with the view that the presence of the sampling chamber significantly decreased the quantity of respirable measured compared to that which would be generated in a "real life" event.
First, the "zero" time concentration of respirable material was based on a backward extrapolation in time of data measured at several discrete times following detonation of the shaped charge. Any increase in the 03/15/85 29 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
agglomeration or settling due to the sampling chamber volume would be I
reflected in the slope of the concentration curve with time. No such change was found. Second, it was thought that following detonation, high velocity particles, if present, would move rapidly from the fuel to the interior surface of the chamber and stick there, thereby removing them from the aerosol and decreasing its concentration.
In the case of the Sandia experiment, a special instrument was included in the instrumenta-tion array to specifically record any high velocity particles.
Its sampl-l ing began 400 milliseconds after detonation.
The instrument gave no evidence of high velocity fuel particles. Third, from a theoretical view-point, the airbone concentration is not high enough to allow agglomera-tion to be a significant factor.
Fourth, the measurement set-up was designed to isolate the instruments from the debris resulting from detona-tion of the explosive.
In a real life situation debris from the 40 pound explosive assembly would have provided numerous agglomeration sites and could be expected to reduce the respirable concentration below that for the isolated case.
Experimental technique not subjected to peer review.
Comment: The peer review was carried out by the U.S. Army Ballistics Laboratory (BRL).
That agency did not review the experimental techniques used to measure the release of radioactive material.
It appears that no agency has reviewed this singularly important aspect.
This is astonishing, since an error at this level would have a direct bearing on the decision to relax safeguards.
Response: Research work used by the NRC in its decisions is subject to peer review chiefly for one of two reasons:
(i) there is a significant difference of professional opinion within the NRC technical staff concern-ing the research; or (ii) the NRC technical staff does not have adequate 03/15/85 30 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
knowledge of the subject to carry out an internal review. Explosive tech '
nology is one specialty field where outside ass'istance was needed and obtained. With respect to the experimental techniques used in the research, neither criterion for instituting a peer review was evident.
In reaching this determination, the staff took into account the following factors.
First, the staff noted that the experimental techniques and instruwntation i
used, while necessarily sophisticated, are well established and widely accepted within the nuclear field. Second, the staff noted that two com-petent, qualified organizations operating independently and following 5 s
substantially different approaches, used similar experimental techniques 4
and instrumentation and arrived at comparable results concerning the quantity of respirable material likely to be released as a result of the same specified sabotage event.
This correlation appeared to the staff to be one of the most acceptable and satisfying forms of validation.
Third, the staff noted that from time to time investigators from the two research programs met to review and comment on experimental technique, instrumentation, and scaling approaches.
Fourth, the staff was aware that DOE and Sandia investigators were being advised and assisted by specialists from Lovelace Inhalation Toxicology Institute, an organiza-tion highly qualified in theory and measurement of respirable particles under various conditions. For these reasons, the staff concluded that formal, outside peer review of experimental technique and instrumentation was not needed.
Technical appendices to the DOE research report. Comment: The table of contents to the report for the DOE-sponsored research (carried out by Sandia) lists 6 technical appendices, none of which have been published.
One of these is entitled "HED [high energy device] Evaluation Tests: Test 03/15/85 31 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 w,rpai.-r-.ya
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Octa." The Ballistics Research Laboratory report says that access to thig appendix would have permitted independent assessment of HED performance.
In absence of this appendix, the explosive aspects of the research have not been verified.
Response: The NRC staff sympathizes with the comment to the extent i
l that absence of the promised appendices does detract from the Sandia report.
The staff does not, however, consider the absence of the appendices to be a fatal flaw in the report, nor a sufficient reason to preclude use of the
)
i report in this rulemaking proceeding.
i The crucial issue, in the staff's view, is not whether appendices have been published, but whether a proper explosive has been selected and applied and whether the performance results are consistent with expecta-1 tions.
In their review, the BRL investigators had access to a large body 1
of data concerning the performance of the reference explosive (the M3Al shaped charge) used in the experiments.
The basic design of the device i
dates back to circa World War II. Data on its penetration performance is widely available in U.S. Army field manuals on demolition and in other documents.
In their report (Reference *), the BRL investigators clearly and explicitly agree with the selection and performance of the M3A1, as is evidenced by the following quotations from the Conclusion section of the BRL report:
"2.
The M3Al demolition charge is an appropriate threat simulant, given considerations of weight, penetration and availability.
"3.
SNL's [Sandia National Laboratories) penetration results for the M3Al into the IF-200 cask are coraistent with the HED's'known performance."
Extrapolation to hiah-burnup fuel not justified. Comment: The NRC is maintaining protection requirements for fuel cooled less than 150 days 03/15/85 32 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 4
_ _ _. ~ _ -. _ -,.__-____.
[7590-01) because detailed calculation consequence calculations have not been carried cut.
Based on the apparent absence of detailed calculations for high burn-up fuel (40,000 mwd /MT w. 33,000 mwd /MT), it appears that the NRC should have applied the current requirements, rather than the moderated require-ments, to high burnup fuel.
Response; The staff believes that there is some misunderstanding here.
In the case of fuel cooled less than 150 days, no calculations were made or deemed worthwhile (see response to Comission question 1) and the existent requirements were retained.
In the case of high-burnup fuel,,
calculations were made, key results were published in the proposed rule (Reference *), and a conscious determination was made that the same rules cculd cpply to both high burnup fuel and lower burnup fuel.
Extrapolation from road cask to rail cask not.fustified. Comment:
Recent proposals. call for use of rail casks each carrying 18 boiling water power reactor (BWR) assemblies.
The research results cannot be simply extrapolated from road to rail casks as was done in the proposed rule notice. Other factors related to scale could sigaificantly affect release levels and health consequences.
Response: The NRC staff agrees that rail shipments in casks contain-ing 18 BWR assemblies are being proposed. No specific objection to extra-polation is set forth in the comment for the staff to address, only a general expression of concern and the unsupported conclusion that factors related to scale could somehow affect release levels and health consequences.
The NRC staff position concerning extrapolation of road cask calculations to rail casks is as follows.
The research and the proposed rule (Reference *) focused on PWR assemblies because such shipments contain the most concentrated forms of 03/15/85 33 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
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[7590-01]
spent fuel.
The experiments dealt with road shipment casks, but it was t
necessary to develop a regulatory position with respect to rail shipments as well.
In developing its position concerning the amount of material likely to be released from a rail cask, the staff took into account that (i) a shaped charge jet is the mechanism that causes the release; (ii) a shaped charge jet operates in a straight line; (iii) a radial attack is likely to yield a larger release than an axial attack; (iv) the release will be in proportion to the number of assemblies that lie in a straight j
line along a radial; and (v) the number of assemblies that lie in a straight line in a fully loaded cask is roughly proportional to the square root of the number of assemblies in the cask.
In the case of a current PWR rail cask containing 10 assemblies, the assemblies lie bottom-to-top j
in a 3-4-3 array and a maximum of four assemblies lie in a straight line.
According to the squarc-root estimate, the release would be 3.16 times the release from a single assembly cask, equivalent to stating that 3 assemblies would be fully penetrated by the jet plus 16% of the fourth.
This would appear to be conservative estimate of the possible release.
This approach can be applied to the rail cask containing 18 BWR assemblies, that prompted the comment.
In such a cask, the assemblies lie from bottom-to-top in a 4-5-5-4 array, for a total of 18 assemblies.
The maximum number of as emblies in a straight line is 5.
The square root of 18 is about 4 1/4, meaning that the jet would be estimated to nenetrate 4 of the 5 assemblies plus 25% of the fifth. This estimate must be adjusted downward relative to PWR assemblies because BWR assemblies contain only about 42% as much fuel per unit (active) length. When this adjustment is made, the estimate becomes comparable to that for a three PWR assembly truck cask, where two PWR assemblies lie in straight line.
03/15/85 34 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 c.
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[7590-01]
Shaped charges with thermal pellets.
Comment: The research did i
not examine possible use of a commercially available shaped charge that includes a high temperature exothermic pellet (reference given).
Such a charge could penetrate the cask and then ignite the fuel with the s
exothermic pellet, thereby yielding a significant increase in respirable release through oxidation.
Response: The effectiveness of a sabotage device is related directly to the amount of energy transmitted to the spent fuel.
Because of its size, the reference explosive can deliver more energy to the target fuel that can a composite exothermic pellet-shaped-charge device. The tempera-ture of 1850*C produced in the target fuel by the reference explosive is higher than the temperature that can be produced by the pellet.
Even under severe sabotage conditions, spent fuel would not ignite and burn i
in the ordinary sense of producing light, substantial additional heat, or smoke.
Finally, the composite device was specially designed to operate against a relatively soft target of homogeneous solid rocket propellant j
fuel.
Its breaching performance against the multiple heterogeneous layers of a cask would be expected to be poorer than the performance of the i
reference explosive.
HFBW Fuel Not Considered Comment:
If successfully sabotage, an HFBR
[High Flux Beam Reactor] fuel shipment in Pti-1A casks would yield a much larger release than that indicated in the Sandia analysis.
Response: Being developed.
Oxidation:
Failure to detect U 0s.
Comment: Reoxidation of UO 2
2 to i
U 0s is known to occur when fuel is exposed to air at a temperature above 3
500*F.
The reference charge produced temperatures of at least 1850*C, yet I
the research instrumentation shown no evidence of the expected U 0s.
3 The instrumentation could be in error.
03/15/85 35 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 i
e
.m.
[7590-01]
Response: Oxidation of fuel is a relatively slow process compared t
to the transient heat, and resultant high temperature, generated by the explosion. The research investigators conclude that the amount of U 0 38 produced by the explosion is small and that the contribution of explosion-induced oxidation to healtn effects is likewise small.
Oxidation: Effect unaccounted for in CRAC and METRAN codes.
Comment:
Oxidation effects are not accounted for in CRAC and METRAN codes.
The codes therefore underestimate both the proportion of fuel that could be aerosolized and the real impact of the release.
s Response: Health effects calculations using the codes are carried out in the following way. Meteorological data, population data, and source ters data a*e among the kinds of data fed into the computer code.
Scurce term data contains such information as the kind, quantity, and particle size distribution of the radionuclides of concern.
Thus, any
^
adjustment to account for the effects of oxidation would be addressed in the. preparation of the source term data and there is no need to adjust the codes themselves.
In the research, the quantity of radionuclides and the particle size distribution are based upon experimental results.
0xidation is accounted for to the extent that it affected the experimental results.
Oxidation:
Failure to account for effects of particles in burnina fuel: Comment:
Particles larger than respirable size would be discharged from the cask and fall in the vicinity of the cask. With little extra effort on the part of the saboteur, fuel from the vehicle fuel tanks could f
then be deliberately releaseo and ignited, thereby creating a more severe radicactive release than that analyzed.
Response: Being developed.
03/15/85 36 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 i
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[7590-01]
Cost savinas from proposed rule insignificant. Comment:
Eliminatiop of some of the protection requirements as proposed would save NRC licensees about $40,000 annually. The costs, if the requirements are retained, are not particularly burdensome to licensees.
Retention of the requirements, an the other hand, provides the public with an added degree of assurance and confidence that shipments of waste are made with minimum risk.
t Response: The comment argues that requirements that are not burden-some and that give assurance to the public should be retained.
If widely, applied, such a regulatory philosophy would have agencies seeking out 5
inexpensive sets of requirements that appeal to the public and applying s
l the requirements without regard to need. The staff does not believe that this is a useful regulatory approach.
Instead, requirements should be based on need.
Need, in turn, should be linked to dangers or unacceptable i
consequences. Unacceptable consequences are those beyond levels widely l
accepted in nonradiological activities. The health consequences relevant to this proceeding are well within the bounds of consequences widely i
accepted in the U.S.
This approach is summarized in the Conclusions sec-tion of the proposed rule (Reference *):
...research recently completed 1
has shown that the likely respirable release from sabotage and the result-ing consequences are but a tiny percentage of the estimate values which originally prompted issuance of the interim rule. Accordingly, the original basis for the rule is no longer valid." The staff believes it would be a disservice to the public to retain requirements that give the impression that a significant problem exists despite strong evidence that the problem is far less significant than previously supposed.
Property damage as a basis for regulation. Comment: Health effects were the fundamental basis for the interim regulation and for its proposed 03/15/85 37 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
moderation. NUREG/CR-0743 indicates that $2 billion in property damage 8
could result from merely the release of " crud" 'on foal.
The release of 0
even a small fraction of solids would raise the figure even further.
When one compares the $40,000 in savings annually to be realized against the results of sabotage at selected sites in urban areas, the dollar sav-ings are inconsequential.
Response: In U.S. culture, healtn and life have traoitionally been valued above property. This value system stems from the view that pro-perty and structures, however costly, could at least conceptually be i
restored to preexisting (in this case, presabotage) conditions.
The same is not true of life and health.
The staff continues to believe that health consequence is currently the best available criterion for detemining whether to adopt a candidate set of safeguards regulations.
Some less basic reasons are:
1.
Health' consequence was the basis for issuance of the interim rule.
Retention of this basis assures a common basis for comparing the results of this proceeding with the interim rule proceeding.
2.
The research was specifically tailored to support the calcula-tion of health effects.
Research tailored to give information about property damage would be quite different.
3.
The data base available for health effects is far more extensive and more refined than that for property damage.
Political and social disruption:
Comment:
A spent fuel release in i
a heavily populated area would lead to evacuation and accompanying social -
disruption. The research did not but should have considered these factors.
Response: These concerns are discussed in Appendix L of NUREG/CR-0743.
(Reference *).
On the basis of public comment and staff evaluation of that 03/15/85 38 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
report the staff decided that a research program focusing on development I
of experimental data to support more confident' calculation of health effects was likely to be the most fruitful kind of research.
Rule chance unlikely to reduce costs. Comment: The rule change is unlikely to reduce shipment protection costs, which are dominated by state regulations. States are unlikely to change their regulations.
Response: The cost aspects of the coisant dra like.l> valid w: thin some states but not within others.
In any event, cost is not the main thrust of this rulemaking. The main thrust is to set forth a suitable, set of protection requirements and a rationale for those requirements.
The NRC staff is confident that states will take this new information into account when considering the correctness of their own regulations.
NRC tries to keep public uninformed.
Comment: The changes seem to reflect a desire to keep the public uniformed of the shipments and what-ever hazards may be involved.
Response: The staff believes that the rulemaking process provides an adequate opportunity for the public to learn about the shipments and
{
the hazards involved.
The following are among the materials that are available to the public concerning this proceeding:
(i) two volumes of reser.rch reports; (ii) several volumes of previous studies which led to the interim rule, (iii) Federal Register notices, giving comprehensive information about the original interim rule, the revised interim rule, the proposed final rule, and this, the final rule; (v) public announce-ments of each of the preceding issuances; (vi) various guidance documents
, designed to aid in understanding the intent of the rule and to set forth example ways of satisfying the requirements; (vii) listings of the routes over which spent fuel shipments are transported; (viii) the public i
l 03/15/85 39 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
c comments received in connection with the proceeding; and (ix) regulatory 8
analyses.
St# NARY OF THE FINAL RULE 1.
The performance requirements for protection of spent fuel ship-cents have bear modifie:! to emphasite protection against sabotage with high consequence. High consequence refers to the levels of consequence
]
that prompted issuance of the original interim rule.
For a truck 3
shipment, high consequence refers to tens of early fatalities and hundreds of latent cancer fatalities.
The performance requirements (i) deny an I
adversary easy access to shipment location infomation; (ii) provide for early detection of malevolent moves against or loss of control of a shipment; (iii) provide a means'to quickly summon assistance from local law enforcement authorities; and (iv) provide a means to impede unauthorized movement of a truck shipment into a heavily populated area.
2.
For shipments of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days, the current detailed requirements continue to apply.
3.
For shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more, moderated detailed requirements call for (i) a shipment to be accompanied by an escort who may be unarmed, who may have other transport duties (driver, rail employee, or ship's officer) and who would carry out prescribed security procedures; (ii) onboard communications (all transport modes);
and (iii) immobilization (truck mode only). Among the requirements i
considered no longer needed (for shipments of fuel cooled 150 days or more) are those for route surveys, advance coordination with local law enforcement authorities, and schedule information protection.
03/15/85 40 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
j
[7590-01]
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION Based on the information available at this stage of the rulemaking proceeding and in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this rule will have no significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. The rule applies to licensees who transport or deliver to a carrier for transport a shipment of spent fuel in a quantity in excess of 100 grams. Typical of the licensees who deliver spent fuel to a carrier for transport are nuclear power reactor operators, independent spent fuel storage pool operators, and research institutions.
None of the licensees who deliver spent fuel to a carrier for transport are known to be small entities.
Licensees who transport spent fuel are typically large carriers who specialize in the transport of radioactive I
materials and other hazardous materials and who have many employees. 'No small entities are known to be within this licensee group.
The NRC has estimated the cost impact of this rule upon the pp licensed industry. According to these estimates licensees would incur the following costs, assuming continuation of the current approximately q
)
250 shipments annually (up from 135 reported in Reference.*).
One-time W
/
costs for the proposed amendments have already been expended due to the same requirements under the present interim rule. Annual maintenance cost of equipment required by the proposed amendments is estimated at
$14,000. Annual planning and administration cost is estimated at
$13,000. Total cost to licensees is therefore estimated at $27,000 annually.
4 03/15/85 41 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
One savings to industry under the new amendments would be the elimi-t nation of about $50,000 expended annually for arined escorts presently O
required under the interim rule.
Simplification of administration is estimated to result in an additional saving of $24,000 annually.
Further information regarding these estimates is set forth in a document entitled
" Moderation of Protection Requirements for Spent Fuel Shipments:
Regula-tory Analysis" and is available for inspection and copying in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC.
- (p.J2Ydr h ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: NEGAT)
RATION The promulgation of these amendments will not result in any activity that affects the environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined under the Nationa Environmental Quality guidelines and the criteria of 10 CFR 5 d) that neither an environmental impact statement nor environ-mental impact appraisal to support a negative declaration for these amend-ments to Title 10 is required.
A M (I o V ll PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The application requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget, DMB approval No.
LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 73 A< [
(,
Hazardous materials - Jransportation Nuclear /9aterials, Packaging k f (s. C 4 and Containe, Penalty, Reporting quirements. A 03/15/85 42 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
.a
[7590-01]
1 For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of i
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1.
, and 5 U.S.C. 553 bisherebygiventhat p g
adoptt n of the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 is cont IInted.
PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 1.
The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 161, 69 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec. 147, s
94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844).
Section73.37(f)isalsoissuefundersec.301, Pub.L.960295,94
[
Stat. 789 (42 I).S.C. 5841 note).
l For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2273); $$ 73.21, 73.37(g),'73.55 are issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat.
948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); SS 73.20, 73.24, 73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.55, 73.67 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)); and
$$ 73.20(c)(1), 73.24(b)(1), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27(a) and (b), 73.37(f), 73.40(b) and (d), 73.46(g)(6) and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2),
(3)(iii)(B) and (h), 73.55(h)(2), and (4)(iii)(B), 73.70, 73.71, 73.72 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2001(o)).
2.
In S 73.21, the first sentence in paragraph (b)(2) is revised to read as follows:
- l S 73 21 Requirements for the protection of safe==rds information.
a a
e 4
03/15/85 43 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 1
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(b) Information to be otected.
O g
4 (2) Physical prote ion in transit.
Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information related to the protection of shipments of Q formula quantities of strategic l
nuclear material and (ii) irradiated fuel subject to the requirements of fL73.37(b).*
m a
a a
a 3.
Section 73.37 is amended as follows:
a.
The title is revised.
b.
Paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (a)(2)(iii), and (b)-(e) are revised.
c.
Existing paragraphs (f) and (g) are moved from this section to section 73.72 and are revised.
d.
A new paragraph (f) is added.
- --f Q3.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor X
fuel (spent fuel) in transit.
-(a) Performance objectives.p e
(1) ***
(i) Minimize the possibilities for high consequence radiological sabotage of spent fuel shipments [especially-within-heavily popainted areas]; and A
A A
R (2) ***
g g
g 7
(iii) Impede attempts at hiah consequence radiological sabotage of spent fuel shipments [within-heavily popainted-areas] or attempts to Whew phrasing is underlined; deleted phrasing is bracketed and dashed 1
through.
03/15/85 44,
FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
fllicitly move spent fuel [such] shipments containing materials with high consequence potential [inte-heavily popaiated-areas], until
~
response forces arrive.
a a
(b) General requirements for protection of shipment of spent fuel cooled for less than 150 days. The licensee, in order [To] to achieve X
the performance objectives of paragraph (a) of this section, shall provide for a physical protection system that has been established, maintained, or arranged [by-the-iieensee-shali] for fuel that has been y s
used as part of an assembly to sustain nuclear fission in a self-support-ing chain reaction at any time during the 150-day period before the date on which the fuel is loaded aboard a vehicle for transport. This physical protection system must include the following:
a a
a a
n (c) Shipments by road of spent' fuel cooled less than 150 days.
In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph (b) of this section that is by road [shali] must provide that:
a a
a a
a (d) Shipment by rail of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days.
In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, the physical protection system for any portion of a spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph (b) of this section that is by rail [shail] must provide that:
1 a
a a
a 1
(e) Shipments by sea of spent fuel cooled less than 150 days.
In addition to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this section, the physical 03/15/85 45 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
protection system for any portion of,a spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph (b) of this section that is by sea [shali] must provide that:
a a
a a
a (f) Requirements for protection of shipments of spent fuel cooled 150 days or more.
To achieve the performance objectives of paragraph
?
A$#F(a) of this section, a physical protection system established, maintained, or arranged for by the licensee for fuel which has not been used as part of an assembly to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction at any time during the ISO-day period before the date on' which the fuel is loaded aboard a vehicle for transport shall:
p ](1) Provide for notifications in advance of each shipment, in accord-ance with S 73.729d& 4 fsA h3mt w
[
(2) Include procedures for coping with circumstances that threaten deliberate damage to a spent fuel shipment and with other safeguards emergencies; (3) Provide that shipments are planned so that scheduled inter-mediate stops are avoided to the extent practicable; (4) Provide for at least one escort who need not be armed, who may simultaneously serve as a shipment vehicle operator or an officer of a shipment vessel, and who maintains visual surveillance of the shipment during periods when the shipment vehicle is stopped or when the shipment vessel is docked; (5) Assure that the escort has been familiarized with, and is capable of implementing the security procedures; (6) Include instructions for each escort that, upon detection of the abnormal presence of unauthorized persons, vehicles or vessels in the l
03/15/85 46 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 i
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k
[7590-01) vicinity of a spent fuel shipment, or upon detection of a deliberately I
j induced situation that has the potential for damaging a spent fuel ship-ment, the escort will:
(i) Determine whether or not a threat exists; (ii) Assess the extent of the threat, if any; (iii) Inform local law enforcement agencies of the threat and request assistance, either directly or through a staffed control point; and I
(iv) Implement the procedures developed in accordance with para-g graph (f)(2) of this section; (7) Provide for shipments by road a capability for an escort to communicate directly with local law enforcement agencies or with a staffed control point that can in turn communicate with local law enforcement agencies, through the use of the following equipment located on the
{
i transport vehicle:
l (i) citizens band (CB) radio; and i
'(ii) radiotelephone or other NRC-approved equivalent means of two-l way voice communication; (8) Provide, for shipments by road, NRC-approved features that permit immobilization of the cab or cargo-carrying portion of the vehicle; (9) Provide, for shipments by rail, a capability for an escort to communicate directly with local law enforcement agencies or with a staffed location that can in turn communicate with local law enforcement agencies, through the use of an onboard radiotelephone or other NRC-approved onboard equivalent means of two-way voice communication; and (10) Provide, for shipments by water in U.S. territory, a capability for an escort to communicate with local law enforcement agencies, or to i
communicate with a staffed location that can in turn communicate with 03/15/85 47 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 1
2
[7590-01]
y local law enforcement agencies, through the use of radiotelephone or other NRC-approved equivalent means of two-way voice communication.
e 73.72 Requirement for advance notice of shipment of speci nuclear material or irradiated reactor fuel.
}
Y, In section 73.72, the section title is revised, paragraph (a) is
/
V revised, ar.d paragraphs (g) and (h) from section 73.37 are revised and redesignated as paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section.
(a) Each licensee'who plans to import, export, transport, deliver s
to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or take delivery, at t
the point where it is delivered to a carrier, the following materials, shall notify the Adn'inistrator of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office listed in Appendix A by U.S. Mail, postmarked at least 7 days in advance of the shipping data:
(1) Formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, or (2) special nuclear material ofmoderatestrategicsignificancecontaininginanykartstrategic special nuclear material [-], or (3) irradiated reactor (spent) fuel sub-fect to the requirements of 5 73.3Lt/fftJrisAanterg a
a a
a a
[fg3] M Prior to the transport of spent fuel within or through a state a licensee subject to debfsetur6( l 73.37(b) or S 73.37(f) d/p (Ap6tes shall notify the governor or the governor's designee. The licensee shall comply with the following criteria in regard to a notification.
(1) The notification must be in writing and sent to the office of l
each appropriate governor or the governor's designee. A notification delivered by mail must be postmarked at least 10 [7] days before transport of a shipment within or through the state. A notification delivered by messenger must reach the office of the governor or the governor's designee 03/15/85 48 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
at least 4 days before transport of a shipment within or through the state. A list of mailin'g addresses of governors' and governor's designees
[is-available-upon-request-from-the-Birt:eter--Office of-State-Program; 8:5:-Naciear-Regulatory-Eemmission--Washington--BE-20555 ] was published in the Federal Register on June 29, 1984 (49 FR 26914). An up-dated list wili be published annually in the Federal Register on or about June 30.
(2) The notification must include the following information:
(i) The name, address, and telephone number of the shipper, carrier and receiver 1[:]
~
(ii) A description cf the shipment as specified by the Department ofTransportationin49CFR(172.202and$172.203(d)1[:]and X
(iii) A listing of the routes to be used within the state.
[(vi)--A-statement-that-the-information-described-below-in S-73:37(f3(33-is required-by-NRE-regulations-to-be protected-in-accordance with-the-requirements-of-S-73 El":]
(3) [The] A licensee shipping spent fuel subject to gripL S 73.37(b) If'MMptA!f,shall provide the following information on a separate enclosure to the written notification [+] together with a state-ment that the information is required by NRC regulations to be protected in accordance with the requirements of S 73.2 M A hapt m (i) The estimated date and time of departure from the point of origin of the shipment 1[:]
(ii) The estimated date and time of entry ir.to the governor's statel
[:]
03/15/85 49 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 r
r i
[7590-01]
i (iii) For the case of a single shipment whose schedule is not t
related to the schedule of any subsequent shipment, a statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the provisions of S 73.21 #fMiMchiotibr until at least the earlier of (A) 10 days after the shipment has entered or orginated within the statel [-] or (B)
I the time at shich the shipment reaches its destination.
(iv) For the case of a shipment in a series of shipments whose che-l dules are related, an estimate of the date on which the last shipment in the series will enter or originate within the state, and a statement thgt s
schedule information must be protected in accordance with the provisions of $ 73.216tgipchtpfap until at least the earlier of (A) 10 days after the last shipment in the series has entered or originated within the state; I
or (B) the time at which the shipment reaches its destination.
(4) A licensee shipping spent fuel subject to paragraph 6 73.37(f)
[p(fdfipfch9b(er shall include in the notification the following informa-tion, which need not be protected from unauthorized disclosure.
(i) The estimated date and time of departure from the point of origin of the shipment; and (ii) The estimated date and time of entry into the governor's state.
[(43] Q1 A licensee shall notify by telephone or other means a responsible individual in the office of the governor or in the office of the governor's designee of any schedule change that differs by more than 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> from the schedule information previously furnished in accordance with [$-73-37(f3f33] paragraphs (3) and (4) of this section, and shall inform that individual of the number of hours of advance or delay relative to the written schedule information previously furnished.
i 03/15/85 50 FRN 10 CFR PART 73 4
?
[7590-01]
[(h)] (e) State officials, state employees, and other individuals, whether or not licensees of the Commission, who receive schedule information of the kind specified in [S-73-37(f3(33] paragraph (d)(3) of this section shall protect that information against unauthorized disclosureasspecifiedinS73.2(
Dated at Washington, DC, this day of
, 1985.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
=
g Samuel J. Chilk,
~
gSe-of the Commission.
SQ4S f
o t
e e
e 03/15/85 51 FRN 10 CFR PART 73
[7590-01]
COMPARISON 8
CURRENT, PROPOSED. AND FINAL REQUIREMENTS RAP. THE PROTECTION OF SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS CURRENT PROPOSED FINAL REQUIREMENT JUNE 1979/ JULY 1980 JUNE 1984 1985 ADVANCE ROUTE APPROVAL X
ARMED ESCORT IN CITY X
COMUNICATIONS CENTER X
ADVANCE LLEA COORDINATION X
SCHEDULE INFORMATION PROTECTION X
X RADIO TELEPHONE X
X X
I M BILIZATION X
X X
UNARMED ESCORT X
X X
SURVEILLANCE X
X X
ADVANCE NOTIFICATION X
X X
PROCEDURES / INSTRUCTIONS X
X X
NO CASUAL STOPS X
X X
l 03/15/85 52
[7590-01]
~
ENCLOSURE 3 In Preparation 03/15/85 53
N
-S*
e d
1 1
=
%e BACKGROUND INFORMATION I
t i
9 l
s t
I i
~.
m o
I.
Federal Resister / Vol 48. No. us / Friday June S.1964 / Proposed Rules 2S887 o-
- mate i - --e peded exphes c
September sa, sees Amenasses:wdttencomm t should be enh=ite=d to the Secretary of the J
e-4 sa= U.S.NacientRegulatory e--s-aa-washington.DC aosas.
At*antionDocketing andService Branch. Copies of comuments on the proposed rule may be --==8=ad and ospied for a fee at the NRCpsblic DocumentRoom.3FIFHStreetNW..
mainsmen asemmanomonwracn Cad B.
.OdBoeofNedear Meterial and Safegehrds.U.S.
Neclear Regulatory e--i.a Washington.DCsossa.Tal phaa-301-4:r-42as.
surn.maurranv assumaanom Beingrand The NRCcarries out s'esatinuing earles of studies to and in deturndning the measures that are needed to protect radioactive metodel,incleans irradiated (spent) InsL against sabotage.
During the mid4sFos, studies (NUREG-otos.-Calculasons d= "'ra
- - -- - from Sabotage d:
e Shipping Casks for Spent Feel and High.
LevelWasta"Febanry terFt and l
NUREG-01FO.'71aal Environmental Statement on tiu Transportation of-8=dwive Material by Air and Other Modes." December 1977), estimated the health sifacts of a radiological release in NUCLEAR REGULATORY a men.orban area resulting from a high-CoesnilSSION
- explosive assault of a spent feel cask.
The esthmated riska. wore not considered W CPR Part 73 to be substantive enou to warrant regulatory action. A : _p-t study 88 by Sandia LaboratoriesincInded a Raphements for Spent M chapter on the sabotage of spent feelin Shipments urban areas of high population density Aeency: Nuclear Regulatory (SAND 77-1927. " Transport of c
i..in.
Radia==elidae in Urban Environs A Acnoen proposed rule.
Woddag Draft Am===Maat").This study suggested that the sabotage of spent fuel mnasaav:The N=clame Regula shipements W the Attalfor ra--ia.laa is considering==
iarits producing serious r=di i
regulations for the physical y..;d.ca of consequences in arets of irradiated reactor fuel in transit. The population density.The
-i==laa e
icue.under canaidacation is one of concluded that.in order to protect sa4.st.s rather than safety.The '
health and =iai=8 = danger to life and
===ad==ats would take into account
- property (sections 1 sib and 1311(3) of new data frasa a research program and the Atonde Energy Act of1964, as from other sources that indicate that the amended). it was prudent and desirable consequences of successful sabotage of to require certain interta safeguards an irradiated fuel shipment in a heavily
=ama='es for spent feel shipments.1he populated area would be small focus of concern was on possible compared to the consequence estimates successful acts of sabotage in densely tha't promptedissuance of the current populated urban areas. Because of the rule. For certain spent fuel shipments.
possibility that spent fuel shipments these amendments would provide could be hijackedhad moved fromlow continued protection against sabotage, population areas to high population while at the same time relieving the areas,thelaterin6 ents applied licensee of non. essential requirements.
to allshipments even though the
\\
I
___.l._'_
/'
}
23868 Federal Register / YeL e, No.112] Friday. Jun2 8.'1984 / Proposed Rules 9'
planned abipment route did not pass to E5. Anny h was assumed. Itis values can be obtained. depending on trough a densely populated usben area. telsegest shased charge readilythe circumstances that are assigned. The De interim 4 :.snts were to be in seeGable. An.V3Al causes damage 1
. effect until the results of ennAnn= tory threagh formatin of a high pressure I following is an example from among th research becama available and were higher values that can be obtained from analyzed.
paramiste jet which may be a fraction the data. For the most densely populated eianhchin diamter and has the ama studied (up to 200.000 persons per De interim rule, which set brth physical protecdon reqmrements in 10 espabihty to penetrate two or more feet square mile), at evening rush hour on a j
af metal eroding everythmg in its path.
- business day. and in the most CFR 73.37, was issued on June 15.1979.
i ymnto cutset,it was expected that a i
and was made effective on July 3 is79.
shaped charge would be more efficient safavorable location for a release, the The rule was issued without benefit of thma eshern
--tions in producing calculated radiological consequence.
i pubhc mawnant. but at the time of sensrable particles. For that reason the (peak consequence) based on data from _ !
publication public comment was invited. M3Alwas demsna 'as the reference Table 5-4 of NUREC/CR-0743 is no Afte reviewmg the public comments and emplosive.De cask was 4 early fatanda and less than three (2.9) after1aking into account its sapensace sped 5ed as a single assembly cask. The latent cancer fatalities.
l la m the rule.the NRC. on span 5catanis conservadve since a ne results of an explosive sabotage June 3.1980, published amenehments to single assembly cask has smaller Nt from experiment to the rale.De==nnhn=nts wem made Namensos than a multiassembly cask fe ent,a only a limited number effective on July 3.1980, and the ama, therefors, more likel to yield.a a
can be performd. De man 4d rule is currently in'e5ect as to yester quantity of respirabfe padicles 1
a ts ith C.
od CFR 73.37(a) thro, ugh (e).
(prassembly)inresponse to a given g,
Ralsted Rassarch using irradiated fuel, and the largest rin t usingmodel measured release value was used to i
SAND 77-1927. which prompted
{
n 1-) explosives against derive the nine gram value cited. In i====== of the protection requuements.
-alan =d casks can'aining irradiated addition. a number of supporting tests
====ad esumates which were hel
- x=
dtheNRC-sponsored were performed to establish shaped unavoidably subject to large ancartandes due to a lack ofi=-8=H yngram.Dese experiments used charge jet characteristics and jet to-fuel-data. Alater draft of the Sandia report pi.--
I waterreactor(PWR) fuel pin interaction.
i
(" Transportation of Radionaddes in wink a barnap of approximately 30.000 Results of the NRC sponsored Urban Environs: Draft Enviramnental megswatt days per metric ton of heavy research program (as well as those of Aa="'n=n'"1 was published by the asseland approximately six and-a-half-the DOE program to be discussed NRC as NUREC/CR-0743. Although this yearconhng. Measurement of the.
subsequently) assume sabotage of a draft predictedless serious of released materialnyealed single assembly cask. while the original fessman that was made up of SAND 77-1927 and NUREC/CR-0743 consequences a signt5 cant doyee of particism of respirable size (those having estimates assume a three-assembly encartamry soll remained that could be a diameter of less than four microns).
casic For the levels of release under resolved only by furtherstudyand Upwaniscaling permitted the data to consideration here, the releases and the experunents.
lavesagators at that time agmed and takainen account the effect of the health consequences for a three-j
""""== to agree (1) that consequences seisrence explosive and a full-scale assembly cask are calculated to be, at of an act of sabotage would be a direct snak.5caling led to the conclusion that f=nedan of the quantity of spent fuel less than nine grams of spent fuel would worst. double those for a single-that would be releasedin respirable ha misesed in respirable form if the -
assembly cask.The presence of -
additional assemblies in a cask would form, and (2) that the only credible suissance charge were used successful!Y means of malevolent generation of agemst a cank containing a single PWR increase the likely release, but only in proportion to the number of assemblies respirable perucles would be through spent feel assembly. Using results of the that lie in the roughly str Isht line path the use of a large quandry(tens to METRAN computer code for health of the jet. For more than three PWR esamenances(one of two health hundreds of pounds) of explosive ceasequence codes used la SAND 77-assemblies (a fully loaded rail cask skillfully applied. Little non was available to aid in predicting the 2sz7 and NUREC/CK-4743) as set forth could contain to PWR assemblies) the response of spent fueland spent fuel inTable 5 4 of NUREG/CR-0743 and upper bound of release wouldlikely casks to explosive sabotage, assusung iso. day rather than six-and-a-increase roughly in proportion to the The NRC and the Department of half-yearanoling.reserschers found that square root of the total number of Energy (DOE)msponded to this md for the everage radiological consequence of assemblies contained in a cask. On the teciuncal data by sponsorms separate a misasein a heevily populated area basis of energy miease from the but coordinated expenmental programs.
such as New York City would be no explosive it is expected that the number Both programs were designed to yield sady fatalities and less than one (0.4) of fatalities from a sabotage explosion information about the release from a -
latest cancar fatality. Early fatalities are would be 8" ster than the number of' spem5 4 reference sabotage event, those that occur within one year after radiologically induced g, tali.,es.
which was defined as follows. Saboteur exposure to the radioactive material Explosive charges other than shaped skillawere speafled as those of an im cancer fatalides am thou that charges wm considered. In other expenanced military or commermal ecuar at any time following the exposure experiments, scaled charges explosive demolition speciahst.
and could result from the intitial npasenting full-scale charges of up to Famaliarity with a wide range of kinds exposure or from any long-term several hundred pounds of explosive did and adgetions of explosives was exposure to low levels of contamination. not breach the cask s inner containment assumed. Use of up to hundreds of The average consequence values just components. Accordingly. such full-pounds of mi!!tary or commecial cited were selected as being the most scale charges appear unlikely to produce explosives was permitted.For the reprenntative of the values that were any release of spent fuel and hence calculated for the specified release.
unlikely to cause radiological special case of shaped charges, use of Ilther higher orlower consequence consequences.
- ~ - - -
_ semras negist:r / Vct. 49. Ns.112 / Frid y. June 8,1964 / Propaa-d Rules 23869 1
The program nM by DOE (KW/Kg), which is termed reference' fatahties.De research recently
. Included one full.ecale and several asel.no possible transport of spent fuel asepleted has shown that blikely small scale experiments.The full-scale subjected to higher burnup was aspirable release from sabotage and the experiments used a reference charge consideredialthough then shipments resulting consequences are but a tiny against a full-scale cask containing a are act now being made. For fuel percentage of the estimated values' single unuradiated surrogate fuel subjected to 40.000 mwd /MT(which is which originally prompted lasuance of assembly. Again the quantity of material typical of b higher burnups being the rule. A
,% Jy. the original basis released from the cask was measured.
considered) at a power density of stL4.
for the rule is no longervaud, and the released quantity was analyzed KW/Kg. the calculated consequences of 2.The velas of consequence now l
to determine what fraction was successful sabotage are about 45 percent
' d(no early fatalities and about composed of respirable-sized es.
higher than the consequences of latent cancer fatalities average for About thme grams of respira e successful sabotage of reference fuel.
reference basis sabotage of a three-surrog:te fuel was released. On b Addidonalinformanon on b NRC.
assembly cask)is obtained only when a basis of the results of small. scale fuel sponsored program can be found in a set of assumptions very favorable to the charactermadon expenments which had been conducted separately. it was report enuded "FinalReport On saboteur are made.The e5scts of' Shipping Cask Sebotage Source Te.m assumpdansless favorable to a determined that a release of three grams Invesugadon." Addisonalinformation saboteur are discussed below:
of surrogate fuel.was equivalent to a on the DOE.eponsored program can be,
s.Tualburngp andosofag.
mammum release of17 grams of
. found in a report entitled "An.
Consequence calculatient are based on irradiated fuelUstag the CRAC Assessment of the Safety of Spent Fuel reference fuel cooled for150 days.
i computer code for health consequend s Transportation in Urban Environs." A Because oflower barnap andlanter (b second of the computer codes used in SAND 77-1927 and NUREG/CR-0743 peer review of both research programs
. cooling. assemblies currently being 6nd a code which generally predicts was carried out by the U.S. Army's shipped typically contain a radioactine Ingher health consequences than the Ballistic Research Laboratory.The materialinventory 0.2 to 0.5 as review focused on the interaction hazardous as the assumed inventory for METRAN code) and again assummg betwun explosives, cask, and fuel and reference bl.
Isoday cooling. researchers found that thi average radiological consequence of on the experimental techniques used.
. b. Population density. The release of The conclusionsin b peu review radioachve material was petulated to a 17. gram release in a heavily ulsted report generally canBrm the take ce wiein an su wie area such as New York City be uw early fatalities and about 2 !atent reasonableness of the appfosches taken tion density in the range between.
cancer fatalitiesme peak
. In the research and based on the 82.000 and enn nnn persons per square i
consequences appearing in the computer assumptions of the research approach, mile.Very few (perhaps only anel conBrmed the estimated release levels.
locations in the U.S. are charactertzed runs were no early fatalities and,about 7 Ihe two ruearch reports, b peu by &is ppuladon density, latent cancer fatalides. Values c.
. average a peak consequences should be review report, and SAND 77-1927 are Consequences decline markedly for doubled to account fw 6e case of a available forinspection at the NRC lower population density.
three.cssembly truck cask.
Public Document Room.1717 H Street c.4/fetime ofid.,,. l.!sparticles. A Conceiva versary d use NW., Washmston. DC.NUREC/CR-0743 respirable particle tends to adhere to the is available from the NRC/GPO Sales Arst =haahla particle H encounters or to att-cking a cask and that possibility Program.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory serve as a cantI==== tion site for vapors was considered. For shaped charges the Commission. Washington.DC 20555.
(such as water). eus pouiblyliminng size cf the reference charge, the likely r
,h As lifenme to one estis aborter &an result is that the release would be in that necessary for human inhalation and proporuon to the number of charges Forthefollowingreasons the deep deposition in the lung. In an actual i
tsed. The use oflarger shaped charges Commission concludes that moderation sabotage, products of the explosion is conceivable butless credible.These of the current interim rule (to CFR 73.37) would undoubtedly provide numerous types cf charges would probably have to for the protection of spent fuel larger than-respirable particles that be custom-made, thereby introducing a shipments against sabotage is justi5ed:
would act as agglomeration sites for f rmidable new problem for an
- 1. lasuance of the laterim rule was respirable particles. In both sets of cdversary.There is no known based chiefly on consequence estimates expemnants, the products of the techn: logy that would allow a set forth in SAND 77-1927. A ham.hne explosion were isolated frun the cask to disproportionately large increase in estimate, a high estimate, and a low keep the measurement problems production of respirable particles with estimate wm provided. At the time the manageable. Water particles (log.like credible ' crease in a saboteur's rule issuance was under consideration, iets)would also serve as m
expl:sive resources.
the high consequence atimate was omeration sites.FinaDy. water _
M:st consequence calculations based on 14.000 grams of respirable vapor orinatorials vaporised by the discussed herein are based on fuel release for a truck cask containing thru explosiv arlier do not acupunt for a subjret2d to burnup of 33.000 megawatt fuel awembnes and on (7.500 grams of waterla t or annulus of wet material
+
days per metric ton of heavy metal respirable release for a rail cask. At the present all truck casks now in use. An (mwd /MT) at a power density of 40 time. the high. estimate releases could
- ent has shown that the presence kil: watts per kilogram of heavy metal not be ruled out.The calculated average of w9ter (water Jacket and water.811ed consequences for truck cask sabotage ca
) between the explosive and the i
. rb. mm cuc
- d. h.: 6. and he were summarized as several tens of reduces the quantity of respirable i
- t.md w a cmAc an.. erna early fatalities and hundreds oflatent terial released by a factor of 40.
y
.t me
- d. mm d in sArm n. str cance, fatalities. The calculated sverage Simultaneous occurrence of worst-or g uc gossa consequences for a rail cask were near. worst-case values for each of these summarized as hundreds of early,
factors, plus an assumption of successful hu.d e um md fatalities and thousands oflatent cancer sabotage appears immote in the extreme.
/l]/.fSM C
'lu.%$.d C4udkaa.c.G.s A O O A
-o
. e.1de. & $6 M/MC V
,n/,. 5 -
. ak a
s
.~-
,m
.-.--,-----..v
. _.- -,.. eu.
nz, <o
,.1. > d.1 ibet a.i-
~
.z camis d-r r,mtad u,rew.e.ne.,s heelssereshmedby s of up ts adays or,more.o new,.nt fe.ioooied o.a.de impee n-n 1
setofmoderate tantialnumber of sman entitles.Ths hmukadeOseines thea,the most seqidrements would apply that are rule,if proemissted, would apply to Ismehleam assigned.
- 3. Alhaugh the expenneents have eensistemtwith the experimentaHy Econsees who transport or deliver to a dan==i==d level of consequence.De carrier for transport a shipment of spent.
sedeced the hJ 4 in the quantity sogakements caRfor a shipment to be fuel irr a quantity la excess of 100 grams.
afmammilikelyto be released as a l
semit of smoosesful sabotage. there are ensampaniedby en snarmed escort-Emitethms to the conclusions of the (wbsmay alma nerve as driver, rail Typ6calof the Scansees who deliver spent fuel to carrier for transport are program thermostbe takaninto empispes, er
's otBcer) who would ' necteer power reactor operators.
eenyout security ladependant spent feel stomse pool i
econnet.Theredecad consequences presadmen.la additian-present operators, and research institutions.
demihed been are ancessarily subject seguirements for protection of shipment None of the licensees who deliver spent to smealesemptness, that.of esheduleinter pation. onboard fuel to a carrier for transport are kapwn aredsmaceemplosive.While the pod ammmencations ehmus selected for the explosive threat and n==ah h-ena(aB transport modes). to be eman entities.ucensees who a (track mode only), '
transport spent fuel are typically large 3' presents a very severe threat. even weeldbe retained.
carriers who spedalise in the t
,~a
- 88'e some ilments cacaot be ruled out Among other requirements considered of radioactive materials and other if as ----, is speated protracted noimageraseded o
l essereiafa sidpmatat and unhedered esoled tse days or(for ahlr==am f fuel hasardous materials and who have novenset.la a sindarvein.
more) are those fo' r many employees.No maaD entities are rene eerseys and advance coordination consequencemedahngaasmisptions withiscellaw enforcement agencies known to be within this licensee group.
i The NRChas estimated the cost mon same then those posentated in (U2As).New DOT requirements for NUREC/CR443 can also be seudag(48 CFR1yr.a25) issued in the 1:npact of these amendments upon the i
ecolocand (ag. locsaised areas, such interest of safety and recently put in liennaed indestry. According to lhese as =hdi=== with extremely high forts apply toNRClicensees and estimetes licensees wouldincur the popeistion e,samities). If completely require them to ese routes consistant followmg costs, assummg continuation munuted momnest of the shipment of the current a tely 135 and mestramedase of sabotage withNacsafeguards routing pohey.
shipments annu
- y. One. time costs for Wie respect to U.EA coordination, a rumens agemst the shipment are aEowaLTer thesereasons a set of esperate NRCrate[the present b proposed amand=*nts 1. ave already moderate regaraments that would g ya.srtf)1 requires the notiBeation of been expended du to b same sevensors (or designated state ofBcials) requirements under the present interim cosamme h prede a sig=*=ae level of whenever spent fuel ls to be transported rule. Annualmaintenance cost of protudios protractedloss of within a state to enable the state to equipment required by the proposed concolof a and aaMa9ed contribute to the
, seemity. and Annualplanning sad administration amendments is estimated at $14.000.
t movemotof a shipment by a saboteur esseof tansportof sW-a' State sing ammiered.He mqmrements should(a)dary an adversary easy U.EAs typically are informed of cost is estimated at $7.000. Total cost to impembas shipments through this licensees is therefore estimated at dom pmom
$21.000 annusHy.
(h One savings to industry under the
=='n.'
- ansves against orloss d EevhemmentalImpact
- Negative proposed amendments would be the controlof a shipment:(c) provide a Dalaraden
- H=inadon d abat $27.m expended means to qudly sanunon assistance The promulgation of these annually for armed escorts presently I
drom local law atforcement authorities:==-ad==a*= would not result in any requimd & eeintenm Ms.
and(d) provide a means to impede acevity that affacts b environment.
Simpl15 cation dadaninistration is unesthorund movement of a truck Accordingly, h r%==I lon has estimated to resultin an additional shipment 1sto a heavily populated area.
determined under the National
- 'I"8 d 828'" *"""*U #" "
I Sammary of the Proposed Rule Enviran===tal Quality guidelines an information regarding these estimates is 1
e cri aria CFR 3L5W) est neithe set forth in a document entitled A raieis proposed that takes into
" Modification of Protection account the newinformation and
- " " '"""['* I"'P*
8 *h""*
Requirements forspent Fuel Shipments:
"a"A"'aa= which have emeryd from the research program.ne important nepuv de on for the Regulatory Analysis" and is available features of the proposed rule are-proposed unendments to Title tois forinspection and copying in the NRC l
- 1. Ilie perfa==ne. '%
ts for g
public Document Room.1717 H Street NW., Washington. D.C.
tecnon of spent bllpments have Paperwork n=A-+6aa Act Statement Any smallentity subject to this modified to emphastza ymtection against sabomge with high consequence.
This proposed rule amends regulation which determines that.
High coeuquence refers to the levels of informa:lon collection requirements that because ofits size,it is likely to bear a consequence that prompted issuance of are subject to the paperwork Reduction disproportionate adverse economic the artsmalinterim rule.For a truck Act of19e0 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) by impact should notify the Commission of slupment, high consequence refers to reducing the burden. This rule has been this in a comment eatindicates:
tens of serly famlities and hundreds of submitted to the OfEce of Management (a)ne licensde size in tums d latent cancer fatalities.
sad Budpt for review of the proposed -
ancualincome or revenue and number
- 2. Forshipment of spent 61 cooled revised paperwork requirements.
.of employees:
less than 150 days. the current Regulatory Flaxibility Certi5 cation (b) How the proposed regulation would result in a significant economic regarements would continue to apply.
Based on b information available at burden upon the licensee as compared because detallad consequence
,~
calculations for such bl have not been this stage of the rulemaking proceeding to that on a largerlicensee: and carned out.
andin accordance with se Regulatory (c)How the proposed regulations Flexibility Act of 1980. 5 U.S.C. 605(b) a could be modified to take into account j
]
i
)
J i
[.'- _
Federal Register / Vol 48. No. tu / Friday, June S.1964 / Proposed Rales 238n inhelicensee's disering needs of
' n) * *
- supporting chain nace.a at may unn l
~ capabaties.
(i) hunimise the possibuities for high dunas the1so.dayperiod before the Puhus Comuneet SoBeled
= radiologicalsabotage of date on which the feel le leaded aboard spentluel shipments;and the transport vehicle for emnsport shalh Although it welcomes public an==ent (1) Provide for nodacanon of b
-en any aspect of the proposed gj...
Naciser Regula Comunissionin gts comment on the following topics:
- (ui) hnpode attempts at advance of each in don, the ra==n=faa particularY 1.Is mom researchlesd5ed for
- ------- mdidogical d
acewdance with I ya.72 aftbis part -
safegurada of shipments of spent fuel spentluel shipments or attempts to (2)Includei -M forcriping with
-*d w &- = *,s id-Hiicitly move spent feelshipments
. circumstances that thesales dahne containing matmios. wsh
-ge. a.oenisei supe.nf and Sh the NRC simplifyits consegance potendalandtrwponse wit o&er @ @
,fm:l'.a*"sc'in.I:i:n'L i.
- - - = ' -
s* -* m.*- br e,-,4*f-i:::i&praweig m
e,n,. 2 f,,
2=
s.,e we avoid.d. s.is.
M
^",**NR cost asumatas,in f,,
g days.
Provide for at leart cae escort, who gg
- P'"*"
Ucensee.in order to achieve se may be a shipment vehis.ie operster or i
List of Subjectsla te CFRPart 3 puformance objeceva d ph (a) an efBcer of the shipmentvesseland Hazardous materials-Transportation, of this section, shan who mah:tains visual surveillance of 6e "M "==t gperiods a the shipment h
y.tionbyreference. Nuclear ysical protection system that has P
is stopped or the materials. Packaging and containers, estabushed, maintained, or Penalty.Esporting requirement.
arranged for fuel that has been used as shipment vesselis docked For the reasons set outin the
{of an assembly to sustain nuclear h(5) Assure that the escort hee been preamble and ander the authority of the in a self-supporting chain we,and h@ d Atomia Energy Act of1954 as==aaa.a reaction at any time durms the 150 day hapiamenting the security procedures:
theEnergy Reorgsmzation Act of1974.
pwlod befon the date on which the fuel (6)W h fw each escat as==eadad, and 5 U.S.C. 553. notice is is loaded aboard a transport vehicle for est.upon hacthe of es M hereby given that adopdon onhe yw;.'Dds physical protection presence of unauthorized persons, foDowing===ad==nts to 10 CFR Part n system mustinclude the following:
vehicles or vessels in tbs vicinity of a spent fuel shipsfrat, or upon detection of h contemplewd (c) Shipments byiood ofspent reactor a dehbaanely tdad situation &at has PART 73 -PHYSICA1. PROTECTION OF fbelcooledless than 250 days. In me pmendalfor damagmg a spent fuel 4
PLANT 3 AND 4AATERIALS addition to the provisions of paragraph supment, the socort wiD:
- 1. The authority citation for part n is (b) of this==daa the P ys cal 0) wlmeer orad a treat i
b
,,3,,,;
spent t sob art ph
- 01) Assess se extentdtin 6reat.If f
mvised to mad as h M
i Aalbestry: Secs. s3.1s1. se Stat. 330. 94s. as (b)of this section thatis b road must any.
amended see 147.M Stat.7so (42 UAC.20r3 I
(IH)Informlocallaw enforcement 218r.2:D1) sec.21o as Stat.1242, as P,rovide &at s
L'aa of the threat and request i
==--d-d sec. aos, as Stat. 224s (42 UAc drismace and i
as42.sese).
(d) Shipments by soil of spent reactor (iv)haplement the procedures Sections 73.27 (s) and (h) are slee leseed fuelcooledless than 250 days.In developedin accordance whh ander sec. 301. Pub.1. SNes se stat. 7ss (42 adcition to the y..Mr.4 of paragraph Paragmph (f)(2)d &is acdon:
i UAc seet note).
(b) of this section, the physical yer the purposes of sec. 223. as Stat. ess, as protection system for any pardon of a w an escat h Mc' ate I
l amended (42 UAc 22rsk 371.21. 73.37(hl, spent fuel shipment subject to paragraph withlocallaw enforcement assocles j
cape 74.s5 are teneed under sec.1 stb. as Stat. ms, as amended (42 UAc 2antb)k II 73.20.
(b) this section thatis by railmust W es me ddu foHowag 73.24. 73.25. 73.as. 73r 73.37. 734o. 73.4s.
pre e
eqmpmentlocated on the transport i
v3Jo. 73.as. 73s are seemed under sec. 2e11.
vehicle:
)
as Stat. Sea, as amended (42 UAc 22o1(Ilh (e) Shipments bysee Ofspentreactor (i)cinzens band and II 73.2D(cN1L 73J4 (bXtl 73.2s (bX31 fuelcooledless than 250 days. In (H)mdidale%(CB):sdio:and l
e&E (h73.es Xs a provis of ph approved equivalentmeans of two-way a
73.40 (b this p y81 mes communicadca:
j (hX2k 73.50 (sX2k (3XiiiXb) and (hk 73.ss thX21. and (4Xili)(B). 7330. 73.72. 7322 a,,
protection system for any portion of a (8) provide, for shipments by road.
issued under sec.1sto. as Stat. eso, as
.sPet fuel shipment subject to paragraph NRC-approved features that permit
== adad (42 UAc 2a7tto)).
(b)of this section that is by sea must immobilizabon d the cab or cargo.
de eat I
- 2. Section y3.37 is amended as follows:
carrying portion of the vehicle:
i
- a. Paragraphs (s)(1)U). (s)(2)(Hi), and (9) Provide,for shipments by reia i
(b).(e) are revised.
(f)Regtdrementsforprotection of capability for an socort to communicate I
- s. Existing paragraphs (f) and (g) are shipments ofspent fuel cooled 150 days withlocallaw enforcement agencies I
red:signated as paragraphs (3) and (h) omm. To achieve the performance through the use of a radiotelephone or respectively and are revised..
objectives of paragraph 73.37(a) of this other NRC-approved equivalent means l
- c. A new paragraph (f)is added, section. a physical protection system of two-way voice en==nalention,which j
established, meintained, or arranged for must be available on the train:and I n.37 Aguirments for physical by the licensa for fuel which has not (10) Provide, for shipments by water l
P'**=sen omnasend funn transit.
been used as part of an aseembly to in U.S. territory, a espability for an i
(2) Performance objectives.
sustain nuclear fission in a self-escort to communiaste withlocallaw i
e O
- y
- nsa redent assisene / veI e, No. m / Friday, June 8,1984 / Propowd Rules
~
~
smiseumments the me of assedsam with the. provisions of '
%enadas.orselseNm - - -M87325 untilso days aberthelast
" pimientmammsdtwo.wayMece-abspeant ta the series has essered or. -
e edginatedwithin the state and an IslPderto the moinsport ofspentind asenses of thedate en widch thela-t -
weblaertbungha state aliosasse ademastlatbs series willents x seitset to this sesens shan actify the adginate within the state.
erthe severnor'sdesipen.The (4) Alicensee shan notify by aberemmptrwiththaallowins esimpbme orothermeans a m paisible anuta la rused to n --wa~da-andtviduallathe ulBoo of the sovarner.
DiTheesm8mskumastbeerwetting erlathe edBoe of the s
andsentinthe esos of aer.h desipes of any change that aisysopriser prumsne or the sovemar's dilms bymeseikan ahours trom the asussen. Aasteentian deliveredby asbeduleinfausados previsonly mail nest be postmarked at lesser days aneinhed la acenedance with imarrJraph a
before ausspot of a shipsest witida or inusigthis sectice,and shaninform tbseachthe aeste. Asettacatlas Is'tinevidual of the number of hours of deksued bymess'ngermustreeds the advance or delay relative to the written e
edBas of the gevemororthesovuoce's Andense et least 4 days before !tansport echadsie infer==tian previonaly Isansbed.
etasimpmentweida or tinaugh tha (k) state om tals, state employees, stats.AEstafmeningaddressesof and etbar individsals. whether or not pousne anilsevernets designess was Ecomeses of the t'a==i.= tan who iubbabadialhoFederalRegimentom enceive schad=In infonnation of the kind Luis F.sset(VcLar,No. ins,pages spect5sdin ph (g)(3) of this searwears). Anapdatedlist webe as-som protect thatinformation mennHyin the Fedesat on erabout assinst seastbortsed disclosure as g,g,lm,,, aem=n== June so-t
.pedsedin I 73.zL ta mustfaminds tim n a.d at we hkenes.DC. ibis sah der of (Il ne name, address, and *=I rha-a 3'''
memberof thesidppec,a=M= rand Per abe NacisarRegulatory, rocsiver:
sammal3. milk, (u) Ad ~*r*"of the Alp==*as sesruasryafa6ecammmmmen.
spectfledbyibec.i ; atof.
yes.
se.s
'.=e Transpostatisala40 CFR171antand saame ease vesse.e In.ana(d):
(IE) Athting oftheroutes tobe need widds the stata:and (iv) A statement ttat the f=fannation desafood belowis.173.3r(s)(3)la required byNRCregulations to be protectedla accordance with the rendremenm ellrs.zt (s) Alicasses shallprovide the loGowinginfr-artian ca a separate enclosure to tbs wittten notification along with a ma=*===ne that the informadosisrequired by NRC regul=*== to be protected in accordance widt the requirements of I 73.2L (D h stimated date and time of departure frasm the point of origin of tha
- r==*
Ollihe estissated date and time of entryinto the... sts state
- Dii)For the case of a single shipment whoes scheduleis not related to the schedule of any subsequent =h'M a ststament that schedele.infonastion seast be proescled in accordance with the prortsicos of I 73.21 until at Isast to days aAar the ship = at has estered or ansimaisd within the statec and (Iv)For the esse of a sidyment in a serics of shiposots whose schedules are l
related,a statement that schedule information meet be protectedin L
-