ML20154Q668

Forwards Comments & Supporting Ref Matls Re Reactor Oerator & Senior Reactor Operator Written Exams Administered at Facility on 880809.Wisdom of Requiring Operators to Memorize Normal & Emergency Operating Procedures Questioned

ML20154Q668
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	08/11/1988
From:	Frizzle C Maine Yankee
To:	Gallo R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20154Q533	List: IR 05000309/1988013 ML20154Q531 ML20154Q668
References
CDF-88-55, MN-88-83, NUDOCS 8810040033
Download: ML20154Q668 (20)

Text

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MaineVankee 5 W d l!) M M .S'i? L5 5 8 '

(OtSON DAlVI . AUGUSTA UAltdE 04330 e (200 6?? 4868 August 11. 1988 HN-88-83 C0F-86-55 Mr. Robert M. Gallo. Chief Operations Branch DRS UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t 475 Allendale Road i King of Prussia PA 19406

Reference:

(a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)

Dear Mr. Gallo:

Enclosed are Haine Yanki'e's coments and supporting reference asterials covering the Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operater written exarrinations administered at oJr f3C111ty on August 9, 1988.

I would like to bring to your attention the number of questinns we / eel require unreasonable me m rization of Normal and Emergency Operating procedures. Maine Yankee training and operations practices discourage operations personnel from relying on their memory for plant operations, except for those emergency response actions required imediately to protect plant and personnel ssfety. Ke feel that requiring licensed operators to memorize the types of information indicated in the referenced questions jtcpardizes this i

operations practice &nd can lead to a docreased level of plant safety.

I would like to erpress our gratitude for the professional manner in whic's i all aspects of the examining process were conducted. ,

$1 ncerel,Y.

WINE YANrEE 7,

, Charles D. Frizzle Vice President Operations ,

C0F/ dis Enclosure l

c: Barry Norris. Chief Examiner j I

l 6810040033 UOOYZJ POR ADOCK 05000309 ,r .

V PDC

.kt!!ICkIlllbCC United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission Page I of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo MN-88-83 SECTION I - Principles of Nuclear Power Plant Operation. Thermodynamics, Heat Transfer and Fluid flow Ovejtion No. Coments ,

1.01 No comment 1.02 The Maine Yankee (Technical Specifications) definition of "Shutdown Margin" is:

1. The reactivity by which the reactor is suberitical in its present condition, and

2. The reactivity associated with the withdrawn trippable CEA's less the reactivity associated with the highest worth withdrawn trippable CEA.

Since CEA's may be withdrawn in hot standby, the candidate may make assumptions as to the actual amount by which the reactor is shutdown. These assumptions may result ,i different calculations than indicated on the answer key. i j

It is recommended that the NRC change the words "Shutdown Margin (SDM)" in this question to "Margin to Criticality" to prevent potential problems if this question is used in the future.

1.03 Although the concept of using a 1/m plot during fuel loading to ensure criticality is nat achieved is trained for theoretical

purposes in licensed operator initial training, Maine Yankee licenst.d operators do not conduct such a plot. Testing of the 1/m concept should be restricted to its use during a reactor startup only. It is requested that the NRC revise this question prior to entry into their Maine Yankee exam bank.

1.04 NO COMMENT 1.05 NO COMMENT 1.06 NO COMMENT 1.07 This question is not operationally oriented in that it uses "backwards" logic, requiring an operator not to use the rod worth integral curves available to him to calculate reactivity addition, but rather to calculate reactivity arided after the fact. based on an unrealistic constant differential rod worth and time (further requiring memorization of various group rod speeds). For future exams, Maine Yankee requests that tne question be re-written to reflect actual operating conditions. '

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MaineYankee United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 SECTION 1 (Continued) 1.08 Other "parameters on the primary plant affecting DNB which can be controlled by the reactor operator" include Tave and T H . A decrease in either raise the DNBR. These should be added to the answer key and any four (of the six) be accepted for full credit.

1.09 NO COMMENT 1.10 NO COMMENT 1.11 It is unreasonable to expect the candidate to state "assume isenthalpic expansion (for 0.5 points partial credit) since this is trained as fact not assumption. The only true assumption which must be made is what Quench Tank Pressure will be in this condition. Full credit should be allowed for computing the i correct temperature (allowing i 10% for graph reading) for the assumed Quench Tank Pressure.

1.12 Since Maine Yankee has no electric driven variable speed pumps.

the requirement to be able to calculate a new power requirement follwing pump speed change is unrealistic. Part (b) of this question should be removed from this exam and the question ,

should be modified prior to entry into the NRC exam bank.

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MaineYankee United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 SECTION 2 - Plant Design including Safety and Emergency Systems Question No. Comments 2.01 NO COMMENT 2.02 NO COMMENT 2.03 b. The EDG's are cooled by an internal cooling water system (chromated water) which is then cooled by PCC/ SCC as mentioned in the answer key. The candidates may state that the EDG's are cooled by an internal cooling water system which should be accepted for full credit (reference -

System Description AS-12).

d. During the pre-exam review the following additional answer j was provided and should be included in the answer key, "push the : top buttons (de-energizes electric fuel pump) and shut the fuel shut off valve (to engine driven fuel pump)". Any 2 of the 3 conditions should be accepted for full credit.

(reference Lesson Plan R0-L-5.4 attached).

2.04 NO COMMENT 2.05 NO COMMENT 2.06 NO COMMENT 2.07 There are at least seventeen (17) automatic responses which occur in the CVCS when an SIAS signal is generated. They are:

1. Standby charging pump starts (P-14A, B or S)

2. HSI-M-50 opens (charging pump suction from RHST)

3. HSI-M-51 opens (charging pump suction from RHST)

4. CH-M-87 closes (charcing pump suction from VCT)

5. CH-H-1 closes (charging pump suction from VCT)

6. CH-A-32 closes (charging isolation)

7. CH-A-33 closes (charging isolation)

8. CM-F-38 closes (charging flow control valve)

9. CH-F-70 closes (flil header flow control valve)

10. LD-T-5 closes (letdown isolation valve)

11. LD-N-68 closes (letdown isolation valve)

12. SL-P-3 closes ('eal H O 2 to RCPs)

13. BA-A-32 closes (boric acid to blend tee)

14. CH-S-119 closes (charging suction vent)

15. CH-S-120 closes (charging suction vent) l 16. Ch-S-121 closes (charging suction vent)

17. Ch-S-122 closes (charging suction vent) l Other "responses" include modifying the trip circuit on the charging /HPSI pumps to prevent unwarranted trips.

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Any 6 of the above responses should be accepted for full credit.

(Reference - Table NS-5-IV in Maine Yankee Systems Training Manual) 1309T

MaineYankee United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Page 4 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 SECTION 2 (Continued)

Ovestion_Ro. Coments 2.08 NO COMMENT 2.09 b. During preparations for RHR operations, a warm-up rectre is conducted per OP 1-13-1. The purpose of this rectre is includeu in Lesson Plan R0-L-2.7 page 11 (attached) as "equalize delta T between RHR and Coolant" This reason should be added to the two reasons listed in the answer key and any two of the three accepted for full credit.

2.10 c. This question involves an unreasonable memorization of Normal Operating Procedures and is not in conformance with NUREG-1021. ES-202, paragraph B.2 which states "the candidate should be familiar with the conditions that require the use of safety and emergency systems and why such protection is required, with ernhasis on areas where a malfunction will require imediate operator action".

Furthermore, paragraph B.4 states "the candidate is not expected to have normal procedures cor.titted to memory, but should be able to explain reasons, cautions, and limitations of normal operating procedures". This question clearly requires knowledge from memory of a normal operating procedure involving a malfunction which does nat require immediate operator action and should be deleted from the exam.

2.11 NO Com ENT 1309T

MaineYankee United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Page 5 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 SECTION 3 - Instrument and Controls Quesitonlo. Coments 3.01 NO C0HLMNT 3.02 NO COMMENT 3.03 NO COMMENT 3,04 NO COMMENT 3.05 NO COM4ENT 3.06 In the condition stated, the PORVs will also open if the candidate assumes the cooldown/depressurization has not reached the point of selecting VPSR. This occurs when two safety channels for pressure pressure fail high on a 2 out of 4 logic.

This should be accounted for in question grading and addressed during entry of this question into the NRC exam bank.

Reference - Maine Yankee System Description NS-5, page 19 - NS-12, pages 23 & 24 3.07 NO COMMENT 3.08 NO C044ENT 3.09 NO COMENT 3.10 NO COMMENT 3.11 a. The answer to this question can be true or false depending upon the readers urderstanding of the words "three fission chambers". The widt range logarithmic channels each receive flux levels from "3 fission chamber detectors (3 clusters of 3 detectors each)" (quite from taragraph 2.1, page 5 of system description NS-10). "Mhen the fission chambers output reaches 1000 cps, two of the three chamber clusters outputs are removed" (quote from page 9 of NS-10). During power operations, the wide range logarithmic channels receive flux level signals from one (1) fission chamber cluster consisting of three (3) fission chamber detectors.

As de have requested in the past, this question should be deleted from the exam and the exam bank due to its confusing nature. Since the NRC answer key indicates thst a "true" response is expected, it is assumed that the NRC wishes to test whether or not the candidate knows that there are three detectors per cluster. It is further recomeded that if the NRC feels that this knowledge is important to safe plant operation, then a more direct question be developed (e.g.,

True or False - There are 3 (three) fission chamber detectors per wide range logarithmic channel fission chamber cluster.

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BlaineTitnicee United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 6 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 SECTION 4 - Frocedures - Normal, Abnormal. Emergency and Radiological Control Question Fo. Cooments 4.01 NO COHHENT 4.02 b. The original intent of this question expected the candidate to provide an answer requiring memorization of subsequent actions of AOP 2-11. During pre-exam review, the Chief Examiner agreed to modify the answer key to reflect knowledge of generic E0P entrance conditions as follows:

1. Plant trips (0,5)

2. SIAS occurs (0,5)

3. Loss of all AC (0.5)

Reference:

E0P Background Document Although this modification was made, the question wording was retained. As worded, the question relates specifically to AOP 2-11 and may not elicit the answer provided in the key. The examiner should allow reasonable answers which the candidate attempts to relate to AOP 2-11.

4.03 The answer provided requires stating "trip the reactor and turbine" for full credit. A 1/3 credit reduction for not stating "and the turbine" is unreasonable. Full credit should be allowed for "tripping the plant" or "tripping the reactor". .

4.04 b. Part (b) of this question involves double jeopardy in that it cannot be answered correctly if part (a) is incorrectly answered. Answers to this question should be granted full credit if in fact "initial actions" exist which must be i taken in the first minute following the cause listed as the answer to part (a). If no initial actions exist which must be taken in the first minute for the cause listed in part (a), then part (b) should be deleted from the exam.

4.05 NO COMMENT 4.06 NO COMMENT 4.07 NO COMMENT 4.08 b. This question has no one correct answer. The answer is YES

- if the Reactor Operator is quallfled as a Fire Brigade leader or NO - if the Reatter Operator is not qualified as a Fire Brigade leader. Five Brigade leader qualification is determined through training provided by the Haine Yankee Fire Frotection Coordinator. l 4.09 NO COMMENT 4.10 NO COMMENT 1309T ,

MaincYankee United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Page 7 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert,R11o HN-88-83 SECTION 4 (Continued) 4.11 During the pre-exam review the following answers were provided:

a. Yes (0.5) - If the proper proficiency watches have been stood in the last quarter (0.5) or NO (0.5) - If the proper proficiency watches have not been stood in the last quarter (0.5).

b. No (1.0) - Must be enrolled in an operator licensing course.

4.12 NO COMMENT 4.13 NO COMMENT l

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h}351)CIIllll\lND United States Nuclear Regulatory C^mmission Page 8 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo. . HN-88-83 SECTION 5 - Theory of Nuclear Power Plant Operation, Fluids, and Thermodynamics Question _No. CogTeats 5.01 NO COHHENT ,

5.02 a. See comment for #1.02.

b. No actions are necessary immediately. The referenced Technical Specification is not appitcable since the reactor is obviously not critical. Since you asked the question, I'm sure the candidates will provide the actions they would take. If one assumes the reactivity addition is unexplained (not mentioned in the question) and assuming a reactor i startup was in progress (not mentioned in the question) then the only inmediate action would be to stop the reactor startup and investigate the reactivity abnormality. The NRC should consider deleting the question.

5.03 See comments for #1.03. ,

5.04 NO COHHENT 5.65 NO COHHENT 5.06 NO COMMENT 5.07 a. See comments for #1.07.  ;

b. The answer key does not contain an answer for this question. Maine Yankee would provide the following answers.

HOW - Startup rate would be more negative (0,5)

HHY - Additional rate due to rate of change of reactivity affec+, on SUR (0,5) 5.08 See comments for #1.08 1 5.09 NO COMMENT 5.10 NO COMMENT  !

5.11 See comments for #1.11 4

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Maine %nkee United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 9 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 SECTION 5 (Continued) 5.12 a. During the pre-exam review, it was noted that choice (2)

"greater than 1.0 but less than 2.0" would be correct for this condition in all normal circumstances although depending on the shape of the spuific pump and system curves (not provided) it might be possible for only choice (4) to be correct. It was requested and agreed to by the Chief Examiner to change choice (4) to "greater than 2.0" to make choice (2) the niost correct answer. During the exam itself, the proctor told the candidates to change choice (4) back to "greater than 1.0". Maine Yankee feels that either choice (2) or (4) should be accepted as correct and that this question be modified to prevent future confusion.

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MaineYankee United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 10 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 SECTION 6 - Plant Systems Design, Control, and Instrumentation Question.No. Coment3 6.01 a.2. Due to the wording of this question, the candidates may take different approaches such as:

1. Describing how the valves function to achieve the purposes in Part 1 above (assumed in answer key).

2. Describing how these valves function as related to the purposes of the CVCS system (root statement of question) including automatic pressuriter level control.

The examiner should allow any reasonable description of letdown valve operation (either independently or as part of the CVCS system) for full credit.

6.02 NO COMMENT 6.03 See comments for #2.03 6.04 Oue to the wording of this question, the candidates may take different approaches such as:

1. Providing the "problem" that necessitated providing a hot leg injection path which could be operated if necessary outside a postulated high radiation environment (as assumed in the answer key).

2. Providing the "problem" that necessitated having a hot leg injection path at all (prevention of boron precipitation in the core during a cold leg LOCA).

The examiner should allow either "problem" to be acceptable for full credit.

6.05 c.2. The EFW isolation valves can be opened following actuation of the low S/G pressure signal in any one of (3) three ways:

1. By placing the 3-position control switches in open (in answer key).

2. By taking control of the valve with the NORMAL / ALTERNATE switch at the alternate shutdown panel (reference - Systems Training Manual, chapter PGS-13, page 23- copy attached).

3. By taking both A and B train (keylock) bypass switches on the HCB for the affected S/G to bypass (reference -

Systems Training Manual, chapter PGS-13, page 26 attached),

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MaineYankee i United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 11 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 i SECTION 6 (Continued) l

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6.06 See coments for #3.06 f 6.07 NO COMMENT

6.08 NO COMMENT 6.09 NO COMMENT 6.10 NO COMMENT l

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MailleYalikce United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 12 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo MN-88-83 SECTION 7 - Procedures - Normal. Abnormal. Emergency and Radiological Control Question _No. Commtall 7.01 c.1 Question was changed during pre-exam review, therefore, the answer key parenthetical statement is not applicable.

7.02 See comments for #4.02 7.03 b. See coments for #4.03 7.04 b. See coments for #4.04b 7.05 NO COM ENT 7.06 NO COMMENT 7.07 This question requires memorization of the E0Ps beyond that specified in paragraph A 3 of NUREG-1021, ES-402 and therefore, should be deleted from the exam.

7.08 NO COMMENT 7.09 This question requires memorization of an extremely infrequently conducted normal operating procedure and is clearly beyond the scope of examination specified in paragraph A.3 of NUREG-1021 ES-402 and therefore, should be deleted from the exam.

7.10 This question goes well beyond the scope of what should be required from memory by an SRO and that specified in paragraph i

A.3 of NUREG-1021 ES-402. This information is readily available in the control room and would additionally be reported by Health Physics personnel. The candidates should be responsible for knowing there are reporting criteria for '

radiological events as contained in Attachment E of H.Y.

Operating procedure 1-26-1, which would be checked by shift personnel if any unusual occurance transpired. Health Physics personnel are required to notify the control room of any radiological incident for the requirements of potential NRC reporting per procedure 9.1.25 (attached). This question should be deleted from the exam.

7.11 a.2. The answer specified is only one of two possible answers.

The more common answer and that trained in our radiation protection lesson is 2S REM (copy attached). This is also ,

the value specified in the M.Y. Radiation Protection Manual l (copy attached).

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BlaineTitnlace United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 13 of 14 Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo HN-88-83 SECTION 8 - Administrative Procedures, Conditions, and Limitations OvettioLNo. Comtat3 8.01 a.2 See comments for #4.08b a.3 This question requires memorization of actions to be taken beyond the one-hour time frame normally considered within the scope of section 8 examining procedures.

8.02 A third answer of "the control room log book" should be included in the answer key since both watchstanders are required to review it prior to taking the watch and this is indicated by initialing the log.

Reference 09 1-26-3, pages 2 & 3.

8.03 NO COHHENT l 8.04 a. This question requires memorization of Technical Specifications beyond the scope of examination specified in paragraph A.4 of NUREG-1021. ES-402 which states "the candidate is not expected to memorize the exact details, numbers and surveillancce requirements contained therein".

This question should be deleted from the exam.

b. The above comment also applies to this question, however, the question should remain in the exam and full credit allowed if the candidate states that 3.25 times the allowed interval must be met.

8.05 NO COMMENT 8.06 NO COMMENT 8.07 If the reactor is assumed to be critt:a1 when this condition occurs the proper "immediate actions" would be to:

, 1. Take actions to return the plant to within the LCO

- and .

2. bring the reactor subtritical.

If the reactor is assumed to be suberitical then the only "immediate action" would be to take action to return the plant to within the LCO.

The performance of an engineering analysis prior to power

,l restoration is a condition for restart and not an immediate action.

8.08 NO COHHENT 8.09 NO COMMENT i

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MaineYankee United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission Page 14 of 14 l Attention: Mr. Robert Gallo MN-88-83 SECTION 8 (Continued) 8.10 The detailed answer in the answer key is not elicited by the question.

"To ensure a return to criticality does not occur following a MSLB" or similar response should be accepted for full credit.

The candidate should not be required to memorize all safety analysis assumptions.

8.11 NO C004ENT 8.12 NO COMMENT 8.13 See coment for #4.11.

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ATTACHMENT 4 NRC RESPONSE TO FACILITY COMMENTS RO EXAMINATION Question Number. Comment 1.02 Noted 1.03 Noted 1.07 Noted. Howeor, the use of a constant differential rod worth is for ease of caiculation and memorization of rod speed is not inappropriate.

1.08 Not accepted. The parameters suggested by the comment are l already included in the answer key.

1.11 Accepted. The points associated with each item represent the partial credit to be deducted if wrong information is used in the candidate's answer.

1.12 Not accepted. During the pre-examination review, the training i department representative stated that Maine Yankee does have some  ;

variable speed electric driven pumps. Additionally, it should be l noted that with the advent of the generic fundamentals examinations, the question is appropriate.

2.03.b Not accepted. Without ICC or SCC, the EDGs will overheat. ,

2.07 Accepted.

2.09.b Accepted.

2.10.c Not accepted. Within the normal operating procedure, there is a section titled "RCP Operation Under Off-Normal Conditions."  !

Additionally, if the noted conditions cannot be maintained, a 1

reactor shutdown is required.

3,06 Accepted.

3.11.a Accepted. Question deleted.

4.02.b Accepted, l 4.03 Accepted.

J

NRC RESP 0NSE TO FACILITY COMMENTS R0 EXAMINATION (continued)

Question Number Comment 4.04.b Not accepted. Parts a and b do not represent double jeopardy.

Even if the cause is not know, the indications provided (loss of main feed flow and potential loss of RCP seal water) necessitate the required actions.

4.08.b Accepted.

4.11.a Accepted, b Accepted.

SRO EXAMINATION

l. Question

_ Number. Comment

~ 5.02.a See 1.02.

5.02.b Accepted.

5.03 See 1,03.

i 5.07.a See 1.07.

l b Accepted.

1 5.08 See 1.08.

5.11 See 1.11.

. 5.12.a Not accepted. The question, as originally stated, was acceptable in that only one answer was correct, in all cases. As modified, no single answer was correct in all cases, although either of two answers could be correct under specific conditions.

6.01.a.2 Accepted, i 6.03 See 2.03.

6.04.b Not accepted. The recent installation of HSI-331/332 was specifically to facilitate operation of the system in an accident

condition.

i 6.05.c.2 Accepted.

NRC RESPONSE TO FACILITY COMMENTS t

SRO EXAMINATION (continued) r Question Number Comment 6.06 ~ See 3.06. ,

7.01.c.1 Accepted. .

7.02.b See 4.02.b.

7.03.b See 4.03, 7.04.b See 4.04.b.

7.07 Not accepted. ES-402, paragraph A.3, states that " ... a  :

I candidate must demonstrate complete knowledge and understanding of the symptoms, automatic actions, and immediate action steps  ;

specified by offnermal or emergency operating procedures." As a transition to the FRPs is required when the symptoms of  !

inadequate heat sink occur, the question is within the scope of l ES-402.  ;

7.09 Not accepted. ES-402, paragraph A.3, states that ... the candidate shot.ed be able to describe generally the objectives and i methods used in the normal ... procedures." As the objective of  !

this procedure is to mitigate the containment airborne activity {

during refueling, and the question asks for a general description of the methods used, the question is within the scope of ES-402.  !

7.10 Not accepted. ES-4-2, paragraph A 3, states that " ... the [

candidate should be familiar with the provisions of 10CFR20 " l The ability to recognize those situations requiring immediate NRC .

notification per 10CFR20.403 is within the scope of ES-402. j 7.11.a.2 Not accepted. The Emergency Plan (procedure 2.50.14, page 11) [

discriminates between the situations for exposures of 12.5 rem j and 25 rem.

See 4.08.b.  !

8.01.a.2 a.3. Noted. However, the question is deemed appropriate. Although r l

l there is a two hour limit, action must be initiated imediately  !

' to fill the vacant position, j 8.02 Accepted. ,

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NRC RESPONSE TO FACILITY COMMENTS SROEXAMINATION(continuedl Question Number _ Comment 8.04.a Partially accepted. The memorization of exact numbers is beyond the scope of ES-402; however, the question has been retained to test the knowledge that the next surveillance is due six months following the previous one.

b Partially accepted. The memorization of exact numbers is beyond the scope of ES-402; however, full credit will be allowed if the candidate understands the concept that 3.25 times the allowed interval over the last three tests is more restrictive that 1.25 times the interval.

8.07 Accepted.

8.10 Not accepted. ES-402, paragraph A.4, states that ". . . questions ,

l concerning the technical specifications will require a thorough knowledge of what items are addressed in .. . the basis for the st uirements ..." Accordingli, this question is within the scope of ES-402.

8.13 See 4.11.

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ATTACHMENT 5

$1MULATION FACILITY FIDELITY REPORT Facility Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 83 Edison Drive Augusta, Maine 04336 Factitty Licenree Oceket No.: 50-309 Fatt11ty Licensee No.: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Operating Tests adttnistered at: Maine Yankee Simulator Wiscasset, Maine Operating Tests Given On: August 10-11, 1988 The Maine Yankee simulator closely parallels the plant from the human factors concept. However, during the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests identified above, one deficiency was noted in that the simulator does not have the ability to overrido the auto start feature of individual pumps (example, safety injection or charging pumps). By not having this ability, they are not able to test the ability of the operators t'a verify the actuation of the all emergency core cooling equipment when implementing the immediate action steps of the E0ps.