IR 05000528/1985034
| ML20138E567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde, Hartsville  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1985 |
| From: | Fish R, Prendergast K, Temple G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138E565 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-85-34, 50-529-85-34, NUDOCS 8512130488 | |
| Download: ML20138E567 (14) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/85-34 and 50-529/85-34 Docket Nos.
50-528 and 50-529 License No.
NPF-34 Construction Permit No.
CPPR-142 Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P. O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona-85072-2034 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site - Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conducted:
September 27, 28 and September 30 - October 4, 1985 Inspectors:
I 'Hi h ts b,
\\\\ / 2 E-/B Y 6%-M. Theple, Emdrgency Preparedness Analyst Date Signed Team Leader h
w\\ ASlO K.'M. Prender ncy Preparedness Analyst Dath Signed Team Members:
G. F. Martin, Pacific Northwest Laboratories M. I. Good, Comex Corporation
//h6/7 Approved By:
o R. F. Fish, Chie'f, Emergency Preparedness Section Date signed Summary:
Inspection on September 27, 28 and September 30 - October 4, 1985 (Report Nos. 50-528/85-34 and 50-529/85-34)
Areas Inspected: Announced preoperational inspection of the emergency preparedness program for the Unit 2 facility, including Emergency Plan training / retraining of Unit 2 personnel, emergency facilities and equipment, and walkthroughs with key Unit 2 personnel. This inspection also included the annual emergency preparedness exercise and associated critiques and follow-up on corrective actions resulting from previous exercises / drills. This combined inspection involved about 172 hours0.00199 days <br />0.0478 hours <br />2.843915e-4 weeks <br />6.5446e-5 months <br /> onsite by two NRC inspectors and two contractor team members.
Inspection Procedure 82301 and Temporary Instruction (TI) 2513/55 were covered.
Results: No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified.
851127 G
05000329 PDR
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DETAILS 1.
' Persons Contacted A.
Arizona Nuclear Power Project Personnel T. Barsuk, Supervisor, Site Emergency Planning H. Bieling, Supervisor, Offsite Emergency Planning D. Callaghan, Shift Supervisor D. Carnes, Shif t Supervisor M. Cates, Emergency Planning Coordinator II H. Doyle, Supervisor, Radiation Protection, Unit 2 R. Eimar, Shif t Supervisor
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V. Elish, General Trnining Instructor F. Hicks, Manager, Training L. Hornback, Radiation Protection Technician
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G. Jones, Radiation Protect. ion Lead D. Karner, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Production R. Middleton, Shift Supervisor D. Nichols, Supervisor, General-Training F. Norris, Mechanical Foreman J. Sims, Emergency Planning Engineer III R. Swern, Radiation Frotection Technician R. Taylor, Shift Supervisor M. Van Dop, Operations Quality Assurance Engineer D. Yows, Manager, Emergency Planning and Preparedness B.
Other Personnel C. Bosted, Resident Inspector, NRC P. Frascino, HMM Associates C. Losinger, HMM Associates R. Merlino, HMM Associates M. O' Hare, HMM Associates M. Vigliani, HMM Associates 2.
Emergency Preparedness Preoperational Inspection - Unit 2 A.
Emergency Plan Training / Retraining
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This portion of the inspection involved the implementation of the licensee's Emergency Plan (EP) Training Program for Unit 2 emergency response personnel. The Training Program is described in Section 8 of the EP and in Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP) Procedure No. 8N718.04.00, Revision 2, " Emergency Plan Training". Training records for Unit 2 emergency response personnel identified on the Emergency Planning Staffing List were examined to determine if training had been accomplished in accordance with the aforementioned procedure. The results'of this examination showed that training had been completed in all cases.
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B.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (1) Emergency Facilities The Control Rooms (CRs) for Unit I and Unit 2 are identical in design, layout and capability. An inspection of the Unit 1 CR was completed during the Unit 1 Emergency Preparedness Appraisal conducted on April 11 - May 12, 1983, and documented by NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-14 (paragraph 4.1.1.1).
NRC inspectors verified that the Unit 2 CR contained current copies of the EP and implementing procedures.
Plant drawings were available for use in the CR.
A microfiche reader and aperture cards were available for infrequently used drawings.
Communications between units is available via normal telephones and two-way radios. The plant paging system is available for communications between units should both the telephones and radios fail. The Emergency Notification System (ENS) telephone was installed, but not operational at the time of the inspection, however, this situation was corrected shortly after the inspection was completed. The inspection disclosed that public address (PA) speakers are not installed. in any of the units' CRs.
Since announcemants are m?de frem tha CR, there should be some mechanism which would provide assurance that announcements were actually transmitted. At the present time, CR personnel must prop open a door in order to hear whether announcemento are actually being transmitted.
The. licensee utilizes a Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC), which operates as an interim Technical Support Center (TSC), prior to activation of the TSC. The Unit 2 STSC operates in the same manner as the Unit 1 STSC. Details associated with the function of the STSC can be found in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-14 (paragraph 4.1.1.2).
Due to the immediate proximity of the STSC to the CR, all drawings and documentation are mutually available to both facilities.
Essential CR communication systems have been duplicated in the STSC.
j The Unit 2 Operations Support Center (OSC) is located in the lunchroom of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, next to the access control area. Unit l's OSC is similarly located and designed.
Communication capabilities provided to~the Unit 2 OSC are identical to the Unit 1 OSC and were found to be consistent with those specified in the EP.
All of the telephones were labeled and functional except that the Maintenance Coordinator's telephone would not ring. A work order was immediately submitted to'have this telephone repaired. The inspector noted that several boxes and file cabinets were being stored in the OSC. Emergency preparedness personne1' explained that this was a temporary condition that would be corrected in the near future. The'OSC appeared to be functional.
As with Unit 1, Arizona State University has been designated as the offsite, backup laboratory support for Unit"2. The
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Unit's 1 and 2 laboratories provide primary, backup laboratory support for each other.
Based on the inspection of the emergency facilities specific to Unit 2, the following item is suggested for improving the prograa.
a.
Since the CR has not been provided with a PA speaker, an administrative or physical method should be established to provide feedback to the CR that a priority PA anncuncement (e.g., plant evacuation instructions) has actually been transmitted.
(2) Protective Facilities The inspector verified that the assembly / reassembly areas
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utilized by Unit 2 personnel were the'same as those used by Unit I personnel. Details concerning the assembly / reassembly areas can be found in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-14 (paragraph 4.1.2.1).
The primary medical treatment facility for Unit 2 is the same
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one used for Unit 1 (see NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-14 paragraph 4.1.2.2).
As with Unit 1, Unit.2 has been provided with a first-aid room located at the 140 foot level of the Auxiliary Building, near the health physics offices and access control point. This first-aid room would be used to stabilize injured individuals, prior to moving them to the primary medical treatment facility. The Unit 2 first-aid room has been stocked with the necessary first-aid supplies required to support its intended function.
The locations of the decontamination facilities in Unit 2 are the same as those in Unit 1 which were described in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-14 (paragraph 4.1.2.3).
Both of the decontamination rooms located near the access control point in Unit 2 were examined for equipment, supplies and functionality. The west decontamination room (A-315) was found to be functional and stocked with adequate supplies. At the time of the inspection, the east decontamination room (A-318)
was missing a shower head and had not been stocked with supplies. The decontamination facility located outside the containment air lock at the 140 foot elevation was found to be functional.
Based on the inspection of the protective facilities specific to Unit 2, the following item is suggested for improving the program.
a.
The east decontamination room (A-318) should be made operational.
It is further suggested that Unit 2 health physics personnel establish and maintain for the decontamination facilities an adequate level of readiness to support their activities.
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'(3)' Emergency Equipment
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,The inspectors examined the emergency kits and emergency survey J
instrumentation which have been prepositioned throughout the Unit 2 facilities. Supplies and survey instruments specific to Unit 2 have been prepositioned at the CR/STSC and OSC. The contents of the emergency lockers were compared against the inventory lists contained in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP)-38, Revision 6, " Emergency Equipment and Supplies Inventory". The ccmparison,showed that six hand-held radios were missing from the OSC emergency locker. Emergency preparedness personnel stated that the radios had been ordered and that delivery was expected in the near future. The acquisition of the radios was being monitored by the emergency preparedness staff. The inspectors also spot checked survey instruments for operability / calibration and found that all of the instruments were calibrated and in working order.
Seismic instrumentation has been installed and tested as documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/84-55 (paragraph 2).
Seismic readout capability is available in the Unit 1 CR only. For seismic events affecting the entire Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) site (i.e., all 3 units), EPIP-02, Revision 4, " Emergency Classification",
specifies the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor (SS) as the Emergency Coordinator (EC) for the site. Although procedurally this should preclude the need for Unit 2 and Unit 3 to classify seismic events, Section 7.3.1.1, paragraph (2) of the EP states that recorded seismic information is available in the CR of each unit.
(see paragraph 2.B.3.a for improvement suggestion)
Meteorological equipment has been installed and tested as documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/84-55
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(paragraph 2).
One tower with dual instrumentation provides information which can be remotely read in the CR of each unit via an Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition and Display System (ERFDADS) terminal. The inspectors verified that the meteorological information requirements of the EP could be read on the ERFDADS terminal located in the Unit 2 CR.
The emergency communication links available in the Unit 2 Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) are identical to those of Unit 1.
A description of the communication capabilities can be found in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-14 (paragraph 4.2.3). All Unit 2 ERFs have been equipped with the primary and alternate methods of communication specified in Section 7.1 of the EP.
All communication equipment was verified to be operable with the exceptions noted in Section 2.B.1 of this report. The inspector verified that tests of the communication equipment had been conducted in accordance with applicable procedures.
The inspector was informed that all of the Unit 2 high noise area warning lights had been installed and were functionally
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tested in July-1985. At that time it was discovered that one
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light did not work. A repair request was subsequently submitted.- By request of the Unit 2 SS, a functional test of the lights was not performed for the inspector. This appeared
to be a prudent decision due to the lack of time necessary to
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notify plant personnel of a test of the system.
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Small hand tools (hammers, pliers, screwdrivers, bolt cutters,
-etc.) are maintained in the,0SC supply lockers. Major tools
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which might be required to mitigate plant emergencies are readily available in the main tool crib at the west end of the Turbine Building and the tool crib in the hot machine shop
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located in the Radwaste Building. Availability of this type of
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equipment appeared adequate.
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Various types of vehicles are available at the PVNGS site for
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use during emergencies as documented by NRC Inspection Report No. 50-528/83-14 (paragraph 4.2.4.3).
A Radiological Emergency
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Response Vehicle (RERV), which has been equipped with the necessary equipment and supplies needed for environmental sampling and remote decontamination, is located at the Service Building (Alternate OSC). An Eberline SAM-2 is included in the
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RERV inventory to provide the capability for detecting airborne radioiodine concentrations of at least IE-7 uCi/cc. The RERV is available for use by any of. the 3' units..The inspector verified that Unit 2 personnel had immediate access to the RERV
. keys. Emergency preparedness personnel stated that in addition to the RERV, a jeep type vehicle has been assigned to Unit 2 for use during emergencies. The: keys to this vehicle were kept with the RERV keys at the-Unit 2 health physics' access control
point.
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Based on the inspection of the emergency' equipment, the following item is suggested for improving the program.
The EP specifies that reco'rded ' seismic information is a.
available in the CR of each unit. -Since recorded seismic information is' available only in the Unit 1 CR,' the EP
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should be changed so that'it is consistent with~ installed instrumentation.
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-(4) Walkthrough Observations Walkthroughs were conducted with four of six-Unit 2 SSs. These walkthroughs were conducted in the CR to facilitate reference to plant instrumentation, procedures and communication equipment. Various scenarios were posed that would require
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detection, classification, notification and mitigation of emergency situations. Walkthroughs required demonstrating
' familiarity with EPIPS, communication equipment utilization, e
staffing and activation of ERFs and notification of offsite agencies. Selected scenarios required determination of appropriate protective action recommendations.
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The SSs who were interviewed demonstrated a good knowledge of EPIPS and their use.
Emergency situations were properly classified in accordance with procedures and simulated notifications were made. The SSs appeared to be familiar with the duties of the EC and knowledgeable in the activation and functioning of the emergency response organization. During the walkthroughs it was noted that the four dedicated green telephones (TSC, STSC, OSC and_ Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) lines) were not labeled. The SSs generally knew they were some kind of dedicated line, but not all knew what type of lines they were or what facilities they served. The telephones were labeled prior to the end of the inspection.
It should be noted that section 7.1.1 of the EP contains a list of telephones, however, similar information did not appear to be
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Walkthroughs were also conducted with three Unit 2 Radiation Protection Technicians (RPTs). During the initial stages of an
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emergency, the RPT fills the position of Radiation Protection Monitor (RFM) and reports to the EC until relieved by the Radiological Protection Coordinator (RPC). The RPM is responsible for initial direction of onsite and offsite field
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monitoring teams, performing dose calculations and advising the EC concerning protective action recommendations (PARS) and matters of a radiological nature. During the walkthroughs, individuals were presented with data concerning a hypothetical accident situation and asked to perform a dose calculation, identify PARS and discuss field team direction. Two of the three individuals interviewed adequately demonstrated the ability to perform dose calculations using the IBM computer and to use the results and procedures to arrive at the correct PAR.
One individual was not able to perform a dose calculation using the information provided and expressed a lack of confidence in his ability to determine a PAR from dose calculations. Two of the individuals did not demonstrate a thorough knowledge and understar. ding of the interfaces, duties and responsibilities of the position of RPM. None of the individuals demonstrated an adequate knowledge of communication techniques used to control offsite teams, including who is responsible for manning the e
radio link and who is responsible for logging and maintaining team data.
Based on the results of the walkthroughs, the following items are suggested for improving the program.
a.
CR emergency response personnel should be refamiliarized with the functions and capabilities of the CR dedicated telephone lines, b.
The frequency and/or level of training provided to personnel qualified to fill the position of RPM should be upgraded.
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3.
Inspector Identified Item During this inspection, the inspector noted that the guidance contained in IE Information Notice No. 83-28, " Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for General Emergencies" had not been incorporated into the EPIPs. The specific automatic recommendation of a 2-mile 360*
shelter and a 5-mile downwind shelter on any General Emergency (GE)
declaration did not appear in either of the applicable EPIPs (EPIP-06, Revision 8, " General Emergency Implementing Actions", and EPIP-15, Revision 3, " Protective Action Guidelines"). Discussions with the licensing staff indicated that a. memo, requesting evaluation of actions required on'IE Notice No. 83-28, had been sent from licensing to the emergency preparedness staff in May of 1983. A response was generated in September of 1983 which apparently indicated that all required action had been taken. The Region intends to track the resolution of this issue and considers it an "open" item (85-34-01).
In addition to the problem described above, the inspector noted the following inconsistencies during the procedure review, a.
Section 3.7 of EPIP-15 states that the PAR for potential and/or i
actual loss of physical control of.the facility is a 360*, 2-mile evacuation. This is in conflict. with Appendix A of the same procedure and Appendix H of EPIP-06.
b.
The PARS contained in Appendix H of EPIP-05, Revision 8, " Site Area
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Emergency Implementing Actions", Appendix H of EPIP-06 and Appendix A of EPIP-15 are not consistent, since a higher (more restrictive) PAR is required for a Site Area Emergency (SAE) than for a GE with release levels below the Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs).
(On a SAE with degrading plant conditions, Appendix H of EPIP-05 requires sheltering to 2-miles (360') and 10 miles downwind.
On a GE, Appendix H of EPIP-06 requires no recommendation unless I
dose projections are greater than PAGs.)
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The information concerning special consideration for plumes in f
sectors P, Q or N, located in Appendix A of EPIP-15, is not l
contained in Appendix H of EPIP-06.
- In addition, a note following procedural step 4.3.1.3 of EPIP-06 directs l
the EC to Appendix H (of the same procedure) for PARS. Step 11 of
Appendix I of EPIP-06 (checklist) directs the EC to EPIP-15 for additional PARA. During certain emergencies, this would have the SS/EC
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referring to two procedures for the purpose of determining the correct PAR. This could potentially lead to a delay and cause confusion,
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particularly since these two procedures appear to be inconsistent with one another.
4.
Exercise / Drill Records Review
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The licensee's method for correcting items identified during drills / exercises was examined during this inspection. The inspector examined the computerized " Emergency Planning Action Item Listing" that t
has been established by the Emergency Planning and Preparedness (EP&P)
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Items identified during the licensee's critique process are entered onto the listing along with the following:
reference number (drill report no.), date assigned, due date, date completed, responsible individual, comments / status and source documentation. The inspector verified that items identified by both the NRC (Inspection Report No.
50-528/84-37) and the licensee during the 1984 exercise had been included in the action item listing. All of the items were considered closed and corrective actions appeared to be appropriate.
Concurrent with the examination of the exercise / drill records, the inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's Medical Emergency Drill which was conducted in conjunction with the annual exercise held on September 26, 1984. The review showed that weaknesses associated with the onsite response had been satisfactorily resolved. However, the review also showed that weaknesses associated with the offsite response had not been entered onto the action item listing to track corrective action (s). Based on discussions held with EP&P personnel,' it appeared that some specific concerns had been addressed, however, the documentation to support the resolution of these items was not available.
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In order to provide assurance that items of this nature are corrected, the licensee should include these items on the action item listing. This issue will be tracked by the Region and is classified as an "open" item (85-34-02).
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Emergency Preparedness Exercise Planning The EP&P staff has the overall responsibility for developing _and conducting the emergency preparedness exercise. The licensee issued a contract to HMM Associates which provided for scenario development, formulation of the data and an evaluation of the exercise..A committee, which was composed of people with the appropriate disciplines (including State and county representatives), was established to review the scenario
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and scenario data.
Persons involved in the scenario development and review were not participants in the exercise.
The EP&P Manager acted as Lead Controller with the responsibilities of
establishing the exercise objectives (in concert with the offsite agencies), developing the scenario package and directing the exercise.
NRC, Region V and FEMA, Region IX were provided with an opportunity to comment on the objectives and scenario package. The exercise package included the objectives and extent of play, exercise scenario, exercise ground rules, messages used during the exercise, initial and subsequent plant parameters, meteorological, chemical and radiological data and guides for the controllers. The exercise document was tightly controlled before the exercise. Advance copies of the scenario package were provided to the NRC observers and other persons having a specific need.
The players did not have access to the exercise document or information on the scenario events. The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV.F.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Controllers were stationed at each of the licensee's ERFs (e.g., CR/STSC, TSC, OSC and EOF) to provide messages / data where appropriate.
Controllers were also dispatched with every repair / monitoring team and to the location of the (simulated) medical emergency (contaminated, injured
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employee). A final briefing of the controllers was conducted on October 1, 1985. The following subjects were discussed at this briefing:
controller responsibilities, contents of the controllers' package, critiques, and importance of determining whether objectives were met.
Final distribution of the scenario package occurred at this briefing.
Prior to the meeting, draft scenarios were logged in/out for control purposes during the review process. All of the NRC observers were present for this briefing.
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Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario started with an event classified as an Alert and ultimately escalated to a GE condition. The initiating conditions presented at 8:00 a.m.
resulted in an Alert being classified based on direct radiation readings increasing by 1000 times normal within the facility. At 9:15 a.m., a problem developed with the operating mechanisms for the containment + access doors' resulting in both being stuck open approximately four inches. At 9:50 a.m., a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak inside containment was detected. ' This led to the declaration
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of a SAE based on the loss of two fission product barriers. At 11:00 a.m., the plant' experienced a large. break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The post-accident monitors. indicated-that fuelidamage had occurred and alarming plant vent monitors indicated that a release to the atmosphere was in progress. This caused a GE to be declared at 11:03 a.m. based on the loss of three' fission product barriers. The l'
scenario also included a contaminated, injured employee and a situation that required a security response.
'A separate Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) drill was conducted during the exercise, however, it.was not considered to be part of the exercise,
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Federal Observers Four NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response. One inspector was stationed in each of the licensee's ERFs.
It should be noted that the simulator was used instead of the Unit 1 CR.
The NRC inspector assigned to the OSC accompanied repair / monitoring teams and observed the response (onsite) to the medical emergency for the purpose of evaluating the performance of the participants.
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Control Room The following aspects of CR operations were observed during the exercise detection and classification of emergency events, mitigation, notification and PARS. The following are NRC observations of the CR activities.
a.
Log keeping in the CR was excellent.
b.
Drill communications (telephone, PA, radio, etc.) were always prefaced with "This is a drill".
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The SS did not initially classify the event as an Alert, even though he recognized he was at an Alert. This resulted in a 14 minute delay in classification.
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The SS and STSC communicator did not understand that manning of the ENS telephone is the responsibility of the utility and not the NRC Resident Inspector.
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Several communications problems existed in the transfer of information to and from the CR.
Examples:
1)
The CR was not always kept informed of the status of repair
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teams.
2)
At 9:17 a.m., the NRC Resident Inspector received information that a section of the plugged hose might be cut out.
The Operations Advisor and SS were unaware of the proposed action.
3)
The Unit I airlock door problem was reported to the SS as a Unit 2 door problem.
4) _ At 9:28 a.m.,
the CR was under the impression that only one containment door was stuck. open.
9.
Technical Support Center The following aspects' of TSC operations were observed: activation, accident assessment / classification, dose assessment, notifications, PARS and CR support. The following are NRC observations of the TSC activities.
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The management of the TSC activities was excellent.
b.
The TSC was' activated in a timely manner,
c.
The TSC experienced difficulties communicating with inplant teams.
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This resulted in the TSC not being kept informed of inplant team
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progress. Although telephones were used as a backup to the radios, the PA system had to be utilized to get the inplant teams to call in with a status report.
d.
The coordination of inplant team activities appeared to be disjointed. The licensee should evaluate its present system for control of inplant teams (i.e.., dispatch and updates occur through the OSC and tracking is accor.plished through the TSC),
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Information flow problems resulted in the TSC having to spend time confirming conflicting information (e.g., status of containment doors and work being done on the hose).
10.
Operations Support Center The following aspects of OSC operations were observed: activation, functional capabilities and disposition of various inplant teams. The following are NRC observations of the OSC activities, s
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By minimizing simulation, several valuable lessons were learned.
Heat exhaustion and communication difficulties were experienced by personnel wearing Self Contained Breathing Apparatus and anti-contamination clothing.
b.
Plant briefings were valuable in keeping personnel in the OSC info rmed.
c.
A repair team controller was observed showing the area survey map to players on several occasions.
Controllers should be instructed to provide only the data a player has asked for and only that data which the players' actions indicate he h's obtained.
a d.
The repair team transporting th'e contaminated, injured man exited a radiologically controlled area without performing body f risks.
Although this may be appropriate,in a real situation, more direction on the part of the controller appeared = warranted.
e.
The contaminated, injured person was frisked in a simulated, high radiation area. The individual should have been moved to a low background area, prior to frisking, since their meters would have
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been pegged.
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Contamination control was inconsistent while dealing with the contaminated employee (i.e., gloves were not always used).
g.
Emergency pocket dosimeters were not checked or zeroed prior to being issued to inplant team members.
It should be noted that anomalous readings were considered real upon return of the team.
Team members were not re-dispatched until readings were verified as being incorrect.
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Emergency Operations Facility The following aspects of EOF operations were observed: activation, functional capabilities, offsite dose assessment and interface with offsite officials. The following are NRC observations of the EOF activities.
a.
The EOF was activated in a timely manner.
b.
The Emergency Operations Director (EOD) kept EOF personnel informed of significant events.
12.
Critiques Immediately following the exercise, mini-critiques were held in each of the ERFs. The players, controllers and evaluators participated in these critique sessions. A combined critique session with controllers /
evaluators and key players from all ERFs was conducted at the EOF following the mini-critiques. A summary of the licensee's findings, including recommendations, and an exercise time line were generated.
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These findings were presented to the Plant Manager during a meeting held
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on October 3, 1985. The NRC Team Leader and one member of the NRC observer team were present at this meeting.
The following represent some of the licensee's exercise findings presented during the October 3, 1985 meeting.
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The Emergency Action Level (EAL) which would have resulted in an
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Alert (i.e., 1000 times normal radiation levels) was not classified
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~for about 12 minutes.
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b.
The SS/EC and STSC Communicator did not realize that the ENS telephone must'be manned continuously until notified otherwise by
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the NRC.
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Direction of the government'offsite' monitoring teams needs i
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improvement.
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d.
The offsite field teams encountered " Road Closed" signs which
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contained radiation warning' signs that did not indicate a drill situation.
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.e.
Communications among STSC/CR and'0SC/TSC could be better.
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Explicitinstructionsarenotprovidedtotiiemedicalteaminthe f.
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event of a site evacuation.
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g.
The Search and Rescue team w'as[ delayed due,to transit time from the Alternate OSC.
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The inplant teams did not periodically report back to the OSC pursuant to procedure.
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The field team calculation of iodine conchntration from SAM-2 data did not agree with the computer assisted calculation.
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Exit Interview l
l An exit interview to discuss the NRC findings from the Unit 2
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preoperational inspection and the exercise was held on October 4, 1985.
The attachment to this report identifies the licensee personnel who were
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l present at the meeting. The NRC was represented by the four evaluator team members. The licensee was informed that no significant deficiencies or' violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection.
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All of the Improvement items contained in Detail Section 2, except for 2.B.4.b., were specifically discussed. The "open" items addressed in Detail Sections 3 and 4 were also mentioned. With respect to the exercise, the licensee was complimented on their performance. Tlie NRC i
Team Leader reported that most of the NRC observations were also identified during the licensee's critique process. The following NRC exercise observations from Detail Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 were l
specifically mentioned during the meeting: 8.c, d and e, 9.c and d, 10.a,
c, d, e, f and g, and 11.c.
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ATTACRMENT EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES T.,Barsuk, Supervisor, Site Emergency Planning H. Bieling, Supervisor, Offsite Emergency Planning R. Butler, Director, Technical Services D. Canady, Manager, Communications G. Clyde, Nuclear Licensing Engineer M. DeMichele, President, Arizona Public Service i
J. Haynes, Vice President, Nuclear Production, ANPP W. Ide, Director, Corporate Quality Assurance / Quality Control D. Karner, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Production, ANPP S. Penick, Supervisor, Quality Monitoring E. Van Brunt, Jr., Executive Vice President, ANPP
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D. Yows, Manager, EP&P s
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