ML20090H344

Significant Const Deficiency Rept Re Four GE Pressure Switches Containing Undercured O-ring That Could Allow Leakage of Process Fluid Into Electrical Portion of Devices. Switches Will Be Replaced by 831216

ML20090H344
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	09/28/1983
From:	Martin T Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8310280075
Download: ML20090H344 (2)

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, i Thomos J. Martin Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 201/4304310 Vice President Engineering and Construction September 28, 1983 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue '

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Dr. Murlcy:

SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY PRESSURE SWITCHES WITH UNCURED O-RINGS HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION' On August 31, 1983, a verbal report was made to Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement representative, Mr. S. Ebneter, advising of a potentially significant construction deficiency concerning four suspect pressure switches supplied by General Electric. The following information is provided in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55 (e) .

Description of the Problem Four pressure switches shipped to Hope Creek contained undercured 0-rings that could allow leakage of process fluid into the electrical portion of the devices. The switches are Model 6N6-E45-NX-ClA-TTX6 and were manufactured by Static-O-Ring Incorporated, Olathe, Kansas.

' Analysis of Safety Implications The switches were intended for use as sensors in the Reactor Protection System to determine turbine control valves fast closure. A failure of two or more of these switches combined with a generator load rejection could delay scram sufficiently 8310280075 830928 PDR ADOCK 05000354 S PDR h1 g

, .L Dr. T. E. Murley 2 9/28/83 to reduce the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) below the Technical Specification safety limit of 1.06. It should be noted that an indirect scram would also occur due to high flux or high reactor pressure conditions.

We have confirmed that the defective switches have not been installed. However, had the switches been installed, a subsequent load rejection would have introduced a probability for degradation of the Technical Specification safety limit. Therefore, this condition is considered reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e).

Corrective Action Bechtel Power Corporation, our Architect / Engineer and Constructor, has initiated Nonconformance Report No. 2491 to control the discrepant hardware. The corrective action will entail the repair /

replacement of the defective switches as directed by General Electric in accordance with their Field Disposition Instruction (FDI) WTHW. This activity will be completed by December 16, 1983.

Very truly yours,

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cc: Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactor Construction Inspection Washington, D. C.

NRC Resident Inspector - Hope Creek P.O. Box 241 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 4

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