ML20064L547
| ML20064L547 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064L520 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8302150305 | |
| Download: ML20064L547 (3) | |
Text
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P TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY hH ATT ANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1 400 Chestnut Street Tower II
- , j y q ' 3 Pl.Q 2 December 29, 1982 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn
- Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR FLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-0IE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/82-25 AND 50-328/82-24 The subject OIE inspection report dated November 30, 1982 from R. C. Lewis to H. G. Parris cited TVA with one Severity Level IV violation.
Enclosed is our response to the subject inspection report.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are ccmplete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Intpection and Enforcement l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 i
G302150305 830119
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PDR ADOCK 05000327 o
PDR An Laual Opportunity Employ er
ENCLOSURE RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-327/ 82-25 AND 50-32 8/ 82-24 R. C. LEWIS' LETIER TO H. G. PARRIS DATED NOVEMBER 30, 1982 Item 50-327/82-25-01 Terknical Specification 3.6.1.8 requaEes that two independent Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) cleanup subsystems shall be operable in modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Ib Contrary to the above, two EGIS cleanup subsystems were not maintained
,1982 the Unit 1 elevation 690 annulus operable in that on September 1)d byggest equipment when the Unit was in door was lef t open and obstructe mode 3 (4500F).
With the annulus usor open,the EGIS would not have been able to maintain the required ust( tive pressure in the annulus for operabil i ty.
The licensee identified the vic2ation and took immediate action to close the annulus door and return thc EGIS to an operable status.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I.D.2). This violation applies to Unit 1 only.
1.
Admission _or Denial of the_A11eaed Violation TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.
2.
Reasons _for_the_ Violation _if_ Admitted Offsite test personnel hsd come onsite to test penetrations as required by Surveillance Instruction (SI) 157, Testable Penetrations.
On September 11, 1982, the shif t engineer was notified that the test l
group would be performing SI-157 which involves annulus entry. The l
test group proceeded to the annulus access area and security personnel unlocked the annulus door for them.
The annulus door (A65) was opened with relative ease by an individual in the test group. Door A65 was lef t open for access of personnel and a test line f at Ae annulus.
Door A64 (an access door into the penetration room 3 5er. 4he annulus door is located) was alao lef t open.
The interlocks on doors A65 and A64 were inoperable allowing both doors to be opened at the same time. The test personnel were not aware that opening both doors wo"uld cause the EGIS to be inoperable. There were no signs on doors A64 and A65 to indicate that if A65 is open A64 i
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> should be closed and vice versa. The SI-157 required shif t engineer netification end signature but did not contain precautions regarding the significance of the doors.
A contributing f actor to A65 being lef t open was the f act that the test personnel opened the door with relative case. This was due to the fact that an annulus purge was in progress and the normal pressure differential causing the A65 door to be difficult to open did not exist. Whec the door was closed, the vacuum was returned because purging operations had stopped.
l An analysis was performed to evaluate the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident with the EGTS inoperable a. described above. The analysis was performed using conservative assumptions. The results of i
this analysis indicated that for worst case conaltions, the 10 CFR 100 limits would not be reached.
3.
Corrective Stees_Which_Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved At 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br /> on September 11, 1982, the shif t engineer was notified by telephone that the annulus door was open. The shift engineer took action to verify this and an assistant unit operator was sent down to shut and secure the door.
This area at the time was a dressout area.
Door A65 was eventually closed and secured at 2320 hours0.0269 days <br />0.644 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.8276e-4 months <br />.
~
4.
Corrective Sters Which Will Be Taken_ to Avoid Further Violations Investigation revealed that the interlocks on doors A65 and A64 may not be strong encugh for normal use.
An evaluation is underway to either modify or replace the interlocks. Also, interlocks on other doors required to maintain auxiliary bulading or EFTS operability will be evalua te d.
A preventivt m aintenance progrsa (PN 756-410) has been established on these interlocks.
Administrative controls in the f orm of signs have been posted on these vital doors to prevent inadvertent opening if the interlocks f ail.
SI-157 has been revised to include the significance of the annulus doors with regard to EGIS operability.
5.
Date When Full Comeliance Will_ Be Achieved f
Full compliance was achieved at 2320 on September 11,1982, when door A65 was closed and secured.
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