ML20052A312
| ML20052A312 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1982 |
| From: | Bradley Jones NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | National Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052A313 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8204280189 | |
| Download: ML20052A312 (7) | |
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t 04/26/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE AT0f11C SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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VilITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY )
Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor
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Plant)
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NRC STAFF'S UPDATED ANSWERS TO NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. AND THE SIERRA CLUB SIXTH SET OF INTERR0GATORIES TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF Pursuant to the Licensing Board's Prehearing Conference Order of February 11, 1982, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff (Staff) hereby updates its April 15, 1976 response to Intervenors' Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. and the Sierra Club Sixth Set of Interrogatories to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff filed on February 9,1976.
In the April 14, 1982 Order Following Conference with Parties, the Licensing Board renumbered NRDC's contentions. When an old contention number appears in the interrogatory question or answer, the new contention number will be indicated in parentheses. Attached hereto are the Staff's answers to NRDC's and the Sierra Club's interrogatories, together with the affidavit of Mr. Robert J. Dube.1/
Respectfully submitted, W-Bradley W. J6nes Counsel for NRC Staff l
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 26th day of April,1982 I
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The affidavit of Mr. Robert J. Dube is unsigned.
However, a copy 09 of his signed, notarized affidavit will be filed shortly.
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i NRC STAFF'S ANSUERS TO NRDC'S AND THE SIERRA CLUB'S INTERROGATORIES III. The following requests for information relate to Contentions 5 (renumbered as 4) and 9b (renumbered as 6) and 12b in the Affidavit of Thomas B. Cochran:
Interrogatory 1 Does the Staff agree that the CRBR must have a safeguards program that provides a high confidence (or some other level defined by the NRC) in its ability to prevent the theft or significant (or some level defined by the NRC) quantities of special nuclear material (SNM)?
Response
The NRC Staff agrees that the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant must have a safeguards program whose objective is to provide high assurance of protection against theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material.
R. Davis Hurt, MC&A Program Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear !!aterial Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
Interrogatory 2 If the Staff does not agree with the statement in (1) above, explain i
in detail the basis for disagreev nt.
Response
Not Applicable.
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' R. Davis Hurt, MC&A Program Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
Interrogatory 3 What numerical confidence level does the NRC believe would be appro-priate in (1) above; in other words quantify "high confidence" (or whatever confidence NRC believes appropriate).
Response
The-Staff does not attempt to quantify an assurance level with respect to protection against theft of special nuclear material.
Sarah A. Mullen, Sifeguards Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the
- question, s
~ Ihterrogatory 4 Quantify "significant" (or whatever level NRC believes is appropriate)in(1)above?
Response
The Staff considers that the formula quantity, as defined in 10 C.F.R $ 73.2(bb), represents a "significant" quantity.
R. Davis Hurt, MC&A Program Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
' Interrogatory 5 What is the basis for the choice of the SKg fonn as defined in 10 C.F.R. 6 73.1(b)?
Response
The basis for the choice of the 5 kg formula, as defined in 10 C.F.R. Q 73.2(bb), is information supplied from the Department of Energy and weapons laboratories that more than one theft equal to the five kilogram formula quantity would be required to fabricate a crude nuclear explosive device that would produce a significant nuclear yield; that is, a yield much greater than the yield of an equal mass of high explosive.
John W. Hockert, Senior Safeguards Scientist, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, and Paul Baker, Research and Technical Assistance Program Manager, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to this question.
References:
1.
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 (Energy) 2.
Memorandum from Lee V. Gossick to the Directors of NMSS, NRR, I
RES and SD, dated August 8, 1977, subject:
" Operating Assumptions on Clandestine Fission Explosives".
Interrogatory 6 Is the level (5Kg) in any way related to risk associated with dispersal weapons? If not, explain why not.
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Response
No. The formula quantity is related to the risk associated with the fabrication of a clandestine fission explosive device.
R. Davis Hurt, MC&A Program Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
Interrogatory 7 Does the Staff believe that the adequacy of the proposed safeguards at the CRBR, and its related fuel cycle activities, can be rationally judged at this time? Explains the basis for the answer.
Response
The purpose of the environmental review process is to determine if the Applicant's proposed safeguards are appropriate for the types of facilities involved and contains the safeguards measures which can be reasonably expected to provide adequate protection of the public health 1
and safety, or will have adverse environmental impacts. Sufficient information is available to make this determination. The Staff does not believe it is necessary to determine the adequacy of the proposed safe-guards systems for the CRBR and its related fuel cycle activities beyond this general review.
R. Davis Hurt, MC&A Program Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
' Interrogatory 8 Does the Staff believe one can analytically divorce the design of adequate safeguards from the specification of threat capabilities? If so, explain the basis for the Staff's view.
Response
The Staff has required its Category I power reactor and SNM fuel cycle and transportation licensees to use the design basis threats contained in 10 C.F.R. Q 73.1(a) when designing safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of SNM.
Sarah A. Mullen, Safeguards Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
Interrogatory 9 Define the threat capabilities or range of threat capabilities against which the adequacy of the CRBR safeguards are judged.
Include here both internal (diversion) and external (assault) threats. The external (assault) threat should include consideration of one or more employees of the facility as parties to the external (assault) threat.
What is the basis for the Staff's choice of these?
Response
The adequacy of the CRBR safeguards program is judged against the regulatory requirements in 10 C.F.R. Part 73. The design basis threats to be used by DOE at the CRBRP and in the design of its safeguards system are contained in 10 C.F.R. 6 73.1(a). The specification of these design basis
. threats is based upon analysis of:
(1) safeguards events at nuclear facilities, both in the U.S. and abroad; (2) analogous cases of theft and sabotage in non-nuclear industries and environments that involve high-value or high-risk material; and (3) terrorist activity worldwide.
10 C.F.R. Part 50.13 stipulates that the Applicant need not provide protection against the facility by an enemy of the U.S., whether a foreign government or other person.
Sarah A. Mullen, Safeguards Analyst, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, provided the answer to the question.
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t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
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Docket No. 50-537 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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(Clinch River Breeder Reactor
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Plant)
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J. 0JBE I, Robert J. Dube, being duly sworn, state as follows:
1.
I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Section Chief of Regulatory Activities and Analyses Section, Fuels Facilities Safeguards Licensing Branch, Division of Safe-guards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
2.
I am duly authorized to participate in answering Interrogatories in Section III, #1 through #9 of the 6th Set and I hereby certify that the answers given are true to the best of my knowledge.
ROBERT J. DUBE Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of April, 1982.
Notary Public r
My Commission expires:
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