ML20034G726
| ML20034G726 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1993 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | Cotter B Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#193-13674 OLA-5, NUDOCS 9303110100 | |
| Download: ML20034G726 (99) | |
Text
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l' T UNITED STATES j,k T ([%i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Nc '
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WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 s'.
e March 2, 1993 93 tE -3 Pi2 :06 mm
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
B.
Paul Cotter, Jr.
Chief Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensi Board Panel FROM:
Samuel J.
Chilk, Secreta 3
i
SUBJECT:
REQUESTS FOR HEARING SUBMITjfED BY THE NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON' NUCLEAR POLLUTION AND THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL Attached are hearing requests submitted, respectively, by the New-England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution and the Massachusetts Attorney General on February 22, 1993. The hearing requests were filed in response to a notice of a proposed determination by the Staff that the issuance of a license amendment to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation for the Vermont Yankee plant (Docket No.
50-271) would involve no significant hazards consideration.
The amendment would allow maintenance to be performed on the "B"
diesel generator for a fourteen day period
^ while the plant is operating at power. The notice was published in the Federal Reaister at 58 Fed. Reg. 5427, 5435 (January 21, 1993)
(copy attached).
The hearing requests are being referred to you for appropriate action in accordance with 10 C.F.R.
Sec. 2.772(j). Copies of comments on the proposed amendment provided by the petitioners and -
referenced in their hearing requests are also attached.
Attachments: as stated cc:
Commission Legal Assistants L
OGC CAA EDO NRR Diane Curran, Esquire Leslie B.
Greer, Esquire John A.
Ritsher, Esquire L
r 9303110100 930302 PDR ADOCK 05000271 C
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
'93 FEB 23 A9 59
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
. c. : m Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S REQUEST FOR HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO VERMONT YANKEE OPERATING LICENSE Introduction On January 21, 1993, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC" or " Commission") issued public notice of an operating li-cense amendment request by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Cor-poration
(" Vermont Yankee"), which would permit Vermont Yankee to perform extensive maintenance on the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station's ("VYNPS's")
"B" diesel generator-for fourteen days dur-ing the current operating cycle, while the reactor is operating at power.
58 Fed. Reg. 5,435.1 Pursuant to Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
S 2239(a), the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP") hereby requests an adjudicatory hearing on the proposed license amendment.
1 The NRC also proposed to make a deterimination of no sig-nificant hazards consideration regarding the proposed license amendment.
In a separate pleading filed today, NECNP seeks reversal of the NRC staff's proposed determination.
New Eng-land Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration (February 22, 1993).
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Description of Petitioner The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP),
founded in 1971, is a nonprofit educational association based in Vermont, with members throughout the New England states.
Its purpose is to inforn and educate the public concerning the
-t hazards of nuclear power and the availability and benefits of safer and more efficient energy sources.
NECNP has actively par-ticipated in many NRC rulemakings and in licensing and enforce-ment proceedings regarding the safety of nuclear power plants in 4
New England.
The health and safety of NECNP's members, most of l
who reside in the New England states, would be affected by an ac-cident at the Vermont Yankee plant.
II.
Nature of NECNP's Right Under the Act to be Made a Party to the Proceeding d
In any licensing proceeding for a nuclear facility, Section l
189a of the Atomic Energy Act guarantees a hearing "to any person whose interests may be affected" by the licensing action.
42 1
U.S.C. 5 2239(a).
The right to intervene under Section 189a is governed by " contemporaneous judicial concepts of s'anding,"
i.e.,
whether (1) the action being challenged could cause injury-
\\
in-fact to the petitioner, and (2) such injury is arguably within the zone of interest protected by the Atomic Energy Act or the j
l National Environmental Policy Act.
Vernont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-90-6, 31 NRC 85, 89 (1990), citina Portland General Electric Co. (Febble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 613-14 (1976).
i I,
1
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NECNP meets the Commission's requirements for asserting standing on behalf of its members.
See Houston Lichtina and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 447-48 (1979), aff'd, ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644 (1979).
As t
demonstrated in the attached affidavits of Charles R.
- Gorsuch, Jessie Haas, and David N. Pyles, NECNP has members who live within 25 miles of the VYNPS, who have authorized NECNP to inter-t vene in this proceeding on their behalf, and whose safety would i
be adversely affected by the unsafe operation of the VYNPS under the proposed license amendment.
Moreover, NECNP meets the Commission's special standing test r
for operating license amendment proceedings, i.e.,
that the l
5 presumption of standing for organizational members who live within 50 miles of a nuclear facility applies only in those cases i
involving "significant" amendments involving " obvious potential for offsite consequences."
Florida Power & Licht Co. (St. Lucie i
Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-21, 30 NRC 325, 329-j 30 (1989).
As discussed in detail in New England Coalition on i
Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Proposed Finding of i
l No Significant Hazards Consideration, filed today and attached i
and incorporated by reference herein, the proposed license amend-ment raises a significant hazard to public health and safety be-cause it would involve the intentional disabling of an important f
safety system, the "B" diesel generator, at power operation, in violation of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 l
2 C.F.R.
Part 50 ("GDC 17"), NRC regulatory guidance, and the f
1 1 -
-4 plant's technical specifications.
Thus, the proposed license amendment would leave the VYNPS without a backup source of onsite energy in the event of a loss of offsite power and a single fail-ure in the "A" diesel generator, with the potential for a beyond design basis accident involving significant offsite consequences.
III. ASPECTS OF PROCEEDING ON WHICH NECNP WISHES TO INTERVENE.
NRC regulations at 10 C.F.R.
S 2.714(a)(2) require a petitioner to set forth "the specific aspect or aspects of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene."
A petitioner may satisfy this requirement by
" identifying general potential effects of the licensing action or areas of concern that are within the scope of matters that may be considered in the proceeding."
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Cor-poration, supra, 31 NRC at 89, citina Vircinia Electric and Power Co.
(North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-146, 6 AEC 631, 633 (1973).
NECNP seeks to litigate the questions of whether the pro-posed license amend =ent violates GDC 17 and Regulatory Guide 1.93, is beyond the scope of actions permitted by the plant's technical specifications, and poses an undue risk to public health and safety.
4 i
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Respectfully submitted, i
Dinne Curran HARMON, CURRAN, GALLAGHER &
SPIELBERG 2001 "S"
Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20009 l
(202) 328-3500 Counsel to NECNP February 22, 1993 a
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION' i
1 i
I BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i'
)
In the Matter of
)
i i
)
l Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
i Power Corporation
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Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
a
)
i AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES R.
GORSUCH 1
r CHARLES R.
GORSUCH deposes and states-l i
i My name is Charles R.
Gorsuch.
My address is Box 2434, Orchard a
Street, West Brattleboro, Vermont. 05303.
My home lies'within l
10 miles of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant.
I am a member of the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution j
("NECNP").
I have authorized NECNP to represent-my interests in l
this proceeding before the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory. Commission
("NRC"), for the consideration of Vermont Yankee Nuclear. Power Corporation's application for a license amendment that would permit it to-perform maintenance on the "B"
diesel generator.
.i for fourteen days while the reactor is at power.
I have authorized NECNP to represent me in this proceeding be-cause I
am concerned that the intentional disabling of one of'
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Vermont Yankee's two diesel generators, during power operation of
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the reactor, would violate NRC regulations intended to protect my j
safety, and would expose me and my family to'an unacceptably high j
L risk of a serious nuclear accident.
J 2.,- a u.
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i CHARLES R.
GORSUCH I
Signed and sworm to before me this N day of February, 1993.
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My commission expires 7 -/o - N f
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
l BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
}
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In the Matter of
)
)
4 Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
1 Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA.
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.l (Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
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AFFIDAVIT OF JESSIE HAAS l
i JESSIE HAAS deposes and states:
j i
My name is Jessie sas.
My address is Barnes Road, Westminster West, Vermont, 031 1.
My home lies within 25 miles of the Vermont Yankee nu lear power plant.
I am a member of the New i
England Coalition in Nuclear Pollution
("NECNP").
I have-authorized NECNP to represent my interests in this proceeding i
before the U.S.
Nuc. iar Regulatory Commission
("NRC"),
for the consideration of 1 rmont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation's application for' a. cense amendment that would permit it to perform maintenance a
the "3"
diesel generator for fourteen days while the reactat is at power.
I have authorized NECNP to represent me in this proceeding be-cause I
am concerned that the intentional' disabling-of one of Vermont Yankee's two diesel generators during power operation of the reactor, would violate NRC regulations intended to. protect my safety, and would expose me and my family to an unacceptably high i
risk of a serious nuclear accident.
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JESSIE HAAS I
Signed and sworn to before me this /8 day of February, 1993.
g? I n tn, y a w i x u rr N o tar y j u blic - ;Cm24an=, J-q, it:
P My com$1ssion expires dM6/
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
i I
3EFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i
)
In the Matter of
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)
i Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID N.
PYLES l
1 l
DAVID N.
P7LES deposes and states:
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My name.is David N.
Pyles.
My address is 67 Main Street, Apt.
l l
- 31, Brattleboro, Vermont, 05301.
My home lies within 10 miles of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant.
I am a member of I
the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP").
I have authorized NECNP to represent my interests in this l
proceeding before the U.S.
Nuclear -Regulatory Commission
("NRC"), for the consideration of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
.1 Corporation's application for a license amendment that would i
permit it to perform maintenance on the "B"
diesel generator for fourteen days while the reactor is at power.
I I
have authorized NECNP to represent me in this proceeding be-l cause I
am concerned that the intentional disabling of.one of j
Vermont Yankee's two diesel generators, during power _ operation of i
the reactor, would violate NRC regulations intended to protect my safety, and would expose me and my family to an unacceptably high 3
ris of a serious nuclear accident.
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M <D DAVID N.
PYLES y' h Signed and sworn to before me this day of February, 1993.
is hu m.h>'ta,~
Notary Public My commission expires 2//O 5.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n&2^
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
'93 FEB 23 E $9
)
In the Matter of
)
)
- ,e Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
4A -
Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE Notice is hereby given that the undersigned attorney, an P
attorney-at-law in good standing admitted to practice in the Dis-trict of Columbia, herewith enters an appearance in the above-captioned matter.
In accordance with 10 C.F.R.
S 2.713 (b), the following information is provided:
NAME:
Diane Curran ADDRESS:
Harmon, Curran, Gallagher & Spielberg i
2001 S Street, N.W.
Suite 430 Washington, D.C.
20009 (202) 328-3500 t
NAME OF PARTY: New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution Respectfully submitted:
~~s fm D)aneCurran(k%
February 22, 1993 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE f
I certify that on February 22, 1993, copies of NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PRO-POSED FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION, NEW ENG-LAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR FOLLUTION'S REQUEST FOR HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO VERMONT YANKEE OPERATING LICENSE, and i
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE were served by first-class mail on all i
parties listed below.
In addition,Las required by the hearing notice at 58 Fed. Reg. 5,427, 5,428 (January 21, 1993), on Febru-ary 19, 1993, I notified the NRC Project Manager, Walter R.
But-l ler, of NECNP's intention to request a hearing on the proposed license amendment.
Rules and Directives Review Branch 2
Divison of Freedom of Information and Publication Services Office of Administration U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Office of the General Counsel U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission dj Washington, D.C.
20555 R
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p '.,
l Thomas G.
Dignan, Esq.
Ropes & Gray w
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225 Franklin Street i
3 Boston, MA 02110 e
Gi C
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Office of the Secretary Attn: Docketing and Serivce l
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
)
M A
/ h Lv Diane Curran i
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION aUiD itiht
)
'93 FEB 23 !%:00 In the Matter of
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
Docket No.c50-271HOLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUr TRAR POLLUTION'S COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Introduction On January 21, 1993, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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("NRC" or " Commission") issued public notice of an operating li-
[
cense amendment request by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Cor-poration
(" Vermont Yankee"), which would permit Vermont Yankee to perform extensive maintenance on the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station's ("VYNPS's")
"B" diesel generator for fourteen days dur-ing the current operating cycle, while the reactor is operating l
at power.1 58 Fed. Reg. 5,435.
The NRC proposes to make a determination of no significant hazards consideration regarding the proposed license amendment.
j i'
The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP") op-t poses the proposed finding of no significant hazards considera-tion.
NECNP's Opposition is supported by the affidavit of Robert t
D.
Pollard, a nuclear safety engineer..
As dis-I t
J I
1 NECNP has requested a hearing on the proposed license amend-ment.
New England Coalition's Request for Hearing on Proposed j
l Operating License Amendment (February 22, 1993).
t nnh/
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+ cussed below, the intentional disabling of one of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station's ("VYNPS's") two diesel generators would violate General Design Criterion ("GDC") 17, the NRC's fundamen-tal requirement that onsite electric power supplies must "have suf fic i ant independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure."
10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
In addition, the proposed amendment violates the technical specifications for VYNPS, which contain no provision for deliberate removal of the diesel generators from service during power operation.
On its face, ty, 2-2 the intentional disabling of an essential safety system, in violation of the NRC's General Design Criteria, NRC regulatory guidance, and VYNPS technical specifications, raises significant hazards considerations.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 189a (2) ( A) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
S 2239 (a) (2) (A),
the NRC must provide a hearing on the proposed license amendment before it can be issued.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS VYNPS has two standby diesel generators which constitute the onsite electrical power supply for the plant's structures, sys-tems, and components important to safety.
GDC 17 requires that each of the diesel generators must be safety grade and designed to " provide sufficient capacity and capability" to maintain plant safety during design basis accidents, assuming a loss of offsite power.
Pursuant to GDC 17 and the plant's Limiting Conditions for Operation ("LCO's"), VYNPS cannct be operated at power unless
v both diesel generators are functional.
As provided by Technical Specification ("TS")
3.10.A.1, Both emergency diesel generators shall be operable and capable of starting and reaching rated voltage and fre-quency in not more than 13 seconds.
A limited exception to this requirement is provided in TS 3.5.H.1:
During any period when one of the standby diesel gener-ators is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days, pro-vided that all of the Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling Subsystems connecting to the operable diesel generator shall be operable.
However, TS 3.5.H.1 also states that "If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."
On three previous occasions, Vermont Yankee has invoked TS 3.5.H.1 for the purpose of repairing diesel generators at power.
4 In 1990, the NRC granted Vermont Yankee permission to inten-
{
i tionally disable and overhaul one of its diesel generators while f
operating at power, on the ground that a local hydroelectric sta-tion was available to provide backup power.2 See Memorandum from l
Thomas E. Murley, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Thomas T. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region I (May 18, 1990) and enclosures, Attachment 2.
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2 As discussed below, the practice of intentionally disabling diesel generators while at power in order to make routine i
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repairs is not permitted by either GDC 17 or the technical specifications for VYNPS.
Thus, NECNP believes that the NRC erred when it granted permission for the 1990 repairs.
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Last year, on two separate occasions a month apart, Vermont l
Yankee declared its "A" diesel generator inoperable after "ab-j normalities were encountered with the jacket cooling system."
Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee, to United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission re:
Proposed Change No. 166, One-Time Extended Emergency Diasel Generator'(EDG) LCO Period to Sup-port Maintenance Activities at 2 (December 15, 1992) (hereinafter r
" Murphy Letter"), Attachment 3.
On May 28, 1992, and again on June 23, 1992, Vermont Yankee began diesel generator repairs j
while the reactor was at power, as permitted by TS 3.5.H.1 for
" inoperable" diesel generators.
When Vermont Yankee found that l
these repairs could not be completed within 7 days, as required l
i by TS 3.5.H.1, it applied for and received temporary waivers which allowed a one-day extension for the repairs begun in May, f
and a two-day extension for the repairs begun in June.
See BVY 92-068, Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee, to United I
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (June 3, 1992);
BVY 92-074, Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee, to United States b
a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (June 29, 1992), Attachments 4 and l
5, respectively.
r According to Vermont Yankee, surveillance of the "B" diesel i
generator "has not-revealed any indication" of the problems which rendered "A" diesel generator inoperable.
Murphy Letter at 2.
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4 i
Nevertheless, Vermont Yankee deemed it " prudent" to make the same repairs to the "B" diesel generator that it had made to the "A" i
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j diesel generator "at the earliest opportunity."
Id.
Rather than i
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. i waiting until the next refueling outage or scheduling an outage to make the repairs, Vermont Yankee submitted a letter to NRC re-l questing a change to TS 3.5.H.1 which would allow a "one-time ex-tension" from the LCO of 7 days to 14 days in which to make those repairs, as well as to conduct the routine 18-month overhaul of t
I the diesel generator.
Murphy Letter, Attachment 3.
On January 21, 1993, the NRC published a Federal Register notice of the pro-posed license amendment, along with a proposed finding that no prior hearing on the amendment is required because it poses no significant hazards consideration.
II.
THE PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT POSES SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS i
CONSIDERATIONS.
l ai A.
Statutory and Regulatory Framework Pursuant to Section 189a(2) ( A) of the Atomic Energy Act and l
10 C.F.R. 50.92(c), the NRC may not issue an operating license amendment before granting a public hearing unless it determines 4
1 that the proposed amendment poses "no significant hazards consid-eration,"
i.e., that the amendment would not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
In passing the enabling legislation for this regulatory provi-sion, Congress recognized that t
issuing the order in advance of a hearing would as a practical matter, foreclose the public's right to have t
its views considered.
In addition, the licensing board would often be unable to order any substantial relief as a result of an after-the-fact hearing.
i i
o Conf. Rep. No.97-884, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 37-38 (1982).
Thus, the conferees noted their intent that in determining whether a proposed license amendment in-volves no significant hazards consideration, the Com-mission should be especially sensitive to the issues posed by license amendments that have irreversible con-sequences (such as those permitting an increase in the amount of effluents or radiation emitted from a facil-i ity or allowina a facility to ocerate for a period of time without full safety protections.)
Id. (emphasis added)
In response to Congress' expression of concern, the Commis-sion "made clear" in the preamble to S 50.92 that t
an amendment which allows a plant to operate at full power during which one or more safety systems are not operable would be treated in the same way as other ex-aoples considered likely to involve a significant hazards consideration.
Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Consid-erations, 31 Fed. Reg. 7,744, 7,750, Col. 3 (March 6, 1986).
In addition, the Commission " charge [d] the NRC staff to assure that doubtful or borderline cases are not found to involve no sig--
t nificant hazards consideration."
51 Fed. Reg. at 7,753, Cols.
2-i 3.
i B.
The Proposed License Amendment Raises Significant-Hazards Considerations The circumstances of this case, involving the disabling of a major safety component in violation-of NRC General Design Criteria and VYNPS technical specifications, raise significant hazards considerations in the starkest terms.
Even were these violations more " doubtful or borderline" [51 Fed. Reg. at 7,753, Cols. 2-3], the serious safety questions raised by the proposed
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> p amendment would dictate against the issuance of a no significant f
e hazards consideration finding, and require the granting of a j
prior hearing on Vermont Yankee's proposed license amendment.
l 1.
The Proposed Amendment Involves the Intentional l
Disabling of A Safety System, In Violation of GDC 17.
t i
Under the Commission's standards for finding no significant hazards considerations, see 51 Fed. Reg. at 7,750, Col.
3, there j
can be no question that the proposed amendment raises "sig-L nificant hazards" considerations, because it would allow the 6
VYNPS to operate "at full power during which one or more safety systems [i.e.,
the "B" diesel generator] are not operable," in direct violation of GDC 17.
The importance of compliance with GDC 17 cannot be gainsaid.
GDC 17 is one of the NRC's " minimum requirements" that establishes the " principal design criteria" l
i for " structures, systems, and components that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to.
the health and safety of the public."
Introduction to 10 C.F.R.
i Part 50, Appendix A.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the onsite t
power supply to power safety systems, GDC 17 assumes that offsite i
power systems are unavailable, and requires the provision of l
E onsite power supplies "with sufficient independence, redundancy,
[
and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single failure."
Thus, in evaluating whether Vermont Yankee's diesel generators comply with GDC 17, it must be assumed that (a) no offsite power is available and (b) one of the two diesel gen-erators has failed.
If the remaining diesel generator were in-em
4 i tentionally disabled, as proposed in Vermont Yankee's license
[
amendment application, VYNPS would have no protection against a single failure of a diesel generator, in direct violation of GDC 3
17.
Moreover, it is clear that such a violation of GDC 17 could increase accident risk at VYNPS in all three of the aspects.by t
which NRC judges "significant hazards" under 10 C.F.R.
S I
- 50. 92 (c) (1)-(3).
With respect to the first criterion, the inten-tional disabling of the "B" diesel generator would significa.
7.y t
compound the " probability or consequences" associated with a i
"previously evaluated" accident i.e.,
the unavailability of one of the diesel generators during a loss of offsite power, as a
t contemplated by GDC 17.
If the "B" diesel generator is inten-tionally disabled and the "A" diesel generator must be assumed to i
be disabled as required by GDC 17, this would leave VYNPS without any source of onsite power.
Under such circumstances, a design i
i basis accident would be transformed to a beyond design basis ac-cident, with the potential for meltdown and catastrophic con-r sequences.
Thus, the proposed amendment raises significant j
l hazards considerations under the second criterion of S 50.92(c).
Finally, the significantly increased probability and consequences 1
of a serious accident would obviously involve a "significant 2
reduction in the margin of safety" at the plant, thus establish-ing a significant hazard under S 50.92 (c) (3).
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_g 2.
The Intentional Disabling of a Diesel Generator for Repairs at Power Violates Vermont Yankee's Technical Specifications and NRC Regulatory Guid-ance.
Vermont Yankee's operating license amendment application is based on the assumption that it is already entitled, through its technical specifications, to disable and repair the "B" diesel generator at power, and that all it requires is an extension of the seven-day period for repairs allowed by TS 3.5.H.1.
See Mur-phy letter at 1.
However, Vermont Yankee's position is based on l
an incorrect interpretation of VYNPS's technical specifications.
In fact, the intentional disabling of a diesel generator for repairs that could otherwise be postponed until a planned outage 4
violates the VYNPS technical specifications.
Pursuant to GDC 17, the principal VYNPS technical specifi-cation governing standby diesel generators, TS 3.10.A.1, requires l
that both diesel generators must be " operable and capable of reaching rated voltage and frequency in not more than 13 sec-i j
onds."
TS 3.5.H.1, upon which Vermont Yankee relies, creates a j
limited exception to this rule, providing that "During any period when one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable, con-t tinued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeed-4 ing seven days Vermont Yankee apparently interprets the term " inoperable",
as used in TS 3.5.H.1, to include the intentional disabling of the diesel generators for routine or non-urgent repairs.
- Thus, as read by Vermont Yankee, TS 3.5.H.1 permits it to intentionally disable one of its diesel generators for repairs at any time, as
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i long as the duration of the repairs does not exceed 7 days.
How-l 1
ever, such a broad interpretation of the exception in TS 3.5.H.1 would swallow the general rule established by GDC 17 and TS j
t 3.10.A.1, that VYNPS cannot operate unless both diesel generators are operable and available.
In effect, under Vermont Yankee's j
l interpretation of the technical specifications, a diesel genera-r tor could be disabled for repairs every two weeks, as long as the repairs could be finished in seven days.
Vermont Yankee's interpretation of its technical specifica-
[
I tions is also inconsistent with the guidance set forth in Reg.
Guide 1.93, which contemplates at power repairs only after the l
risks of shuttina down the reactor have been balanced aaainst the risks of continuina to operate with only one diesel cenerator:
l t
Under certain conditions, it may be safer to continue l
operation at full or reduced power for a limited time l
than to effect an immediate shutdown on the loss of I
some of the required electric power sources.
Such de-l cisions should be based on an evaluation that balances the risks associated with immediate shutdown against those associated with continued operation.
If, on balance, immediate shutdown is the safer course, the unit should be brought promptly to an orderly shutdown,
(
and to a cold shutdown as soon as possible.
For exam-(
ple, the risks associated with an immediate shutdown on the loss of onsite a.c. power supply during a period.of light system load would tend to be less than those dur-l ing a peak load period because the stability of the i
3 offsite power system would be relatively higher.
If, on b;. ance, continued power operation is the safer course, the period of continued operation should bc used to restore the lost source and to prepare for an i
orderly shutdown, provided, of course, that these ac-i tivities do not risk further degradation of the elec-
[
tric power system or in any way jeopardize plant j
safety.
l l
Reg. Guide 1.93 at 1.
Under this standard, the only acceptable l
justification for repairing the diesel generators at power would l
l 1
}
i I
4 i be a showing that it is safer to do that than to shut the plant j
t down -- an argument that could be made only if the diesel genera-l tor was unable to function, or so unreliable as to be effectively inoperable.
Those circumstances do not exist here, where the "B"
diesel generator is functional, and Vermont Yankee seeks permis-sion simply to make non-urgent repairs and to conduct routine maintenance.
Thus, under the guidance of Reg. Guide 1.93, the VYNPS technical specifications cannot be read to permit the in-tentional disabling of the diesel generators in order to perform i
routine repairs.
j Because Vermont Yankee's proposal to intentionally disable l
the "B" diesel generator during power operation constitutes a l
2 i
departure from its technical specifications governing important i
safety functions, it necessarily raises "significant hazards con-siderations."
In fact, while the NRC staff concluded (error.eous-i J
ly, NECNP submits) that Vermont Yankee's 1990 bid to overhaul its l
P diesel generator during power operation was sanctioned by its j
technical specifications, the staff noted its concern that "this j
maintenance practice poses a noteworthy risk."
Memorandum from i
J.
Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No.
3, Region I,.to R.
1 Wessman, Directorate I-3, NRR (April 6, 1990), Enclosure to At-tachment 2.
t I
1
4 3.
The Existence of the Vernon Tie-Line Would Not Compensate for the Disabled Diesel Generator Under GDC 17.
Vermont Yankee attempts to satisfy the no significant hazards standard by arguing that there will be no significant change in the types of potential accidents at VYNPS or decrease in the margin of safety of the plant, "because of the availability of other plant electrical systems, including the Vernon tie line" from a local hydropower station.
Murphy letter at 5.
However, this argument ignores GDC 17, which provides quite clearly that offsite power scurces, such as the Vernon tie line, cannot be used as substitutes for onsite power sources in order to satisfy the requirements for backup power supply.
Moreover, even if GDC 17 could be ignored, and the Vernon tie line could be credited as a backup electricity supply, far too many questions exist about the capacity and reliability of the vernon tie line as a source of backup power to safety sys-tems.
For instance, as Vermont Yankee has conceded, it is in-possible to test the Vernon tie-line under a full station black-out load.
BVY 92-94, Letter from Leonard A.
- Tremblay, Jr., Ver-mont Yankee, tv United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, re:
10CFR50.63 Station Blackout (SBO) - Response to NRC Request for Additional Information, Attachment to BVY 92-94 at 3 (July 31, 1992), Attachment 6.
Moreover, Vermont Yankee admits that "[d]ne to the vintage of the hydro station generators' voltage regulators," it is unable to " analytically predict" what the voltage levels will be upon application of the largest load to the 4160-volt emergency bus.
Id. at 3.
Instead, Vermont Yankee
~
I
- 13 l
relies on the engineering judgment of hydro operators and dis-patchers from outside Vermont Yankee, who.are not licensed by NRC and who have no responsibility for the safety of VYNPS.
In sum, i
Vermont Yankee has neither empirical evidence nor analytical f
i results to demonstrate that the Vernon tie line has " sufficient-capacity and capability" to meet the requirements of GDC 17.
Ac-cordingly, the existence of the Vernon tie-line provides no basis i
i for a no significant hazards finding in this case, i
CONCLUSION Vermont Yankee has failed to demonstrate that the proposed I
license amendment involves no significant hazards considerations; l
l in fact, on its face, it would significantly increase the_ risk to l
l public health and safety posed by operation of the VYNPS.
Accor -
dingly, the NRC should reverse its proposed finding of no sig-l nificant hazards considerations, and order a prior hearing on the proposed license amendment.
l 1
Respectfully submitted, l
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Crane Curran j
HARMON, CURRAN, GALLAGHER &
SPIELBERG 2001 "S" Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20009 (202) 328-3500 4
Counsel to NECNP i
February 22, 1993 b
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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In the Matter of
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Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
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Power Station)
)
l
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AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D.
POLLARD I,
Robert D.
Pollard, do make cath and say:
i 1)
My name is Robert D.
Pollard.
Since February 1976, I have been employed as a nuclear safety engineer by the Union of Concerned Scientists.
My business address is 1616 P Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
20036.
Previously, I was employed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Licensing Pro-ject Manager for commercial nuclear power plants.
2)
In May 1959, I enlisted in the United States Navy and was selected to serve as an electronics technician in the nuclear power program.
After completing the required training, I became an instructor responsible for teaching naval personnel both the theoretical and practical aspects of operation, maintenance and repair for nuclear propulsion plants.
From February 1964 to April 1965, I served as the senior reactor operator, supervising the reactor control division aboard the U.S.S.
Sargo, a nuclear-powered submarine.
In May 1965, I was honorably discharged from the U.S. Navy and attended Syracuse University, where I received the degree of Bachelor of Science maana cum laude in electrical engineering in June 1969.
3)
In July 1969, I was hired by the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and continued as a technical expert with the AEC and its successor, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) until February 1976.
After joining the AEC, I completed a year of graduate studies in advanced electrical and nuclear engineering at the Graduate School of the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.
I subsequently advanced to the posi-tions of Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) and Project Manager with AEC/NRC.
As a Reactor Engineer, I was primarily responsible for performing detailed technical reviews analyzing and evaluat-ing the adequacy of the design reactor protection systems, con-trol systems and emergency electrical power systems in proposed nuclear facilities.
In September 1974, I was promoted to the position of Project Manager and became responsible for safety reviews of applications for licenses to construct and operate several commercial power plants.
l r
4)
In the course of my six and a half years with the AEC and NRC, I performed technical reviews, analyses and evaluations of designs of systems and components necessary for safe operation
[
of reactor facilities under normal, abnormal and emergency condi-tions for the purpose of determining whether such systems com-plied with NRC rules and provided an acceptable level of safety for the public.
5)
For the past fifteen years, I,
along with other members of the Union of Concerned Scientists' professional staff, have conducted numerous studies pertaining to the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants, both on a generic and plant-specific basis.
I have provided technical analysis for UCS's participation in rulemaking proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for UCS's litigation against the NRC for failure to fulfill its responsibilities under the Atomic En-ergy Act.
I testified before the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island which investigated that 1979 acci-t dent.
I participated as an expert witness in the NRC's ad-judicatory proceeding on matters pertaining to reactor safety be-fore numerous committees of the United States Congress and vari-ous other state and local legislative and administrative bodies.
Thus, my 23 years of professional experience on the technical staffs of the AEC, NRC, and UCS have given me first-hand knowl-edge of NRC regulations and how they are developed, administered, and interpreted.
6)
I have reviewed all of the documents referenced in New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration (Feb-ruary 22, 1993).
I am also familiar with NRC regulations and regulatory guidance governing the design and operability of diesel generators.
7)
The factual statements made in the attached New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Pro-posed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Robert D.
Pollard Subscribed and sworn to before ne this __ day of February, 1993.
Notary Public I
My Commission expires
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UNITED STATES
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PEMD w CUM FCR: Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator, Region I FROM:
Thomas E. Murley, Director i
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation SL'BJECT:
USING THE OUTAGE TIME ALLOWED BY THE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION FOR OVERHAULING AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR WITH THE PLANT OPERATING AT FULL POWER I share the concern you expressed in your May 2,1990 note (enclosure) to me regarding intentional entry into an LCO (limiting condition for operation) action statement in Mode 1 to overhaul a diesel generator. This concern relates to the broader issue of routine entry into LCOs to perform preventive maintenance, which appears to be a common practice among licensees.
In the case of Vermont Yankee, certain design features and licensee comitments led the staff to conclude that an acceptable level of safety would be maintained while the licensee was overhauling the diesel generator at power. The Question is whether it is acceptable for licensees whose plants have a less forgiving design to do the same.
The staff does not want to discourage licensees from doing preventive maintenance at power, because of the potential for achieving better reliability; but it should be done in a manner that decreases overall plant risk.
The NER staff is considering the issue of routine entry into LCO action statements for performing preventive maintenance. Diesel generator overhaul will, of course, be addressed.
In the interin, it may be appropriate for the regions to identify licensees that TCutinely overhaul diesel generators in Mode 1, and determine if they have evaluated the adecuacy of the technical bases for doing 50.
Licensees that do this should adhere to the following conservative principles:
(1) The practice should represent a net safety benefit and be warranted by operational necessity, not just by convenience.
(2) The practice should not be abused by repeated entry into and exit from the LCO.
(3) The reroval from service of safety systems and important non-safety equipment should be minimized during the overhaul, including offsite power sources.
(4) Any conponent testing or maintenance that increases the likelihood of a plant transient should be avoided; plant operation should be stable during the overhaul.
(This could include consideration of degraded or out-of-service balance of plant equiprent.)
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t it.tre rey te etter sters Lt)cr.c these that licensees can take to minim.ize the ri!L associette with rer.4sitc a diestl generatcr f ree service for ar. extencec.
perict of tire.
I hER generally accepts the practice of licensees perforring prtiventive r.ainte-nance at gewer, and this includes diesel generator overhauls, but only after j
careful planning and if the safety benefit is clear.
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Origina1 signed by, Thocas 1.E rley j
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Thomas E. Murley. Director f
Office of Nuclear Feactor Regulatier.
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Enclosure:
As stated
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May 2, 1990 I
NOTE FOR:
Tom Murley Frank Miraglia Bill Russell
SUBJECT:
YERMONT YANKEE
- j Attached is correspondence I discussed on May 1, 1990 regarding the propriety of Vermont Yankee's practice of using 7-day LCD to overhaul diesel generators. Your staff gave me a supportable legal answer. -Given YY's claim that others do the same, should NRC discourage this practice as 7
a matter of policy in light of the DG's key role in accident mitigation?
Tim i
Enclosures:
1.
Memo did 4/13/90 J. Johnson fm R. Wessman 2.
Memo did 4/6/90 R. Wessman fm F. Rosa 3.
Memo did 4/6/90 R. Wessman fm J. Johnson i
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.er==snvama tpos APR 0 61990 ter m ~D'.TDR:
R. Wessn:.n Dincter, Project Directorate 1-3, NRR N'.:
J. JcMson, Chief, Reacter Projects Branch No. 3, Pagico I S. E I:~I:
VEPK2C YANYE P ANS 70 CNDOW.TL AN IMDCDK.Y DIESEL CD"UN~tR M{ILE AT TUll, }CM:R ihe p u:se of this re crard.n is to follewup on our discussion of W.rt:n 30, 2190 of vew Yankee's plans to cveztaul cne of the two d2esela.M to reqJest that XR garenters stile the plant is operating at full powe.r.
The diesel gereratcr verder 1.nitially rectmerde:i the cve:t.aul eve 2y 12-18 renths, but his sites stated that a 22-24 conth intazval is a xer.able.
Is cf April,1990, the cuestaul interval for this d.iesel gc.v. rater is 22 renths; the it.taxval vill be e.xterdad *J 27 rentr.s if the even.aul is delayed to the next rvfuelity cutage.
Alth2x;h ;s 3.5.M.1 a.11cus a 7 day ifD for one diesel generator o.:t vf-se:vice ard this time period is appanntly sufficient to perfe:: the over.aul, w q.>estion Vhether the re cual of s.x:n an
- pert. ant piece of saft.ty-related eq.ti; rent is prudent 55en the pla.t is at po.er.
several v 112 ties ard feed that this practice was ret uniq;e andWhile ve r that the bases of their 75 do ret irdicate that this action is u acceratle, we re airnd concemed that this reintararce practice peces a ret.e crthy risk.
The diesel generater vill probably ret be
- n a c=n11 tion durirg the evett.aul to be gaicMy rustered to service should a Iccs of offsite po er etr.
We :tq;est that ycu review this issae for a 9eneric NRR positien en this ratter.
A position was te. ken by XRR "n 1987 regaxtiJq villful en.:y into Stdu :1 Tbchnical Specificatien 3.0.3 for one hour IIDs with rtd -d. ant egalp ent cut-et-service, tut that position is ret ceccidertd applicable here.
We valid appreciata a prtrpt wee to this ratter because Verrcot YarAne interds to antar this IID on cr abcut April 16, 1990.
ve nmd to ccre.act Verrent Yankae rarage ent pr rptly.If this practics is doened Sircerely, 11.,
u-chief Roactor Projects Branch 3 c=:
B. Bcger, NRR H. Eichenholt, SRI, Vement Yankee V. Ya e, RI J. Durr, R.I g
W. Pascaak, RI R. Callo, RI f
J. Wiggins, RI R. Barkley, RI
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R. Vessr.an, Project Of rector Proj s t DirM torate I-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II FRCM:
Taust Rosa, Chief Electrical Systems Branch Division of Systems Technoicqy
SUBJECT:
YERMONT YANKEE - PLANS TO CYERKAUL AN EPCRGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR WHILE AT r7LL POWER In rescense to a eemorandum (undated, received 4/5/g0) from J. Johnsen, Chief.
Feacter Projects Branch No. 3, Region I to R. Vessman, Director, Project Directorate 13, ARR which requested HER to review Yereont Yankee's (YY) plans to declare a seven day LCO to overhaul an emergency diesel generator (EDG) while at full t er, the Electrical Systems Branch (SELB) has reviewed YY's emergency electrical distribution system for its adecuacy in the context of this planned LCD. Our evaluatien follows:
Our pcsition en the subject matter is based on the follcwing information:
1.
Accorcing to YY's current Technical Specification (75) 3.5.H.2, if one of the two EDGs found to be ineperable, continued reactor operation is per-ritted for seven days, i.e., seven days Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO).
2.
In addition to two onsite ED3s and four offsite pcwer lines through two startup transforcers at YY. there is Vernon hydro station tie line which is a dedicated line (one half mile away) that can be connected cirtetly to either of the emergency buses from the YY control room.
This switchfrg o;eration is covered by the current plant procedures and operator training. This line has enough capacity to supply all the toer-gency pcrer 1 cats to safely shutdown the plant.
3.
The hydro station is energized continuously, therefore, there is no need to startu; any equipment; and it has excellent reliability demonstrated by having a history of only two unplanned outages (total of less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) since 1965.
Contact:
P. race, SELB/ DST J20812
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eliLa 0
.a t; y-
- a. Wessran 2
4 To ensure more reliability. YY has ccrritted to set up a preventive i
raIntentece program which includes inspection of the line regularly and testing the line every other refueling by aligning it to che of the safety buses and supplying it with the needed power.
5.
We also agree with YY's survey that this practice (i.e.. overhauling er cerforming 18 month EDG surveillance during power operation) by declaring 4 seven day LCO is not unique to YY.
We find that such practice is necessary for those multi. unit plants wh!ch are ersigned and operated with shared CDG configurations (e.g., Brunswick).
shle EDG, this time period is apparently sufficient to perfern the fact that the current YY's TS allows a seven day LCD for an ineper.
At Brunswick for this case. the remaining thre: available EDGs would meet the single failure criterion for loss of offsite power safe shutdown but not for a 05A.
The YY situation is exactly similar when the Vernen hydro is credited as being equivalent to a stancby EDG.
Therefore we see no significant safety problem with YY's plans to overhaul an EDG cur 1ng a ssven day LCD whfie at fu11 power.
7
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Faust Resa. Chief Electrical Systems Branch Division of Systems Technology cc:
A. Thadani P. Fairtile J. Knight I
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December 15,1992 BW 92-139 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
References:
(a)
License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)
(b)
Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, BVY 92-068, dated June 3,1992 (c)
Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 92-095, dated June 4,1992 (d)
Letter, VYNPC to USNRC, BVY 92-074, dated June 29,1992 (c)
Letter, USNRC to VYNPC, NVY 92-127, dated July 1,1992
Subject:
Proposed Change No.166, One-Time Extended Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) LCO Period to Support Maintenance Activities
Dear Sir:
Pursuant to Section 50.59 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Vermont Yankee hereby proposes the following changes to Appenoix A of the Operating License [ Reference (a)].
Proposed Chance This request proposes to replace Page 94 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications with the attached revised Page 94. Section 3.5.H.1 on Page 94 presently stipuates a Limiting Condition for Operation of seven (7) days with one Emergency Diesel Generator out of service. This request proposes to change Section 3.5.H.1 by allowing a one time extension of the seven (7) day LCO to fourteen (14) days during the current operating cycle (Cycle 16) to permit extensive maintenance to be performed on the "B" EDG while the reactor is at power.
2'i()Uu) 9212220005 921215 Q
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 15,1992 Page 2 i
NRC apprc ~' 'ihis proposed change would allow continued reactor operation for an additional so.on days beyond the present seven day LCO period (14 days total) for a one-time cylinder liner replacement and routine preventive maintenance activities on the "B" EDG during the present power cycle (Cycle 16). The extension period will i
allow sufficient time to perform the planned maintenance activity and to thoroughly test the "B" EDG before returning it to service.
Reason for Chance On May 28,1992, and again on June 23,1992, the "A" EDG was declared inoperable. In each of these cases, during a routine monthly EDG surveillance, abnormalities were encountered with the jacket cooling system.
Upon engine disassembly, cracks were discovered in two (2) cylinder liners. For each of these i
occurrences, Vermont Yankee requested a temporary waiver of compliance
[ References (b) and (d)] to extend the LCO period such that repairs and proper testing could be made at power prior to restoring the "A" EDG to service. Both of these requests were approved by NRC [ References (c) and (e)]. In the second instance, the maintenance performed included replacement of all cylinder liners, on the "A" EDG, with new improved liners. The " A" EDG was returned to service within the extended LCO period and has since encountered no performance problem related to the cylinder liner replacement.
Following each of these occurrences, Vermont Yankee performed a detailed Root Cause Analysis (RCA) to investigate the cause of the specific failures. In addition, an EDG Task Force was assembled to review the overall EDG maintenance and surveillance programs. Both of these efforts have been completed and a number of recommendations have been made to management. Vermont Yankee has already implemented some of the recommendations and is in the process of implementing the remainder. One of the recommendations was to replace cylinder liners on the "B" EDG coincident with the next scheduled overhaul.
Surveillance testing of the "B" EDG has not revealed any indication of the cylinder liner problems that occurred on the " A" EDG. However, it is prudent to make the same improvements to the "B" EDG that have already been made to the " A" EDG at the earliest opportunity. As a result, Vermont Yankee plans to perform replacement of all cylinder liners during the next scheduled 18 month overhaul of the "B" EDG.
During this maintenance period, we also plan to replace the " inverted 'Y' housing" as a result of Vermont Yankee experience with broken bolts on this component in 1992 and a Fairbanks Morse Service information Letter (SIL). In addition, we will be performing the preventative maintenance tasks normally associated with the scheduled 18 month overhaul of the "B" EDG.
t t
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE AR POWER CORPORATON U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 15,1992 Page 3 Basis for Chance Fourteen (14) days are required to complete the maintenance associated with cylinder liner replacement, replacement of the " inverted 'Y' housing" and performance of the preventative maintenance tasks normally associated with the scheduled 18 month overhaul of the "B" EDG. The scheduled 18 month overhaul, including post-maintenance testing, typically requires most of the allowed 7-day EDG LCO period.
The cylinder liner replacement on the "A" EDG conducted in June, including the required augmented testing, required more than the allowed 7-day LCO.
The augmented testing that is planned prior to declaring the "B" EDG operable includes:
operating the engine continuously for approximately twenty-one (21) hours at loads varying from "no load" to 100% load, allowing the EDG to cool down for a minimum of eight (8) hours, then performing an eight (8) hour operability run. The return of the "B" EDG to operable status would occur after successful completion of the first one (1) hour of the eight (8) hour operability run. This testing would be conducted with careful monitoring of key diesel engine parameters to further substantiate satisfactory operation.
in order to perform this extensive preventative maintenance effort and the additional task of replacing the cylinder liners, including special testing, additional time is needed beyond the existing seven (7) day LCO period provided in Technical Specifications. Therefore, Vermont Yankee is requesting a one time extension of the present seven (7) day LCO to fourteen (14) days to allow for implementation of these improvements during the current power cycle (Cycle 16).
We t'elieve that approval of a seven day LCO extension will provide sufficient margin to repair and thoroughly test the EDG without compromising the continued safe operation of the plant. As we indicated above, a significant portion of the aeditional LCO time would be for "run-in" of the new components and operability testing. The EDG would be available during this period, but not considered operable until testing has been satisfactorily completed.
Upon NRC approval of this proposed change, Vertrort Yankee would then utilize the one time LCO extension for the express purpose of performing the "B" EDG maintenance activity, described herein, during Cycle 16 operation at power. Vermont Yankee is in the process of preparing the necessary procedures, schedules and procuring the parts and equipment necessary to perform this maintenance activity.
It is anticipated that we will be in a position to perform this activity sometime within the first four months of 1993.
4 VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATON U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 15,1992 Page 4 As required by Technical Specifications, the alternate EDG will be tested and all of the Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling Subsystems connected to the operable EDG will be verified operable prior to declaring the "B" EDG inoperable and entering the LCO period.
In addition, Vermont Yankee procedures require tM Statio.' Manager of the
)
Vernon Hydro Station to be contacted to ensure that continut.d avalidity of power is expected on the dedicated tie-line to Vermont Yankee prior to and for the, duration of the LCO period.
A thorough review of all other planned surveillance activities will be performed prior to entering the LCO period and only those determined to be of low risk to equipment or system availability will be allowed.
Safety Considerations l
in order to provide added assurance that the "A" EDG will perform its function if required, the "A" EDG will be tested for operability prior to entering into the "B" EDG LCO period. The Technical Specifications also require that during the LCO period, all remaining Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling Systems connected to the operable EDG remain operable. Vermont Yankee has developed a detailed LCO maintenance plan for EDG LCO maintenance. This plan has been successfully used during prior EDG LCO maintenance and will be invoked for this evolution as well. In addition, the Vernon Hydro Station dedicated tie-line, which historically has demonstrated a very high reliability, is required by Vermont Yankee procedure to be available to supply power to Emergency Bus 3 during the "B" EDG LCO. Any previously analyzed event postulated during the seven day extension period can be mitigated by the other available systems. Tha proposed LCO extension has no significant impact on the consequences of any previously analyzed event.
The proposed extension would allow the "B" EDG to remain inoperable for an additional seven days beyond the present seven day LCO allowed by Technical Specifications. The unavailability of one EDG is not a part of the initiation of any of the analyzed accidents. Therefore, the proposed change does not increase the i
probability of an accident previously evaluated.
This proposed change has been reviewed by the Vermont Yankee Plant Operations Review Committee and the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Safety Audit and j
Review Committee.
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLE AR POWER CORPOR ATON U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 15,1992 Page 5 Sionificant Hazards Consideration The standards used to arrive at a determination that a request for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration are included in the Commission's Regulations,10CFR50.92, which state that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The discussion below addresses the proposed change with respect to these three criteria and demonstrates that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration:
1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. As discussed above, a seven day extension to an already existing seven day LCO period would involve no significant increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of a design basis accident during the extension period.
2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated. The proposed change would have no impact on the possibility of a new or different initiating event. The proposed change requests a one time extension of 7 days beyond the already authorized 7 day "B" EDG LCO. Any previously analyzed event postulated during the seven day extension period can be mitigated by the other available systems.
3.
Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
The propt 3ed change would not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As discussed above, approval of this request involves an insignificant reduction in the margin of safety because of the availability of other plant electrical systems, including the Vernon tie line, and the short duration of the extension period.
VERMONT YANMEE NUCLE AR POWER CORPOR ATION U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission December tS,1992 Page 6 Based upon the above, Vermont Yankee concludes that the propsed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10CFR50.92(c).
Schedule of Chance This proposed change will be incorporated into the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications as soon as practicable following receipt of your approval.
Vermont Yankee plans to utilize the one time extended LCO provision for the "B" EDG during tne current power cycle (Cycle 16).
Vermont Yankee w.;l keep the NRC Senior Resident inspector informed of our progress in preparing for this maintenance activity and will notify the NRC Senior Resident inspector in advance of entering this extended maintenance LCO.
We view the proposed activity as a positive contributor toward our nutual goal of maintaining a high degree of plant safety through improved equipmer.t reliability.
We trust that the information provided herein adequately supports our request, however, should you have any questions or should you need to discuss this matter further, please contact this office.
Very truly yours, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation A
r g
Warren P.[ Preside
[.
urph Senior Vice (Op rations j
f' ' ',
N g
cc:
USNRC Region i Administrator USNRC Resident inspector - VYNPS j
USNRC Project Manager - VYNPS STATE OF VERMONT )
) SS WINDHAM COUNTY )
Then personally appeared before me. Warren P. Murphy, who, being duty sworn did state that he is Senior Vice President. Operations of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation that he is authorizeo to execute and file the foregoing document in the name and on the behalf of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation and that the statements therein are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Sally A. Sahastrum Notary Public My Commission Erotros February 10.1995
VYSPS
' 5 tiMITING COND1110NS FOR OPERATION 4.5 SURVEILLANCE hE00lREFEP.15 3.
If the requirements of Speci ficat ion 3.5.G cannot be met. an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 120 psig within 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 5.
1.
Minimum Core and Cont ainment fooling System H.
Minimum Core and Centainmerit fonlinq System Availability Availability i.
During any period when one of the standby 1.
When one of tne standby diesel generators is diesel generators is inoperable, continued made or found to be inoperable. the remaining reactor operation is permissible ~ 11y during diesel generator shall have been or shall be the succeeding seven days, or the succeeding demonstrated to be operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
fourteen days for a one-time extended maintenance activity for the ~B" standby diesel generator during Cycle 16, provided that all of the tow Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling Subsystems connecting to the operable diesel generator shall be operable.
If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown candition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
Any combination of inoperable components in the Core and Containment Cooling Systems shall not defeat the capability of the remaining operable cotponents to fulfill the core and containment cooling functions.
,ya 33u 3.
When irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel 30 and the reactor is in the cold shutdown gg condition, all Core and Containment Cooling nm Subsystems may be inoperable provided no work is permitted which has the potential for Oj$
draining the reactos vessel.
8E iSG a4 Amendment No.
- 27. 114 94
- VEllMONT YANElsli
- NticLliAlt Powlilt ColtPoitATioN Attachent 4
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June 3,1992 i
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
Region i Administrator 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia,PA 19406
References:
(a)
Ucense No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271)
(b)
NRC Memorandum from T.E. Murley, Director. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, " Temporary Watvers of Compliance *, dated 2/22/90
Dear Sir:
Subject:
Request for Temporary Walser of Compliance from Technical Spectrication LCO Requirements Pertaining to Emergency Oleoel Generator The purpose of this letter is to document our request,in accordance with the guidance provided in Reference (b), for a temporary waiver of compilance from Technical Specification LCO requirements for Emergency Diesel Generator operability.
1.
Reouirements to be Waived:
Vermont Yankee Technical Specification 3.5.H.1 states the following:
During any period when one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days, provided that all of the Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Coollng Subsystems connecting to the operable diesel generator shall be operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be inillated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Vermont Yankee is requesting relief from the 7-day Limiting Condition for Operation of Section 3.5.H.1 for a period of 1 additional day with an emergency diesel generator (EDG) Inoperable.
The waiver would extend the available time to replace engine components and thoroughly test the unit prior to a return to operable status.
2.
D'scussion of Circumstances The "A* Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable on May 28,1992 at 1240 pm.
During a routine monthly EDG surveillance, a pecclem was noted with the lacket coolant system and the EDG was therefore declared inoperable pending investigation into the cause of the abnormalltles. Upon disassembly of the diesel engine, the #7 cylinder liner was found to have i
9206240359 920603 Pfm ADnCK 05000271 f g l
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V E 4 MON T YA NM CF *.u 24 4 POWL 4 L OH4 'OR A1 ION U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 3.1992 Page 2 a crack. In addition, further inspection revealed plating damage of tne liner and pitting damage of the upper piston in the #3 cytander. Tnese indications were in tha combustion area and not in the piston wear ring area.
Both liners and the #3 piston will be replaced.
3.
Comcensatory Actions As,equired by Technical Specifications, the alternate EDG was satisf actorily tested and all of tne Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling Subsystems connected to this operable EDG were venfled as operable. Additionally, the Vernon Hydro Station was notified of this situation and the dedicated tie-line to Vermont Yankee was verified as being available.
The Station Manager concurred with our reouest not to do anytning that would jeopardize the tie line availability as well as to notify Vermont Yankee of any change in the tie-line status.
It should be noted that use of the Vernon tie-line is addressed la operating procedures and operators are tratned in its use.
A thorough review of all planned surveillance acthntles was conducted and only those determined to be of low risk will be allowed. Based upon the short duration of this rcQuest, i
additional alternate testing of the *B" EDG and its subsystems was considered, and determined not to be necessary.
4.
Safety Sicnificance and Potential Consecuences The proposed one day extension has no impact on the consect.ences of any previously anatyred event if ctf-site power remains available. The afternate EDG was tested for operability cr:or to requesting the one-day extenston period. This gtves assurance that the avaltable EDG would function, if required. In addition, the Vernon tie-line, which has historically demonstrated a ve.y high reliabi!!!y, is available to supply power to the emergency bus. The reQuireme'Its of the Technical Specifications also require that during the one-day extension period, all remaining Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling systems connected to the operable EDG will remain operatie. The proposed change would allow the *A* EDG to remain inoperable for one additional day. Any accident whir.h could occur during this one-day period could have occurred in the previous seven-day period also. Therefore, the preposed change does not significantly increase the probability of an accident. Since this is an extension of only one day, the increased risk associated with an accident during this period is not significant.
Probabetistic Risk Analysis has estimated that the impact on the expected core damage frequency would be changed by less than 1 percent during the additional one day extension period.
I VF. AMON T YA NK CC NUC : C AR POWCH COHPOR ATION I
i U.S. Nuclear Reguletory Commission
. lune 3.1992 Page 3 l
5.
Duration of Recuest t
The proposed watver of compilance is for one time approval of reactor operation for up to eight (B) days with the EDG Inoperable. The current Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications allow reactor operation for seven m days wrth the EDG inoperable. Vermont Yankee believes that tne additional one day will provide sufficient margin to repair and thoroughty test the EDG without compromising the continued safe operation of the plant. It should be noted that a significant portion of the extra LCO time would be for *run-in* of the new components and operability testing. The EDG would be available during this period, but not considered cperable.
6.
Sionificant Hazards Consideration Vermont Yankee has concluded that the request does not invotve a significant hazards consideration in that the request would not:
()
involve a significant increase in the probablilty or consequences of an accident i
previously evaluated. As discussed in section 4, a one (1) day extension to an already existing seven @ day Limiting Condition for Operation would involve an insignificant increase in the probability of occurrence and consequences of a design bas!s accident during the extension period, 01) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those prarviously evaluated. The proposed change can have no impact on the possibl!1ty of a new or different initiating event. Any prevtously analyzed event postulated during the one-day extension period can be mitigated by the systems powered by the Vemon tie-line.
(iii) involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. As discussed above, approval of this recuest involves an insignificant reduction in the margin of safety because of the availability of other plant electrical systems and the short duration of the extension period. The change will have no significant impact on the consequences of any accident and will have no impact on any protecitve bouncary.
in summary, the waiver of compilance would provide a non-recurring, one-time approval of reactor operatlon for up to an additional day with the 'A' EDG inoperable. The walver of l
compilance would extend the existing Technical Specification LCO through Jur,e 5.1992 at 1240 pm. The watver of compilance will allow an additional one day to repair components and thoroughty test the EDG prior to retuming it to service.
W The Vermont Yankee Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) has reviewed this recuest 4
for a temporary waiver of compliance and concurs with the determinations presented.
l
VCRMONT YANKEE NUCL: A R POWER CORPOR ATION U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 3.1992 Page 4 7.
Environmental Consecuences No environmental consequences will result from approval of this request.
B.
Notification of State Vermont Yankee has notif!ad the State of Vermont of the content of this request and has forwarded a Copy of this document to the Vermont State Nuclear Engineer.
11is cur understanding that this request for a one-day temporary waiver of Compilance has been authertzed by telecon on June 3,1992 by James C. Unville (USNRQ to Donald A. Reid (WNPC).
We trust that the information provided adequately supports our request; however should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Very truly yours, Vermont Yankee Nuctsar Power Corporation l nf /
t.-
Warren P. Murphy
[,' l Senior Vice President. Operatiops V
cc:
USNRC Document Control Desk USNRC Director, NRR USNRC Director. Reactor Projects, NRR USNRC Director Office of Enforcement USNRC Technical Assistant. Reactor Projects. NRR USNRC Resident inspector (WNPC)
USNRC Project Manager. NRR VT Department of Public Service
4 VERMONT YANKEE
^""""'
NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION 3
Ferry Road Drattleboro. VT 053o1-70C2 0
-ON 2
ENGINEERING CFFICE d
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/J aooca.ua citso V
June 29,1992 United Sutes Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional !
475 Allendaje Road King of Prus112. PA 19406 Attn: Regional Administrator
References:
a)
License No. DPR.28 (Docket No. 50-271) b)
NRC Memorandum from T.E. Murley, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, *Tecnporary Waivers of Compliance", dated 2/22/90 Dezr Sir:
Subject:
Request for Ternporsry Walver of Compliance from Technical SpecificatJon LCO Requirernents Pertaining to Emergency Diesel Generator ne purpose of this letter is to documect our request, in accordance with the guidance provided in Reference b), tor a temporary waiver of compliance from Technical Specification LCO requirements for E=crgency Dier,el Generator operability.
1.
RMuirements to be Walved!
Vermont Yankee Technical Specification 3.5.H.1 states:
During any period when one of the sundby diesel generators is Inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days, provided that all of the 1.ow Pressure Core 1
Cooling and Containment Cooling Subsystems connecting to the operable diesel generator shall be operabic. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold thu:down condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Vermont Yankee is requesting relief from the 7-day Limiting Condition for Operation of Section 3.5.11.1 for a period of 48 additionti hours with an emergency diesej generator (EDG) moperable. The walver would e.itend the available time to replace engine componmts and thoroug:lly test the unit prior to a return to operable status.
920717c032 920701 PDR ADOCK 03000271 P
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I VERMONT YANKEC iNUCLLAR POWEA CORPOM AT K)N r
U.S. Nucleu F,cgulatory Commission i
June 29,1992 i
Page 2 2.
Dhemion of Clrtustancri We *A* Emergency Diesel Generator was deciered snoperat e on June 23,1992 at 0457 a.m.
i During a routine monthly EDG surveillance, the engloe tripped approximately 90 minutes into j
~
its scheduled 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> run from low Jacket cooling system pressure.
l Due to extensive rework earlier in June to troubleshoot and replace two cylinder !!ners. leaking cylinder a&pters were considered suspect. After an investigation of torque values for adaptri, j
lapping of cylinder liner sealing surfaces and installationof new gaskets, hydro tests of the jacket I
cooling system failed repeatedly. At this point, cylinder integrity was suspect and i was found t
i that the #10 cylinder wu leaking A crack was discovered that originates in the threaded adapter' connection in the cy!!nder liner.
i Vermont Yankee determined that the most conservative approach to the repalt of this diesel l
engine was to replace eleven of th: twelve cylinder liners with new improved liners. De twelfth j
liner in cylinder 13 was replaced a month ago.
j i
3.
Compensatorv Art! ens As required by Tcdtnical Specifications, the alternue EDG was satisfactorily tested and a!I of the Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling Subsystems connected to this operable EDG were verified as operable. Additionally, the Vernon Hydro Station was notilled of this i
situation and the dedicated tie-line to Vermont Yankee was verified as being available. He Station Manager concurred with our request not to do anything thu would jeopardize the tic line availability as well as to notify Vermont Yankee of any change in the tie-line status, j
lt should be noted that use of the Vemon tie-!!ne is addressed in operating procedures and operators are trained in its use, A thorough review of all planned surveillance activities was conducted and only those determined j
to be of low risk will be allowed. Based upon the short duration of this request, additional alternate testing of the *B* EDG and its subsystems was considered, and detercuned not to be i
necessary.
4.
Safc4v Srnificance and Poten at Con <ecuerices J
ne proposed 48 hout extension has no impact on the consequences of any previously analyzed
~
event if ott site power remalte available, ne alternate EDG was tested for operabt!!ry prior to requesting the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> estension period. This gives mutance that the available EDG would l
l function, if requtred. In addition, the Vemon tic-line, which has historically demonstrated a very high reliability, is available to supply power to the emergency bus, ne requirements of the Technical Specifications also require that during the LCO perid all remaining Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Coo!!cg systems connected to the operable EDG will remain cperable. He proposed extension would allow the "A* EDG to remain Inoperable for 45 additional hours. Any accident which could occur during this 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period could have occurred in the previous seven-day period also. Therefore, the proposed change does not significantly increase the probability of an accident. Stocc this is an extension of only 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the increased rist associated with an accident during this period is not,lgnificant.
a i NUCL.C AH POWER COHPOMrtoN U.S. %. lex Replatory Commission VERMONT W m
Jur.e
), l'rC i
Pop 3 I
5.
[ M tuan et umtu ne proposed waiver of compliance.s for approsal of reactor operation for up to nine (9) days with me EDG ir. operable. De current vermont Yankee Technical Specific.itions allow reactor cperation for seven (7) days wid ce EDG inoperable. Vermont Yarmee believes that the aJditional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> will povide suf5cient margin to repalt and thoroughly test the EDG without compromising the continu d safe operation of the plant. It should be noted that a significant portien of the citta LCO time would be for *run-in* of the new components and openbility testing. The EDG would be available during this period, but not considered operable.
Following approximately nine (9) hours of continuous operation at 70, 75, 87.5 ed 100% load, it is our intent to A!!uw the EDG to cooldown for a minimum of twelve (12) hours, ne return of de
- A* EDG to operable status would then occur after a sueecssful eight (8) hour operability run. Fellowing restoration of the *A* diesel generator to operable s.:us it is our intent to conduct an additional surveillance test of the *A* diesel generator within one week.
Dis testing would be conducted with careful monitoring of key diesel engine parameters to further substantiate satisfactory cperation. Additionally,if any significant, related problems are discovered during these test periods, such that the jacket coollng system problems do cut appear to be corrected, an orderly shutdown of the plant would be initiated.
He ~B* EDG will also be tested for eight hours, after declaring the *A* EDG operable, per the normal monthly surveillance procedure.
6.
Sgt,ificarlLila m rds ConsWrmtlen Vermont Yankee has concluded eiar the request does not involve a significant hazards consideration in th.st the request wou!d not:
(i) involve a sigmficant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. As discussed in section 4, a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> extension to an already existing seven (7) day Limiting Condition for Operation would involve an insignificant increase in ce probability of occurrence and consequences of a design basis accident during the extension period.
r In) create me possibihty of a new or different kind of accident fro n those previously evaluated. The proposed change can have no impact on the possibility of a new or different initiating event. Any previously analyzed event postulated during the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> extensivu perted can te mitigated by the systems powered by the Vernon tie-!!ne.
gii) involse a significAnt reda; tion in the margin of safety. As discussed above, approval of this request involves an insignificant reduction in the margin of safety because of the
[
availability of other plant electrical systems and de short duration of the extension period.
i In summary, de waiver of cc:npiiance would provide approval of reactor cperatica for up to as add;tional 45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br /> with Se " A* i.DG inoperaNe. The waiver of compliance would extend the existmg Techrueal Specification LCO through July 2.19o2 at 0457 am.
De walver of compliance w til diow.tn adJ!tum.d 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to repair componen's and diercughly test me EDG prior to r-turning it to s:rvice.
e VERMONT YANKEE WUCLE AR POWER CORPORATON U.S. Nuctur Regulatory Corrunission June 29,1992 Ptge 4 a
T?.e Vermor:t Yuice Pimt Operations Review Committee (PORC) and Nuclear Safety Audit md Review Committee (NSARC) bave reviewed this request for a ternporary waiver of compliat.e and concur with the deterrn! nations presented.
7.
Environmenal Corecouenets No c vironmental consequences will result from approval of this request.
8.
Not:nestfon of Sute Vermont Yankee hr.s notified the State of Vermont of the content of this request and has forwarded a copy of this document to the Vermont State Nuclear Engineer.
It is our understanding that this request for a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> temporary waiver of compilance h's been I
authorized by telecen on June 29,1992 by James C. Linville (USNRC) to Donald A. Reid (VYNPC).
We trust that the information provided adequately suppotts our iequest; however should you have any questions regarding this matter, pleast contact this office.
i t
Very truly yours, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation i
p, a Warren P. Mu,hy l
Senior Vic: P esident. Oper. o WPM /dm cc:
USNRC Document Control Dest USNRC Direcor, NRA USNRC Director, Reanor Projects, NRR USNRC Director Office of Enforcement USNRC Technical Assistut, Reactor Projects. NRR USNRC Resident inspector VYNPS USNRC Project Manager, VYNPS
{
VT Deptt::nect of Public Service e
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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION I
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Ferry nonc. Brattlecoro. VT 05301-7002
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July 31.1992 BVY 92 - 94 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Contml Desk i
l Washington, DC 20555 License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50 271)
References:
a.
{
b.
Letter. USNRC (Radani) to NUMARC (Rasin) "Appmval of NUMARC l
Documentation Station Blackout". dated October 7.1988 Letter. VYNPC to USNRC BVY 89-36, dated April 12.1989 l
c.
l d.
NUMARC 87-00 " Supplemental Questions and Answers, dated December 27,1989 i
NUMARC 87-00 " Major Assumptions", dated December 27.1989 l
e.
f.
NUMARC letter. " Station Blackout (SBO) Implementation: Request for Supplemental SBO Submittal to NRC". dated January 4.1990 Letter. USNRC (nadani) to NUMARC (Manoc), dated January 3.1990 l
g.
h.
Letter. VYNPC to USNRC. BVY 90-3R. dated March 30.1990 i.
Letter. VYNPC to USNRC. BVY 91-21. dated f'ebruary 28.1991 j.
Letter. USNRC to VYNPC NVY 91-98, dated June 5.1991 k.
t 1.
Letter. VYNPC to USNRC BVY 91-88, dated October 1.1991 Letter. USNRC to VYNPC NVY 92-16. dated F.tniary 21.1992 m.
i i
Subject:
10CFR50.63 Station Blackout (SBO)- Response to NRC Request for AdditionalInfomution Dear Sir.
l Dy letter dated February 21.19921 Reference (m)). NRC transmitted to Vermont Yankee a list of questions concerning the availability of the Vemon Ilydro Station. Answers to these
' l questions are considered necessary for NRC to complete the SBO review for Vermont Yankee.
Attached please find Vermont Yankee's response to Reference (m). Should you have any further questions, please contact this office.
Very truly yours.
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWE CORPORATION
$mdO.%h
.*i.
.v c t <.,
Leonard A. Tremblav. Jr.
J Senior Licensing Eng'incer Auxhment w:
USNRC Region 1 Administrator USNRC Resident inspector - VYNPS
e Attachment to 11VY 92-94
/
Question No.1 What provisions are in place or will be put in place to alert the Vemtont Yankee nuclear operators if at least 2.3 51W of Vernon Hydro is not available, or could not be made available (within 10 minutes) upon demand?
Itesponse The FERC operating license for the hydro station requires a minimum river flow of 1250 cfs. This 1250 cfs flow, if passed through the turbine-generator wheels, corresponds to an average electrical output of 3.5 31W available to Vermont Yankee.
Since the maximum safe shutdown load requirement for Vermont Yankee is 2.3 A1W, it is clear that the hydro station always has suflicient capacity to supply all loads required for a Station Blackout event under these conditions. New England Power has reconfirmed the operating directive requiring a minimum flow of 1250 cfs be directed through the water wheels, thus assuring 3.5 51W is available to Vennont Yankee.
Vermont Yankee and the Vernon Hydro station have a mutual understanding, recently confirmed with Vernon Hydro station management, that Vermont Yankee will be notined of an anticipated unavailability of the tie line that supplies Vermont Yankee from Vernon Hydro. It is a long-standing, customary practice for Vermont Yankee, Vernon Hydro station, and all other electrical suppliers on the grid to notify individuals that may be affected prior to any planned switcning, connection. or disconnection of electrical supply; changes in the availability of the tie line with Vermont Yankee would be no exception. In addition, Vennont Yankee operators monitor tie line voltage and Vernon Hydro total power output in the control room.
These provide information regarding the loss of voltage on the tie line, and the loss of hydro station generator output for any reason. Even in the rare instance where the Vernon Hydro power output is zero, power can still be prodded by the separate 69-kV grid through the Vernon Hydro tie line to Vermont Yankee.
The Lie line between the Vernon Hydro station and Vermont Yankee is normully energized, and the breaker to control connection of the tie line to emergency buses is under Vermont Yankee control. Connection of Vernon Hydro power to Vermont Yankee emergency buses can be mado directly from the Vermont Yankee control room.
1
s Question No. 2 If a LOOP and subsequent SHO at the nuclear plant is due to an extensive grid failure which result.s in the separation of the hydro generation from the grid, what steps and how much time (realistically under these conditions) would be required by the nucIcar plant operators and the operators at the hydro plant to re-energize the line to the nuclear plant. (with required KW available), assuming (1) that the pre-existing hydro plant. load does not completely separate from the hydro generation (ie.
the load equals the hydro generation), and (2) that. the pre. existing load separates from the hydro generation?
Responso In addressing Station Blackout. requirements, Vermont Yankee considered a loss of the 345-kV and 115-kV lines, which constitute the normal omite power supply. The Vernon Hydro station connects to tho G9-kV system, and is not, considered a nonnal source of offsite power to Vermont Yankee. It. is extremely unlikely for common mode failum of Vernon Hydro and Vermont Yankee's o%ite and onsite power to occur.
Vernon Hydro station generators are not normally connected the Vermont Yankee emergency buses; the equipment is of different manufacturer; the equipment is maintained and operated by a separate organization. Vernon Hydro is connected to a 69-kV transmission system which is not. directly electrically connected to Vermont Yankee's offsite power sources, thus providing electrical independence and minimizing the potential for common cause failure due to electrical faults, switching problems, or other grid related losses of power. The hydro station is connected to its own switchyard which is physically separated from Vermont Yankee's switchyard (appmximately 1 mile), and the transmission lines emanating from the station are routed on separate rights of way. The majority of the lines emanating from the hydro station are ruuted in completely different directions from the lines supplying offsite power to Vermont Yankee.
'While the tie line from Vernon Hydro to Vennont. Yankee is nonnally energized.
( Vermont. Yankee does not constitute a nonnal (pre existing) load for the hydro j
' station. Since hydro station house loads are inconsequential, the only pre-existing I
loads are gnd loads. In tho highly unlikely event of a regional blackout, the hydro l
station would separate from the gHd. Vernon Hydro station has the capability to }
black start, and provido power to Vermont. Yankee within an hour. Vennont Yankee is considered a priority load in accordance with Vernon Hydro Station Operating Itules.
l a
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$4 9
Question No.
ARer the AAC source is connected to the safety bt, u J 9 nuc! car plant, how will the loads be sequenced on (manually or automatica n.
A versus timed For this j
loading sequence, and assuming a LOOP and SBO as ccscribed above and mmimum y
pre-existing hydro generation, what tests have been or will be made per 10 CFit 50.63(aX2)(sic) to assure that there will be adequate voltage and power availability at the Vermont Yankec safety bus? Provide a description of the tests and any supporting analysis including results if available, or provide the descriptions and a schedule for implementation.
Itesponse r
f As discussed in our submittal BVY 9169, dated July 17, 1991, the automatically sequenced loads for either emergency bus are less than 600lGV. The remaining loads f
No, OT '1122.will be manually sequenced on in accordance with Vermont Yankee's LNP Tests of the Vernon Hydro lire are conducted in accordance with j
Vermont Yankee Procedure No. OP 4142, ~Vernon Tie Suncillance."
Plarn. mode,
\\
}
system operating configuration, and circuit breaker interlocks make it physically k
impossible to conduct these tests at the full 2.3 MW load anticipated during a sution blackout Vermont Yankee in evaluating hardware changes that would al'ow testing at full SBO load. However, there are no plans to perform increased load testing until i
the tie line is modified in conjunction with the Vernon Hydro station upgrade, at which time testing will be readdressed. (Also, tests required by 10 CFR 50.63(cx2) i relate to time, not capacity.)
g
O preliminary load flow analysis shows, for conservatively assumed initial loads, that adequate voltage and power can be made available to the 4160-volt and 480 volt emergency buscs. Due to the vintage of the hydro station generators' voltage regulators, we cannot at this time analytically predict what the voltage levels will be upon application of the largest load to the 4160 volt bus. However, engineering personnel from hydro operations and from central dispatching who are familiar with the operation and responsiveness of the hydro generators, are confident tho these units can power the largest Vermont Yaitkee load. Additionally, as discussed m our submittal BVY 91-69, Vermont Yankee will be implementing a design change to upgrade the tie line from Vernon Hydro. This is scheduled to coincide with the hydro station upgrade. With this equipment in place, we will be able to analytically show adequate voltage and power availability for all Vermont Yankee loads.
t h
HARMON. CLTIRAN, GALLAGHER & SPIELBERG 2001 S STREET. N.W UN SUITE 430 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20009-1133 FEB 25 P2 36 GAIL McGREEVY liARMON TELEPHONE
+
DIANE CURRAN (202) 328 3500 ANNE SPIELBERG FAX JANNE G. GALLAGHER
'Vi (202) 328 4918 JESSICA A. LADD*
Of Counsel:
6 DEAN R. TOUSLEY ERIC R. GUTZENSTEIN KADiLRINE A MFYER February 24, 1993
'Adrmited ordy m Massachuscru BY HAND Rules and Directives Review Branch Divison of Freedcm of Information and Publication Services i
Office of Administration U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 l
t
SUBJECT:
Proposed Sionificant Hazards Findina for Vermont Yankee Operatina License Amendnent i
To Whom It May Concern:
On February 22, 1993, I filed with your office-the New England l
Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments In Opposition to Pro-posed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration.
NECNP's j
comments were accompanied by the unsigned affidavit of Robert D.
l Pollard, who was out of town at the time.
Mr. Pollard has
]
returned and I am now enclosing the executed original of his af-i fidavit.
In addition, paragraph 5 of Mr. Pollard's affidavit has been cor-i rected to restore parts of the fourth and fifth sentences that were inadvertently omitted from the copy that was filed on Febru-ary 22.
Thank you for your consideration.
i
?
Sincerely, r
hC% C%
4.
Diane Curran.
j cc:
Docketing and Service Office of General Counsel Thomas G.
Dignan, Esq.
M,00 N i
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4)
In the course of my six and a half years with the AEC and NRC, I performed technical reviews, analyses and evaluations r
of designs of systems and components necessary for safe operation of reactor facilities under normal, abnormal and emergency condi-tions for the purpose of determining whether such systems com-plied with NRC rulev and provided an acceptable level of safety fnr the public.
5)
For the past fifteen years, I,
along with other members of the Union of Concerned Scientists' professional staff, have conducted numerous studies pertaining to the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants, both on a generic and plant-specific basis.
I have provided technical analysis for UCS's participation in rulemaking proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for UCS's litigation against the NRC for failure to fulfill its responsibilities under the Atomic En-crgy Act.
I testified before the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island which investigated that 1979 acci-
[
dent.
I participated as an expert witness in the NRC's ad-l judicatory proceeding on the restart of Three Mile Island Unit 1.
I have also testified on matters pertaining to reactor safety be-1 fore numerous committees of the United States Congress and vari-ous other state and local legislative and administrative bodies.
Thus, my 23 years of professional experience on the technical staffs of the AEC, NRC, and UCS have given me first-hand knowl-l edge of NRC regulations and how they are developed, administered, and interpreted.
~
6)
I have reviewed all of the documents referenced in New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration (Feb-ruary 22, 1993).
I am also familiar with NRC regulations and j
regulatory guidance governing the design and operability of diesel generators.
7)
The factual statements made in the attached New England j
Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Pro-l posed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration are true 1
)
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
J Robert D.
Pollard k
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24 day of February, 1993.
I
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Votar? Public j
My Commission expires 3/fD.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
)
In the Matter of
)
)
l Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
[
Power Station)
)
}
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. POLLARD I,
Robert D.
Pollard, do make oath and say:
1)
My name is Robert D.
Pollard.
Since February 1976, I have been employed as a nuclear safety engineer by the Union of Concerned Scientists.
My business address is 1616 P Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
20036.
Previously, I was employed ~by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Licensing Pro-ject Manager for commercial nuclear power plants.
2)
In May 1959, I enlisted in the United States Navy and was selected to serve as an electronics technician in the nuclear power program.
After completing the required training, I became an instructor responsible for teaching naval personnel both the theoretical and practical aspects of operation, maintenance and i
repair for nuclear propulsion plants.
From February 1964 to April 1965, I served as the senior reactor operator, supervising the reactor control division aboard the U.S.S.
Sargo, a nuclear-i powered submarine.
In May 1965, I was honorably discharged from the U.S.
Navy and attended Syracuse University, where I received the degree of Bachelor of Science maana cum laude in electrical engineering in June 1969.
3)
In July 1969, I was hired by the United States Atomic
,f Energy Commission (AEC) and continued as a technical expert with the.AEC and its successor, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) until February 1976.
After joining the AEC, I completed a year of graduate studies in advanced electrical and i
nuclear engineering at the Graduate School of the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.
I subsequently advanced to the posi-tions of Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) and Project Manager with AEC/NRC.
As a Reactor Engineer, I was primarily responsible
{
for performing detailed technical reviews analyzing and evaluat-ing the adequacy of the design reactor protection systems, con-trol systems and emergency electrical power systems in proposed nuclear facilities.
In September 1974, I was promoted to the i
position of Project Manager and became responsible for safety reviews of applications for licenses to construct and operate several commercial power plants.
i
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.W C 93 FEB 24 P3 :39 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.n.
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARDa.
~
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Dkt. No. 50-271-OLA Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL *S REQUEST FOR HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO VERMONT YANKEE OPERATING LICENSE For the reasons set forth in the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's ("NECNP") Comments In Opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration, its supporting affidavit, and NECNP's Request for Hearing on Proposed Amendment to Vermont Yankee Operating License, attached hereto as
- exhibits, and incorporated herein by reference, the Massachusetts Attorney General requests that a hearing be held on the license amendment requested by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
(" Yankee").
A signed copy of the supporting affidavit is being filed this date by NECNP.
Notice of the proposed license amendment is found at Fed. Reg. Vol. 58, No. 12, page 5435.
The Massachusetts Attorney General is an elected representative of the citizens cf Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
A significant portion of Yankee's emergency planning zone is within the Commonwealth's borders.
The
-1
1 s
Commission should hold a hearing on whether the proposed amendment poses an undue risk to public safety.
If such a hearing is held, the Massachusetts Attorney General requests the opportunity to participate in the hearing.
u Respectfully submitted, l
SCOTT HARSHBARGER l
ATTORNEY GENERAL l
l b
Leslie B. Greer Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton place, 19th Floor l
e Boston, MA 02108 k/#
i3 (617) 727-2200 Dated:
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA Ver=ont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
NEW ENGIAND COALITION ON NU N AR POLLUTION'S COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Introduction the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on January 21, 1993, issued public notice of an operating li-("NRC" or " Commission")
by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Cor-cense amend =ent request which would permit Vermont Yankee to poration (" Vermont Yankee"),
perform extensive maintenance on the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Pow "B" diesel generator for fourteen days dur-Station's ("VYNPS's")
i ing the current operating cycle, while the reactor is operating l
at power.1 58 Fed. Reg. 5,435.
The NRC proposes to make a deternination of no significant hazards consideration regarding the proposed license a=endnent.
The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP")
op-poses the proposed finding of no significant hazards considera-
'5 NECNP's Opposition is supported by the affidavit of Robert tion..
As dis-D. Pollard, a nuclear safety engineer.
NECNP has requested a hearing on the propose 1
Operating License Amendment (February 22, 1993).
ment.
WHth IT g _
the intentional disabling of one of Vorment Yankca cussed bolow, two diesel generators would Nuclear Power Station's ("VYNpS's")
17, the NRC's fundamen-violate General Design Criterion ("GDC")
tal requirement that onsite electric power supplies must "have independence, redundancy, and testability to perform sufficient 10 C.F.R.
their safety functions assuming a single failure."
Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17.
In addition, the proposed amendment which contain no violates the technical specifications for VYNPS, Tators from provision for deliberate removal of the diesel ga:
On its face, ty, 2-2 service during power operation.
in intentional disabling cf an essential safety system, the NRC regulatory j
violation of the NRC's General Design Criteria, and VYNPS technical specifications, raises significant
- guidance, Accordingly, pursuant to Section hazards considerations.
189a(2)(A) of the Atcric Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
S 2239 (a) (2) (A),
the NRC must provide a hearing on the proposed license amendment beform it can be issued.
I.
STATLrtENT OF FACTS 1
VYNPS has two standby diesel generators which constitute the l
onsite electrical power supply for the plant's structures, sys-GDC 17 requires that tems, and components i=portant to safety.
each of the diesel generators must be safety grade and designed capacity and capability" to maintain plant to "proside sufficient safety during design basis accidents, assuming a loss of offsite power.
and the plant's Limiting Conditions for Pursuant to GDC 17 VYNPS cannot be operated at power unless Operation ("LCO's"),
REB II 93 ~ 03: MS11
-~.
As providad by Tochnical both diesel generators are functional.
3.10.A.1, Specification ("TS")
Both energency diesel generators shall be operable and and fre-capable of starting and reaching rated voltage quency in not nore than 13 seconds.
A limited exception to this requirement is provided in TS 3.5.H.1:
During any period when one of the standby diesel gener-ators is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days, pro-vided that all of the Low Pressure Core Cooling and i
Containment Cooling Subsystems connecting to the operable diesel generator shall be operable.
t However, TS 3.5.H.1 also states that "If this requirement canno an orderly shutdewn shall be initiated and tne reactor be net, shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."
On three previous occasions, Vermont Yankee has invoked TS for the purpose of repairing diesel generators at power.
3.5.H.1 the NRC granted Vernont Yankee permission to inten-In 1990, hile tionally disable and overhaul one of its diesel generators w a local hydroelectric sta-operating at power, on the ground that tion was available to provide backup power.2 Egg Memorandum from Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Thomas Thocas E. Murley, (May 18, 1990) and T. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region I enclosures, Attachnent 2.
the practice of intentionally disabling As discussed below, diesel generators while at power in order to make routine 2
repairs is not permitted by either GDC 17 or the technicalTh specifications for VYNPS. erred when it granted permission for the 1 repairs.
tez rEE 21 *Pi 03:10m
-4 Vermon2 Last year, on two separate occasions a month apart, Yankee declared its "A" diesel generator inoperable after "ab-normalities were encountered with the jacket cooling system.
to United States Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Ver=cnt Yankee, Proposed Change No. 166, One-Nuclear Regulatory Commission re:
LCO Period to Sup-Time Extended Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2 (December 15, 1992) (hereinafter port Maintenance Activities at
" Murphy Letter"), Attachment 3.
On May 28, 1992, and again on Vermont Yankee began diesel generator repairs June 23, 1992, while the reactor was at power, as permitted by TS 3.5.H.1 for When Vermont Yankee found that
" inoperable" diesel generators.
be completed within 7 days, as required these repairs could not it applied for and receivxd temporary waivers by TS 3.5.H.1, which allowed a one-day extension for the repairs begun in May, Ege BVY and a two-day extension for the repairs begun in June.
to United Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee,92-068, 1992);
BVY 92-074, States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (June 3, to United States Letter from Warren F. Murphy, Vermont Yankee, 1992), Attachments 4 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (June 29, 5, respectively.
surveillance of the "B" diesel According to vermont Yankee, revealed any indication" of the problems which generator "has not Murphy Letter at 2.
rendered "A" diesel generator inoperable.
Yankee deemed it " prudent" to make the same l
Nevertheless, Vermont it had made to the "A" "B" diesel generator that repairs to the diesel generator "at the earliest opportunity."
Id.
Rather than W
4
F.6 RE ZI *:I OI:11R1 r
5-waiting until the next refueling outage or scheduling an cutago NRC re-to =ake the repairs, Vermont Yankee submitted a letter to i
questing a change to TS 3.5.H.1 which would allow a "one-t me ex-days in which to make those tension" from the LCO of 7 days to 14 repairs, as well as to conduct the routine 18-month overhaul of I
On January Murphy Letter, Attachnent 3.
the diesel generator.
the NRC published a Tederal Register notice of the pro-21, 1993, along with a proposed finding that no posed license amendment, is required because it poses no prior hearing on the amendment significant hazards consideration.
THE PROPOSED LICENSE AMENDMENT POSES SIGNIF II.
CONSIDERATIONS.
Statutory and Regulatory Pramework A.
of the Atomic Energy Act and Pursuant to Section 189a(2) (A) i the NRC may not issue an operating license i
before granting a public hearing unless it determines anencnent ao significant hazards consid-that the proposed amendment poses l
the amend =ent wou1A H21:
eration,"
i.e.,
that increase in the probability (1) Involve a significant or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; Create the possibility of a new or different kind frca any accident previously evaluated; or (2) of accident Involve a significant reduction in the margin of (3) safety.
In passing the enabling legislation for this regulatory provi-sion, Congress recognized that issuing the order in advance of a hearing would as a foreclose the public's right to have its views considered.
In additien, the licensing board practical matter, would often be unable to order any substantial relief of an after-the-fact hearing.
as a result f
TEE II *?1 03:?asi
. 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 37-38 (1982).
Conf. Rep. No.97-884, Thus, the conferees noted their intent that in-in determining whether a proposed license amendment volves no significant hazards consideration, the com-mission should be especially sensitive to the issues posed by license amendments that have irreversible con-(such as those permitting an increase in the amount of effluents or radiation emitted from a facil-sequences to coorate for a period of ity or allowine a facility time without full safety orotections.)
Id. (emphasis added)
In response to Congress' expression of concern, the Commis-sion "made clear" in the preamble to S S0.92 that an amendment which allows a plant to operate at full power during which one or more safety systems are not operable would be treated in the same way as other ex-amples considered likely to involve a significant hazards consideration.
Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Consid-erations, 51 Ted. Reg. 7,744, 7,750, Col. 3 (March 6, 1986).
In addition, the Commission " charge [d] the NRC staff to assure that doubtful or borderline cases are not found to involve no sig-51 Fed. Reg. at 7,753, Cols. 2-nificant hazards consideration."
3.
The Proposed License Amendment Raises Significant B.
Hazardr. Considerations l
involving the disabling of a The circumstances of this case, f
major safety component in violation of NRC General Design f
Criteria and VYNPS technical specifications, raise significant Even were these hazards considerations in the starkest terms.
violations more " doubtful or borderline" [51 Ted. Reg. at 7,753, the serious safety questions raised by the proposed Cols. 2-3),
1
rcE. N.1 amend =ent would dictate against the iscuanca of a no oignificant hazards consideration finding, and require the granting of a Yankee's proposed license amendment.
prior hearing on Vernont The Proposed Amendment Involves the Intentional 1.
Disabling of A Safety System, In Violation of GDC 17.
Under the Connission's standards for finding no significant hazards considerations, Eat 51 Fed. Reg. at 7,750, Col.
3, there can be no question that the proposed amendment raises "sig-nificant hazards" considerations, because it would allow the VYNPS to operate "at full power during which one or more safety syste=s [i.e., the "B" diesel generator) are not operable," in direct violation of GDC 17.
The importance of compliance with GDC 17 cannot be gainsaid.
GDC 17 is one of the NRC's "mininun establishes the " principal design criteria" requirements" that and components that provide reasonable for " structures, systons, assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public."
Introduction to 10 C.F.R.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the onsite Part 50, Appendix A.
GDC 17 assures that offsite power supply to power safety systems, power systens are unavailable, and requires the provision of onsite power supplies "with sufficient independence, redundancy, 1
and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a
)
i single failure."
Thus, in evaluating whether Vernont Yankee's diesel generators comply with GDC 17, it must be assumed that (a) no offsite power is available and (b) one of the two diesel gen-If the remaining diesel generator were in-erators has failed.
1 l
4
rcs 22 s 03ry m I ~
license k
tentionally disabled, as proposed in Vermont Yan oo s i
inst a acendment application, VYNPS would have no protect on aga failure of a diesel generator, in direct violation of CDC single 17.
is clear that such a violation of GDC 17 could Moreover, it in all three of the aspects by increase accident risk at VYNPS which NRC judges "significant hazards" under 10 C.F.R. S With respect to the first criterion, the inten-50.92 (c) (1)-(3).
i ificantly tional disabling of the "B" diesel generator would s gn compound the " probability or consequences" associated with a i
the unavailability of i.e.,
"previously evaluated" accident as generators during a loss of offsite power, one of the diesel If the "B" diesel generator is inten-conter. plated by GDC 17.
d to tionally disabled and the "A" diesel generator must be assume this would leave VYNPS without be disabled as required by GDC 17, Under such circumstances, a design any source of onsite power.
i basis accident would be transfor=ed to a beyond design bas s ac-f with the potential for meltdown and catastrophic con-
- cident,
/
the proposed amendment raises significant sequences.
- Thus, hazards considerations under the second criterion of 5 l
Finally, the significantly increased probability and consequences
\\
l of a serious accident would obviously involve a "significant thus establish-reduction in the margin of safety" at the plant, ing a significant hazard under S 50.92 (c) (3).
\\
m FEE II '93 03: ??Pn.
The Intentional Disabling of a Dicsnl Generator for Repairs at Power Violates Vermont Yankee's 2.
?
Technical Specifications and NRC Regulatory Guid-ance.
Vermont Yankee's operating license amendment application is is already entitled, through its based on the assu=ption that it to disable and repair the "B" diesel technical specifications, and that all it requires is an extension of generator at power, Egg Hur-the seven-day period f or repairs' allowed by TS 3.5.H.1.
However, Vermont Yankee's position is based on phy letter at 1.
interpretation of VYNPS's technical specifications.
an incorrect the intentional disabling of a diesel generator for In fact, repairs that could otherwise be postponed until a planned outage violates the VYNPS technical specifications.
the principal VYNPS technical specifi-Pursuant to GDC 17, requires cation governing standby diesel generators, TS 3.10. A.1, f
that both diesel generators =ust be " operable and capable o reaching rated voltage and frequency in not more than 13 sec-upon which Ver=ont Yankee relies, creates a onds."
TS 3.5.H.1, limited exception to this rule, providing that "During any period when one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable, con-d tinued reactor operation is permissible only during the succee -
ing seven days vermont Yankee apparently interprets the term " inoperable",
to include the intentional disabling of as used in TS 3.5.H.1,
- Thus, the diesel generators for routine or non-urgent repairs.
TS 3.5.H.1 permits it to intentionally as read by Vermont Yankee, its diesel generators for repairs at any time, as disable one of f
TEE 11 'M 05: 3 pm F.11 10 o How-long as the duration of the repairs does not exceed 7 days.
ever, such a broad interpretation of the exception in TS 3.5.H.1 and TS would swallow the general rule established by GDC 17 that VYNPS cannot operate unless both diesel generators 3.10.A.1, I
are operable and available.
In effect, under Vermont Yankee's interpretation of the technical specifications, a diesel genera-1 tor could be disabled for repairs every two weeks, as long as the repairs could be finished in seven days.
Vermont Yankee's interpretation of its technical specifica-1 tions is also inconsistent with the guidance set forth in Reg.
after the Guide 1.93, which contemplates at power repairs only reactor have been balanced acainst the.
rinks of shuttina down tne one diesel cenerator:
risks of continuina to Operste with only it nay be safer to continue Under certain conditions, full er reduced power for a limited time operation at an in=ediate shutdown on the loss of than to effect Such de-some of the required electric power sources.
cisions should be based on an evaluation that balances the riska associated with im=ediate shutdown against If, on these associated with continued operation.
the innediate shutdown is the safer course,
- balance, unit should be brought pro =ptly to an orderly shutdown, For exam-and to a cold shutdown as soon as possible.
plc, the risks associated with an im=ediate shutdown on power supply during a period of the loss of onsite a.c.
light system load would tend to be less than those dur-ing a peak load period because the stability of theIf, offsite power system would be relatively higher.
continued power operation is the safer on balance, the period of continued operation should be
- course, used to restere the lost source and to prepare for an of course, that these ac-orderly shut down, provided, tivities do not risk further degradation of the elec-tric power systen or in any way jeopardize plant safety.
Reg. Guide 1.93 at 1.
Under this standard, the cnly acceptable i
justification for repairing the diesel generators at power would
rEE II '23 03:1311.
i is safer to do that than to chut the plant be a showing that it could be made only if the diesel genera-i down -- an argument that or so unreliable as to be effectively ter was upable to function,
[
Those circumstances do not exist here, where the "B"
i diesel generator is functional, and Vermont Yankee seeks perm s-i i
i sion simply to make non-urgent repairs and to conduct rout ne the Thus, under the guidance of Reg. Guide 1,93, maintenance.
in-VYNPS technical specifications cannot be read to permit the f
tentional disabling of the diesel generators in order to per orm 1
routine repairs.
Yankee's proposal to intentionally disable Because Vermont the "B" diesel generator during power operation constitutes a departure from its technical specifications governing important i
necessarily raises "significant hazards con-safety functions, it while the NRC staff concluded (erroneous-siderations."
In fact, I
Vermont Yankee's 1990 bid to overhaul its that ly, NECNP submits) diesel generator during pcwer operation was sanctioned by its "this l
technical specificatiens, the staff noted its concern that Memorandum from maintenance practice' poses a noteworthy risk."
Reactor Projects Branch No.
3, Region I, to R.
J. Johnson, Chief, Directorate I-3, NRR (April 6, 1990), Enclosure to At-
- Wessman, tachnent 2.
9 2
l i
t
m
[
rrE 2; '93 03:Isn 12 -
The Existence of the Vernon Tie-Line Would Not 3.
Compensate for the Disabled Diesel Generator Under GDC 17.
Vermont Yankee attempts to satisfy the no significant hazards standard by arguing that there will be no significant change in the types of potential accidents at VYNPS or decrease in the nargin of safety of the plant, "because of the including the availability of other plant electrical systems, Vernon tie line" from a local hydropower station.
Murphy letter at 5.
However, this argument ignores GDC 17, which provides quite clearly that offsite power sources, such as the Vernon tie cannot be used as substitutes for onsite power sources in
- line, order to satisfy the requirenents for backup power supply.
Moreover, even if GDC 17 could be ignored, and the Vernon tic line could be credited as a backup electricity supply, far tco nany questions exist about the capacity and reliability of the Vernon tie line as a source of backup power to safety sys-tens.
For instance, as ver=ont Yankee has conceded, it is in-the Vernon tie-line under a full station black-possible to test out load.
BVY 92-94, Letter from Leonard A.
Tremblay, Jr., Ver-to United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, re:
ment Yankee, 19CFRSO.63 Station Blackout (SBO) - Response to NRC Request for at 3 (July 31, Additional Information, Attachnent to BVY 92-94 1992), Attachment 6.
Moreover, Vernent Yankee admits that "[d]ue to the vintage of the hydro station generators' voltage regulators," it is unable to " analytically predict" what the voltage levels will be upon application of the largest load to the 4160-volt energency bus.
Id. at 3.
Instead, Vermont Yankee
FE5 22 'M cFO$si
_ 13 relies on the engineering judgment of hydro operators and dis-patchers from outside Ver=ent Yankee, who are not licensed by KRC and who have no responsibility for the safety of VYNPS.
In sum, ver=ont Yankee has neither e=pirical evidence nor analytical results to de=onstrate that the Vernon tie line has " sufficient Ac-capacity and capability" to meet the require =ents of GDC 17.
cordingly, the existence of the Vernon tie-line provides no basis for a no significant hazards finding in this case.
CONCLUSION Ver=ont Yankee has failed to demonstrate that the proposed involves no significant hazards considerations; license anendment it would significantly increase the risk to in fact, on its face, Accor-public health and safety posed by operation of the VYNPS.
dingly, the NRC should reverse its proposed finding of no sig-nificant hazards considerations, and order a prior hearing on the proposed license amendment.
Respectfully submitted,
-sfJk~
Kane Curran HARMON, CURRAN, GALLAGHER &
SPIELBERG 2001 "S" Street N.M.
Washington, D.C.
20009 (202) 328-3500 Counsel to NECNP February 22, 1993
N FG ZZ '91 03: eft 1 Attachme::t 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. POLLARD I, Robert D. Pollard, do make oath and say:
1)
My name is Robert D. Pollard.
Since February 1976, I have been e= ployed as a nuclear safety engineer by the Union of Concerned Scientists.
My business address is 1616 P Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
20036.
Previously, I was employed by the-United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Licensing Pro-ject Manager for commercial nuclear power plants.
2)
In May 1959, I enlisted in the
- States Navy and m
an in the nuclear was selected to serve as an electronics te After ce=pleting the requiia raining, I became power program.
an instructor responsible for teaching naval > rsonnel both the theoretical and practical aspects of operation, maintenance and From February 1964 to repair for nuclear propulsion plants.
I served as the senior reactor operator, supervising April 1965, the reactor control division aboard the U.S.S.
Sargo, a nuclear-In May 1965, I was honorably discharged from powered submarine.
Navy and attended Syracuse University, where I received the U.S.
in electrical the degree of Bachelor of Science magna cum laude engineering in June 1969.
I was hired by the United States Atomic 3)
In July 1969, and continued as a technical expert with Energy Con =ission (AEC) the AEC and its succestor, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Com=ission (NRC) until February 1976.
After joining the AEC, I completed a year of graduate studies in advanced electrical and nuclear engineering at the Graduate School of the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque.
I subsequently advanced to the posi-tions of Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) and Project Manager As a Reactor Engineer, I was primarily responsible with AEC/NRC.
for performing detailed technical reviews analyzing and evaluat-con-ing the adequacy of the design reactor protection systems,
- sed trol systems and c=ergency electrical power systems in prt_
nuclear facilities.
In September 1974, I was promoted to the position of Project Manager and became responsible for safety l
reviews of applications for licenses to construct and operate several commercial power plants.
J 1
mi In the course of my six and a half years with the AEC 4)
I performed technical reviews, analyses and evaluations and NRC, of designs of systems and components necessary for safe operation of reactor facilities under normal, abnormal and emergency condi-of determining whether such systems com-tions for the purpose plied with NRC rules and provided an acceptable level of safety for the public.
5)
For the past fifteen years, I, along with other members of the Union of Concerned Scientists' professional staff, have conducted numerous studies pertaining to the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants, both on a generic and plant-specific basis.
I have provided technical analysis for UCS's participation in rulemaking proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for UCS's litigation against the NRC its responsibilities under the Atomic En-for failure to fulfill I testified before the President's Commission on the ergy Act. at Three Mile Island which investigated that 1979 acci-AccidentI participated as an expert witness in the NRC's ad-dent.
judicatory proceeding on =atters pertaining to reactor safety be-fore numerous committees of the United States Congress and vari-legislative and administrative bodies.
ous other state and local my 23 years of professional experience on the technical
- Thus, and UCS have given me first-hand knowl-staffs of the AEC, NRC, administered, edge of NRC regulations and how they are developed, and interpreted.
reviewed all of the documents referenced in New 6)
I have England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in opposition to Proposed Tinding of No Significant Hazards Consideration (Feb-I am also familiar with NRC regulations and ruary 22, 1993).
regulatory guidance governing the design and operability of diesel generators.
The factual state =ents made in the attached New England 7)
Coalition en Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Pro-posed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration are true and correct to the test of my knowledge and belief.
Rccert D.
Pollard 1993.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this __ day of February, Notary Publ2c My Ccamission expires
?
1 i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION'S REQUEST FOR BEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO VERMONT YANKEE OPERATING LICENSE Jntroduction the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on January 21, 1993,
("NRC" or "Co= mission") issued public notice of an operating li-cense anendment request by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Cor-poration ("Vernont Yankee"), which would permit Vermont Yankee to perform extensive maintenance on the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power "B" diesel generator for fourteen days dur-Station's ("VYNPS's")
operating cycle, while the reactor is operating ing the current at power.
58 Fod. Reg. 5,435.1 Pursuant to Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. S 2239(a), the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("HECNP") hereby requests an adjudicatory hearing on the proposed license ar ndment.
The NRC also proposed to make a deterimination of no sig-nificant hazards consideration regarding the proposed license 1
In a separate pleading filed today, NECNP seeks acendnent.
New Eng-reversal of the NRC staff's proposed determination.
land Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration (February 22, 1993).
- E Y' (4 IG1T B
m-
.n.. >
I)
Description of Potitioner The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP),
founded in 1971, is a nonprofit educational association based in Its with members throughout the New England states.
- Vermont, purpose is to inform and educate the public concerning the hazards of nuclear power and the availability and benefits of NECNP has actively par-safer and more efficient energy sources.
in many NRC rulemakings and in licensing and enforce-ticipated ment proceedings regarding the safety of nuclear power plants *in The health and safety of NECNP's members, most of New England.
would be affected by an ac-who reside in the New England states, cident at the Vermont Yankee plant.
Nature of NECNP's Right Under the Act to be Made a Party to II.
the Proceeding In any licensing proceeding for a nuclear facility, Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act guarantees a hearing "to any person 42 interests may be affected" by the licensing action.
whose The right to intervene under Section 189a is U.S.C. 5 2239(a).
governed by " contemporaneous judicial concepts of standing,"
l the action being challenged could cause injury-i.e., whether (1) in-fact to the petitioner, and (2) such injury is arguably within protected by the Atomic Energy Act or the the zone of interest Vernont Yankee Nuclear Power National Environnental Policy Act.
LBP-90-6, 31 NRC Station (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station),
citina Portland General Electric Co._ (Pebble 85, 89 (1990),
i' Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 613-i 14 (1976).
i i
rEE II '93 03:321 m
-3 NECNP meets the Commission's requiremonts for caserting See Houston Lichtina and standing on behalf of its members.
P__ower Co. (South Texas Project, Units I and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 447-48 (1979), aff'd, ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644 (1979).
As demonstrated in the attached affidavits of Charles R. Gorsuch, Jessie Haas, and David N. Pyles, NECNP has members who live within 25 miles of the VYNPS, who have authorized NECNP to inter-vene in this proceeding on their behalf, and whose safety would be adversely affected by the unsafe operation of the VYNPS under the proposed license a=endment.
NECNP meets the Commission's special standing test
- Moreover, for operating license amendment proceedings, i.e.,
that the presumption of standing for organizational members who live within 50 miles of a nuclear facility applies only in those cases involving "significant" amendments involving " obvious potential for offsite consegeences."
Florida Power & Licht Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Planc, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-21, 30 NRC 325, 329-As discussed in detail in New England Coalition on 30 (1989).
Nuclear Follution's Comments in Opposition to Proposed Finding of l
r No Significant Hazards Consideration,' filed today and attached D
and incorporated by reference herein, the proposed license amend-4
=ent raises a significant hazard to public health and safety be-1 cause it would involve the intentional disabling of an ir.portant 1
in safety system, the "B" diesel generator, at power operation, violation of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 and the C.F.R. Part 50 ("GDC 17"), NRC regulatory guidance, r
i
rts 11 S OM&W Thus, the proposed license plant's technical specifications.
amendment would leave the VYNPS without a backup source of onsite il-energy in the event of a loss of offsite power and a single fa ure in the "A" diesel generator, with the potential for a beyond design basis accident involving significant offsite consequences.
III. ASPECTS OF PROCEEDING ON WHICH NECNP WISHES TO INTER NRC regulations at 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714 (a) (2) require a petitioner to set forth "the specific aspect or aspects of the f
subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to I
A petitioner nay satisfy this requirement by intervene."
" identifying general potential effects of the licensing action or areas of concern that are within the scope of natters that may be Verr.ont Yankee Nuclear Power Cor-considered in the proceeding."
ejting Vircinia Electric and Power ooration, supra, 31 NRC at 89, ALAB-146, 6 AEC (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2),
Co2 631, 633 (1973).
NECNP seeks to litigate the questions of whether the pro-posed license a=endnent violates GDC 17 and Regulatory Guide is beyond the scope of actions permitted by the plant's 1.93, technical specifications, and poses an undue risk to public health and safety.
I
W mr v5 ryssyr--------------------
Respectfully cubmittod, Diane Curran MARMON, CURRAN, GALIAGHER &
SPIELBERG 2001 "S" Street H.W.
Washington, D.C.
20009 (202) 328-3500 Counsel to NECNP Tebruary 22, 1993 i
l
)
I
t
- ,N C,a 93 FOB 24 p3 20 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
,{
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- g.
- .1:r, ;'i:^. [
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD:
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Dkt. No. 50-271-OLA Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
)
Unfice of Appearance Notice is hereby given of the appearance of the undersigned for the Massachusetts Attorney General.
Respectfully submitted, SCOTT HARSHBARGER ATTORNEY GFNERAL i
l 4
h Leslie B. Greer Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 2/?> /13 (617) 727-2200 l
)
Dated:
i
)
l 4
)
r:
j.)hr L 93 FEB 24 P3 20 e i.,~ ',. r;,.i
$ ;' h,'&
Certificate of Service I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing pleadilgs to which this certificate is attached were served by first-class
]
mail on the parties listed below on this date.
Rules and Directives Review Branch Divicon of Freedom of Inf ormati on end Fublication Services Office of Admi n i st r ati on U.S. Nucleer Regul et ory Commi ssi on Washington, D.C.
% 555 Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regitlatory Commission Washangton, D.C.
20555 T h o m 4t<; G.
D2gnan, Esq.
Ropes Grey 222 Frand in Street Boston, MA 02110 l
Office of the Secretary Attn: Docketing and Serivce U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommisGion wannington, D.C.
20555 7!%1 /T3 Dated:
i l
s
. 2i ;i.i!
r l'O htT UNTTED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
r:
f BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD'
'~
t
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Dkt. No. 50-271-OLA Power Corporation
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Station)
)
[
}
I MASSACHUSETrS ATTORNEY C~NERAL* S COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION The CommonwedIth of Massachm ctts by its Attc.rney General, Scott Harshbarger, joins in the comments submitted by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP") in opposing the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration j
for the license amendment requested by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear F.)wer Station.
Notice of the proposed license amendment is found at Fed. Reg.
Vol. 58, No. 12, page 5435.
For the reasons set forth in NECNP's Comments in Opposition to proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration, attached hereto as an exhibit, and incorporated herein by
(
reference, tre Massachusetts Attorney General requests that the proposed finding be rejected and an czder issue requiring a 1
i h
i hearing on the proposed license amendment.
l Respectfully submitted, SCOTT HARSHBARGER ATTORNEY GENERAL Le d. 4 Leslie B.
Greer Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor I
Boston, MA 02108 Dated:
N8.97 i
5 P
P b ;
FEG ZZ '93 03: 29Pf1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA Ver ont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
i
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
j Power Station) j NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUPT. ERR POLLUT. TON'S COMMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED FINDING OF l
NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Introduction the Nuclear Regulatory Commission On January 21, 1993, issued puclic notice of an operating li-("NRC" or " Commission")
cense amendment regt.est by the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Fower Cor-which would permit Vermont Yankee to poration
(" Vermont Yankee"),
perform extensive maintenance on the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power l
I l
diesel generator for fourteen days dur-Station's ("VYNPS's")
"B" ing the current operating cycle, while the reactor is operating at power.1 58 Fed. Reg. 5,435.
The NRC proposes to make a hazards consideration regarding determination of no significant the proposed license acendment.
The New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution ("NECNP")
op-poses the proposed finding of no significant hazards considera-NECNP's opposition is supported by the affidavit of Robert tion.
D. pollard, a nuclear safety engineer..
As dis-NECNP has requested a hearing on the proposed license 1
ment.
Operating License ^r,endnent (February 22, 1993).
r-G f fri
/f j)
=
rts II 13 er:3&n
.. cussed below, the intentional disabling of one of Vormont Yankes two diesel generators would Nuclear Power Station's ("VYNPS's")
17, the NRC's fundamen-violate General Design criterion ("GDC")
tal requirement that onsite electric power supplies must "have independence, redundancy, and testability to perform sufficient 10 C.F.R.
their safety functionn assuming a single failure."
Part 50, Appendix A, G'
17.
In addition, the proposed amendment which contain no violates the technical specifications for VYNPS, provision for deliberate re= oval of the diesel generators from On its face, ty, 2-2 service during power operation.
in the intentional disabling of an essential safety system, NRC regulatory l
violation of the NBC's General Design Criteria, technical specifications, raises significant guidance, and VYNPS Accordingly, pursuant to Section hazards considerations.
42 U.S.C.
5 2239 (a) (2) (A),
189a(2)(A) of the Atemic Energy Act, the NRC must provide a hearing on the proposed license amendment before it can be issued.
I.
STATLnzni OF FACTS VYNPS has two standby diesel generators which constitute the onsite electrical power supply for the plant's structures, sys-GDC 17 requires that tems, and components important to safety.
d each of the diesel generators must be safety grade and designe i
l t
to " provide sufficient capacity and capability" to mainta n p an assuming a loss of offsite safety during design basis accidents, power.
and the plant's Limiting Conditions for Pursuant to GDC 17 VYNPS cannot be operated at power unless Operation ("LCO's"),
l i
m rEE 22 '93 03:30Pn As provided by Technical both diesel generators are functional.
3.10.A.1, Specification ("TS")
Both emergency diesel generators shall be operable and capable of starting and reaching rated voltage and fre-guency in not more than 13 seconds.
A limited exception to this requirement is provided in TS 3.5.H.1:
During any period when one of the standby diesel gener-continued reactor operation is ators is inoperable, pro-permissible only during the succeeding seven days,vid containment Cooling Subsystems corc
f However, TS 3.5.H.1 also states that "If this requirement cannot l
an orderly shutdown snall be initiated and the reactor be net, hours."
shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 on three previous occasions, Vermont Yankee has invoked TS
]
for the purpose of repairing diesel generators at power.
I 3.5.H.1 the NRC granted Vermont Yankee permission to inten-In 1990, and overhaul one of its diesel generators while tionally disable en the ground that a local hyurcelectric sta-operating at power, gg, y
.andum from tion was available to provide backup power.2 to Thomas Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio.2, Thomas E. Murley, (May 18, 1990) and Martin, Regional Administrator, Region I T..
enclosures, the practice of intentionally disauling As discussed below, diesel generators while at power in order to make routineor the technica 2
repairs is not permitted by either GDC 17Thus, NECNP believes that the NR specifications for VYNPS.
erred when it granted permission for the 1990 repairs.
F.!
rcs ;; gg 03: 3cn 3
, t Lcst year, on two separate occasions a month apart, Vermon "ab-Yankee declared its "A" diesel generator inoperable after t
normalities were encountered with the jacket cooling sys em.
to United States Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee, Proposed Change No. 166, One-Nuclear Regulatory Commission re:
LCO Period to Sup-Time Extended Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)
(December 15, 1992) (hereinafter port Maintenance Activities at 2 On May 28, 1992, and again on
" Murphy Letter"),
Vermont Yankee began diesel generator repairs June 23, 1992, for while the reactor was at power, as permitted by TS 3.5.H.1 When Vermont Yankee found that
" inoperable" diesel generators.
as required be completed within 7 days, these repairs could not applied for and received temporary waivers by T5 3.5.H.1, it in May, which allowed a one-day extension for the repairs begun Ege BVY and a two-day extension for the repairs begun in June.
to United Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee,92-068, 1992);
BVY 92-074, States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (June 3, Letter from Warren P. Murphy, Vermont Yankee, to United States 1992), Attachments 4 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (June 29, 5, respectively.
surveillance of the "B" diesel According to Vermont Yankee, ih generator "has not revealed any indication" of the problems wh 2.
Murphy Letter at rendered "A" diesel generator inoperable.
to make the same Yankee deemed it " prudent" Vermont Nevertheless, it had made to the "A" repairs to the "B" diesel generator that diesel generator "at the earliest cpportunity."
Id.
Rather than i
r my
P,6 FEE II *91 03: 31Pil i waiting until the next refusiing outage or scheduling an outags NRC re-to make the repairs, Vermont Yankee submitted a letter to 3.5.H.1 which would a'. low a "one-time ex-qt** sting a change to TS days in 9hich to make those tension" from the LCO of 7 days to 14 as well as to conduct the routine 18-month overhaul of
- repairs, On January Murphy Letter, Attachment 3.
the diesel generator.
the NRC published a Federal Register notice of the pro-21, 1993, along with a proposed finding that no posed license amendment, is required because it poses no prior hearing on the amendment significant hazards consideration.
N POSES SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS THE PROPOSED LICENSE A.
II CONSIDERATIONS.
Statutory and Regulatory Pramework A.
of the Atemic Energy Act and l
Pursuant to Section 189a(2) (A) issue an operating license 10 C.T.R. 50.92(c), the NRC may not amendment before granting a public hearing unless it determines id-that the proposed amendment poses "no significant hazards cons the amendment yLc.Als agI:
eration,"
i.c.,
that increase in the probability (1) Involve a signif4. cant or consequences cf an accident previously evaluated; Create the pessibility of a new or different kind from any accident previously evaluated; or (2) of accident Involve a significant reduction in the margin of (3) safety.
In passing the onabling legislation for this regulatory provi-4 sion, Congress recognized that issuing the order in advance of a hearing would as a 3
foreclose the public's right to have practical matter, In addition, the licensing board l
its views considered.
vould often be unable to order any substantial relief as a result of an after-the-fact hearing.
r l
rcs II.'93 03: ?!Pri at 37-38 (1982).
Conf. Rep. No.97-884, 9/th Cong., 2d Sess.,
i Thus, the conferees noted their intent that in-in determining whether a proposed license amendment the Com-volves no significant hazards consideration, mission should be especially sensitive to the issues posed by license amendments that have irreversible con-sequences (such as those permitting an increase in the of effluents or radiation emitted from a facil-ity or allowina a facility to coerate for a period of amount time without full safety orotections.)
Id. (emphasis added)
In response to Congress' expression of concern, the Commis-sion "made clear" in the proar.ble to S 50.92 that an amendment which allows a plant to operate at full power during which one or more safety systems are not operable would be treated in the same way as other ex-amples considered likely to involve a significant i
hazards consideration.
Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Consid-erations, 51 Fed. Reg. 7,744, 7,750, Col. 3 (March 6, 1986).
In addition, the Commission " charge (d] the NRC staff to assure that doubtful or borderline cases are not found to involve no sig-51 Fed. Reg. at 7,753, Cols.
2-nificant hazards consideration."
3.
i Tbc Proposed License Amendment Raises Significant i
B.
Hazards Considerations involving the disabling of a The circumstances of this case, major safety component in violation of NRC General Design raise significant Criteria and VYNPS technical specifications, Even were these hazards considerations in the starkest terms.
violations more " doubtful or borderline
[51 Fed. Reg. at 7,753, j
the serious safety questions raised by the proposed Cols. 2-3),
i l
i a
P.e rts II '93 03: 32Pn
-7 amendment would dictate against the issuance of a no significant i
hazards consideration finding, and require the granting of a prior hearing on Vermont Yankee's proposed licence amendment.
The Proposed Amendment Involves the Intentional 1.
Disabling of A Safety System, In Violation of GDC 17.
Under the Commission's standards for finding no significant hazards considerations, see 51 Fed. Reg. at 7,750, Col.
3, there can be no question that the proposed amendment raises "sig-hazards" considerations, because it would allow the nificant t
VYNPS to operate "at full power during which one or more safety.
systems [i.e., the "B" diesel generator) are not operable," in The importance of compliance with direct violation of GDC 17.
GDC 17 cannot be gainsaid.
GDC 17 is one of the NRC's " minimum establishes the " principal design criteria" requirements" that and components that provide reasonable for " structures, systems, assurance thac the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public."
Introduction to 10 C.F.R.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the onsite Part 50, Appendix A.
assumes that offsite power supply to power safety systems, GDC 17 power systems are unavailable, and requires the provision of j
redundancy, 1
onsite power supplies "with sufficient independence, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a 4
single failure."
Thus, in evaluating whether Vermont Yankee's it must be assumed that (a) diesel generators comply with GDC 17, no offsite power is available and (b) one of the two diesel gen-If the remaining diesel generator were in-erators has failed.
1
P.9 rEE 22 M M: 32n1 L
-B-Yankee's license tentionally disabled, as proposed in Vermont i
ta amendment application, VYNPS would have no protection aga ns
'l in direct violation of CDC failure of a diesel generator, single i
17.
is clear that such a violation of GDC 17 could o
Moreover, it l
risk at VYNPS in all three of the aspects by t
increase accident 5
which NRC judges "significant hazards" under 10 C.F.R.
With respect to the first criterion, the inten-50.92 (c) (1)-(3).
ld significantly tional disabling of the "B" diesel generator wou co= pound the " probability or consequences" associated with a the unavailability of l
i.e.,
"previously evaluated" accident i
generators during a loss of offsite power, as one of the diesel If the "B" diesel generator is inten-contemplated by GDC 17.
ed to tionally disabled and the "A" diesel generator must be assum this would leave VYNPS without l
be disabled as required by GDC 17, a design Under such circumstances, any source of onsite power.
i transformed to a beyond design basis ac-basis accident would b2 with the potential for meltdown and catastrophic con-
- cident, the proposed amendment raises significant
- Thus, sequences.
( )
hazards considerations under the second criterion of S s
Finally, the significantly increased probability and consequence i
t of a serious accident would obviously involve a "signif can thus establish-reduction in the margin of safety" at the plant, hazard under S SO.92 (c) (3).
ing a significant
F.10 FEB II '?? 03: ??F11 The Intentional Disabling of a Diesel Generator for Repairs at Power Violates Vermont Yankee's 2.
Technical Specifications and NRC Regulatory Guid-ance.
application is Vermont Yankee's operating license amer.dment it is already entitled, through its based on the assumption that to disable and repair the "B" diesel technical specifications, all it requires is an extension of r
and that generator at power, Egg Mur-the seven-day period for repairs allowed by TS 3.5.H.1 However, Vermont Yankee's position is based on phy letter at 1-interpretation of VYNPS's technical specifications.
an incccrect the intentional disabling of a diesel generator for In fact, repairs that could otherwise be postponed until a planned outage violates the VYNPS technical specifications.
the principal VYNPS technical specifi-Pursuant to GDC 17, requires cation governing standby diesel generators, TS 3.10.A.1, both diesel generators must be " operable and capable of that reaching rated voltage and frequency in not more than 13 sec-upon which Ver=ont Yankee relies, creates a onds."
TS 3.5.H.1, limited exception to this rule, providing that "During any period the standby diesel generators is inoperable, con-when one of tinued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeed-ing seven days Vermont Yankee apparently interprets the term " inoperable",
to include the intentional disabling of as used in TS 3.5.H.1, i
- Thus, the diesel generators for routine or non-urgent repa rs.
intentionally as read by Vermont Yankee, TS 3. 5.H.1 permits i-a its diesel generators for repairs at any time, as disable one of
rEE II * $ 03:33Pn F.11 10 -
How-long as the duration of the repairs does not exceed 7 days.
i interpretation of the exception in TS 3.5.H.1 over, such a broad general rule established by GDC 17 and TS would swallow the operate unless both diesel generators 3.10.A.1, that VYNPS cannot i
under Vermont Yankee's In effect, are operable and available.
interpretation of the technical specifications, a diesel genera-as long as the tor could be disabled for repairs every two weeks, repairs could ba finished in seven days.
'i Vermont Yankee's interpretation of its technical specifica-l tions is also inconsistent with the guidance set forth in Reg.
cuide 1.93, which contemplates at power repairs only after the the reactor have been balanced acainst r,icks of shutt.ino down tne with only one dienel cenerator:
ricks of continuino to operate it may be safer to continue Under certain conditions, full or reduced power for a limited time operation at an inmediate shutdown on the loss of than to effect Such de-some of the required electric power sources.
cisions should be based on an evaluation that balances the risks associated with immediate shutdown against If, on associated with continued operation.
4 the those immediate shutdown is the safer course,
- balance, promptly to an orderly shutdown, unit should be brought For exam-and to a cold shutdown as soon as possible.
the risks associated with an immediate shutdown on the loss of ensite a.c. power supply during a period of
- ple, light system load would tend to be less than those dur-ing a peak load period because the stability of theIf, offsite power system would be relatively higher.
continued power operation is the safer on balance, the period of continued operation should be source and tc prepare for an
- course, used to restore the lost orderly shutdown, provided, of course, that these ac-tivities do not risk further degradation of the elec-tric power system or in any way jeopardi7.c plant safety.
Under this standard, the only acceptable Reg. Guide 1.93 at 1.
power would justification for repairing the diesel generators at
F.1:
FEE II *?3 03: 3sn is safer to do that than to shut the pl9nt be a showing that it down -- an argument that could be made only if the diesel genera-or so unreliable as to be effectively ter was unable to function, Those circumstances do not exist here, where the "B" inoperable.
and Vermont Yankee seeks permis-diesel generator is functional, i
sion simply to make non-urgent repairs and to conduct rout ne the under the guidance of Reg. Guide 1.93, maintenance.
- Thus, in-VYNPS technical specifications cannot be read to permit the tentional disabling of the diesel generators in order to perform t
routine repairs.
Yankee's proposal to intentionally disable Because vermont diesel generator during power operation constitutes a the "B"
departure from its technical specifications governing important necessarily raises "significant hazards con-r safety functions, it while the !fRC staff concluded (erroneous-siderations."
In fact, Vermont Yankee's 1990 bid to overhaul its that ly, NECNP submits) diesel generator during pcwer operation was sanctioned by its its concern that "this the staff noted technical specifications, Memorandun from maintenance practico poses a noteworthy risk."
J. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch No.
3, Region I, to R.
Directorate I-3, !TRR ( April 6, 1990), Enclosure to At-
- Wessman, tachment 2.
P. 2 3 r n 22 93 03: 3sti The Existence of the Vernon Tie-Line Would Not 3.
Compe.nsate for the Disabled Diesel Generator Under GDC 17.
Yankee attempts to satisfy the no significant Vermont hazards standard by arguing that there will be no significant in the types of potential accidents at VYNPS or decrease change "because of the in the margin of safety of the plant, availability of other plant electrical systems, including the Vernon tie line" from a local hydropower station.
Murphy letter at 5.
However, this argument ignores GDC 17, which provides quite clearly that offsite power sources, such as the Vernon tie cannot be used as substitutes for onsite power sources in
- line, order to satisfy the requirer-onts for backup power supply.
Moreover, even if GDC 17 could be ignored, and the Vernon tie line could be credited as a backup electricity supply, far too many questions exist about the capacity and reliability et the vernon tie line as a source of backup power to safety sys-tems.
For instance, as Vermont Yankee has conceded, it is im-the Vernon tie-line under a full station black-possible to test out load.
BVY 92-94, Letter from Leonard A. Tremblay, Jr., Ver-l to United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, re:
l mont Yankee, l
10CFR50.63 Station Blackout (SBO) - Response to NRC Request for at 3 (July 31, Additional Information, Attachment to BVY 92-94 1992), Attachment 6.
Moreover, Vermont Yankee admits that "[d]ue to the vintage of the hydro station generators' voltage f
regulators," it is unable to " analytically predict" what the load to voltage levels will be upon application of the largest the 5460-volt emergency bus.
Id. at 3.
Instead, Vermont Yankee
FEB 11 '?? bb:3TFil y, y 13 -
relies on the engineering judgment of hydro operators and dis-who are not licensed by NRC patchers from outside Ver=ont Yankee, responsibility for the safety of VYNPS.
In sum, and who have no Vermont Yankee has neither empirical evidence nor analytical the Vernon tio line has " sufficient results to demonstrato that i
Ac-capacity and capability" to meet the requirements of GDC 17.
the existence of the Vernon tie-line provides no basis cordingly, for a no significant hazards finding in this case.
CONCLUSION Vermont Yankee has failed to demonstrate that the proposed involves no significant hazards considerations; license amendment it would significantly increase the risk to in fact, on its face, Accor-public health and safety posed by operation of the VYNPS.
dingly, the liRC chould reverse its proposed finding of no sig-and order a prior hearing on the nificant hazards considerations, proposed license amend =ent.
Respectfully submitted, m
t
)
Kane Curran HARMON, CURRAN, GALLAGHER &
SPIELBERG 2001 "S" Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20009 (202) 328-3500 Counsel to NECNP February 22, 1993 l
met FE II '95 01: E!Ff1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
)
Power Corporation
)
Docket No. 50-271-OLA
)
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)
)
)
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. POILARD I,
Robert D. Pollard, do make oath and say:
1)
My name is Robert D.
Pollard.
Since February 1976, I have been employed as a nuclear safety engineer by the Union of Concerned Scientists.
My business address is 1616 P Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
/0036.
Previously, I was employed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a Licensing Pro-ject Manager for commercial nuclear power plants.
! enlisted in the United States Nrvy and 2)
In May 1959, was selected to serve as an electronics technician in the utclear After completing the required training, I betsme power program.
an instructor responsible for teaching naval personnel both the theoretical and practical aspects of operation, maintenance and From February 1964 to repair for nuclear propulsion plants. served as the senior reactor operator, superv April 1965, I the reactor control division aboard the U.S.S. Sargo, a nuclear-In May 1965, I was honorably discharged from powered submarine.
Navy and attended Syracuse University, where I received the U.S.
in electrical the degree of Bachelor of Science magna cum laude engineering in June 1969.
I was hired by the United States Atomic 3)
In July 1969, 6sd continued as a technical cxpert with Energy Commission (AEC) the AEC and its successor, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) until February 1976.
After joining the AEC, I completed a year of graduate studies in advanced electrical and nuclear engineering at the Graduato School of the University of I subsequently advanced to the posi-New Mexico in Albuquerque.
tions of Reactor Engineer (Instrumentation) and Project Manager As a Reactor Engineer, I was primarily responsible with AEC/NRC.
for performing detailed technical reviews analyzing and evaluat-ing the adequacy of the design reactor protection systems, con-trol systems and e=ergency electrical power systems in proposed nuclear facilities.
In September 1974, I was promoted to the for safety position of Project Manager and became responsible reviews of applications for licenses to construct and operate several commercial pouer plants.
~
p, g FEE II '93 03: MF11 i :
In the course of my six and a half years with the AEC 4) analyses and evaluations and NRC, I performed technical reviews, of designs of systems and components necessary for safe operation of reactor facilities under normal, abnormal and emergency condi-tions for the purpose of determining whether such systems ce=-
plied with NRC rules and provided an acceptable level of safety for the public.
5)
For the past fifteen years, I, along with other members r
of the Union of Concerned Scientists' professional staff, have conducted numerous studies pertaining to the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants, both on a generic and plant-specific basis.
I have provided technical analysis for UCS's participation in rulemaking proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for UCS's litigation against the NRC its responsibilities under the Atomic En-for failure to fulfill I testified before the President's Commission on the ergy Act.
1979 acci-Accident at Three Mile Island which investigated that I participated as an expert witness in the NRC's ad-dent.
judicatory proceeding on matters pertaining to reactor safety be-i fore numerous committees of the United States Congress and vari-ous other state and local legislative and administrative bodies.
Thus, my 23 years of professional experience en the technical staffs;of the AEC, NRC, and UCS have given me first-hand knowl-administered, edge of !TRC regulations and how they are developed, and interpreted.
t reviewed all of the documents referenced in New 6)
I have England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in Opposition to Proposed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration (Feb-1993).
I am also familiar with NRC regulctions and ruary 22, regulatory guidance governing the design and operability of diesel generators.
The factual statements made in the attached New England l
7)
Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's Comments in opposition to Pro-posed Finding of No Significant Hazards Consideration are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
i Rocert D.
Pollard Sub.acribed and sworn to before me this __ day of February, 1993.
f
)
i Notar/ Public 4
My Commission expires
i k
Federal Register / Vol. 58, No.12 / Thursday, January 21, 1993 / Notices 5427
/ Lactica to recent ACRS comments and previous meetmas as time and This biweok'y notice includes all mmeviations.
availability of information permit.
notices of amendments issued, or D 1. NRC Regulatory iienew Gmup-
/omt Meeting of the ACAW Worung pmposed to be issued from December n, cuss the proposed char *er for and Group /ACRS Subcommittee on 24.1992. through January 7,1993. The j
4:tivities of the NRC Regulatcry Review Occupanonal and Ennronmenray last biweekly notice w as published en
' Group. The purpose of this group will Ibtecnon Systems, March 5,195l3 kmuary 6.1993 (58 FR 590).
j to conduct a comprehensive and (tentat2 vel. Bethesda, MD. The fiorkm g Notice Of Consideration OfIssuance Of disciphned review of power r~acter Croup /Sabcommittee wdl revfew the Amendment To Facility Operating
-egulations and related NEC process.
followmg proposed final rgolatory License Proposed No Significant mgrams, and implementatmn guides related to the implernentataon of lisrards Consideration Determination, rectices. Representatives of the NRC the revised 10 CFR part 20:
And Opnortunity for A Ilearing aff anc of the industry wdl partiapate.
(1) DG-e006. " Control of Access to The Commission has made a.
appropnate.
H:gh and Very liigh Radiation Arees in J. Fnefing on Recent Chanres to the Nuclear Power Plants."
pmp sed determmation that the segulat;cas on the Conduct hf C) DG-8009. "interpre' tion of f Ilowmg amendment requests invclve n sig ficant hazards consideration.
Government Employees-Briefing by Dionssay Measurement," and Under the Commission'a regulations m, 9d discussicn with representsuves of f 3) DCr4013. "ALARA Radiation 10 UR 5032. this means that o ration de NRC Office of the Generel Counsel Pmtection Pror. rpm for Effluents from c,f the facility m, accordance wit the
'on the impact on ACRS members of the Metenals Faalj(ies.
P"E
".mendments would not (1)
<implernentation of the recent O!! ice of ACAW War ng Group on low-inel mm a y,m scant incruse in de h[dtanges to the regulation on the conduct Government Ethics govemment-wid" Waste Repor tory Performonce YI
"'*S""'"
indscators./farth 23,1993. Bethesda.
acudent previously evaluated; or (2)
$cf government employees.
MD. The icrking Group will conuder create the possibility of a new or K. Schedules e/ NRC Review of Troposed Advanced Reactor Demns-f7 P " '" * ",P" dnfferent Lind of act dent from any acadent previously evaluated; or (3)
Jnefing by and discussion with nng's anous aspects of low. level monit
- N*
margin cf safety,""he basis for thi."
representatives of the NRC staff on thu (current schedules for the NRC sta!f's h';
[g". ".85 " I'8"dli R"d T
P Posed determmetion for each
$ review of proposed advanced reactor
.,nd ACAW MeetmE. March 24 amendment request is shown below.
d f'iscenancous-Discuss
- 93. Bethesda MD. Agenda to t e The Commission is seeking public 3nformation of a personal nature w r.ere comments on this proposed 53rd ACNM. Meeting, Aptd 28-29 determination. Any comments received idisclosure would constitute an 3.
thesda, MD. Agenda to be within 3, days efter the date of 0
snwarranted invanon of personal announced.
7 privacy and matters discuswd but ne pubhcotwn of this notice will be completed dunna previous meetmr as Dated P.nuary 13.1993.
considered in making any final determmation. The Commissmn wul s
Hume and availabihty of informatic lohn C. Hoyle, not normally make a final determination Spemut.
mory Con.imtree Manuement c'fa er rehs a qw h a W4
" u.sntien comments may be submitted y..
395th ACRS Merring, March 14d J a D,.c M-1297 I ded 01-19-93, B 45 arn!
g 1993. Detgtesda. MD. Agenca
> b" emu o coor m.mv by mail to the Rules a:'d Directives
- o. announced.
Review Branch, Divisi n of Freedom of F 396th ACRS Meerme Apr i 197 information and Publications Serv ces, U 1993. Bethesca. MD Agen' a to be Biweedy Notice Of.n of Admmistrat on. U.S. Nuclear c announced gi
/
Applications and Amendments to Regulatory Cummissmn. Washington.
f ACNW Full Comnuttee ed Worimg Operatmg Licenses involving No DC 22555, and should cite the 7 Group Meetings his;mficant Harartts Considerations
- ,ubbcation este and page nurr.ber of i[ Crcup/AC!b Sdungmtree ca this Federal Register notice. Wntten Jomt M< ente c f the C'M m r b
- ?
- 1. Dat kernund temmen.s mnv also be delivered to P uuant to Pul hc m (P W W1E Room P 223 Philhps buildmg. 7920
' Occurm om;l v.nd Eduronmer j h" Md"ar Wm.norv Commissmn Phe Wrft.k Avenue. Bethesda, Maryla..d
'. ' Protecten S atemshelnmry 5 Im-
$T/' Postponmt M Wnjh 5.1 M m rate Mummen u W WM is peuhir.R
'com 7.30 a ta to 415 p m. federal
'us regu!ar Lmwaly : ace. P L 97-415 woradays. Copies cf wntten comments I?k Bethesda. MD /
51st ACAW $ctme, i et,rarv 2 44 ewd e n m of the Atomic reui.ed may be eummed at the NRC
@{h#
1u43. Itethesca/MD !! ems are
- .ergy Act of 1954, as amended (the Pubhc Document Room. the Gelman tt to requae it;e Cummission 1o Buddmg,2no L Street. NW.,
f.k ~ A Meet w;fh the Commissm,.
- utbh not
- ce of any amendments Washmgton. DC 20555. The filing of h; tentantly schculed 7 discuss cenA c: mutual eterest.
m"d. cr proposed to be issued. under requests for heanng and petitions for jp 11 Bnefnye on manoams of Ethmal r.ew prov:sion of sectmn 1R of the
- eave to mterwme is discussed below.
l g Conduct f/t Employees cf the becun.e Att This provision grants the By i ebruary 22,1993, the hcensee branch /
Ucmmission the authontv to asue and
- nav fde a request for a beanna with l f' for tt /Shoreham Nucinar Tower Plant O
C. Udfmg on disommasanma phm make 2mmed.ately ef fective any respect to issuance of the amendment to f
amendment to an operstm.' htense the suoiect faality cperating license and DAEscuss antiopeted and proposed upon a determmation by the any p-rson whose interest may be l !y Cerntnittee activit;es. future meetma Commission that such amencment affected by this proceeding and who
[ rpnda. administrative ar.d mvoivas no significant hazards wishes to' participate as a party in the frganir.ational matters, as appropnate.
tonsiderstion. notwithstanding the proceedmg must file a wntten request i y / Also, discuss matters ar.d spec:he issues rundency before the Commissmn of a for e beanng and a petition for leave to
'f
- h thet were not ccmpleted dunng
- nquest for a haanng fmm any person.
mtervene. Requests for a hearmg and a i
,P a
nn,
,m n
~ mne 3 wn 3
l f 542&
Federal Res;ister / Vol. 58. No.12 / Thursday, January 21. 1993 / Notices e
< 1:
2 h
, out on inr Invn to intervena shall H provmg the contennon at the her.nng.
mpects that the need to take this act.:n 1-
%d m accordance with the The peutioner must also previde ml! cccur very infrequently.
n -
Gmmmion s " Rules of Prvt;ce for refemnees to those speafic sources and A request for a hes.rmg or a petition
.. manc Lhnmne Procwoints" ia 0 bcuments of w hich the mutioner is f ar leave to interveno must be filed w:n LFR Part 2. Intensted parsons snouM aware and on which the pettrioner de Secmtary of the Commission. U.S asa.t a t rmt copy of 10 CFR 2J14 mtenas to reiy to establish those facts or Nuclear Reculatory Commission.
l, u nu n is mdable at the Commmon s expert opmion. Petitioner must p cvide Washirston. DC 20555. Attention:
h nlm h.umtat Room. tb Man sufficient informatmn to snow that a Docketmg and Services Branch, cr mav 11 Hedmnv.1123 L Street. NW..
g enuine dispute emts with th, be delivered to,the Commission's Pub &
..etman. DC r.r,3 and at the k.cd eppbcane on a matenaf issue of law or Document Room, the Calman Buildin2 pat 6c dumment room fc.r the partniar fact. Contentions shall be limited to 2120 L Street. NW., Washington DC fx thts mvolved. If a request for a maters within the scope of the 20555, by the above date. Where hoanra or petition for lente to mtervene omendment under consrderation. The Petitiens are filed dunng the last ten 3 [
w hico by the above ds'e.the contention must be one which if (10) days of the notice period,it is p
i:ommimon nr an Atomic Safary and pros en, would entitle the petitioner to N' quested that the petitioner promptly
- 1 la ensmg Ecurd, designated by the rehef. A petitk>ner who fails to file such so inform the Commistian by a toll-free
[
Cemme or by the Chaiman cf the a supplement which satisf+s these Mephene cal! to Western Union at 1-
, j Ata mi ' J.m and Licensmg Nard requirements with respect to et least one 300) 325-6090 tm Missotrri 1-(800)312 E j PAM. Nil rule on the request nd/or contention will not be permitted to 6700). The Western Union operator i ~
enhon: and the Secreta v er the part2cipste as a party.
should be grvan Datagram Identification drwno'ed Atomic Safety and Urens:n?
Those permitted to intervene become Number N1023 and the following
~
hmrd will issue a natim et he *!ng er parti.es to the pruceedme, subject to any messa;;e addressed to (Proyect Directorb (h}
.7 an wpmpnate order.
hm:tarmns rn the order granting leave t'o peutioner s name and telephone As required by to CFR 2314. a erve% and have the epportumtv to number, date petition wat mailed, plant
.uton for leave to mtervene shail ser pangte fully in the conduct of the name. and puMitation date and page
+ *m w tth particulanry the mtem.st of hurme mcludig tM oppe m nu Der f this federal Registernotice 3
. (j.
6 pentmner m the pmcentirw. and present evidence and crosvexamme A copy f the petition thould also be uw that mterest may ba affected by the sent ta the Of5ce of theGeneral witnesses.
mmhs of the proce*oirw. The pentmn If a heenug is requested, the Counsel U.S. Noc}earRegulatory g
nouM spactfically empiain the rvnson' Commisston will make a final Commissmn. Washington, DC 20555, 4
w hv ntervention shmud be parmitted
"" d be anomey for the knsue.
, d,,to i
detennination on the issue cino mn parncular reference to the "Um Y "K8 Pehs for L
significant hazards couderation. The following factors:(1)the neru e of fhe
. eave t intervene, amemled petititms.
final determination wdl sene to decide
, g
- ennoner s nght under the Act to be when the hearing is held.
supNemental W% anhnpsts nade a party to the proceedmc (2) the for beanng will not be entertained u
r If the final deterrmnation is that the
@I nature md ntent of the pennoner's l
propeny, finmcial, or other mtemst in amendment request mvolves n absent a determination by the-
{' [
the prmveomg: and (3) the possib!a ugmficant hazards considaration the Commission, the presid!ng officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board th-t e*ct of any order wbx_h may be Comrr ssion may issue the amendment k [;
enured in the proceeding on'the and make it immediately effective, the petition end/or request should be
~
j +,'
pent mneri interest. The pet: tion should n twithstanding the request for a granted based upon e bel ncing of factors specified in 10 CFR j
m!w identify the spactfre aspectts) of the heanne Any hestmg held would take 2314(aH1XiMv) and 2114[dl l i suW matter of the roceadmg as to P
8 N iS5UB " I 8*
For further data:Is with respect to this
,1 1 If the final detennination is that th" x nu h pantioner w es to intertm act or. see tne application for
- l }
Anv pehon who has fiteef a pannon for
^*f"dmant regtmst involves a amendment which is available for
' I me to etervene or who has twu N fk t hazards consuluratmn any public inspect:an at the Commissmn's einn ted as a party may amend the beanng held would take place tefore Public Document Room, the Gelman
']
pentmn without reauestma leave of the the issuance of any amendment.
Hmldmc. 2120 L Street. NW.,
I boani m to hfteen i151 devs or:cr to the Nonnally, the Commission w ill r.ot Wastungton. IX' 20555,and at the lorn!
b nt rmneanog comemnre % tauied in tsue the amendment until th"
- )ubhc document room for the pan;cuLr e vnw ecamg. but such an am.med espiration of the 30. day nonce penod-f acil.tv invoived.
"nhan must sansty tha sparafinty However, should nr umstances chance
~
~
h l
-omroments dnentwd abor, dunmr the noure penod such thet Duquesne Light Company, Docket
'o.
'0-334. Beaver Valley Ptrwer Sta on, i
mt h.ler tuan dhwa 05) dws prmt failure to act in a timely war would f
o be hrst preheutna conferem e result. for examde, in deratmg or l?mt No.1. ShippiDrpcst. Pen. Ivarua j
u Nda!ed in the pmr twdmc a shutdown of the facihty the Date of cmrndment rPquas! deber
+ uhor'er shall hit a suppleme::t 'a ma Commis90n rney issue the license
- 5. W92 i
e' i m to mtwrvene wruch inust emendment before the expirttion of the Desrnprion of cmendme r= quest:
1 m hMo a hst of the contennons wtdi 30-day nottre penod, providad thct its The preposec smendment 'ould revise I
m mant to be Ltwated a the matter.
final deterrmnation a that the Tecnmcal Spac:fication ( S) 3J.L2 a h t untenuan must consist cf a emendment involves no sicnificar.t relatin to the Auxiliarv eedwatt.r
< peaSc statament cf t% issue of law or hazards consideration. The final
( AFW) System. Specifi lly, two wt to b e r:nsed or centrovened. In determination will consider all pubbe 2ddit:onal acton stat 'ments would be d&or. the petittener s*ta3 pronde a and State comments recerved befom sdded to the Limiti Condition for 3
bnef erAanacm of the bases ci the action is taken. ShouM the Comonssion Operation (LCOI. d Surveillance c ntennon and a ccactse statemans ni take this action. at will publish in the Requirements (S 1(J.12.a and
.r.c allege d facts oranrpa.t epsman Federal Reghter a notice of issuance 4 7.1.2.c would >e modified. One of the which support the centratics and on and prowde for opporttmrty for a r,ew action strJeme=ts added to the LCD 1
w hith the petmourmtends ta reiv in heanng after issuance. He Comr-ission would app!y when two AfV pumps are i
4
wa M
l Federal Register / Vol. 58. No.12 / Thursday, January 21, 1993 / Notices 5435 3 p e-3 Suppl 1. assessed the impact of changing Rod repain and tests which could cause an In order to provide edded assurance that 4 Block STis on Rod Block failure inquency.
lacreased nsk of error. Also, plactng the "A" EDG will pertorm its function d 4,
Specifically. Sectmn 5 (BNL's Tech. Eval.
individual channel in a tnpped co ition required. the "A" EDG will be tested for 4
Venort - Attachment 2 to the NRC SER) of because no AOT exists. as in the nt TS.
operability pnor to entenng into the *"B" EDC NEDC40851P-A Suppl 1 states that:
mcmases the potential of an inad ertent LCO penod. The Technical Specifications 4
"The BWR Owners' Gmup proposed scam. The p oposed AOTs pro de realistic also require that dunng the LCO penod, all changes to the Technical Specifications times to complete the require ions remainmg Low P essure Core Cooling and y concernmg the test requirements for BWR without increasmg the overal instniment Contamment Cooling Systems connected to car. trol rud block instrumentation, The failum frequency. The app edBWR the operable EDG remam operable. Vermont charmes consist of increasing the surveill&nce Owners' Group Clanficati, Yankee has developed a detailed 140
.s are test intervals imm one to thne months.
enhancements to alloweb out-of-service mamtenance plan for EDG 140 mamtenance.
r{
4 hese test interval extensions are consistent tunes (AOTs) and do no nvolve a significant This plan has bnen sucx:essfully used dunng with the already appmvec changes to STh reduction in a margin safety.
pnor EDG ILO matntenance and will be i
for the Reactor Protection Syste, 7h The mcorporation extended STis does invoked for thts evolution as well. In K-technical analysts reviewed and voud as not result in signifi t changes m the addition, the Vernon Hydro Station I
documented hereta indicates that there will probabihty ofins ent failure, as dedicated tie 4me. which histoncally has f
be no significant changes in the availabihty demonstrated by t LTRs. These changes, of the contml rod block function if these when coupled wit the redured probability demonstrated a very nigh reliability, is required by Vennoot Yankee procedure to be k'
changes are implemented, in addition, there of test-mduced p' nt transients and avadable m supply power to Emergency Bus v
wds be a negl4ble impact on the plant core equipment fa.1 s, result in an overall h
melt hequency due to the decreased testmgf increase m the aarpn of safety. Also.the 3 dunng the
- B' EDG 1.CO. Any previously
~
2 fmm this genenc analysis.the BWR sensor canbre ton frequency has not changed. analyzed event postulated dunng the seven Therefore, urance exists that the setpomts day extension penod can be mitigated tiy the f'
Owners' Group concludod that the pmposed mil not be /fected by dnft. Therefore, there other available systems. The proposed IID
( nanves do not significantly i crease the
- no redu son in the margm of safety.
ntension has no significant impact on the b
probatnhty of an accident previously The N sC staff has reviewed the consequences of any previously analyzed b
evaluated.
event.
licenset s anesysis and, based on this i'
? The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit U
/. m accorcance with the proposed review it appears that the thrt e Ihe proposed extension would allow the
,,F, EDG to nmaus inoperable for an S
amendment, will not create the possibahty of stand ds of 50.92(c) are satisfied.
additi nel seven days beyond the present 1
a rmw or different kind of acadent from any Ther ore the NRC staff proposes to even day 1.00 allowed by Technical g
acc: dent previously evaluated.
dete mine that the amendment uquest
'I I" f'
The pmposed change will not alter the inv,1ves no significant hazards is not a part of the initiation of any of the yucal charactenstics of any plant systems (siderstion.
analyzed accidents. Therefore, the pmposed or romponents and all safety.related systems i
PuMic Dccumenf Boom change does not increase the probability of and components remain within their
' icati n: Reference and Documents an accident previously evaluated.
'i opphcable design limits. Thus system and epartment. Penfield Library, State As discussed above. a seven day extension b
cnmponent performance is not adversely Umversity of New York. Oswego, New to an already exisung seven day LCO period Y
affected by this change. thereby assunng that j'
the design capabilities of those systems and York 13126.
would involve no sigmficant increase in the r
L wmponents are not challenged in a manner Attorneyforlicensee: Mark J.
pmbability of occurrence or consequences of I
not previously assessed so as to create the Wetterhahn. Esquire. Winston & Strewn, a design basis accident dunng the extension i
- >ossitulity of a new or different kind of 1400 L Street, NW.. Washington, DC PC" d-2 Does the change create the possibility of edect.
20005-3502, a ww or different und of accident from any NRC Profect Director: Robert A. Capra accident previously evaluatedi T't.e nadition of allowable out.of-surv e 7.es ( AUTs) and the increase in surve ilance wt amervals (STis) does not alter the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power The proposed change would not create the
!a tion of the CCCS,Imlanon. Rod hxk Corporation, Docket No. 50 271, possibility of a new or different kind of m Selected Instrument Systems n =r invosve Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power aCC2 dent from those previously evaluated.
nv type of pl ant modification an( no new Stawn Vernon, Vennont
& pmposed change would have noimpact on the possibility cif a new or different oces of plant operation are mvr ved with Date cf amendment request; imtiatmg event. The proposed chanee me t hanges. Finally. the appr edBWR Decemt er 15,1992 n quests a one time extension of 7 das s Owners' Group cianfications a.
nancements to ellowatAe o -alvrvwe Destnption of amendment request:
bevnnd the already authonned 7 day'n" m MUTs) and do not cre athe he proposed amendment would allow EDO LCO Any p-eviously analyzed event woihty or lofl a r.ew of l' I different Lnd 3 orie-time extension of the 7 day postulated durma tr.e seven day extension
! m ident. Therefore, ope tion m Limitmg Condition for Operation (LCO) penod can ta mihgated by the other available m oruana with the pro sed amendment to fourteen days during the current 9"S8-1 Does the cr.ange involve a significant W not create the posv..hty of a new or operstmg cycle (Cycle 15), to permit xn n m a namn of safetyY Trent Hnd of accade t imm any acocent
..xtensive maintenance to be performed
. ae prancsed tnaue would not involve a m msiv evaluated.
On tb 1 did puW M& b significant radettaen in the margin of safety.
' The rwration of ilne Mile Pomt l'mt tor is at power.
As discussed ebose. epproval of this request 1 accorcanu wit. the preposed n [ asis W prwosed no $1gmficant
- nvolves an msigmficant reduction m the n ndmeut, will n t involve a sgnihcant hrards consderation dctenninctJon' margm of safety because of the availabihty of w.ict on m a margin of safety.
Me NRC staff.as reviewed and approved As ruquired by 10 CFR 50 91(al, the other piant emctnuil systems, includmg the e renenc sta.cs contained in the LTRs licensee has provided its analysis of the Vernon tie hne, ano the short duration of the M has toncpred with the BWR Owrmrs issue of no siRmficant hazards "tensmn penod oup inat tp proposed chanees do not consideration which is presented The NRC staff has reviewed the jmticant f affect the availabihty cf the RPS. below:
licensee's analysis, and based on this i
CC3. hostion. Rod Block or Selected L Does the change involve a si;;mficant review, it appears that the three at umpt Systems. The proposed addition
.mense m the probabihty or consecuences standards of 50M(c) are satisfied.
a AOTt far the instruments addressed in the of an accioent prevmusly evaluatedT Then fom. the NRC staff proposes to LTRs providi reasonable t:me for makmg The proposed change would not involve a repa$ and performing tests. The lack of s;gm6 cant mcrease in the prubabihty or determme that the amendment request AOM m the current Techmcal Specincation consecuenws of an accident previously mvolves no significant hazards iT creates a hurned atmosphere dunng evaluated consideration.
,--e*-
O MM Federal Register / Vct 58. No.12 / Thursday, January 27, 1993 / Notices
, a; %! he Dorwnent Foom Penned in a c.ffeent manrrer fmm which pcwer c;nnmrms and frorn moder, nucleu
. ~:r !Wks Memonal Ubnrv 22 4
- rev we - der s-no 'n orcres. Ptn*bermonr.
bei in'o ti.e cr:facunect buildtrw 9
' un -rect. Ih 1:eboro, Wrmort G,301 m pant memwns for w* rich % nm be Maimenancr he fa@ has been m ' r!.:rrsee: jahn A. Rinher, w m hn= baen hmeed en rard st:vedown 5 nm.ficar.t'y r: npirf:ed wtth the reducun m mi refu*hne s nedrwn.
tte nurnbers ci sys =ms, structures and end Gray.One a
'_e y g y,,,yg,y,.,,.vdacm i n a rumponeres regared for the permanemfy nc.. mal e aus Bostoa.
wa of sarcer.
' um w tis C*.0-2f>24 shutdown ano ecfneled condition.The 7.e propm.d Tahnrral Speerficancs accident enafts-s have been revised.
..';e : a Erector: Wel'er r,t Uder, p:rernents br terra of an rsolet=c loop to incogwiranre me newm n 6.eand
' cua i!artric and Pom r Company
- wrue Mfill the function of the loop step cor,fiartrra9ans. end conchrde the artly s
s aive mecincks. Mermate corrtres have credib e ami-ne r-eramtr g is the fuel
%c a et.
- n. 50450 and 50 28L Surry een estaDfrshed to virtuelty etnmnete the hnnolire, accidst.
[
6er Eta
. L' nit Nos.1 and 2. Surry yt, nual for an medver'ent valve crening in T':e cregss described herein irrcorpnrate p-
. ant v. Wrtptua 4n i ntated loeti, rettsing a baron dt.'trt*on cer the chacens and erafyecal ressPts irren the
- c sena ent request.
coH water additron accident. These con *rets Pouession Ont, E kertos and les Techtrical g_
4 y, g
t
- , me r I L.492 1 m of shuidown cootmg cowed tvy the both. As such, these changes wG mot-
-ff
, m vmn/ cme. ment tr7uest:
opentne of a swo vdve in an isolated and
- 1. Involve a trenificant hscrease in the L
ar mi ch inm t 'he Techrdcal camed loop. Ftmh-rmo e. stortup of an pmbeb4tv or cch_ a eien accident j
u-
- :TS) would Jmmate the notated iorrp ir ntnv irrnsted to rm:y r.of d prewarsiv evatussed. The revtsed enetrees m
?>
m memer.ts for L, reactor
'autdown or refueHeg outriown.
indscate that rmty the fuel handlieg amidant k
> t u am imp :Jop uhe Mcsoms hav* nown that an inadvertent r*mams credibia ne proposed clarrrree
' I
. as e.a arrhsh nqarmne 's
' "''8ftp et omd shtrticer wr!! not rernit mwrporate teto t% Taciwical 5pecmcetirms
)
r < v:4.i a d it:e k>op stop va h et m an medvertant cr tvrahty r-ga tfiers of the rnquirormnts hen these analyser and t)ms r proposed no.ugm!scani
. ti rutte:w differatitial be weer locris. At Jn not mvnhai a segn.tw inessetse tus the d
s m: memtion determinat on:
< old shut *=n ennebrum ibe pmettve pmbabih+y er consequencs of an accident cj
,at tnna etbc:s of channnst snederator pievinusJv evaine:md.
3
- or t.rW: t v to CFR LOSth). the nerature m sutstanuelty neue tnan the
- 2. Crnte the possMay ele new or o
j
%s or rvidend its analysis of the
+ivan > le shutdown mrpn.Themore, the d onnms iu.nd cd arr*4=me from arry aandens er w y
,c: r.o rxnificant hazard, magm safety as oehed is any T chmcal prewmu ssy eearante1The posed disages mton, which is presented below Speutic in is not reduced.
mtegrate into ti;e T R
g"- -M
..sa s --
i d " nrbrded thift the prnpcred The W ~ aff has reviewed the previously evarna+ed =rul==h and abos do es t7 the TS will not.
heenwe's an vas and, based on this not usats the ymst.dtyof a new me sb5crent br h? a sign # cant increme m the 7" view, it appe-that the three bd M och insu assy gemsty j
m inv of onxrrence er consequences of standards of SOA are satisfied.
e a
s..wae rt prevmusty evnfuated.
. herefore, the NRC s.
prcposes to d 4 N W hp l ;
v pmpred danges do not mueue the determine that the ame sent request m
' {*
NMhry or consequences of a kop startup ins 0:ves no significant ha rds inc4arporate me the Delue&nd Technical spncir.cate me awarpe es adsty anaeramied
- gy
. nient or a fots of shutdown decay heet consideration.
e with the (vrrent adety and thus da 1
, rmt. T*e r:sk ofinadvertent rntecahty in local Public DocuInent Roo not mvolve a ugmfkant
<f ma La s
.f dut+wn or refuehr g shutdown b p'
onev icw that cdmmistrante <nntrols lggy. Sw cm Library, College margm of saf.tv.
~
j maa m t.eu of tha kx,p smp vau" WilHam and Mary, Williamsburg, Bmd c>n the above considmtions,it is m
r" a --m in those conc!rtres Tha Viry,mia 23185.
conduded that ttsare to reasonable ensurance
?
oc m< t r run-, c-i fonp st"p va"
wg g,
.,rj yg. y; gy, that the mamtenants cd Yankee Nuclear u o, t-r hMe n ry.nsferaat p'smve
.11u;nn. E.so., Hunton and Williams, Pawer Station cans: era eth the proposed h
"v wtrmm or ims nt Fractor Crdant Hn erfront Plan. Last Tower,951 E.
haces, wiu r.ot erdar.gst the beakh and
~n menry we-, en nn!a ed fonp es Pvrd Street. Hrhmond. Virdnia 23M 9
- 'etv of the public.
1 i j
nm m wrvwe Imr g c Wed the stap MC Pnnect Dmctor-Herbert N.
is pmp.w.d charge has been swiewed t y tr. P act Ox anons Review Ornmitter k
o w h1 imp = te h p"w-r Berk ow and tL Ec. ear Safefy Audit and Revtew 1 wevenn maovertrmt crier:mt er d Commm m wnn imrtmn or fms M mventm i.anLee Atarmc Electric Company
- The Nh ' staff has reviewed the
, m Or biern e en er.F f mn.
Dotlet Nos 504129. YanLee Norieer
- m
- m1 ref firm Fow rur,m Power Statierr iYNPS), i ra rikhrt W ensor s an ' sis,and based on tids g
w M f M kmene no s en:rnnt C,ou nty, Nianachusetts mysew, it appe 's that the three nvy snen orruts wran standards of 50 U4c) are satishd.
1 e of omerdment request:
Therefore, the NFsC41f proposes to r 2L m2 determme that the amhqdment rwruest st kw r af e
r e et e.
$. km &,es not re?- er a AvryD n cf amendment reguNt:
mvolves no s:zmficant bhards l'
_.b p powd amendment would revito considenten.
\\
mri e t!.voam Femntmea n
.a tar n.we.nt sn ern 4 er TbMWEdWhEd lod Pdh *htmM ha.
w o. *.% a M of FJiW frmthai t eat
@nfcbons ta reCect the pernuar.ently location. GremEeld Commterty 0
. un seen w ben f.!nne a
- dwn and defueled status cf the Collwe.1 CaDeg Drive, Greenfic!
w wn t+ eo-rura tric Wp W mus
- .t. This charge would elimmete Massachusetts 01301 y
i a re u.e t.m whtv of a 1 ew n-
.how requirements appbcab'e only to A *tornevfar licenwe:'Romas Dy,mm,
)
. m..r.c r.
a '.a.m s from a ~v a< rver.t a m rm', nucint power statian.
Esqmre. Rops u.d Gray.One
.+
hs far prcrowd no symficant Interne tical F bca, Bosten.
J
-.s.< d..ms eu nw narrun."'
' rc:rds consdercnon determinction:
Massachuwitts 02M G-2fi24
$f i.
e
!av 3,s regired by 10 CTR 50/11(a), uie NRC P ow ct Deector-Sevrnour H.
.:s mr te loop stop vu e laensee has prouded its arudysis of th x.
n eiss n m me emat-nry new or msue of no sypnbunt hazards nt a m! t.f accMant scenation. The }arp consa deration, wtuch is presented Notice ofissuancs Of A.me.ndmesa Ta y g; gy a a w ndent has been ensh rad with re below:
wn h kxa stop walve saterlock
'r NPS Scads a Possess.on Onty 2.bre Durim[ the pertod dom pubbim of i t
's
- ar
- 2 e iaop stop valves wid not te wtw t' permanentiv n stracts the facn:ty frtwn the last btwet fy notice, the I
- fi 1